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PREFACE.

In preparing the following pages the purpose has been to set

forth with reasonable clearness the general principles under

which tangible and intangible rights may be claimed, and

their disturbance remedied in the law. The book has been

written quite as much for students as for practitioners, and

if some portions of it are more elementary than is usual in

similar works, this fact will supply the explanation.

THOMAS M. COOLEY.

Uurvznsnw or Mxomoszw, Ann Anson, December. 1878.
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which tangible and intangible rights may be claimed, and
their disturbance remedied in the law. The book has been
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if some portions of it are more elementary than is usual in
similar works, this tact will supply the explanation.

THOMAS M. COOLEY.
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December, 18i8.
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THE LAW OF TORTS.

OHAPTERI.

was GENERAL NATURE or LEGAL WRONGS.

The purpose in the establishment of judicial tribunals is to

prevent the commission of wrongs; to compel redress to those

who have suffered from them, and to inﬂict punishment in proper

cases on those guilty of their commission. In order that this

may be eﬁl-cted the power of the State is placed at the command

of the judges, and a trained body of men is always at hand to

assist by their advice, and to guard by the results of their labor

and investigations against any departure from correct principles.

In a political society where intelligence is steadily increasing,

and where public and private morality are commonly believed to

gain in strength and_ vigor in corresponding ratio, it might be

THE LAW OF TORTS.

supposed that the occasions for judicial interference in the aﬂ'airs

of the citizen would continually grow less and less numerous, in

proportion as the people acquire the capacity to understand their

rights and duties, and the disposition to respect the rights of

others. The contrary, however, is most indubitably the fact.

The increase in intelligence, and especially the new inventions

and improvements which follow it, have a powerful tendency in

CHAPTER I.

the direction of creating new wants and desires, and of establish-

ing people in new occupations, and as these increase, the inter-
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ests, desires and passions of men must necessarily breed more

THE GENERAL NATURE OF LEGAL WRONGS.

frequent controversies. Moreover, every recognition by the law

of a new right, is likely to raise questions of its adjustment to,

and its harmony with, existing rights previously enjoyed by

(1)

The purpose in the establishment of judicial tribunals is tG
prevent the commission of wrongs; to compel redress to those
who have suffered from them, and to inflict punishment in proper
cases on those guilty of their commission. In order that this
may be effected the power of the State is placed at the command
of the judges, and a trained body of men is always at hand to
assist by their advice, and to guard by the results of their labor
and investigations against any_ departure from correct principles.
In a political society where intelligence is steadily increasing,
and where public and private morality are commonly believed to
gain in strength and. vigor in corresponding ratio, it might be
supposed that the occasions for judicial interference in the affairs
of the citizen would continnally grow less and less numerous, in
proportion as the people acquire the capacity to understand their
rights and duties, and the disposition to respect the rights of
others. The contrary, however, is most indubitably the fact.
The increase in intelligence, and especially the new inventions
and improvements which follow it, have a powerful tendency in
the direction of creating new wants and desires, and of establishing people in new occupations, aud as these increase, the interests, desires and passions of men must necessarily breed more
frequent controversies. Moreover, every recognition by the law
of a new right, is likely to raise questions of its adjustment to,
and its harmony with, existing rights previously enjoyed by
(1)

2 THE LAW or roars.

others; and in consequence thereof people in the honest asser-

2

THE LAW OF 1.'0RTS.

tion of their supposed rights are brought in conﬂict, and one or

the other is found to be chargeable with legal wrong, though no

purpose has existed to do otherwise than strictly to obey the law.

The effect upon the business of judicial tribunals is very marked

and striking.

In a primitive state of society, while occupations are few and

the transactions of business and trade are simple, the judge is

seldom called upon to give redress, except for lawless and reck-

less conduct, where only the facts are in dispute. In the more

advanced society his attention is invited to invasions of copy

rights and patents, to frauds accomplished by new and peculiar

methods, to questions in the law of common carriers, which are

intimately connected with the new improvements in methods of

transportation, and to a variety of wrongs that are new, because

the conditions from which they spring, or which give occasion

for them, are new. Intellectual and material progress in various

ways begets a complexity of business and social relations, and

this adds perpetually to the diﬁiculties of legal administration,

and multiplies with no little rapidity the occasions for an adjudi-

cation upon disputed or doubtful rights. And it renders neces-

sary an inﬁnity of legislation in order to adjust and harmonize
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the new conditions with what remains of the old.

Classiﬁcation of Wrongs. It is customary in the law to arrange

the wrongs for which individuals may demand legal redress into

two classes: the ﬁrst embracing those which consist in a mere

breach of contract, and the second those which arise independent

of contract. The classiﬁcation is not very accurate. Many cases

exist where the complaining party may, on the same state of facts,

at his option, count upon a breach of contract as his grievance, or

complain of a wrong in a manner that puts the contract out of

view. Imperfect as it is, however, the classiﬁcation has been found

suﬂicient for judicial purposes; and where forms of action have

been abolished by statute the old distinctions are still kept in view

in giving redress. And while thus the common law classiﬁed

wrongs, it appropriated the generic term to one class of wrongs

only. Breaches of contract were mere failures to perform agree-

ments, and the actions for redress in the courts of law were

actions on contracts, or actions ea: contmctu. Other acts or omis-

sions giving rise to a suit at law were called speciﬁcally wrongs

~‘

others; and in consequence thereof people in the honest assertion of their supposed rights are brought in conflict, and one or
the other is found to be chargeable with legal wrong, though no
purpose has existed to do otherwise than strictly to obey the law.
The effect upon the business of judicial tribunals is very marked
and striking.
In a primitive state of society, while occupations are few and
the transactions of business and trade are simple, the judge is
seldom called upon to give redress, except for lawless and reckless conduct, where only the facts are in dispute. In the more
advanced society his attention is invited to invasions of copy
rights and patents, to frauds accomplished by new and peculiar
methods, to questions in the law of common carriers, which are
intimately connected with the new improvements in methods of
transportation, and to a variety of wrongs that are new, because
the conditions from which they spring, or which give occasion
for them, are new. Intellectual and material progress in various
ways begets a complexity of business and social relations, and
this adds perpetually to the difficulties of legal administration,
and multiplies with no little rapidity the occasions for an adjndi- '
cation upon disputed or doubtful rights. And it renders necessary an infinity of legislation in order to adjust aud harmonize
the new conditions with what remains of the old.
Classification of Wrongs. It is customary in the law to arrange
the wrongs for which individuals may demand legal redress into
two classes: the first embracing thoie which consist in a mere
breach of contract, and the second those which arise independent
of contract. The classification is not very accurate. Many cases
exist where the complaining party may, on the same state of facts,
at his option, count upon a breach of contract as his grievance, or
complain of a wrong in a manner that puts the oontract out of
view. Imperfect as it is, however, the classification has been found
sufficient for judicial purposes; and where forms of action have
been abolished by statute the old distinctions are still kept in view
in giving redress. And while thus the common law classified
wrongs, it appropriated the generic term to one cla.ss of wrongs
only. Breaches of contract were mere failures to perform agreements, and the actions for redress in the courts of law were
actions on contracts, or actions eaJ contractu. Other acts or omissions giving rise to a suit a.t law were called specifically wrongs

GENERAL NATURE OF LFtG.»\l. YVRONGS. 3

or torts. and the actions by which redress was to be obtained

GENERAL NATURE OF I"EGAJ. WRONGS.

3

were called actions for torts or actions as delictof

It is of the cases designated torts that we propose to treat.

Where Wrongs are mentioned it will be understood that breaches

of contract are excluded, except as otherwise indicated.

An act or omission may be wrong in morals, or it may be

wrong in law. It is scarcely necessary to say that the two things

are not interchangeable. No government has undertaken to give

redress whenever an act was found to be wrong, judged by the

standard of strict morality; nor is it likely that any government

ever will. Of the reasons that would preclude such an attempt,

or render it futile if made, it will be snﬁicient here to mention

the following:

Any standard by which the law can undertake to compel the

people to regulate their conduct must be one generally and spon-

taneously accepted, so that their approving judgment shall accom-

pany the endeavor to enforce conformity. It must not be one

that a majority of the people do not habitually observe, because

if the majority of the people are law breakers, it is obvious that

only some extraneous power could ever enforce the law. And

if a perfect standard were agreed upon, it must have judges and

other administrators of the law so perfectly constituted in their
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mental and moral natures, and so perfectly trained and disci-

plined, as to be capable at all times of perceiving its application

and of applying it, and so entirely in harmony with it as habitu-

ally to be disposed to do so.

‘The English Common Law Pro-

cedure Act of 1852 deﬁnes a tort as

“ a wrong independent of contract;”

which is perhaps as good a deﬁnition

as can be given, though even this may

require explanation, since in many

cases a tort only arises in conse-

quence of the disregard of contract

relations. Addison (on Torts, p. 1,)

gives no deﬁnition, only quoting from

B_urLl-:Y, J., in Rex v. Pagram Com-

miasioners, 8 B. & C. 862, that to con-

or torla, and the actions by which redress was to be obtained
were called actions for torts or actions ez delicto.l
It is of the cases designated torts that we propose to treat.
Where wrongs are mentioned it will be understood that breaches
of oon tract are excluded, except as otherwise indicated.
An act or omission may be wrong in morals, or it may be
wrong in law. It is scarcely necessary to say that the two things
are not interchangeable. No government has undertaken to give
n'dress whenever an act was found to be wrong, judged by the
titlmdard of strict morality; nor is it likely that any government
e\"cr will. Of the reasons that would preclude such an uttempt,
or render it futile if made, it will be ~ufficient here to mention
the following:
Any standard by which the law can undertake to compel the
people to regulate their conduct must be one generally and spontaneously accepted~ 80 that their approving judgment shall accompany the endeavor to enforce conformity. It must not be one
that a majority of the people do not habitually observe, because
it' the majority of the people arc law breakers, it is obvious that
only some extraneous power could ever enforce the law. And
if a perfect standard were agreed upon, it must have judges and
other administrators of the law 80 perfectly constituted in their
mental and moral natures, and so perfectly trained and disciplined, as to be capable at all times of perceiving its application
and of applying it, and so entirely in harmony with it as habitually to be disposed to do so. The mere suggestion of these

stitute a tort two things must concur,

actual or legal damage to the plaintiti‘

and a wrongful act committed by the

defendant; but this is no more than

The mere suggestion of these

saying that there must be damage as

well as wrong to,constitut-c a tort;

and beyond that it might be mislead-

ing, since the want of an act—in

other words, blamable ncglcct—is

oﬂen the very thing in which a tort

consists. Mr. Chitty speaks of per-

sonal actions in form of er tlelitto an

being those “ principally for the rc-

dress of wrongs unconnected with

contract," which is true enough,

though, as we have said, torts, in

large classes of cases, only arise in

consequence of a disregard of duty

in relations which have been formed

by express or implied contract.

J The English Common Law Pro.
cedure Ac~ of 1852 defines a tort as
" a wrong independent of contract; "
which is perhaps as good a definition
u can be given, though even this may
require explanation, since in many
cases a tor' only arises in consequence of the disregard of contract
relations. Addison (on Torts, p. 1,)
gh·es no definition, only quoting from
BAYLBT, J., in Rex tt. Pagram Com.
m isaioneJ"'I., 8 B. & C. 862, that to con.
l'titute a tort two things must concur,
actual or legal damage to the plaintiff
and a wrungful act committed by the
defendan'; bu' this ia no more than

saymg that there must be damage u
well as wrong to, constitute a tort;
and beyond that it might be mislead.
ing, since the want of an act -in
other words, blamable neglect -is
often the very thing in which a tort
consists. ~r. Chitty speaks of per.
sonal actions in form of e.r delirto &.'1
being those " principnlly for the re.
dress of wrongs unconnected with
cuntrl\ct ;" which is true enough,
though, as we have said, torts, in
large classes of cases, only arise in
consequence of a disregard of duty
in relations which have been formed
by express or implied contract.
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THE J,AW OF TORTS.

requirements 1B suﬁicient to make clear to the mind the impossi-

bility of making moral wrong the test of legal wrong. It follows

that there must of necessity be a legal standard of right and

wrong; one that will be generally accepted, and one that the

people in general will consent, under penalties, to conform to.

Nor is it possible that this standard should be established other-

wise than by positive human law; for human law alone could

constitute the authoritative expression of assent which would be

evidence of agreement upon it. When, therefore, the law of the

land undertakes to declare and protect rights, and establishes a

standard of conduct for the purpose, the acts or omissions which

disturb or impede the enjoyment of such rights may be treated

as legal wrongs or torts, but none others can be.

But while it is true that many things wrong in morals may not

be wrong in law, it is equally true that some things which consti-

tute wrongs in law may not be wrongs in morals. This remark

is made without any purpose to broach a controversy concerning

the moral obligation of every citizen to obey all the laws of his

country; since taking this for granted, the observation is still

accurate. It has already been stated that acts or omissions may

constitute wrongs in law where the purpose to disobey the law
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or to disregard any of its requirements has been wholly wanting.

Every case in which parties have acted under an honest mistake

regarding their rights may be of this character; and possibly it

might be safe to say that in a majority of cases in which persons

have been adjudged guilty of legal wrongs, no intent to disobey

the law has existed ;‘ the wrong is one of accident, mistake, or

negligence, or it is due to some other cause which is consistent

with the absence of evil purpose.

Deﬁning Rights. Every government must concern itself with

the deﬁnition of rights and the providing of adequate security

‘If a person unlawfully injures an-

other, he must pay the damages with-

out regard to the intention with which

the act was done. Amick v. O'Hara,

6 Blackf. 258; Bruch o. Carter, 32 N.

J., 554; Cate o. Cate, 44 N. H., 211;

Dexter 0. Cole, 6 Wis. 319; Gibbs 0.

Chase, 10 Mass. 128; Miller 0. Baker,

1 Met. 27. A rightful act negligently

done is a tort. Howe 0. Young, 16

requirements IS sufficient to make clear to the mind the impossibi~ity of making moral wrong the test of legal wrong. It follows
that there must of necessity be a legal standard of right and
wrong; one that will be generally accepted, and one that the
people in general will consent, under penalties, to conform to.
Nor is it possible that this standard should be established otberwise than by positive human law; tor human law alone could
constitute the authoritative expression of assent which would be
evidence of agreement upon it. When, therefore, the law of the
land undertakes to declare and protect rights, and e~:tablishes a
standard of conduct for the purpose, the acts or omissions which
disturb or impede the enjoyment of such rights may be treated
as legal wrongs or torts, but none others can be.
But while it is true that many things wrong in morals may not
be wrong in law, it is equally true that some things which consti.
tnte wrongs in law may not be wrongs in morals. This remark
is made without any purpose to broach a controversy concerning
the moral obligation of every citizen to obey all the laws of his
country; since taking this for granted, the observation is still
accurate. It has already been stated that acts or omissions may
constitute wrongs in law where the purpose to disobey the law
or to disregard any of its requirements has been wholly wanting.
Every case in which parties have acted under an honest mistake
regarding their rights may be of this character; and possibly it
might be sate to say that in a m1~ority of cases in which persons
have been adjudged guilty of legal wrongs, no intent to disobey
the law has existed;' the wrong is one of accident, mistake, or
negligence, or it is dne to some other cause which is consistent
with the absence of evil purpose.

Ind. 312; Baltimore, etc., R. R Co.

0. Reaney, 42 Md. 117. Good faith

does not excuse negligence. Lincoln

0. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 652; Tally 0.

Every government must concern itself with
the definition of rights and the providing of adequate security
Defining Rights.

Ayres, 3 Snced, 677. A trespass is

oﬂen a mistaken assertion of a right

in which the party has utmost conﬂ-

deuce.

1 If a person unlawfully injures another, he must pay the damages withoutregn.rd to the intention with which
the act was done. Amick t~. O'Hilr&,
6 BlRckf. 258; Bruch"· Carter, 32 N.
J., 554:; Cate tr. Catc, 44 N.H., 211;
Dexter "· Cole, 6 Wis. 319; Gibbs v.
Cbal!C, 10 Mass. 128; Miller"· Baker,
lllet. 27. A rightful act negligently

done Is a tort. Howe tr. Young, 16
Ind. 312; Baltimore, etc., R. R Uo.
"·Reaney, 42 Md. 117. Good faith
does not excuse negl igcnce. Lincoln
tr. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 052; Tally "·
Ayrf's, 8 Sneed, 677. A trespass is
often a mistaken assertion of a right
in which the party has utmost coo1ldence.
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administered, this will be its chief business; and this in its true

sense constitutes civil liberty. The term natural liberty is some-

times made use of by writers on law and on politics in a sense

implying that freedom from restraint which exists before any

government has imposed its limitations. But in no proper or

valuable sense has any such liberty existed or been possible. If

itbe said that every man, considered as an individual without

regard to family or political relations. has a natural liberty to do

what he pleases, subject only to the laws of nature,‘ and, as Ben-

tham expresses it, " to make use of everything," ’ then, as the

liberty of one would only be the same unrestricted liberty which

was the right of every other, the liberty would be one of per-

petual warfare and contention, as the wants, desires, or appetites

came in conﬂict, and every man would have equal right to take

or hold what his courage, strength, or cunning could secure to

him. but no available right to more. A natural liberty of this

sort is obviously inconsistent with any valuable right whatsoever,

and would of itself, as other writers have shown, be sufficient to

demonstrate the necessity of government for the imposition of

restraints and the establishment of a common arbiter or judge

between individuals.‘ And where governments are established,
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the rights of which the law can take notice, can be those only

which come from and are deﬁned by the law itself. A legal

right is something which the law secures to its possessor by

requiring others to observe it, and to abstain from its violation.

Only the law can prevent such interference by others as would

deprive it of all the qualities of an individual possession. Indi-

vidual rights, liberty, and property are born of legal restraints;

b_v means of these every man may be protected within the pre-

scribed limits; when without them, possessions must be obtained

and defended by cunning or force. In the domain of speculation

or morals a right may be whatever ought to be respected; but in

law that only is a right which can be defended before legal tribu-

nals. Protection in rights gives to a man his liberty, but the

same protection sets bounds to and constitutes a limitation upon

' 1 Bl. Com. 125. those which are the creatures of law."

' Constitutional Code, V. 1 c. 8 s. 6. Austin, Jurisprudence, Lee. XII.

Austin justly says that, “ Strictly ' Burlaniziqui, Nat. and Pol. Law.

speaking, there are no rights but Vol. 2, pt. 1, c. 3.

for their enjoyment. If a go\·ernment is properly and justly
administered, this will be its chief business; and this in its true
sense constitutes civil liberty. The term natural liberty is sometimes made use of by writers on law and on politics in a sense
implying that freedom from restt·aint which exists before any
government has imposed its limitations. But in no proper or
valuable sense has any such liberty exioted or been possible. If
it be said that every man, considered as an individual without
.regard to family or political relations. has a natural liberty to do
what he pleases, subject only to the laws of nature,' and, as Bentham expresses it, .. to make use of everything,'' 2 then, as the
liberty of one would only be the same unrestricted liberty which
was the right of every other, the liberty would be one of perpetual warfare and contention, as the wants, desires, or appetites
eame in conflict, and every man would have equal right to take
or hold what his courage, strength, or cunning could secure to
him. bot no available right to more. A natural liberty of this
sort is obviously inconsistent with any valuable right whatsoever,
and would of itself, as other writers have shown, be sufficient to
demonstrate the necessity of government for the imposition of
restraints and the establishment of a common arbiter or jndge
between individuals.• And where p;ovemments are established,
the rights of which the law can take notice, can be those only
which come from and are defined by the law itself~ A legal
right is something which the law secures t{) its possessor by
requiring others to observe it, and to abstain from its violation.
Only the law can prevent such interference by others as would
deprive it of all the qualities of an individnal.possession. Individual rights, liberty, and property are born of legal restraints;
by means of these every man may be protected within the preICI'ibcd limits; when without them, possessions must be obtained
anc.l defended by cunning or force. In the domain of speculation
or morals a right may be whatever ought to be respected; but in
law that only is a right which can be defeuded before legal tribunals. Protection in rights gives to a man his liberty, but the
same protection sets bou.mls to and constitutes a. limitation upon
1 1 Bl. Com. 125.
• Conatitutional Code, V. 1 c. 8 s. 6.
Austin jllStly aaya that, " Strictly
~king, there are no rlgh&a but

those which arc the creatures of law."
Austin, Jurisprudence, Lee. XII.
• Burlnmaqul, Nat. and Pol. Law,
Vol. 2, pll, c. 8.
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of which government is capable is attained when individual

rights are clearly and accurately deﬁned by impartial laws, which

impose on no one any greater restraint than is found essential for

securin;_g equivalent rights to all others, and which furnish for

the rights of all an adequate and an equal protection.‘

Public Wrongs. Certain acts or omissions are taken notice

of by the law as constituting wrongs to the State. These may

consist in something which tends to disturb, embarrass, or sub-

vert the government, or to hinder the administration of the laws,

the liberty of every other person, and the maximum of benefit
of which government is capable is attained when individual
rights are clearly and accurately defined by impartial laws, which
impose on no 1me any greater rest•·aint than i~ found essential for
securing equivalent rights to all others, and which furnish for
the rights of all an adequate and an equal protection.'

or they may consist in acts or neglects which prejudice individu-

als, but indirectly and pereeptibly affect the public also. These

cases will be referred to in a subsequent chapter.’

The law also permits certain acts to be punished as wrongs to

municipal corporations, or to the several political divisions of the

State, because they have a tendency to disturb their peace and

good order, or to embarrass or obstruct in some manner the local

government, though to the people of the State at large they may

' Much is said by some writers con-

cerning natural rights and natural

liberty, and of the duty of the govern-

ment, instead of creating, to recogruu
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those which come from nature. As

if nature had indicated any clear line

which the human intellect and con-

science would infallibly recognize, on

either side of which might be placed

the acts permitted and the acts pro-

Public Wrongs. Certain acts or omissions are taken notice
of by the law as constituting wrongs to the State. These may
consist in something which tends to disturb, embarrass, or subvert the government, or to hinder the administration of the laws,
or they may consist in acts or neglects which prejudice individuals, bot indirectly and perceptibly affect the public also. These
cases will be referred to in a subsequent chapter.•
The law also permits certain acts to be punished as wrongs to.
municipal corporations, or to tho several political divisions of' the
State, because they have a tendency to disturb their peace and
good Qrder, or to embarrass or obstruct in some manner the local
government, though to the people of the State at large they may

hibited, according as the one or the

other was by nature justiﬂed or con-

demned. As if every human act or

omission had a moral quality of which

the government could take notice, and

by which it might judge the act or

omission. Indeed. some have even

gone so far as to assume that in a world

where the moral law was accepted

fully and obeyed implicitly, no law

would be necessary, because every in-

dividual would at once perceive and

do that which was right, and thus put

legal compulsion out of the question.

But if the most conscientious persons

in any state of existence were com-

pelled to support themselves by their

industry; if they had occasion to buy

and sell, and to ﬁnd their transactions

affected by accident and mistake; if

occasionally they encountered ques-

tions of defective title, or questions

of commercial law. where one of two

innocent persons must inevitably suf-

fer; if bankruptcies must occur. the

consequences of which must fall upon

third persons, whose dealings with the

bankrupt had been interwoven with

dealings between themselves; in short,

if they lived in a world which, except

in the moral qualities of the people,

corresponded to the present, they

would be likely soon to discover that

the rule of morality is very far from

being adequate to the adjustment ofa

large proportion of all the contro-

versies in which conscientious men,

in the absence of law, would ﬁnd

themselves involved.

’ See Chap. III.

W " 351”-Ilﬁiiﬁiliis.

1 Much is said by some writers concerning natural rights and natural
liberty. and of the duty of tbe government, instead of crtating, to r~gtuu
those which come from nature. As
if nature bad indicated any clear line
which the huml\0 intellect and conscience would infallibly recognize, on
either side of which might be placed
the acts permitted and the acts pl'Ohibited, according as the one or the
other was by nature justified or condemned. As if every human act or
omission had a moral quality of which
1.hc government could take notice, and
by which it might judge the act or
omission. Indeed. some have even
gone so far as to assume that in a world
where the moral law was accepted
fully and obeyed implicitly, no law
would be necessaJ:y, because every individual would at once perceive and
do that which was right, and thus put
legal compulsion out of the question.
But if the most conscientious persons

In any state of existence were compelled to support themselves by theirindustry; if they bad occasion to buy
and sell, and to find their transactions
affected by accident and mistake; if
occasionally they encount~red questions of defective title, or questions
of commercial law. where one of two
innocent persons must inevitably suf.
fer; if bankruptcies must occur, the
consequence» of which must fall upon.
third persons, whose dealings with the
bankrupt had been interwoven with
dealings between themselves; in short.
if they lived in a world which, except
in the moral qualities of the people.
corresponded to the present, they
would be likely soon to discover that.
the rule of morality is very far from
being adequate to the adjustment of &
large proportion of all the contl'Ovcrsies in which conscientious men,
in the absence of law, would find
themselves involved.
• See Chap. III.
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be matters of indifference. These wrongs will consist mainly in

breaches of municipal by-laws, or of local police regulations, and
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they may or may not be wrongs to individuals.

The two classes of wrongs just enumerated constitute what are

known as public wrongs, and they will be visited with some spe-

cies of penalty. While the leading purpose in imposing the

penalty will be security for the future, incidentally the reforma-

tion of the offender may also be had in view. In inferior offenses

the idea of compensation is sometimes present, and even in case

of oﬁ'enses of a high grade, pecuniary penalties are often imposed

to cover in whole or in part the cost of bringing the wrong-doer

to justice. But compensation in the case of public wrongs is

usually a subordinate purpose, while in the case of private wrongs

it is the substantial purpose of the law.

Wrongs essentially Public sometimes Private Wrongs also.

when the act or neglect which constitutes a public wrong is

specially and peculiarly injurious to an individual, and obstructs

him in the enjoyment of some right which the law has under-

taken to assure, the offender may be subject to a double liability;

he may be punished by the State, and he may also be compelled

to remunerate the individual. These cases we pass for the pres-

ent, with only the general remark, that the private injury must

be matters of indifference. These wrongs will consist mainly in
breaches of municipal by.laws, or of local police regulations, and
they may or may not be wrongs to individuals.
The two classes of wrongs just enumerated constitute what are
known as public wrongs, and they will be visited with some speciee of penalty. While the leading purpose in imposing the
penalty will be security for the future, incidentally the reformation of the offender may also be had in view. In inferior offenses
the idea of compensation is sometimes present, and even in case
of offenses of a high grade, pecuniary penalties are often imposed
to cover in whole or in part the cost ot' bringing the wrong-doer
to justice. .But compensation in the case of public wrongs is
UBUally a subordinate purpose, while in the case of private wrongs
it ia the substantial purpose of the law.
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be of a pecuniary nature; something different from that which is

inﬂicted upon or suﬁ'ered by the public at large. One man can-

not have his private action against a murderer on a showing that

the murder was more shocking to him than to others, or touched

him peculiarly in his affections. These injuries are general in

kind; they are only peculiar in degree.

Wrongs to Aggregate Bodies. A wrong may consist in

depriving a number of persons associated together for their own

purposes of some legal right. In such a case there is either a

joint wrong to all, or there is an individual wrong to each of the

associates. The wrong must be sever-able, and constitute indi-

vidual wrongs, if it only deprives each associate of a right per-

sonal to himself, though exactly like the rights of which his

associates are deprived at the same time, and by the same act or

neglect. Such would be the case if the several members of a

voluntary organization were wrongfully prevented from meeting.

Wrongs euentially ~blio sometimes Private Wronp alao.
When the act or neglect which constitutes a public wrong is
specially and peculiarly injurious to an individual, and obstructs
him in the enjoyment of some right which the law has "under.
taken to assure, the offender may be subject to a double liability;
he may be punished by the State, and he may also be compelled
to remunerate the individual. These cases we pass for the pres.
ent, with only the general remark, that the private injury must
be of a pecuniary nature; something different from that which is
inflicted upon or suffered by the public at large. One man can.
not have his private action against a murderer on a showing that
the murder was more shocking to him than to others, or touched
him peculiarly in his affections. These injuries are general in
kind; they are only peculiar in degree.

A wrong may consist in
deprh·ing a number of persons associated together for their own
purposes of some legal right. In such a case there is either a
joint wrong to all, or there is an individual wrong to each of the
aasociates. The wrong must be severable, and constitute indi.
vidual wrongs, if it only deprives each associate of a right per.
aonal to himself, though exactly like the rights of which his
&880Ciate8 are deprived at the same time, and by the same act or
neglect. Such wonld be the case if the several members of a
voluntary organization were wrongfully prevented from meeting.
Wrvnp to Aggregate Bodies.
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The right of each is personal to himself, and therefore, though

there is a common wrong. there is no joint wrong.‘

8
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On the other hand, an injury to the property owned in com-

mon by the associates would be an injury to all, and all should

unite in seeking redress.’ This might lead to great diﬁiculties

when the associates were numerous, and to avoid these. one per-

son is sometimes made the owner of the property, or given legal

control over it in trust for the others, and is thus enabled in his

ﬁduciary capacity to protect the rights of all. The importance

of this is perceived in the rule of law which requires the parties

complainant and respondent in legal proceedings to be namedlin

the plea lings, and which refuses to know voluntary associations,

except through the individualism of their members.

The voluntary society cannot, as such, sue or be sued; in legal

phrase, it is not known to the law. But the inconveniences

which may ﬂow from this rule are, to a large extent, obviated by

the permission of the sovereign authority to organize the volun-

tary society into an artiﬁcial person, which is called a corpora-

tion, and into which. for legal purposes, the individual identity

is merged. This artiﬁcial person, like any other, has its name,

and is capable of wronging and being wronged, and of sueing

and being sued. It has its civil rights, and it is a part of the
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civil right oi’ each corporator that the law is to protect him, and

to protect the association in the liberties and privileges which

the law permits the corporation to assume and exercise.

Civil Liberty. From what has been said we may approach

an understanding of what the condition is which constitutes civil

‘ 2 Saunders, 116 a, note 2. The ques-

tion in each case is, whether the par-

ticular injury was or was not u. joint

injury. It may have been exactly

alike to each, and it may have been ac-

complished by one act, and yet be no

joint injury; as where one says to two

persons, “You have murdered J. S.;"

this is a several, not ajoint, slander,

the reputation of each being assailed.

The right of each is personal to himself, and therefore, though
there is a common wrong, there is no jGint wrong.'
On the other hand, an injury to the property owned in common by the associates would be an injury to all, and all should
unite in sPeking redress.' This might lead to great difficulties
when the a:;::sociates were numerous, and to avoid these. one person is sometimes made the owner of the property, or given legal
control over it in trust for the others, and is thus enabled in his
fiduciary capacity to protect the rights of all. The importance
of this is perceiver! in the rule of law which requires the parties
complainant and respondent in legal proceedings to IJe named ·in
the plea. lin~rs, and which refuses to know voluntary associations,
except through the individnalism of their members.
The voluntary society cannot, as such, sne or be sned; in legal
phrase, it is not known to the law. But the inconveniences
which may flow from this rule are, to a large extent, obviated by
the permission of the sovereign authority to organize the voluntary society into an artificial pe•·son, which is called a corporation, and into which. for legal purposes, the individual identity
is merged. This artificial person, like any other, has its name,
and is capable of wronging and being wronged, and of sneing
and being sued. It has its civil rights, and it is a part of the
civil right of each corporator that the law is to protect him, and
to protect the association in the liberties and privileges which
the law permits the corporation to assn me and exercise.

Smith 0. Cooker, Cro. Oar. 513. But

the injury may be joint, though it con-

sists in depriving parties of some

right, tho proﬁt of which would be

OivU Liberty. From what has been said we may approach
an understanding of what the condition is which constitutes civil

several; as where an unauthorized

person undertook the business of dip-

per in the medicinal waters at Tun-

bridgc Wells, Ihcieby rendering less

valuable and diminishing the prob-

able gains of all those who were

authorized. Weller v. Baker, 2 Wil-

son. 414. Or where a public oﬂicer

threatens to misappropriate corporate

funds, thus increasing the burden of

all taxpayers.

’ Austin 11. Hall, 13Johns. 286; Mer-

rill o. Berkshire, 11 Pick. 269.

28aunders,116a,note2. The question in each case is, whether the particular injury waa or was not a joint
Injury. It may have been exactly
alike to e11ch, and it may have been aecomplished by one act, and yet be no
joint Injury; as where one says to two
persons, "You have murdered J. S. ;"
this le a several, not a joint, slander,
the reputation of each being assailed.
Smith "· Cooker, Cro. Car. 518. But
the Injury may be joint, though it con.
siste in depriving parties of some
right, tho profit of which would be
1

several; as where an unauthorized
person undertook the business of dipper in the medicinal waters at Tun.
bridge Wells, thereby rendering lea~
valuable and diminishing the probable gains of all those who were
authorized. Weller "· Baker, 2 Wil.
son, 414. Or where a public officer
threatens to misappropriate corporate
funds, thus increasing the burden of
all taxpayers.
1 Austin"· Hall, 13 J obns. 286; Mer.
rill "· Berkshire, 11 Pick. 269.
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liberty. In making use of this terln it is proper to state that
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1:J •

writers of acknowledged authority employ it in very different

senses. Thus the leading commentator on American law deﬁnes

it as “consisting in being protected and governed by laws made

or assented to by the representatives of the people, and eon-

ducive to the general welt'are.”' This excludes the idea of civil

liberty, except where representative institutions prevail; and in

this particular it differs radically from the deﬁnition of Justice

BI.scus"rom:.’ It also makes civil liberty and political liberty

synonymous. in this particular agreeing with that of Blackstone.

Mr. Austin says that “political or civil liberty is the liberty

from legal obligation which is left or granted by a sovereign

government to any of its own subjects.” ’ Mr. Lieber says civil

liberty “ consists in guarantees—and corresponding checks—of

those rights which experience has proved to be most exposed to

interference, and which man holds dearest and most important.” ‘

Witliout giving the deﬁnition of others, we prefer to distinguish

civil from political liberty, deﬁning the former as that condition

in which rights are established and protected by means of such

limitations and restraints upon the action of individual members

of the political society as are needed to prevent What would be

injurious to other individuals or prejudicial to the general
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welfare; and deﬁning political liberty as consisting in an effectual

' 2 Kent Com p. 1. In the French

Constitution of 1793 there was the fol-

lowing speciﬁcation of rights:

" 1. The object of society is the gen-

eral welfare. Government is under-

stood to insure to man the free use of

his natural and inalienable rights.

“ 2. These rights are equality, liber-

ty. security, property.

"3. All men are equal by nature

anal before the law.

liberty. In making use of this term it is proper to state that
writers of acknowledged authority employ it in very difft!reut
senses. Thus tho leading commentator on American law defines
it as ''consisting in being protected and governed by laws made
or assented to by the representatives of the people, and conducive to the general welfare." 1 This excludes the idea of civil
liherty, except where representative institutions prevail; and in
this particular it differs radically from the definition of Justice
BLACKSTONK.• It also makes civil libe1·ty and politieal liberty
synonymous, in this particular agreeing with that of Blackstone.
Mr. Austin says that "political or civil liberty is the liberty
from l~l obligation which is left or granted by a sovereign
government to any of its own subject::~." • Mr. Lieber says civil
liberty" consists in guarantees-and corresponding cheeks-of
tho~e rights which expel'ience has proved to be most exposed to
interference, and which man holds dearest and most important." •
Without giving the definition of' others, we prefer to distinguish
civil from political liberty, defining the former as that <:ondition
in which rights arc established and protected by means of such
limitations and restraints upon the action of individual members
of the political society as at·e needed to prevent what would be
injurious to other individuals or prejudicial to the general
welfare; and defining political liberty as consisting in an effectual

" 4. Law is the free and solemn pro-

clamation of the general will; it is

the same for all, be it protective or

penal; it can command only what is

just and beneﬁcial to society, and

prohibit only what. is injurious to the

same.

" 6. Fret-tlom is the power by which

man can do what does not interfere

with the rights of another; its basis

is nature; its standard is justice; its

protection is law; its moral boundary

is the maxim, Do not unto others

what you do not wish they should do

unto you.

"8. Security rests on the protection

given by society to each of its mem-

bers for the preservation of his per.

sou, his rights and his property.

“ 16. The right of property is that

by which every citizen can enjoy his

goods and his income, the fruits of

his labor and industry, and his right

to dispose of them at his pleasure."

' 1 Bl. Com. 125.

‘ Austin, Jurisprudence. Lcc. VI.

and XLVII.

‘ Lieber, Civ. Lib. and Self-Gov.

Ch. Ill.

1 J Kent Com p. 1.
In the French
C.onstitution of 1793 there was the fol.
lowing speciftcs\lon of right,J:
" 1. The object of aoclety is the gen.
eral welfare. Government is under.
stood to insure *'> man the free usc of
bis natural and Inalienable rights.
.. 2. ThctW rights are equality, liberty. IH'Curity, property.
u 8. All men are equal by nature
and before the law.
...... Law is the free and solemn pro.
elamation of the general will; it is
the same fnr Ill l, be it prott:ct i vc or
penal; it can command only what is
just and IM>neflcial to society, and
prohibit only wbat is injurious to the

8&1De.

"'8. Freedom Ia •be po~·er by wh lch
man can do what doee not interfere

with the rights of another; its basta
Ia nature; its standard Is justice: ita
protection is law; its moral boundary
is the maxim, Do not unto othera
what you do not wish they should do
unto you.
"8. Security rests on the protection
given by society to each of its mem•
bers for the preservation of his per.
aon, his rights and his property.
" 16. The right of property Ia that
by which every citizen can enjoy his
goods and his income, the fruits of
his labor and industry, and hls right
k> dispose of them at his pleaauro."
• 1 Bl. Com. 121S.
• Austin, Jurisprudence, Lee. VI.
nnd XLVII.
• Lieber, Civ. Lib. and 8elf.Qoy,
Ch. III.
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participation of the people in the making of the laws. The

'.
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former may exist when the latter is absent; but since it would be

perpetually liable to be broken in upon and set aside by the arbi-

trary action of rulers, it is manifest that it could have no secure

existence except under a government whose powers were exer-

cised under very effectual constitutional restraints, such as can

exist only where the people govern through their representatives.

Civil liberty must begin with law; and in order that it may have

ﬁrm root, it is essential that the law-maker himself shall be

under effectual restraints of the law. Without this it could not

be very important how just were the purposes of the ruler. A

magistrate with despotic powers who goes about administering a.

rude justice in special cases according as his individual sense of

right and wrong inspires him, may possibly be applauded for his

wisdom, his justice or his clemency; but his decisions can settle

no principles which his subjects can understand and appreciate,

and by which they may afterward regulate their actions. Security

can only come from ﬁxed rules which the people, as they become

familiar with them, will habitually respect and observe; it cannot

come from judgments which are directed by the individual will

alone, every one of which must stand by itself on its own reasons,

must be submitted to without question, and will be attributed to
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good motives or bad, to wisdom or caprice, to judgment; or pas-

sion, aecording to the views which are held by the people or

by individuals concerning the ruler who gives it. But where

rights are deﬁned and regulated by durable laws, respect and

obedience become habitual, and there is at length a spontaneous

conformity of action thereto which deprives the numerous

restraints of the law of all seeming hardship that might have

been felt originally. The restraints come to be understood and

appreciated in their true character as being severally the repre-

sentatives of rights secured and protected, and the feeling they

give is one of security rather than of restiveness and oppression.

The restraints and the liberty of the people will progress

together, so that the restraints will be most numerous where

rights are most fully recognized and most perfectly protected;

and if the laws are impartial, even peculiar privileges which fall

to the possession of the few will be cheerfully acquiesced in by

the many, because they will be granted on a consideration of what

is best for the whole political society, so that though the few may

~

participation of the people in the making of the lawa. The
former may exist when the latter is absent; but since it would be
perpetually liable to be broken in upon and set aside by the arbitrary action of rulers, it is manifest that it could have no secure
existence except under a government whose powers were exercised under very effectual constitutional restraints, such as can
exist only where the people govern through their representatives.
Civil liberty must begin with law; and in order that it may have
firm root, it is essential that the law-maker himself shall be
under effectual restraints of the law. Without this it could not
be very important how just were the purposes of" the ruler. A
magistrate with despotic powers who goes about administering a
rude justice in special cases according as his individual sense of
right and wrong inspires him, may possibly be applauded for his
wisdom, his justice or his clemency; but his decisions can settle
no principles which his subjects can understand and appreciate,
and by which they may afterward regulate their actions. Security
can only come from fixed rules which the people, as they become
familiar with them, will habitually respect and observe; it cannot
come from judgments which are directed by the individual will
alone, every one of which must stand by itself on its own reasons,
must be submitted to without question, and will be attributed to
good motives or bad, to wisdom or caprice, to judgment or passion, &<..'COrding to the views which are held by the people or
by individuals concerning the ruler who gives it. But where
rights are defined and regulated by durtlble laws, respect and
obedience become habitual, and there is at length a spontaneous
conformity of action thereto which deprh•es the numerous
restraints ~f the law of all seeming hardship that might have
been felt originally. The re8traints come to be understood aml
appreciated in their true character as being severally the representatives of rights secured and protected, and the feeling they
give is one of security rather than of restiveness and oppression.
The restraints and the liberty of the people will progress
together, so that the restraints will be most numerous where
rights are most fully recognized and most perfectly protected;
and if the laws are impartial, even peculiar privileges which fall
to the possession of the few will be cheerfully acquiesced in by
the many, because they will bP. granted on a consideration ot" what
is best for the whole political society, so that though the few may
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receive the direct beneﬁt, all others will be supposed to receive
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incidental beneﬁts suiiicient to justify the grant of such privileges.‘

11

Growth of Rights. Some reference to the progressive growth

of rights seems required by the subject. llistorically, this

is always obscure and can only imperfectly be traced. In

receive the direct benefit, all others will be supposed to receive
incidental benefits sufficient to j ostity the grant of such pri vileges.•

most countries rights, in their origin, are traditionary rather

than statutory. \Vith us, as will be more fully shown hereafter,

they have always rested in the main upon what we call the com-

mon law, and upon principles which, by a liberal use of ﬁction,

we assume have always constituted a part of this common law.

A common law was unquestionably in existence during the

period of the Saxon kings, and it supplied the rule of right and

of property under the arbitrary Normans to an extent sutlicient

to continue to it that attachment of the people which had been

cherished before the Conquest. The Great Charter was a guaranty

of its principles rather than a new grant. It was a useful code

in barbarous and despotic periods. and it has not been any the

less so in enlightened periods and under free governments. But

in order that it may be continuously useful the progressive

changes must be great and numerous, so great and so numerous

that it could only be by the most enlarged intendment that the

law of to-day could be recognized as the common law of even
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the time of Lord Coke. In fact, its principles now depend very

largely on a species of judicial legislation which from time to

time, as new conditions were found to exist, has endeavored to

ﬁt and conform the old law to them.

In making use of this term, judicial legislation, we encounter

prejudices which have for their foundation much apparent

reason. The term seems in itself a contradiction; judicial action

is one thing, legislation is anothe_r, and by the theory and prac-

tice of our government we seek to make them stand distinctly

apart, and require that their exercise shall be in different bands.

Legislation by the judiciary must consequently consist in an

invasion of the province of another department of the govern-

ment, and is properly denominated usurpation. But there is

another sense in which judicial legislation may be understood,

' 1 Bl. Com. 467; A. & A. on Corp. u. Mutual Assurance Society, 4 Hen.

§13; Aldridge o. Railroad Co.,2Stew. & M. ZH7; Dartmouth College 0.

& Port. 199; Dungbdrill o. Ala. Life Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 637.

Ins. Co., 31 Ala. 91; Curries’ Admr.

Growth of Bipta. Some reference to the progressive growth
of rights seems required by the subject. Historically, this
ia always obscure and can only imperfectly be traced. In
moat countries rights, in their origin, are traditionary rather
than statotory. With us, as will be more fully shown hereafter,
they have always rested in the main upon what we call the common law, and upon principles which, by a liberal use of fiction,
we assume have always constituted a part of this common law.
A common law was unquestionably in existence during the
period of the Saxon kings, and it supplied the rule of right and
of property under the arbitrary Normans to an extent sufficient
to continue to it that attachment of the people which had been
cherished before the Conq nest. The Great Charter was a guaranty
of its principles rather than a new grant. It was a useful code
in barbarous and despotic periods, and it has not been any the
leu so in enlightened periods and under free governments. Bnt
in order that it may be continuously useful the progressive
changes must be great and numerous, so great and so numerous
that it could only be by the most enlarged intendment that the
law of to-day could be recognized as the common law of even
the time of Lord Coke. In fact, its principles now depend very
largely on a species of judicial legislation which from time to
time, as new conditions were found to exist, has endeavored to
fit and conform the old law to them.
In making use of this term, judicial legislation, we encounter
prejudices which have for their foundation much apparent
reason. The term seems in itst:lf a contradiction; judicial action
is one thing, legislation is anoth~r, and by the theory and prac.tice of our go\·ernment we seek to make them stand distinctly
apart, and require that their exercise shall be in different hands.
Legislation by the judiciary must consequently consist in an
invasion of the province ot' another department of the government, and is properly denominated usurpation. But there is
another sense in which judicial legislation may be understood,
1 BJ. Com. 487; A. & A. on Corp.
118; Aldridge"· Railroad Co., 2 Stew.
II Port. 189; Dunghdrill "· AlL Lire
laa. Co., 81 Ala. 91 ; Curries' Admr.
1

"· Mutual Assurance Society, 4 Hen.
& M. 847; Dartmouth College •·
Woodward, 4 Wheal 618, 637.
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in which it seems to be a necessary condition of any steady
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improvement in the law, and, therefore, deserving of no censure.

A few suggestions by way of indicating what this is will be all

we care at this time to make, and these will relate to the method

by which the common law of any country is usually developed.

It is impossible to conceive of any condition of organized

society, even the most primitive, in which some rights will not

be recognized; the right, for instance, of every man to his life,

to the implements by the aid of which he secures the means of

sustaining life, to the results of the chase, or of his rude agri-

culture, and to form family relations. But between those pos-

sessing such rights there must necessarily be some common

arbiter of controversies, and every people will select this common

arbiter with some reference to a supposed superior wisdom or

superior experience, such as will enable him to draw clear and

accurate conclusions where others would hesitate, or perhaps ﬁnd

themselves wholly at fault. It would be the business of such an

arbiter to determine the application of the law to the facts of any

case brought before him, and he must either ﬁnd an existing rule

which governs the case, or he must withhold decision until the

competent authority can legislate and establish one. The latter

course, in many cases, would be equivalent to remanding the
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parties, as regards the pending controversy, to a condition like

that preceding established government; a condition in which

violence would be invited, because no peaceful remedy was attain-

able. It would consequently be wholly inadmissible. The alter-

native would be the acceptance of the principle that the existing

law governs all cases, and that the ruling principle for any exist-

ing controversy will be found, if sought for. This is substan-

tially what is done by the English common law; and with this

principle accepted, rights have grown up under judicial regula-

tion, and through judicial deﬁnition, much more than under

legislation properly so designated. The code of to-day is there-

fore to be traced rather in the spirit of judicial decisions than in

the letter of the statute. The process of growth has been some-

thing like the following: Every principle declared by a court in

giving judgment is supposed to be a principle more or less

general in its application, and which is applied under the facts

of the case, because, in the opinion of the court, the facts bring

the case within the principle. The case is not the measure ot

in which it seems to be a necessary condition of any steady
· improvement in the law, and, therefore, deserving of no censure.
A few suggestions by way of indicating what this is will be all
we care at this time to make, and these will relate to the method
by which the common law of any country is usually de\·eloped.
It is impossible to conceive of any condition of organized
society, even the most primitive, in which some rights will not
be recognized; the right, for instance, of e\·cry man to his life,
to the implements by the aid of which he secures the means of
sustaining lite, to the reoults of the chase, or of his rude agriculture, and to form family relations. But between those possessing l'uch rights there must necessarily be some common'
arbiter of controversies, and every people will select this common
arbiter with some reference to a suppo~ed superior wisdom or
superior experience, such as will enable him to draw clear and
&<.'Curate conclusions where others would hesitate, or perhaps find
themselves wholly at fault. It would be the business of such an
arbiter to determine the application of the law to the facts of any
case brought bet'ore him, and he must either find an existing rule
which governs the case, or he must withhold decision until the
competent authority can legislate and establish one. The latter
course, in many cases, wonld be equivalent to remanding the
parties, as regards the pending controversy, to a condition like
that preceding established government; a condition in which
violence would be invited, because no peaceful remedy was attainable. It would consequently be wholly inadmissible. The alternative would be the acceptance of the principle that the existing
law governs all cases, and that the ruling principle for any exist.
ing controversy will be found, if sought for. This is substantially what is done by the English common Jaw; and with this
principle accepted, rights have grown up under judicial regulation, and through judicial definition, much more than under
legislation properly so designated. The code of to-day is therefore to be traced rather in the spirit of judicial decisions than in
the letter of the statute. The process of growth has been something like the following: Every principle declared by a court in
giving judgment is supposed to be a principle more or leBB
general in its application, and which is applied under the facts
of the case, becau8e, in the opinion of the court, the facts bring
the case within the principle. The case is not the measure ot
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the principle; it does not limit and conﬁne it within the exact
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facts, but it furnishes an illustration of the principle, which,

perhaps, might still have been applied, had some of the facts

been different. Thus, one by one, important principles become

recognized, through adjudications which illustrate them, and

which constitute authoritative evidence of what the law is

when other cases shall arise. But cases are seldom exactly alike

in their facts; they are, on the contrary, inﬁnite in their diversi-

ties; and as numerous controversies on differing facts are found

to be within the reach of the same- general principle, the prin-

ciple seems to grow and expand, and does actually become more

comprehensive. though so steadily and insensibly under legiti-

mate judicial treatment that for the time the expansion passes

unobserved. But new and peculiar cases must also arise from

time to time, for which the courts must ﬁnd the governing prin-

ciple, and these may either be referred to some principle pre-

viously declared, or to some one which now, for the ﬁrst time,

there is occasion to apply. But a principle newly applied is not

supposed to be a new principle; on the contrary, it is assumed

that from time immemorial it has constituted a part of the com-

mon law of the land, and that it has only not been applied before,

because no occasion has arisen for its application. This assump-
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tion is the very ground work and justiﬁcation for its being

applied at all; because the creation of new rules of law, by what-

soever authority, can be nothing else than legislation; and the

principle now announced for the ﬁrst time must always be so tar

in harmony with the great body of the law that it may naturally

be taken and deemed to be a component part of it, as the decision

assumes it to be. Thus a species of judicial legislation, proper

and legitimate in itself, because it is absolutely essential to a

systematic adjudication of rights, goes on regularly, and without

interruption; and up to the present time, in England and America,

it has been not only more eﬁicient, but also more useful, in estab-

lishing the rules by which private rights are to be determined,

and in giving remedies for their violation, than has been the

regular and formal enactment of laws. If we consider in detail

any one branch of the law, that, for instance, of wrongs by neg-

ligenoe, the examination would render this truth very manifest.

Statutes have provided for some new cases; they have changed

the common law in some particulars in which, under new circum-

the principle; it does not limit and confine it within the exact
facts, but it furnishes an illustration of the principle, which,
perhaps, might still have been applied, had some of the facts
been different. Thus, one by one, important principles become
recognized, through adjudications which illustrate them, and
which constitute authoritative evidence of what the law is
when other cases shall arise. But cases are seldom exactly alike
in their facts; they are, on the contrary, infinite in their diversities; and as numerous controversies on differing facts are found
to be within the reach of the same- general principle, the principle seems to grow and expand, and does actually become more
comprehensive, though so steadily and insensibly unJer legitimate judicial treatment that for the time the expansion passes
unobserved. But new and peculiar cases must also arise from
time to time, for which the courts must find the governing principle, and these may either be referred to some principle previously declared, or to some one which now, for the first time,
there is occasion to apply. But a principle newly applied is not
supposed to be a new principle; on the contrary, it is assumed
that from time immemol'ial it has constituted a part of the common la\v of the land, and that it has only not been applied before,
"because no occasion has arisen for its application. This assumption is the very ground work and justification for its being
applied at all; because the creation of new rules oflaw, by what&<>ever authority, can be nothing else than legislation; and the
principle now announced for the first time must always be so far
in harmony with the great body of the law that it may naturally
be taken and deemed to be a component part of' it, as the decision
assumes it to be. Thus a species of judicial legislation, proper
and legitimate in itself, bet'anse it is absolutely essential to a
systematic adjudication of rights, goes on regularly, and without
inter~nption; and up to the present time, in England and America,
it l1as been not only more efficient, but also more useful, in establishing the rules by which private rights are to be determined,
and in giving remedies for their violation, than has been the
regular and formal enactment of laws. If we consider in detail
any one branch of the Jaw, that, for instance, of wrongs by negligence, the examination would render this truth very manifest.
Statutes have provided for some new cases; they have changed
the common law in some particulars in which, under new circum-
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stances, a change which was not within the compass of legitimate
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judicial action seemed essential; they have given a private remedy

in some cases where the common law gives none; as, for instance,

where death has resulted from a wrongful act or default; and

they have taken away remedies in some cases, as, for instance,

that which tl1e common law gave against the owner of a

house for a ﬁre accidentally originating in it..' But even in

these cases the statutes have been left for explanation to the

rules of the common law; they have given rights which can only

be understood in the light of common law principles. In some

cases, also, the statutory law has forbidden the doing of certain

acts, and the common law, as administered by the courts, has

supplemented this action by giving remedies to private parties

who are injured by a disregard of the statutory prohibition. In

these cases the statute law may be said to lean upon and receive

aid from the common law; but in the vast majority of all the

cases in which remedies are given for wrongs committed, the

judge looks only to the common law, and must administer

justice on principles which have grown up irrespective of stat-

utes, and which, no matter how recently announced, are assumed

to have existed from time immemorial.

The common law is generally said to consist in the established
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usages of the people, by which their respective rights are recog-

nized ancl limited, and to which they are expected to conform in

their dealings.’ This deﬁnition is quite sutﬁcient for all ordinary

purposes; but if considered critically, it is inaccurate in this:

That it fails to comprehend those cases which are disposed of

under the common law, in respect to which there can be no estab-

lished usage, because the cases themselves are entirely new. The

usage in such a case must come after the decision has established

the principle, and it must have followed the decision as a result,

instead of preceding it as a cause or reason. With these cases in

view, it will be evident that the common law is something more

than a body of usages; it is that, indeed, but it also embraces the

principles which underlie the usages, or which so harmonize

with them that the courts are justiﬁed in accepting them as the

1 Tuberville 0. Stamp, 1 Comyn R. cases cited, Le Barron 0. Le Barron,

32; S. (1.2 Salk, 647; Filliter o.Phip- 35 Vt. 365; Commonwealth 0. Chur-

pard, 11 Q. B. 847. chill, 2 Met. (Ky.) 118.

’ Cooley,’ Const Lim. 22-24, and

stances, a change which was not within the compass of legitimate
judicial action seemed essential; they have given a private remedy
in some cases where the common law gives none; as, for instanee,
where death has resulted from a wrongful act or default; and
they have taken away remedies in some cases, as, for instance,
that which the common law gave against the owner of a
house for a fire accidentally originating in it.. • Bnt even in
these cases the statutes have been left for explanation to the
rules of the common law; they have given rights which can only
be understood in the light of common law principles. In some
cases, also, the statutory law has forbidden the doing of certain
acts, and the common law, as administered by the courts, has
supplemented this action by giving remedies to private parties
who are injured by a disregard of the statutory prohibition. In
these cases the statute law may be said to lean upon and receive
aid from the common law; but in the vast majority of all the
cases in which remedies are given for wrongs committed, the
judge looks only to the common law, and must administer
justice on principles which have grown up irrespective of statutes, and which, no matter how recently announced, are assumed
to have existed from time immemorial.
The common law is generally said to consist in the established
usages of the people, by which their respective rights are recognized and limited, and to which they are expected to conform in
their dealings.• This definition is quite sufficient for all ordinary
purposes; but if considered critically, it is inaccurate in this:
That it fails to comprehend those cases which are d~sposed of
under the common law, in respect to which there can be no established usage, because the cases themselves are entirely new. The
nsage in such a case must come after the decision has established
the principle, and it must have followe'a the decision as a result,
instead of preceding it as a cause or reason. With these cases in
view, it will be evident that the common law is something more
than a body of usages; it is that, indeed, but it also embraces the
principles which underlie the usages, or which so harmonize
with them that the courts are justified in accepting them as the
1 Tuberville"· Stamp, 1 Comyn R.
32; S. C. 2 Salk, 647; Filliter "· Phip.
pard, 11 Q. B. 847.
• Cooley; Const. Lim. 22-24, and

cases cited, Le Barron "· Le Barron,
M Vt. 86:i; Commonwealth e. Churchill, 2 Met. (Ky.) 118.
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basis for judicial action, and as forming with the usages a con-
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sistent body of law. Thus a very considerable proportion of the

common law has had its real origin in judicial action, which has

accepted many things for law, and rejected many others, and by

a sifting process has made the law what we ﬁnd it now. The

growth of the law‘ under this treatment has been so moderate, so

steady, and so beneﬁcent as to afford no small justification for

the hearty praise that so often has been bestowed upon it. It

has been modiﬁed and expanded under the decisions, but the

changes eifected by or through the inﬂuence of any particular

decision have been such only as it was believed did not disturb

the general harmony of the law, and such as could be justiﬁed as

being rather a new illustration of the law as it was, than an alter~

ation of it. In this steady and almost imperceptible change

must be found the chief advantages of a judicial development

of the law over a statutory development; the one can work no

great or sudden changes; the other can, and frequently does, make

such as are not only violent, but premature. A large share of

the value of any law consists in the habitual reception and the

spontaneous obedience which the people are expected to give to

it, and which they will give when they have become accustomed

to and understand its obligation. The people then may be said
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to be their own policemen; they habitually restrain their actions

within the limits of the law, instead of waiting the compulsion

of legal process. A violent change must break up, for the time

being, this spontaneous observance, and some degree of embar-

rassment is always to be anticipated before that which is new and

strange becomes habitually accepted, and its advantages appreci-

ated, and before that which remains of the old is adjusted to it.

For this reason an imperfect law let alone may be much more

conducive to the peace of society and the happiness of the people

than a better law often tampered with. But there are always

some particulars in which improvement by judicial decisions is

impossible, and where legislation alone is adequate to the pur-

pose. An illustration may be given of a case which has already

been made use of on another point.

No action would lie at the common law for causing the death

of a human being. This was as thoroughly settled by decisions

as it was possible for any point to be, and the concurrence of

authority was unanimousﬂ When, therefore, it was concluded
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buis for judicial action, and as forming with the ul¥lges a consistent bod1 of' law. Thus a very considerable proportion of the
oommon law has had its real origin in judicial action, which hu
accepted many things 'for law, and rejected many others, and by
a sifting process has made the law what we find it now. The
growth of the law' under this treatment has been so moderate, so·
steady, and so beneficent as to afford no small justification for
the hearty praise that so often hu been bestowed upon it. It
has been modified and expanded under the decisions, but the
changes effected by or through the influence of any particular
decision have been such only as it was believed did not disturb
the general harmony of the law, and such as could be justified as
being rather a new illustration of the law as it was, than an alteration of it. In this steady and almost imperceptible change
must be found the chief advantages of a judicial development
of the law over a statutory development; the one can work no
great or sudden changes; the other can, and frequently does, make
such as are not only violent, but premature. A large share of
the value of any law consists in the habitual reception and the
z:~pontaneous ol>OOience which the people are expected to give to
it, and which they will give when th~y have become accustomed
to and understand its obligation. The people then may be said
to be their own polic.-emen; they habitually restrain their actions
within the limits of the law, instead of waiting the compulsion
of legal process. A violent change must break up, for the time
being, this spontaneous observance, and some degree of embarrassment is always to be anticipated before that which is new and
strange becomes habitually accepted, and its advantages appreciated, and before that which remains of the old is adjusted to it.
For this reason an imperfect law let alone may be much more
conducive to the peace of society and the happiness of the people
than a better law often tampered with. But there are always
some particulars in which improvement by judicial decisions is
impossible, and where legislation alone is adequate to the purpose. An illustration may be given of a case which has already
been made use of on another point.
No action would lie at the common law for causing the death
of a human being. This was as thoroughly settled by decisions
as it was possible for any point to be, and the concnrrence of
authority was unanimous~ When, therefore, it was· concluded
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that public policy demanded the giving a right of action in these

cases, a new law was obviously essential. There was no old prin-

ciple that could adapt itself to such a remedy, for the established

principle was distinctly adverse to it. Near a century ago an

English judge pointed out the distinction between the cases in

which legislative interference was essential and those in which it

was not, in the following language: “VVhere cases are new in

their principle, there I admit that it is necessary to have recourse

to legislative interposition in order to remedy the grievance; but

where the case is only new in the instance, and the only question is

upon the application of a principle recognized in the law to such

new case, it will be just as competent to courts ofjustico to apply

the principle to any case which may arise two centuries hence as it

was two centuries ago; if it was not, we ought to blot out of our law

books one-fourth part of the cases that are to be found in them.” '

It must be conceded that this is somewhat indeﬁnite, and that

the ﬁeld it allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in deter-

mining what principles are and what are not recognized in the

law, and what cases fall within those that are recognized, is a

very broad one. It is often exercised by looking beyond the

limits of the common law and culling from the civil law the prin-

ciples there discovered which may supplement and improve where
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the common law is discovered to be deﬁcient. An actual adjudi-

cation will illustrate this: The owner of logs, by a sudden and

very great freshet, had them carried away upon the land of a

proprietor below, where they cause considerable injury as they

ﬂoat about. For this injury the owner ot' the logs is not

responsible, because it happened without his fault. The law does

not impose on any one the obligation to compensate for accidental

injuries. But the logs are now upon the land of another and

cannot be reclaimed without a trespass. The owner of the logs

must, therefore, lose them, or he must reclaim them with further

injury to the owner of the land. Wliat is the solution of this

diﬂtlculty, and how, under such circumstances shall the rights of

the parties be adjusted? The civil law affords a solution. By

that, if the owner of the logs claimed exemption from responsi-

bility for the injury occasioned by them, he must abandon them

to the party they had injured. If he reclaimed them he must

' Asnuasr, J ., in Pasley v. Freeman, 8 '1‘. R 51, 63.
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that public policy demanded the giving a right of action in these
cases, a new law was obvionsly essential. There was no old principle that could adapt itself to such a remedy, for the established
principle wa!; distinctly adverse to it. Near a century ago an
English judge pointed out the distinction between the cases in
which legislative interference was essential and those in which it
was not, in the following language: "Where cases are new in
their principle, there I admit that it is necessary to have recourse
to legislative interposition in order to remedy the grievance; but
where the case is only uew in the instance, and the only question is
upon the application of a principle recognized in tho law to such
new case, it will be just as competent to courts of justice t.o apply
tho principle to any case which may arise two centuries hence as it
was two centuries ago; if it was not, we ought to blot out of' our law
books one-fourth part of the cases that arc to be found in them."'
It must be conceded that this is somewhat indefinite, and that
the field it allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in determining what principles are and what are not recognized in the
law, and what cases fall within those that are recognized, is a
very broad one. It is often exercised by looking beyond the
limits of the common law and culling from the civil law the principles there discovered which may supplement and impro,·e where
the common law is discovered to be deficient. An actual adjudication wil1 illustrate this: The owner of logs, by a sudden and
very great freshet, had them carried away upon the land of a
proprietor below, where they cause considerable injury as they
float about. For this injury the owner of the logs is not
responsible, because it happened without his fault. The law does
not impose on any one the obligation to compensate for accidental
injuries. But the logs arc now upon the land of another and
cannot be reclaimed without a trespass. The owner of the logs
must, therefore, lose them, or he must reclaim them with further
injury to the owner of the land. What is the solution of this
difficulty, and how, under such circumstances shall the rights of
the parties be adjusted~ The civil law affords a solution. By
that, if the owner of the logs claimed exemption from responsibility for the injury occasioned by them, he must abandon them
to tho party they had injured. If' ho reclaimed them ho must
..
1 .A.sumurr,

J., In Pasley e. Freeman, 8 T. R. In, 68.
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pay for the injury. The option was with him, and the condition
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was perfectly reasonable. N ow the common law judge ﬁnds this

principle applicable to a case before him. and he also ﬁnds that

it may readily be ﬁtted in and accommodated to the common

law system; that, in fact, it seems to belong there, and he there-

fore accepts it.‘ It decides the particular case and it becomes a

precedent.

The view which is quite the opposite of this, and of which

Mr. Bentham was a conspicuous exponent, denounces the judi-

cial development of the law as usurpation, and demands legis-

lative codiﬁcation as the legitimate substitute. “Of the whole

b rdy of actual law,” this writer says, “one pre-eminently

remarkable division, derived from a correspondently remarkable

source and pervading the whole mass, still remains. It is that

by which it is distinguished into two branches, the arrangements

of one of which are arrangements that have really been made-

made by hands universally acknowledged as duly authorized and

competent to the making of such arrangements, viz., the hands

of a legislator general, or set of legislators general, or their

respective subordinates. This branch of the law may stand dis-

tinguished from that which is correspondent and opposite to it,

by the name or real law, really existing law, legislator made law;
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under the English government it stands already distinguished by

the name 01 statute law, as also by the uncharacteristic, undis-

criminative and in so far improper appellation of written law. The

arrangements supposed to be made by the other branch, in so far

as they are arrangements of a general nature, applying not only

to individuals assignable, but to the community at large, or to

individuals not individuals assignable, may stand distinguished

by the appellations of unreal, not really existing, imaginary,

ﬁctitious, spurious, judge-made law; under the English govern-

ment the division actually distinguished by the unexpressive,

uncharacteristic and unappropriate names of common and un-

written law.

“ Of the manner in which this wretched substitute to real and

genuine law is formed, take this description: In the course of a

suit in which application is made of the rule of action thus com-

' Sheldon 0. Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484; S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 569.

2

pay for the injury. The option was with him, and the condition
was perfectly reasonable. Now the common law judge finds this
principle applicable to a case before him, and he also finds that
it may readily be fitted in and accommodated to the common
law ~ystem; that, in fact, it seems to belong there, and he tl•crcforo accepts it.' It decides the llarticnlar case and it becomes a
precedent.
The view which is quite the opposite of this, and of which
:Mr. llentbam was a conspicuous exponent, deoounc:es the judicial development of the law as usurpation, and demands legislative codification as the legitimate substitute. "Of the whole
b>dy of actual law," this writer says, "one pre-eminently
remarkable division, derived from a corrcspondently remarkable
source and pervading the whole mass, still remains. It is that
by which it is distinguished into two branches, the arrangements
of one of which are arrangements that have really been mademade by hands universally acknowledged as duly authorized and
competent to the making of such arrangements, viz., the hands
of a legislator general, or set of legislators general, or their
respective subordinates. This branch of the law may stand distinguished from that which is correspondent and opposite to it,
by the name or real law, really existing law, legislator made law;
onder the English government it stands already distinguished by
the name ot atat't.IU law, as also by t~e uncharacteristic, nndiscriminative and in so far improper appellation of written law. The
arrangements supposed to be made by the other branch, in so far
u they are arrangements of a general nature, applying not only
to h1dividuals assignable, but to the community at large, or to
individuals not individuals assignable, may stand distinguished
by the appellations of unreal, not really existing, imaginary,
fictitious, spurious, judge-made law; under the English government the division actually distinguished by the unexpressive,
uncharacteristic and unappropriate names of' common and unwritten law.
"Of the manner in which this wretched substitute to real and
genuine law is formed, take this description: In the course of a
auit in which application is made of the rule of action thus com1

Sheldon •· Shermao, ~ N'. Y. ~; 8. 0. 1 Am. Bep. 1509.
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posed, the judge on each occasion pretends to ﬁnd ready-made,
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and -by competent authority, endued with the force of law (and

at the same time universally known to be so in existence and so in

force), a proposition of a general aspect adapted to the purpose

of affording sutﬁcient authority and warrant for the particular

decision or order, which on that individual occasion he accord-

ingly pronounces and delivers.

“Partly from the consideration of the general proposition so

framed, as above, by this or that judge, or set of judges; partly

from the consideration of the individual instruments or docu-

ments expressive of such individual decision or order, as above;

partly from the consideration of such discourses as have been or

are supposed to have been uttered, whether by the judges or the

advocates on one or both sides, a class of lawyers have, under the

names of general treatises, or reports of particular cases, concur-

red in the composition of an immense chaos, the whole of it

written, and a vast portion of it printed and published, consti-

tuting an ever increasing body of that which forms the matter

which passes under the denomination of unwritten law.” ‘

Such were the views of Mr. Bentham. To understand the

working of the opposite system of codiﬁcation, which he favored,

it is necessary to suppose the whole body of law reduced to
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writing and adopted by legislation as a complete substitute for

the common or unwritten law as now understood. Such a code

could embrace little more than general principles only; it could

not anticipate the inﬁnite variety of cases as they arise on their

facts; but every actual controversy, as it is presented to the

judges for decision, must be compared by him with those gen-

eral principles; he must ﬁnd that it is or is not embraced within

some one of them, and must hold according to this ﬁnding that

there is or is not a remedy. If his conclusions are accepted as

guides in future cases, books of reports, and at length, com-

mentaries will be found convenient and will naturally be pub-

lished; if they are not accepted as guides, every judge will

construe the code according to the inclination of his own mind;

one judge strictly, lest he be chargeable with judge-made law;

another liberally, lest he fail in some cases to give the redress

' Coast. Code, Introduction, Ch. 2; Works, Vol. IX. p. 8.

posed, the judge on each occasion pretend.s to find ready-made,
and -by competent authority, endued with the force of law (and
at the same time universally known to be so in existence and so in
force), a proposition of a general aspect adapted to the purpose
of affording sufficient authority and warrant for the }Jarticular
decision or order, which on that individual occasion he accordingly pronounces and delivers.
''Partly from the consideration of the general proposition so
framed, as above, by this or that judge, or set of judges; partlJ
from the considemtion of the individual instruments or documents exprcssi\'e of such individual decision or order, as above;
partly from the consideration of such discourses as have been or
are supposed to have been uttered, whether by the judges or the
advocates on oue or both sides, a class of lawyers have, under the
names of general treatises, or reports of particular cases, concurred in the composition ot' an immense chaos, the whole of it
written, ·and a vast portion of it printed and publisheJ, constituting an ever increasing body of that which forms the matter
which passes undP.r the denomination of unwritten law." 1
Snch were the views of Mr. Bentham. To understand the
working of the opposite system of codification, which he favored,
it is necessary to suppose the whole body of law reduced to
writing and adopted by legislation as a complete substitute for
the common or unwritten law as now understood. Such a code
could embrace little more than general principles only; it could
not anticipate the infinite variety of cases as they arise on their
facts; but every actual controversy, as it is presented to the
judges for decision, must be compared by him with those general principles; he must find that it is or is not embraced within
some one of them, and must hold according to this finding that
there is or is not a remedy. If his conclusions are accepted as
guides in future cases, books of reports, and at length, commentaries will be found convenient and will naturally be published; if they are not accepted as guides, every judgo will
construe the code according to the inclination of his own mind;
one judge strictly, lest he be chargeable with judge-made law;
another liberally, lest he fail in some cases to give the redresa
1

Const. Code, Introduction, Ch. 2; Works, Vol. IX. p. 8.
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which justice demands, until the statute which was intended to
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make all clear seems only to introduce an uncertainty as great as

the minds of men are variant. As this state of things would be

less endurable than the other, it would follow that the other

would be preferred; the code would only become a starting point

from which judical development would necessarily begin, the

courts being under the same necessity for ﬁnding in the code the

goveming principles of every case that before compelled them

to ﬁnd it in the common law, and, for the sake of instruction as

well as of uniformity, being required to look to the decisions of

their predecessors as some evidence of what the general declara-

tions of the code intend, and as some guide in the future applica-

tions to new states of facts. Thus, without touching upon the

point of the desirableness of a code, it is perceived that its

enactment is not to dispense wholly with some of the supposed

objections to the common law system, nor can it wholl y preclude

judge-made law.

For the judge must either ﬁnd the code adequate to all contro-

versies, or he must pause in doubtful cases until the legislature

can declare the rule. But to lay down the rule retrospectively

for existing controversies is not only in a very high degree objec-

tionable and dangerous, but it is also a species of legislative
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judicial action, and, particularly when it is done with reference to

special cases, is liable to all the objections which have led the

people when framing their governments to forbid the legislature

exercising judicial power. The udge could not assume that for

the government of any particular controversy the law has abso-

lutely no rule whatever; he must hold that it either gives a

remedy, or it denies one in every conceivable case.

No Wrong without a Remedy. Judicial development of the

law is perceived in two forms: In the recognition of rights, and

in giving a remedy for the invasion or deprivation of rights.

In the ﬁrst, usages and precedents will be consulted, and analo-

gies made use of. A right cannot be recognized until the prin-

ciple is found which supports it. But when the right is found,

the remedy must follow, of course. The maxim of law, that

wherever there is a right there is a remedy, is a mere truism;

for, as Lord Hour has said, “it is a vain thing to imagine a right

which jnstice demands, until the statute which was intended to
make all clear seems only to introduce an uncertainty as great as
the minds of men are variant. As this state of things would be
less endurable than the other, it wonld follow that the other
would be preferred; the code would only become a starting point
from which judical development would necessarily begin, the
O.)urts being under the same necessity for finding in the code the
go~erning principles of every case that before compelled them
to find it in the common law, and, for the sake of instruction as
well as of uniformity, being required to look to the decisions of
their predecessors as some evidence of what the general declarations of the code intend, and as some guide in the fntnre applications to new states of facts. Thu£:, without touching upon the
point of the desirableness of a code, it is perceived that its
enactment is not to dispense wholly with some of the supposed
objections to the common law system, nor can it wholly preclude
jud~-made law.
For the judge must either find the code adequate to all controYcrsics, or he must pause in doubtful cases until the legislature
can declare the rule. But to lay down the rule retrospectively
for existing controversies is not only in a very high degree o~jec
tionable and dangerous, but it is also a species of legislative
judicial action, and, particularly when it is done with ref01·ence to
special eases, is liable to all the objections which have led the
people when framing their governments to forbid the legislature
exercising judicial power. The judge could not assume that for
the government of any particular controversy the law has absolutely no rnle whatever; he must hold that it either gives a
remedy, or it denies one in every conceivable caso.
llo Wrong without a Bemedy.

Judicial development of the
Jaw is perceived in two forms: In the recognition of rights, and
in giving a remedy for the invasion or deprivation of rights.
In the firs,t, u&anoes and precedents will be consulted, nnd analogies made use of. A right cannot be recognized until tho principle is found which supports it. But when the right is found,
the remedy most follow, of course. The maxim of law, that
wherever there is a right there is 8 remedy, is a mere truism;
for, as Lord HoLT has said, "it is a vain thing to imagine 8 right
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without a remedy; for want of right and want of remedy are
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reciprocal." ‘

The idea here conveyed is, that that only is a legal right which

is capable of being legally defended; and that is no legal right, the

enjoyment of which the law permits any one with impunity to

hinder or prevent. It is a legal paradox to say that one has a

legal right to something, and yet that to deprive him of it is not

a legal wrong. When the law thus declines to interfere between

the claimant and his disturber, and stands, as it were, neutral

between them, it is manifest that, in respect to the matter involved,

no claim to legal rights can be advanced Thus, if the domestic

animals of one man invade the unfenced premises of another,

and the latter demands compensation from the owner, but ﬁnds

that the statute denies it to him, the denial itself is conclusive

that the person damniﬁed has no right to demand protection

against such invasions.

The method of determining the question of remedy is well

illustrated by the leading case of Ashby v. White ust referred to.

The facts were, that certain persons had been denied the right to

vote for members of Parliament. They brought suit against the

oﬂicer who excluded them. No such case had ever been adjudged,

and there was no precedent for the suit. But in the opinion of
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Lord Hour, a precedent was not important. The material ques-

tion was, Had they a right to vote? This was to be determined

by the statute prescribing the qualiﬁcations of voters, and by the

facts which did or did not bring these parties within the statute.

When the facts were found in their favor, the legal conclusion must

follow. Having a. right, the remedy was of course. It might

have been diﬁerent had the olﬁcer been made the udge, whether

' Ashby 0. Wliite, Ld. Raym. 938;

B. C. 1 Smith Lead. Cases, 105. See

Co. Lit. 197 b; Herring 1:. Finch,

Lev. 250; 3 Bl. Com. 123; Johnstone

0. Sutton, 1 T. lt. 493; Lord Camden,

in Entrinck o. Carrington, 19 How.

State Trials, 1066; Pasley v. Freeman,

3 T. R. 63; Hobson v. Todd, 4 T.

R. '71; Millar 0. Taylor, Burr. 2344;

Braithwalte v. Skinner, 5 M. & W. 313;

Marzetti 0. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415;

Hodsoll o. Stallebrass, 11 A. & E. 301;

Cliﬂon 0. Cooper, 6 Q. B. 468, 474;

· without a remedy; for want of right and want of remedy are
reciprocal.'' 1
The idea here conveyed is, that that only is a legal right which
is capable of being legally defended; and that is no legal right, the
enjoyment of which the law permits any one with impunity to
hinder or prevent. It is a legal paradox to say that one has a
legal right to something, and yet that to deprive him of it is not
a legal wrong. When the law thus declines to interfere between
the claimant and his disturber, and stands, as it were, neutral
between them, it is manifest that, in respect to the matter involved,
no claim to legal rights can be advanced Thus, if the domestic
animals of one man invade the unfenced premises of another,
and the latter demands compensation from the owner, but finds
that the statute denies it to him, the denial itself is conclusive
that the person damnified has no right to demand protection
against such invasions.
The method of determining the question of remedy is well
illustrated by the leading case of .Ashby v. White just referred to.
The facts were, that certain persons had been denied the right to
vote for members. of Parliament. They brought snit against the
officer who excluded them. No such case had ever been adjudged,
and there was no precedent for the suit. But in tho opinion of
Lord HoLT, a precedent was not important. The material question was, Had they a right to vote~ This was to be determined
by the statute prescribing the qualifications of voters, and by the
facts which did or did not bring these parties within the statute.
When the facts wore found in their favor, the legal conclusion must
follow. Having a. right, the remedy was of course. It might
have been different had the officer been made the judge, whether

Pickering 1:. James, L. R. S C. P. 489;

Atkinson v. Waterworks Co. L. R 6

Exch. 404; Jenkins 0. Waldron, 11

Johns. 120; Pastorious 0. Fisher, 1

Rawle, 27; Snow o. Cowles, 22 N. H.

296; Woodman 0. Tufts, 9 N. II. 88;

Toothakcr 0. Winslow, 61 Me. 123;

Lorman o. Benson, 8 Mich. 18.

1 Ashby tJ. White, Ld. Raym. 938;
B. C. 1 Smith Lead. Cases, 105. See
Co. Lit. 197 b~· Herring tJ, Finch,
Lev. 250; 8 Bl. Com. 128; Johnstone
e. Sutton, 1 T. H. 403; Lord Camden,
in Entrinck fl. Carrington, 19 How.
Bt.ate Trials, 1066; Pasley"· Freeman,
ST. R. 68; Hobson "· Todd, 4 T.
R. 71; Millar t~. Taylor, Burr. 2344;
Braithwaite"· Skinner, 5 M. & W. 818;
Harzetti tJ, Williams, 1 B. & Ad. -'15;

Hodson t~. Btallebrass, 11 A. & E. 801;
Clifton tJ, Cooper, 6 Q. B. 468, 474;
Pickering "· James, L R. 8 C. P. 489;
Atkinson t!. Waterworks Co. L. R 6
Exch. 404; Jenkins t~.. Waldron, 11
Johns. 120; Pastorious tJ, Fisher, 1
Rawle, 27; Bnow tJ, Cowles, 22 N.H.
296; Woodman e. Tufts, 9 N.H. 88;
Toothaker e. Winslow, 61 Me. 128;
Lorman tJ, Benson, 8 Mich. 18.
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the proper qualiﬁcations existed; for then his judgment that the
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right existed would have been a condition precedent.

To what is here said there are some apparent exceptions. _ Thus

statutes, in many cases, forbid, under penalties payable to the

State, the doing of certain acts that might be injurious to indi-

viduals, or, under like penalties, require certain acts to be done,

the doing of which will be beneﬁcial to individuals. In these

cases, if it is manifest from the statute that the penalty is the

only injurious consequence that is to be incurred by a violation

of the law, it may be said that the individual has a right, and

yet that the law aﬁbrds him no remedy for its infringement.

But in a strict legal sense, the statute in such cases is to be

regarded as prescribing duties on public grounds only, and the

party who suﬁ'ers from a failure to observe them only chances to

be the individual upon whom fall the consequences of a wrong

done to the public.

It may be said, also, that in the election case, if the oﬁicer had

been made ﬁnal judge of the facts and had decided erroneously,

the voter would equally have been wronged, and yet no remedy

have been open to him. But in contemplation of law the decis-

ion of the tribunal appointed to decide ﬁnally upon any question

must be conclusively deemed correct. If that tribunal ﬁnds that
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no right exists, then the party is not wronged by a right being

denied him. Order and stability in government require that in

all civil proceedings this conclusion shall be absolute.

Classiﬁcation of Remedies. Legal remedies are either pre-

ventive or compensatory. Every remedy is, in a certain sense,

preventive, because it threatens certain undesirable consequences

to those who violate the rights of others. The person inclined

to invade his neighbor’s premises has over him the threat of the

law that he shall be made to pay all damages, as well as the costs

of litigation, if he shall venture to trespass. If he proposes to

defame his neighbor, the threat is that he shall pay not actual

damages merely, but damages specially assessed in proportion to

the aggravation of the case. The principle, however, in all cases,

is compensation for an injury done, and exemplary damages are

only given in those cases in which the injury, for some reason, is

the proper qualifications existed; for then his judgment that the
Jight existed would have been a condition precedent.
To what is here said there are some apparent exceptions.. Thus
statutes, in many cases, forbid, under penalties payable to the
State, the doing of certain acts that might be injurious to individuals, or, onder like penalties, require certain acts to be done,
the doing of which will be beneficial to individuals. In these
cases, if it is manifest from the statute that the penalty is the
only injurious consequence that is to be incurred by a violation
of the Jaw, it may be said that the individual has a right, and
yet that the law affords him no remedy for its infringement.
Bnt in a strict legal sense, the statute in such cases is to be
regarded as prescribing duties on public grounds only, and the
party who suffers from a failure to observe them only chances to
be the individual upon whom fall the consequences of wrong
done to the public.
It may be said, also, that in the election case, if the officer had
been made final judge of the facts and had decided erroneously,
the voter would equally have been wronged, and yet no remedy
have been open to him. Bnt in contemplation of law the decision of the tribunal appointed to decide finally upon any question
mnst be conclusively deemed correct. If that tribunal finds that
no right exists, then the party is not wronged by a right being
denied him. Order and stability in government require that in
all civil proceedings this conclusion shall be absolute.

a

one of special aggravation. In some cases the law permits a

mandatory writ to restrain the commission of some threatened

Cla88ifloation of Remedies. Legal remedies are either preventive or compensatory. Every remedy is, in a certain sense,
preventive, because it threatens certain undesirable consequences
to those who violate the rights of others. The person inclined
to invade his neighbor's premises has over him the threat of the
law that he shall be made to pay all damages, as well as tho costs
of litigation, if he shall venture to trespass. If he proposes to
defame his neighbor, the thrrat is that he shall pay not actual
damages merely, but damages specially assessed in proportion to
the aggravation of the case. The principle, however, in all cases,
is compensation for an injury done, and exemplary damages are
only given in those cases in which the injury, tor some reason, is
one of special aggravation. In some cases the law permits a
mandatory writ to restrain the commission of some threatened
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wrong; but the general employment of such a writ would lead
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to abuses which would be intolerable. At the best, preventive

remedies are dangerous, because they must to a considerable

extent be summary, and be awarded without that full and careful

inquiry into the merits which precedes the ﬁnal judgment.

Besides, they must be awarded upon a supposed wrongful intent,

and the inquiry into an unexecuted intent is usually among

the most unsatisfactory things in legal procedure.

The danger from the employment of preventive remedies is,

that though given for the protection of rights and liberties they

oﬁ'er a constant invitation to the usurpation of right and the

overthrow of liberties. It is better and safer to assume that no

one will violate the law, and to treat him as an offender only after
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he has done so.

wrong; but the general employment of such a. writ would lead
to abuse.a which would be intolerable. At tho best, preventive
remedies are dangerous, because they must to a considerable
extent be summary, and be awarded without that full and careful
inquiry into the merit.a which precedes the final judgment.
Besides, they must be awarded upon a supposed wrongful intent,
and the inquiry into an unexecuted intent is usually among
the most un8atistactory things in legal procedure.
The danger from the employment of pre,·enth·e remedies is,
that though given for tho protection of rights and liberties they
offer a constant invitation to the usurpation of right and the
overthrow of liberties. It is better and safer to assume that no
one will violate the law, and to treat him as an offender only after
be has done so.
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GENERAL CLASSIFICATION or LEGAL RIGHTS.

What a Bight is. In the preceding chapter the term right has

been employed in the legal sense exclusively. In that sense it

implies something with which the law invests one person, and in

respect to which, for his beneﬁt, another, or, perhaps, all others

are required by the law to do or perform acts, or to forbear or

abstain from acts.‘ Before proceeding further, a classiﬁcation

of rights seems desirable, that we may the better understand the

methods which the law has devised for their protection.

CHAPTER II.

Inﬂuence of Political Institutions. The‘ general form of politi-

cal institutions has little to do with the classiﬁcation of rights,

this being in the main the same under all governments. There

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF LEGAL RIGHTS.

may be this difference, however, that under some forms of

government certain rights will be recognized and provided for

which, under other forms, will not be given. This is particularly

true of those rights which are political; those which are conferred

in some countries being few in number, and very imperfectly

protected. The general purpose of government is the same under

all forms; it exists for the beneﬁt of those who submit to and are

governed by it, and the beneﬁt is aﬁbrded in the establishment

and protection of rights. Except for this purpose, no govern-
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ment could for a moment justify its existence.

The rights which every government is expected to recognize

and protect may be classed under the following heads: 1. Security

What a Bight is. Tn tho preceding chapter the term right has
been employed in the legal sense exclusively. In that sense it
implies something with which the law invests one person, and in
respect to which, for his benefit, another, or, perhaps, all others
are required by the law to do or perform acts, or to forbeRr or
abstain from acts.• Before proceeding further, a classification
or rights seems desirable, that we may the better understand tho
methods which the law has devised for their protection.

in person. 2. Security in the acquisition and enjoyment of

property. 3. Security in the family relations. \Vhether the

government be despotic or free, so much will be expected

from it; and in a free government there will also be a further

class of rights, known as political. The theory of political

rights is, that they are not given for their own sake, and for

' Austin, J urisprndcncc, Lecture XVL; sec, also, Lee. VI.

I

Inftuence of Political Institutions. The' general form of politieal institutions has little to do with the classification of rights,
this being in the main the same under all governments. There
may be this difference, however, that under some forms of
go,·ernment certain rights will be recognized and provided for
which, under other forms, will not be given. This is particularly
trne of those rights which are political; those which are conferred
in some countries being few in number, and very imperfectly
protected. The general purpose of government is the same nuder
all forms; it exists for the benefit of those who submit to and are
go\"erned by it, and the benefit is aft'orded in the establishment
and protection of rights. Except for this purpose, no government could tor a moment justify its existence.
The rights which e\·ery government is expected to recognize
and protect may be classed nnder the following heads: 1. Security
in person. 2. Security in the acquisition an<.l enjoyment of
prope1·ty. 3. Seeurity in the family relations. 'Vhetber the
,._rovernment be dc~;potic or free, so much will be expected
from it; and in a free government there will also be a furtlter
elass of rights, known as political. The theory of political
rights is, that they are not given for their own sake, and for
1

Austin, Jurisprudence, Lecture XVI.; sec, also, Lee. VI.
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the beneﬁt of those who enjoy them, but for the general beneﬁt
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of the political society. Their chief advantage to the individual

consists in this: That they constitute securities to other rights,

so that their value is to be found in what they protect. Tho

right of the English peasant to such property as the law recog-

nized as belonging to him was the same under despotic rule as it

is to-day; but the political rights which have been acquired by

the people have given it guaranties and a security which it did

not have before. What then was often violated with impunity is

now assured as completely as the experience of the country up

to this time has shown to be practicable. On the feeling of

security which political rights aﬁ'ord must mainly depend the

content and happiness of the people. \Vere the government

itself, instead of protecting rights, to impose unnecessary restric-

tions for its own purposes, or the purposes of those wielding its

authority, or were it to interfere capriciously to deprive individ-

nals or communities of rights which nominally are assured to the

people, there would to that extent be a tyranny, whether the form

of government were representative or despotic. A representa-

tive government only affords certain security against abuse of

power, which cannot be had where political rights are not pos-

sessed by the people.
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Personal Rights. In the classiﬁcation above made, the ﬁrst

class embraces the rights which pertain to the person. In this

are included the right to life, the right to immunity from attacks

and injuries, and the right equally with others similarly circum-

stanced to control one’s own action. In all enlightened countries

the same class would also include the right to the beneﬁt of such

reputation as one’s conduct has entitled him to, and the enjoy-

ment of all such civil rights as are conceded by the law. Polit-

ical rights may also be included under the same head.

Right to Life. The ﬁrst and highest of all these is the right to

life. On this all others are based, and it is needless to discuss

the benefit of thoae who enjoy them, but for the general benofi~
of the political society. Their chief advantage to the ind~vidual
consists in this: That they constitute securities to other rights,
so that their value is to be found in what they protect. Tho
right of th£> English peasant to such property as the law recognized as belonging to him was the same under despotic rule as i~
is to-day; but the political rights which have been acquired by
the people have gh·en it guaranties and a security which it did
not have betore. What then was often violatoJ with impunity is
now assured as completely as the experience of the country up
to this time has shown to be practicable. On the feeling of
security which political rights afford must mainly depend the
content and happiness ot' the people. Were the government
itself, instead of protecting rights, to impose unnecessary restrictions for its own purposes, or the purposes of those wielding ita
authority, or were it to interfere capriciously to deprive individuals or communities of rights which nominally are nssnred to the
people, there would to that extent be a tyranny, whether the form
of government were representn.tive or despotic. A representative government only aftords certain security against abuse of
power, which cannot be had where political rights are not possessed by the people.

others if the life is not protected. In barbarous periods a man

sometimes, for some great crime or contempt of authority, was put

out of the protection of the law, and a term was then applied to him

which indicated that he might be treated as a wild beast of prey,

and must ﬁnd his protection in his own strength and cunning. This

was the ancient outlawry; and the law under some circumstances

Personal Rights. In the classification above made, the first
class embraces the rights which pertain to the person. In thia
are included the right to life, the right to immunity from attacks
and injuries, and the right equally with others similarly cironmstanccd to control one's own action. In all enlightened conntriea
the same class would also include the right to the benefit of such
reputation as one's conduct has entitled him to, and the enjoyment of all such civil rights as are conceded by the Jaw. Political rights may also be included under the same head.
Bight to Life. The first and highest of all these is the ri~ht to
life. On this all others are based, and it is needless to discnea
others if the lite is not protected. In barbarous periods a man
sometimes, for some great crime or contempt of authority, was put
out of the protection of the law, and a term was then applied to him
which indicated that he might bo treated as a wild beast of prey,
and must find his protection in his own strength and cunning. This
was the ancient outlawry; a~d the Jaw under some circumstances
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even permitted the _life to be taken with impunity.‘ But this

was a case of forfeiture of rights, and it implied that the outlaw,

by his contempt of the law, had justly put himself beyond the

pale of human sympathy. No society is so barbarous as not to

recognize the right of its several members to their lives, but the

securities which are provided for the protection of the right

must, in different countries, be as diverse as are the characters

of the people. Among the early laws of some people will be

found regulations giving to the relatives or friends of one who

had been unlawfully slain the privilege of private vengeance.

Two different views may be taken of such regulations: 1. That

assuming the protection of life to be the concern of the State,

they make the friends of the person slain the agents of the State

in inﬂicting punishment, for the reason that the natural feelings

and impulses would be more-likely to impel them than others to

the performance of the duty. 2. That, regarding the protection

of the life of an individual as, something which specially con-

cerns him and his immediate relatives and friends, rather than

the political society, they make the homicide a ground for the

just forfeiture of the life of the slayer to those relatives and
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friends, but not to others. Where such rules prevail, they are

likely not to distinguish between criminal homicides and those

which are excusable; and it is manifest that they rest upon very

unenlightened notions, and can supply to society only a rude and

imperfect protection. Indeed, the tendency is to cruelty, rather

than to justice, and anarchy is encouraged by them, rather than

governmental order. In a wiser period, the government takes

into its own hands the punishment for homicide, and treats it as

a wrong to the State. But this is on the assumption that it is

found to be blamable. Governments do not assume to punish

innocent acts, however serious may be the consequences resulting

from them.’

' “ An outlaw was said cnput germ-e that in the counties of Hereford and

Iupinum, by which it was not meant

that any one might knock him on

the head, as has been falsely im-

tminul, but only in case he would not

surrender himself peaceably when

taken; for if he made no attempt to

ﬂy. his death would be punished as

that of any other man, though it seems

Gloucester, in the neighborhood of the

marches of Wales, outlaws, were in

all cases considered literally capito

lupina." Reeves‘ Hist. of English

even permitted the .life to be taken with impunity.' But this
waa a case of forfeiture of rights, and it implied that the outlaw,
by his contempt of the law, had justly put himself beyond the
pale of human sympathy. No society is so bBrbarous as not to
re<,'Ognize the right of its several members to their lives, but the
securities which are provided for the protection of' the right
must, in different countries, be as diverse as are the characters
of the people. Among the early laws of some people will be
found regulations giving to the relatives or friends of one who
had been unlawfully slain the privilege of private vengeance.
Two different views may be taken of sueh regulations: 1. That
assuming the protection of life to be the concern of the State,
they make the friends of the person slain the agents of the State
in inflicting punishment, for the reason that the natural feelings
ami impulses would be more.likely to impel them than others to
the performance of the duty. 2. That, regarding the protection
of the lite of an individual as, something which specially concerns him and his immediate relatives and friends, rather than
the political society, they make the homicide a ground for the
just forfeitnre of the life of the slayer to those relatives and
friends, but not to others. Where such rules prevail, they are
likely not to distinguish between criminal homicides and those
which are excusable; and it is manifest that they rest upon very
unenlightened notions, and can supply to society only a rude and
imperfect protection. Indeed, the tendency is to cruelty, rather
tlmn to justice, and anarchy is encom·aged by them, rather than
go\·ernmental order. In a wiser period, the government takes
iuto its own hands the punishment for homicide, and treats it as
a wrong to the State. But this is on the assumption that it is
found to be blamable. Governments do not assnme to punish
inno<."('nt acts, however serious may he the consequences resulting
from them.'

Law, Ch. VIIL, Sec. 4; Bl. Com. 178,

319.

‘Austin, Jurisprudence, (4th ed.)

1092; People 0. Paulks, 38 Mich.

1

"An outlaw was said cnput ge,·ere

lrtJ•;,wm, by which it was not meant

that any one might knock him on
the bend, 1\8 bas been falsely ima::incil, but only in c&~c he would not
surrender himself peaceably when
taken; for if he made no attempt to
fly. his death would be punished as
&hat of any other man, though it seems

that in the counti('s of llereford and
Gloucester, in the nei~h bol'ho)()d of the
marches of 'Vales, outlaws, were in
all cases considered I itcrn lly capita
lupina." Reeves' Hist. of English
Law, Ch. VIII., Sec. 4; Bl. Com. 178,
319.
1 Austin, Jurisprudence. (4th ed.)
1002; People"· Paulks, 38 :Mich.
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The Germanic nations were accustomed to compound for the
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taking of life by a money payment, made in part to the king,

and in part to the family of the person slain.‘ This was less bar-

barous than the method of abandoning the slayer to private ven-

geance, because it partook of orderly government. But like that,

it was suited only to periods of violence, and to people accus-

tomed to protect themselves by strength and valor, instead’ of

looking for redress to the govemment which should afford it.

To demand a money payment for the taking of a life was to give

to it no reasonable security whatever; it rather held out induce-

ment to the indulgence of passion by promising immunity at so

so slight a sacriﬁce. Wiser laws take notice of the fact that

when the passion or depravity is equal to the taking of human

life, the government cannot reasonably hopeto restrain it, unless

the consequences threatened are such as the passionate or depraved

would fear the most. In this view, the least that could be threat-

ened would be the loss of whatever renders life valuable, namely,

the liberty; the most that could be threatened would be to take

the life itself.

But it is manifest that in this punishing the taking of life,

the government gives no protection in the particular case, but

instead, is giving indirect protection in other cases. It is impos-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:39 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

sible to protect life as property is protected, by giving private

remedies. Preventive remedies, such as injunction and man-

damus, could be of no avail, for they could command no more

than the law itself commands. Threats might justify requiring

sureties for the peace, but the proceeding to obtain these is crim-

inal rather than civil, and of little avail where the real peril

is to the life. And supposing the man actually slain, whether

through inadvertence or of purpose, a remedy on his behalf has

become impossible, since the very act which would give a cause

of action would also terminate the existence of the person

entitled to it.

If there are taken into the account the many ways in which

one person may have an interest in the life of another—the hus-

band in that of the wife, the wife in that of the husband, the

child in that of the parent, and so on—it may seem a little

remarkable that the common law, after death had been made the

' Crabbe-’s Hist. of English Law, 35-37; Reeves’ Hist. of English Law, Ch. I.

The Germanic nations were accustomed ~ compound for the
taking of life by a money payment, made in part to the king,
and in part to the family of the person slain.' This was less barbarous than the method of abandoning the slayer to pri'\"ate vengeance, because it partook of orderly government. But like that,
it was suited only to periods of violence, and to people accustomed to protect themselves by strength and valor, instead· of
looking for redress to the government which should afford it.
To demand a money payment for the taking of a life was to give
to it no reasonable security whatever; it rather held out inducement to the indulgence of passion by promising immunity at so
so slight a sacrifice. Wiser laws take notice of the fact that
when the passion or depravity is equal to the taking of human
life, the go\'ernment cannot reasonably hope to restrain it, unless
the consequences threatened are such as the passionate or depraved
would fear the most. In this view, the least that could be threatened would be the loss of whatever renders life valuable, namely,
the liberty; the most that could be threatened would be to take
the lite itself.
But it is manifest that in this punishing tho taking of life,
the government gives no protection in the particular case, but
instead, is giving indirect protection in other cases. It is impossible to protect life as property is protected, by giving private
remedies. Preventh·e remedies, e.nch as injunction and mandamus, could be of no avail, for they could command no more
than the law itself commands. Threats might justi(y requiring
sureties for the peace, but the proceeding to obtain these is criminal rather than civil, and of little avail where the real peril
is to the lifo. And supposing the man actually slain, whether
through inadvertence or of purpose, a remedy on his behalf has
become impossible, since the very act which would give a cause
of action would also terminate the existence of tho person
entitled to it.
If there arc taken into the account the many ways in which
one person may l1ave an interest in the life of another-the husband in that of the wife, the wife in that of the husband, the
child in that of the parent, and so on -it may seem a little
remarkable that the common law, after death had been made the
1

Crabbe's Hist. of English Law, 85-37; Reeves' Hist. of English Law, Ch. I.
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penalty for the felonious taking of human life, should not have
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allowed the damages suffered by others from an unlawful killing

to be recovered. The interest which husband and wife possess

in each other‘s life must usually have a pecuniary value which

would be estimated for many purposes at a large sum in the

dealings with others; as for instance in those relating to insurance:

and to the parties themselves, would be invaluable; but when

not noticed by the law as a ground for an action, it could only

have the incidental and indirect protection which the criminal

laws afford: the government thus disregarding the private injury

and punishing only the public injury. Here again, if we speak

of a man’s estate as that aggregate of possessions which on his

deeease will pass to his representatives, why should not the

money value of his life, when it has been taken away by unlaw-

ful act or negligence, be a right of action in the hands of his

representatives? It is agreed, however, that the common law

made no award of compensation in these cases.‘ If we look for

the reasons, we ﬁnd them variously stated. One that is assigned

is the repugnanee of the common law to any estimate of the

pecuniary value of human life.‘ If the proposition were that

a money estimate should be made of the life for the purpose of

determining the proper penalty for a felonious homicide, this
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repugnance would be perfectly reasonable. It would also be

reasonable that the law should refuse to estimate the money value

of a life against one who, without fault, had been the instrument

' Higgins 0. Butcher, 1 Brownl.205;

Yelv. 89; Baker o. Bolton, 1 Camp.

N. P. 493; Carey 0. Berkshire R. R.

Co.. 1 (lush. 475; Kearney 0. Boston

& \Vorcc.-stcr R. R. Co., 9 Cush. 109;

Quin 0. Moore,15 N. Y. 433; Whit-

ford v. Panama R. R. Co., 23 N. Y.

465; Eden u. L. 8:. T. R. R. Co., 14 B.

Mon. 2- 4: Conn. Mu. Life Ins. Co. o.

N. Y. & N. XI. R. R. Co., 25 Conn.

285; Ohio & M. R. R. Co. 0. Tindall,

13 Ind. 366; Kramer v. San Francisco,

penalty for the felonious taking of human life, should not have
allowed the damages suffered by others from a.n unlawful killing
to be recovered. The interest which husband and wife possess
in each other's life must usually have a pecnniary value which
would be estimated for many purposes at a large sum in the
dealings with others; 88 for instance in those relating to insurance:
and to the parties themselves, would be invaluable; but when
not noticed by the law 88 a ground for an action, it could only
have the incidental and indirect protection which the criminal
laws afford: the government thus disregarding the private injury
and punishing only the public injury. Here again, if we spt·ak
of a man's estate as that aggregate of possessions which on his
decease will pass to his representatives, why should not the
money value of his life, when it has been taken away by unlawful act or negligence, be a right of action in the hands of his
representatives l It is agreed, however, that the common law
made no award of compensation in these cases.' If we look tor
the reasons, we find them variously stated. One that is assigned
is the repugnance of the common law to any estimate of the
pecuniary value of human life. 2 If the propo~ition wet·e that
a money estimate should be made of the life tor the purpose uf
detennining the proper penalty for a felonious homicide, this
Npugnanee would be perfectly reasonable. It would also be
reasonable that the law should refuse to estimate the money value
of a life against one who, without fault, had been the instrument

etc., R. R. Co., 25 Cal. 434. In the

recent case of Sullivan o. Union Pac.

R. R. Co., 8 Dill. 334. Judge DILLON

questions the conclusions in these

cases, and is inclined to hold that the

father may, at common law, maintain

suit for loss of services of his minor

son by a wrongful act by which he is

instantaneously killed. He cites and

places some reliance upon Ford v.

Monroe, 20 Wend. 210, where a father

whose minor child was killed, was

allowed to recover for loss of services,

not merely up to the dcuth, but for

the whole period of minority. Sec

Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 0. Zebc, 33

Penn. St. 318.

’ Hyatt 0. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 191,

per Cuursrutxcr, J.: “ The life of a

freeman cannot be appraised, but that

of a slave who might have been sold

may." Grotius.

• Hif.!gins •· Butcher, 1 Brownt. 2M;
Yelv. 89; Baker "· Bolton, 1 Cantp.
N. P. 493; Carey "· Berkshire R. R
Co.• 1 Cusb. 475; Kearney "· Bo11ton
& Worcester R R Co., 9 Cusb. 109;
QuiD e. Moore, 15 N. Y . 433; Whit.
ford e. Panama R. R Co., 23 N.Y.
485; Eden 11. L. &. T. R. R. Co., 14 B.
Mon. 2· 4: Conn. llu. Life In\!. Co."·
N. Y. & N. II. R. R. Co., 25 Conn.
285; Ohio & M. R R. Co. "· Tindall,
18 Ind. 366; Kramer"· San Francisco,
et~ R R. Co., 25 Cal. 434. In the
recent case of Sullivan "· Union Pac.
R R Co., 8 Dill. 834. Judge Dn.r.oN
~aeations the conclusions in these
euea, and is inclined to hold that the

father may, at common law, maintnio
suit for loss of services of his minor
son by a wrongful act by which he ia
instantaneously killed. He cites and
places some rE>~iancc upon Ford "·
Monroe, 20 Wend. 210, wher·e a father
whose minor child was killed, was
allowed to recover for loss of sen· ires,
not ID('rely up to the dPath, but for
the whole period of minority. S(•e
Pennsyl·muia R. R Co. "· Zcbe, 33
Penn. Sl 318.
'Hyatt 11. Adams, 16 :Mich. lRO, HJl,
per CHJUSTIANCY, J.: "The life of u
freeman cannot be appraised, but thl\t
of a slave who might have bcc:n sold
may." Grotius.
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or occasion of its loss. But if life were taken by the wrongful

act or default of another, whether felonious or not, the sentimental

objection to making an estimate of the value in money by way

of compensation to the persons wronged, could have little of the

ordinary hard reason of the law in its support. It was making

a sentimental scruple of more importance than ustice itself, and

in cases in which the killing was through some degree of negli-

gence, but not negligence of that extreme character which would

make plain the road to criminal conviction, it defeated justice

entirely. Where the killing was felonious it was also said that

the common law would not award compensation, because the

private injury was drowned in and swallowed up by the public

injury;‘ a purely arbitrary reason, and one which might with

more justice have been applied in the cases of public wrongs

where the private injury was less extreme. But the reason, such

as it was, fails utterly in this country, where the doctrine of the

merger of private wrongs in public wrongs is not recognized.

We have, therefore, the rule of the common law left to us, but

without even the inadequate reasons by which the common law

supported it.

From this statement it will appear that Lord Oampbell’s act,‘

which gave an action for the beneﬁt of the surviving husband
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or wife, parent or child of the person whose death should be

occasioned by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another,

and allowed the value of the life to be assessed by way of com-

pensation, was an act which gave new and important rights. It

gave to husband, wife, parent and child, in addition to the rights

recognized by the common law, a. new and important interest in

each other’s life. It imposed upon all persons the duty to obey

all such laws and observe all such precautions as might be need-

ful to prevent their causing the loss of human life by wrongful

act, neglect or default; and imposing this for the beneﬁt of the

relatives designated, the correlative right was their right, even

though the action on breach of duty was to be brought in the

name of the personal representative of the person killed. The

act, which, in its main features, has been generally adopted in

this country, has relieved the law from the glaring absurdity of

recognizing claims to service, nurture, support, etc., any inter-

' Sec next Chapter. ’ 9 and 10 Vie. c. 93.

or occasion of its loss. But if life were taken by the wrongful
act or default of another, whether felonious or not, the sentimental
objection to making an estimate of the value in money by way
of compensation to the persons wronged, could have little of the
ordinary hard reason of the law in its support. It was making
a sentimental scruple of more importance than justice itself, and
in cases in which the killing was through some degree of negligence, but not negligence of that extreme character which would
make plain the road to criminal conviction, it defeated justice
entirely. Where th_e killing was felonious it was also said that
the common law would not award compensation, because tho
private injury was drowned in and swallowed up by the public
injnry;' a purely arbitrary reason, and one which might with
more justice have been applied in the cases of public wrongs
where the private injury was less extreme. Bnt the reason, such
as it was, fails utterly in this country, where the doctrine of the
merger of private wrongs in public wrongs is not recognized.
We have, therefore, the rule of the common law left to. us, but
without even the inadequate reasons by which tho common law
supported it.
From this statement it will appear that Lord Campbell's act,'
which gave an action for the benefit of the surviving husband
or wife, parent or child of the person whose death should be
occasioned by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another,
and allowed the value of the life to be assessed by way of compensation, was an act which gave new and important rights. It
gave to husband, wife, pat·ent and child, in addition to the rights
recognized by the common law, a new and important interest in
each other's life. It imposed upon all persons the duty to obey
all such laws and observe all such precautions as might be needful to prevent their cau~ing the loss of human life by wrongful
act, neglect or default; and imposing this for the benefit of the
relatives dc~;ignated, the correlative right was their right, even
though the action on breach of duty was to be brought in the
namo of the personal representative of the person killed. The
act, which, in its main features, has been generally adopted in
this country, has relieved the law from the glaring absurdity of
recogniziug claims to service, nurture, support, etc., any inter• Bee next Chapter.
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ference with which might give a right of action, but the destruc-
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tion of which would give no action whatever.

Personal Immunity. The right to one’s person may be said to

be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone. The corres-

ponding duty is, not to inﬂict an injury, and not, within such

terence with which might give a right of action, but the destruction of which would give no action whatever.

proximity as might render it successful, to attempt the inﬂiction

of an injury. In this particular the duty goes beyond what is

required in most cases; for usually an unexecuted purpose or an

unsuccessful attempt is not noticed. But the attempt to commit

a battery involves many elements of injury not always present in

breaches of duty; it involves usually an insult, a putting in fear, a

sudden call upon the energies for prompt and effectual resistance.

There is very likely a shock to the nerves, and the peace and quiet

of the individual is disturbed for a period of greater or less dura-

tion. There is consequently abundant reason in support of the

rule of law which makes the assault a legal wrong, even though

no battery takes place. Indeed, in this case the law goes still

further and makes the attempted blow a criminal offense also.

Threats and Words. A threat to commit an injury is also

sometimes made a criminal offense, but it is not actionable private

wrong. Many reasons may be assigned for distinguishing between

this case and that of an assault, one of them being that the threat
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only promises a future injury, and usually gives ample opportunity

to provide agaiustit, while an assault must be resisted on the instant.

But the principal reason, perhaps, is found in the reluctance of

the law to give a cause of action for mere words. Words never

constitute an assault, is a time honored maxim.‘ Words may be

thoughtlessly spoken; they may be misunderstood; they may

Personal Immunity. The right to one's person may be said to
be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone. The corresponding duty is, not to infiict an injury, and not, within such
proximity as might render it successful, to attempt the infliction
of an injury. In this particular the duty goes beyond what is
required in most cases; for usually an unexecuted purpose or an
unsuccessful attempt is not noticed. But the attempt to commit
a battery involves many elements of injury not always present in
breaches of duty; it involves usually an insult, a putting in fear, a
sudden call upon the energies for prompt and effectual resistance.
There is very likely a shock to the nerves, and the peace and quiet
of the individual is disturbed for a period of greater or less dura.
tion. There is consequently abundant reason in support of the
rule of law which makes the assault a legal wrong, even though
no battery takes place. Indeed, in this case the law goes still
further and makes the attempted blow a criminal offense also.

have indicated to the person threatened nothing but momentary

spleen or anger, though when afterward reported by witnesses

they seem to express deliberate malice and purpose to injure.

Even when defamation is complained of the law is very careful

to require something more than expressions of anger, reproach,

or contempt, before it will interfere; justly considering that it is

safer to allow too much liberty than to interpose too much

restraint. And comparing assaults and threats, another impor-

‘Smith 0. State, 89 Miss. 521; State his side a deadly weapon, which,

0. Mooney, Phill. (N. C.) L. 434. Even however, he makes no attempt to use.

though the party at the time has by Warren 0. State, 33 Texas, 517.

Threats and Words. A threat to commit an injury is also
aometimes made a criminal offense, but it is not actionable private
wrong. Many reasons may be assigned for distinguishing between
this cnse and that of an assault, one of them being that the threat
only promises a future injury,and usually gives ample opportunity
toprovideagainstit, while an assault must be resisted on the instant.
Hot the principal reason, perhaps, is found in the reluctance of
the law to give a cause of action tor mere words. Words never
constitute an assault, is a time honored maxim. 1 Words may be
thoughtlessly spoken; they may be misunderstood; they may
have indicated to the person threatened nothing but momentary
spleen or anger, though when afterward reported by witnesses
they seem to express deliberate malice and purpose to injure.
Even when defamation is complained of the law is very careful
to require something more than expressions of anger, reproach,
or contempt, before it will interfere; justly considering that it ie
eafer to allow too mnch liberty than to interpose too muciJ
restraint. And comparing assaults and threats, another impor• Smith •· State, 89 lliaa. ti21 ; State
•· llooney, Phill. (N. C.) L. 484. Even
&hough the party at the time baa by

his aide a deadly weapon, which,
however, be makes no attempt to use.
Warren e. State, 83 Texaa, ti17.
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tant diﬁ'e1'en'ce is to be noted: In the case of threats, as has been
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stated, preventive remedies are available; but against an assault

there are usually none beyond what the party assaulted has in his

own power of physical resistance.

Right to Reputation. The law also gives to every man a right

to security in his reputation. Perhaps a more accurate statement

would be, that it gives him a right to be protected in acquiring,

and then in maintaining. a good reputation. Even this does not

tant differenCe is to be noted: Iri. the case of threats, as has been
stated, preventive remedies are available; but against an assault
there are usually none beyond what the party assaulted has in hia
own power of physical resistance.

state the point with entire accuracy, since one may obtain a good

reputation when deserving a bad reputation; and in a reputation

to which one is not entitled he has no greater claim to protection

than he would have in anything else his claim to which was

ﬁctitious.

The subject might be illustrated by supposing the case of one

coming into a community as an entire stranger. When he comes

he can have there no reputation, either good or bad; but he has

a right, by good conduct, to acquire a good repute, and there

may be said to be a moral obligation resting upon him to do so,

since it is his duty to observe the rules of good conduct, and this

will be likely to bring him good repute. If, therefore, evil-

minded or thoughtless persons, by inventions or insinuations to

his discredit, prevent his acquiring a good repute, they thereby
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invade his right, and he should have the appropriate redress.

Referring now to what has already been said of the reluctance

of the law to make mere words a ground of action, and postpon-

ing explanations to a future occasion, it will suﬂice for our pres-

ent purpose to say that there may be interference, provided the

following things appear: (1) A false charge or insinuation which

(2) is made in malice, and (3) causes damage by its effect on the

standing and reputation of the plaintiff. Now it may be that

in the case supposed it will be found impracticable to show by

evidence of a positive nature that any of the elements of injury

exist. First, the evidence of falsity may be wanting, because

the charge may relate to something in the plaintiff ’s past history

concerning which information is not attainable. Second, it may

appear that the defendant, in making the charge, did so on

grounds of suspicion which to him were grounds of conviction

and consequently he made it without malice. And, T /tird, the

plaintiff being still a stranger, it may be said that, as yet he has

Right to Rep~tation. The law also gives to every man a right
to security in his reputation. Perhaps a more accurate statement
would be, that it gives him a right to be protected in acquiring,
and then in maintaining. a good reputation. Even this does not
state the point with entire accuracy, since one may obtain a good
reputation when deserving a bad reputation; and in a reputation
to which one is not entitled he has no greater claim to protection
than he would have in anything else his claim to which was
fictitious.
The subject might be illustrated by supposing the case of one
coming into a community as an entire stranger. When he comes
he can have there no reputation, either good or bad; but he has
a right, by good conduct, to acquire a good repute, and there
may be said to be a moral obligation resting upon him to do so,
since it is his duty to observe the rules of good conduct, and this
will be likely to bring him good repute. If, therefore, evilminded or thoughtless persons, by inventions or insinuations to
his discredit, prevent his acquiring a good repute, they thereby
invade his right, and he should have the appropriate redress.
Referring now to what has already been said of the reluctance
of the law to make mere words a ground of action, and postponing explanations to a future occasion, it will suffice for our present purpose to say that there may be interference, provided the
following things appear: (1) A false charge or insinuation which
(2) is made in malice, and (3) causes damage by its effect on the
standing and reputation of' the plaintiff. Now it may be that
in the case supposed it will be found impracticable to show by
evidence of a positive natnre that any of the elements of injury
exist. First, the evidence of falsity may be wanting, because
the charge may relate to something in the plaintiff's past history
concerning which information is not attainable. Second, it may
appear that the defendant, in making the charge, did so on
grounds of' suspicion \\hich to him were grounds of conviction.
and consequently he made it without malice. And, Third, the
plaintiff being still a stranger, it may be said that, as yet he has
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acquired no standing or reputation which the charge could dam-
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age. For these reasons it may be argued that grounds of recovery

are absent in such a case. But if this were the law, it is plain it

could not be a just law, and it would fall far short of doing

adequate ustice. It would enable a person of suspicious nature

to exclude another from the good opinion of the world when his

motives and efforts fairly entitled him to general esteem. The

ditliculty in the case is overcome by a series of legal presump-

tions. These may be stated as follows: First, every man is

presumed to be of good repute until the contrary is shown.

Second, a derogatory charge against him is presumed to be false.

T/iird, being false, it is presumed to be maliciously made.

Fourth, if its natural and legitimate effect is to cause injury,

then it is presumed to have done so in this instance. Thus one

fact—that of the publication——and four presumptions of law

support the action.‘ The exception to this is of cases where the

charge is one which, in contemplation of law, is not necessarily

followed by injury, in which case the law will not presume dam-

age, but will leave the plaintiﬁ‘ to allege and prove it. These

presumptions may, in some cases, seem somewhat violent, but

they are nevertheless reasonable. They must be so unless human

nature, conduct and reputation, are presumptively bad, so as to
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justify a legal assumption that an injurious charge is true rather

than false. Perhaps if that were to be assumed it would still be

reasonable to throw the burden of proof upon the party making

the charge, because, if he asserts facts, he ought to know where

his evidences are and be able to produce them; while the proof of

a negative, in case of a false charge, is notoriously diﬁicult, and

the more absolutely without foundation the charge may be, the

more ditﬁcult will often be the showing.

In general, however, the law has to deal with the cases of those

who have acquired a reputation of some kind. Of these there

may be several classes:

1. Those who deservedly stand in good repute.

2. Those who deservedly stand in bad repute. i

3. Those who undeservedly stand in good repute.

4. Those who undeserved] y stand in bad repute.

' In a subsequent chapter it will be quite different from the common

shown that the legal deﬁnition of meaning.

malice in the law of defamation is

acquired no standing or reputation which the charge could damage. For these reasons it may be argued that grounds of recovery
are absent in such a case. Bnt if this were the law, it is plain it
could not be a just law, and it would fhll far short of doing
adequate justice. It would enable a person of suspicious nature
to exclude another from the good opinion of the world when his
motives and efforts fairly entitled him to general esteem. The
difficulty in the case is overcome by a series of legal presumptions. These may be stated as follows: .First, every man is
presumed to be of good repute until the contrary is shown.
St!cond, a derogatory charge against him is presumed to be false.
Third, being false, it is presumed to be maliciously made.
Fourth, if its natural and legitimate effect is to cause injury,
then it is presumed to have done so in this instance. Thus ono
fact-that of the publication-and four presumptions of law
support the action.' The exception to this is of cases where the
charge is one which, in contemplation of law, is not necessarily
followed by injury, in which case the law will not presume damage, but will leave the plaintifF to allege and pro,·e it. These
presumptions may, in some cases, seem somewhat violent, but
they are nevertheless reasonable. They must be so unless human
nature, conduct and reputation, are presumptively bad, so as to
justify a legal assumption that an injurious charge is true rather
than false. Perhaps if that were to be assumed it would still be
reasonable to throw the burden of proof upon the party making
the charge, because, if he asserts facts, he ought to know where
his evidences are and be able to produce them; while the proof of
a negative, in case of a false charge, is notoriously difficult, and
the more absolutely without foundation the charge may be, the
more difficult will often be the showing.
In general, however, the law has to deal with the cases of those
who have acquired a reputation of some kind. Of these there
may be sc\·eral classes:
1. Those who deservedly stand in good repute.
2. Those who deservedly stand in bad repute. ·
3. Tho~e who undeser\•eclly stand in good repute.
f. Those who undeservedly stand in bad repute.
• ln a subsequen& chapter it will be
ahown that the legal definition or
malice in the law of defamation is

quite differen& trom the commoll
meaning.
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Upon the case of the man who is justly in good repute we
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need not pause. The man who is undeservedly in bad repute is

entitled to overcome this, and he is wronged by whomsoever

interposes obstacles, though they consist in the mere repetition

of charges which have made his reputation what it is. What

are left, then, are the cases of men who deserve a bad repute

whether as yet they have it or not.

A man whose reputation is deservedly not good, may be

wronged as well as any other by having that said of him which

is untrue. A worthless vagabond suffers a legal injury if he is

called a thief when he is not. A certain individual may be gen-

erally despised with abundant reason; but if he is a kind and

indulgent man in his family, he may justly be entitled to main-

tain an action if he be accused of treating them with cruelty.

But if the charge be true he has no legal ground for complaint.

The law has never conferred upon any one the right to be pro-

tected against the damaging effect of the truth concerning his

character. If he has been enabled to put on a good outward

appearance by covering himself with the mantle of hypocrisy, it

is not illegal for public inquiry and contempt to tear this away.

A dishonest man is not wronged when his good repute is de-

stroycd by exposure.
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But at this point it may be necessary to make a distinction

between the rights of the political community and the rights of

the individual. On grounds of public policy a. duty may some-

times be imposed to observe silence for the public good when no

such duty is imposed for the protection of the individual. The

individual is not to be heard to complain if only the truth is

spoken of him; but an offensive truth may be published without

occasion, and may then be harmful. If it bring to light facts

the publication of which can beneﬁt no one, either by way of

admonition or warning, the correction of abuses or the punish-

ment of offenders, the probable tendency of the publication must

be in the direction of immorality, disorder or violence. It thus

becomes a public oﬁense; the duty to abstain from that which

may injure the public morals or disturb the public peace has been

disregarded. And here the very truthfulness of the charge may

render it the more injurious to the public order; since a truthful

charge which subjects one to ridicule or contempt, or which

brings out gross immorality or indecency, if made in mere wan-

Upon the case of the man who is justly in good repute we
need not pause. The man who is undeserve<.lly in Lad repute is
en ti tied to overcome this, and he is wronged by whomsoever
interposes obstacles, though they consist in the mere repetition
of charges which have made his reputation what it is. What
are left, then, are the cases of men who deserve a bad repute
whether as yet they have it or not.
A. man whose reputation is deservedly not good, may be
wronged as well as any other by having that said of him which
is untrue. A worthless vagabond suffers a legal injury if he is
called a thief when he is not. A certain individual may be generally despised with abundant reason; but if he is a kind and
indulgent man in his family, he may justly be entitled to maintain an action if he be accused of treating them with cruelty.
But if the charge be true he has no legal ground for complaint.
The law has never conferred upon any one the right to be protected against the damaging effect of the truth concerning his
character. If he has been enabled to put on a good outward
appearance by covering himself with the mantle of hypocrisy, it
is not illegal for public inquiry and contempt to tear this away.
A dishonest man is not wronged when his good repute is destroyed by exposure.
But at this point it may be necessary to make a distinction
between the rights of the political community and the rights of
the individual. On grounds of public policy a duty may sometimes be imposed to obser'\"e silence for the public good when no
such duty is imposed for the protection of the individual. The
individual is not to be heard to complain if only the truth is
spoken of him; but an offensive truth may be published without
occasion, and may then be harmful. If it bring to light facts
the publication of which can benefit no one, either by way of
admonition or warning, the correction of abuses or the punishment of offenders, the probable tendency of the publication must
be in the direction of immorality, disorder or violence. It thus
becomes a public offense; the duty to abstain from that which
may injure the public morals or disturb the public peace has been
disregarded. And here the very truthfulness of' the charge may
render it the more injurious to the public order; since a truthful
charge which subjects one to ridicule or contempt, or which
brings out gross immorality or indecency, if made in mere wan-
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tonness and without justiﬁable occasion, is more likely to corrupt

public morals and incite the party assailed to acts of violence
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than it would be if its falsity could be shown. In the latter case

the party might rely upon his innocence or upon his civil remedy

to vindicate him; in the former he might feel that only in

violence had helany redress whatever.

Civil Rights. In deﬁning civil liberty reference has been

made to civil rights. An enumeration of these in detail is

neither expedient nor practicable. In a free country they em-

brace the right to do everything not harmful to the public or to

other individuals. The boundaries are such as are prescribed by

tonnetas and without justifiable occasion, is more likely to corrupt
public morals and incite the party assailed to acts of violence
than it would be if its falsity could be shown. In the latter case
the party might rely upon his innocence or upon his civil remedy
to vindicate him; in the former he might feel that only in
violence had he ,any redress whatever.

general regulations of police for the public good. Perhaps the

whole body of civil rights may be summed up in two: The right

to exemption from any restraint that has in view no beneﬁcial

purpose, and the right to participate in all the advantages 01

organized society. These give the proper liberty and insure

against unjust discrimiuations.

Religious Liberty. Among the ﬁrst of civil rights is that of

enjoying religions freedom. If this is complete, as it is supposed

to be in this country, it implies two things: 1. The right freely

to render adoration and worship to the Supreme Being in the

manner indicated by the belief, and according to the dictates of the

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:39 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

individual conscience; and 2. The right to be exempt from

exactions in support of the worship of others. _ The ﬁrst of these

may exist where there is only religious toleration; the second

enlarges toleration into religious liberty and equality.

But the liberty to worship, like all other liberty, must have

Civil Bights. In defining civil liberty reference has been
made to civil rights. An enumeration of these in detail is
neither expedient uor practicable. In a free country they embrace the right to do everything not harmful to the public or to
other individuals. The boundaries are such as are prescribed by
general regulations of police tor the public good. Perhap8 the
whole body of civil rights may be summed up in two: The right
to exemption from any restraint tlmt ha.s in view no beneficial
purpose, and the right to participate in all the admntages ot
organized society. These give the proper liberty and insure
against unjust discriminations.

bounds prescribed to it as a necessary protection to rights that

might be invaded by extravagance or excess in its indulgence.

These bounds must be ﬁxed by law; and, as in all other cases of

restraining laws, the law on this subject must have regard to the

circumstances of the people for whom it is made. One of the

most important of these circumstances is the religious belief

which generally prevails among the people. The same laws

which give reasonable protection to religious liberty where one

belief prevails, might be abhorrent and therefore wholly inad-

missible where a different belief is general. To illustrate this,

we have only to see what is tolerated or required by the religious

creeds of some people. The religion of some savage tribes per-

3

..

Among the first of civil rights is that of
enjoying religious freedom. If this is complete, as it is supposed
to be in this country, it implies two things: 1. The right freely
to rt.>nder adoration and worship to the Supreme Tieing in the
manner indicated by tl1e belief, and according to the dictates of the
indh·idnal conscience; and 2. The right to be exempt from
exactions in support of the worship of others. . The first of these
may exist where there is only religious toleration; the second
enlarges toleration into religious liberty and equality.
But the liberty to worship, like all other liberty, must ha,•e
bounds prescribetl to it as a neccs:;ary protection to rights that
might be invaded by extravagance or excess in its iudulgcnce.
The~e bounds must be fixed by law; and, as in all other case::; of
restnlining laws, the Jaw on this subject must have regard to the
circumstances of the people for whom it is made. One of the
mo£1-t important of these circumstances is the religions belief
which generally prevails among the people. The same laws
whieh give reasonable protection to religions liberty where one
belief premiJs, might be abhorrent and therefore wholly inadmissible where a different belief is general. To illustrate this,
we have only to see what is tolerated or required by the rcligil,UA
ereeds of some people. The religion of some savage tri~ pt•rReligious Liberty.
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mits human sacriﬁces; and there were saturnalia among the

Greeks and Romans; but in Turkey, to-day, where religious lib-
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erty is supposed to exist, such sacriﬁces and prgies would be

abhorrent, and the law would punish them. The religion of the

Turk, on the other hand, sanctions polygamy, and this in a

Christian country would be forbidden and punished as a high

offense. But neither in the one case nor in the other is religious

liberty violated when that which is abhorrent to the general

public is forbidden. There must necessarily be bounds to relig-

ions liberty in every country, varying in each with the religious

belief and accepted moral code of the people generally. A single

sentence may perhaps be suflicient for the presentation of the

general principle. Religious liberty in any country cannot

embrace those things which the moral sense or sense of decency

of the general public condemns, and which consequently cannot

be allowed without injury to the‘public morals.

The acceptance of this as a general rule cannot preclude any

government in its discretion tolerating that which its people

would condemn, where for any reason of policy it should think

proper to establish regulations to that effect. But the general

principle that any class of people in a country can rightfully do

that which is offensive to the public morals cannot be accepted.
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Opinion must be free; religious error the government should not

concern itself with; but when the minority of any people feel

impelled to indulge in practices or to observe ceremonies that the

general community look upon as immoral excess or license, and

therefore destructive of public morals, they have no claim to

protection in so doing. The State cannot be bound to sanction

immorality or crime, even though there be persons in a commu-

nity with minds so perverted or depraved or ill-informed as to

believe it to be countenanced or commanded of heaven. And

the standard of immorality and crime must be the general sense

of the people embodied in the law. There can be no other.‘

When religious liberty is deﬁned, there may still be rules for

regulating its enjoyment. We say, in general, that every man is

at liberty to worship God according to the dictates of his own

conscience. But one man’s conscience may perhaps impel him

to gather a crowd for worship in the streets of a populous city,

‘Cooley, Const. Lim. 471, at aeq.,- Woolsey's Political Science, § 52.

?_

mits human sacrifices; and there were saturnalia among the
Greeks and Romans; but in Turkey, to-day, where religious liberty is supposed to exist, such sacrifices and .Prgies would be
abhorrent, and the law would punish them. The religion of the
Turk, on the other hand, sanctions polygamy, and this in a
Christian country would be forbidden and punished as a high
offense. But neither in the one case nor in the other is religious
libet·ty violated when that which is abhorrent to the general
pn hlic is forbidden. There must necessarily be bounds to religions liberty in every country, varying in each with the religious
belief and accepted moral code of the people generally. A single
sentence may perhaps be sufficient for the pre.sentation of the
general principle. Religions liberty in any country cannot
embrace those things which the moral sense or sense of decency
of the general public condemns, and which consequently cannot
be allowed without injury to the' public morals.
The acceptance of this as a general rule cannot preclude any
government in its discretion tolerating that which its people
would condemn, where for any reason of policy it should think
proper to establish regulations to that effect. But the general
principle that any class of people in a country can rightfully do
that which is offensive to the public morals cannot be accepted.
Opinion must be freo; religious error the government should not
cuncern itself with; but when the minority of any people feel
impelled to indulge in practices or to observe ceremonies that the
general community look upon as immoral excess or license, and
therefore destructive of public morals, they have no claim to
protection in so doing. The State cannot be bound to sanction
immorality or crime, even though there be persons in a community with minds so perverted or depraved or ill-informed as to
believe it to be countenanced or commanded of heaven. And
the standard of immorality and crime mnst be the general sense
of the people embodied in the law. There can be no other!
When religious liberty is defined, there may still be rules for
regulating its enjoyment. We say, in general, that every mania
at liberty to worship God according to the dictate3 of his own
eonscience. But one man's conscience may perhaps impel him
tll gather a crowd for worship in the streets of a populous city,
1

Cooley, Conal J..im. 471, et aeq.; Woolsey's Political

~cience,

§52.

CLASSIFICATION OF LEGAL RIGHTS. 35

or to invade the house of worship of people of another belief

OLASSIFIOATION OF LEGAL RIGIITS.

and interrupt their exercises by substituting his own, or, Gas-

!~5

sandra-like, to Qve solemn warnings in legislative halls or courts

of justice. These the law must deal with as the excesses of lib-

erty, because they encroach upon the just liberty of others or

disturb the public order. Concede to every man the liberty to

follow what he may assert to be the dictates of his own conscience,

and there must soon be no organized society and no rational liberty

of any sort. The reason is obvious: Society and liberty, as has

been already shown, depend for their existence on regulations and

restraints.

Equality of Civil Rights. In a free country all civil rights

must be equal, except as the circumstances of individuals or

classes create distinctions which it is necessary or proper for the

law to recognize. We may illustrate with the right to maintain

suits. Every one must possess it, and one is out of the protection

of the law who is deprived of it. But there are classes whom it may

not be proper to permit to manage their suits in their o\vu way.

or to invade the house of worship of people of another belief
and interrupt their exercises by substituting his own, or, Cassandra-like, to ~ve solemn warnings in legislative haJls or courts
of justice. These tpe law must deal with as the excesses of liberty, because they encroach upon the just liberty of others or
di~;ttub the public order. Conc:ede to every man the liberty to
follow what he may assert to be the dictates of his own conscience,
and there must soon be no orga.uized society and no rational liberty
of any sort. Tho reason is obvious: Society and liberty, as hat\
been already shown, depend for their existence on regulations and
re~traints.

The infant or the non compoa, for instance, who must appear by

guardian. But this manifestly is only a regulation of a right; not

a denial or even an abridgemont of one. The State must deny to

no man right and justice, but it may properly regulate the forms
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and proceedings through whichhe must obtain them. So the right

to acquire an education is an important civil right; but though the

State provides for this, it usually establishes schools for those who

are within certain ages, and not for any others. In this case the

persons within the prescribed ages have a right in the schools

under proper regulations; others have a right to make their own

voluntary arrangements. The people are impartially arranged

into classes, and that is all that can be required. The public

highways are for the common use of all, but discriminating reg-

ulations are often essential, and it may be deemed politic to pro-

hibit certain classes being abroad in the streets at hours or under

circumstances when they or the public would be peculiarly liable

to outrage or injury in consequence. The reasonableness of such

regulations is the concern of legislation, and they may be legal,

even when on the score of policy or justice there seems to be

abundant ground to question the propriety of the distinctions.

I‘ he common law did not allow the married woman to make con-

tracts on her own behalf. The general conviction now is that the

In a free country all civil rights
must be equal, except as the circumstances of individuals or
classes create distinctions which it is necessary or proper for the
law to recognize. We may illustrate with the right to maintain
suitd. E\"ery one must possess it, and one is out of the protection
of the law who is depri vcd of it. Bnt there are classes whom it ma1
not be proper to permit to manage their snits in their own way.
The infant or the 1WB oompo8, for inatance, who must appear b.Y
guardian. But this manifestly is only a regulation of a right; not
a denial or even an abridgement of one. The State must deny to
no man right and justice, but it may properly regulate the forme
and proceedings through which'hc must obtain them. So the right
to acquire an education is an important civil right; but though the
State pro•;ides for this, it usually establishes schools for those who
are within certain ages, and not for any others. In this case the
persons within tho prescribed ages have a right in the schools
under proper regulatio~s; others have a right to make their own
volnntar.Y arrangements. The people are impartially arranged
into classes, and that is all that can be required. The public
bip:hways are for the common use of all, but discriminating rcgulntions are often essential, and it may be deemed politic to prohibit certain classes being abroad in the streets at hours or under
eireomstanccs when they or the pnblic would be peculiarly liable
to outrage or injury in consequence. The reasonableness of sneh
n>;...rulations is the concern of legislation, and they may be legal,
even when on the score of policy or justice there seems to be
abundant ground to question the propriety of the distinctions.
The common law did not allow the married woman to make contracts on her own behalf. The general conviction now is that the
Equallty of Civil Bights.
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reasons were insuﬁicient; but while they were accepted and acted
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upon, the most that one could say would be that this class of

persons ought to have the right, but did not. However unfairly

any particular discrimination might operate, it will readily be

admitted that to give exactly the same rights to all classes under

all circumstances would work injustice rather than equality. The

case of the infant is perhaps the best illustration here; to give

him the same control and management of his property which the

law allows to others would only be taking from him a rule of

protection which he needs, but which is not needed by others.

The infant is undoubtedly entitled to equal consideration in the

law with all others; but equality of civil rights in a general sense,

can only mean equality under impartial regulations; and these

regulations cannot be reasonable or ust unless in some cases they

recognize or establish important distinctions.

The right to acquire, own and enjoy property may be said

to be of universal recognition in government. And this includes

the right to select and follow any lawful employment, with a

view to the acquisition of property, subject only to reasonable

and impartial regulations. The infant has this right of acquisi-

tion equally with the adult, and the insane equally with all others.
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There may be restrictions on control and management of prop-

erty for the general good, or for the good of the owner, but

these guard the right; they are not properly an abridgement of

it. Instances of this are found in the requirement of the statute

of frauds, that certain contracts and sales shall not be made

unless by writing duly signed; the purpose here is not to pre-

clude any proper contracts or sales, but to establish such precau-

tions as will prevent the setting up of contracts and sales which

were never made, and establishing them on mistaken or false

testimony.

Political Rights. The privilege of participation in the gov-

ernment is conferred as an act of sovereignty on those whose

participation is supposed to be most beneﬁcial to the State.

Being a privilege, no one is supposes to be injured when it is not

conferred upon him. The rules of admission will be established

by the State on a consideration of the general good.‘ The priv-

‘ Minor 1:. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233; Spencer 0.

Spragins 0. Houghton, 3 Ill. 3'77, 396; B'd of Registration, 1 Mcrirthur, 169.

reasons were insufficient; but while they were accepted and acted
upon, the most that one could say would be that this class of
persons ought to have the right, but did not. lJowever unfairly
any particular discrimination might operate, it will readily be
admitted that to give exactly the same rights to all classes under
all circumstances would work injustice rather than equality. The
case of the infant is perhaps the best illustration here; to gh·e
him the same control and management of his property which the
law allows to others would only be taking from him a rule of
protection which he needs, but which is not needed by others.
The infant is undoubtedly entitled to equal consideration in the
law with all others; but equality of civil rights in a general sense,
can only mean equality under impartial regulations; and these
regulations cannot be reasonable or just unless in some cases they
recognize or establish important distinctions.
The right to acquire, own and enjoy prOJlerty may be said
to be of universal recognition in government. And this includes
the right to select and follow any lawful employment, with a
view to the acquisition of property, subject only to reasonable
and impartial regulations. The infant has this right of acquisition equally with the adult, and the insane equally with all others.
There may be restrictions on control and management of property for the general good, or for the good of the owner, but
these guard the right; they are not properly an abridgement of
it. Instances of this are found in the requirement of the statute
of frauds, that certain contracts and sales shall not be made
unless by writing duly signed; the purpose here is not to preclude any proper contt·acts or sales, but to establish such precautions as will prevent the setting up of contracts and sales which
were never made, and establishing them on mistaken or false
testimony.
The privilege of participation in the government is conferred as an act of sovereignty ou those whose
participation is supposed to be most benetidal to the State.
Being a privilege, no one is supposes to be injured when it is not
conferred upon him. The roles of admission \Vill be established
by the State on a consideration of the general good.1 The privPolitical Rights.

Minor"· Happersett, 21 Wall. 162;
Bpragina "· Boughton, 8 Ill. 377, 396;
1

State "· Staten, 6 Cold. 233; Spen<'.er "·
B'd of Registration, 1 McArthur, 169.
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ilege is not conferred on the very young, and it is sometimes
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withheld from the ignorant. It is also sometimes made to depend

on the possession of property. A defense of such a discrimina-

tion is made by some on the ground that one of the chief

objects of government is to render it possible to own and enjoy

property, and if suﬂrage were universal, this purpose might be

defeated by the government passing into the hands of those who,

having no property of their own, may be disposed to despoil

others. It may also be said that those ought to control the

government whose contributions support it, and that these are

the property owners.

Still, again, it may be said that the owner of property is prima

facie better qualiﬁed to take part in the government than he

who has nothing, because facie he has exhibited more

prudence, thrift and judgment than the other. These theories

do not concern us now. When the political privilege is conferred

as an act of sovereign power, it becomes for the time being a

legal right; a right which others must not disturb, which is

capable of being defended, and which may even, for the purposes

of legal defense, be considered as having a money value to the

possessor. The deprivation thereof may consequently be com-

pensated by a recovery of damages. Butalike act of sovereignty
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to that which confers a political right may take it away. There

cannot be, either in the elective franchise or in a public office any

vested right as against the sovereignty, except so far as, in form-

ing the constitution of government, it has been agreed that there

should be.

Some political privileges are the right of every person, whether

an elector or not Such is the privilege of meeting and discus-

sing public aﬁ'airs with others. Such, also, are the privileges of

petition and remonstrance. Every person under the jurisdiction

of the laws has the right to petition for or remonstrate against

a change therein, and also to address any oﬂicial person or body

upon any subject which concerns him as an individual, or the

public of which he is a member, and over which such oﬁieial

person or board is vested with authority. Precautions are taken

to guard this right by constitutional provisions, but they cannot

be very effectual, because they are easily evaded. The callous

Often in advance decides that the petition or remonstrance shall

have no inﬂuence, and its reception then becomes an idle ceremony.

fle~ is not conferred on the very young, and it is sometimes
withheld from the ignorant. It is also sometimes made to depend
on the po~MeSSion of property. A defense of such a discrimination is made by some on the ground that one of the chief
objects of government is to render it possible to own and enjoy
property, and if snfl'rage were universal, this purpose might be
defeated by the government passing into the hands of those who,
having no property of their own, may be disposed to despoil
others. It may also be said that those ought to control the
government whose contributions support it, and that these are
the property owners.
Still, again, it may be said that the owner of property is prima
faci.6 better qualified to take part in the government than he
who bas nothing, because prima facU he has exhibited more
prudence, thrift and judgment than the other. These thcori<'s
do not concern us now. When the political privilege is conferred
as an act of sovereign power, it becomes for the time being a
legal right; a right which others must not disturb, which is
capable of being defended, and which may even, for the purposes
of legal defense, be considered as having a money value to the
possessor. The deprivation thereof may consequently be compensated by a recovery of damages. But alike act of sovereignty
to that which confers a political right may take it away. There
cannot be, either in the elective franchise or in a public office any
vested right as against the sovereignty, except so far as, in forming the constitution of government, it has been agreed that there
should be.
&Jme political privileges are the right of every person, whether
an elector or not. Such is the privilege of meeting and discussing public affairs with others. Such, also, are the privileges of
petition and remonstrance. Every perr:Son under the jurisdiction
of the laws has the right to petition f'or or remonstrate against
a c!1angc therein, and also to address any official person or body
upon any subject which concerns him as an individual, or the
public of which he is a member, and over which such official
person or board is vested with authority. Precautions arc taken
to guard this right by constitutional provisiom;, but they cannot
be very effectual, because they are easily evaucd. The ~mcue
often in advance decides that the petition or J'emonstrance shall
have no influence, and its reception then becomes an idle ceremony.
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Family Rights. I‘he following may be mentioned as rights
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in the family relation:

1. The right of the husband to the society and services of

of the wife. It is often, and very justly, spoken of as areproach

to the common law, that it recognized in the wife no correspond-

ing right to the society and services of her husband. Theoreti-

ically, the duty was imposed upon him to comfort and cherish,

but the duty was one of imperfect obligation, because no rem-‘dy

whatever was provided for failure to observe it.‘

Some few of the States have provided a remedy for this defect

in a single class of cases; that is to say, cases in which the loss

to the wife is occasioned by selling or giving to the husband

intoxicating drinks. In these cases she is permitted to bring

suit against the party who, by furnishing the means of intoxica-

tion, has been the cause of the loss, and she is allowed to recover

substantial damages, where substantial loss has been suffered.

2. The right of the wife to a reasonable support, to be fur-

nished by her husband.’ This, also, at the common law was a

'2 Kent, 182: Reeve Dom. Rel. 110.

The subject will be discussed in a

subsequent chapter.

' When a wife leaves the husband's
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house because of his cruelty or neg-

lect, or with his express or implied

consent, the husband is liable to any-

one furnishing her with necessaries;

Billings v. Pitcher,7 B. Mon. 458;

Family Bights. rhc following may be mentioned as rights
in the family relation:
1. The right of the husband to the society and services of
of the wife. It is often, and very justly, spoken of as a reproach
to the eommon law, that it recognized in the wife no corr('spouding right to the society and sen·ices of her lm8uand. Theoretiically, the dnty was imposed upon him to comfort and cherish,
but the duty wa~ one of imperfect obligation, because no rcm. ·dy
whatever was provided for failure to ob:>erve it.'
Some few of' the States have provided a remedy for this defect
in a single class of cases; that is to f:lay, cases in which the loss
to the wife is occasioned by selling or gidug to the husband
iutoxicatiug drinkt~. In these ea8es she is permitteJ to brin;
suit against the party who, by furnishing the means of intoxication, has been the cause of the loss, and she is allowed to recover
substantial damages, where substantial loss has been sufiered.
2. The right of the wife to a reasonable support, to be furnished by her husband.• This, also, at the common law was a

Mahew v. Thayer, 8 Gray, 172; Em-

mett 0. Norton, 8 C. & P. 506; Dixon

0. Hurrcll, 8 C. & P. 717; Rawley

0. Vandyke, 3 Esp. 251; Hodges 0.

Hodges, 1 Esp. 441; Burlen 1:. Shan-

non, 14 Gray, 433; Cartwright 1:. Bate,

1 Allen, 514; Hultz v. Gibbs, 66 Penn.

St. 360; Biddle v. Frazier. 3 Honst.

258; Allen o. Aldrich, 9 Foster, N. H.

63; Pidgin '0. Cram, 8 N. H. 350;

Trotter v. Trotter, '77 Ill. 510; Lock-

wood v. Thomas, 12 Johns. 24$; Tab-

betts 0. Hapgood, 84 N. H. 420 ; Wal-

ker '0. Simpson, 7 Watts & S. 83;

Parke 1:. Klccber, 37 Penn. 251; Sno-

ver 0. Blair, 25 N. J. 94; Pearson 0.

Darrington, 82 Ala. 227; Reese 0.

Chilton, 36 Mo. 598; Clement 0. Mat-

tison, 3 Rich S. C. 98; Black v. Bryan,

18 Texas, 453. So, too, if he deserts

his wife and family, he is liable for

their necessaries; Hall v. Wicr, 1 Al-

len, 261; Walker u. Laighton, 31

N. H. 111. If, by his cruelty, he

compels his wife to leave him. and

she dies while away, he is liable for

the reasonable expense of her funeral,

without notice of her death. Cun-

ningham 0. Ileardon, 98 Mass. 538;

Ambrose 0. Kerrison, 10 C. B. 776;

Bradshaw v. Beard, 12 C. B., N. S.

344. Ile is not liable if she leaves

without suﬂicicnt cause. Hurttmaun

0. Tcgart, 12 Kan. 177; Oinson v. Her-

itage. 45 Ind. 73; S. C. 15 Am. Rep.

258; Ross 0. Ross, 69 Ill. 561); Allen

'0. Aldrich, 29 N. H. 63: Brown 0.

Mndgett, 40 Vt. 68; Sturlcvant 1;.

Starin, 19 Wis. 2118; McCutchcn 0.

McGahay, 11 Johns. 281; Rutlicrford

v. Coxc, 11 Mo. 347; Brown 0. Pat»

ton, 3 Humph. 135; Porter v. Bobb,

2 Kent, 182: Reeve Dom. Rei. 110.
Tho subject will be discussed in a
subsequent chapter.
1 When a wife leaves the husband's
house because of his C'ruelty or neg.
lect, or wilh his express or implied
consent, the husband is liable to anyone furnishing her with necessaries;
Billings "· Pitcher, 7 B. Mon. 458;
llahew 11. Thayer, 8 Gray, 172: Em.
mett 11. Norton, 8 C. & P. 50[1; Dixon
tl. Hurrell, 8 C. & P. 717; Rawley
e. Vandyke, 3 Esp. 251; Hodges tl.
Hodges, 1 Esp. 441; Burien tl. Shannon, 14 Gr·ay, 433; Cartwright 11. Bate,
1 Allen, 514: Hultz"· GibtJs, 66 Penn.
St. 360 ; Biddle e. Frazier, 3 Houst.
258; Allen tl. Aldrich, 9 Foster, N.H.
68: Pidgin 11. Cram, 8 N. H. 8:i0;
Trotter "· Trotter, 77 111. 510; Lockwood fl. Thomas, 12 Johns. 24~; Tebbetts 11. Hapgood, 34 N.H. 420; Walker fl. Bimpson, 7 Watts & S. 83;
Parke"· Kleeber, 87 Penn. 251; Snover "· Blair, 25 N. J. 94; Pearson 11.
Darrington, 82 Ala. 227; Reese "·
1

Chilton, 36 ~lo. oOR; Clement "· Mat.
tison, 3 Rich S.C. 93; Black 11. BryiUl,
18 Texas, 453. So, too, if he desert&
his wife and fRmily, he is liable for
their necessaries; Hall t:. Wier, 1 Allen, 261; Walker e. Lai~hton, 81
N. II. 111. If, by hla cruelty, h~
compels his wife to leave him, and
she dies while away, he is liable for
the reasonable expense of her funeral,
without notice of her death. Cunningham "· Ucardon, 08 ?tl:1ss. :;as;
Ambrose tl. Kcrrison, 10 C. B. 776;
Brad:~haw "· Beard, 12 C. B., N . 8.
344. lie is not lillble if shH l<·nves
without sufficient cause. Harttmann
tl. Tegart, 12 Kan. 177; Oinson t. Heritage. 45 Ind. 73; 8. C. 15 Am. Hep.
2.1~; Ross 11. Ros;;, 69 Ill. 5u9; Allen
11. Aldrich, 29 N. H. 63; Brown e.
:Mudgett, 40 Vt. 68; Sturtevant e.
Starin, 19 Wis. 2t;s; ?tlcCutch<'n e.
McGahay, 11 Johns. 281; Huthl•rford
"· Coxe, 11 1\lo. 347; Brown "· Pat.
ton, 3 Humph. 135; Porter tl. Bobb.
25 llo. 36; Evans tl. Fishm·, 10 Ill.

CLASSIFICATION or 1.1~:o.u. 1{1G}.l'1‘S. ' 39

OLABSIFIOATION 0},' Ll-:GAL IUGll'l'S.

right of imperfect obligation, not only because the remedies for

3V

compelling its observance by the husband were inadequate, but

because not protected in any way against abridgement or defeat

at the hands of other parties.

3. The right of the parent to the custody and services of his

child,‘ which is qualiﬁed by such regulations as the State may

establish for his beneﬁt and protection, and for the care and pres-

ervation of any property of which he may be possessed. One

universal regulation is, that the right shall cease at a certain age;

at twenty-one, or perhaps, in the case of females, at eighteen.

Others which are sometimes established are, that very young

children shall not be employed in mines, collieries, or factories,

and that for a certain portion of the year they shall be placed in

schools. ‘

4. The obligation of the parent to support the child, when from

immaturity or other cause he is unable to support himself, can

hardly be said to confer upon the child a right to such support,

because the law provides no means of enforcing the parental obli-

gation for his beneﬁt. The common law in this regard let't the

interests and protection of the child to what must often prove the

imperfect guardianship of the State. In other words, it imposed

569; Williams 0. Prince, 3 Strobh. methods in which emancipation may
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490: Ross 0. Ross. 69 Ill. 569; Bevier

0. Galloway, 71 Ill. 517.

Where husband and wife separate

by mutual consent, and the husband

makes a contract with a third person

to maintain the wife, if the wife leave

such third person voluntarily, and

withoutjust cause, she will not carry

with her authority to pledge her

right of imperfect obligation, not only because the remP-dies for
compelling its observance by the husband were inadequate, but
bocausc not protected in any way against abridgement or defeat
at the hands of other parties.
3. The right of the parent to the custody and services of his
child,1 which is qualified by such regulations as the State may
e&tablish for his benefit and protection, and tor the care and preser\·ation of any property of which he may be posse:;::;cd. One
universal regulation is, that the right shall cease at a certain age;
at twenty-one, or perhaps, in the case of females, at eighteen.
Others which are sometimes established are, that very young
children shall not be employed in mines, collieries, or factories,
and that tor a certain portion of the year they shall be placed in
~ehools.

4. The obligation of the parent to support the child, when from
immaturity or other cause he is unable to support himself, cau
hardly be said to confer upon the child a right to such support,
because the law provides no means of enforcing the parental obligation tor his benefit. The common law in this regard left the
interests and protection of the child to what must often prove the
imperfect guardianship of the State. In other words, it imposed

husband for her support. Pidgin 0.

Cram. 8 N. H. 350.

The husband has a right to change

his domicil, and it is the wife's duty

to accompany him, and if she refuses,

he is not liable for her support and

maintenance. Babbitt 0. Babbitt, 69

lll. 277.

‘The right of the parent to the ser-

vices of his child may be lost by

cmsnciputing him. In brief, the

take place are the following:

1. By a formal agreement between

the father and child to that etfect.

Morse 0. Wclton, 6 Conn. 547; At-

wood 1:. Holcomb. 39 Conn. 270; Wol-

cott 0. Rickey, 22 Iowa, 172; Mason

o. Hutchius, 32 Vt. 780; Hull 0. Hall,

44 N. II. 293. 2. By the father re-

fusing to care and provide for the

child. Nightingale 1:. Withington,

15 Mass. 272; Atwood 0. Holcomb,

39 Conn. 270. 3. By the father suffer-

ing the child to depart and act for

himself, and employ his own services

at his option. Johnson 0. Terry, 34

Conn. 259; Everett o. Shcrfey.1 Iowa,

356; \\/biting o. Earle, 3 Pick. 201;

\Vodcll v. Coggesliull, 2 Met. 89; Bray

o. Wheeler, 29 Vt. 514. That no for-

mal emancipation is necessary, see

Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 2&7.

MO; Williams tl. Prince, 8 Btrobh.
480: Ross"· Ross, 69 Ill. 569; Bevier
•· Galloway, 71 Ill. 517.
Where husband and wife separate
by mutulll consent, nod the husband
makes a contract with a lbird person
lo maintain the wife, if the wife leave
•uch third person vuluntarily, and
without just cause, she will not carry
willa hrr authority to pll'dge her
husband f•1r her support. Pidgin 11.
Cram. 8 :N. H. 350.
The husband bas a right to change
hill domicil, and it is the wife's duty
to accompllny him, and if she rcfu,es,
be is not liable for her support and
maintenance. Babbitt 11. Babbitt, 69
Ill. 277.
1 The right of the parent to ll1e ser.
Tices of his child may be lost by
emaucipati.Dg him.
In brief, the

methods in which emancipation may
take place are the following:
1. By a formal agreement between
the father and cllild to that ell'ect.
:Morse "· Welton, 6 Conn. 547; At.
wood"· Holcomb.39 Conn. 270; Wol.
cott "· Hickey, 22 Iowa, 172; lluson
"· llutchins, 32 Vt. 780; Hall"· Hall,
44 N. II. 293. 2. By the father refusing to care and provide for the
child. Ni.~htingnle "· Within.~ton,
15 Mass. 272; Atwood 11. Holcomb,
89 Conn. 270. 3. By the fath1~r sutfering the child to dl'part and act for
himself, and emploY' his own services
at his option. Johnson "·Terry, 34
Conn. 2:39; EveJ'Cit "· Sherfey. llowa.
856; Whiting "· Earle, 3 Pick. 201;
Wodcll "· Coggl'shull, 2llet. 89; Bray
"· Wheeler, 29 \'t. 514. That no for.
mal emancipation is necc"sary, sec
Sword o. Keith, 31 Mich. 2l7.
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the obligation on the parent as a duty to the State, and not as I.

THE L.A \V 0.1!'

TOI~TS.

duty to the child.

the obligation on the parent as a duty to the State, and not as a
duty to the child.
There are other rights to which, in customary but somewhat
loose language, it is said the child is entitled: such as the right
to protection against injuries and against the unlawful action of
others, the right to culture and education, the right to share in
the parent's estate.
These are sometimes spoken of as natural rights, and the parent
is said to be under an obligation to recognize them. But, as in
the case of other so-called natural rights, this can be no more
than a moral obligation, and therefore the rights in a legal sense
do not exist. "\Ve may test this by supposing any one of the
supposed rights violated: that, for instance, of protection. A
third person beats the child witHout justification, the fitther looking on and not giving the protection which the impulses of
affection and the sense of justice should prompt him to afford.
In snch a. case the assaulter is responsible to the State for his
criminal attack upon a. citizen; he is responsible to the child in
a civil action, and he may possibly e\"en be liable to the father if
the attack has diminished the child's ability to perform labor.
But the father incurs no liability to the child for failure to extend
protection.
In thus neglecting the parental obligation he may have demonstrated how lamentably he is wanting in natural feeling, but he
has violated no positive command of the law. The same remark
holds good when the education of the child is in question. A
parent having the nece:;:;ary ability ought to give his child such
an education as will fit him to enter the world of business,
literature, science, art, or politics, with such full prep::1ration as
will enable him to contend tor wealth, position, and honors with
those whom he may there encounter. But the duty to do this
was never imposed by tho Jaw; it was left wholly to the dictates
of natural affection, family pride, and the other motives which
usualJy are expected to influence the parent in that direction.
If these failed of effect, the child at the common law had no
remedy whatever. Some steps have recently been taken by
statute for the compulsory education of chil£h·en; but the duty
which statutes impose in that direction is imposed as a duty to the
State, and its performance is compelled by imposing penalties, not
by allowing the child to bring action against the delinquent parent.

There are other rights to which, in customary but somewhat

loose language, it is said the child is entitled: such as the right

to protection against injuries and against the unlawful action of

others, the right to culture and education, the right to share in

the parent’s estate.

These are sometimes spoken of as natural rights, and the parent

is said to be under an obligation to recognize them. But, as in

the ease of other so-called natural rights, this can be no more

than a moral obligation, and therefore the rights in a legal sense

do not exist. \Ve may test this by supposing any one of the

supposed rights violated: that, for instance, of protection. A

third person beats the child witliout justiﬁcation, the father look-

ing on and not giving the protection which the impulses of

affection and the sense of justice should prompt him to aﬂbrd.

In such a case the assaulter is responsible to the State for his

criminal attack upon a citizen; he is responsible to the child in

a civil action, and he may possibly even be liable to the father if

the attack has diminished the child’s ability to perform labor.

But the father incurs no liability to the child for failure to extend

protection.
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In thus neglecting the parental obligation he may have demon-

strated how lamentably he is wanting in natural feeling, but he

has violated no positive command of the law. The same remark

holds good when the education of the child is in question. A

parent having the necessary ability ought to give his child such

an education as will ﬁt him to enter the world of business,

literature, science, art, or politics, with such full preparation as

will enable him to contend for wealth, position, and honors with

those whom he may there encounter. But the duty to do this

was never imposed by the law; it was left wholly to the dictates

of natural affection, family pride, and the other motives which

usually are expected to inﬂuence the parent in that direction.

If these failed of etfect, the child at the common law had no

remedy whatever. Some steps have recently been taken by

statute for the compulsory education of children; but the duty

which statutes impose in that direction is imposed as a duty to the

State, and its performance is compelled by imposing penalties, not

by allowing the child to bring action against the delinquent parent.

i
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The old common law did not empower theparent to dispose

OLA88Ii'IOATION OF LEGAL BIGHTS.

41

of his real estate by testamentary gift, and it probably did not

permit him to dispose of all his chattels. -But since the reign of

Henry VIII. a general power to dispose of both species of prop-

erty has existed, saving, however, the rights of creditors, and of

the widow if there was one. Wliile, therefore, it is usually

expected that the child will be permitted to share in the parent’s

estate. the law does not insure this as a right. If the parent sees

tit to disinherit him, he has no redress. But if the parent makes

no will, the law of distributions and descents apportions the

property among the kindred, usually remembering the children

ﬁrst of all.

There have, in some instances, been statutes which took from

the parent some portion of this authority; limiting his power to

dispose of property by testamentary gift to a certain proportion

thereof, leaving the remainder to‘ pass to those who are desig-

nated by the law as heirs and distributees. Even such statutes

give no rights to the child as such. They limit the power of the

owner over his real estate; but what they give on the owner’s

death is given, not in recognition of a right, and not necessa-

rily to a child, but to such persons as in that contingency, in

view of their relationship to the deceased, the State has thought
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proper to make his successor in the ownership.

Bight to Form the Family. Back of these family rights is the

right to form the relation from which, at the common law, all

family rights spring: the relation of marriage. In various direc-

tions this right is hedged about with conditions, established for the

general good. First. The person in nst have attained the prescribed

age or the act will be inehoate only, and require conﬁrmation when

that age is reached. Second. The consent of parents or guardian

may perhaps be required by law. T/tird. There must be the con-

sent of the person to be married, freely given; for the law only

sanctions voluntary arrangements. Some act of publicity may be

required to precede it, such as the publishing of banns, or the issue

and record of a license. Fuurt/t. The law may permit it only under

certain prescribed forms, the absence of which will render any

voluntary action ineffectual. And, even observing these forms,

it is only persons of consenting mind who may marry; by which

is meant only those persons who have that degree of legal

capacity which the law recognizes as suﬂicient for entering into

The old common law did not empower the. parent to dispose
of his real estate by testamentary gift, and it probably did not
permit him to dispose of all his chattels. ·But since the reign of
Henry VIII. a general power to dispose of both species of property has existed, saving, however, the l'ights of creditors, and of
the widow if there was one. While, therefore, it is usually
expected that the child will be permitted to share in the parent's
estate.. the law cloes not insure this as a right. If the pareut sees
tit &o disinherit him, he has no redress. But if the parent makes
uo will, the law of distributions and descents apportions the
vroperty among the kindred, usually remembering the children
:first of all.
There have, in some instances, been statntes which took from
the parent some portion of this authority; limiting his power to
dispose of property by testamentary gift to a certain proportion
thereof, lea\'ing the remainder to- pass to those who are designated by the law as heirs and distrilmtees. Even such statutes
give no rights to the child as such. They limit the power of the
uwner over his real estate; bnt what they give on the owner's
death is given, not in recognition of a right, and not necessarily to a child, but to such persons as in that contingency, in
view of their relationship to the deceas~d, the State has thought
proper to make his sn<:<:essor in the ownership.
B.tght to J'orm the Family. Back of these family rlgltts is the
right to form the relation from which, at the common law, all
family rights spring: the relation of marriage. In various directions this right is hedged about with conditions, established for the
Jleneral good . .Firat. The person must have attained the prescribed
Bf...'C or the act will be inchoate only, and require confirmation when
that ~C?C is reached. Second. The consent of parents or guardian
may perhaps be required by law. Thi1·d. There must be the cont:ent ot' the person to be married, freely given; for the law only
t~anctions voluntary arran~ernents. Some act of publicity may be
ft<{Uired to )>recede it, SU<'h 1\8 the publishing of banns, or the issue
ami record of a license. P'ottrth. The law may permit it only under
certain prescribed forms, the abocn<:e of which will render any
voluntary action ineffectual. And, e\·en observing th('~e forms,
it is only persons of consenting mind who may marry; by which
is meant only those persons who have that degree of legal
capacity which the law recognizes as sufficient for entering into

42 THE LAW on roars.

contracts of this important nature. Wlien, therefore, it is said

42

TilE LAW OF TORTS.

that the right to enter into the relation of marriage is universal,

this does not exactly express the legal idea. The legal idea is,

that every one has a legal right to marry who obtains the consent

of a person of the opposite sex having a like right, provided both

have the capacity and qualiﬁcations prescribed by law, and

observe all the legal conditions.

Domestic Relations in General. Besides the family relations

which spring from marriage there are certain domestic relations of

another origin. The relation of master and servant, for instance,

is one of contract. The relation of master and apprentice is similar,

though here the contracting party on one side may really be the

State in some cases. The relation of guardian and ward is of

various origin, but usually is a matter of judicial creation. But

none of these are strictly family relations, or give family rights.

Family relations, strictly and fully recognized by the law as such,

embrace that formed in marriage and those which spring therefrom.

The common law did not even take notice of adoption as giving

one any permanent family rights. The adopted child was only

permitted to occupy the place of a child for the time being; that

is to say, he stood in the position of child by suiferance only, and

had no share in the distribution of the parent’s property at his
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death.‘ The child born out of matrimony had, at the common

law, no claim whatever upon the parent.’

- The statutes of some States give a

child formally adopted the rights,

more or less complete. of n child by

birth under the laws of descent. This

is, of course, a change of the com-

mon law. See Commonwealth 1:. N an-

crede, 32 Penn. St. 389; Scwall 12.

Roberts, 115 Mass. 262; Sntford 0.

Houghton, -18 Vt. 286; Barnes v. Allen,

25 Ind. 222. Step children and adopt-

ed children who are received into a

family stand for the time being in the

position of children. They cannot

claim compensation for services per-

formed in the family, neither, on the

other hand, can they be required to

pay for a support received, in the ab-

sence of express contract. Williams

0. Hutchinson, 3 N. Y. 312; Sharp 0.

Cropsey, ll Barb. 224; Defrancc 0.

Austin, 9 Penn. St. I309; Lantz o. Frey,

19 Penn. St. 366; Worcester v. March-

ant, 14 Pick. 510; Brush 1;. Blanchard,

18 Ill. 46; Frcto 0. Brown, 4 M:1ss.675;

Bond 0. Lockwood, 33 Ill.212; An-

drus o. Foster, 17 Vi. 556; Lunay 0.

Vantyne, 40 Vt. 501; Ilussey 0. Round-

trce, Bushee, 510; Gillctt 0. Camp,

27 Mo. 541; Murdoch 0. Murdock, '7

Cal. 51] ; Mowbry 0. Mowbry, 64 Ill.

383; Mulhert 0. McDuvitt, 16 Gray,

404; Meyer 0. Tcnimc, 72 Ill. 574;

Sword 0. Keith, 81 Mich. 247; Ruck-

man's Appeal. 61 Penn. St. 231. In

England the statute 4 and 5 W. IV. c.

76, § 75, requires the husband to sup-

port the children of his wife, legiti-

mate or illegitimate, until they reach

the age of sixteen or their mother dies.

' It is provided by statute in several

contracts of this important nature. When, therefore, it is said
that the right to enter into the relation of marriage is universal,
this does not exactly express the legal idea. The legal idea ia.
that every one has a legal right to marry who obtains the consent
of a person of the opposite sex having a like right, provided both
have the capacity and qualifications prescribed by law, and
obser\·e all the legal conditions.
Domestic Relations in General. Besides the family relations
which spring from marriage there are certain domestic relations of
another origin. The relation of master and servant, for instance,
is one of contract. The relation of master and apprentice is similar,
thongh here the contracting party on one side may really be the
State in some cases. The relation of guardian and ward is of
various origin, but usually is a matter of judicial creation. But
none of these are strictly family relations, or give family rights.
Family relations, strictly and fully recognized by the law as such,
embrace that formed in marriage and those which spring therefrom.
The common law did not even take notice of adoption as giving
one any permanent family rights. The adopted child was only
permitted to occupy the place of a child tor the time being; that
is to say, he stood in the position of child by sufferam:e only, and
had no share in the distribution of the parent's property at his
death.' The child born out of matrimony had, at the common
law, no claim whatever upon the parent.'
· The statutes of some Stat<.'S give a
child formally adopted the rights,
more or less complete, of a child by
birth under the laws of descent. This
is, of course, a chaoge of the common law. See Commonwealth e. Nancrede, 82 Penn. St. 889; Sewall e.
Roberts, 115 .Mass. 262; Sntlhrd e.
Houghton, 48 Vt. 236; Barnes~'· Allen,
25 Ind. 222. Step children and adopted children who are received into a
family stand for the time ~eing in the
position of children. They cannot
claim compensation for services per.
formed in the family, neither, on tho
other hand, can they be required to
pay for a support received, in the absence of express contract. Williams
e. Hutchinson, 3 N.Y. 312; Sharp e.
Cropsey, l1 Barb. 224; Defrance "·

Austin, 9 Penn. St. :l09; Lantz "· Frey,
19 Penn. St. 366; Worcester e. March.
ant, 14 Pick. 510; Brush e. Blancllllrd,
18 Ill. 46; Freto "· Brown, 4 Mnss. 675;
Bond e. Lockwood, 83 Ill. 212; Andrus e. Foster, 17 Vt 556; Luoay e.
Vaotyne, 40 \•t. 501; Hussey o. Round.
tree, Busbl'e, 510; Gillett "· Camp,
27 Mo. 541; Murdoch e. Murdock, 7
Cal. 511 ; Mowbry e. Mowbry, 64 Ill.
883; Mulhert e. McDavitt, 16 Gray,
404; Meyer e. Temme, 72 Ill. 574;.
Sword "· Keith, 81 lllch. 247; Uuck.
man's Appeal. 61 Peon. St. 2iil. In
England the statute 4 and 5 W. IV. c.
76, § 75, requires the husband to sup.
port the children of his wife, legitimate or illegitimate, uotn they reach
the age of sixteen or thf'ir mothrr tlit>S.
' It is provided by 11tatute in several
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Family, as such, no Rights. It was remarked in the preceding

CLASSU'IC.ATION OF LEGAL RIGHTS.
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chapter that the law only recognized individual rights; it did not

recognize associations except as so many individuals, each having

a distinct legal identity and distinct legal rights. An apparent

exception was made in the case of a corporation, but only by aggre-

gating the persons composing the corporation and treating them all

as one artiﬁcial person. The remark holds good in the case of the

family; the family as such has no distinct rights in the law. The

father has a certain position in the family, and this he may defend

against outside assailants; the wife has also a certain position in

the family, and the children have their respective positions; but

the act which destroys the family or takes away any of its com-

ponent parts is not in law a family wrong, but only a wrong to

individual members of the family. Thus this fundamental rela-

tion, which is older than civilization, and must always precede

and always accompany it, and without which there can be neither

social state in which morality or decency will be recognized, nor

civil state with regulated liberty and order, is only indirectly

recognized in the recognition of rights of its constituent mem-

bers. Wlietlier it would be wiser for the law to give positive

recognition to the family as a legal entity, and confer rights to

deﬁnite legal positions therein, is something which experience
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could alone determine. Religion, we have seen, is only indirectly

recognized in the law, in the regulations that are made for the

protection of worshipers, and yet religion, doubtless, is most

prosperous when the State interferes with it least. And it is

probably true that in the vast majority of cases the natural

impulses and aﬁections have more inﬂuence in insuring the

observance of moral obligations in the family relations than the

law could exercise or possess.

Taking away Rights. All the rights which have been enumerated

are subject to be taken away by an act of sovereignty accomplished

under legal forms. This is sometimes done by way of forfeiture or

punishment, as life or liberty is taken away for felony. In other

eases it is done in the regular administration ofjusticc to others, as

family rights are taken in granting a divorce, or property is taken

Btatcs that the intermarriage of the spring, shall legitimate him. As to

parents of an illegitimate child, and such legislation see Morgan 0. Perry,

their recognition of him as their oﬂ‘- 51 N. H 559.

J'am.Uy, aa such, no Rights. It was remarked in the preceding
chapter that the Jaw only recognized individual rights; it did not
.recognize associations except as so many individuals, each having
a distinct legal identity and distinct legal rights. An apparent
m:ception was made in the case of a corporation, but only by a6gregating the persons composing the corporation and treating them all
aa one artificial person. The remark holds good in the case of' the
family; the famil1as such has no distinct rights in the law. The
father has a certain position in the family, and this he may defl>nd
against outside assailants; the wife has also a certain position in
the family, and the children have their ret"pective positions; but
the act whieh destroys the family or takes away any of' its component parts is not in law a family wrong, but only a wrong to
individual members of the family. Thns this fundamental relation, which is older than civilization, and must always precede
and always accompany it, and without which there can be neither
social state in which morality or decency will be recognized, nor
civil state with regulated liberty and order, is only indirectly
recognized in the recognition of rights of its constituent memben. Whether it would be wiser for the law to give positive
recognition to the family as a legal entity, and confer rights to
definite legal positions therein, is something which experience
could alone determine. P~.Cligion, we have seen, is only indirectly
reeognized in the law, in the regnlations that are ma.de fur the
protection of worshipers, and yet religion, doubtless, is most
prosperous when the State interferes with it least. And it is
probably true that in the vast majority of cases the natural
impulses and affections have more influence in insuring the
ub&ervance of moral obligations in the family relations than the
law could exercise or possess.

Taking away Rights. A11 the rights which have been enumerated
are subject to he taken away by an act of so,·ereignty accomplished
under legal forms. This is sometimes done by way of forfeitnre or
punishment, as life or liberty is taken away for felony. In other
eases it is done in the regular administration of justice to others, ns
family rights are taken in granting a divorce, or property is taken
States that the Intermarriage of the

parents or an illegitimate child, and
dlelr recognition of him as their off-

spring, shall legitimate him. As to
such legislation see Morgan t~. Perry,
51 N. H 550.
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in compelling the satisfaction of a debt. In still other cases a
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man deprives himself of the legal protection of rights by his

own illegal conduct. Thus, to a certain extent, a man puts aside

the protection of the law when he makes an assault upon another,

for the other may lawfully inﬂict injury upon him in necessary

self-defense.‘ So, if he engages in an illegal act, and thereby

exposes himself to the negligence of another, he waives any right

to redress, because any exposure to injury under such circum-

stances is as culpable in him as is the negligence in his associate,

and the result comes from a concurrence of blamable conduct.

The principle will be further considered in another place. Here

it may be stated in a few words: A person cannot make his own

illegal action the foundation of a legal right. Therefore, if, as

a consequence of his own illegal action, he suffers a wrong, he

must not look to the law for redress. Ea: dolo malo non oritur

actio. He has invited what has come, and he must accept it.

‘Dr. Woonsmr, speaking of self-

defense, considers the party defending

himself, as for the time, in so doing,

an instrument of the law in adminis-

tering its justice. He says: “There

are seeming cases of collision which
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must be explained by the essential

limitation of certain rights. One of

in compelling the satisfaction of a debt. In still other cases a
man deprives himself of the legal protection of rights by his
own illegal conduct. Thus, to a certain extent, a man puts aside
the protection of the law when he makes an assault upon another,
for the other may lawfu1ly inflict injury npon him in necessary
self'-det{mse.• So, if he engages in an illegal act, and thereby
exposes himself to the negligence of another, he waives any right
to redress, because any exposure to injury under such circumstances is as culpable in him as is the negligence in his associate,
and the result comes from a concurrence of blamable conduct.
The principle will be further considered in another place. Here
it may be stated in a few words: A person cannot make his own
illegal action the foundation of a legal right. Therefore, if, as
a consequence of his own illegal action, he suffers a wrong, he
must not look to the law for redress. E:» dolo malo non oritur
actio. He has invited what bas come, and he must accept it.'

these is the right of taking life in

lawful self-defense, as when a man is

attacked by arobber. The harmless

passenger and the highwayman have

both by nature a right. to life, but the

right is not unlimited; otherwise the

State could not take the life of the

criminal, and the man who respects

his obligations would be required to

renounce for ever the right of self-

defense against enemies seeking his

life. The true statement is that the

right of self-defense belongs only to

the innocent man, and not, in this

particular case, to the robber. Ho

has the general right of life, but now

he is in effect punished for a crime,

and there can be no punislinientwitl»

out deprivation of rights." And again:

“ It might seem that a man who, in

self-defense, takes away the life of a

robber, does an injury to another.

The true statement, however, seems

to have been given already; he does

no injury to the robber, although he

does harm to him, for he acts as a

minister ofjustice." Political Science,

§ 18. This is not at all the legal view.

The right of self-(lefense is given

solely for self-protection, and it is

limited strictly to the necessity. The

moment one exceeds the limit of the

necessity and proceeds to “ punish "

his assailant, or to make himself a

“minister of justice," he - becomes

himself an object of punishment.

' Broom, Legal Maxims, 571.

2 Dr. WooLsEY, speaking of selfdefense, considers the party defending
himself, as for the time, in so doing,
an instrument of the law in administering its justice. He says: "There
are seeming cases of collision which
must be explained by the essential
limitation of certain rights. One of
these is the right of taking life in
lawful self-defense, as when a man is
attacked by a robber. The harmless
passenger and the highwayman have
both by nature a right to life, but the
right is not unlimited; otllerwise the
State could not take the life of tho
criminal, and the man who respects
his obligations would be required to
renounce for ever the right of selfdefense against enemies seeking his
life. The true statement is that the
right of self-defense belongs only to
the innocent man, and not, in this
particular case, to the robber. Ho

has the general right of life, but now
be is in effect punished for a crime.
aud there can be no punishment without deprivation of rights." And again:
"It might seem that a man who, in
self.defense, takes away the life of a
robber, does an injury to another.
The true statement, however, seema
to have been given already; he doca
no injury to the robber, allhougu he
does harm to him, for he acts as a
minister of justice." Political Science,
§ 18. This is not at all the legal view.
The right of self-defense is given
solely for self-protection, and it Ia
limited strictly to the necessity. The
mom(•nt one exceeds the limit of the
necessity and proceeds to " punish "
his assailtmt, or to make himself a
"minister of justice," he • bccomea
himself an object of punishment.
1 Broom, Legal Maxims. 671.

OIVIL INJURIES. 45

CHAPTER III.

CIVIL INJURIES; THEIR ELEMENTS, AND THE REMEDIES FOR

CIVIL IN.JUIUES.

4:5

THEIR COMMISSION. A

In a previous chapter it was said that the law undertakes to

give security to the rights of individuals by putting within their

reach suitable redress whenever their rights have been actually

violated.‘ Before any violation has in fact taken place, the law

assumes that none will happen; but that each individual will

respect the rights of all others. Therefore, it does not undertake

in general to provide preventive remedies; it gives them in a

few exceptional cases, which stand on peculiar grounds, and in

OHAPTER III.

which the mischiefs ﬂowing from an invasion of rights might be

such as would be incapable of complete redress in the ordinary

methods, or perhaps in any manner. In most cases it is assumed

that, if the law places within the reach of every one a suitable

l."'VVL INJURIES; THEIR ELEMENTS, AND THE REMEDIES FOR
THEIR COMMISSION.

remedy to which he may resort when he suffers an injury, it has

thereby not only provided for him adequate protection, but has

given him all that public policy demands. The remedies that

are aimed at wrongs not yet committed but only threatened, are

so susceptible of abuse that they are wisely restricted within very

narrow limits.

Redress by the Party's own Act. In a few cases the party
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injured is allowed to redress his own wrong, in whole or in part,

without calling in the aid of the law. But the cases in which

this is permitted are not numerous, and they are in the main

eases of urgency, in which a resort to the ordinary remedies

would be inadequate to complete justice. A general permission

to every man to take the law into his own hands for his own

redress, would be subversive of civil government; the permission

cannot safely go beyond those cases in which force is justiﬁable

in defense of person or property, and other cases resting on sim-

ilar reasons.

l Ante, p. 4-8.

In a previons chapter it was said that the law undertakes to
gh·e security to the rights of individuals by putting within their
reach suitable redress whenever their rights have been actually
violated! Before any violation has in fact taken place, the law
assumes that none will happen; bnt that each individual will
respect the rights of all others. Therefore, it does not undertake
in general to provide preventive remedies; it gives them in a
few exceptional cases, which stand on peculiar grounds, and in
which the mischiefs flowing from an invasion of rights might be
euch as would be incapable of complete redress in the ordinary
methods, or perhaps in any manner. In most cases it is assumed
that, if the law places within the reach of every one a suitable
remedy to which l1e may resort when he suffers an injury, it has
thereby not only provided for him adequate protection, but has
given him all that public policy demands. The remedies that
are aimed at wrongs not yet committed but only threatened, are
so susceptible of abuse that they are wisely restricted within very
narrow limits.
BedreBB by the Party's own Aot.

In a few cases the party
injured is allowed to redress his own wrong, in whole or in part,
without calling in the aid of the law. But the cases in which
this is permitted are not numerous, and they are in the main
cases of urgency, in which a resort to the ordinary remedies
_would be inadequate to complete justice. A general penuission
to every man to take the law intp his own hands for his own
redress, wonld be subversive of civil government; the pcrmissi~m
cannot safely go beyond those cases in which force is justifiable
in defense of person or property, and other cases resting on similar reasons.
I

Ante, p. 4-6.
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Abatement of Nuisance. One instance in which redress by

THE LAW OF TORTS.

the act of the party is admitted, is where a nuisance exists to his

prejudice; either a private nuisance or a public nuisance from

which he suffers a special and peculiar injury. The redress here

consists in removing that which constitutes the nuisance, and it

is allowed, not because of any injury it may have done, but to

prevent tl1e injury it may do. It is, therefore. in some sense, a

preventive remedy, not a compensatory remedy: for damages

suffered the party is left to the ordinary action.

The question who may abate a nuisance may depend upon

whether the nuisance is public or private. If it is a private

nuisance, he only can abate it who is injured by its continuance:

if it is a public nuisance, he only may abate it who suffers a special

grievance not felt by the public in general. Therefore, if one

places an obstruction in a public street, an individual who is

incommoded by it may remove it;' but unless he has occasion to

make use of the highway he must leave the public injury’ to be

' Lincoln 0. Chadbourne, 56 Me. 197.

The proprietors of a steamboat on a

navigable river may tear away sum-

cicnt of a bridge to enable them to

take their boat through, where the
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bridge has been constructed without

a draw, and the proprietors, after no-

tice, have neglected to remove the

bridge or put in a draw. State 0. Par-

Abatement of Nuisance. One instance in which redress by
the act of the party is admitted, is where a nuisance exists to his
prejudice; either a private nuisance or a public nuisance from
which he suffers a special and peculiar injury. The redress here
consists in removing that which constitutes the nuisance, and it
is allowed, not because of any injury it may have done, but to
prevent the injury it may do. It is, therefore, in some sense, a
preventive remedy, not a compensatory remedy: for damages
sufi'et·ed tho party is left to the ordinary action.
The question who may abate a nui:;ance may depend upon
whether the nuisance is public or prh·atc. If it is a private
nuisam·e, he only can abate it who is injured by its continuance:
if it is a public nuisance, he only may abate it who suffers a special
grievance not felt by the public in general. Therefore, if one
places an obstruction in a public street, an individual who is
incommoded by it may remove it;1 but unless he has occasion to
make uoe of the highway he must leave the public injury~ to be

rott, '71 N. C. 811. Sec Fort Plain

Bridge C0. 17. Smith, 30 N. Y. 44; In-

hab. of Arundel 0. McCulloch, 10

Mass. 70. ‘

’ Mayor of Colchester 0. Brooke, '7

Q. B. 339; Dimes 0. Pettey, 15 Q. B.

2'76; Davies v. Mann, 10 Mend W. 546;

Bateman v. Bluck, 18 Q. B. 8'70; East-

ern Co. R. (30.12. Dorling, 5 C. B. (N. s.)

821; Roberts 0. Rose, 8 H.an(l 0.162;

S. C., L. R. 1 Ex. 82; Arundel 0. Mc-

Culloch, 10 Muss. 70; Brown 0. Per-

kins, 12 Gray, 89; Lansing 0. Smith,

8 Cow. 146; Rogers 0. Rogers, 14

Wendell, 131; Ely 0. Supervisors, 36

N. Y. 297; Fort Plain Bridge Co. 0.

Smith, 30 N. Y.-14; Adams 0. Beach,

6 Hill, 271; Burnham 1*. Hotchkiss,

14 Conn. 311; State 0. Paul, 5 R. I.

185; Hopkins 0. Croinbic,4 N. H.

520; Amoskeag Co. 0. Goodnle, 46

N. H. 63; Bung 0. Shoneberger, 2

Watts, 23; Philber 0. Mntson, 14

Penn. St. 306; Gates 0. Blincoe, 2 Da-

na, 158; Gray 0. Ayers, 7 Dana, 375;

Selman 0. Wolfe, 27 Texas, 68; Motfett

0. Brewer, 1 Iowa, 848. In Brown 0.

Perkins, 12 Gray, 89, 101, Snaw, Ch.

J'., says: “The true theory of abate-

ment of nuisance is, that an individ-

ual citizen may abate a private nui-

sance injurious to him, when he could

also bring an action; and also when

a common nuisance obstructs his in-

dividual right, he may remove it to

enable him to enjoy that right, and

he cannot be called in question for so

doing." See Hopkins o. Crombie, 4

N. H.520; Griﬁith 0. McCullum, 46

Barb. 561; Bateman o. Bluck, 18 Q.

B. 870; Mayor, etc., of Colchester 0.

Brooke, '7 Q. B. 839, 877.

'Lincoln,, Chadbourne, 56 Me. 197.
The proprietors of a steamboat on a
navigable river may tear away sum.
cicnt of a bridge to enaule them to
take their boat through, where the
bridge has been constructed without
a draw, and the proprietors, after notice, have neglected to remove the
bridge or put in a draw. State "· Par.
rott, 71 N. C. 811. See Fort ?lain
Bridge Co."· Smith, 30 N. Y. 44; Inhab. of Arundel ~. McCulloch, 10
Mass. 70.
'Mayor of Colchester "· Brooke, 7
Q. B. 389; Dimes "· Pettey, 15 Q. B.
276; Davies"· Mann, 10 M.and W. 546;
Bateman"· Bluck, 18 Q. B. 870; East.
ern Co. R Co."· Dorling, 5 C. B. (N. s.)
821; Roberts "· Rose, 8 H. and C. 162;
S. C., L. R. 1 Ex. 82; Arundel ,, Me.
Culloch, 10 Mu.ss. 70; Brown e. Perkins, 12 Gray, 89; Lansing ,, Smith,
8 Cow. 146 ; Rogers ,, Rogers, 14
Wendell, 131; Ely 17. Supervisors, 36
N. Y. 297; Fort Plain Bl'idge Co. e.
Smith, 80 N. Y.44; Adams"· Beach,

6 IIIli, 271; Burnham "· Hotchklaa,
14 Conn. 811; SlRte "· Paul, 5 R. I.
185; Hopkins e. Crombie, 4 N. H.
620; Amoskeag Co. e. Goodale, ~
N. H. 53; Rung e. Shoneberger, 2
Watts, 23; Philber e. Matson, 1'
Penn. 8t. 306; Gates e. Blincoe, 9 Da.
na, 158; Gray "· Ayers, 7 Dana, 8715;
Selmantl. Wolfc,27TcXRs, 68: Moffet~
"·Brewer, 1 Iowa, 848. In Brown e.
Perkins, 12 Gray, 89, 101, SHAW, Ch.
J., says: "The true theory of abatement of nuisance is, that an individual citizen may ahnte a private nut.
sRnce injurious to him, when he could
also bring an action; and also when
a common nuisance obstructs his indivirlual right, he may remove It to
enable him to enjoy that right, and
he cannot be called in question for so
doing." See Hopkins "· Crombie, 4
N. II. 520; Griffith 17. :&IcCullum, 46
Barb. 561; Bateman tl. Bluck, 18 Q.
B. 870; Mayor, etc., of Colchester •·
Brooke, 7 Q. B. 889, 877.

CIVIL mmnrss. 47

redressed by the public authorities. It is the existence of an

OIV.lL INJURIES.

47

emergency which justiﬁes the interference of the individual.‘

In permitting this redress, certain restrictions are imposed to

prevent abuse or unnecessary injury. One of these is, that the

right must not be exercised to the prejudice of the public peace:

therefore, if the abatement is resisted, it becomes necessary to

seek in the courts the ordinary legal remedies.’ Another is that,

as a general rule, before resorting to such extreme measures, the

party responsible for the nuisance should be notiﬁed of its exist-

ence, and requested to remove it; and the forcible abatement

would only be justiﬁed when, after lapse of reasonable time, the

request was not complied with.’ This, however, is by no means

a universal rule. It has been said, in one case: “ Nuisances by

act of commission are committed in deﬁance of those whom such

nuisances injure; and the injured party may abate them without

notice to the party who comtnitted them; but there is no decided

case which sanctions the abatement by an individual of nuisances

from omission, except that of cutting the branches of trees which

overhang a public road, or the private property of the person

who cttts them. The permitting these branches to extend so far

beyond the soil of the owner of the trees, is a most unequivocal

‘In Burnham n. Hotchkiss,14 Conn.
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810. 317, it is said that a common nui-

sance may be removed, or, in legal

language, abated by any individual;

for which the general language of sev-

erul authorities is cited. But the cases

in which the question has been care-

fully considt-red restrict the right as

above shown.

‘Miller et al. 0. Burch, 32 Texas,

redressed by the public authorities. It is the existence of an
emergency which justifies the interference of the individual.'
In permitting this redress, certain restdctions are imposed to
prevent a\mse or unnecessary injury. One of these is, that the
right must not be exercised to the prejudice of the public peace:
therefore, if the abatement is resisted, it becomes neces~ary to
seck in the conrts the ordinary legal remedies.~ Another is that,
as a general rule, before resorting to such extreme measures, the
party responsible for the nuisance should be notified of its existence, and refpiCstcd to remove it; and the forcihle abatement
would only be justified when, after lapse of' reasonable time, the
req_nest was not compiied with.' This, however, is by no means
a univertial rule. It has been said, in one case: " N uisan<:es by
act of commission are committed in defiance of those whom such
nuitiances injure; and the injured party may abate them without
noti<-.e to the party who committed them; but thcro is no decided
<!&Se which sanctions the abatement by an individual of nuisances
from omission, except that of cutting the branches of trees which
overhang a public road, or the private property of the person
who ents them. The permitting these branches to extend so far
beyond the soil of the owner of the trees, is a most unequivocal

208; Day o. Day, 4 Md. 262; Graves

0. Shuttuck, 85 New Hump. 257; Per-

ry 0. Filzhowe, 8 Q. B. 757; Bald-

win e. Smith, 82 Ill. 162. In the case

last mentioned, the question mainly

discussed was whether, when the nul-

sance consists in a dwelling house

which is inhabited, and which has

been wrongfully erected where the

defendant had n right of common, the

latter could lawfully pull it down

while the family were in it; and the

conclusion was that from the neces-

sary tendency of such an act to a

breach of the pence, the law could

not permit it.

In some cases, however, parties have

been heldjustiﬂed in removing houses

which were nuisances, even while the

families were in them. Davies 0. Wil-

liams, 16 Q. B. 546; Burling o. Read,

11 Q. B. 904; Meeker 0. Van Reasse-

laer. 15 Wend. 397. But where no-

tice of the intention to rctnovc was

not given, it was held to be unjustifi-

able. Jones u. Jones, 1 H. & C. 1.

‘Perry 0. Fitzhowe, 8 Q. B. 776;

Burling u. Read, 11 Q. B. 904; Davies

0. Williams, 16 Q. B. 546; Jones o.

Jones,1 H. & C. 1; Meeker 0. Van

Rcnsselner, 15 Wend. 897; State 0.

Pnrrott, 71 N. C. 311; S. C. 17 Am.

Rep. 5.

1

In Bumham e. Hotch kiss,14 Conn.

110, 317, it ia said that a common nul.

sauce may be removed, or, in legal
language, abated by any individaa&l;
for which the general language of several authorities is cited. But the cases
in which the question has been care.
fully consillrred restrict the right ae
above shown.
'Miller eL al. 11. Burch, 82 Texas,
208; Day 11. Day, 4 MJ. 262; Grnvea
"· Shattuck, 85 New Hnmp. 257; Per.
ry "· Fitzbowe, 8 Q. B. 757; Bald.
win "· Smith, 82 Ill. 162. In the case
last mentioned, the question mainly
dkcusscu was whether, when the nul.
aancc consists in a dweJiing house
which is inhabited, and which has
been wrongfully erected where the
deft·ndant had a right of common, the
latter could lawfully pull it down
while the family were in it; and the

conclusion was that from the neoee.
eary tendency of such an act to a
breach of the peace, the law could
not permit it.
In some cases, however, parties have
been heldjustitlcd in removing hou~teS
which were nuisances, even while the
families were in them. Davies e. WiJ.
Iiams, 16 Q. B. r.46; Burling "· Read,
11 Q. D. 904; )[ePkcr 11. Van Hens..<~e
laer, 15 Wend. 8!>7. But wh'lre n~
tice of the intention to remove was
not given, it was held to be unjustifiable. Jones 11. Jones, 1 H. & C. 1.
1 Perry 11. Fitzhowe, 8 Q. B. 776;
Burling "· Read, 11 Q. H. 904; Davies
e. Will inms, 16 Q. B. MO; Jones e.
Jones, 1 H. & C. 1; Meeker "· Van
Ren!'selncr, 15 Wend. 897; State e.
Parrott, 71 N. C. 811; 8. C. 17 A.m.
Rep.~.
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act of negligence, which distinguishes this case from most of the

48

THJC LAW OF TORTS.

other cases which have occurred. The security of lives and

property may sometimes require so speedy a remedy as not to

allow time to call on the person on whose property the mischief

has arisen to remedy it. In such cases an individual would be

justified in abating a nuisance from omission without notice. In

all other eases of such nuisances, persons should not take the law

into their own hands, but follow the advice of Lord HALE, and

appeal to a court of justice.” ' If we take this as a correct state-

ment of the circumstances under which the nuisance may be

abated without previous notice, it would seem that notice is not

essential where the grievance has arisen from the positive wrong-

ful act or gross negligence of the party responsible for its continu-

ance, or where it threatens such immediate injury to life or health

that the allowance of time for its removal, beyond what is abso-

lutely essential, could not reasonably be demanded. Under this

rule, if the nuisance were merely permitted by the alienee of the

party creating it, notice to remove it would be essential in all

eases which were not of extreme urgeney;’ and in such cases

this is obviously a very proper requirement.

Another limitation upon the right is, that in its exercise the

party must inﬂict as little injury as possible.’ The fact that he is
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taking the law into his own hands, imposes upon him a special

obligation to keep clearly within the necessity which ustiﬁes it;

‘Best. J. in Earl of Lonsdale 0.

Nelson. 2 B. &. C. 302, 311.

' Penruddock's Case, 5 Rep. 101;

Jones v. Williams, 11 M. 85 \V.176;

Van Wormer o. Albany, 15 Wend. 262;

Meeker 0. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend.

897. In the two cases last cited,

buildings were torn down as nuisan-

ces during the prevalence of Asiatic

cholera, no previous notice having

been given, except to the tenants, to

remove. And see Hart v. Albany, 8

act of negligence, which distinguishes this case from most of the
other cases which have occurred. The security of lives and
property may sometimes require so speedy a remedy as not to
allow- time to call on the persqn on whose property the mischief
has arisen to remedy it. In such cases an individual would be
justified in abating a nuisance from omission without notice. In
all other cases of such nuisances, persons should not take the law
into their own hands, bnt follow the advice of Lord HALE, and
appeal to a court of justice." 1 If we take this as a correct statement of the circumstances onder which the nuisance may be
abated without previous notice_, it would seem that notice is not
essential where the grievance has arisen from the positive wrongful act or gross negligenc:e of the party responsible for its continuance, or where it threatens such immediate injury to life or health
that the allowance of time for its removal, beyond what is absolutely essential, could not reasonably be demanded. Under this
rule, if the nuisance were merely permitted by the alienee of the
party creating it, notice to remove it would be essential in all
cases which were not of extreme urgency;' and in such casea
this is obviously a very proper requirement.
Another limitation upou the right is, that in its exel"cise the
party must inflict as little injury as possible.• The fact that he il!
taking the law into his own hands, imposes upon him a :;pedal
obligation to keep clearly within the necessity which justifies it;

Paige, 213. See also Occum Co. 0.

Sprague Co., 34 Conn. 529.

'“ Where a person attempts to jus-

tify an interference with the property

of another, in order to abate a nui-

ssnce, he may justify himself as

against the wrong deer, so far as his

interference is positively necessary.

We are also agreed that in abating

the nuisance, if there are two ways

of doing it, he must choose the least

mischievous of the two. We also

think if, by one of these alternative

methods, some wrong would be done

to an innocent third party, or to the

public, then that method cannot be

justified at all, although an interfer.

ence with the wrong doer himself

might be justiﬁed. Therefore, where

the alternative method involves such

an interference, it must not he adopt-

ed, and it may become necessary to

abate the nuisance in a manner more

onerous to the wrong doer." Black-

burn, J. in Roberts 0. Rose, L. R. 1

Ex. 82, 89.

1 Best. J. in Earl of Lonsdale e.
Nelson, 2 B. &. C. 802, 311.
• Penruddock's Case, 5 Rep. 101;
Jones t~. Williams, 11 M. & W. 176;
Van Wormeu. Albany, 15 Wend. 262;
Meeker t~. Van Hensselaer, 15 Wend.
897. In the two cases last cited,
buildin.gs were torn down as nuisances during the prevalence of Asiatic
cholera, no previous notice having
been given, except to the tenants, to
remove. And see Hart v. Albany, 8
Paige, 213. Bee also Occum Co. e.
Sprague Co., 84 Conn. 529.
'"Where a person attempts to justify an interference with the property
of another, in order to abate a nul.
eance, he may justify himself a.s
against the wrong doer, so far a.s his

interference is positively necc-!l~ary.
We are also ugrccd thnt in abating
tl1e nuisance, if Utcrc are two ways
of doing it, be must choose the least
mischievous of the two. We also
think If, by one of these alternative
methods, some wrong would be done
to an innocent third party, or to the
public, then that method canuot be
justified at all, although an interfcr.
ence with the wrong doer himself
might be justified. Therefore, where
the alternative method involves such
an interference, it must not he adopted, and it may bee• •me necessR;y to
abate the nuisance in a manner more
onerous to the wrong doer." Black.
burn, J. in Roberta "· Rose, L. R 1
Ex. 82, 89.
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and if he is guilty of wanton or unnecessary violence, he is liable

49

for the excess.‘ A building is not to be destroyed merely be-

cause the use to which it is put is a nuisance;’ nor because it

has become offensive, if the cause of oﬁ'e,nse can otherwise be

removed. The nuisance of a bawdy house is not in the building

itself, but in the character of its occupation ;’ and a barn which

has become offensive by reason of the accumulation of ﬁlth, is to

be cleaned instead of destroyed, when cleaning is practicable.‘

it is only where an erection or structure in itself constitutes a

nuisance because of its being erected in a public street, or with-

out right either on public or private grounds that its demolition

and removal can be justiﬁed.°

Abatement of the nuisance by the act of the party aggrieved

does not preclude an action for damages. “It is a preventive

remedy merely, and resembles more an entry into land, or recap-

ture of personal property. Neither will'bar an action for the

original invasion of the plaintiﬂ"s right.” '

Defense of Person or Property. The right to defend one’s

own person, the right to defend anyone standing in the relation

'Greensladc o. Halliday, 6 Bing.

379; Roberts 0. Rose, L. R. 1 Exch.

82; State 1:. Bloffett, 1 Greene (Iowa),
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247; Motfett r. Brewer, Ibid. 348; In-

dianapolis 0. Miller, 2'7 Ind. 394.

'Wclch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. Mich.

332; Barclay o. Commonwealth, 25

and if he is guilty of wanton or unnecessary violence, he is liable
for the execs:;.• A building is not to be destroyed merely because the use to which it is put is a nuisance;2 nor be.causo it
has become offensive, if the cause of off~se c.an otherwise be
removed. The nuisance of a bawdy house is not in the building
it.-.elf, but in the character of its occupation ;• and a barn which
has become offensive by reason of the accumulation of filth, is to
be cleaned instead of de!'troyed, when cleaning is practicable. •
It is only where an erection or structure in itself constitutes a
nuisance because of its being erected in a public street, or without right either on public or private grounds that its demolition
u.nd removal <:an be j ostitied. •
Abatement of the tmi8ance by the act of the party aggrieved
does not preclude an action for damages. "It is a preventive
remedy merely, and resembles more an entry into land, or recaptore of personal property. Neither will· bar an action for the
original invasion of the plaintiff's right."'

Penn. SL 503; State o. Paul, 5 R. I.

185; State r. Keeran,5 R. I. 497; Ely

e. Supervisors of Niauara. 86 N. Y.

Derense of Person or Property. The right to defend one's
own person, the right to defend anyone standing in the relation

297; Miller n. Burch, 32 Texas, 208;

Brown v. Perkins, 12 Gray, 89; Earp

c. Lee, 71 Ill. 193; S. C 5 Am. Rep.

242. In Van Wormer 12. Albany, 15

Wend. 262, and Meeker 0. Van Reus-

selaer, Ib. 397, the destruction of the

building itself seems to have been

justiﬁcd, on the ground, apparently,

that it was impossible otherwise to

remove the cause of disease. This

subject was fully and carefully con-

sidered, and the authorities collected

in Brightmnn 0. Bristol, 65 Me. 426;

S. C. 20 Am. Rn-p. 711. The case was

one where a building, in which a

business offensive from its smells was

carried on, was torn down to abate the

nuisance. This method of abatement

was held unjustifiable, and the pro-

prietor recovered the full value of his

building.

‘King v. Rosewell, 2 Salk. 459;

Welch o. Stowell, 2 Doug. Mich. 332;

Ely v. Supervisors of Niagara, 36 N.

Y. 297.

‘The nuisance of a pond of water

is not to be abated by ﬁlling it up.

Finley v. Hcrshev, 41 Iowa, 389.

‘Barclay v. Commonwealth, 25

Penn. St. 503.

‘Pierce 0. Dart, 7 Cow. 609, 612.

See, also, Wetmore v. Tracy, 14 Wend.

250; State e.Moll"ctt,1 Grrene,([owa)

47. A tannery is not prr ma nui-

sance, and should not be abated as

such without proper legal proceed-

ings. Marshall 0. Street Commie.

sinner, 36 N. J. 283.

4

'Greenslade 11. Halliday, 6 Bing.
379; Hober~ "· Rose, L. R. 1 Exch.
M2; State"· ::\[offctt, 1 Greene (Iowa),
24'7: Moffett t'. Brewer, Ibid. 848; IndiaMpolis "·Miller, 27 Ind. 894.
•welch "· Stowell, 2 Doug. Mich.
332; Barclay "· Cowmonwe~lth, 25
Per: n. St 503; State "· Paul, 5 R. I.
185; State t'. Keeran, 5 R. I. 497: Ely
"· Bupc"isors of Nia!!'nra. 86 N. Y.
29'1; :Miller "· Burch, a2 Texas, 208;
Brown"· Purkins, 12 Uray, 89; Earp
~- Lee, 'i1 Ill. 193; S. C ~ Am. Rep.
2-42. In Van Wormer e. Albany, 1~
Wend. 262, and Mreker e. Van Rena.
8claer, lb. 397, the destruction of the
huilding itself seems to have been
jastilk-d, on the ground, apparently,
that it was impos.~ible otherwise to
remove the cause of disease. This
subject wu fully and carefully coneidered, and the authorities collected
iD Brightman "· Bristol, 65 Me. 426;
S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 711. Tho case was

4:

one where a building, In which a
bu~ine~:; offensive from its smells was
carried on, was toru down to abate the
nuisance. This method of abatement
was held unjulltifinblc, and tho pro.
prictor recovered the full value of bis
building.
• King "· Rosewell, 2 Balk. 459;
Welch"· Stowell, 2 Doug. Mich. 332;
Ely"· 8upcrvisors of Niagara, 86 N.
Y. 297.
• Tho nuisance of a pond of water
is not to be abated by filling it up.
Finlry "· Hershey, 41 Iowa, 389.
1 Barclay
e. Commonwealth, 26
Penn. St. 503.
• Pierce "· Dart, 7 Cow. 609, 612.
See, also, Wetmore e. Tracy,14 Wend.
260; Stute "·Moffett, 1 Gr«'ene, (Iowa)
47. A tannery is not per • a nulaance, and should not be abated u
such without proper legal proceed.
ings. .Marshall •· Street Cowmi'll.'ioner, 86 N. J. 288.
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of husband and wife, parent and child, or master and servant, and

the right to defend one’s property, are rights given, not for the

redress of injuries, but for their prevention. The right is lim-

ited strictly to the necessity, and the redress for any injury actu-

ally sustained must be sought by suit.

Reception or Reprisal is a remedy by the act of the party

himself, where any of his personal property, or any person to

whose custody he is entitled, is taken or detained away from him.

of husband and wife, parent and child, or master and SE.'n·ant, and
the right to defend one's property, are rights given, not for the
redress of injuries, but for their prevention. The right is limited strictly to the necessity, and the redress for any injury actually su~tained must he sought by snit.

This consists in retaking the same into his own possession when-

ever or wherever he may peaceably do so. But this right is sub-

ordinate to the preservation of the public peace; for “ the public

peace is a superior consideration to any 1nan’s private property,”

and “if individuals were once allowed to use private force as a

remedy for private injuries, all social justice must cease; the strong

would give law to the weak, and every man would revert to a

state of nature.”‘

In order to a correct understanding of this right of recaption,

it is necessary to have in mind the diﬁ'erent circumstances under

which one’s goods may be upon the premises of another, and the

persons who may be responsible for their being there. It is a

general rule, that the owner of real estate is entitled to exclusive
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possession thereof, and every unauthorized entry thereon is a tres-

pass; but if one take the goods of another, and carry them upon

his own land, the owner may enter to retake them, because the

wrong of the other excuses the entry.’

S0 if one, though not purposely a wrong-doer himself, has

received possession from another whose possession was tortious, the

‘ 8 Bl. Com. 4: see Davis v. Whe-

bridge, 2 Strob. 232; Hyatt 0. Wood,4

Johns. 150, 158; Evcrtson 0. Sutton,

5 Wand. 281, 285; Higgins o. State, 7

Ind. 549; Sterling 0. Warden, 51 N.

H. 217; S. O. 12 Am. Rep. 80. But

the fact that a breach of the peace was

committed in taking the property does

not make the taking, if otherwise

rightful. a trespass; it only subjects

the party to a public prosecution.

Brown '0. Cram, 1 N. H. 171; Blades v.

Recaption or RepriBal is a remedy by the act of the party
himself, where any of his per:>onal property, or any person to
whose custody he is entitled, is taken or detained away from him.
This consists in retaking the same into his own possession whene,·cr or wherever he may peaceably do so. But this right is subordinate to the preservation of the public peace; for "the public
peace is a superior com~ideration to any man's private property,"
and "if individuals were once allowed to use private force as a
remedy for private injuries, all social justice must ~ea;;e; the strong
would give law to the weak, aud every man would revert to a
state of nature." 1
In order to a correct understanding of th~ right of recaption,
it is necessary to have in mind the different circumstances under
which one's goods may be upon the premises of another, and the
persons who may be responsible for their being there. It is a
general rule, that the owner of real estate is entitled to exclugive
possession thereof, and every unauthorized entry thereon is a trespass; bnt if one take the goods of another, and carry them upon
his own land, the owner may enter to retake them, because the
wrong of' the other excuses the entry.•
So if one, though not purposely a wrong-doer himself, bas
received possession from another whose possession was tortious, the

Briggs, 10 C. B. (x. s.) 713; Mills 0.

Wooten, 59 Ill. 234.

‘Chapman 0. Thumblethorp, Cro.

Eliz. 329; Patrick 0. Colerick, 3 M. &

W. 483; Webb v. Beavan, 6 M. 8.: G.

1055; Richardson 0. Anthony, 12 Vt.

273; White 0. Twitchell, 25 Vt. 620;

Spencer 0. McGowen, 13 Wend. 256;

Newkirk e. Sabler, 9 Barb. U52, 656;

Burns u. Johnson, 1 J. J. Marsh. 196;

State v. Elliott, 11 N. H. 540; Ster

ling n. Warden. 51 N. H. 217, 228;

Allen 0. Fcland, 10 B. Mon. 306;

Chambers e. Bedell, 2 W. & S. 125.

1 8 BI. Com. 4: see Davis 1l. Wbe.
bridge, 2 Strob. 232; Ilyatt1l. Wood,4
Johns. 150, 158; Evcrlson 1l. Sutton,
5 Wend. 281, 285; Higgins 1l. State, 7
Ind. 549; Sterling "· Warden, 51 N.
H. 217; B. C. 12 Am. Rep. 80. But
the fact that a breach of the peace was
committed in taking the property docs
not mnke the taking, if otherwise
rightful, a trespass; it only subjects
the party to a public prosecution.
Bmwn "· Cram, 1 N. H. 171 ; Blades e.
Briggs, 10 C. B. (N. s.) 713; Mills v.
Wooten, 59 Ill. 284.

1 Chapman "· Tbumblethorp, Oro.
Eliz. 829; Patrick "· Colerick, 3 M. &
W. 483; Webb 11. Beavan, 6 M. & G.
10:i5; Richardson 1l. Anthony, 12 Vt.
273; White 1l. Twitcllell, 2.."i Vt. 620;
Spencer 11. McGowen, 18 Wend. 256;
Newkirk 1l. Sabler, 9 Barb. 652, 656;
Burn~ 1l. Johnson, 1 J. J. Mal'sh. 196;
State 11. Elliott, 11 N. H. 540; Sterling "·Warden. 51 N. H. 217, 228;
Allen 1l. Feland, 10 B. Mon. 806;
Chambers v. Bedell, 2 W. & S. 1215.
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owner may enter to retake them; the tort feasor being incapable

of conferring any better right than he himself had.‘

CIVIL

!~JURIES.

ol

So if one sells goods which are in his own possession, and

nothing in the contract of sale indicates that they are to be deliv-

ered elsewhere than where they are, the sale itself is an implied

license to the purchaser to enter and take the goods away; and

this license being coupled with an interest, is incapable of being

revoked.’ So where one, upon his own land, has been rightfully

in possession of property, but his right has terminated and been

acquired by another, the latter may lawfully enter to take it away;

as in the case of a government officer, who may justify entering

upon the premises of his predecessor to remove the public property

there remaining.‘ One who obtains property by a fraudulent

purchase becomes a wrong-doer in respect to the possession so

soon as the sale is rescinded for the fraud, and the vendor may

reclaim it by peaceable entry.‘ The right to retake is not lost by

' 'I‘rudo 0. Anderson, IQ Mich. 357;

McLeod 0. Jones, 105 Mass. 403, 405;

S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 539.

' Wood 0. Manley, 11 Ad. & El. 34;

Giles o. Simonds. 15 Gray, 441; Net-

tlcton 0. Bikes, 8 Met. 34; Miller o.
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State, 89 Ind. 267. The doctrine and

the limitations upon it are thus stated

by Wanna, J. in McLeod o. Jones, 105

Mass 403. 406: " A license is implied,

because it is necessary to carry the

sale into complete etfect, and is there-

fore presumed to have been in the

contemplation of the parties. It

forms a part of the contract of sale.

The seller cannot deprive the pur-

chaser of his property, or drive him

to an action for its recovery, by with-

drawing his implied permission to

come and take it. This proposition

does not apply, of course, to a case

where a severance from the realty is

necessary to convert the subject of

the sale into personalty, and the revo-

cation is made before such severance.

“ But there is no such inference to

he drawn when the property, at the

time of the sale, is not upon the sell-

er's premises, or when, by the terms

of the contract, it is to be delivered

elsewhere. And when there is noth-

ing executory or incomplete between

the parties in respect to the property,

and there is no relation of contract

between them respecting it, except

what results from the facts of legal

ownership in one and possession in

the other, no inference of a license to

enter upon lands for the recovery of

the property can be drawn from that

relation alone. 20 Vin. Abr. 508,

Trespass, H. a. 2 pl. 18; Anthony o.

owner may enter to retake them; the tort feasor being incapable
of conferring any better right than he himself had.'
So if one sells goods which are in his own possession, and
nothing in the contract of sale indicates that they are to be deliv~red el~>ewhere than where they are, the sale itself is an implied
license to the purchaser to enter and take the goods away; and
this license being coupled with an interest, is incapable of being
reY"oked." So where one, upon his own land, has been rightfully
in po"se~sion of property, but his right has terminated and been
ac•1nired by another, the latter may lawfully enter to take it away;
a,.; in the case of a government officer, who may jnsti(y entering
upon the premises of his predecessor to remove the public property
tl1ere remaining.' One who obtains property by a frandulent
purchase becomes a wrong-doer in respect to the pos,.;ession so
soon as the sale is rescinded for the fraud, and the vendor may 1
reclaim it by peaceable entry! The right to retake is not lost by
• Trudo e. Anderson, :Ji Mich. 3.37;
McLeod e. Jones, 105 Mass. 40a, 400;
8. C. 7 Am. Rep. 589.
• Wood e. ll:mley, 11 Ad. & El. 84;
Gilee e. Simonds. 15 Gray, 441; Nettleton e. Sikes, 8 Met. :U; Miller e.
State, 89 Ind. 267. The doctrine and
the limitations upon it are thus stated
by WEI.L8, J. in McLeod e. Jones, 105
){a.~ 403,406: "A license is implied,
because U. is necessary to carry the
sale into complete effect, and is therefore presumed to have be£>n in the
-contemplation of the parties. It
forms a part of the contract of sale.
The seller cannot deprive the pur-chnser of his property, or drive him
to an action for its recovery, by withdrawing his implied permission to
-come end take il This proposition
does not apply, of course, to a CILSe
where a s(•vernnce from the realty is
n{'CI'l!sary to convert the subject of
the sale into personalty, and the revo.
-cut ion Is made before aucb severance.
.. Bot there is no such inference to
he drawn when the property, at the
time of the sale, i~ not upon the ~cll
er's premises, or when, by the terms

of the contract, it is to be delivered
elsewlu:re. And when there is nothing executory or incomplete between
the parties in respect to the property,
and there is no relation of contract
between them respecting it, except
what results from the facts of legal
ownership in one and possession in
the other, no inference of a license to
enter upon lands for the recovery of
the property can be drawn from that
relation 1:&lone. 20 Vin. Abr. 508,
Trespass, H. a. 2 pl. 18; Anthony e.
Haneys, 8 Bing. 186; Williams e.
Morris 8 11. & W. 488."
1 Sterling 17. Warden, 52 N.H. 197:
see, also, the case of Burridg-e e. Nicholetts, 6 H. & N. 383. A tenant, after
the relation is dissolved, may enter to
reclnim his goods. Danicls17. Brown,
84 N.H. 456.
4 Wheeldon e. Lowell, 50 )[e. 499:
see Rea 17. Shepard, 2 M. & W. 426. If
one's cuttle are found on the land of
another, and there is no evidence how
they came there, be may lawfully enter and reclaim them. Richardson
e. Anthony, 12 Vt. 273.

Hancys, 8 Bing. 186; Wllliums 0.

Morris 8 M. & W. 488."

' Sterling 0. Warden, 52 N. H. 197:

see, also, the case of Burridgc o. Nich-

oletts, 6 H. & N. 888. A tenant, after

the relation is dissolved, may cuter to

reclaim his goods. Daniels v. Brown,

34 N. H. 456.

‘ Wheeldon o. Lowell, 60 Me. 499:

sec Rea n. Shepard, 2 M. & W. 426. If

one‘s cattle are found on the land of

•
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the wrong-doer having put the chattel to such a use that remov-
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ing it inﬂicts a damage upon him, but he must take all such risks

as are incident to an exercise of the owner’s right.‘ And in any

case, if one’s property is on the land of another, with either the

express or the implied assent of the latter, the former may enter

to remove it,’ subject, we should say, to this restriction: That

notice should be given of the intent to do so, whenever, under

the circumstances, it can reasonably be supposed that notice to

the land-owner can be important to the protection of his own

rights. The time and the circumstances, also, ought to be suit-

able; one should not enter his neighbor’s house unannounced, or

in the night time, to take away an article left there by permis-

sion, nor, if the chattel is under lock, break open doors or fast-

enings, without ﬁrst making demand for its restoration.‘ And

if a third party shall take the property of one, and place it upon

the land of another, without the consent or co-operation of either,

while the latter, perhaps, might forbid the entry of the owner to

remove it, and hold him a trespasser if he should persist in doing

so, yet in that case he would be under obligation to restore it on

demand, and the owner might proceed, by replevin, to take it, on

his refusal.‘

But if the owner is himself a wrong-doer in leaving his property
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upon another‘s land, he must take the consequences of his wrong-

ful act, and cannot, by an unlawful entry, acquire a right to

make one that shall be lawful.‘

' White -v. Twitchell, 25 Vt. 620.

' Ne-ttlcton o. Sikcs, 8 Met. 34; Ster-

ling o. Warden. 51 N. H. 217: S. C.

12 Am. Rep. 80; Whit/e 0. Elwell, 48

Me. 360.

' See Blades 0. Briggs, 10 C. B. (N.

s.) 713; Sterling 1;. Warden, 51 N. H.

217; S. O. 12 Am. Rep. 80, and cases

cited.

‘ In Anthony 0. Haney, 8 Bing.

187, it is intimated by Tmnlm, Ch. J.,

that if the occupant of the freehold

the wrong-doer having put the chattel to such a use that removing it inflicts a damage upon him, but he must take all such risk&
as are incident to an exercise of the owner's right. 1 A.nd in any
case, if one's property is on the land of another, with either the
express or the implied assent of the latter, the former may enter
to remove it,' subject, we should say, to this restriction: That
notice should be given of the intent to do so, whenever, under
the circumstances, it can reasonably be supposed that notice to
the land-owner can be important to the protection of his own
rights. The time and the circumstances, also, ought to be suitable; one should not enter his neighbor's house unannounced, or
in the night time, to take away an article left there by permission, nor, if the chattel is under lock, break open doors or fastenings, without first making demand for its restoration.' And
if a third party shall take the property of one, and place it upon
the land of another, without the consent or co-operation of either,
while the latter, perhaps, might forbid the entry of the owner to
remove it, and hold him a trespasser if he sllould persist in doing
so, yet in that case he would be under obligation to restore it on
demand, and the owner might proceed, by replevin, to take it, on
his refusal. 4
But if the owner is himself a wrong-doer in leaving his property
upon another's land, he must take the conf'eqnences of his wrong.
ful act, and cannot, by an unlawful entry, acquire a right to
make one that shall be lawfuL •

refused to deliver up the property,

the owner might enter and take it,

subject to the payment of any dam-

ages he might commit. But if he

were liable in damages for the en-

try. it must be because the entry is

unlawful; and in that case it might

be resisted. Thr-re can be no such

absurdity as a right of entry and a co-

existent right to resist the entry. The

case of Chambers o. Bedell, 2 W. &

S. 225, seems to recognize the right

of the owner, after the demand and

refusal, to enter and take away his

property, if he can do so peaceably.

Compare Roach 0. Dumron, 12

Humph. 425.

‘Anthony 0. Haney, 8 Bing. 187;

Roach o. Dumron, 2 Humph. 425;

Crocker 0. Carson, 38 Me. 436; Blake

1 White "· Twitchell, 25 Vt. 620.
'Nettleton"· Sikes, 8 :Met. 34; Sterling"· Warden, In N. H. 217; S.C.
12 Am. Rep. 80; White e. Elwell, 48
Me. 860.
• See Blades "· Briggs, 10 C. B. (1'1'.
8.) 713; Sterling"· Warden, IH N.H.
217; S. C. 12 Am. Rep. 80, and cases
cited.
4 In Anthony t>. Haney, 8 Bing.
187, it is intimated by Tll'I'DAL, Ch. J.,
that if the occupant of the freehold
refused to deliver up the property.
the owner might eot~r and take it,
subject to the payment of any damages he might commit. But if he
were liable in damages for the en-

v. Johnson, 14 Johns. 406; Heermance

0. Fernoy, 6 Johns. 5; Chess 0. Kel-

•

try, It must be because the entry is
unlawful; and in that case it mi;;ht
be resisted. There can be no such
absllrdity as a right of entry and a co.
existent right to resist the entry. The
case of Chambers "· Bedell, 2 W. &
S. 226, seems to recognize the right
of the owner, after the demand and
refusal, to enter and take away his
property, if he can do 80 peaceably.
Compare Roach e. Dumron, 12
Humph. 425.
• Anthony e. Haney, 8 Bing. 187;
Roach "· Dumron, 2 Humph. 42:i;
Crocker •· Carson, 38 Me. 436 ; Blake
"·Johnson, 14 J obns. 406; Heennance
e. Ferooy, ~ J ohos. 5 ; Cheu e. Kel-
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The right of recaption may sometimes be exercised under cir-
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cumstances which give to the party exercising it not his own

merely, but also property of the wrong doer. When that is per-

mitted it is of necessity, and because in no other way can prac-

tical justice be accomplished. For example, if one purposely

or by negligence take a hundred bushels of his neighbor’s wheat

and commingle it with a hundred bushels of his own barley, so

that a separation of the two becomes practically impossible, the

law permits the owner of the wheat, in retaking it, to take that

which is inseparably commingled with it, since in no other way

can he reclaim his own property.‘ The inextricable confusion of

his goods with the goods of another gives him this right, pro-

vided the intermixture was wrongful. But at his option he may

refuse the whole and sue for the value of what has been taken

ﬁ'om him.

Suppose, however, that the grain, instead of being different in

kind, had all been wheat of the same kind and quality owned

severally by the two. In that case, as in the other, separation

would have been impossible; but if each were to take from the

mass a quantity equal to what he owned when the commingling

took place, he would receive, though not exactly his own, yet that

which, for all practical purposes, is the equivalent. It would be
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equal in value, it could be used for the same purposes, and to the

senses no difference would be perceptible. To give him back the

equal quantity is therefore to do him justice, unless his having

been deprived of it for the time has caused him a special

injury, in which case he would be entitled to recover damages

for that injury. Even if the cunmingling were malicious or

fraudulent, a rule of law which would take from the wrong doer

the whole, when to restore to the other his proportion would do

him full justice, would be a rule wholly out of harmony with

ley. 3 Blackf. 438. One of two tenants ' 2 Kent. 364, 36$; Lnomis v. Green,

in common of a chattel has no right to

break into the premises of the other

to obtain it. Herudon 0. Bnrllctt, 4

Porter, 481; Crocker 0. Carson, 33 Me.

-I36. See, further. Hupport 1;. Mor-

rison, 27 Miss. 365; Allen 0. Feland,

10 B. Mon. 306; Newbold 0. Sablcr, 9

Barb. 57; Chase 0. Jefferson, 1 lioust.

257.

'7 Me. 886; Wingate 0. Smith, 20 Me.

287; Moore v. Bowmun,47 N. H. 494;

Weil o. Silverstone, 6 Bush, 698; Al.

ley 0. Adams, 44 Ala. 609; Hart 0.

The right of recaption may sometimes be exercised under cirenmstances which give to the party exercising it not his own
merely, but also property of the wrong doer. When that is permitted it is of necessity, and because in np other way can prac.
tical justice be accomplished. For example, if one purposely
or by negligence take a hundred bushels of his neighbor's wheat
and commingle it with a hundred bushels of his own barley, so
that a separation of the two becomes practically impo::.;sible, the
law permits the owner of the wheat, in retaking it, to take that
which is inseparably commingled with it, since in no other way
ean he reclaim his own property.' The inextricable confu.!lion of
his goods with the goods of another gives him this right, provided the intermixture was wrongful. But at his option he may
refuse the whole and sue for the value of what has been taken
from him.
Suppose, however, that the grain, instead of being different in
kind, had all been wheat of the same kind and quality owned
severally by the two. In that case, as in the other, separation
wonld have been impossible; but if each were to take from the
mass a quantity equal to what he owned when the commingling
took place, he would receive, though not exartly his own, yet that
which, for all practical purposes, is the equivalent. It would be
equal in value, it could be used for the same purposes, and to the
senses no difrerence would be perc«:>ptible. To give him bac~k the
equal quantity is therefore to do him justice, unless his having
been deprived of it for the time has caused him a special
injury, in which case he would be entitled to recover damages
for that injury. Even if the ('·)mmingling were malicious or
fraudulent, a role of law which would take from the wrong doer
the whole, when to restore to the other his proportion would do
him full justice, would be a role wholly out of harmony with

Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 62; Willard

o. Rice, 11 Met. 490; Jenkins v. Ste-

anka, 19 Wis. 189; Beach v. Sehmulh,

20 Ill. 185.

Jey. a Blackf. 488. One of two tenants
in common of a chattel has no right to
break into the premises of the other
to ob&ain it. Herndon t~. Bnrllctt, 4
Porter, 481 ; Crocker"· Carson, 33 Mo.
-186. See. further, Hupport "· Morrison, 2'7 Miss. 865; Allen "· Fe land,
10 B. )[on. 806; Newbold "· Babler, 9
Barb. G'7; Chase •· J etrcraon, 1 Houst.

1 2 Kent, 864, 86'i; Loom i!l "·Green,
'7 Me. 886; Win~ate "· Smith, 20 Me.
287; Moore "· Bowman, 47 N. H. 494;
Weil "· 8ilverstone, 6 Bush, fillS; Alley "· Adams, 44 Ala. 60!:1; Hart e.
Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 62; Willard
t~. Rice, 11 Met. 490; .Jenkins t~. Bte.
anka, 19 Wis. 189; Beach"· BchmuUa,
20 Ill. 186.
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the general rules of civil remedy, not only because it would
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award to one party a redress beyond his loss, but also because it

would compel the other party to pay not damages but a penalty.

The inﬂiction of penalties by way of civil remedy is not favored

in the law;' on the other hand the law inclines against them;

construing contracts so as to avoid them, and in many eases

giving relief against them in equity, where the parties have

expressly stipulated for them.’ Therefore, the law in these cases

does justice between the parties as nearly as, under the circum-

stances, is practicable by dividing between them the commingled

mass according to their respective proportions.‘ Nor is this

method of arranging their interests limited to the cases in which

the commingled mass is exactly the same with the separate par-

cels: it is suﬁicient that it is practically the same, so that the

separation of that which is equivalent in quantity or measure

will give to the party whose property has been wrongfully taken

that which is substantially equivalent in kind and value. This

rule has been applied to the case of quantities of saw-logs,

belonging to different parties but commingled together; and it is

held that to give the party whose logs are lost the option of

taking from the mass an equivalent in quantity and quality, or

of demanding the value, is all that in ustiee he can require.‘
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‘ Willard, Eq. 56; Sanders 1;. Pope,

12 Ves. 282; Griggs v. Laudis, 21 N. J.

Eq. 282.

‘Crane v. Dwyer, 9 Mich. 350;

White v. Port Huron, etc., R. R. Co.,

13 Mich. 256; Wing 1:. Railey, 14

Mich. 83; Jaquith 0. Hudson, 5

Mich. 123; Griggs 0. Landis, 21 N.

J. Eq. 494; McKim 0. The White

Hall Co., 2 Md._ Ch. Dec. 510; Skin-

the general niles of civil remedy, not only because it would
awar·d. to one party a redress beyond his loss, but also because it
wonld compel the other party to pay not damages but a penalty.
The infliction of })enalties by wa.y of ciYil remedy is not favored
in the Jaw; • on the other hand the law inclines against them;
construing contracts so as to avoid them, and in many cases
giving relief against them in equity, where the parties have
expressly stipulated for them.~ Therefore, the law in these cases
does justice between the parties as nearly as, under the circumstances, is practicable by dividing between them the commingled
ma.ss according to their respective proportions.1 Nor is this
method of arranging their interests limited to the case~ in which
the commingled mass is exactly the same with the separate parcels: it is sufficient that it is practically the same, so that theseparation of that which is equivalent in quantity or measure
will give to the party whose property has been wrongfully taken
that which is substantially equivalent in kind and value. This
rule has been applied to the case of quantities of saw-logs,.
belonging to different parties but commingled together; and it is
held that to give the party whose logs are lost the option of
taking from the ma.ss an equivalent in quantity and quality, or
of demanding the value, is all that in justice he can require.•

ner v. Dayton, 2 Johns. Ch. 526;

Skinner 21. White, 17 Johns. 357;

Livingston 0. Tompkins, 4 Johns. Ch.

510; Cythe o. La Fontain, 51 Barb.

186; Baxter o. Lansing, 7 Paige, 350;

Hager v. Buck, 44 VL 285; Wal-

ker 1:. Wheeler, 2 Conn. 299; Bowen

0. Bowen, 20 Conn. 126; Warner 0.

Bennett, 31 Conn. -L68; Horsburg v.

Baker, 1 Peters, 239; Smith v. Jew-

ett, 40 N. II. 530; Sanders v. Pope, 12

Vesey, 282; Davis v. West, Id. 475;

Northcote 0. Duke, Amb. 511: Sto-

rey’s Eq. Jnr., Sec. 1319; Williard’s

Eq. J ur., 56.

'Lut‘ton v. White, 15 Ves. 442;

Spence v. Union Murine Ins. Co., L.

R. 3 O. P. 427; Ryder v. Hathaway,

21 Pick. 298; Robinson o. Holt, 39 N.

H. 557; Moore 1:. Bowman, 47 N. ll.

494; Willard o. Rice, 11 Met. 493;

Bryant 1;. Ware, 30 Me. 295; Hesse]-

tine v. Stockwell, 30 Me. 237; Hol-

brook 0. Hyde, 1 Vt. 286; Adams e.

Myers, 1 Sawyer, 306.

‘ Stephenson '0. Little, 10 Mich. 433;

Jenkins v. Steanka, 19 Wis. 126 ; Ryder

1:. Hathaway, 21 Pick. 298: Hes-seL

tine v. Stockwell, 30 Me. 237; Smith

0. Morrill, 56 Me. 566. If the goods

can be distinguished and separated,

no change, of course, takes place in

1 Willard, Eq. 56; Banders e. Pope,
12 Ves.282; Griggu.Landis,21 N.J.
Eq. 282.
1 Crane "· Dwyer, 9 Mich. 850;
White e. Port Huron, etc., R. R. Co.,
18 Mich. 256; Wing e. Railey, 14
Mich. 88; Jaquith e. Hudson, 5
Mich. 123; Griggs e. Landis, 21 N.
J. Eq. 494; McKim e. The White
Hall Co., 2 Md. Ch. Dec. IUO; Skinner e. Dayton; 2 Johns. Ch. 526;
Skinner "· White, 17 Johns. 857;
Livingston e. Tompkins, 4 Johns. Ch.
610; Cythe e. La Fontain, 51 Barb.
186; B~ter e. Lansing, 7 Paige, 850;
Hager e. Buck, 44 Vt. 285; W alker e. Wheeler, 2 Conn. 299; Bowen
tl. Bowen, 20 Conn. 126; Warner "·
Bennett, 81 Conn. 468; Ilorsburg e.
Baker, 1 Peters, 239; Smith "· Jewett, 40 N. II. 680; Sanders"· Pope, 12

Vesey, 282; Davis e. West, Id. 475;
Northcote e. Duke, .Amb. 511: Sto..
rey's Eq. Jur., Sec. 1319; Williard's
Eq. Jur.,M.
1 Lufton e. White, 15 Vee. 442;.
Spence e. Union Marine Ins. Cu., L.
R. 8 C. P. 427; Hyder e. Hathaway,
21 Pick. 298; Robinson e. Holt, 39 N.
H. 557; :Moore "· Bowman, 47 N. 11.
494; Willard e. Rice, 11 Met. 493;
Bryant e. Ware, SO Me. 295; Hesst>ltine "· Stockwell, SO Me. 237; Holbrook e. Hyde, 1 Vt. 286; Adams e.
Myers, 1 8awyer, 806.
• Stephenson"· Little, 10 l'rlich. 438;
Jenkinn. Steanka, 19 Wis. 126; Ryder
e. Hathaway, 21 Pick. 298: Hesseltine e. St.ockwell, SO Me. 237; Smith
e. Morrill, 56 Me. 566. If the goods
can be distinguished and separated ..
no change, of course, takes place in.
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Property by Accession. In another class of cases the owner

of property may either lose it by the wrongful act of another,

or he may be entitled to reclaim it in a modiﬁed or perhaps

wholly diﬁ'erent form. The reason why the owner is permitted

to reclaim his own property from a wrong-doer is, that the pro-

tection of property and the peace of society are inconsistent

with a state of the law in which a wrong-doer may compel

another to sell to him, by seizing the property he desires and

leaving the owner to bring suit for its value. Therefore, in gen-

eral, the owner of property, so long as he can trace and identify

his own, may reclaim it. But there are some cases in which he

is not permitted to reclaim his own, even though the identiﬁca-

tion be complete.

In illustration of some of these cases the instance may be

given ofa stone or board belonging to one man taken by another

and built into his house in such manner that it could not be

removed without inﬂicting injury out of proportion to the value

of the stone or board. In such a case the law would not suﬁ'er

the original owner to reclaim it, but would leave him to his

remedy in the recovery of damages, and treat the stone or board
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as having become a part of the realty by accession. A like loss

of property to the original owner might follow where one has

taken the personal property of another and expended upon it

labor or money of his own, thereby converting it into something

substantially diifereut, or adding so greatly to its value that, to

permit the original owner to reclaim it, would be shocking to

one's sense of justice.

If one has willfully, as a trespasser, taken the property of

another and altered it in form or substance by an expenditure ot

his own labor or money, he will not be suﬁered to acquire a title

by his wrongful action as against the original owner reclaiming

his property. Therefore, one whose trees have been converted

the property. Alley o. Adams, 44

.\la. 60 ; Robinson 0. Holt. 39 N. H.

-‘>57. If they are intermingled by

consent, th- parties become tenants

in common of the mass. Adams 0.

Meyers. 1 Sawyer, 306; Ryder v.

ll:\rha\\'ay, 21 Pick. 299; LOW v.

.\I:u"tin, 18 Ill. 286. The same is true

Where they are intermixed by acci-

dent. Moore 0. Erie R. R. Co.. 7

Lnns. 39.

As to an lntermixture where the

ProJ)8rt;7 by ~on.

In another class of cases the owner

of proJ.erty may either lose it by the wrongful act of another,
or he may be entitled to reclaim it in a modified or perhaps
wholly different fonn. The reason why the owner is permitted
to reclaim his own property from a wrong-doer is, that the protection of Jlroperty and the peace of society are inconsistent
with a state of the law in which a wrong-doer may compel
another to sell to him, by seiz~ng tho property he desires and
leaving the owner to bring suit for its value. Therefore, in general, the owner of property, so long as he c&n trace and identity
his own, may reclaim it. But there are some eases in which be
is not pennitted to reclaim his own, even though the identification be c~mplete.
In illustration of some of these cases the instance may be
given of a stone or board belonging to one man taken by another
and built into hie house in such manner that it conl<l not be
removed without inflicting injury out of proportion to the value
of the ~tone or board. In such a case the law would not snffer
the original owner to reclaim it, but would leave birn to his
remedy in the recovery of dam~O'CS, and treat the stone or board
&ri having become a part of the realty by accession.
A like loss
of property to the original owner might follow where one has
taken the personal property of another and expended upon it
labor or money of his own, thereby converting it into something
..ubstantially different, or adding so greatly to its value that, to
permit the original owner to reclaim it, would be shocking to
onc·s ~use of julitice.
If one bas willfnlly, as a trespasser, talren the property of
another and altered it in form or substance by an expenditure ot
his own labor or money, he ltill not be suffered to acquire a title
by his wrongful action as against the original owner reclaiming
his proJ.erty. Therefore, one whose trees have been converted

purly clmrgt-able with it is innocent

of inn-nded wrong, see Bryant 0.

Ransom, 20 Vt. 383; IIt-sseltinc 1:.

Slockxvcll, 30 Me. 257; Thornc 0. (‘ol-

ton, 27 Iowa, 425; Wetherbee u. Green,

22 Mich. 311.

I

tbts property. Alley e. Ad1Ull8, 44
•\1&. 60 ; Robin!!On e. Holt, 89 N. ll.
:-.m. If they are intenninglcd by
l"ODIM'Dt. tb• parties become tenants
io common of tbe mBSB. Adams e.
lleyeN, 1 Sawyer, 306; Ryder •·
Hathaway, 21 Pick. 299; Low •·
llartln, 18 Ill. 286. Tbf' same is true
where they are intcnnized by acci.

dent. .Moore •· Erie R. R. Co., 7
Lans. 39.
As to an lntermiJ:ture where the
party cluug(•able with it is inn()("ent
of inh·nded wrong, see Bryant 11.
Ransom, 20 Vt. 38:1; Il('"',.cltine "·
Stnckwt'!l, 30 Me. 2.'i7; Thome e. ('ol.
ton, 27 Iowa, 425; Wetherbee e. Green,
22 )licb. 311.
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into shingles by a trespasser may reclaim his property in the
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shingles,‘ or if they have been made into the frame of a boat, he

may have them in that form.’ Indeed, the doctrine has been

carried so far that in New York it has been held that one whose

grain has been taken by a willful trespasser and converted into

alcoholic liquors is entitled to demand and recover the new pro-

duct.‘ But “it is on all hands conceded where the appropriation

of the property of another was accidental or through mistake of

fact, and labor has in good faith been expended upon it which

destroys its identity, or converts it into something substantially

different, and the value of the original article is insigniﬁcant as

compared with the value of the new product, the title to the

property in its converted form must be held to pass to the per-

son by whose labor in good faith the change has been wrought,

the original owner being permitted, as his remedy, to recover

the value of the article as it was before the conversion. This is

thoroughly equitable doctrine, and its aim is so to adjust the

rights of the parties as to save both, if possible, or as nearly as

possible, from any loss. But where the identity of the original

article is susceptible of being traced, the idea. of a change in the

property is never admitted. unless the value of that which has

been expended upon it is sufficiently great, as compared with the
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original value, to render the injustice of permitting its appro-

priation by the original owuer so gross and palpable as to be

apparent at the ﬁrst blush. Perhaps no ease has gone further

than Wetlw-rbee v. Green,‘ in which it was held that one who, by

unintentional trespass, had taken from the land of another young

trees of the value of twenty-ﬁve dollars, and converted them into

hoops worth seven hundred dollars, had thereby made them his

own, though the identity of trees and hoops was perfectly capable

of being traced and established.” '

‘ Church o. Lee, 5 Johns. 348. See,

also, Curtis o. Groat, 6 Johns. 168;

Worth 0. Northam, 4 Ired. 102.

” Burris 0. Johnson. 1 J. J. Marsh.

196.

' Silsbury 0. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379.

See Riddle v. Driver, 12 Ala. 590.

' 22 Mich. 311.

5 Isle Royal Mining Co. 0. Hertin,

37 Mich. 332. In this case parties, by

mistake, had felled trees on the land

of another and cut them into cord

wood. The owner of the trees then

seized the wood and sold it. The par-

into shingles by a trespasser may reclaim his property in the
shingles; or if they have been made into the frame of a boat, he
may have them in that tbnn.1 Indeed, the doctrine has been
carried so far that in New York it bas been held that one whose
grain has been taken by a willful trespasser and converted into
alcoholic liquors is entitled to demand and recover the new product.• But "it is on alJ hands conceded where the appropriation
of the property of another was accidental or through mistake of
fact, and labor hRB in good faith b(>en expended upon it which
destroys its identity, or converts it into something substantially
different, and the value of the original article is insignificant 88
compared with the value of the new product, the title to the
property in its converted form must be held to pass to the person by whose labor in good faith the change has been wrought,
the original owner being permitted, as his remedy, to recover
the value of the article 88 it was before the conversion. This is
thoroughly equitable doctrine, and its aim is so to adjust the
rights of the parties as to save both, if possible, or as nearly as
possible, from any loss. Bnt where the identity of the original
article is susceptible of being traced, the idea of a change in the
property is never admitted, unless the value of that which has
been expended upon it is sufficiently great, as c..'Ompared with the
original value, to render the injnsti<.-e of permitting its appro·
priation by the original owner so gross and palpable as to be
apparent at the first blush. Perhaps no case has gone further
than Wetherbee v. Green,• in which it was held that one who, by
unintentional trespass, had taken from the land of another young
trees of the value of twenty-five dollars, and converted them into
hoops worth seven hundred do11ars, had thereby made them his
own, though the identity of trees and hoops was perfectly capable
of being traced and established." '

ties cutting it thereupon brought suit

in assumpsit, claiming that they were

entitled to recover either the value of

the wood, as having been made their

own by the labor expended on it, or

the value of their labor, which the

1 Church 11. Lee, l5 Johns. 848. See,
also, Curtis 11. Groat, 6 Johns. 168;
Worth fl. Northam, 4 Ired. 102.
• Burris 11. Johnson, 1 J. J. Marsh.
196.
1 Bilsbury 11. McCoon, 8 N. Y. 879.
Bee Riddle 11. Driver, 12 Ala. 590.
• 22 Mich. 811.
1 Isle Royal Mining Co. 11. Hertin,
87 Mich. 882. In this case parties, by

mistake, had felled trees on the land
of another and cut them into cord
wood. The owner of the trees then
seized the wood and sold it. The par.
ties cutting it thereupon brought suit
in a~sumpsit, claiming thnt tlwy were
entitled to recover either the value of
the wood, as having been made their
own by the labor expended on it, or
the value of their labor, which the
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as the right of recaption is the right which the owner of lands

has, when another is wrongfully in possession thereof, to re-enter

when he may do so peacefully, and thereafter to exclude the

wrong-doer therefrom. This right may exist either where one

n\\'[IBl' of the trees had now appro-

priated. By the court: “There is no

such disparity in value between the

standing trees and the cord wood in

Entry upon Lands to Repossess them. Of the same nature
as the right of recaption is the right which the owner of lands
has, when another is wrongfully in possession thereof, to re-enter
when be may do so peacefully, and thereafter to exclude the
wrong-doer therefrom. This right may exist either where one

this case as was found to exist be-

tween the trees and hoops in Wethcr-

bee v. Green. The trees are not only

Susceptible of being traced and iden-

tiﬁed in the wood, but the difference

in value between the two is not so

great but that it is conceivable the

owner may have preferred the trees

standing to the wood cut. The cord

wood has a higher market value, but

the owner may have chosen not to cut

it, expecting to make some other use

of the trees than for fuel, or anticipat-
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ing a considerable rise in value if

they were allowed to grow. It cannot

be assumed as a rule that. a man pre-

ft-rs his trees cut into cord wood

rather than lcft standing, and if his

right to leave them uncut is interfered

with, even by mistake, it is mani-

fcstly just that the consequences

should fall upon the person commit-

ting the mistake and not upon him.

Nothing could more encourage care-

1e.~~ne<s than the acceptance of the

principle that one who by mistake

pt-rl'orm.< labor upon the property of

another should lose nothing by his

error, but should have a claim upon

the owner for remuneration. Why

should one be vigilant and careful of

the rights of others if such were the

law t Whether mistaken or not is all

the -tame to him, for in either case he

has employment and receives his

remuneration, while the inconve-

niences, if any, are left to rest with

the innocent owner. Such a doctrine

otfers a premium to heedlessness and

blunders, and a temptation by false

evidence to give an intentional tres-

pass the appearance of an innocent

mistake.

“A case could seldom arise in

which the claim to compensation

could be more favorably presented by

the facts than it is in this, since it is

highly probable that the defendant

would suller neither hardship nor in-

convenience if compelled to pay the

plaintiffs for their labor. But a gen.

eral principle is to be tested, not by

its operation in an individual case,

but by its general workings. If a

mechanic employed to alter over one

man’s dwelling house shall by mis-

take go to another which happens to

be unoccupied, and before his mis-

take is discovered, at a large expendi-

ture of labor, shall thoroughly over-_

(owner or the trees bad now appro.
prillted. By the court: "There is no
such di!lparity in value between the
st.&ntling trees and the cord wood in
this casc as was found to exist betw~cu the tre<'S :md hoops in Wether})~'(' r. Green. The trees are not only
su~Pptihle of being trat'ed and ideo.
titled in the wood, but the difference
in vllluc between the two is not so
great but that it is conceivable the
owner m!Cy have preferred the trees
fllt:mding to the wood cut. The cord
wood has a higher market value, but
&.bt: owner may h"vc chosen not to cut
it, expecting to make some other use
of the trees than for fuel, or unticipat.
iD!! a considerable rise in value if
they were allowed to grow. It cannot
bt: assumed lLS a rule that. a man prefer!! his tret•s cut into cord wood
r:Lther than }pft standing, and if his
ri::ht to leave them uncut is interfered
.,..·itb, even by mh;take, it is manifPstly just that the consequences
al.aould f~&ll upon the person committin~ the mistake and not upon him.
Nuthing could more encourage care](.·,..-nr-,:;s than the acceptance of the
principle that one who by mistake
p;•rform:-; labor upon the property of
another should lose nothing by his
~rrur, but should have a claim upon
the owner fur remunemtion. Why
f'-1Jnuld one be vigilant and careful of
tht' rights of others if such were the
Jan~· ? Whether mistaken or not is all
&he ..ame to him, for in either case he
bas employment and receives his
remnneration, while the inconveniences, if any, are left to rest with
the innocent owner. Such a doctrine

offers a premium to heedlessness and
blunders, and a temptation by false
evidence to give an intentional trespass the appearance of an innocent
mistake.
"A case could seldom arise in
which the clnim to compensation
could be more favornbly pr<>sl'nted by
the facts than it is in this, since it Ia
highly probable that the defendant
would suffer neither hardship nor inconvenience if compelled to pay tho
plaintiffs for their labor. But a gen.
eral principle is to be tested, not by
its operation in an individual case,
but by its general workings. If a
mechnnic employed to alter over one
man's dwelling house shall by mfatake go to another which happens to
be unoccupied, and before his mistake is discovered, nt a large expenditure of labor, shall thoroughly over-.
haul and change it, will it be said
that the owner, who did not dcsiro hla
bouse disturbed, must either abandon
it altogether, or If be takes possession
must pay for labor t'Xpended upon it
which he neither contracted for nor
desired nor consented to f And if so,
what bounds can be prescribed to
whkh the application of tbis doctrine can be limited? The mRn who
by mistake carries otr the property of
another will next be demanding payment for the transportation; and the
only person reasonably secure against
demands he bas never assented to
create, will be the person who, possessing nothing, is thereby protected
against anything being accidentally
improved by another at his cost and
to his ruin."
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has gone into possession without right, or where one, having had
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an estate in, or at least lawful possession of the lands, has had

his right terminated by operation of law or by the act of the

owner.‘ The chief restraint upon this remedy is sutﬁciently

indicated by what has already been said: it must be had in a

peaceful manner, and an actual possession, though wrongful,

must not be subverted by the employment of force.’

Distress of Cattle Damage Feasant. If the cattle of one

man stray upon the lands of another, thereby causing him dam-

age. he may distrain and hold them until the damage is estim-

ated and satisﬁed. This is a common law right, and is regulated

by statute. The distress consists in taking the cattle into custody

has gone into possession without right, or where one, having had
an estate in, or at least lawful possession of the lands, has had
his right terminated by operation of l~w or by the act of the
owner! The chief restraint upon this remedy is sufficiently
indicated by what has already been said: it must be had in a
peaceful manner, and an actual possession, though wrongful,
must not be subverted by the employment of force.'

while they are still upon the lands, and impounding them until

satisfaction is made. For the protection of the owner, notice to

him of the distress is required, and i_f the compensation is not

agreed upon, disinterested appraisers are chosen to assess it-

The detention of the cattle is only for the purpose of in-

demnity, and they must be surrendered when satisfaction is

made. In the meantime the distrainer must feed and care for

them properly; but if they die or are injured or lost, without

his fault, the loss must fall upon the owner.’

The right to distrain cattle damage feasant may be affected
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by statutory regulations making it the duty of the owner of the

land to enclose his premises with a fence suﬂieient for their pro-

tection. \Vhere adjoining owners are required by law to con-

struct and maintain respectively a certain portion of the partition

fence between them, and one neglects this duty and the cattle of

the other enter his premises in consequence, he is precluded

from maintaining an action, because the default from which the

injury ﬂows is his own.‘ But as the obligation in such a case is

' Taunton v. Costar, 7 T. R. 431;

Turner 1:. Mcymott, 1 Bing. 158; Ax-

gent v. Durrant, 8 T. R.-103; Barnes v.

Dean, 5 Watts, 543; Thompson 0.

Craigmylc, 4 B Mon. 391; Sharon '0.

Wooldrick, 18 Minn. 355.

' See post, Ch. VI.

“ Pcttit v. May, 34 ll/is. 666; Taylor

v. Welbey, 36 Wis. 42; Moshcr v. Jew-

ett, 59 Me. 4-53; S. C. 63 Me. S4; Rust

o. Low, 6 Mass. 90; Melody v.Reab, 4

Mass. 471; Eames 0. Salem & Lowell

ll. R. Co., 98 Mass. 560; Ladue 0.

Branch, 42 Vt. 5'74. Property cannot

If the cattle of one
man stray upon the lands of another, thereby causing him damage. he may distrain and hold them until the damage is estimated and satisfied. This is a common law right, and is regulated
by statute. The distress consists in taking the cattle into custody
while they are still upon the lands, and jmpounding them nntil
satisfaction is made. For the protection of the owner, notice to
him of the distress is required. and ~f the compensation is not
agreed upon, disinterested appraisers are chosen to assess it.
The detention of the cattle is only for the purpo8e of indemnity, and they must be surrendered when sati~t'action is
made. In the meantime the distrainer must feed and care for
them properly; but if they die or are injured or lost, without
his fault, the Joss must tall upon the owner.•
The right to distrain cattle damage feasant may he affected
by statutory regulations making it the duty of the owner of the
land to enclose his premises with a fence sufficient tor their protection. Where adjoining owners are required by law to construct and maintain respectively a certain portion of the partition
fence between them, and one negl£'cts this duty and the cattle of
the other enter his premises in consequence, he is precluded
from maintaining an action, because the default from which the
injury flows is his own.• But as the obligation in such a case is
Distrell8 of Cattle Damap l'euant.

be distrained which, at the time, is in

the actual possession of the owner.

Storey 1;. Robinson, 6 T. R. 138; Field

0. Adames, 12 Ad. & El. 649.

‘ Shepherd v. Hces, 12 Johns. 433;

Colden av. Eldred, 15 Johns. 220; Staf-

'Taunton "· Costar, '7 T. R. 481;
Turner "· Meymott, 1 Bing. 158; .A:rgen\ "·Durrant; 8 T. R. 403; Barnes fl,
Dean, 5 Watts, 543; Thompson "·
Craigmyle, 4 B Mon. 391; Sharon "·
W ooldrick, 18 Minn. SM.
' Bee post, Ch. VI.
• Pettit"· May, 84 Wis. 666; Taylor
"· Welbey,86 Wia.42; Xosbeu.Jew.
ett, 69lle. ~8; B. C. 68lle. 84; Rust

e. Low, 6 Maaa. 00; .&lelody "· Reab, (
Mass. 471; Eames "· Salem & Lowell
U. R. Co., 98 .Mas:~. 560; Ladue •·
Branch, 42 Vt. ~74. Property cannot
be distrained which, at the time, is in
the actual po~se811ion of tho owner.
Storey "· Robinson, 6 T. U.. 1~; Field
e. Adames, 12 Ad. & El 04U.
• Shepherd "· Hee8, 12 Johns. 488•
Coluen fl, Eldred, 15 Johns. 220; Star-
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0

only imposed for the protection of those whose beasts may be

lawfully on the adjoining lands, if cattle trespass upon such

only .imposed for the protection of those whose beasts may be
lawfully on the a.Ujoining lands, if cattle trespass upon such
adjoining lands, and from thence pass upon the premises insufficiently. t'tmced, the owner of such premises is not precluded from
a recovery of his damages. 1

adjoining lands, and from thence pass upon the premises insufli-

ciently fenced, the owner of such premises is not precluded from

Distreas of Goeds to Compel Performance of Duty.

In

a recovery of his damages.‘

Distress of Goods to Compel Performance of Duty. In

several cases where an obligation, owing to a party, remained

nnperformed, the common law permitted him to enforce per-

formance by seizing the goods and chattels of the party in default,

and holding them until performance. If performance was not

made in reasonable time after seizure, it also permitted him,

under proper regulations, to sell the distress. The most common

of these cases was that of the non-payment by a tenant of his

rent; and this is the only one which has any place in the law of

this country. All movable articles which are the subject of
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property are liable to be seized for rent, including even the chat-

tels of other persons which chance to be in the tenant’s posses-

sion with the owner’s permission; but with this important

exception, that articles held by him in the way of trade, such as

goods of a guest in possession of an inn-keeper, and goods in the

hands of a mechanic to be made up or repaired, are privileged

for the encouragement of business. And whatever is for the

moment in the personal use of the tenant is also, while so used,

privileged.’ And now, by statute, in this country, this right of

distress is in the main taken away; and where not taken away, it

is regulated by statute. A consideration of it does not properly

belong to our subject.

From the foregoing statement of the law it will appear that

the privilege of redressing one’s own wrongs is not to any great

extent permitted to individuals; indeed, the State cannot aﬁord

ford v. Ingersoll, 3 Hill, 38; Cowles

s. Balzer, 4'7 Barb. 562; Tonawanda

R. R. Co. a. Manger, 5 Denio, 260;

Alters 0. George, 61 Ill. 876; Milligan

e. Wehinger, 68 Penn. St. 235; Griﬁln

0. Martin, 7 Barb. 297. _

' Lord v. Wormwood, 29 Me. 282;

aeveral cases where an obligation, owing to a party, remained
onperfonned, the common law permitted him to enforce perfonnance by seizing the goods and chattels of the party in default,
and holding them until perfonnance. If performance was not
made in reasonable time after seizure, it alFoo permitted him,
under proper regulations, to sell the distress. The most common
of these cases was that of the non-payment by a tenant of his
rent; and this is the only one which has any place in the law of
this country. All movable articles which are the subject of
property are liable to be seized for rent, including even the chattels of other persons which chance to be in the tenant's possession with the owner's permission; but with this important
exception, that articles held by him in the way of trade, such as
goods of a guest in pos~>ession of an inn-keeper, and goods in the
hands of a mechanic to be made up or repaired, are privile~ed
for the encouragement of business. And whatever is for the
moment in the personal use of the tenant is also, while so n:;cd,
privileged.' Ana now, by statute, in this country, this right of
distress is in the main taken away; and where not taken away, it
is regulated by statute. A consideration of it does not properly
belong to our subject.
From the foregoing statement of the law it will appear that
the privilege of redressing one's own wrongs is not to any great
extent permitted to individuals; indeed, tho State cannot atlord

Lyons v. Merrick, 105 Mass. '71; John-

son c. Wing, 3 Mich. 163. Statutes on

this subjectdo not usually go further

Lhnn to take away the right of action

where the owner of lands neglects to

enclose them with a proper fence and

they are trespassed upon in conse-

quence. He may, Lhcret‘ore,dis|m1se

with a fence if he sees ﬁt to leuve his

premises open to cattle lawfully on

the premises which adjoin them.

Aylesworth o. Herrington, 17 Mich.

417.

' See 1 Bl. Com. 8, and notes.

ford e. Ingersoll, S Hill, 88; Cowles
•· &lzer, 47 BIU·b. 562; Tonawanda
R R. Co. 1l. )[unger, 5 Denio, 260;
Abrs 1l. George, 61 Ill. 376; ~lilligtm
o. We binger, 68 Penn. SL 2:.15; Griffin
"· :Martin, 7 Barb. 297.
.
I wnl "·Wormwood, 29 Me. 282;
Lyons"· llerrick., 105 Mass. 71; JohnliOn"· Wing, 3llich. 16a. Statutes on
this subject do not usually go further
than to take away Ute right of action

where the owner of lands neglects to
enclose them with a proper feuce and
they are trespassell upon in consequence. He may, thercfore,llispeusc
with a fence if he sees tit to h·avc his
premises open to cattle lawfully on
the premises which adjoin them.
Aylesworth e. Herrington, 17 Mich.
417.
1

See 1 Bl. Com. 8, and nutes.
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to clothe individuals with its own powers for the purpose of
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enforcing its laws according to their own judgments, especially

when in enforcing the laws they would only be judging of and

redressing their own grievances. Order is no less the law of

human governments than of the divine government, and indi-

vid_ual convenience must be subordinated to it. The cases which

are above mentioned are in the main to be regarded as cases in

which the individual is permitted to act on his own behalf, in

order that he may prevent a mischief already begun from becom-

ing more serious. He interposes obstructions to the lawless

conduct of others, he protects his person, he reclaims his prop-

erty; but only on the condition that he can do so Without a

breach of the public peace; and he abates a nuisance on the

same terms. But to obtain redress for any wrong done him he

must invoke the assistance of the law.

Nature of the Legal Redress. The redress the law will give

will be suited to the injury suffered. If one’s land is taken from

him, he shall have the proper writ for its recovery. If personal

property is taken which he prefers to recover rather than have

judgment for its money value, he may demand back the thing

itself. But the principal remedy, and for the most part the only

available remedy which the law can give for a wrong, is an award
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of money estimated as an equivalent for the damage suﬁered.

to clothe individuals with its own powers for the purpose of
enforcing its laws according to their own judgments, espE>cially
when in enforcing the laws they would only be judging of and
redressing their own grievances. Order is no less the law of
human governments than of the divine government, and individual convenience must be subordinated to it. The cases which
are ab'!ve mentioned are in the main to be reh"B.rded as cases in
which the individual is permitted to act on his own behalf, in
order that he may prevent a mischief already begun from becoming more serious. He interposes obstructions to the lawless
conduct of others, he protects his person, he reclaims his property; but only on the condition that he can do so without a
breach of the public peace; and he abates a nuisance on the
same terms. But to obtain redress for any wrong done him he
must invoke the assistance of the law.

How One Becomes a Wrong-Deer. The ways in which one

may become liable to an action as for a tort are the following:

1. By actually doing to the prejudice of another something he

ought not to do.

2. By doing something he may rightfully do, but wrongfully

or negligently doing it by such means or at such time or in such

manner that another is injured.

3. By neglecting to do something which he ought to do,

whereby another suffers an injury.

The ﬁrst is the active wrong; the others are usually the

wrongs of negligence.

The active wrong may be done by the party in person, or it

Nature of the Legal Redress. The redress the law will give
will be suited to the injury suffered. If one's land is taken from
him, he shall have the proper writ for its recovery. If personal
property is taken which he prefers to recover rather than have
judgment for its money value, he may demand back the thing
itself. But the principal remedy, and for the most part the only
a\•ailable remedy which the law can give for a wrong, is an award
of money estimated as an equivalent for the damage suffered.

may be done by some other person for whose conduct generally

or under the particular circumstances he is responsible. He is

always responsible for the conduct which he counsels, advises or

How One Becomes a Wrong-Doer. The wavs in which one
may become liable to an action as for a tort are the followiQg:
1. By actually doing to the prejudice of another somethinjr he
ought not to do.
2. By doing something he mn.y rightfully do, but wrongfully
or negligently doing it b.v SliCh means or at such time or in such
manner that another is injured.
3. By neglecting to do something which he ought to do,
whereby another suffers an injury.
The first is the active wrong; the others are usually the
wrongs of negligence.
The active wrong may be done by the party in person, or it
may be done by some other person for whose conduct generally
or under the particular circum'"tances he is responsible. He is
always responsible for the conduct which he counsels, advises or
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That is his wrong which he thus accomplishes through another.

Without more than a passing allusion in this place to rules

which will receive attention hereafter, it may be stated that the

common law holds the husband civilly responsible for the con-

duct of his wife, the two in law being considered as one person

for the purposes of legal redress. They are to be joined in the

suit, but the judgment, if one is recovered, may be collected of

the husband, and it is immaterial that he never advised the

wrong, or that it may have been unknown to him, or against his

will. The idea underlying this doctrine is, not that the husband

is necessarily in fault, but that the interests of society are best

subserved by maintaining the principle of marital unity. An-

other case of responsibility for the acts of others is that of the

master, who, in general, must redress all wrongs negligently

committed by servants or others to whom he may have entrusted

his business, and who is also responsible for their active wrongs,

such as frauds and deceits, which are committed in the line of

his business and with his actual or presumed authority. So the

magistrate may be responsible for illegally setting the constable

in motion; the plaintiff who is back of him may be responsible

for the acts of both; the sheriff may be holden for the conduct
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of his deputy, and so on. If the position of the parties is such

relatively that the particular act must be considered as having

been, in contemplation of law, advised, counseled or procured to

be done by another, it may be treated as the tort of the party

who thus counsels. advises and procures, and he is liable as if he

had done it in person.

The wrong may also be done by one person or by several, but

when by more than one, it is the several act or neglect of all. It

may also be suﬂ'ered by several, where they have joint interests

which are invaded, as where they are joint owners of property,

or are partners.

Acts merely Intended. An act contemplated but not yet

accomplished, though it may sometimes be ground for preventive

remedies, cannot support an action as for a tort. A tort sup-

poses a wrong actually committed, and this implies a right

invaded, or in some manner hindered or abridged. The mere

directs, and for whatever naturally results from his counsels.
That is his wrong which he thus accomplishes through another.
Without more than a p888ing allusion in this place to roles
which will receive attention hereafter, it may be stated that the
common law holds the husband civilly responsible for the conduct of his wife, the two in law being cunsidered 88 one person
tor the purposes of legal redress. They are to be joined in the
:mit, but the judgment, if one is recovereu, may be collected of
the hooband, and it is immaterial that he never advised the
wrong, or that it may have been unknown to him, or against his
will. The idea underlying this doctrine is, not that the but~btmd
is necessarily in tault, but that the interests of soeiety are best
~ubeervoo by maintaining the principle of marital unity. Another case of respon11ibility for the acts of others is that of the
wa.eter, who, in general, must redress all wrongs negligently
committed by servants or others to whom he may have eutruswd
his business, and who is also responsible for their active wrongs,
such 88 t'rands and deceits, which are committed in the line of
his business and with his actual or presumed authority. So the
magistrate may be responsible tor illegally setting the constable
in motion; the plaintiff who is back of him may be responsible
for the acts of both; the sheriff may be holden for the conduct
of his deputy, and so on. If the position of the parties i~ such
relatively that the particular act must be con~idcred as having
heen, in contemplation of law, advised, counseled or pt·ocured to
be done by another, it may be treated as the tort of the party
who thus counsels. advises and procures, and he is liable as if he
had done it in person.
The wrong may also be done by one person or by several, bnt
when by more than one, it is the several act or neglect of all. It
may al~o be suffered by several, where they have joint interests
which arc invaded, 88 where they are joint owners of property,.
or are partners.
An act contemplated bnt not yet
aooomplished, though it may sometimes be ground for preventive
remedies, cannot support an action 88 for a tort. A tort supposes a wrong actually committed, and this implies a right
invaded, or in some manner hindered or abridged. The mcro
Acta meroly Intended.
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intent cannot constitute actionable matter.‘ A malicious person
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may purpose to libel his rival in business; he may have the libel

prepared, put in print ready for dissemination among the people,

have messengers ready for its distribution, so that the evil intent

and the deliberate purpose to do mischief are manifested in a

manner most emphatic and conclusive; but if no other person

has yet seen the libel there is no wrong, because the reputation

is not yet assailed, and the right of the party to protection in it is

therefore not yet violated. It is only assailed when a publication

is made. All that precedes the publication rests in intent, and

intent may be overcome by repentance, or accident or the inter-

position of others may prevent its being carried into eifect.

Any degree of preparation for a tort can never constitute a tort;

if the wrong is prevented there is certainly no wrong suffered.

Elements of a Tort. It is said by the authorities that it is

the conjunction of damage and wrong that creates a tort, and

there is no tort if either damage or wrong is wanting.’ Here

the word wrong is used in the sense of a thing amiss; something

which for any reason the party ought not to do or to permit, and

which does not become the actionable wrong called a tort unless

the other element is found in the same case, namely, a damage

suffered in consequence of the thing amiss. In this sense we

intent cannot eonstitnte actionable matter.1 A malicious person
may purpose to libel his rival in business; he may have the libel
preparl'd, put in print ready for qis~emination among the people,
have messengers ready for its distribution, so that the evil intent
and the deliberate purpose to do mischief are manifested in a
manner most emphatic and conclusive; but if no other person
has yet seen the libel there is no wrong, because the reputation
is not yet assailed~ and the right of the party to protection in it is
therefore not yet violated. It is only assailed when a publication
is made. All that precedes the publication rests in intent, and
intent may be overcome by repentance, or accident or the interposition of others may prevent its being carried into effect.
Auy degree of preparation for a tort can never constitute a tort;
if the wrong is prevented there is certainly no wrong suffered.
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shall frequently be compelled to make use of the word wrong,

though it may sometimes be confusing to do so. This is one of

the inconveniences which follow from employing a word which

signiﬁes a quality to designate a class of cases in which, in its

ordinary sense, it is only an element, while it is equally appli-

cable to numerous other cases which are not so classed.

Although damage is a necessary element in an actionable

wrong, it is sometimes damage merely implied or presumed; not

‘Sheple 1:. Page, 12 Vt. 519; Kim-

ball 'v. Harman, 34 Md. 407; S. C. 6

Am. Rep. 340; Herron '0. Hughes, 25

Cal. 555; Page '0. Parker, 43 N. H. 363;

Jones 0. Baker, '7 Cow. 445.

‘Watercr o. Freeman, Hob. 266.

“If a man sustains damage by the

wrongful act of another, he is entitled

to a remedy; but to give him that

title two things must concur: damage

to himself and a wrong committed by

the other party." BAYLEY, J ., in Rex

0. Pagliam, 8 B. & O. 362. As one

has no right to a gratuity by will, he

can maintain no action against an-

Elements of a. Tort. It is said by the authorities that it is
the conjunction of damage and wrong that creates a tort, and
there is no tort if either damage or wrong is wanting.' Here
the word wrong' is used in the sense of a thing amiss; something
which for any reason the party ought not to do or to permit, and
which does not become the actionable wrong called a tort unless
the other element is found in the same case, na~1ely, a damage
suffered in consequence of the thing amiss. In this sense we
shall freq nently be compelled to make usc of the word wrong,
though it may sometimes be confusing to do so. This is one of
the inconveniences which follow from employing a word which
signifies a quality to designate a class of cases in whicl1, in its
ordinary sense, it is only an element, while it is equally applicable to numerous other cases which are not so classed.
Although damage is a necessary element in an actionable
wrong, it is sometimes damage merely implied or presumed; not

other who, by falsehood or otherwise,

induces the revocation of a will in

his favor. Hutchius v. Hutchins, '7

Hill, 104.

1

Sheple "· Page, 12 Vt. 519; Kim-

ball "· Harman, 84 lid. 407; B. C. 6
Am. Rep. 340; Herron "· Hughes, 25
Cal. 555; Page 'D. Parker, 43 N.H. 363;

Jones"· Baker, 7 Cow. 446.
1 Waterer "· Freeman, Hob. 266.
" If a man sustains damage by the
wrongful act of another, he is entitled
to a remedy; but to give him that
title two things must concur: damage

to himself and a wrong committed by
the other party." BAYLEY, J., in Rex
"· Pagham, 8 B. & C. 362. As one
ba.s no right to a gratuity by will, he
can maintain no action against another who, by falsehood or othcrwi~,
induces the revocation of a wlll in
his favor. Hutchins fl. Hutchlna, '1
Hill, 104.
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damage shown. There are many cases in which, in point of fact,
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a showing of pecuniary damages is impossible, and some where

it would be easy to show that none had been sustained, in which,

nevertheless, the law adjudges that a tort has been committed.

Illustrations might be found in the law of libel. Any person of

ordinary information would perhaps be able to name some man

of high national reputation, perhaps in public life, perhaps at

the bar, or in some other walk of private life, who, during a long

and honorable career, had been conspicuous for the purity of his

life and for an unblemished reputation, until he had acquired a

hold upon the public conﬁdence which no assault could weaken.

Let it be supposed now that one is inspired by malice to attack

such a reputation, and make it the target for the most prepos-

terous libels. Here is a wrong clearly, a thing amiss; but if we

question ourselves concerning its probable effect, the instinctive

answer is, it does not in the least damage the object of this Vitu-

peration; it may give the public a sense of outrage, but the only

person actually injured is the person attacking, not the one

attacked. The former would be rendered infamous, the latter

would be unaffected, except as the effort to defame his character

would be likely to elicit in his behalf evidences of public sympa-

thy and regard. But if he were to feel impelled by a sense of
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duty to bring suit for the publication, he would not only be held

entitled to substantial damages, but the assessment of these

would probably be all the more severe because of the impregna-

ble position occupied in the public conﬁdence by the libeled

party, which, although it precluded actual damage, at the same

time rendered the moral quality of the assault more atrocious.

A more simple case may be that of the man who has entered

the ﬁeld of another for the purposes of plunder, but been fright-

ened away before the mischief was accomplished. Assuming,

in such a case, the impossibility of showing the slightest actual

injury, the trespasser is nevertheless held liable to pay damages.

The ground of liability is, that from every distinct invasion of

right some damage is presumed; and the law therefore makes

some award, though no damages are proven, and none are sus-

ceptible of proof.‘ If the reason for this is sought for, we are

‘Ashby 0. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938, 2 Roll. R. 21; Weller 0. Baker, 2 Wils.

955; Herring v. Finch, 2 Lev. 250; 414; Wells e. Watling, 2 W. Black.

Hunt u. Dowman, C1-o.Jac.478; S.C. 1283; Bloﬂeld o. Payne, 4 B. & Ad.

damage shown. There are many cases in which, in point of fact,
a j;howing of pecuniary damages is impossible, and some where
it would be easy to show that none had been &nstained, in which,
ne,·ertheless, the law adjudges that a tort has been committed.
ll!u:o.trations might be found in the law of libel. Any person of
Hrtlinary information wonltl perhaps be able to name some man
of' high national reputation, perhaps in public life, perhaps at
the bar, or in some other walk of private life, who, during a long
and honorable career, had been conspicuous for the purity of his
lite and for an unblemished repntation, until he had af~quired a
hold upon the public confidence which no assault could weaken.
l.ct it be supposed now that one is inRpired by malice to attack
~"ll<'h a reputation, and make it the target for the most prepos~
tt·rous libels. Here is a wrong clearly, a thing amiss; but if we
(ptcstion ourselves concerning its probable effect, the instinctive
ans\ver is, it does not in the least damage the object of this vituperation; it may give the public a sense of outrnge, but the only
per::on actually injured is the person attacking, not the one
attacked. The former would be rendered infamous, the latter
would be unaffected, except as the effort to defame his character
would be likely to elicit in llis behalf evidences of public sympathy and regard. But if he were to feel impelled by a sense of
duty to bring suit for the publication, he would not only be held
entitled to substantial damages, but the assessment of these
would probably be all the more severe because of the impregnable position occupied in the public confidence by the libeled
party, which, although it precluded actnal damage, at the same
time rendered the moral quality of the assault more atrocious.
A more simple case m"y be that of the man who has entered
the fielc.l of another for the purposes of plunder, but been frightent>d away before the mischief was accomplished. Assuming,
in ::.nch a case, the impossibility of showing the slightest actual
injury, the trespusser is nevertheless held liable to pay damages.
The ground of liability is, that from every distinct invasion of
right some damage is presumed; and the law therefore makes
some award, thongh no damages are proven, and none are susceptible of proof.' If the rea~on for this is sought for, we are
• Asbhy "·White, 2 Ld. Raym., ti:JB,
Herring "· Finch, 2 Lev. 230;
Hunt"· Dowman, Cro. Jac. 478; S.C.

9.j.'j ;

•

2 Roll. R 21; Weller o. Baker, 2 Wile.
414; W(•lls "· Watling, 2 W. Blact.
1283; Blotleld "· Payne, ' B. & Ad.

64 THE LAW OF roars.

not left in perplexity or doubt. The method chosen for the pro-
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tection of rights being an action for the recovery of damages for

their invasion, it is manifest that when a party is convicted of

the invasion, the conviction must be followed by some conse-

quences disagreeable to himself, or it could not possibly operate

as a restraint. As damages are the only penalty which the law

provides for the commission of a tort, it is obvious that a recov-

ery of these must be allowed in every case in which a wrong is

committed, or those wrongs for which no damages are awarded

will be committed with impunity. Subject every man to the

necessity of pointing out in what manner a trespass had caused

him a pecuniary injury, and for many of the most vexatious

there might be no redress and for the rights invaded no protec-

tion. Under such a rule the eavesdropper might with impunity

invade the privacy of one’s home, by listening at key-holes and

playing the spy at windows, since acts like these, however

annoying and reprehensible, could not in any manner tend to

impoverish the family, or deprive them of food, or drink, or

clothing, or diminish their current revenue.

Lord Hour has endeavored to express the legal foundation of

recovery in these cases as follows: “The damage is not merely

pecuniary, for if a man gets a cuff on the ear from another, though
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it cost him nothing, no, not so much as a little diaehylon, yet he

shall have his action, for it is a personal damage.”‘

The idea here is, that it is a damage in contemplation of law,

410; Wood o. Wand, 8 Exch. 748;

Barker 0. Green, 2 Bing. 817. "Actual,

perceptible damage is not indispensi-

ble as the foundation of an action; it

is suﬂieient to show the violation of

a right in which the law will pre-

sume damage." Parke, B. in Embrey

o. Owen, 6 Exch. 358, 368. “I am

not able to understand how it can

correctly be said in a legal sense that

an action will not lie even in case of

a wrong or violation of a right, un-

not left in perplexity or doubt. The method chosen for the protection of rights being an action for the recovery of damages for
their invasion, it is manifest that when a party is convicted of
the invasion, the conviction must be followed by some consequences disagreeable to himself, or it could not possibly operate
as a restraint. As damages are the only penalty which the law
provides for the commission of a tort, it is obvious that a recovery of these must be allowed in every case in which a wrong is
committed, or those wrongs for which no damages are awarded
will be committed with impunity. Subject every man to the
necessity of pointing out in what manner a trespass had caused
him a pecuniary injury, and for many of the most vexatious
there might be no redress and for the rights invaded no protection. Under such a rule the eavesdropper might with impunity
invade the privacy of one's home, by listening at key-holes and
playing the spy at windows, since acts like these, however
annoying and reprehensible, could not in any manner tend to
impoverish the family, or deprive them of food, or drink, or
clothing, or diminish their current revenue.
Lord HoLT has endeavored to express the legal foundation of
recovery in these cases as follows: "The damage is not merely
pecuniary, for if a man gets a cuff on the ear from another, though
it cost him nothing, no, not so much as a little dinchylon, yet he
shall haYe his action, tor it is a personal damage." 1
The idea here is, that it is a damage in contemplation of law,

less it is followed by some perceptible

damage which can be established as

a matter of fact; in other words, that

injuria sine damno is not actionable.

* ‘F “Actual, perceptible damage

is not indispensible as a foundation

of an action. The law tolerates no

further inquiry than whether there

has been a violation of a right."

Bronv, J., in Webb 0. The Portland

Manufacturing Co., 3 Sumner, 189.192.

Bee, also, Williams o. Esling, 4 Penn.

St. 486; Whittemore 0. Cutter, 1 Gall.

429; Blanchard 0. Baker, 8 Me. 253;

Woodman 0. Tufts, 9 N. H. 88; Bas-

sett o. Salisbury Manufacturing Co.,

28 N. H. 438. 455; Tillotson o. Smith,

32 N. H. 90; Laﬂln o. Willard. 10

Pick. 64; White v. Griﬂin,4Jones. L.

139; Dixon 0. Clow, 24 W'end. 191.

‘ Ashby 0. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938,

955; S. C. 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 425.

410; Wood e. Waud, 8 Exch. 748;
Barker"'· Green, 2 Bing. 817. "Actual,
perceptible d!lmage is not indispensible as thP foundation of an action; it
is sufficient to show the violation of
a right in which the law will presume damage." Parke, B. in Embrey
"'· Owen, 6 Exch. 353, 868. "I am
not able to understand how it can
correctly be said in a legal sense that
an action will not lie even In case of
a wrong or violation of a right, un.
less it is followed by some perceptible
damage wllich can be establlshed 88
a matter of fact; in other words, that
inJuria 1iru damno is not actionable.
• • "Actual, perceptible damage

fs not indispensible 88 a foundation
of an action. The law tolerates no
further inquiry than whether there
bas been a violation of a right."
STORY, J., in Webb "'·The Portland
Manufacturing Co., 8 Sumner, 189,192.
Bee, also, Williams"'· Esling, 4 Penn.
St. 486; Whittemore"'· Cutter, 1 Gall.
429; Blanchard "· Baker, 8 Me. 253;
Woodman "· Tuftg, 9 N.H. 88; Bas.
sett e. Salisbury Manufacturing Co.,
28 N. H. 438, 455; Tillotson"'· Smith,
82 N. H. 90; Laflin "· Willard, 16
Pick. 64; White"'· Gritll.n,4Jones, L.
189; Dixon fl, Clow, 24 Wend. 191.
1 Ashby"· White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938.
955; B. C. 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 425.
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though follo\ved by neither loss nor pain, because the n1an’s

65

right to personal security has been ‘invaded. As is, perhaps, bet-

ter expressed by Bunman, J., in another case, an action may be

supported because “the right has been injured.” ' And here

there is no room for the application of that oft quoted but little

understood maxim do mz'ni1m's non curat law. It is a maxim

that may usefttlly be applied where a party demands that which

is insigniﬁcant for mere purposes of vexation;’ but it “is not

an applicable answer to an action for violating a clear right.”’

The law tnust regard the substantial rights of parties, though it

may overlook trivial and unimportant matters in giving redress.‘

Therefore, slight errors in computation may be overlooked, though

they may exceed the actual damages ﬂowing from a distinct and

palpable wrong, where the maxim, if applied, might inﬂict incal-

culable injury.‘

The necessity for the protection of the right requiring a pre-

sumption of injury from its violation, the la.w measures that

injury by the best standard at its command, and that is a pecu-

niary standard. But in doing this it must take into account

many things which it is impossible to estimate in money,

' Hobsou 0. Todd, 4 T. R. 71, '73.

" Here,” says this judge, “ is a wrong-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:39 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

doer, and the plaintiff is entitled to

an action without proving any spe-

ciﬁc damages.” " When the clear right

of a party is invaded in consequence

of anothcr's breach of duty, he must

be entitled to an action against that

party for some amount." Lord DEN-

mus, Ch. J., in Clifton v. Hooper, 6

though followed by neither loss nor pain, because the man's
right to personal security has been "invaded. As is, perhaps, better expressed by BuLLER, J., in another case, an action may be
supported because "the right has been injure<l." 1 And here
there is no room tor the application of that oft quoted but little
understood maxim de minimis non curat lez. It is a maxim
that may usefully be applied where a party demands that which
is insignificant for mere purposes of vexation;~ but it" is not
an applicable answer to an action for violating a clear right."'
The law must regard the substantial rights of parties, though it
may overlook trivial and unimportant matters iu giving redres~.'
Therefore, j;light errors in computation may be overlooked, though
they may ex<..-eed the actual damages flowing from a distinct and
palpable wrong, where the maxim, if applied, might inflict incaleulable injury.•
The necessity for the protection of the right requiring a presumption of injury from its violation, the law measures that
injury by the best standard at it;g command, and that is a pecuniary standard. But in doing this it must take into account
many things which it is impossible to estimate in money,

Q. B. 468. See Fray v. Voules, 1 El.

& El. 839, in which an attorney was

held liable for compromising a suit,

contrary to the instructions of his

client, and it was held to be no an-

swer. that the compromise was rea-

sonable and bonaﬁde, and for the ben-

eﬁt of the client.

' Hickey 0. Baird, 9 Mich 32.

’ Mut.t.s'r'r, J., in Ellicottville, etc.,

Plank Road Co. c. Buffalo, etc., R. R.

Co., 20 Barb. 644, 651. Sec E1-pnrte

Becker,4 Hill, 618; Hall 0. Fisher,

9 Barb. 17, 29; Schnable 0. Koehler,

28 Penn. St. 181; Kidder o. Barker,

18 Vt. -154; Graver 0. Sholl, 42 Penn.

St. 58; Case 0. Dean, 16 Mich. 12.

‘ Smith 0. Gugerty, 4 Barb. 014, 620;

Boyden v. Moore, 5 Mass. 365; Pin-

dar o.Wadswotth, 2 East. 154; Bil-

lingsley 0. Groves, 5 Ind. 553; Kemp

0. Harmon, 11 Ind. 311; Zehucr 0.

Taylor, 15 Ind. '70.

' Er-parte Becker, 4 Hill, 613. See,

further, Fullam 0. Stcarns, 30 Vt 445;

Ripka 0. Sergeant, 7 W. .& S. 9; Ha-

thorn 0. Stinson, 12 Me. 183; Dixon

0. Clow, 24 Wend. 188; Cowles 0.

Kidder, 24 N. H. 359; Jcwett 0. Whit-

ney, 43 Me. 242; Munroe ~v. Gates, 48

Me. 463; Champion 0. Vincent, 20

Texas, 811; Stncthhurst v. Journey, 1

Houst. 196; Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Ducr,

596, 599; Marzelti 0. \Villiums, 1 B.

& Ad. 415; The Reward, 2 Dod.

Adm. R. 269, 270.

5

' Hobson "· Todd, -4 T. R 71, 78.
•• Here," says this judge, "is a wrong.
doer, and the plaintiff is entitled to
ao action without proving any spe.
cifte damages." "When the clear right
or • party is invaded in consequence
or another's breach of duty, lie must
be entitled to an action against that
party fur some amount." Lord DK~
KAN, Ch. J., in Clifton "· Hooper, 6
Q. B. 468. Sec Fray "· Voules, 1 El.
& El. 839, in which an attorney was
held liable for compromising a suit,
«"ontrary to the instructions of his
client, and it wus held to be no an.
1wer. tllat the compromise was rea..
!IOnablo and bonafide, and fi)r Lhe ben~ftr. of the client.
~ Ilickey "· Baird, 9 Mich 32.
1 lluLLETT, J., in Ellicottville, etc.,
Plank Rnad Co. t". Buffalo, etc., R. R.
Co., 20 Burh. 644, 651. Sec E:r-1mrte
Becker, -4 Bill, 613; Hall "· Fisher,

5

9 Barb. 17, 29; Bchnable "· Koehler,
28 Penn. SL 181; Kidder v. Bauker,
18 Vt. 454; Graven. Sholl, 42 Penn.
St. 58; Vnse "· Dean, 16 ?tlich. 12.
'Smith o. Gugerty, 4 Barb. 014, 620;
Boyden "· Moore, 5 :Muss. 3G5; Pindar "·Wadsworth, 2 East. 1<14; BiJ.
lingsley "· Groves, 5 Ind. 553; Kemp
"· H~~ormon, 11 Ind. 311 ; Zehner "·
Taylor, 1~ Ind. '70.
• E:e-par~ Bt·ckcr, 4 Bill, 613. Sec,
further, Fullam"· Stenrns,30 Vt 445;
Ri pku "· Sergeant, 7 W. & S. 9; Ha.
thorn "· Stinson, 12 lie. 18:.1; Dixon
"· Clow, 24 Wcn<l. 188; Cowles "·
Kidder, 24 N. H.lhl9; Jewett"· Whitney, 43 ~le. 242; 1\Iunroe "·Gates, 48
lie. 4G3; Champion "· Vincent, 20
Texas, 811: Sm<'thhurst "· Journey, 1
Boust. 196; Woolsey"· Ju<ld, 4 Ducr,
506, 51!9; l\Iarzet ti "· Will iums, 1 B.
& Ad. 415; The Reward, 2 Dod.
.A.dm. R. 269, 270.
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but which, nevertheless, money must compensate; the chief of
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these, in many cases, being the personal affront and indignity

which are given by the wrongful act. Even a showing that the

party was beneﬁted, rather than damniﬁed, would be no defense,

since no man is compellable to have beneﬁts thrust upon him

offensively, and in deﬁance of his right of independent action;

and if he were, it might be a good defense to rioters who had

tossed one in a blanket, that the exercise was beneﬁcial, or who

had thrown him into a river, that his voluntary ablutions were

not so frequent as health demanded.

A further reason makes the award of damages a necessity to

the preservation of rights in many cases, and that is, that immu-

nity tempts to the repetition of the act, and the frequent repeti-

tion has a tendency to ﬁx in the minds of the community an

impression that it is rightful—an impression that the party

doing it, by consent or in some other manner, has become entitled

to do it—aud community at length act upon this idea, and when

at last complaint is made ot' the wrong, the frequent repetition

becomes a witness in favor of the wrong-doer, and those who are to

try the right come prepossessed with the idea that there must be

something unsound in the case of the man who is so tardy with

his complaint. At length the law itself may raise a presump-
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tion of a right, so that if one, by obstructing the waters of a

stream, ﬂoods his neighbor’s land, and perseveres in the wrong

for a series of years, he may at last have the protection of the

law in doing so, if in the meantime he has not been disturbed.

The wrong, by acquiescence and presumption, has then become a

right, and to interfere with it will be a legal wrong. For this

reason many wrongs damnify the owner, not only by the direct

loss they inﬂict, but by their tendency to obscure and disturb the

foundations of the right itself through their frequent repetition.‘

‘Where the water of a running which an action is maintainable."

stream is used without right,“ the gru-

eral principle applies, that although

no appreciable damage may be sus-

tained in the particularinstancc by the

wrongful act. yet. as the repetition of

such an act might be made the found-

ation of claiming the right to do the

act hereafter, a damage in law has

already been sustained. in respect of

Connnrucn, J ., in Rochdale Canal

C0. 0. King, 14 Q. B. 134-5. See Tur-

ner v. Sterling. 2 Lev. 50; S. G. 2 Vent.

25; Bower v. Hill, 1 Bing. N. 0.549:

but which, nevertheless, money must compensate; the chief of
these, in many cases, being the personal affront and indignity
which are given by the. wrongful act. Even a showing that tho
party was benefited, rather than damnified, would be no defense,
since no man is compellable to have benefits thrust upon him
offensively, and in defiance of his right of independeut action;
and if he were, it might be a good defense to rioters who had
tossed one in a blanket, that the exercise was beneficial, or who
had thrown him into a river, that his voluntary ablutions were
nut so frequent as health demanded.
A further reason makes the award of damages a necessity to
the preservation of rights in many cases, and that is, that immunity tempts to the repetition of the act, and the frequent repetition has a tendency to fix in the minds of the community an
impression that it is rightful- an impression that the party
doing it, by consent or in some other manner, has become entitled
to do it-and community at length act upon this idea, and when
at last complaint is made of the wrong, the frequent repetitiol'l
becomes a witness in favor of the wrong-doer, and those who are to
try the right come prepossessed with the idea that there must be
something unsound in the case of the man who is so tardy with
his complaint. At length the law itself may raise a presumption of a right, so that if one, by obstructing the waters of a
stream, floods his neighbor's land, and perseveres in the wrong
for a series of years, he may at last have the protection of the
law in doing so, if in the meantime he has not been disturbed.
The wrong, by acquiescence and presumption, has then become a
right, and to interfere with it will be a legal wrong. For this
reason many wrongs damnify the owner, not only by the direct
loss they inflict, but by their tendency to obscure and disturb the
foundations of the right itself through their frequent repetition.'

Mason v. Hill, 3 B. & Ad. 304; S. C.

5 B. 85 Ad. 1; Wood 1:. Wand, 3 Exch.

748. This last was an action for foul-

ing the water of a running stream, to

the injury of the plaintiifs, proprietors

1 Where the water of a running
stream is used without right," the gt·n.
eral principle applies, that although
no appreciable damage may be sustained in the particular instance by the
wrongful act, yet, as the repetition of
such an act might be mnde the found.
ation of claiming the right to do the
act hereafter, a damage in law bas
already been sustained. in respect of

which an action Is maintainable."
CoLERIDGE, J., In Rochdale Canal
Co. "· King, 14 Q. B. 134-5. Bee Turner"· Sterling. 2 Lev. 50; S.C. 2 Vent.
25; Bower"· Hill, 1 Bing. N.C. 549:
Mason "· Hill, 3 B. & Ad. SOt; B. C.
5 B. & Ad. 1; Wood"· Waud, 8 Exch.
748. This last was an action for foul.
ing the water of a running stream, to
the injury of the plaintiffs, proprietors
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But in a very large proportion of cases the wrong is only oom-

plete when damage is suffered; that is to say, the act done is not
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6i

wrongful in itself, but only becomes so when an injurious conse-

quence follows.‘ Thus, if one build a ﬁre on his own grounds,

below. The water was already so pol-

luted by the acts of others. that the act

of defendant. caused no actual damage

to the plaintiﬂ‘, the water, notwith-

Bnt in a very large proportion of cases the wrong is only complete when damage is suffered; that is to say, the act done is not
wrongful in itselt~ but only becomes so when an injurious conse(tuence follows. 1 Thus, if one build a fire on his own grounds,

standing what was done by them,

beingjust as applicable to useful pur-

poses as it was before. Ponnocx, C.

B. “ We think, notwithstanding, that

the plaintiffs have received damage

in point of law. They had a right to

the natural stream ﬂowing through

the land in its natural state, as an in-

I-ident to the right to the land on

which the water-course ﬂowed; and

that right continues, except so far as

it may have been (lcrogated from by

user or by grant to the neighboring

land owners. This is a case, there-
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fore, of an injury to a right. The

defendants, by continuing the prac-

tice for twenty years, might establish

the right to the easement of discharg-

ing into the stream the foul water

from their works. If the * * other

sources of pollution above the plain-

tiffs should be afterward discontinu-

ed, the plaintiffs, who would other-

wise have had in that case pure

water, would be compellable to sub-

mit to this nuisance, which would

then do a serious damage to them."

In Webb 0. Portland Mani‘. Co., 8

Sum. 192, Mr. Justice Sromr says:

“ From my earliest reading, I have

considered it laid up among the very

elements of the common law, that

whenever there is a wrong, there is a

remedy to redress it; and that every

injury imports damage in the nature

oi‘ it, and if no other injury is estab-

lished, the party injured is entitled to

1 verdict for nominal damages. A

fortion' this doctrine applies where

there is not only a violation of a right

of the plaintitl‘, but the act of the de-

fendant, if continued, may become

the foundation, by lapse of time, of

an adverse right in the defendant; for

then it assumes the character, not

merely of a violation of right, tend-

ing to diminish its value, but it goes

to the absolute destruction and extin-

guishmentof it. Under such circum-

stances, unless the party injured can

protect his right from such aviola-

tion by an action, it is plain that it

may be lost or destroyed without any

possible remedial redress. In my

judgment the common law counte-

nances no such inconsistency, not to

call it by a stronger name. Actual

perceptible damage is not indispen-

sable as the foundation of an action.

The law tolerates no further inquiry

than whether there has been the vio-

below. The water was already so polluted by the acts of others. that the ac'
of defend an~ caused no actual damage
&o the plaintiff. the water, notwith!ol&llding what WIUI done by them,
l>eing just as applicable to useful purpotlell RS it was before. PoLLOCK, C.
B. "Wo think, notwithstllndlng, that
the plaintilf:t have received damage
in point of law. They had a right to
the natural stream flowing through
rhe land in its natural state, as an in(·ident to the right to the land on
which the water-course flowed; and
rhat right continu<'s, except so fur as
it may have been derogated from qy
user or by grant to tho neighboring
hmd owners. This is a case, there.
fore, of an injury to a n'gM. The
defendants, by continuing the prac.
tice for twenty years, might establish
the right to the casement of discharging into the stream the foul water
from their works. If the • • other
sources of pollution above U1e plaintiffs should be afterward discontinu.
ed, the plaintiffs, who would otherwi.e have had In that case pure
water, would be compellable to sub.
mit to this nuisance, which would
tben do a serious damRge to them."
In Webb "· Portland llanf. Co., 8
Sum. 192, Mr. Justice STORY says:
.. From my earliest reading, I have
considered it laid up among the very
elements of the common law, tl1at
whenever there is a wrong, there is a
rE>medy to redresa it; and that every
injury imports damage in the nature
of it, and If no ot11er Injury is establi£>bed, the party injured is entitled to
a Terdict for nominal damages. A
forlim this doctrlno applies where

there 1!1 not only a violation of a right
of the plaintitf, but the act of the defendant, if continued, may become
the foundation, by lapse of time, of
an adverse right in the dcfcndnnt; for
then it assum<'s the character, nnt
merely of a violation of right, tendIng to diminish its valu<', but it goes
to the absolute destruction and <':dinguishmentof it. Under such circumstances, unless the party injured can
protect his right from such 1\ violation by an action, it is plain that it
mny be lost or destroyed without any
possible remedial redress. In my
judgment the common law countenances no such inconsistency, not to
call it by a stronger name. Actual
perceptible damage is not lndispenaablEJ as tile foundation of an action.
The law tolerates no further inquiry
than whether thPre has been the vio.
lation of a right. If so, the party injured is entitled to maintain his
action for nominal damages, in vindication of his right, if no other damages are flt and proper ·to remunerate
him." See, also, p. 200; also Blanchard "· Baker, 8 GreenI. 258: Whittemore "· Cutter, 1 Gall. 429, 483:
Johns tl. Stevens, 8 VL 808; Ripka"·
Sergeant, 7 W. & B. 9; Gladfelter e.
W11lker, 40 Md. 1.
'A peculiar case which !Day be said
to illustrate this rule was that of Occum Co. "· Sprague :Mnnf. Co., 84
Conn. 52!). The plaintiff11 were a corporation. The defendants maintained
a dam, which was said to injure land
above, and not owned by them. The
plaintiffs bought this land and instituted a suit for flootling the same. It
was alleged by the defense that the
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there is no wrong in the act, and in law no complaint can be

made of it; but if the circumstances surrounding the act render

it imprudent and dangerous to the rights of others, and at length

it spreads to the premises of others, inﬂicting damage, this dam-

age completes the injury. In all such cases, that which may

cause damage, but as yet has not done so, being something that

the party may rightfully do, it cannot be taken notice of as a

thing amiss until the damage is suffered; and the case differs

from an assault, which in itself is a thing amiss. So if one call

another a rogue, this speaking is not in itself a legal wrong, the

law not supposing such words to be injurious; but if the person

concerning whom they were spoken can show that he lost his

employment in consequence, he thereby connects the speaking

with a damage, which constitutes it, in law, a. thing amiss, and

the tort is then complete. S0 many things which are actionable

as nuisances only become so when actual damage can be traced

to them.‘

Proximate and Remote Cause. It is not only requisite that

damage, actual or inferential, should be suffered, but this damage

must be the legitimate sequence of the thing amiss. The maxim

of the law here applicable is, that in law the immediate and not
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the remote cause of any event is regarded;’ and in the applica-

tion of it the law rejects, as not constituting the foundation for

an action, that damage which does not ﬂow proximately from the

act complained of. In other words, the law always refers the

there is no wrong in the act, and in law no complaint can be
made of it; but if the circumstances surrounding the act render
it imprudent and dangerous to the rights of others, and at length
it spreads to the premises of others, inflicting damage, this damage completes tlte injury. In all such cases, that which may
canso damage, but as yet has not dono so, bein~ something that
the party may rightfully do, it cannot be taken notice of as a
thing amiss until the damage is suffered; and the case differs
from an assault, which in itself is a thing amiss. So if one call
another a rogue, this speaking is not in itself a legal wrong, the
law not supposing such words to be injurious; but if the person
concerning whom they were spoken can show that he lost his
employment in consequence, he thereby connects the speaking
with a damage, which constitutes it, in law, a thing amiss, ami
the tort is then complete. So many things which are actionable
as nuisances only become so when actual damage can be traced
to them. 1

injury to the proximate, not to the remote cause. The explana-

tion of this maxim may be given thus: If an injury has resulted

in consequence of a certain wrongful act or omission, but only

through or by means of some intervening cause, from which last

purchase was made solely for the pur-

pose of bringing the suit, and that the

land was not used or intended to be

used by the plaintiﬂs for corporate

purposes. If this were proved, the

court held the action could not be

sustained. “ \Ve are not aware of any

principle of law that will allow cor-

porations, chartered and organized for

speciﬁc purposes, to purchase or lease

property, having no connection with

their legitimate business, for the sole

purpose of commencing and prose-

Proximate and Bemote Cause. It is not only requisite that
damage, actual or inferential, should be suffered, but this damage
must be the legitimate sequence of the thing amiss. The maxim
of the law here applicable is, that in law the immediate and not
the remote cause of any event is regarded; • and in the application ot' it the law rejects, as not constituting the foundation for
an action, that damage which does not :flow proximately from the
act <.'omplained of. In other words, the law always refers tho
injury to the proximate, not to the remote cause. The explanation of' this maxim may be given thus: If an injury has resulted
in consequence of a certain wrongful act or omission, hut only
through or hy means of some intervening cause, from which last

cuting a suit and harrassing another

under the forms of law." Canrnnran,

J ., p. 541-2.

‘See the instructive cases of Ratl-

cliﬁ'e‘s E.\;rs.1>. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195,

and Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 471$;

S. C. Am. Rep. 623, as to the cases in

which that which is not unlawful in

itself may become actionable.

9 Bac. Max., reg. 1; Broom Max.

165.

mg _ _ _

purchase was made solely for the pur.
pose of brin9ing the suit, and that the
land was not used or intended to be
used by the plaintiffs for corporate
purposes. If this were proved, the
court held tho action could not be
sustained. "We are not aware of any
principle of law U1at will a.Ilnw corporations, chartered and organized for
specific purposes, to purchase or lease
pl"tlperty, having no connection with
their legitimate business, for the sole

purpose of commencing and prose.
cuting a suit and harrassing anotht>r
under the forms of law." CAltPENTER,
J., p. 541-2.
1 See the instrurtive cases of Radcliffe's Exrs. "· Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 195,
and Losee"· Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476;
8. C. Am. Rep. 623, as to the cases in
which that which is not unlawful in
itself may become actionable.
1 Bac. Max., reg. 1 ; Broom Max.
165.
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cause the injury followed as a direct and immediate consequence,

69

the law will refer the damage to the last or proximate cause, and

refuse to trace it to that which was more remote. The chief and

snﬁicicnt reason for this rule is to be found in the impossibility

of tracing consequences through successive steps to the remote

cause, and the necessity of pausing in the investigation of the

chain of events at the point beyond which experience and obser-

vation convince us we cannot press our inquiries with safety.

To the proximate cause we may usually trace consequences with

some degree of assurance; but beyond that we enter a ﬁeld of

conjecture, where the uncertainty renders the attempt at exact

conclusions futile. A writer on this subject has stated the rule

in the following language: If the wrong and the resulting

damage are not known by common experience to be naturally

and usually in sequence, and the damage does not, according to

the ordinary course of events, follow from the wrong, then the

wrong and the damage are not suﬁiciently conjoined or concate-

nated as cause and effect to support an action.‘

As this principle is of the highest importance in the law of

torts, and the right of action in many cases, and the extent oi

recovery in others depends upon it, it may be well to consider

it a little further. In doing this we lay down the following
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propositions: 1/

1. The one already more than once mentioned, that in the

case of any distinct legal wrong, which in itself constitutes an

invasion of the right of another, the law will presume that some

damage follows as a natural, necessary and proximate result.

Here the wrong itself ﬁxes the right of action; we need not go

further to show a right of recovery, though the extent of recov-

ery may depend upon the evidence.

2. \Vhen the act or omission complained of is not in itself a

distinct wrong, and can only become a wrong to any particular

individual through injurious consequence resulting therefrom,

this consequence must not only be shown, but it must be so

connected by averment and evidence with the act or omission as

‘Addison on Torts, p. 6. Sec Mur- 382; Craiu 0. Pctrie, 6 Ilill, 522; Dale

ble 0. Worcester, 4 Gray, 305, per 1:. Grant, 34 N. J. 142; llulcy 0. Chi-

Suaw, Ch. J.; Anthony o. Slaid, 11 cago, etc., ll. R. 00., 21 Iowa, 15.

Met. 290; Silver 0. Frazier, 8 Allen,

•

cause the injury followed as a direct and immediate consequence,
the law will refer the damage to the last or proximate cause, and
refuse to trace it to that which was more remote. The chief and
anfficieut reason for this rule is to be found in the impossibility
of tracing consequences through succeBSive steps to the remote
cause, and the necessity of pausing in the investigation of the
chain of events at the point beyond which experience and obser·
vation convince us we cannot press our inquiries with safety.
To the proximate cause we may usually trace consequencel:i with
some degree of ast~umnce; but beyond that we enter a field of
conjecture, where the uncertainty renders the attempt at exact
conclusions futile. A writer on this subject has stated the rule
in the fol1owing language: It' the wrong and the resulting
damage are not known by common experience to be naturally
and osnally in sequence, and the damage does not, according to
the ordinary course of e\·ents, follow from the wrong, then the
wrong and the damage are not sufficiently conjoined or concatenated as cause and effect to support an action.'
As this principle is of the highest importance in the Jaw of
torts, and the right of action in many cases, and the extent ot
recovery in others depends U])On it, it may be well to consider
it a little further. In doing this we lay down the following
t /
propositions:
1. The one already more than once mentioned. that in the
case of any distinct legal wrong, which in itself constitutes an
invasion of the right of another, the law will presume tltat some
damage follows as a natural, necessary and proximate result.
Here the wrong itself fixes the right of action; we need not go
further to show a right of recovery, though the extent of recovery may depend npon the evidence.
2. 'Vhen the act or omission complained of is not in itself a
distinct wtong, and can only become a wrong to any particular
individual through injurious consequence resulting therefrom,
this consequence must not only be shown, but it must be so
connected by averment and evidence with the act or omission as
1 Addison on Torts, p. 8.
Bee Marble "· Worcester, 4 Gray, 805, per
8B.A.W, Ch. J.; Anthony e. Blaid, 11
XeL 290; Silver •· Frazier, 8 Allen,

882; Crain e. Petrie, 6 Hill, 522; Dale
e. Grant, 84 N. J. 142; Haley e. Chicago, etc., R. R Co., 21 Iowa, 15.
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to appear to have resulted therefrom according to the ordinary

70
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course of events, and as a proximate result of a snﬁicient cause.

3. If the original act was wrongful, and would naturally,

according to the ordinary course of events, prove injurious to

some other person or persons, and does actually result in injury

through the intervention of other causes which are not wrongful,

the injury shall be referred to the wrongful cause, passing by

those which were innocent.’ But if the original wrong only

' Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1; Rail-

road Co. e. Reeves. 10 Wall. 176; Cuff

n. Newark, etc., R. R. Co., 35 N. J.

17; S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 205. A party

who by contract is entitled to all the

to appear to have resulted therefrom according to the ordinary
course of' events, and as a proximate result of a sufficient cause.'
3. If the original act was wrongful, and would naturally,
according to the ordina~·y course of event~, prove injurious to
some other person or persons, and does actually result in injury
through the intervention of other causes which arc not wrongful,
the injury shall be referred to the wrongful cause, passing by
those which were innocent.~ But if the original wrong only

articles to be manufactured by a cer-

tain company, he furnishing the raw

materials, cannot maintain an action

against a wrong docr who by trespass

stops the machinery of the company

and obstructs its operations in per-

forming the contract. Dale o. Grant,

34 N. J 142, citing Connecticut Ins.

Co. o. New York, etc., R. R. Co. 25
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Conn. 265; Rockingham Ins. Co. 0.

Boscher, 89 Me. 253; Anthony 0.

Slaid, 11 Met. 290. See also the valu-

able case of Kahl 0. Love, 37 N. J. 5.

Reference to a few recent cases on

this subject may be desirable. A

bridge having become impassible, one

who desired to ‘carry wood across

piled it on the levee to await oppor-

tunity. A ﬂood carried it oﬂ. Suit

was brought for the loss, as being

occasioned by the non-repair of the

bridge. Held, too remote. Dubuque

Wood, etc., Association v. Dubuque,

80 Iowa, 176. Only the party takiu g

directly under a conveyance, and not

a remote purchaser, can maintain an

action against the oﬂicer who falsely

certiﬁed the acknowledgment thereof.

Ware e. Brown, 2 Bond, 267. For a

like principle, see Kahl o. Love, 37

N. J. 5. If one sells adefective engine,

which explodes, only the purchaser

from him can maintain an action for

negligence in construction. A third

person injured by the explosion has no

such remedy. Loscc v. Clute, 51 N. Y.

494; S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 638. One who

is supporting a pauper for hire, can

maintain no action against a third

person for assaulting and beating the

pauper, thereby increasing the ex-

pense. Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Met. 290.

One who has directed his agent to

erect a house for him at a certain

1 Vicaru. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1 ; Rail.
road Co. fl. Reeves, 10 Wall.176; Cuff
fl. Newark, etc., R. R. Co., 85 N. J.
17; S.C. 10 Am. Rep. 205. A party
who by contract is entitled to all the
articles to be manufactured by a certain company, he furnishing the raw
materials, cannot maintain an action
against a wrong doer who by trespass
stops the machinery of the company
and obstructs its operations in performing the contract. Dale fl, Grant,
34 N. J 142, citing Uonnecticut Ins.
Co. fl. New York, etc., R. R. Co. 25
Conn. 265; Rockingham Ins. Co. fl.
Boscher, 89 Me. 253; Anthony e.
Slaid, 11 Met. 290. See also the valuable case of Kahl "·Love, 37 N.J. 5.
Reference to a few recent ca!les on
this subject may be de11irable. A
bridge having become impassible, one
who desired to 'carry wood across
piled it on the levee to await opportunity. A flood carried it nfl. Huit
was brought for the losg, as being
occasioned by the non-repair of the
bridge. Held, too remote. Dubuque
Wood, etc., Association fl. Dulmque,
80 Iowa, 176. Only the party taking
directly under a conveyance, and noL
a remote purchaser, can muintain an
action against the officer who falsely
<'ertitled the acknowledgment thereof.
Ware "·Brown, 2 Bond, 267. For a
like principle, see Kahl fl. Love, 37
N.J. 5. If one sells a defective rngine,
which explodes, only the purchaser
from him can maintain an action for

negligence in construction. A third
person injured by the explosion has ng
such remedy. Lo<JeetJ. Clute, tn N.Y.
4!J4; H. C. 10 Am. Rep. 6a8. One who
is supporting a pauper for hire. can
maintain no action against o. third
person for assaulting nod beating the
pauper, thereby increasing the ex.
pense. Anthony "· Slaid, 11 Met. 290.
One who hns directed his agent to
erect a huu11e for him at a certain
spot, can ha\·e no remedy against one
who, by false rt>presentations regard.
ing the boundary liD<', induccs the
agent in the owner's absence to begin
the erection elsewhere. 8ilvt·r "· Fra..
zier, 3 Allen, 382. If there is a defect
in a hitch inp: post, and a horse hitched
to it is frightened by the running
away of another hor~e, and ureuks
the post and runs over n person in
the street, the latter cannot maintain
a suit for the defect in the pnst as the
causeofhisinjury. Rockportfl. Tripp
(Sup. Ct. Ill.), 15 Allmny Law Jour.
165. S l·e, further, Sharp "· Powell, L.
R. 7 C. P. 25a; HullingH "·Worrell
(Sup. Ct. Ill.), 15 Albany Law Jour.
234; Haley"· Chicago, t·tc., R. R. Co.,
21 Iowa, 15; Sledge "· H.cid, 73 N. C.
440.
'A horse took fright from the car.
riage striking an obstruc1ioo in a
way, and b~came unmanageable, and
ran away, injuring the driver. lleld,
that the obstruction was the pro.xi.
mate cause of the injury. Clar·k fl.
Lebanon, 63 Me. 893, citing Willey "·

spot, can have no remedy against one

who, by false representations regard-

ing the boundary linc, induces the

agent in the owner's absence to begin

the erection elsewhere. Silver 0. Fra-

zier, 3 Allen, 382. If there is a defect

in a hitching post, and a horse hitched

to it is frightened by the running

away of another horse, and breaks

the post and runs over a person in

the street, the latter cannot maintain

a suit for the defect in the post as the

I
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becomes injurious in consequence of the intervention of some

distinct wrongful act or omission by another, the injury shall be

imputed to the last wrong as the proximate cause, and not to

that which was more remote.

We may pause here to give some illustrations of this proposi-

tion, beginning with the leading case of Scott v. Shep/nerd,

where the facts were that the defendant threw a lighted squib

into a crowd of people, one after another of whom in self pro-

tection threw it from him until it exploded near the plaintiﬁ"s

eye, and blinded him. Here was but a single wrong; the origi-

nal act of throwing the dangerous missile; ’ and though the

plaintiff would not have been harmed by it but for the subse-

quent acts of others throwing it in his direction, yet as these

were instinctive and innocent, “it is the same as if a cracker

had been ﬁling, which had bounded and rebounded again and

again before it had struck out the plaintiﬁ"s eye,‘ and the injury

is therefore a natural and proximate result of the original act. It

Belfast, 61 Me. 569; Marble 0. Wor-

cester, 4 Gray, 395.

If parties loan money on forged

certiﬁcates of stock in a corporation,
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and afterwards obtain on these new

certiﬁcates from the corporation

which prove worthless, the proximate

'

becomes injurious in consequence of the intervention of some
dittinct wrongful act or omission by another, the injury shall Le
imputed to the last wrong as the proximate cause, and not to
that which was more remote.
We may pause here to give some illustrations of this proposition, beginning with the leading case of Scott v. Shephsrd,
where the facts were that the defendant threw a lighted squib
into a crowd of people, one after another of whom in self protection threw it from him until it exploded near the plaintiff's
eye, and blinded him. Here was but a single wrong; the original act of throwing the dangerous missile; · and though the
plaintiff would not have been harmed by it but for the subse<tnent acts of others throwing it in his direction, yet as the:;e
were instinctive and innocent, "it is the same as if a cracker
had been flung, which had bounded and rebounded again and
again before it had struck out the plaintiff's eye,' and the injury
is therefore a natural anJ proximate rtsult of the original act. It

cau~e of their loss is the forgery,

unless they can show that they might

have avoided the loss but for the

negligence of the corporation when

the new certiﬁcates were applied for.

Brown o Howard Ins. Co., 42 Md.

384; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 90. See, fur-

ther, McCaﬁ'erty v. Railroad Co., 61 N.

Y. 178.

' Scott 0. Shepherd, 8 Wils. 403; S.

C. 2 W. Bl. 892. And see Scott o.

ilunter, 46 Penn. St. 192. In Baltimore

& Potomac R. R. Co. 0. Rcaney,42

Md. 117, 136, Anvav, J., says: "in

the application of the maxim, In jura

non remut-r ca um, arrIpro.rt'nm spt'<'tutu1',

there is always more or less diﬂiculty,

and attempts arc frequently made to

introduce reﬁnements that would not

consist with principles of rational

justice. The law is a practical science,

and courts do not indulge reﬁnements

and subtleties, as to causation, that

would defeat the claims of natural

justice. They rather adopt the prac-

tical rule, that the eﬁlcient and pre-

dominating cause, in producing a

given event or effect, though there

may be subordinate and dependent

causes in operation, must be looked

to in determining the rights and

liabilities of the parties concerned.

“ It is certainly true that where two

or more independent causes concur in

producing an effect, and it cannot be

determined which was the cilicient

and controlling cause, or whether,

without the concurrence of b tth, the

event would have happened at all, and

a particular party is responsible for

only the consequences of one of such

causes, in such case a recovery cannot

be had, because it can not bejudicially

determined that the dumztgc would

Belfast, 61 Me. IS69; Marble ~. Wort"e&ter, 4 Gray, 39:>.
If parties loan money on forged
certificates of stock in a corporation,
and anerwards obtain on these new
certificates from the corporation
which prov<.> worthles11, the proximate
cau•e of their loss is the forgery,
onle:-s they cRn show that they might
bave avoided the Joss but for the
negligence of th<• corporation when
tbe new certifkale3 were applied for.
Brown ~ Howard Ins. Co., 42 Md.
384; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 00. Bee, further, llcCafl'erty "· Rnilroad Co., 61 N.

Y.liS.
, Scott 11. Shepherd, 8 Wits. 403; S.
C. 2 W. Bl. 8!12. And sec S~ott ~.
Hunter, 46 Penn. St. 1!12. In Baltimore
& Potomac R H. Co. "· Reaney, 42
Ald. 117, 136, At.VF.Y, J., says: "In
the application of the ma:tim, In jur6
non rr:n.ut.r ca Ulltl, s<d pro.rima aput11t ur,
there ilJ alwnys more or lco~s difficulty,
IUJd attempts nr<l frl'qlll'ntly made to
introduce refinements tbat would not
consist with principles of rational
juatice. Tbe law is a practiculscience,

and courts do not Indulge refinements
and subtleties, as to causation, that
would defeBt the claims of natural
justice. They rather adopt the practical rule, that Ute efflcient and predominating cause, in producing a
given eYent or eft"ect, though there
may be subordinate and dependent
causes In opcr~ttion, must be looked
to in detct·mining tbc rights and
liabilities of the parties concerned.
"It is certninly true that where two
or more independent causes concur in
producing nn effect, and it cannot be
determined which was the efficient
and controlling cause, or whether,
without the concurrence of b •th, Ute
event would have happened at all, and
a particular party is rcsponsiLle for
only the cons('quences of one of such
causes, in su~h ca<;e a recovery cannot
be had, bl'cause it cannot be jmlicially
determined that the dnmag-c would
have been done without such concur.
renee. Marble ~- Worcester, 4 Oruy,
895. But. it is equally true that no
wrong doer ought to be allowed to
apportion or qualify his own wrong;
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is an injury that should have been foreseen by ordinary forecast;
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and the circumstances conjoined with it to produce the injury

being perfectly natural, these circumstances should have been

anticipated.

An illustration of a different sort is aﬁbrded by the case of

Mowison v. Dtwis. In that case common carriers undertook to

transport goods from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh by canal.

While on their way the goods were destroyed by an extraordinary

ﬂood. There was evidence that the goods would not have been

at the place of injury but for their having been delayed by the

lameness of a horse attached to the boat; and the argument made

on behalf of the plaintiff was, that the culpability of the defend-

ants in allowing the boat to be delayed by the lameness of the

horse, having exposed the boat to the ﬂood, was the proximate

cause of the loss. Now, if human foresight could foresee the

exact time when such a ﬂood might be anticipated, the argument

would be unanswerable; but as this is impossible, and an accident

of the sort is as likely to overwhelm a boat that has been moved

with due diligence as one that has been unreasonably delayed, it

is obvious that the antecedent probabilities are equal, that the

delay will save the boat instead of exposing it to destruction.‘

As is said by the Court in the case referred to: “A blacksmith
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pricks a horse by careless shoeing. Ordinary foresight might

anticipate lameness, and some days or weeks of unﬁtness for use;

but it could not anticipate that by reason of the lameness the

horse would be delayed in passing through a forest until a tree

fell and killed him or injured his rider; and such injury would

be no proper measure ot' the blacksmith’s liability.” ’

and that. as a loss has actually hap-

pened whilst his own wrongful act

was in force and operation, he ought

not to be permitted to set up as a

defense that there was a more immedi-

ate cause of the loss, if that cause was

put in operation by his own wrongful

act. To entitle such party to exemp-

tion he must show not only that the

same loss might have happened, but

that it mwzt have happened it the act

complained of had not been done.

Davis v. Garrett, (S Bing. 716?"

is an injury that should have been foreseen by ordinary forecast;
and the circumstances conjoined with it to produce the injury
being perfectly natural, these circumstances should have been
anticipated.
An illustration of a different sort is afforded by the case of
NO'I"'"i8on v. .Da?JUJ. In that case common carriers undertook to .
transport goods from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh by canal.
While on their way the goods were destroyed by an extraordinary
flood. There was eddence that tl1e goods would not have been
at the place of injury but for their having been delayed by the
lameness of a hort\e attached to the boat; and the argument made
on behalf of the plaintiff wns, that the culpability of the defendants in allowing the boat to be delayed by the lameness of the
horse, having exposed the boat to the flood, was the proximate
cause of the loss. Now, if human foresight could foresee the
exact time when such a flood might be anticipated, the argur1ent
would be unanswerable; but as this is impossible, and an accident
of the sort is as likely to overwhelm a boat that has been moved
with due dili~ence as one that has been unreasonably delayed, it
is obvious that the antecedent probabilities are equal, that the
delay will save the boat instead of exposing it to destruction. •
As is said by the Court in the case referred to: "A blacksmith
pricks a horse by careless shoeing. Ordinary foresight might
anticipate lameness, and some days or weeks of unfitness tor use;
but it could not anticipate that by reason of the lameness the
horse would be delayed in passing through a forest until a tree
feU and killed him or injured his rider; and such injury would
be no proper measure of the blacksmith's liability." •

S0 if one negligently frightens the

horse of another, and the latter runs

against and injures a second horse,

the owner of the latter may have his

action for the negligence. McDonald

0. Smelling, 14 Allen, 290.

1 See Academy of Music o. Hackett,

2 Ililt. 217; Ashley o. Harrison, 1

E-p. 48; Butler v. Kent, 19 Johns. 223.

’Lownr1-:, J ., in Morrison n. Davis,

so Tenn. st. 171, 115. Sec Hoadley

0. Nor. Transp. Co, 115 Mass. 304.

But had the property been exposed-

to the ﬂood by a wrongful act con-

current in point of time, the party

and that. as a lou bas actually hap..
pened whilst his own wrongful act
was in force and operation, be ought
not to be permitted to set up as a
defense that there was a more Immediate cause of the loss, if that cause was
put in operation by his own wrongful
acL To entitle such party to exemp..
tion be must show not only that the
same loss might have happened, but
that it m'IUI have hnppened it the act
complained of bad not been done.
Davis 11. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716:''
So if one negligently frightens the

horae of anolber, and the latter runs
against and injures a second horse,
the owner of the latter may have his
action for the negligence. McDonald
e. Snelling, 14: Allen, 290.
• See Academy of :&lusic "·Hackett,
9 Hilt. 217; Ashley "· Harrison, 1
E·p. 48; Butler 11. Kent, 19 Johns. 223.
1 LowRIE, J., in Morrison "· Davia,
90 rcun. 8L 171, 176. Bee finadley
e. Nor. Transp. Co, 115 Mass. 80(,
But had the prop<'rty lx..en expoaed
to the tlood by a wrongful act con.
current in point of time. the p&rtJ
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In further illustration of this subject, two other cases may be
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compared; in the ﬁrst of which a man who had been up in a

balloon landed upon private grounds, attracting upon them a

considerable number of people, by whom the premises and crops

were considerably damaged. For this he was held responsible

would have been responsible. Scott

0. Hunter, 46 Penn. St. 192. Or if the

tlood had occurred in consequence of

a wrongful act. Dickinson o. Boyle,

In further illustration of this subject, two other cases may be
compared; in the first of which a man who had been up in a
balloon landed upon private grounds, attracting upon them a
considerable number of people, by whom the premises and crops
were considerably damaged. For this he was held responsible

I7 Pick. 78. See, further, Railroad Co.

e. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176; MeGrew e.

St me, 53 Penn St. 436; Denny v. N.

Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 13 Gray, 481;

George e. Fisk, 32 N. H. 32; Alston

v. Herring, 11 Exch.822. A railroad

train running behind time was upset

by a gale of wind, and the plaintiff

was injured. Had the train been on

time lhc gust would not have reached

it. Ileld, that the injury could not

be attributed to the delay as the

proximate cause, and the railroad
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company was not liable. McCiary 0.

Sioux, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Neb. 44; S.

C. 19 Am. Rep. 681. See Daniels 0.

Ballantine, 23 Ohio (ts. s.) 532; S. C.

13 Am. Rep. 284. Compare Read o.

Spalding, 5 Bosw. 395. In New York

the dot-trine of the cases above cited

is rt-jcctcd. Sec Condict o. Grand

Trunk R. R. 00,54 N.Y. 500. In that

case a common carrier was chargable

with delay in the transportation of

goods, and they were burned in its

wart-liouse. Earl, Com. "The ques-

tion to he considered is whether the

lU:S by ﬁre was in such a sense a con-

sequence of the delay us to impose

any liability upon the defendant.

There was a clause in the conditions

annexed to the contract, that the

defendant should not be responsible

for (ltlIlI€l_'_'€ occasioned by ﬁre. 'l‘hcre

was a similar clause in the contract

in the case of Lamb e. Camden &

Amboy R R. & T. Co., 46 N. Y. 271,

and it was held that such clause did

not exonerate the carrier from a loss

occasioned by ﬁre, in case the ﬁre

resulted from its own negligence. So

in this case, if the loss can be attributed

to the fault or negligence of the

defendant, it must he held liable

But it is claimed that the delay on

the part of the defendant in the trans-

portation of the goods, which exposed

them to the ﬁre. was the remote and

not the proximate cause of the loss,

and hence that the defendant cannot

be held liable for the loss without

violating the maxim, causa promlma

non remom apcctutur. But the law is

otherwise settled in this State. In

Michaela v. New York Central Railroad

Company, 30 N. Y. 564, the defendant

received at Albany, from the Hudson

River Railroad Company, a box of

goods to be transported to Rochester

and delivered to the owners. lnstead

would have been responsible. Scot&
e. Hunter, 46 Penn. St. 192. Or if the
finod bad occurred in consequence of
a wrongful act. Dickinson e. Boyle,
17 Pick. 78. Bee, further, Railroad Co.
e. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176; McGrew e.
t\t 1nt\ 53 Penn 8L 486; Denny "· N.
Y. C.enl R. H. Co., 1R Gray, 481;
George "· Fi;k, 82 N.H. 32; Alston
"· Ht'rring, 11 Exch. 822. A railroad
train nmning behind time was upset
by a gale of wind, and the plaintiff
was injured. Had the train been on
time the gust would not have reached
it. lltld, that the injury could not
be attributed to the delay as tbt'
proximate cause, and the railroad
company wa8 not liable. ~IcC . ary "·
Sioux, etc., R R Vo., 3 Neb. 44; 8.
C. 19 Am. Rep. 631. Sec Daniels e.
Ballantine, 23 Ohio (N. s.) 532; S. C.
l:i Am. Uep. 264. Compare Read tl.
8pahling,5 Bosw. 395. In New York
the do<"trine of the C1~es above cited
is rt-ji•Cil'{l. Sec Condict "· Grand
Trunk H. H. Co.,M N.Y. 500. In that
case a common carrier was chargable
with delKy in the transportation of
goods, und they were burned in its
warchoulle. Et1rl, Com. "The question to he considcted is whether the
Ju,s hy fire was in such a sense a conBl'quencc of the delay Ull to impose
any liubility upon the defendanL
There was a clause in the conditions
annf•xed to the contract, tlmt the
defendant tohould not be responsible
for danm~e •ICCasioned by fire. There
wu " similar clattso in the contract
In the case of Lamb tl. Cum1lcn &
Amboy R. R. & T. Co., 46 N.Y. 271,
and it was held that such clause did

not exonerate the carrier from a loss
occasioned by fire, i.n case the tire
resulted from its own negllgencu. Su
in this case, if the loss can be Rttributed
to the fault or negli~ence of the
defendant, It must be held liable
But it is claimed that the delay on
the part of Ute defendant in the transportation of the good~:~, which exposed
them to the tire, was the remote and
not the proximate cause of the 1088,
and hence that the defendant cannot
be held liable for the loss without
violating the maxim, cau1a prozi'IIUJ
non rtmwtn 1patatu1'. But the law is
otherwise Rcttled in this State. In
Michael• v. New York Oe11tral Railr~tJd
Cumpany, 30 N. Y. 564, the defendant
received at Albany, from the Hudson
River Railroad Company, a box of
goods to be transported to Rochester
and delivered to the owners. Instead
of furwurding the box immediately,
it detained the Sl\tne in its freight.
house at Albany, to await the render.
ing of a bill for back charg(•s by the
Hudson River Railroad Company.
While 80 detained, the good!l were
injured by being wet by an unusual
and extraordinary rise in the water
of the Hudson river; and it was held
that the detention of the goods was
negI igcnce on the part of the defend.
ant., Rnd that such negligence bnving
concurred in and contributed to the
Injury to the goods, the tlcfendnnt was
precluded from claiming the t'X!'mJ>tion fmm linbility which the law
would otherwise exwnd to iL The
same rule was held in Hl'ad "· Spauld.
ing, 80 N. Y. 630, and reiterated by
IUroLLO, J., in Bostwick"· Baltimore
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as for a result he should have foreseen and avoided.‘ In the
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other, a preacher attracted a crowd about him in the public

street, some of whom mounted a pile of stones which were pri-

vate property, and by their weight broke them. Whether the

speaker should have anticipated this result, it was said, was a

question of fact for the jury. “ It cannot be said with judicial

certainty that when he stopped to make his speech in the street

he must have foreseen, as the natural and probable consequence

of his act, that the persons collecting together to listen to him

would mount the pile of stoncs, and even if some of them would,

that so many would as, by their connected weight, might break

some of the stones. The lowermost stones in the pile were

already trusted by the plaintiff with the weight of the upper-

niost. Height of pile, strength of grain, distance from the

speaker, number of bystanders, and perhaps other circumstances,

all would enter into the question of the probability of injury.

The question was therefore one of fact for the jury, and not of

law for the court.” '

& Ohio Railroad Co., 45 N. Y. 712.

A ditferent rule was applied in Mor-

rison o. Davis, 20 Penn. 171, and in

Denny v. New York Central Railroad
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Co., 13 Gray, 481. But thos: cases

were cited in the argument of the

cases above referred to in the Court

of Appeals, and were not followed.

The rule adopted in Massachusetts

as for a result he should have foreseen and avoided: In the
other, a preacher attracted a crowd about him in the public
street, some of whom mounted a pile of stones which were private property, and by their weight broke them. Whether the
speaker should have anticipated this result, it was said, was a
question of fact tor the jury. "It cannot be said with judicial
certainty that when he stopped to make his speech in the street
he must have foreseen, as the natural and probable consequence
of his act, that the persons collecting together to listen to him
would mount the pile of stones, and even if some of them would,
that so many would as, by their connected weight, might break
some of the stones. The lowermost stones in the pile were
ah·eady trusted by the plaintiff with the weight of the uppermost. Height of pile, strength of grain, distance from the
speaker, number of bystanders, and perhaps other circumstancee,
all would enter into the question of the probability of injury.
The question was therefore one of fact for the jury, and not of
law for the court." •

and Pennsylvania was also applied in

Railroad Company v. Reeves, 10 Wal-

lace. 176. Those decisions are in

direct conﬂict with the law as settled

in this State, and cannot control the

decision of this case. The defendant's

delay was unreasonable. It was at-

tributable to (left-ndant's fault, and it

exposed the goods to the ﬁre by which

they were consumed. Hence, its fault

contributed to the loss, and it thus

became liable."

' Guille u. Swan, 19 Johns. 881. The

case of Toms 0. Whatby, 35 U. C. Q.

B. 195, is a valuable case on the gen-

eral subject of remoteness of injury

from the cause. The facts were that

the approach to a bridge was not pro

tected by any railing or guard; that

the plaintiffs wife was driving over

the bridge, when the horse shied, and

backed the carriage over the bank.

Held, that the injury was to be attrib-

uted to the want of the railing as the

proximate cause.

'Fairhanks o. Alston, 70 Penn.

St. 86, 91, per Aomsw, J.; Kerr v.

Herring, 11 Exch. 8'21. In Harris-~u

0. Berkley, 1 Strob. 525, 529, it is said:

“ Such uearnessiu the order of events

and closeness in the relation of cause

and effect must subsist that the inﬂ u-

ence of the injurious act may pre-

dominate over that of other causes,

and shall concur to produce the con-

sequence, or may be traced in those

causes. To a sound judgment must

be left each particular case. The cou-

neetion is usually eufeebled, and the

inﬂuence of the injurious act cou-

trolled, where the wrongful act of a

third person intervenes, and where

& Ohio Raill'ond Co., 45 N. Y. 712.
A difterent rule was applie1l in ?tlor.
rison fl. Davis, 20 Penn. 171, nnd in

Denny"· New York Centrnl Railroad
Co., 13 Gray, 481. But thus! cases
were cited in the argument of the
cases above referred to In the Court
of Appeals, und were not followed.
The rule adopted in ?tlnssaehusetts
and Pennsylvania was also applied in
Hailroad Company fl. Reeves, 10 Wal.
lace, 176. Those decisions are in
direct conflict with the llnv as settled
in this Stute, and cnnnot control the
decision of this cnsu. The defendant's
delay was ltnn'nsonable. It was at.
tributable to defl•ndant's fault, and it
exposed the goods to the fire by which
tlwy were consumed. lll'nce, its f.tult
<'ontributcd to the loss, and It thus
becumc liuble."
• Guillc "·Swan, 19Johns. 881. The
case of Toms o. \Vhatby, 85 U. U. Q.
B. l9:i, Ia a valuable case on the gen.
t-ral subjert of remoteness of Injury
from the cause. The facts were that

the approach to a bridge was not pro.
tected by any railing or guard; that
the plaintiff's wife was driving ov<'r
the bridge, when the horse shied, and
backed \he carrin.~e over the bank.
Htld, that the injury was to be attrib..
utcd to the want of the railing as the
proximate cause.
'Fairbanks "· Alston, 70 Penn.
St. 86, 91, per AGNEW, J.; Kerr o.
llerring, 11 E~ch. 821. In Ha:·ris •n
o. Berkley, 1 Strob. 525, 529, it is said:
" Such ncarnes!t in the order of events
and closeness in the relation of cause
and effect must subsist that the inftu.
ence of the injurious act may pre.
dominate over that of other causes,
and shull concur to produce the con.
sequence, or may be traced In those
causl's. To a sound judgment must
be left each particular case. The coo.
nectinn is usually enfl·~blcd, and the
influence of the injurious act coo.
trolled, where the wrongful net of a
third prrson in tcrvenes, and where
any new agent) introduced by ac;;i.
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It may also be instructive to compare two others, in each of
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which successive events followed the original cause before the

damage was suffered, but in the one the wrong of a third party

intervened, while in the other the subsequent acts were blameless.

In Vicar: v. Wilc0cks' the special damage from defamation for

which a recovery was sought, was the discharge of the plaintilf

from his employment before the time for which he had been

engaged had expired. But this, as Lord Eumznaoaouon showed,

was “ a mere wrongful act of the master, for which the defendant

was no more answerable than if, in consequence of the words,

other persons had afterward assembled and seized the plaintiif

and thrown him into a horse-pond by way of punishment for his

transgression.”’ In T/aomae v. Winchester,‘ the defendant, who

was a druggist, negligently sold a package .of poison labelled as

extract of dandelion, a harmless medicine, to another druggist,

who re-sold it to a third, who sold it to the plaintiff, who was

injured by making use of it, supposing it to be correctly labelled.

The court distinguish the ease from one in which two parties

deal with each other under no obligations but such as their con-

tract imposes, and charged with no duty to third persons, and

hold that where one puts up drugs for a dealer, to be used not by

him but by such person as may eventually purchase for use, he is
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dent or design, becomes more power-

ful in producing the consequence

than the ﬁrst injurious act. It is

therefore required that the conse-

quences to be answered for should be

natural as well as proximate. By

this I understand not that they should

be such as. upon a calculation of

chances, would be found likely to oc-

cur, nor such as extreme prudence

might anticipate, but only that they

It may also be instructive to compare two others, in each of
which successive events followed the original cause before the
damage was suffered, but in the one the wrong of a third party
inter,·ened, while in the other the subsequent acta were blameless.
In Vicat".t v. Wilcock, • the special damage from defamation for
which a recovery was sought, was the discharge of the plaintiff
from his employment before the time for which he had been
engaged bad expired. But this, as Lord ELLENso&ouon showed,
was u a mere wrongful act of the master, for which the defendant
was no more answerable than if, in consequell(.'e of the worus,
other persons had afterward assembled and seized the plaintiff
and thrown him into a horse-pond by way of punishment for his
transgression."' In Tho1na8 v. Winche8ter,' the defendant, who
was a druggist, negligently sold a package .of poison labelled as
extract of dandelion, a harmless medicine, to another druggist,
who re-sold it to a third, who sold it to the plaintiff, who was
injured by making use of it, supposing it to be correctly labelled.
The court distinguish the case from one in which two parties
deal with each other under no obligations but such as their eontract imposes, and charged with no duty to third person.s, and
hold that whore one puts up drugs for a dealer, to be used not by
him but by such person as may eventually purchase for use, he is

should be such as have actually en-

sued. one from another, without the

concurrence of any such extraordi-

nary conjuncturc of circumstances, or

the intervention of any such extraor-

dinary result, as that the usual course

of nature should seem to have been

departed from." In Vnndenburgh

0. Truax, 4 Denio, 464, a man who

chased a boy with an axe into a store,

was held liable for lnj ury done by the

boy in the store while endeavoring to

escape. It‘, through one‘s negligence,

his mill-dam gives way, and the force

of the water carries away a dam be-

low, and the volume thus increased

inﬂicts an injury upon a proprietor

below, the damage is chargeable to

the original negligence, and the party

guilty of it may be held responsible.

Pollett v. Long, 56 N. Y. 200. And,

see, Gilbertson'c. Richardson, 5 C. B.

502; Powell 0. Deveney, 3 Cush. 300.

'8 East. 1

' See, also, Ward o. Weeks, '7 Bin 2.

211; Tulein 0. Hurley, 98 Mass. 211.

' 6 N. Y. 397; S. C. Big. Lead. Gus.

on Torts, 602. See, also, Loop 0.

Litchﬁeld, 42 N. Y. 351; S. C. 1 Ann.

Rep. 543; Wheeler 0. Downer, etc.,

Co., 104 Mass. 64.

deat or design, becomes more powerfa) in prod~cing the consequence
than the first injurious acl It is
\berefnre required that the consequences to be answered for should bo
ua&ural u well as proximate. By
thia I understand not that they should
be such as, upon a calculation or
chances, would be round likely to oc..
cur, nor such as extreme prudence
might anticipate, but only that they
mould be such as have actually en.
sued, one from &D(Ither, without the
COilCUrreoce of any such extraordi.
nary conjuncture of circumstances, or
me intervention or any such extraor.
diDary result, aa that the usual course
or nature should seem to have been
departed from." In Vandenburgh
e. Truu, ' Denio, 464, a man who
cbued a boy wlth an axe into a store,

was held liable for injury done by the
boy in the store while endeavoring to
escape. If, ll.l•·ough one's ocgli~ence,
his mill-dam gives way, and the force
of the water carries away a dam below, Hod the volume thus increased
inflicts an injury upon a proprietor
below, the damage is chargeable to
the original negligence, and the party
guilty of it may be held rcsponsil>le.
Pollett "· Long, 56 N. Y. 200. And,
see, Gill>ert.son ·o. Hich:mlson, 5 C. B.
G02; Powell "· Dcvem·y, 8 Cush. 300.
1 8 East. 1
"See, also, Ward o. Wl"ekg, 7 Bin~.
211; Tutein o. Hurlf'y, 9!:1 Mass. 211.
"6 N.Y. 397; B. C. Big. Lead. Ca>\.

on Torts, 602. Sec, also, Loop o.
Litchfit"ld, 42 N.Y. 351; S. C. 1 Am.
Rep. 543: Wheeler o. Downer, etc.,
Co., 104 Ma88. 64.
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charged with a duty towards every person who may become pur-

chaser to label them correctly, and the number of intermediate

sales that, in the natural course of business, may take place is

immaterial.‘ There is a maxim that “fraud is not purged by

circuity,” and this is true of any wrongful act. If its inﬂuence

must naturally, and without the interposition of any extraordi-

nary event, produce to some one an injurious result, it is imma-

terial what shall be the circuit of events or the number of suc-

cessive stages.

How far one may be chargeable with the spread of a ﬁre negli-

gently started by himself, is one that has attracted no little

attention in judicial circles, and led to some difference of opinion.

In New York it is held that while the culpable party would be

liable to the owner of an adjoining house to which the ﬁre had

spread, he would not be liable to one to whose'house the ﬁre

should spread from the burning of the ﬁrst; the court apparently

being more inﬁ uenced in their decision by the fact that the oppo-

site doctrine would subject to a liability against which no pru-

dence could guard, and to meet which no private fortune would

be adequate,” than by a strict regard to the logic of cause and
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effect."

In Pennsylvania the same conclusion has been reached, and

from similar considerations.’ But a different view prevails in

‘Lynch 0. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29, is re-

lied upon, and Illidge v. Goodwin, 5

C. & P., 190, distinguished. And, see,

McDonald 0. Snelling, 14 Allen, 290.

And compare Carter 1:. Towne, 103

Mass. 507. As to the consequences

that may reasonably be expected to

follow a wrongful act, see Greenland

v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 243, 2l8; Hoey

d1arged with a duty towards every person who may become purchaser to label the111 correctly, and the number of intermediate
sales that, in the natural course of business, may take place is
immaterial.' There is a maxim that "fraud is not purged by
circuity," and this is true of any wrongful act. If its influence
must naturally, and without the interposition of any extraordinary event, produce to some one an injurious result, it is immaterial what shall be the circuit of events or the number of successive stages.
How far one may be chargeable with the spread of a :fire neglig~'ntly started by himself~ is one that has attracted no little
attention in judicial circles, and led to some difference of opinion.
In New York it is held that while the culpable party would be
liable to the owner of an adjoining house to which the fire had
spread, he would not be liable to one to whose ·house the fire
should spread from the burning of the first; the court apparently
being more influenced in their decision by the fact that the oppOsite doctrine would subject to a liability against which no prudenee could guard, and to meet which no private fortune would
be adequate," than by a strict regard to the logic of cause and
effect.•
In Pennsylvania the same conclusion has been reached, and
from similar considerations.' But a different view prevails in

v Ft-lton, ll C. B. (N. s) 142; Weath-

erford v. Fishback, 4 Ill. 170; Young

0. Hall, 4 Geo. 9:); Addington '0. Allen,

11 Wend. 375. If one innocently re-

peat a slander, the slanderer may be

held liable therefor. Kcenholts 1:.

Becker, 3 Denio, 346. Compare Has-

tings o. Palmer, 20 Wend. 225.

’ Ryan o. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 35

N. Y. 210. This decision does not

appear to have been entirely satisl'a<>

tory in New York; _at least, the

courts in subsequent cases have not

been very positive in planting them-

selves upon it. See Webb n. Rome,

etc., R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 420, 427-8;

Pollett 0. Long, 56 N. Y. 200, 206.

‘ Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 0. Kerr, 62

Penn. St. 353. We should say that

the weight of this case as a precedent

was somewhat diminished by Oil

Creek, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Kcighron, 74

Penn. St. 316, and Pennsylvania R. R.

Co. 0. Hope, 80 Penn. St 373; S. (1.30

Am. Rep. 100. In the last mentioned

case, proximate cause is held to be a

question for the jury. To the same

effect are also the following: Lake 0.

Millikan, 62 Me., 240; Willey 0. Bel-

fast, 61 Me. 569; Kellogg v. St. Paul,

etc., R. R. Co., 94 U. S. 469.

1 Lynch"· Nuruin, 1 Q. B. 29, Is relied upon, and Illidge "·Goodwin, 6
C. & P., 100, distinguished. And, see,
McDonald "·Snelling, 14 Allen, 290.
And compare Carter ~- Towne, 103
Mass. 507. As to the consequences
that may reasonably be expected to
follow a wrongful act, sec Greenland
"· Chnplln, 5 Exch. 243, 2l8; Hoey
" Fdton, 11 C. B. (N. 8) 142; Weath·
erford D. Fishback, 4 111. 170; Young
fJ. Hall, 4 Gco. 9:>; Addington"· Allen,
11 Wend. 375. If one innoccnlly re.
peat a slander, the slanderer may be
held liable therefor. Keenholts "·
Becker, 3 Denio, 340. Cum pare Ha.s..
tings "· Pulmer, 2U Wend. 225.
'Ryan "· N.Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 35
N. Y. 210. This decision does not
.appear to have been entirely satisl'oo-

tory in New York; . at least. the
courts in subsequent cases have not
been very positive in planting themselves upon it. See Webb "· Rome,
etc., R. R. Co., 49 N.Y. 420, 427-8;
Pollett"· Long, 5(} N. Y. 200, 206.
a Pennsylvania R. R. Co."· Kerr, 69
Penn. St. 353. We 11hould say that
the weight of this casu as a prcl~edent
was somewhat diminished by Oil
Creek, etc., R. R. Co. 1!. Kcighron, 7(
Penn. St. 316, and Pennsylvania R. R
Co. "· Hope, 80 Penn. St 373; B. C. 90
Am. Rep. 100. In the last mrntioned
case, proximate cause is held to be a
question for the jury. To the same
cflect are also the following: Lake "·
Milliken, 62 Me., 240; Willey "· Belfast, 61 Me. 569; Kellogg fJ. St. PauL,
etc., R. R. Co., 94 U. 8 . .f.69 .
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England and in most ot' the American States. The negligent
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ﬁre is regarded as a unity: it reaches the last building as a direct

77

and proximate result of the original negligence, just as a rolling

stone put in motion down a hill, injuring several persons in suc-

cession, inﬂicts the last injury as a proximate result of the orig-

inal force as directly as it does the ﬁrst; though it‘ it had been

stopped on the way and started anew by another person, a new

cause would thus ha.ve intervened back of which any subsequent

injury could not have been traced. Proximity of cause has no

necessary connection with contiguity of space or nearness in

time. The slow match which causes an explosion after much

time and at considerable distance from the ignition, and the

libelous letter which is carried from place to place by different

hands before publication, produces an injurious result which is

as proximate to the cause and as direct a sequence as if in the

one case the explosion had been instantaneous, and in the other

the author had called his neighbors together and read to them

his libel.‘

' See Smith v. London, etc.,R. R.Co.,

L. R. 5 (J. P. 98; Pcrley 0. Eastern R.

R. Co., 98 Mass. 414; Clemens v. Han-

nibal, etc., R. R. Co., 53 Mo. 366; S.
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C. 14 Am. R. 460; Iloyt 0. Jeifers, 30

Mich. 181; Fent v. Toledo, etc., R. R.

Co., 59 Ill. 849: S. C. 14 Am. Rcp.18;

Toledo, etc., R. R Co. 1;. Muthers-

haugh, 71 Ill. 572; Annapolis, etc., R.

England and in most of the American States. The negligent
fire ia regarded as a unity: it reaches the last building as a direct
and proximate result of the original negligence, just as a rolling
atone put in motion down a hill, injuring several persons in succession, inflicts the last injury as a proximate result of the original force as directly as it does the first; though if it bad been
stopped on the way and started anew by another person, a new
cause wonld thus have intervened back of which any subsequent
injury <:ould not have been traced. Proximity of cause has no
n~sary connection with contiguity of space or nearne~;s in
time. The slow match which causes an explosion after much
time and at considerable distance from the ignition, and the
libelous letter which is carried from place to place by different
bands beforo publication, produces an injurious result which is
as proximate to the cause and as direct a sequence as if in the
one case the explosion had been instantaneous, and in the other
the author had called his neighbors together and read to them
his libel.1

R. Co. 0. Gantt, 39 Md. 115; Balti-

more, etc., R. R. Co. o. Rcaney, 42 Md.

117; Kellogg o. Chicago, etc., R. R.

Co I26 Wis. 223; Hooksett v. Concord

R R, 38 N. H.242; Atchison, etc., R.

R. Co 0. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354; S. C.

15 Am. R. 362; Kellogg 11. St. Paul,

etc., R. R. Co., 94 U. S.-169; Delaware,

etc., R. R. Co. o. Salmon, 39 N. J. 299.

In Annapolis, etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Gantt. 39 Md. 115, 141, BARTOL, Ch.

J., says: " It is contended on the

part of the appellant that, for such

injury, the company is not liable

under the code, btcutlse it was the

remote, and not the proximate, consc-

quence of the del'cndu.nt’s negligence.

In support of this proposition we have

been referred to Ryan 0. N. Y. Central

R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210, and Penn. R.

R. Co. 0. Kerr. 62 Penn. 353.

“In those eases it was held that

‘where the ﬁre is communicated by

the locomotive to the house of A.,

and thence to the house of B., there

can be no recovery by the latter,’ and

the decisions are based upon the

ground that the ﬁre from the locomo-

live is not the proximate cause of the

destruction of B.'s house; and his

injury being only the remote and

indirect result of the wrongful act of

the defendant, he cannot maintain an

action, according to the maxim, cauaa

pro:n'mu /ton rcmota spertutur. There

is no rule of the law better cstabl isht-ti

or more universally reeognizul.

Whether it was correctly applied in

the cases above cited, it is not mutcriul

for us now to consider; becallse it is

obvious that the facts in the present

case clearly distinguish it from those.

1 8ee Smith"· London, etc., R. R.Co.,
L. R. ti C. P. 98; Perlt~y "· Eastern R.
n. Co., 98 MilS&. 414; Clemens o. Han.
nibal, etc., R. R. Co., 53 !lo. 366; S.
C. 14 Am. R. 460; Hoyt o. Jefl"ers, SO
Mich. 181; Fent "· Toledo, etc., R. R.
Go., 59 Ill. 840; S.C. 14 Am. Rep. 18;
Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. "· lluthershftugh, 71 Ill. 572; Annapolis, etc., R.
R. Co. e. Gantt, 39 Md. 115; Baltimore, etc., It R. Co. tl. Reaney, 42 Md.
117; Kellogg "· Chicago, etc., R. R.
Co ,"26 Wis. 223: Hooksett"· Concord
R R, 3S N. H.242; Atchison, etc., H.
1t. Co "· Stanford, 12 Kan. 3!i4; S. C.
15 Am. R. 362; Kellogg ·" · St. Paul,
etc., R R. Co., 94 U. 8. 469; DclawRre,
etc., R. H. Co."· Salmon, 39 N.J. 290.
In Annapolis, etc.. R. H. Co. tl.
Gantt, 39 ::\Ill. 115, 141, BARTOL, Ch.
J., s:•ys: "It is contended on tho
l13rt or the appellant that, for such
injury, the company is not liable
under the code, LL,:anse it was the
nm•ote., and not the prozimate, consequence of the defcndiUlt.'s ncgligeuctl.

In support of this proposition we have
been referred to RyiUl "·N.Y. Central
R R. Co., 85 N. Y. 210, and Penn. R.
R. Co. "· Kerr. 62 Penn. 853.
"In those cases it was held that
• where the flrc is communicated by
the locomotive to the house of A.,
and thence to the house of B., there
can be no recovery by the latter,' and
the decisions are ba~:ed upon the
ground that the fire from the locomo..
tive is not the proximate cause of the
destruction of B.'s house; and hiR
Injury being only the remote and
Indirect result of the wrongful act of
the defendant, he cannot mainttlin an
action, according to the ma:tim, causa
pro:rimrt /WI& remota spertatur. Then!
is no rule of the law bettt·r l'Stabl hllwd
or more univer1;ally reco~nizul.
Whether it was correctly applied in
the cases ubovtl cill·d, it is uot material
for us now to con!':t!er; lJcl"ll'N' it i:>
obvious that the fuels in the pre:;cnt
case clearly dh:tinguisb it from tlwsc.
"It may be pmpcr to obscrvo that
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4. A fourth proposition may be stated thus: That if the dam-
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age has resulted directly from concurrent wrongful acts or

neglects of two persons, each of these acts may be counted on as

the wrongful cause, and the parties held responsible, either jointly

the decisions in 15 N. Y. and 62 Penn.

are not supported by any English case

that we have seen, and are in conﬂict

with several decisions both in Eng-

4. A fourth proposition may be stated thus: That if the dam&nue has resulted directly from concurrent wrongfn) acts or
neglects of two persons, each of the'se acts may be counted on as
the wrongful cause, and the parties held responsible, either jointly

land and in this country, which have

been cited in argument by the appel-

lee. Among them we may refer to

Piggott 0. Eastern Counties R. Co.,

3 M. G. & S. 229; Smith '0. L. & S. R.

R. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 98; Perley 0.

Eastern R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 418; Hart

0. Western R. R. Co., 13 Met. 99;

Fent v. Toledo, etc., R. R. Co., 59 Ill.

349.

“Without attempting to reconcile

the various decisions, which would

be a fruitless and unproﬁtable task,

or undertaking to deﬁne for all pos-
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sible cnses the exact limits and extent

of the liability of railroad companies

under our code, for damages by ﬁre

occasioned by their engines and car-

riages, we may safely state the rule to

be, that when their liability arises it

extends to ‘all the near and natural

consequences of their wrongful act,

and not to those which are remote,

incidental or exceptional.’ Law Reg.

Sep., No.1873, p. 560,Judge Redﬁeld's

note. The rule is thus stated by Par-

sons: ‘The defendant is held liable

for all those consequences which

might have been foreseen and ex-

pected as the results of his conduct,

but not for those which he could not

have foreseen, and was therefore under

no moral 0lJllgal.lOI1 to take into con-

sideration,’ 2 Pars. on Cont. 456.

The rule is laid down substantially

in the same terms by I’oLLocx, C. B.,

in Rigby '0. Hewitt, 5 Exch. 240.

Other deﬁnitions might be cited from

Judges and text writers; but this

would serve no useful purpose. The

rule is one which, from its nature and

the class of cases where it applies, is

incapable of precise deﬁnition. It

has been correctly said by Mnmnn,

J., speaking for the Supreme Court,

‘If we could deduce from the cases

the best possible expression of the

rule, it would remain after all to

decide each case largely upon the

special facts belonging to it, and often

upon the very nicest diseriminations.‘

He adds, ‘One of the most valuable

criteria furnished us by the authorities

is to ascertain whether any new cause

has intervened between the fact ac-

complished and the alleged cause.

If a new force or power has inter-

vened, of itself suﬁlcient to stand as

the cause of the misfortune, the other

must be considered as too remote.’ Ins.

Co. 0. Tweed, '7 Wall. 52. To apply

the decisions in 15 N:Y. and 62 Penn.
are not supported by any Eng! ish case
tllat we have seen, and are in conflict
with several decisions both in Eng.
land and in this country, which have
been cited in argument by the appellee. Among them we may refer to
Piggott "· Eastern Counties R. Co.,
8 111. G. & S. 229; Smith t~. L. & S. R.
R. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 98; Perley "·
Eastern R R. Co., 98 Mass. 418; Hart
"· Western R. R. Co., 18 Met. 99;
Fent "· Toledo, etc., R. R. Co., 59 Ill.
349.
"Without attempting to reconcile
the various decisions, which would
be a fruitless and unprofitable task,
or undertaking to define for all possible cnscs the exact limits and extent
of the liability of railroad companies
under our code, for damages by fire
occasioned by their engines and carriages, we may safely state the rule to
be, that when their liability arises it
extends to • all the near and natural
consequences of their wrongful act,
and not to those which are remote,
incidental or exceptional.' Law R"g.
Scp., No.1873, p. 560,Judge Redtleld"s
note. The rulP is thus stated by Parsons: 'The defendant is held liable
for all those consequences which
might have been foreseen and expected as the results of his conduct,
but not for those which he could not
have foreseen, and was therefore under
no moral obligation to take into con.
hider11tion,' 2 Pars. on Cont. 456.
The rule is laid down substantially
in the same terms by PoLLOCK, C. B.,
in Rigby "· Hewitt, 5 Exch. 240.
OLher definitions might be cited from
Judges and text writers; but this

would serve no useful purpose. The
rule is one which, from its nature and
the class of cases where it applies, is
incapable of precise definition. JL
has been correctly said by 1thLLBR,
J., speaking for the Supreme Court,
'If we could deduce from the cases
the best possible expression of the
rule, it would remain after all to
decide each case largely upon the
special facts belonging to it, and often
upon the very nicest disrriminations.'
He adds, 'One of the most valuable
criteria furnisbcd us by the authorities
is to ascertain whether any new cause
bas intervened between tho fact ac.
complished and the alleged cause.
If a new force or power hu intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as
the cause of the misfortune, the other
must be considered as too remote.' Ins.
Co."· Tweed, 7 Wall. 52. To apply
this criterion to the case before us, it
seems too plain for argument that
• * the injury to the plaintifl's
property was the direct consequence
of the fire occasioned by the defend.
ant's locomotive. The fact that the
fire began on the side of the railroad
and spread to the plaintifl's l!Uld, can.
not in any jullt sense be said to render
the injury suffered by him of a nature
merely remote and incidental within
the meaning of the rule. The fire
consumed his property in its natural
and direct course, without any' intervening force or power to stand as tho
cause of the mbfortune,' and the
injury suffered was therefore its prox.
imate effect.
"No case has been cited which su.atains the defense here made by the
appellant. In W oodruff'a Case, 4 Md.
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or severally, for the injury.‘ Thus, if two persons wrongfully
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block up a street, so that one is injured in attempting to pass

them, neither of the culpable parties can excuse himself by

showing the wrong of the other, for the injury is a natural and

proximate result of his own act under the then existing circum-

stances, and to excuse either would be to deny all remedy in the

case of plain and palpable injury. But if the acts or neglects

were not concurrent in time, and the party last in fault was

chargeable with some duty to the other which, if performed,

would have prevented the injury, the law will attribute to his

culpable conduct the injurious consequence, and refuse to look

beyond it. For illustration the case may be instanced of the

escape of gas into a dwelling in consequence of the negligence

ot' the gas company, and the subsequent ignition of the gas

through the negligence of a tenant. “If the tenant, upon dis-

covering the presence of gas in large quantity in the house,

neglected to give notice to the agents or servants of the defend-

azit, or to take reasonable precautions to remove or exclude the

gas, and recklessly brought the ﬂame of a candle in contact with

it. thus bringing about injurious effects which would not have

followed but for such reckless or negligent conduct on his part,

the defendant ought not to be held responsible for those results.’
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Whatever of care was requisite for the protection of the premises

under the circumstances was due from the occupant. The de-

242, the ﬁre happened in the same

way, and neither court nor counsel

thought of applying the rule of causa

rrmola. So in B. & O. R. R. C0. 0.

Dorsey, 37 Md. 19, the ﬁre originated

in the same way, and it was not pre-

tended that the injury to the plaintitf

was not a proximate consequence of

the defendant's negligence. The lan-

zuage of the court (p. 24) would seem

conclusive of the question as it is

or severally, for the injury.• Thus, if two persons wrongfully
block up a street, so that one is injured in attempting to pass
them, neither of the culpable parties can excuse himself by
showing the wrong of the other, for the injury is a natural and
proximate result of his own act under the thon existing circumstances, and to excuse either would be to deny all remedy in the
case of plain and palpable injury. But if the acts or neglects
were not concurrent in time, and the pat·ty last in fimlt was
chargeable with some duty to the other which, if performed,
would have prevented the injury, the law will attribute to his
eulpnble conduct the injurious consequence, and refuse to look
beyond it. For illustration the cnse may be instanced of the
(•scape of gas into a dwelling in consequence of the negligence
of the gas company, and the subsequent ignition of the gas
through the negligence of a tenant. "If the tenant, upon diseovering the pt·esen<.:e of gas in large quantity in the house,
neglected to give notice to the agents or servants of the defenda:•t, or to take reasonable precautions to remove or exclude the
gas, and recklessly brought the flame of a candle in contact with
it. thus bringing about injurious effects which would not have
followed but for such reckless or negligent conduct on his part,
the defendant ought not to be held responsible for those results.'
\Vhatever of care was requisite for the protection of the premises
onder the circumstances was due from the occupant. The de-

here presented. We may refer also

to Field e. N. Y. Central R R. Co., 32

N. Y. 839, Where the question was

ruled in the same way by the same

court which subsequently decided

Ryan 9. X. Y. Central R. R. (10.35

N. Y. 210." See, also, Higgins 0.

Dewey, 107 Mass. 494.

' Lynch 0. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; Il-

lidge v. Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 190; Mc-

Cahill v. Kipp, 2 E. D. Smith, 418:

Chapman 0. N. H. etc., R. R. Co., 19

N. Y. 341; Colegrove 0. N. Y., etc.,

R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 492; Barrett a.

Third Av. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 628;

Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81;

Powell o. Deveney, 3 Cush. 800; Lane

o. Atlantic Works, 107 Mass. 104;

Weick 0. Lander, 75 Ill. 93; Rickcr 0.

Freeman, 50 N. H. 420; S. C. 9 Am.

Rep. 267; Lake 0. Milliken, 62 Me.

240; S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 4-36.

‘Citing Hunt 0. Lowell Gaslight

Co., 1 Allen, 343; Sherman 0. Fall

River Iron Works, 2 Allen, 524.

242, the ftre bllppeued lu the same
way, and neither court nor counsel
thought of applying the rule of CliUIIJ
"mot4. So in B. & 0. R. R. Co."·
Doney, 87 M:d. 19, the fl.re originated
in the aame way, and it waa not preu.•oded that the injury to the plaintiff
was no& a proximate consequence of
the defendant's negligence. The Jansntage or the court (p. 2-1) would seem
<·onclnsive of the question as it is
here presented. We may refer also
to Field"· N.Y. Central R R. Co., 32
N. Y. 839, where Ule qneation was
ro led in the same way by the same
court which aubscquently decided
Hyaa •· N.Y. Central R. R. Co, 35
N. Y. 210." Bee, aleo, Biggina ..
Dewey, 10'l Haaa. 494.

1 Lynch "· Nordin, 1 Q. B. 29; Illldgc .,, Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 190; McCahill "· Kipp, 2 E. D. Smith, 413:
Chapman "· N. B. etc., R. R. Co., HI
N.Y. Ml; Colegrove "· N. Y., etc.,
R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 492; Burrett t).
Third Av. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 628;
Griggs "· Fleckenstein, 14 :}linn. fll;
Powell"· Deveney, 3 Cush. 300; Lane
e. Atlantic Works, 107 Mass. 104;
Weick"· Lander, 75lll. 93; Ricker o.
Freeman, 50 N. H. 420; S. C. 9 Am.
Rep. 267; Lake "· Milliken, 62 Me.
240; B. C. 16 Am. Rep. 4:i6.
1 Citing Bunt e. Lowell Gaslight
Co., 1 Allen, 343; Sherman o. Fall
River Iron Work.a, 2 Allen, 524.
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fendant, as well as the plaintiff, had a right to expect and require
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it of him. The measure of duty and the extent of liability of

the defendant in respect to the property exposed to injury are

not affected by the consideration whether the occupant who has

charge of it is in fact owner in fee or tenant for years or at Will.

If the intervening misconduct of the occupant produced the

explosion which was the immediate cause of the injury to the

building, the plaintiff cannot charge the legal responsibility for

that result upon the original negligent act or omission of the

defendant.” ‘

Accidental Injuries. For a purely accidental occurrence,

causing damage without the fault of the person to whom it is

attributable, no action will lie, for though there is damage the

thing amiss—the 1Znjuria—-is wanting.’

'Wr1.r.s, J., in Bartlett 0. Boston

Gaslight Co., 117 Mass. 533, 538.

fendant, as well as the plaintiff, had a right to expect and require
it of him. The measure of duty and the extent of liability of
the defendant in respect to the property exposed to injury are
not affected by the consideration whether the occupant who has
charge of it is in fact owner in fee or tenant for years or at will.
If the intervening misconduct of the occupant produced the
explosion which was the immediate ~use of the injury to the
building, the plaintiff cannot charge the legal responsibility for
that result upon the original negligent act or omission of the
defendant." '

‘Weaver 0. Ward, Hob. 134; Gib-

bons o. Pepper, 1 Ld. Ray. 38; Lloyd

0. Ogleby, 5 C. B. (rt. s.) 667; Cotton

o. Wood,8 C. B. (N. s.) 566: Ilammack

0. White, 11 C. B. (N. s.) 588; Alderson

0. Waistell, 1 C. & K. 357; Holmes 0.

Accidental Injuries. For a purely accidental occurrence,
cansing damage without the fault of the person to whom it is
attributable, no action will lie, for though there is damage the
thing amiss-the injuria-is wanting.'
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Mather L. R. 10 Exch. 261; Vincent

0. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62; Dygert 0.

Bradley, 8 Wend. 469; Losee 0. Bu-

chanan, 51 N. Y. 476; S. C. 10 Am.

Rep. 623; Clark v. Foot, 8 Johns.

421; Sheldon 1;. Sherman, 42 N. Y.

484; S. C. Am. Rep. 569; Wilson 0.

Rockland Manuf. Co., 2 Harr. 67;

Spencer 0. Campbell, 0 W. & s. 32;

Boynton v. Rees. 9 Pick. 527; Rock-

wood v. Wilson, 11 Cush. 221; Brown

v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292; Gault 0.

Humes, 20 Md. 297; Robinson v.

Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 32 Mich. 322;

Toledo, etc.. R. R. Co. v. Daniels, 21

Ind. 162; Indianapolis, ctc., R. R Co.

o. Trnitt, 24 Ind. 162; P. C. & S. R. R.

Co. 1:. Smith, 26 Ohio, (N. s.) 124; Bur-

ton 1;. Davis, 15 La. Ann. 448; Brown

0. Collins, 53 N. H. 442; S. C. 16 Am.

Rep. 372; Hanlon o. Ingram, 3 Clark

(Iowa), 81; Morris o. Platt, 82 Conn.

75; Strouse 0. Whittlcsey, 41 Conn.

559; Chicago. etc., R. R Co. o. J acobs,

63 Ill. 178; Toledo, etc., R. R. C0. 0.

Jones, 76 Ill. 311. Encamping and

hunting in awilderness district is not

such an illegal and mischievous act

as will render the person responsible

for all injury that may result to others

regardless of diligence, care, or pru-

dence on his part. Bizzell 0. Booker,

16 Ark. 308. Where a party, in self-

defense, ﬁred a pistol at his assailant

and accidentally shot a third party,

he was held not liable for the injury

done. Morris v. Plutt, 32 Conn.75. See,

to the same effect, Paxton o. Boyer,

67 Ill. 132; S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 615.

Where in the use of a steam engine,

without negligence it explodes and

causes injury to others, the owner is

not liable therefor. Losee o. Bu-

chanan, 51 N. Y. 746; S. C. 10 Am.

Rep. 623; Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.

J. 339; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 39-1. An

accident may be deﬁned as an event

I WILLS, J., In Bartlett e. Boston
Gaslight Co., 117 Mass. 538, 588.
1 Weaver e. Ward, Holl. 134; Gibbons e. Pepper, 1 Ld. Ray. 88; Uoyd
e. Ogleby, 5 C. B. (N. s.) 667; Cotton
e. Wood,8C. B. (N. B.J 566; Hammack
e. White, 11 C. B. (N. s.) 588; Alderson
o. Waistell, 1 C. & K. 857; Holmes o.
Mather L. R 10 Exch. 261 : Vincent
e. Stlnchoor, 7 "VL 62; Dygert e.
Bradley, 8 Wend. 469; Losee e. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476; S. C. 10 Am.
Rep. 623; Clark "· Foot, 8 Johns.
-'21; Sheldon e. Sherman, 42 N. Y.
484; 8. C. Am. Rep. 569; Wilson e.
Rockland 1rlanof. Co., 2 Harr. 67;
Spencer e. Campbell, 9 W. & S. 82;
Boynton "· Rees, 9 Pick. 527; Rockwood "· Wilson, 11 Cush. 221 ; Brown
e. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292; Gault e.
Humes, 20 Md. 297; Robinson "·
Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 82 Mich. a22;
Toledo, etc.. R. R. Co. "· Daniels, 21
Ind. 162; Indianapolis, etc., R. R Co.
fl. Truitt, 24 Ind. 162; P. C. & S. R. R
Co."· Bmith, 26 Ohio, (N. s.) 124; Burton v. Davis, l!i La. Ann. 448; Brown
fl. Collins, 58 N.H. 442; S.C. 16 Am.
Rep. 872; Hanlon "· Ingram, 3 Clark
(Iowa), 81; Morris fl. Platt, 32 Conn.

75; Strouse "· Whittlesey, 41 Conn.
M9; Chicago. etc., R. R Co. o. Jacobs,
68 Ill. 178; Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. e.
Jones, 76 Ill. 311. Encamping and
hunting in a wilderness district is not
suci1 an illegal and mischievous act
as will render the person responsible
for all Injury that mny result to others
regardless of diligt•nce, care, or pru.
dence on his part. Bizzell fl, Booker.
16 Ark. 808. Where a party, in self.
defense, fired a pistol at his &l;Sailant
and accidentally shot a third party,
he was held not liable for the Injury
done. .Morris o. Platt, 32 Conn.75. See,
to tho same effect, Paxton "· Boyer,
67 Ill. 132; S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 615.
Where in the use of a stenm engine,
without negligence it explodes and
causes injury to others, the owner is
not liable therefor. Losee "· Bu.
channn, 51 N.Y. 746; S. C. 10 Am.
Rep. 623; llarshallt1. Wclwood, 88 N .
J. :389; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 394. An
accident may be defined as an C\'ent
happening unexpectedly and without
fault: if there is any fKult there ie
liability. As where one drivc·s against
another by getting on the wrong side
of the road in a durk night. Leame fl.
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absgue ivzjuria also if through the lawful and proper exercise by

one man of his own rights a damage results to another, even

though he might have anticipated the result and avoided it. That

which it is right and lawful for one man to do cannot furnish the

foundation for an action in favor of another.‘ Nor can the ab-

sence of commendable motive on the part of the party exercising

his rights be the legal substitute or equivalent for the thing

amiss which is one of the necessary elements of a wrong. “ An-

act which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable

because it is done with a bad intent.

77’ .

Crimes and Torts Distinguished. It was observed in a previ-

ous chapter that the same act may constitute a public offense and

also a private injury; or, in other words, may be both a crime

and a. tort. But whether or not it shall have this two-fold char-

acter can never be determined by an analysis of the moral qual-

It is d(lllnnum,
ah8t.[U6 injuria also if through tho lawful and proper exercise by
one man of his own rights a. damage results to another, e,·cu
though he might have anticipated the result and avoided it. That
which it is right and lawful for one man to do cannot tumish the
foundation for a.n action in favor of another.' Nor can the absence of commendable motive on the part of the party exercising
his rights be the legal substitute or equivalent for the thing
amiss which is one of the necessary elements of a wrong. "An·
act which does not amount to a. legal injury cannot be a.ctionuble
because it is done with a bad intetit."'
Damage from the Lawful Exercise of Rights.

ities, and a determination of the presence or absence of evil

intent. We must look beyond these, and see whether the act

comes within the deﬁnition of a crime, and also within that of a.

private injury, and if it does, the fact that it is the one will not

prevent its being the other also. Certain acts or omissions are
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made public offenses by the common law or by statute, either

because their inherent qualities and necessary tendencies make

them prejudicial to organized society, or because it is believed

that the evils likely to ﬂow from them will be so serious that the

general good will be snbserved by forbidding them; and penal-

ties are attached to them, which are imposed on public grounds.

These according to their grade, are crimes or misdemeanors, or

they are simply things prohibited under penalty. But where the

Bray. 3 East. 593. Or by pulling the

wrong rein by mistake. Wakeman 0.

R0biuson.1 Bing. 213. See Shawhan 0.

Clarke, 24 La. Ann.890; W. U.Tel. Co.

c. Quinn, 56 Ill. 319; Sullivan 0.

Scripture. 3 Allen. 564.

' Aldred’s Case, 9 Co. 58, b. ; Acton

e. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 350; Chase-

more r. Richards, 2 H. & N. 168; S. C.

7 H. L. Cas. 749; New River Co. v.

Johnson, 2 El. & El. 485; Charles

River Bridge 0. Warren Bridge, 7

Pick. 844; S. O. in Error, 11 Pet. 420;

Crimes and Torts Distinguished. It was observed in a previous chapter that tho same act may constitute a public offense and
also a private injury; or, in other words, may be both a crime
and a. tort. Bot whether or not it shall have this two-fold character can never be determined by a.n analysis of the moral qualities, and a determination of the presence or absence of evil
intent. We most look beyond these, and see whether the act
comes within the definition of a crime, and also within that of a.
private injury, and if it does, the fact that it is the one will not
pre\·ent its being the other also. Certain acts or omissions are
made public offenses by the common law or by statute, either
beca.use their inherent qualities aud necessary tendencies make
them prejudicial to organized society, or because it is believed
that the evils likely to flow from them will be so serious that the
general good will be subserved by forbidding them; and penalties are attached to them, which are imposed on public grounds.
These according to their grade, are crimes or misdemeanors, or
they are simply things prohibited under penalty. But where the

Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn.533; Chat.

ﬁeld v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Frazier v.

Brown, 12 Ol1l0,(N. B.) 2214; Wlieatley

0. Baugh_ 25 Penn. St. 528.

‘Parke B. Stevenson 0. Newham,

18 C. B. 285. See Floyd 1:. Baker, 18

Co. 23; Stowball 0. Ansell, (‘omb. 11;

Taylor v. Henniker, 12 Ad & El. 488.

This subject will be considered in a

future chapter.

__...~ i
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Bray. 8 East. li98. Or by pulling the
'lfl'Ong rein by mistake. Wakeman e.
Robinson, 1 Bing. 218. See Shawhan e.
Clarke, 24: La. Ann. 890; W. U. Tel. Co.
e. Quinn, 56 Ill. 319; Sullivan e.
Scriptnre, 8 Allen. tl64.
1 Aldred's Case, 9 Co. 38, b.; Acton
e. Blu11dell, 12 M. & W. MO; Chase.
metre "· Richards, 2 H. & N. 168; 8. C.
7 B. l~o Cu. 749; New River Co. e.
JobllS('n, 2 El. & El. 486; Charles
Blftl' Brl.Ige e. Warren Bridge, 'l

6

Pick. 844; B. 0. In Error, 11 Pet420 ;
Roath tt. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 5:13; Chat.
field e. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Frazier tt.
Brown, 12 Ohio, {N. s.) 2!J4; Wheatley
e. Baugh, 25 Penn. St. 528.
1 Parke B. Stevenson e. Newham,
18 C. B. ~. Mee Floyd e. Baker, lB
Co. 23; Stowball e. Ansell, Comb.11;
Taylor e. Henniker, 12 Ad & El. 488.
This subject will be considered in a
future chapter.
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same wrongful acts cause damage to private individuals. they come
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directly within the deﬁnition of torts, and are such. If one man

strike another in anger, the public peace is broken, and the man

assaulted is injured; and there is thus a public wrong and a pri-

vate wrong. Punishing one does not redress the other, nor docs

forgiving the one preclude legal proceedings to punish or obtain

compensation for the other.

Many attempts have been made to draw a clear distinction

between a tort and a crime, but they have not always thrown

light upon the subject. Thus Blackstone says: “ The distinction

of public wrongs from private, of crimes and misdemeanors from

civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this: That private

wrongs or civil injuries are an infringement or privation of the

civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as

individuals; public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a

breach and violation of the public rights and duties due to the

whole community, considered as a community in its social aggre-

gate capacity. As if I detain a ﬁeld from a man, to which the

law has given him a right, this is a civil injury, and not a crime;

for here only the right of an individual is concerned, and it is

immaterial to the public which of us is in possession of the land;

but treason, murder and robbery are properly ranked among
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crimes; since, beside the injury done to individuals, they strike

at the very being of society, which cannot possibly subsist where

actions of this sort are suffered-to escape with impunity.” '

Again, it is said by Lord Mansrmtnz “The offense that is indict-

able must be such a one as affects the public. As if a man uses

false weights and measures, and sells by them to all or many of

his customers, or uses them in the general course of his deal-

ings. So, if a man defrauds another under false tokens; for these

are deceptions that common care and prudence are not suﬁicient

to guard against. So, if there be a conspiracy to cheat; for ordi-

nary care and caution is no guard against this.” " And still

another judge has said: “ All offenses of a public nature, that is,

all such acts or attempts as tend to the prejudice of the commu-

nity, are indictable.” '

N ow it is not an immaterial matter to the public that one man

' 4 Bl. Com. 5. ' LAWRENCE, J ., in King 0. Higgins,

’ Rex 12. W'heatly, Burr. 1125, 1127. 2 East. 5, 20. '

tmme wrongful acts causedam~ooe to private individuals, they come
directly within the definition of torts, and are such. If one man
strike another in anger, the public peace is broken, and the man
a:;sanlted is injured; and there is thus a public wrong and a private wrong. Punishing one does not redress the other, nor do<'s
forgiving the one preclude legal proceedings to punish or obtain
compensation for the other.
Many attempts have been made to draw a clear dL•tinction
between a tort and a crime, but they have not always thrown
light upon the subject. Thus Blackstone says: "The distinction
of public wrongs from private, of crimes and misdemeanors from
civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this: That private
wrongs or cidl injuries are an infringement or privation of the
civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as
individuals; public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a
breach and violation of the public rights and duties dne to the
whole community, considered as a community in its social aggregate capacity. As if I detain a field from a man, to which the
law has gh·en him a right, this is a civil inju!Y, and not a crime;
fot· here only the right of an individual is concerned, and it is
immaterial to the public which of us is in possession of the land;
but treason, murder and robbery are properly ranked among
crimes; since, beside the injury done to individuals, they strike
at the very being of society, which cannot possibly subsist where
actions ot' this sort are suffered. to escape with impunity." '
Again, it is said by Lord MANSFIELD: "The offense that is indictable must be such a one aa affects the public. As if a man uses
false weights and measures, and sells by them to all or many of
his customers, or uses them in the general course of his dealings. So, if a man defrauds another under false tokens; for these
are deceptions that con,1mon care and prudence are not sufficient·
to guard against. So, if there be a conspiracy to cheat; for ordinary care and caution is no guard against this."' And still
another judge haa said: "All offenses of a public nature, that is,
all such acts or attempts as tend to the prejudice of the community, are indictable." •
Now it is not an immaterial matter to the public that one man
1

4 Bl. Com. IS.

1

Rex "· Wheatly, Burr. 1125, 1127.

1

LA WRBNOE, J., In King e.

2 East. 5, 20.

Higgins,
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takes from another his land,whether it be done by force or by

stealth; and if it were so, the law might well have made no pro-

vision on the subject. Among the highest purposes of government

are the protection of property and the enforcement of justice in

respect thereto, as between those who may be adverse claimants;

and for these purposes courts and oiﬁces are created and are sup-

ported at large expense to the State. Nor can the tendency of

any particular act or omission, or the practicability of guarding

and protecting against it be the sole and suflicieut test of crime

and tort; for many things are crimes which due caution might

guard against, and many things are only torts which are done

secretly, and which the prudence of the injured party cannot pre-

vent. Mr. Austin more correctly says: “The difference between

crimes and civil injuries is not to be sought in a supposed diﬁ'er-

ence between their tendencies, but in the difference between the

mode wherein they are respectively pursued, or wherein the sanc-

tion is applied in the two cases. An offense which is pursued at

the discretion of the injured party or his representative is a civil

injury. An offense which is pursued by the sovereign or by the

subordinate of the sovereign, is a crime.”' This more correctly

states the real distinction, which after all must be found in posi-
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tive laws.‘

1 Austin,Jurisprudcnce, Lee. XVII.

* “ It is plain, as matterof philosoph-

ical speculation, that any act which in-

jures any member of the body politie

injures the body politic. The infer-

ence from this proposition would be,

that every such act, falling directly

though it. may, only on an individual,

is of a nature to be indictable. But. this

83

take~ from another his land, whether it be done by fo1-ce or by
stealth; and if it were so, tbe law might wen have made no pro,·ision on the subject. Among the highest purposes of government
are the protection of property and the enforcement ot' jusdce in
respect th~reto, as between those who may be adverse claimants;
and tor these purposes l'Ourts and offices are created and are supported at large expen8e to the State. Nor can the tendency of
any particular act or omission, or the practicability of guarding
and protecting against it be the sole and sufficient test of crime
and tort; for many things are crimes which due caution might
guard against, and many things are only torts which arc dono
hBCI'etly, and which the prudence of the injured party cannot pre,·ent. Mr. Austin more correctly says: "The difference between
crimes and civil injuries is not to be sought in a supposed c..lifi'erence between their tendencies, bnt in the differenoo between the
mode wherein they are respectively pursued, or wherein the sanction is applied in the two cases. An offense which is pursued at
the discretion of' the injured party or his representative is a civil
injury. An offense which is pursued by the sovereign or by the
subordinate of the sovereign, is a crime." 1 This more correctly
state~ the real distinction, which after all must be tbund in positive laws.•

philosophical view is limited in its

practical application by the doctrine

that the law does not take cognizance

of small things. If an injury is of

a private nature, affecting directly and

primarily only a single person, though

the injury is great in magnitude, it

still, as a general proposition, is

deemed a small thing in the law,

when viewed with reference to the

public. The individual injured has,

in such L case, his civil remedy, but

an indictment will not lie. * * A

better practical statement of the doc-

trine, therefore, is, that either the act

must be in its nature injurious to the

public at large, in distinction from

individuals, or else it must be s wrong

to individuals of a nature which the

public takes notice of as done to it-

self. The books are full of expres-

sions going further than this state-

ment. to the effect that in all cases the

act must be a public wrong, in dis-

tinction from a private. But clearly

such expressions arise from misappre-

hension; for, to illustrate, nothing

can be more purely and exclusively

a tort against the individual alone

than a simple larceny, where there is

no breach of the pence, no publillloss

of property, since it only changes

hands; no open immorality, corrupt-

• .A.osLln, J urlaprodence, Lee. XVII.
matter of philosoph.
ieal apeculation, that any act whicli iu.
Jores any member or the body politic
injures tbe body politic. The infer.
euoe from thia proposition would be,
lhal eTery such ac\, falling directly
&hough it may, ouly ou au individual,
is or a nature w be indictable. But this
phlloeophical view Ia limited in Us
practical application by the doctrine~
that the law doee not take cognizance
of small things. If au injury ia of
a private uatore, affecting directly and
primarily oDly a single penon, though
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etill, u a general proposition, is
dl-emed a small thing iD the law,
when newed with reference to the
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an Indictment will not lie. • • .A.
better practical statement or the doe.
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most be in ita nature Injurious w the
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meut. to the effect that iD all cases the
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hension; for, t.o illustrate, nothing
can be more purely and exclusively
a tort against the individual alone
than a simple larceny, where there fa
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of property, since It only ch..a~-s
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In those cases in which wrongs to individuals are regarded as
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wrongs to the State also, they are so regarded either because the

common law, in consideration of their evil effects upon the social

state, or their tendency to disturb it, has declared them such, or

because the statute law, on similar considerations, has made them

punishable on a public prosecution. Other wrongs are regarded

by the law as private wrongs, merely because it is believed that

suﬁicient protection is given when a remedy is provided which

the party wronged can pursue at his option. If he pursues this

remedy and obtains redress, any incidental injury the public may

have suﬂiered from the act or omission constituting the wrong is

supposed to be too insigniﬁcant to demand the attention of the

State; if he overlooks or forgives the wrong, no one else is sup-

posed suﬁiciently concerned to warrant an interference.

The foregoing constitutes the only reliable distinction between

a crime and a tort; but some of their respective characteristics

may be mentioned. In acrime, the most conspicuous and insep-

arable element is the intent; in a tort, on the other hand, the

intent is usually of subordinate importance; sometimes of no

importance whatever. The State will not punish an act as a

crime unless there is an evil intent‘ either actually indulged or

imputable. Where there has been no purpose to disobey the
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public laws, there cannot, in general, be a crime. A murder lies

not in the killing, but in accomplishing a murderous purpose.

If one knock another down purposely, it is a crime; but if care-

lessly, it is only a tort. If one negligently burn his neighbor’s

house, it is no arson, but it is a tort, because the neighbor had a

right to enjoy his house in peace, and to have others observe

toward him due care in any action that might endanger his

property. But there may be a negligence so gross as to be

criminal; the criminal inattention to the rights and safety

of others, supplying the place of intent. Such would be the

case if the keeper of a savage beast were to leave it to wander at

ing the minds of the young; no per-

son in any way affected but he who

takes and he who loses the thing

stolen; and, as in larceny, so in many

other crimes. * * Whenever the

public deems that an act of wrong to

individuals is of such a nature as to

require the public protection to be

cast over the individual, with respect

to the act, it makes the act punish-

able at the suit of the public; or, in

other words, it makes it a crime." 1

Bishop, Cr. Law, §§ 532, 533, 3d ed.

In those cases in which wrongs to individuals are regarded 88
wrongs to the State also, they are so regarded either because th"
common law, in consideration of their evil effects upon the social
state, or their tendency to disturb it, has declared them such, or
because the statute law, on similar considerations, has made them
J>nnishable on a public prosecution. Other wrongs are regarded
by the law as private wrongs, merely because it is believed that
Rufficient protection is given when a remedy is provided which
the party wronged can pursue at his option. If he pursues this
remedy and obtains redress, nny incidental injury the public mny
have suffered from the act or omission constituting the ~·rong is
supposed to be too insignificant to demand the attention of the
State; if he overlooks or forgives the wrung, no one else is supposed sufficiently con~erned to warrant an interference.
The foregoing constitutes the only reliable distinction between
a crime and a tort; but some of their respective characteristics
may be mentioned. In a crime, the most conspicuous and inseparable element is the intent; in a tort, on the other hand, the
intent is usually of subordinate importance; sometimes of no
importance whatever. The State will not punish an act as a
crime unless there is an evil intent' either actually indulged or
imputable. Where there has been no purpose to disobey the
pnblic laws, there cannot, in general, be a crime. A murder lies
not in the killing, but in accomplishing a murderous purpose.
If one knock another down purposely, it is a crime; but if carelessly, it is only a tort. If one negligently burn his neighbor's
house, it is no arson, but it is a tort, because the neighbor had "
right to enjoy his house in peace, and to have others observe
toward him due care in any action that might endanger his
property. But there may be a negligence so gross 88 to be
criminal; the criminal inattention to the rights and safety
of others, supplying the place of intent. Such would be tl1e
case if the keeper of' a savage beast were to leave it to wander at
ing the minds of the young; no person in any way affected but he who
tnkes and he who loses the thing
stolen ; and, as in luceny, so in many
other crimes. • • Whenever the
public deems that an act of wrong to
individuals is of such a nature u k>

require the public protection to be
cast over the individual, with respt>ct
to the act, it ma.k£'s the act puni~h
able at the suit of the public; or, io
other words, it makes it a crime." 1
Bishop, Cr. Law,§§ rJ82, 588, 8d ed.
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large, or if one on the roof of his dwelling were to throw the
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snow and ice into the public street without looking to ascertain

if persons were passing; or if a sportsman were to ﬁre in the

direction and within the reach of a crowd of people; or if the

conductor of a railway train were to run out of time in dis-

regard of orders. In the case of negligence so gross, the law

implies a. guilty intent; or, in other words, it implies that the

culpable party must have intended the natural and probable con-

sequences of that which he did or neglected to do, and it holds

him accountable accordingly.‘

A classiﬁcation of the various cases of injuries not actually

intended may assist in determining the criminal or civil respon-

sibility. The following will, perhaps, be sufficient:

1. Those where an individual, in the exercise of his rights, has

accidentally, but without negligence, caused damage to another;

as where the horse he was driving has taken fright and run his

vehicle against the 0thcr’s vehicle or person. In such a case he

is not legally responsible, either civilly or criminally. No one

is in fault; the injury is to be attributed to inevitable accident,

and the damage must be left where it chanced to fall.

2. Those where a man, in exercising his rights, has been guilty
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of negligence to the injury of another. In these cases there is

wrong in the negligence, and there is consequently that conjunc-

tion of wrong and damage which constitutes a tort.

3. Those where a party who causes the injury was at the time

acting recklessly, or with such gross negligence that an injury

has followed which should have been anticipated by him. These

may be both crimes and torts. A killing by such recklessness

or gross negligence would be punished as criminal manslaughter.

A case of fatal wounds inﬂicted while indulging in rude and

dangerous sports might be one of this description.’

4. Those whore a party, though not intending the particular

injury, was, nevertheless, engaged in doing that which was

unlawful. Here it is proper that he be held to an accountability

' James 0. Campbell, 5 C. & P. 372;

Regina 0. Towers, 12 Cox C. C. 530;

Regina v. Maclcod, Id. 534; Regina 1:.

Finney, Id. 625; Regina 1:. Jones, Id.

628; People v. Fuller, 2 Park. (7. R. 16;

Rice v. State, 8 Mo. 561; State o.Vance,

17 Iowa, 138; Lee 0. State, 1 Cold. 62;

Sparks 1:. Commonwealth, 8 Bush,

111; Chrystal 0. Commonwealth 9

Bush, 669; State a. Center. 35 Vt. 378.

' Pennsylvania 0. Lewis, Add. (Pa)

279.

large, or if one on the roof of his dwelling were to throw the'
snow and ice into the public street without looking to ascertain
if persons were passing; or if a sportsman were to fire in the
direction and within the reach of a crowd of people; or if the
conductor of a railway train were to run out of time in disregard of orders. In the case of negligence so gross, the law
implies a guilty intent; or, in other words, it implies that the
culpable party must have intended the natural and probable consequences of that which he did or neglected to do, and it holds
him accountable accordingly. 1
A classification of the various cases of injuries not actually
intended may a!:'sist in determining the criminal or civil responsibility. The following will, perhaps, be sufficient:
1. Those where an indiridual, in the exercise of his rights, hn:-;
accidentally, but without negligence, caused damage to another;
as where the horso he Wll.S driving has taken fright and run his
vehicle against the other's vehicle or person. In snch a case he
is not legally responsible, either civilly or criminally. No one
is in fault; the injury is to be attributed to inevitable accident,
and the damage must be left where it chanced to tall.
2. Thoi'e where a man, in exercising his rights, h!\8 been guilty
of negligence to the injury of another. In the~e c:tse,; there is
wrong in the negligence, and thero is consequently that conjuncti~n of wrong and dainage which constitutes a tort.
8. Those where a party who causes the injury was at the time
acting recklessly, or with such gross negligence that an injury
has followed which should have been anticipated by him. These
may be both crimes and torts. A killing by such recklC'ssuess
or gross negligence would be punished as criminal manslaughter.
A case of fatal wounds inflicted while indulging in rude and
dangerous sports might be one of this description.'
4. Those where a party, though not intending the particular
injury! was, nevertheless, engaged in doing that which was
unlawfuL Here it is }lroper that he be held to an accountability
1 Jamee "·Campbell, 50. & P. 872;
Begin a "· Towers, 12 Cox C. C. 530;
Regina"· :Macleod, I d. li84; Regina e.
Flnuey, Id. 62li; Regina 11. Jones, ld.
828; People"· Fuller, 2 Park. C. R. 16;
Blce •· State, 8 Mo. G61; State t~.Vaoce,

17 Iowa, 188; Lee 11. State, 1 Cold. 62;
Sparks 11. Commonwealth, 8 Bush,
111; Chryst~&] e. Vommonwea.lth 9
Bush, 669; Stnte ~- Center, 85 Vtll78.
'Pennsylvania"· Lewis, Add. (P&.)
i79.
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beyond that which he is under when lawfully doing what he has

a right to do. These, also may be both public and private wrongs.
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The case of one who, while committing a trespass, accidentally

kills the person trespassed upon, is an illustration. \Vhat is thus

unintentionally done in the course of a trespass is and must be

blamable. The killing, though by accident, is manslaughter.‘

The foregoing will suﬁiciently indicate the grounds on which

the criminal law punishes evil intent, and also recklessness. The

law so far makes allowances for the inﬁrmities of our nature as

not to punish a mere failure to observe ordinary care as a crime,

though injury result; but it may justly and properly compel res-

titution by the party in fault to the party injured.’

There is in England a rule regarding the order of proceedings

when an action is both a public and a private offense. The rule

is, that if the public offense is of the grade of felony, the private

remedy is suspended until the public justice is satisﬁed. Some-

times it is said that the private wrong is merged in the pub-

lic wrong; but this is inaccurate; it is not merged or swal-

‘ State o. Center, 35 Yt. 378; Rice

v. State, 8 Mo. 561.

‘In the private suit, a conviction

in the public prosecution cannot be
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proved for the purpose of making out

acause of action. Smith v. Rummens,

1 Camp. 9. It has been held, how.

ever, that if the defendant plead guilty

in the criminal suit, this is evidence

against him in the civil suit. Eno v.

beyond that which he is nuder when lawfully doing what he has
a right to do. These, also may be both public and private wrongs.
The case of one who, while committing a trespass, accidentally
ki11s the person trespassed upon, is an illustration. What is thus
unintentionally done in the course of a trespass is and most be
blamable. The killing, though by accident, is manslaughter.•
The foregoing will sufficiently indicate the grounds on which
the criminal law punishes evil intent, aqd also recklessness. The
law so far makes allowances for the infirmities of our nature as
not to punish a mere failure to observe ordinary care as 8 crim~.
though injury result; bot it may justly and properly compel restitution hy the party in fault to the party injured.•
There is in England 8 rule regarding the order of proceedings
when an action is both a public and 8 private offense. The rulo
is, that if the public offense is of the grade of felony, the private
remedy is suspended until the Jmblic justice is sa.tisfied. Some.
times' it is said that the Jlrivate wrong is merged in the public wrong; but this is inaccurate; it is not merged or swa1-

Brown, 1 Root,52S. Mr. Phillips says

it is conclusive against him. 3 Phil. Ev.

518. But in another place he speaks

with more reserve. 2 Phil. Ev. 54.

Mr. Starkie says the conviction on a

plea of guilty is evidence, like any

other admission. 2 Stark Ev. 218. note.

And, see, Stephense. Jack, 3 Ycrg. 403;

lVa1'd 0. Green, 11 Conn. 455; Brad-

ley o. Bradley, 2 Fairf. 367: Mead 0.

Boston, 3 Cush. 404. If the guilty

party has been convicted, on trial, and

punished for the crime, he may, nev-

ertheless, contest the fact of guilt in

a civil suit instituted by the aggrieved

party, and the judgment in the crimi-

nal suit is not admissible in evidence

to establish it. The reason given in

some cases is, that the plaintiff in the

civil suit may have been a witness. by

means of whose testimony a convic-

tion was had, and to receive the con-

viction in evidence in his behalf

would be to enable him indirectly to

prove his case by his own oath; but

the better ground is, that the parties

to the two proceedings are not the

same, and there is consequently a

want of mutuality. Duchess of

Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Trials,

538; Gibson '0. McCarthy, Ca. Temp.

Hard. 311. See England o. Bourke, 3

Esp. 80; Cook v. Field, Ib. 133; The

King e. Boston, 4 East. 572; Burden

'0. Browning, 1 Taunt. 519; Jones r.

While, 1 Str. 68; Maybee v. Avery, 18

Johns. 352; Mead 0. Boston, 3 ('ush.

404; 1 Hale P. C. 416; 1 Stark Ev.

332; 1 Grcenl. Ev. § 587 and note; 1

Phil. Ev., Ch. 4, § 2; 2 Ibid. Ch. 1,

5' 1.

1 State •· Center, 85 Vt. 878; Rice
•· State, 8 Mo. 561.
.
1 In the private suit, a conviction
in the public prosecutiOil cannot be
proved for the purpose of making out
a cause of action. t;mitb "· Rum mens,
1 Camp. 9. It has been held, however, that if the defendant plead guilty
in the criminal suit, this is evidence
against him in the civil suit. Eno "·
Brown, 1 Root,528. Mr. Phillips says
it Is concluai1liJ against him. 8 Phil. Ev.
518. But in another place he speaks
with more reserve. 2 Phil. Ev. 54.
Mr. Starkie says the conviction on a
plea of guilty is evidence, likiJ an11
oflwr admiBBion. 2 St11.rk Ev. 218. note. '
And, see, t;tephen81l. Jack, 8 Yerg. 403;
Ward "· Green, 11 Conn. 455; Bradley "· Bradley, 2 Fairf. 867: Mead "·
Boston, 8 Cush. 404. If the guilty
party has been convicted, on trial, and
punished for the crime, he may, nevertheless, contest the fact of guilt in
a civil suit instituted by the aggrieved
party, and the judgment in the crimi-

nal suit ie not admissible in evidence
to establish it. The reason given in
som" cases ia, that the plaintiff in the
civil suit may have been a witness, by
means of whose testimony a conviCtion was had, and to receive the conviction in evidence in his behalf
would be to enable him indirectly to
prove his case by his own oath; but
the better ground is, that the parties
to the two proceedings are not the
same, and there is consequently a
want of mutuality. Duchess of
Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Trials,
538; Gibson "·McCarthy, Ca.. Tt•mp.
Hard. 811. Bee England "· Bourke, 3
Esp. 80; Cook "· Field, lb. 183; The
King "· Boston, 4 East. 5i2; Burdon
"· Browning, 1 Taunt. 519; Jones "·
White, 1 Str. 68; Maybee t. Avt'ry,lS
Johns. 852; Mead •· Boston, 8 ("ush.
40!; 1 Hale P. C. 418; 1 Stark Ev.
832; 1 GreenI. Ev. §$ 587 and note; 1
Phil. Ev., (,'b. 4, § 2; 2 Ibid. Ch. 1,
§ 1.
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lowed up, it is only stayed for the time. The rule is stated by
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Lord ELLENBnROL'Gl1 as follows: “The law requires that before

S7

the party injured by any felonious act can seek civil redress for

it, the matter should be disposed of before the proper criminal

tribunal, in order that the justice of the country may be ﬁrst sat-

isﬁed in respect to the public offense; and after a verdict, either

of acquittal or conviction, a civil action may be maintained.” '

Looking for the reason of the rule, which seems a harsh one,

we discover it in the fact that in that country the party injured

is relied upon to take the place of public prosecutor; and his

interest in the accomplishment of public justice is enlisted and

kept active by postponing the redress of his private grievance.

But the reason for this suspension of private remedy failed when

property which was the subject of felony had passed into the

hands of innocent parties, by purchase or otherwise, and in such

cases,as no prosecution of these parties was demanded at the

hands of the public, the owner might proceed at once for the

recovery of his property or its value.’

In this country the common law doctrine of the suspension of

civil remedy in case of felony has not been recognized. The

reason usually assigned is, that in this country the duty of pros-

ecuting for public offenses is devolved upon a public ofiicer
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chosen for the purpose, instead of being left, as in England,

to the voluntary action of the party injured by the crime.‘

' Crosby r. Leng. 12 East, 409. See

1 Hale, P. (7. 546; Masters v.Milicr.4

T. R. 820; Higgins v. Butcher, Yeiv.

I-'9; Gibson 0. Minet, 1 H. BL569;

Gimson v. \Voo(li'ull, 2 C. ab P 41;

Wliitc 1'. Spt-ttigue, 13 M. & W. 603;

Stone 0. Marsh, 6 B. & C. 551. The

suspension of civil remedy is fre-

quently spoken of in the books as a

merger of the civil action in the fel-

ony; hut, as was well said hy Rica-

ARDSUN, Ch. J.. in Pcttingiil 0. Ride-

lowed up, it is only stayed for the time. The rule is stated by
Lord Eu.i:mloBouuu as follows: ''The law requires that before
the party injured by any felonious act can seek civil redress for
it, the matter should be disposed of before the proper criminal
tribunal, in order that the justice of the country may be first satisfied in respect to the public offense; and after a verdict, either
of acquittal or conviction, a civil action may bo maintained." •
Looking for the reason of the rule, which seems a ltarsh ono,
we discover it in the fact that in that country the party injured
ia relied upon to take the plaoe of public prosecutor; and his
interest in the accomplishment of public justice is enlisted and
kept active by postponing the redress Gf his private grievance.
But the reat\On for this suspension of private remedy failed when
property which was the subject of felony had passed into the
hands of innocent parties, by purchase or otherwise, and in such
cases, as no prosecution of these parties was demanded at the
hands of the public, the owner might proceed at once for the
recovery of his property or its value.'
In this conn try the common law doctrine of the suspension of
civil remedy in case of felony has not been recognized. The
reason usually assigned is, that in this country the duty of prosecuting for public offenses is devolved upon a public officer
chosen for the purpose, instead of being left, as in England,
to the voluntary action of the party injured by the crime.•

nut. 6 N. H. 4-">4: " to call a suspen-

sion oi‘ civil remedy till the criminal

justice of the State is satisﬁed a

merger, is, in our opinion, very little,

if anything, short of an abuse of lan-

guage." The suspension might take

place when there was no felony at all ;

for if the circumstances were such

that there was reasonable ground to

believe the action of the party was

felonious, the civil remedy was de-

nied until after his guilt or innocence

had been determined in a criminal

prosecution. Prosscr v. Rowe, 2 C. &

P. 421 ; Crosby v. Leng, 12 East. 409;

Gimsnn 0. Woodfuii, 2 C. & P. 41.

* Marsh v. Kcating, 1 Bing. N. (7.

197; Stone 0. Marsh, 6 B. & C. 5-‘>1;

White v. Spettigue, 13 M. ts. W. 60 1;

Lee o. Bayes, 18 (T. B. 599.

‘ Plummer o. Webb, 1 Ware, 69; Pet-

tingili v. Ridcout, 6 N. H. 4-54; Board-

man v. Gore, 15 Mass. 331; Boston &

Worcester R. R. Co. 1:. Dana, 1 Gray 83;

1 Cro~by "· J..t>ng, 19 EMt, 400. See
1 Hale. P. C. M6: MRBtM'I 11. Millt>r, -i
T. R. 320; HiJrlrins o. ButchPr, Yt>lv.
~; Gib<u>n tt. "Mint't, 1 II. Bl. M9;
Gim11on e. Woodfull, 2 C. & P 41;
While ~. Sp1·ttigne, 18 M. & W. 60S;
Stone •· :Marsll, 6 B. & C. Mt. The
llll8JM!nsion of civil remedy is fre..
qut'ntly spokrn of in the books as a
tMrgn' of the civil action In the feJ.
ooy: but, as Watl well ttald by RtcHAllDfiON, Ch. J .• In Pt'ttio.rill "· Rldt>out. 6 N. II. .._..,_.: " to call ll ~U!lpPn
sion of c.-lvll remt'rly till thP criminal
jWitice of &he Stale Is satisfit-d a
mer~rer, is, in our opinion, very little,
if anythinJC, sbort of an abuse of Jan.
guage." The suspen11ion might te,ke

place when there Wall no felony at all:
for if the circumstances were such
that there was reasonable ground to
believe tho action of the party was
felonious, the c.-ivll remt'dy was dt'nted until after his ~uilt or lnnocenoe
had been determined in a criminal
prosreution. Pros.~r o. Rowe, 2 0. &
P. 421: Croshy "· Len~. 12 Ea11t, 409;
GimRon "· Wootlfull, 2 C. & P. 41.
t }Iarsh o. K(•fttiog, 1 Bin,r. N. C.
197 ; Stone t'. :Marsh, 6 B. & C. zs:u :
White "· SpettigUe, 18 M. &. W. 60:;
Lf>t> o. BayPs, 18 C. B. 699.
aPlum mere. Webb,l Ware, 69; P<>ttlngillll. Rideout, 6 N. H. 4tH; Board.
man "· Gore, 15 :Mass. 881; Boston &
Worcester R R Co. •· Dana, 1 Gray 83:
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The civil and the criminal prosecution may therefore go on
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pari passu, or if the latter is not commenced at all, the failure

to seek public justice is no bar to the private remedy.

In many cases of public wrongs the law can take no notice of

private injuries as constituting the foundation of a lawful claim

for compensation. Any rule that may be prescribed by the law

on this subject must be a practical rule, and no rule can be prac-

tical which undertakes to give private damages in every case of

a public injury. A single illustration will make this plain. Let

it be supposed that a house on one of the public streets of a city

is entered in the daytime and robbed, the family being ﬁrst out-

raged or murdered. We instance such a casein order to show

how a public crime of great enormity may cause injury to pri-

vate interests. Every individual in the city—we might almost

say in the country—is injured by the crime. His sense of secu-

rity is disturbed, his enjoyment of his property is diminished,

he feels the necessity of greater precautions to protect his home

and family, he is more uneasy when abroad, he perhaps incurs

additional expense for locks and bolts, or he employs watchmen

to guard his premises day and night. Here are important ele-

ments of damage, such as the law would take notice of and give

redress for if the case concerned him alone. But the case does
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not concern him alone; it concerns everybody; the damage which

every person suffers is only a part of the general injury to the

whole public; to redress it in private suits would require an

apportionment of the general injury. But the apportionment

would not only be an impracticable thing in itself, from the

impossibility of ascertaining in what degree each had suffered

injury, but the attempt itself, and the inﬁnity of suits which

would be requisite in the case of a single crime, would make such

serious demands upon the judicial machinery of the State as

could not by any possibility be met. Nothing more need be said

to show that the law cannot recognize a. public injury as a ground

for a private action.‘

There may, nevertheless, be a special and particular injury to

an individual in any case of a public injury; special in that the

Hyatt -v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Alli- Commonwealth, 8 W. & S. 77; Blas-

son v. Bank of Va., 6 Rand, 204; Bal- singame 0. Glaves, 6 B. Mon. 38.

lew 1:. A1exander,6 Humph. 433; Hep- ' 1 Bishop Cr. Law, Sec. 534, 3d ed.;

burn's Case, 8 Bland, 114; Foster 0. 1 Bl. Com. 219.

The civil and the criminal prosecution may therefore go on
pari pusu, or if the latter is not commenced at all, the failure
to seek public justice is no bar to the private remedy.
In many cases of public wrongs the law can take no notice of
private injuries as <.'Ontltituting the foundation of a lawful claim
for compensation. Any rule that may be prescribed by the law
on this subject must be a practicalrnle, and no rule can be practical which undertakes to give private damages in every case of
a public injury. A single illustration will make this plain. Let
it be supposed that a house on one of the public streets of a city
is entered in the daytime and robbed, the family being first outraged or murdered. We instance such a case in ot·der to show
how a public crime of great enormity may cause injury to private interests. Every individual in the city- we might almost
say in the country-is injured by the crime. His sense of security is disturbed, his enjoyment of his property is diminished,
he feels the necessity of greater precautions to protect his lwme
and family, he is more uneasy when abroad, he perhaps incurs
additional expense for locks and bolts, or he employs watchmen
to guard his premises day and night. Here are important elements of damage, such as the law wonld take notice of and give
redress for if the case concerned him alone. But the case does
not concern him alone; it concerns everybody; the damage which
every person suffers is only a part of the general injury to the
whole public; to redress it in private suits would require an
apportionment of the general injury. But the apportionment
would not only be an impracticable thing iu itself, from the
impossibility of ascertaining in what degree each had suffered
injury, but the attempt itself, and the infinity of suits which
wonld be requisite in the case of a single crime, would make such
serious demands upon the judicial machinery of the State as
could not by any possibility be met. Nothing more need be said
to show that the law cannot ret'Ognize a public injury as a ground
for a private action.'
There may, nevertheless, be a special and particular injury to
an individual in any case of a public injury; special in that the
Hyatt "· Adams, 16 :Mich. 180; .Alliaon11. Bank of Va., 6 Rand, 204; Ballew"· Alexander, 6 Humph. 433; HE'pbum's Case, 8 Bland, 114; Foster "·

Commonwealth, 8 W. & 8. 77; Blu..
singame "· Glaves, 6 B. Mon. 88.
1 1 Bishop Cr. Law, Sec. 584, 3d ed.;
1 Bl. C'om. 219.
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public do not share it at all. In the case supposed, the individual
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robbed has suffered special damage, and for this damage the law

permits a private action. It is no answer to such an action that

the general public, whose houses were not broken into, have suf-

fered in other ways. Again: a wrong may be committed by

forcibly driving an elector from the polls. The general public is

injured. because the complete expression of the public sentiment

in the manner provided by law, has been defeated. But the

elector himself has suffered a special and particular injury in

being deprived of his vote; he has lost a right which he is sup-

posed to value highly, and he shall therefore have his action.

No special embarrassment is encountered in giving a remedy to

him for his peculiar injury.

Nor is it any objection to private actions that several may

suffer special injuries from the same public offense. “If many

persons receive a private injury from a public nuisance, every

man shall have his aetion;” ‘ the test in each case being, not the

number injured, but the special and personal character of the

injury. A person may dam a navigable stream so as to ruin it

as a highway, and in so doing may injure the several millers who

were accustomed to make use of its water for operating their

machinery. However numerous these millers may be, they do
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not in the aggregate constitute the public; and, in a legal sense,

neither the public nor any other individual is concerned with the

special damage which each of their number sustains.’

If we could imagine a. state of things in which a people, with-

out any antecedent experience in government, were pl‘()(‘C1'(llI‘lg

tn frame a code of laws, we might suppose the question worthy

of consideration, whether the government should not, when its

laws were violated to the injury of one of its subjects. proceed,

of its own motion, to compel the proper red ress; especially when

compelling redress would have for one of its purposes the pre-

vention of disorder and wrong in the future. But the answer to

such a question must be, that to leave to the government the

detection and punishment of those who violate private rights

would be to require of it an omnipresence and a minute super-

‘Per Hour, Ch. J., in Ashby 0. S. C. 8B. &Acl.'77; Nicholle. Allen,

While, Ld. Ruym. 938, citing Wil- 1 B. 8: S. 936; MeKinnon o. Pensun,

Hams’ Case, 5 Rep. '72; Co. Litt. -‘>6 a. 8 Exch. 319; King 0. Richards, 8 T.

' Henley 0. Lyme Rcgis, 5 Bing. 91; R. 634.

pablio do not share it at all. In the case supposed, the indh·idoal
robbed has suifered special damage, and for this damage the law
permita a private action. It is no answer to such an action that
the general public, whose houses were not broken into, have suffered in other ways. Again: a wrong may be committed by
forcibly driving an elector from the polls. The general public is
iujured, because the complete expression of tho public sentiment
in the manner provided by law, has been defeated. But the
elector himself has suffered a special and particular injury in
being deprived of his vote; he has lost a right which he is supvoeed to value highly, and he shall therefore have his action.
No special embarrassment is encountered in giving a remedy to
him for his peculiar injury.
Nor is it any objection to private actions that several may
suffer special injuries from the same public offense. "If many
pel'80ns receive a private injury fa·om a public nuisance, every
man shall have his action;'" the test in each case being, not the
number injured, but the special and personal character of the
injury. A person may dam a navigable stream so as to ruin it
as a highway, and in so doing may injure the several millers who
were accustomed to make nee of its water fur operating their
machinery. However numerous the:;e millers may be, they do
not in the &gbrregate constitute the public; and, in a legal sense,
n~ither the public nor any other individual is eoncenaed with the
special dam~ which each of their number sustain::o.'
If we could imagine a state of things in which a people, without any antecedent experience in government, were proecPding
tu frame a code of laws, we might suppose the question worthy
of consideration, whether the govcrnm~nt should not, wh~n its
Jaws were violated to the injury of one of its subjects. proceed,
of iU; own motion, to compel the proper redress; especially 'vhen
compelling redress would have for one of its purposes the prevention of diwrder and wrong in the future. But the answer to
l!lneh a question must be, that to leave to the government the
dete<>tion and punishment of thMe who violate private rights
would be to require of it an omnipresence and a minute super• Per HoLT, Ch. J., In Ashby e.
White. Ld. Ruym. 938, citin!( \VII.
Iiams' Cue,li Rep. 72; Co. Litt. 56 a.
t Denley 11. Lyme Regia, 5 Bing. tn ;

S. C. 8 B. & Ad. 77; Nicholl e. Allen,
1 B. & B. 936; McKinnon e. Penson,
8 Exch. 819; King e. Richards, 8 T.
R. 6M.
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vision of private affairs which would render it intolerable. The
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best government is that which, in its structure and machinery,

affords least occasion for oﬂicial interference. If the institution of

proceedings for the redress of private wrongs is left to the parties

injured, it may fairly be assumed that all cases will be brought

to notice which the general interest requires shall be dealt with.

It may also be assumed that many wrongs which are wrongs not

of deliberate purpose and not serious, will be overlooked, though

an oiﬁcious government might be disposed to add to the disturb-

ance they have caused by making them the subject of investiga-

tion. Good order is often as much promoted by overlooking

insigniﬁcant breaches of order as by punishing them; and while

justice demands that all parties be at liberty to have their com-

plaints heard, good policy also requires that the option should be

left to parties injured to waive redress if they see ﬁt to do so.

Contracts and Torts. Passing now from a consideration of

torts as they are found to be akin to or coincident with public

Wrongs,we may brieﬂy direct attention to another side, on which

they seem to be mere breaches of contract. Indeed. in many

cases an action as for a tort or an action as for a breach of con-

tract may be brought by the same party on the same state of

facts. This, at ﬁrst blush, may seem in contradiction to the deﬁ-
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nition of a tort, as a wrong unconnected with contract; but the

Yision of private affairs which would render it intolerable. The
best government ie that which, in its structure and machinery,
affords least occasion for official interference. If the institution of
pr&ceedings for the redress of private wrongs is left to the parties
injured, it may fairly be assumed that all cases will be brought
to notice which the general interest requires shall be dealt with .
It may also be assumed that many wrongs which are wrongs not
of deliberate purpose and not serious, will be overlooked, though
an officious government might be disposed to add to the disturbance they ha,·e cansetl by making them the subject of investigation. Goou order is often as much promoted by overlooking
insignificant breaches of order as by punishing them; and while
justice demands that all parties be at liberty to have their complaints heard, good policy also requires that the option should be
left to parties injured to waive redress if they see fit to do so.

principles which sustain such actions will enable us to solve the

seeming diﬁiculty.

If one by means of a false warranty is enabled to accomplish a

sale of property, the purchaser may have his remedy upon the

contract of warranty, or he may bring suit for the tort.‘ The

tort consists in his having been, by fraud and falsehood, induced

to make the purchase. There is a broken contract, but there is

also something more: there is deception to the injury of the

purchaser in procuring the contract to be made. Suit may be

brought on the contract, ignoring the fraud; but it may also be

brought for the fraud, and then the contract will not be counted

on, though it will necessarily be shown, in order to make appear

how the deception was injurious. The tort in such a case is eon-

‘ Langridgze 0. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519; Carter, 24 Conn. 392; Johnson w. Mr-

Dobell 0. Stevens. 5 D. & Ry. 490; Daniel, 15 Ark. 109; Newellv. Horn,

West 0. Emery, 17 Vt. 583; Ives o. 45 N. H. 421.

Contracts and Torts. Passin~ now from a consideration of
torts as they are found to be akin to or coinciuent with public
wrongs, we may briefly direct attention to another side, on which
they seem to be mere breaches of contract.. Indeed, in many
cases an action as for a tort or an action as for a breach of contract may be brought by the same party on the same state of
facts. This, at first blush, may seem in contradiction to the definition of a tort, as a wrong unconnected with contract; but the
principles which sustain such actions will enable us to solve the
seeming difficulty.
If one by means of a false warranty is enabled to accomplish a
sale of property, the purchaser may have his remedy upon the
contract of warranty, or he may bring suit for the tort. 1 The
tort consists in his ha\·iug been, by frauJ and fal:;chood, induced
to make the purchase. There is a broken coutrat't, but there is
also something more: there is deception to the injury of the
purchaser in procuring the contract to be made. Snit may be
brought on the contract, ignoring the fraud; but it may also be
brought for the fraud, and then the contract will not be counted
on, though it will necessarily be shown, in order to make appear
how the deception was injurious. The tort in such a case is conLangrid~c "·Levy, 2 ll. & W. 519;
Dobell "· Stevens. 5 D. ~ Ry. 490;
West "· Emery, 17 Vt. 583; lves "·
1

Carter, 24 Conn. 892; Johnson "· :M!'Daniel, t.j Ark. 109; Newell"'· Il01n,
4-i N. H. 421.
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nected with the contract only as it enabled the tort feasor to

bring the party wronged into it.‘

There are also, in certain relations, duties imposed by law. a

failure to perform which is regarded as a tort, though the rela-

tions themselves may be formed by contract covering the same

ground. The case of the common carrier furnishes us with a

conspicuous illustration. The law requires him to carry with

impartiality and safety for those who offer. If he fails to do so,

he is chargeable with a tort. But when goods are delivered to

him for carriage, there is also a contract, express or by operation

of law, that he will carry with impartiality and safety; and if he

fails in this there is a breach of contract. Thus for the breach

of the general duty, imposed by law because of the relation, one

form of action may be brought, and for the breach of contract

another form of action may be brought. Other bailees of prop-

erty occupy a similar position; they assume certain duties in

respect to the property by receiving it. The keeper of an inn

does this in respect to property conﬁded to his care by his guests,

and his failure to perform the duty of an innkeeper is tortious,

though in contemplation of law there are between him and his

guest contract relations also.’ But these are exceptional cases.
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The rule is general that where contract relations exist the parties

assume toward each other no duties whatever besides those the

contract imposes.

Waiving a Tort. There are a few cases in which a party is

permitted to treat that which is purely a tort as having created

' In Dean 0. McLean, 48 Vt. 412. S.

C. 21 Am. Rep. l30, it was decided

that one who had contracted for run-

ning his logs over a dam, and agreed

to pay all damages. might be sued in

case for a negligent injury which was

within the contract. The court relies

upon cases where, though there is a

contract. against waste, an action on

nected with the contract only as it euabled the tort feasor to
brhig the party wronged into it. 1
There are also, in certain relations, outies imposed by law, a
failure to perform which is regarded as a tort, though the relations themselves may be formed by contract covering the same
ground. The case of the common carrier furnishes us with a
conspicuous illustration. The law requires him to carry with
impartiality and safety for those who offer. If he fails to do so,
he is chargeable with a tort. But when goods are delivered to
him for carriBp,<re, there is also a contract, express or by operation
of law, thllt he will carry with impartiality and safety; and if he
fails in this there is a breach of contract. Thus for the breach
of the general duty, imposed by law because of the relation, one
form of action may be brought, and for the breach of contract
another form of action may be bronght. Other bailees of property. occupy a similar position; they assume certain duties in
respect to the property by receiving it. The keeper of an inn
does this in respect to propet·ty confided to his care by his guests,
and his failure to perform the duty of an innkeeper i8 tortious,
though in contemplation of law there are between him and his
guest contract relations also.' But these are exceptional cases.
The rule is general that where contract relations cxiP.t the parties
assume toward each other no duties whatever besides those the
contract imposes.

the case for waste is nevertheless sus-

tained. Kinlysidc 0. Thornton, 2 Bl.

R llll, and upon the familiar case of

Wai"ring a Tort. There are a few cases in which a party is
permitted to treat that which is purely a tort as h1n·ing created

common carriers, alluded to in the

next paragraph of the text

’ The rule is stated by J nnvts, Ch.

J., as follows: “ Where there is an

employment, which employment it.-

self creates a duty, an action on the

case will be for a breach of that duly,

although it may consist in (icing

something CODLI‘-tl‘_V to an ugrvelnent

made in the course of such employ-

mcnt, by the party upon whom the

duty is cast.” Courtenay 0. Earle, 10

C. B. 83. And, see, Govett 0. Raul-

inge, B East, 67.

I In Dean "· llcLean, 48 Vt. 412, 8.
C. 21 Am. Rep. 130, it was decided
lbat one who bad contracted filr running his lngs over a dam, and agreed
10 pay all damnges. might be sued in
~for anrgligent injury which was
within the contrscl. The court reliC!!
upon cases where, though there is a
contract against waste, an action on
lbe case for waste is neverthelet!S sustained. K.inlyside "· Thornton, 2 Bl.
R 1111, and upon the familiar cnse of
common carriers, alluded to in the
next paragraph of the texL.

• The rule is stated by JERVIs, Cb.
J ., as follows: " Where there is an
employment, which employment itself creates a duty, an action on the
case will he for a lJrcuch of that duty,
although it Dli\Y consist in doing
so met hiug conu·.• ry to an ngr ..emeut
made in the course of such employment, lJy the party upon whom tht>
duty is cast." Courtenay t~. Earle, 10
C. B. 83. And, see, Govt:tt "· Uadinge, 8 East, 67.
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right of action for the tort, to pursue his remedy for the breach

of the supposed contract These cases are not numerous.

It is said by an eminent judge in one case that “no party is

bound to sue in tort where, by converting the action into an

action on contract, he does not prejudice the defendant; and,

generally speaking, it is more favorable to the defendant th It he

should be sued in contract, because that form of action leti in a

set-oﬁ' and enables him to pay money into court.‘ This, how-

ever, is stating the rule much too broadly, for in most eases the

tort feasor could not be prejudiced by converting the action into

one ‘on contract if the law would suffer it.

The right to waive a tort and sue in assumpsit seems to have

been ﬁrst distinctly recognized in an action’ where assumpsit

was brought by an administrator to recover the moneys received

by the defendant on a sale made by him, without authority, of

debentures belonging to the estate. It was objected that the

action would not lie, because the defendant sold the debentures

under a claim of administration in himself, and therefore could

not be said to receive that money to the use of the plaintiﬂ',

which, indeed, he had received to his own use; but the plaintiﬁ'

ought to have brought trover or detinue for the indentures.
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Powann, J., said: “ It is clear the plaintiff might have maintained

detinue or trover for the indentures, but the plaintiff may dis-

pense with the wrong and suppose the sale made by his consent,

and bring an action for the money that they were sold for as

money received to his use.” And Hour, Ch. J ., said: “Suppose

a person pretends to be guardian in soeage, and enters into the

land of the infant and takes the proﬁts; though he is not right-

ful guardian, yet an action of account will lie against him. So

the defendant in this case pretending to receive the moneys the

debentures were sold for in the right of the intestate, why should

he not be answerable for it to the intestate’s admiuistrator'l,”

Now, in looking at the facts of this ease, we ﬁnd that one per-

son has sold something belonging to another, and received and

retained the money for it. On the facts thus stated, the law will

unquestionably raise an implication of promise to pay the money

' Tmoann, Cb. J ., inYoung v. Man ' Lamine v. Bonell, Ld. Raym. 1216.

shall, 8 Bing. 43.

a contract between himself and the wrong doer, and waiving his
right of action for the tort, to pursue his remedy for the breach
of the supposed contract These eases are not numerous.
It is said by an eminent judge in one case that "no party is
bound to sue in tort where, by converting the action into an
action on contract, he does not prejudice the defendant; and,
generally speaking, it is more favorable to the defendant th tt he
should be sued in contract, because that form of action letL in a
set-off and enables him to pay money into court.' This, however, is stating the rule much too broadly, for in most cases the
tort feasor could not be prejudired by converting the action into
one 'on contract if the law would suffer it.
The right to waive a tort and sue in assumpsit seems to have
been first distinctly recognized in an action 2 where assumpsit
was brought by an administrator to recover the moneys received
by the defendant on a sale made by him, without authority, of
debentures belonging to the estate. It was objected thnt the
action wonld not lie, because the defendant sold the debentures
under a claim of administration in himself, and therefore could
not be said to receive that money to the use of the plaintiff,
which, indeed, he had received to his own use; but the plaintiff
onght to have brought trover or detinue for the indentures.
Pmnr.r., J., said: "It is clear the plaintiff might have maintained
detinue or trover for the indentures, but the plaintiff may dispense with the wrong and suppose the sale made by his consent,
and bring an action for the money that they were sold for BB
money received to his use." And HoLT, Ch. J., said: "Suppose
a person pretends to be gua.ruian in socage, and enters iuto the
land of the infant and takes the profit!'!; though he is not ri~ht
ful guardinn, yet an action of acconnt will lie against him. So
the defendant in this case pretending to receive the moneys the
debentures were sold for in the right of the intestate, why should
he not be e.nswerable ti.1r it to the intcl"ta.te's administratorW"
Now, in looking at the facts of this ease, we find that one person has sold something belonging to another, and received and
retained the money t'or it. On the facts thus stated, the law will
unquestionR.bly raise an implication of promise to pay the money
Cb. J., in Young 11. Marshall, 8 Bing. 43.
1
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to the party entitled to it. This implication, under ordinary cir-
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cumstances, would be conclusive, and would support an action of

assumpsit. Now, can it be any answer to such an action for the

defendant to say, “ True, I have turned your property into money,

but I did so in denial of your right; I did so with intent to de-

prive you of the proceeds; in other words, I insist upon having

done it as a wrong and repudiate all suggestion of agreement to

pay?” The answer appears to be this: If there are in the case

all the elements of an implied contract, it is of no consequence

that there is, over and beyond those, some other fact or circum-

stance not in any way militating against the plaintiﬁ"s claim,

but rather the reverse, which constitutes a tortious element and

might support an action as for a tort. Here, as the defendant

cannot possibly be prejudiced by that course, the plaintiff may

ignore the tortious element and rely solely upon the facts which

support the implication of a promise. He may waive that which

rendered the act, in the legal sense, wrongful, and rely upon the

remainder.

N o question is made of this doctrine where, as a result of the

tortious act, the defendant has come into possession of money

belonging to the plaintiff. The law will not permit him to deny

an implied promise to pay this money to the party entitled.‘
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Mr. Addison, in his treatise on the law of torts, dismisses this

See Hitchin o. Campbell, 2 W. Bl.

827: Abbotts e. Barry, 2 B. & B. 369;

Powell 0. Rees, 7 A. & E. 426; Berlcy

c. Taylor, 5 Hill, 5'77; Miller v. Miller,

9 Pick. 34; Gilmore 0. Wilbur, 12

Pick. 120; Appleton 0. Bancroft. 10

Met. 231; Morrison o. Rogers, 2 Scam.

317; Smut 0. Evans, 35111. 455; Leigh-

ton 0. Preston, 9 Gill, 201; Gray v.

(lriﬁth, 10 \Vatts, £31; Goodenow ~v.

Luyder, 8 Greene (Iowa), 599; White

to the party entitled to it. This implication, under ordinary circumstances, would be conclusive, and would support an action of
assumpsit. Now, can it be any answer to such an action for the
defendant to say," True, I have turned your property into money,
bot I did so in denial of your right; I did so with intent to deprive yon of the proceeds; in other words, I insist upon having
done it as a wrong and repudiate all suggestion of agreement to
pay1" The answer appears to be this: If there are in the CIU)e
all the elements of an implied contract, it is of no consequen~
that there is, over and beyond those, some other fact or circnmstan<>,e not in any way militating against the plaintiff's claim,
but rather the reverse, which constitutes a tortious element and
might support an action as for a tort. Here, as the defendant
cannot possibly be prejudiced by that course, the plaintiff may
ignore the tortious element and rely solely upon the facts which
support the implication of a promise. He may waive that which
rendered the act, in the legal sense, wrongful, and rely upon the
remainder.
No question is made of this doctrine where, as a result of the
tortious act, the defendant has come into possession of money
belonging to the plaintiff. The law will not permit him to deny
an implied promise to pay this money to the party entitled.'
Mr. Addison, in his treatise on the law of torts, dismisses this

n. Brooks, 48 N. H. 402; Lord 0.

French, 61 Me. 420. “The principle

is," says Ponnocx, C. 13., “that the

nWD6l' of property wrongfully taken

has a right to follow it and adopt any

act done to it, and treat the proceeds

as money had and received to his

use." Neat o. Harding. 20 Law J.

Rep.(1~z. s.) Exch. 250; S. C. 4 Eng.

L. & Eq. 464. “Subject,” he adds,

“to certain exceptions," which, how-

ever, he does not point out. In Hall

0. Peckham, 8 R. I. 870, lt was held

that where goods had fraudulently

been bought without an intent to pny

for them, the seller might follow them

into the hands of an assignce, and if

the latter had sold them, recover

from him in an action for money had

and received. Citing Tllllfnlﬁll v.

Blanchard, 22 Pick. 18. The prin-

ciple applies to one who sells chattels

in violation of a trust. Rand 0. Nes-

mith, 61 Me. 111. And to one who

steals and sells them. Boston, etc.,

R. R. (Jo. o. Dana, 1 Gray, 83; Shaw

0. Coﬁln, 58 Me. 254; S. C.4 Am. Rep.

290; Howe 0. Clancy, 58 Me. 130.

Bee Hitchin "· Campbell, 2 W. Bl.
f:l27: Abbotts "·Barry, 2 B. & B. 369;
Powell "· Rees, 7 A. & E . 426; Berley
e. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577; )Iiller 1l.1rliller,
9 Pick. 84; Gilmore "· Wilbur, 12
Pick. 120; Appleton t~. Bancroft, 10
~[ct. 281; Morrison tl. Rogers, 2 Scam.
:n7; Sta!lt e. Evans, 35 Ill. 455; Leighton "· Preston, 9 Gill, 201; Gray e.
Oriftlth, 10 'Va.tts, 431; Goodenow "·
Luyder, 8 Greene (Iowa}, 500; White
u. Brooks. 43 N. H. 402; Lord t~.
French, 61 Me. 420. "The principle
ill," says PoLLOCK, C. B., "that the
owner ot' property wrongfully taken
bu a right to follow U and adopt any
ad done to it, and treat the proceeds
aa money bad and received to his
Wle." Neat "· Harding, 20 Law J.
Rep. (K. 1.} Excb. 250; 8. C. 4 Eng.

L . & Eq. 464. "Subject," he adds,
"to certain exceptions," which, how.
ever, be does not point out. In Hall
"· Peckham, 8 R. I. SiO, It was bcltl
that where goods had fraudulently
been bought without an intent to pay
for them, the seller might follow them
into the bands of an llssignce, and if
the latter had sold them, recovt:r
from him in an action for money hl\d
and received. Citing Thur,ton l!.
Blanchard, 22 Pick. 18. The prin.
ciple applies to one who sells chattels
in violation of a trusL Ruml "· N~
mitb, 61 Me. 111. And to one who
steals and sells them. Boston, etc.,
R. R. Co. e. Dana, 1 Gray, 88; Shaw
e. Coftlo, 58 Me. 25i ; 8. C. 4. Am. Rep.
290; Howe.,, Clancy, 58 Me. 180.
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subject after very brief consideration. “If a man,” he says,

“has taken possession of property, and sold or disposed of it

without lawful authority, the owner may either disaﬂirm his act

and treat him as a wrong-doer, and sue him for a trespass or for

a conversion of the property, or he may aﬂirm his acts and treat

him as his agent, and claim the beneﬁt of the transaction; and if

he has once aﬂirmed his acts and treated him as an agent, he

cannot afterward treat him as a wrong-doer, nor can he aﬂirm

his acts in part and avoid them as to the rest. If, therefore.

goods have been sold by a wrong-doer, and the owner thinks ﬁt

to receive the price, or part thereof, he ratiﬁes and adopts the

transaction, and cannot afterward treat it as a wrong.”‘ But

this is scarcely doing the subject full justice. Lord Mansﬁeld

long ago held that where one refused to account for a masquerade

ticket in his possession belonging to another, he might be sued

in assumpsit for its value, the fact of his refusal to account for it

being suﬁicient evidence that he had sold it.“ Suppose, however,

it had appeared that he had not sold it, but that he still retained

and refused to surrender it; had it been asked whether, on this

state of facts, the plaintiff could have recovered in assumpsit, it

would have been necessary to concede that the authorities are in

conﬂict. The decisions are quite numerous in this country that

3
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assumpsit cannot be maintained unless the property of which

the plaintiff has been deprived‘

‘ Addison on Torts, 83, citing

Brewer 0. Sparrow, '7 B. & C. 310, and

Lyt-hgoe v. Vernon, 5 H. & N. 180; 29

Law J. Exch. 164.

" Humbly -0. Trott, Cowp. 375.

“ Jones u. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285; Glass

Co. 0. Wolcott, 2 Allen, 227; Mann o.

Locke. 11 N. H. 246, 248; Smith v.

Smith, 43 N. H. 536; Morrison o.

Rogers, 3 ll]. 317; O’Reer v. Strong,

subject after very brief consideration. " If a man," he says,
"has taken possession of property, and sold or disposed of it
without lawful authority, the owner may either disaffirm his act
and treat him as a wrong-doer, and sue him for a trespass or for
a conversion of the property, or he ~ay affirm his acts and treat
Lim as his agent, and claim the benefit of the transaction; and if
he Las once affirmed his acts and treated him as an agent, he
cannot afterward treat him as a wrong-doer, nor can he affirm
his acts in part and avoid them as to the rest. If, therefore,
goods have been sold by a wrong-doer, and the owner thinks :tit
to receive the price, or pa1·t thereof, he ratifies and adopts the
transaction, and cannot afterward treat it as a wrong."' But
this is scarcely doing the subject full justice. Lord Man11field
long ago held that where one refut:ed to account for a masqm•1-ade
ticket in his posr;.e:>sion Lelonging to another, he might be sued
in assumpsit tor its value, the tact of his refusal to account tor it
being sufficient evidence that he had sold it.' Suppose, however,
it had appeared that he had not sold it, but that he still retained
and refused to surrender it; had it been asked whether, on this
state of facts, the plaintiff could have recovered in assumpsit, it
would have been necel'1sary to concede that the authorities are in
conflict. The decisions are quite numerous in this country that
assumpsit cannot be maintained unless the property of which
the plaintiff has been deprived_ has been converted into money."

13 Ill. 688; Kelty v. Owens, 4 Chand.

106; Elliott 0. Jackson, 3 Wis. 649;

Stearns o. Dillingham, 22 Vt. 624;

Willett e. Willett, 3 Watts. 277; Pear-

soll o. Chapin, 44 Penn. St. 9; Guthrie

'0. Wicklitfe, 1 A. K. Marsh. 83; Fuller

9). l)uren, 36 Ala. '73; Tucker o. J ewett,

32 Conn. 563; Sanders o. Hamilton, 3

Dana, 550; Barlow 0. Stalworth, 27

has been converted into money.

Geo. 517; Pike 1:. Bright, 29 Ala. 332:

Emerson 0. McNamara, 41 Me. 565.

Compare Bennett 0. Francis, 2 B. &

P. 550; Read v. Hutchinson, 3 Camp.

352. In Noyes 1:. Lorlng, 55 Me. 408,

812, Wavron. J .. says: “ It is only in

favor of the action for money had and

received, which has been likened in

its spirit to a bill in equity, that the

rule is relaxed that the evidence must

correspond with the allegations and

be conﬁned to the matter in issue,

and this relaxation, by which a party

is allowed to aver a promise and

recover for a tort, being n departure

from principle and the correct rule

of pleading, ought not to be extended

to new cases."

'Addison on Torts, 88, citing
Hrt>wer "·Sparrow, 7 B. & C. 310, and
Lythgoe "· Vernon, 5 H. & N. 180; 29
Law J. Exch. 164.
• Humbly"· Trott, Cowp. 875.
• Jones "·Hoar, 5 Pick. 285; Glass
Cll. "·Wolcott, 2 Allen, 227; :Muon "·
Ll)cke, 11 N . H. 246, 248; Smith "·
Smith, 43 N. H. 536; Morrison "·
Uogers, 3 Ill. 317; O'Reer "·Strong,
1:3 Ill. 688: Kelty 11. Owens, 4 Chand.
Hl6; Elliott 1l. Jackson, 3 Wis. 649;
8tearns 1l. Dlllingham, 22 Vt. 624;
Willett "· Willett, 3 Watts. 277; Pear.
soll1l. Chapin, 44 Penn. St. 9; Guthrie
o. Wicklifte, 1 A. K. Marsh. 83; Fuller
"· Duren, 36 Ala. 78 ; Tucker 1l. Jewett,
82 Conn. 563; Banders "· Hamilton, 8
Dana, 550; Barlow o. Stalworth, 27

Geo. 517; Pike o. Bright, 29 Ala. 88»:
Emerson o. MeNamara, 41 He. 565.
Compare Bennett 1l. Francis, 2 B. &
P. 550; Read "· Hutchinson, 8 Camp.
352. In Noyes"· Loring, 55 Me. ~.
812, WALTON, J., says: "It is only in
favor of the action for money bad and
received, which baa been likened in
its spirit to a bill in equity, that the
rule is relaxed that the evidence mus&
correspond with the allegations and
be confined to the matter in issue,
and this relaxation, by which a party
is allowed to aver a promise and
recover for a tort, being a departure
from principle and the correct rule
of pleading, ought not to be extended
to new cases."
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But other cases decide that if the defendant has converted the

property in any manner to his own use, that is suﬂicient. The

following are illustrations: Trading oﬁ' the property for other

property; turning one's cattle wrongfully into another’s ﬁeld and

pasturing them there; employing an apprentice without the

master’s assent, and so on. In all these cases, it will appear, all

the elements of an implied contract are found, and we can conceive

of no suﬁicient reason for denying the right to bring assuinpsit.‘

But by all the authorities it is conceded that where the act is a

naked trespass an action of assumpsit cannot be maintained,

because the elements of an assumpsit are wanting. In most

cases this is clear enough. Suppose one commits an assault and

battery upon another, there is absurdity in the suggestion of a

contract that the one party should permit this and the other

should pay for it a reasonable compensation. Suppose his cattle

had invaded his neighbor’s premises and trampled down and

destroyed his crops, the ground for an implication of contract is

equally wanting. There is a wrong, nothing more and nothing

less.‘ We cannot imply a contract that one party should proceed

to destroy the other’s crops and then pay him for it. That is an

unnatural transaction, and we cannot suppose would take place
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except as a wrongful act.

Torts by Relation. There are many cases in which one’s right

to institute proceedings for a wrong may only accrue after the

wrong has been committed, and where, if he is wronged at all,

‘ Miller v. Miller, 7 Pick. 133; Budd

1:. Iiilcr, ‘J7 N. J. 43; Stockctt 1:. Wal-

kins‘ Admr. 2 G. & J. 326; Welch 1:.

Bagg, 12 Mich. 42; Hill 0. Davis, 3

N. H. B84; Floyd v. Wiley, 1 Mo. 430;

Ford v. Caldwell, 8 Hill, (S. C.), 248;

But other cases decide that if the defendant has converted the
property in any manner to his own use, that is sufficient. The
following are illu&trations: Trading off the property for other
property; turning one's cattle wrongfnlly into another's field and
pasturing them there; employing an app1-entiee without the
master's assent, and so on. In all these cases, it wip appear, all
the elements of an implied contract are found, and we can conceive
of no sufficient reason for denying the right to bling assumpsit!
But by all the authorities it is conceded that where the act is a
naked trespass an action of assumpsit cannot be maintained,
because the elements .of an assumpsit are wanting. In most
<'aaes this is dear enough. Suppose one commits an assault and
battery upon another, there is absurdity in the suggestion of a
<.-ontract that the one party should permit thiR and the other
should pay for it a reasonable compensation. Suppose his cattle
had invaded his neighbor's premises and trampled down and
destroyed his crops, the ground for an implication of contract is
equally wanting. There is a wrong, nothing more and nothing
less.• We cannot imply a contract that one party should proceed
to destroy the other's crops and then pay him for it. That is an
unnatural transaction, and we cannot suppose would take place
except as a wrongful act.

Baker 0. Cory, 15 Ohio, 9; Fiquct v.

Allison. 12 Mich. 828; Webster 1:.

Drinkwater, 5 Me. 319: Jones v. Buz-

zard, 1 Hemp. 240; Johnson 0. Reed,

8 Ark. 202; Labeaume 0. Hill, 1 Mo.

Torts by Relation. There are many cases in which one's right

to institute proceedings for a wrong may only acerne after the
wrong has been committed, and where, if he is wronged at aU,

643. Sec also note to Putnam n. Wise,

1 Ilill, 240; note to 2 Green]. Ev. §

l0"1. In Schweizer v. We-ibcr, 6 Rich.

159, this doctrine was held applicable

to the case of one who had wrong-

fully taken property, and in whose

hands it had been accidentally dc-

stroyed. See, also, Halleck v. Mixer,

16 Cal. 574; Cooper 0. Berry, 21 Geo.

526; Randolph Iron Co. 0. Elliott, 34

N. J. 184.

' See Noyes 0. Loring, 55 Me. 408.

where the authorities on this point

are collected. In that case a party

fraudulently procured an advertise-

ment to be published at the expense

of the town, and he was held not to

be liable in assumpsit. See, also, Wat-

son 0. Stever, 25 Mich. 386; Moses 0.

Arnold, 48 Iowa, 187.

1 Miller "· Mtller, 7 Pick. 188; Budd
'"·Hiler, 27 N.J. 4.'J; Stockett 11. Watkins' Admr. 2 G. & .J. 826; Welch "·
Bagg, 12 Mich. 42; Hill "· Davis, 8
N.H. 884; Floyd tt. Wiley, 1 Mo. 480;
Ford "· Caldwell, 8 Hill, (8. C.), 248;
B:lker "·Cory, 15 Ohio, 9; Fiquct "·
Allison. 12 Mich. 828; Wt>bster "·
Drinkwater,~ Me. 319; Jones"· Buzzard, 1 Hemp. 240; Johnson "·Reed,
~ Ark. 202 ; Labeaume "· Hill, 1 Mo.
M.'i. See also note to Putnam "·Wise,
1 Hill, 240; note to 2 Greenl. Ev. ~
1~. In Schweizer"· WPiber, 6 Rich.
159, thb doctrine was held applicable
to the case or one who had wrong·

fully taken property, and In whoee
hands It had been accidentally destroyed. Bee, also, Halleck "· Mixer,
16 Cal. 574; Cooper"· Berry, 21 Geo.
l>26; Randolph Iron Co."· Elliott, 84
N .•J. 184.
t See Noyes "· Loring, 5~ Me. 408,
where the authorities on this polnt
are collected. In that ca.<l<' a party
fraudulently procured an advertise.
ment to be published at the expense
of the town, and he wns held not to
lX' liable in assumpsit. See, also, Wat.
snn "· Stever, 25 Mich. 386; )[oees "·
Arnold, 43 Iowa, 187.
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it must be by relation. The bankrupt law affords an illustration:
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the title of the assignce in bankruptcy relating back to the time

when the act of bankruptcy was committed, so as to avoid all

dispositions of his property made by the bankrupt after that

time. The question then arises, what remedy the assignee may

have against those who may have intermeddled with the gOOds,

intermediate the act of bankruptcy and the suing out of the

commission; and the rule, in England, is that trover may be

brought for the value,‘ bnt not trespass.’ It is a general rule

that one shall not be made trespasser by relation;' but the rule

will not prevent a party who has been wronged by unauthorized

action before his title became perfected obtaining redress in some

Ibrm of action; and if the injury consisted in making way with

personal property, trover, in which the value might be recovered,

would be the appropriate action, while trespass for the recovery

of indeﬁnite damages might not lie.‘ So case may be brought

against one committing waste upon lands intermediate a pur-

chase on execution and the time when the title was perfected by

deed.‘ In the case of estates of deceased persons, however, the

distinction between trespass and case as a remedy for wrongs

intermediate the death of the testator or intestate and the issue

of letters, does not appear to have been recognized, and the per-
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sonal representative has been allowed to recover in either form

of action, according as the facts would have warranted it had

letters been issued before the wrong was done.‘

' Balme 0. Hutton, 9 Bing. 471, in

which all prior cases are carefully

reviewed.

' Smith o. Clarke. 1 T. R. 475.

' Case 0. DeGoer, 3 Gaines, 261 ;

Jackson 0. Douglass, 5 Cow. 458;

Wickham 0. Freeman, 12 Johns. 183;

Bacon o. Kimmel, 14 Mich. 201. Bee

Heath 0. Ross, 12 Johns. 140.

‘ Balrne 0. Hutton, 9 Bing. 471.

‘ Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. (Mich.)S4.

it must be by relation. The bankrupt law affords an illustration:
the title of the assignee in bankruptcy relating back to the time
when the act of bankruptcy wu oommitted, so as to avoid all
dispositions of his property made by the bankrupt after that
time. The question then arises, what remedy the assignee may
have against those who may have intermeddled with the goods,
intermediate the act of bankruptcy and the suing out of the
commission; and the rule, in England, is that trover may be
brought for the valne,1 but not trespass.' It is a general rule
that one shall not be made trespasser by relation; 1 but the rule
will not prevent a party who has been wronged by unauthorized
action before his title became perfected obtaining redress in some
form of action; and if the injury consisted in making way with
personal property, trover, in which the value might be recovered,
would be the appropriate action, while trespass for the recovery
of indefinite damages might not lie.• So case may be brought
against one committing waste upon lands intermediate a purchase on execution and the time when the title was perfected by
deed.' In the case of estates of deceased persons, however, the
distinction between trespass and case as a remedy for wrong~
intermediate the death of the testator or intestate and the issue
of letters, does not appear to have been recognized, and the per.
sonal representative has been allowed to recover in either form
of action, according as the facts would have warranted it had
letters been issued before the wrong was done.'

‘ Sharpe 0. Stallwood, 5 M. & Gr.

760; Scarson 0. Robinson, 2 F0sL 6:

F. 351; Carlisle 0. Benley, 8 Me. 250;

Valentine v. Jackson, 9 Wend. 302;

Manwell 0. Briggs, 1'7 Vt. 176; Brack-

ett 0. Hoitt, 20 N. H. 257; Bell D-

Humphrey, 11 Humph. 451.

1 Balme 11. Hutton, 9 Bing. 471, tn
which all prior cases are carefully
reviewed.
• Smith 11. Clarke, 1 T. R. 471S.
1 Case 11. DeGoer, 8 Caines, 261 ;
Jackson w. Douglass, lS Cow. 4~;
Wickham"· Freeman, 12 Johns. 188;
Bacon "· Kimmel, 14 Mich. 201. Bee
Heath"· RoSSs 12 Johns. 140.

• Balme "· Hutton, 9 Bing. 471.
• Stout 11. Keyes, 2 Doug. (Mich.)84.
1 Sharpe ,, Stallwood, 5 l'tl. & Gr.
'760; Searson 11. Robinson, 2 Foet. &
F. 851; Carlisle"· Benley, 8 Me. 260;
Valentine "· Jackson, 9 Wend. 802;
Manwell "· Briggs, 17 Vt. 176; Brackett "· Hoitt, 20 N. H. 257; Bell "·
Humpbrey,ll Humph. 461.
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run PARTIES wao MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR TORTS.

The rules of law respecting the capacity to form contract rela-

tions, and the consequent liability for failure to observe such as

are entered into, are in the main very precise and deﬁnite.

Leaving out of view a few exceptional cases, and speaking gene-

rally, it may be said that one is not authorized to deal with

others on the footing of contract, unless he is of the full age of

twenty-one years; and that he cannot make the most simple

agreement, or enter into the most ordinary legal obligation a day

earlier. Neither can he enter into contracts if he is unsound in

OHAPTER IV.

mind; but his care and protection, and the making of con-

tracts therefor must devolve upon others. The rules of law on

THE PARTIES WHO MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR TORTS.

this subject have in view the protection of classes supposed, from

their immaturity and weakness, incapable of fully protecting

themselves; and though to some extent they are necessarily arbi-

trary, they are not, because of that quality, a hardship or griev-

ance to those whom they preclude from entering into contracts.

Neither are they a hardship or grievance to others whom they

deprive of the opportunity to make contracts with immature or

imbecile people. As the gains which might be derived from such

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

contracts would be likely to be gains at the expense of those

incompetent to protect their own interests, there can be no just

complaint of the law which precludes them.

There are also rules of a like deﬁnite character as regards crim-

inal responsibility. Au infant under the age of seven can com-

mit no offense against the State. The reason is, that at that

immature period he is incapable of understanding political or

social duties or obligations, and the law assumes, as a conclusion

not to be disputed -not to be put aside by the uncertain judg-

ment of others-— that he cannot harbor acriminal intent. After

that age, until he reaches fourteen, the case is open to proof of actual

capacity and actual malice. An idiot or an insane person is also

7

The rules ot' law respecting the capacity to form contract relations, and the consequent liability for failure to observe such as
are entered into, are in the main ,•ery precise and definite.
Leaving out of view a few exceptional cases, and speaking generally, it may be said that one is not authorized to deal with
others on the footing of contract, unless he is of the fnll age of
twenty-one years; and that he cannot make the most simple
agreement, or enter into the most ordinary legal obligation a day
earlier. Neither can he enter into contracts if he is unsound in
mind; bnt his care and protection, and the making of eontracts therefor must devolve upon others. The rules of law on
this subject have in view the protection of classes supposed, from
their immaturity and weakness, incapable of fully protecting
themselves; and thongh to some extent they are necessarily arbitrary, they are not, because of that quality, a hardship or grievance to those whom they preclude from entering into contracts.
Neither are they a hardship or grievance to others whom they
deprive of the opportunity to make contracts with immature or
imbecile people. As the gains which might be derived from snch ·
contracts would be likely to be gains at the expense of those
incompetent to protect their own interests, there can be no just
complaint of the law wl1ich precludes them.
There are also rules of a like definite character as regards criminal responsibility. An infant under the age of seven can commit no offense flo<PRinst the State. Tho reason is, that at that
immature period he is incapable of understanding political or
eocial duties or obligations, and the law assnmes, as a conclu:iion
not to be dispnted- not to be put aside by the uncertain judg.
ment of others- that he cannot harbor a criminal intent. After
that age, until he reaches fourteen, the case is open to proof of actnal
capacity and actual malice. An idiot or an insane person is also
7
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incapable of committing a crime, and to punish one of these as
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a criminal would be to punish him for a mere animal or insane

impulse,- or for mere nnreasoning and motiveless action, for

in~pable

of committing a crime, and to punish one of these as

which he was in no proper sense responsible; to punish him, in

short, for his misfortune. The right of the State to protect its

people against injurious acts by such persons, and for that pur-

pose to put them under restraints or into conﬁnement, is plain

enough; but to punish, as for a wrong, a party incapable,ot' indulg-

ing an evil intent is a mere barbarity; not useful as a discipline to

the individual punished, and of evil example instead of warning

to others. It is, therefore, never to be provided for, but carefully

to be guarded against. It is no doubt true that insane persons

accused of crime are sometimes convicted and suﬁ'er punishment;

but this is never intended, and it is attributable to diiﬁculties

inherent in such cases; diﬁiculties in discriminating between

mental disease and criminal perversion; difficulties in testimony,

and inﬁrmities in tribunals. Such results are the misfortunes

and accidents of criminal administration; not results at which it

aims.

In determining whether there shall be civil responsibility for

wrongs suffered, a standpoint altogether different is occupied.

A wrong is an invasion of right, to the damage of the party who
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suffers it. It consists in the injury done, and not commonly in

the purpose, or mental or physical capacity of the person or agent

doing it. It may or may not have been done with bad motive;

the question of motive is usually a question of aggravation only.

Therefore the law, in giving redress, has in view the case of the

party injured, and the extent of his injury, and makes what he

suﬁ"ers the measure of compensation. A blow by a youth of

eighteen may inﬂict as serious an injury as a blow by a man of

mature years, and the torch of a child may destroy a house as

effectually as though applied on the twenty-ﬁrst birthday, instead

of the tenth. If, therefore, redress is the object of the law, the

party injured should have the same redress in the one case as is

provided for him in the other. Neither is it now protection to

society that is sought, except as any enforcement of just laws

tends incidentally to its protection. There is consequently nu

anomaly in compelling one who is not chargeable with wrong

intent to make compensation for an injury committed by him;

for, as is said in an early case, “ the reason is, because he that is

a criminal would be to punish him for a mere animal or insane
impulse,. or for mere unreasoning and motiveless action, for
which he was in no proper sense responsible; to punish him, in
short, for his misfortune. The right of the State to protect its
people against injurious acts by such persons, and for that purpose to put them under restraints or into confinement, is plain
enough; but to punish, as for a wrong, a party incapaLle.of indulging an evil intent is a mere barbarity; not useful as a discipline to
the individual punished, and of evil example instead of warning
to others. It is, therefore, never to be provided for, but carefully
to be guarded against. It is no doubt true that insane persons
accused of crime are sometimes convicted and suffer punishment;
but this is never intended, and it is attributable to difficulties
inherent in such cases; difficulties in discriminating between
mental disease and criminal perversion; difficulties in testimony,
and infirmities in tribunals. Such results are the misfortunes
and accidents of criminal administration; not results at which it
aims.
In determining whether there shall be civil responsibility for
wrongs suffered, a standpoint altogether different is occupied.
A wrong is an invasion of right, to the damage of the party who
suffers it. It consists in the injury done, and not commonly in
the purpose, or mental or physical capacity of the person or agent
doing it. It may or may not have been done with bad motive;
the question of motive is usually a question of aggravation only.
Therefore the law, in giving redress, has in view the case of the
party injured, and the extent of his injury, and makes what he
suffers the measure of compensation. A blow by a youth of
eighteen may inflict as serious an injury as a blow by a man of
mature years, and the torch of a .child may destroy a house as
effectually as though applied on the twenty-first birthday, instead
of the tenth. If, therefore, redress is the object of the law, the
party injured should have the same redress in the one case as is
provided for him in the other. Neither is it now protection to
society that is sought, except as any enforcement of just laws
tends incidentally to its protection. There is consequently no
anomaly in compelling one who is not chargeable with wrong
intent to make compensation for an injury committed by him;
for, as is said in an early case, " the reason is, because he that is
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damaged ought to be recompensed." • If recompense 1s what
the law aims at, it is readily percei,·ed that the question of civil
responsibility for wrongs suffered is one which directs our attention chiefly to the injury done; and that the weakness of the
party committing it, or the absence of any deliberate purpose to
injure, must commonly be of little or no importance .

I
the law aims at, it is readily perceived that the question of civil

a..J

responsibility for wrongs suffered is one which directs our atten-

tion chieﬂy to the injury done; and that the weakness of the

party committing it, or the absence of any deliberate purpose to

injure, must commonly be of little or no importance.

,.,,•
·~,"
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Wrongs by' Lunatics, etc. The case of an injury suﬁbred at

the hands of a lunatic furnishes us with an apt illustration. Let

it be supposed that one of this unfortunate class meets a trav-

eler on the highway, and. by force, or by the terror of his threats,

rakes from him his horse and vehicle, and abuses or destroys them.

In a sane person this may have been highway robbery; but the
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lunatic is incapable of a criminal intent, and therefore commits

no crime. Neither is the case one in which a contract to pay for

the property, or for the injury, can be implied, for the law can

imply no contract relations where the capacity to enter into them

is withheld. But a plain wrong has been done, because the trav-

eler has been forcibly deprived of his property; and if the person

at whose hands the wrong has been suffered is possessed of an

estate from which compensation can be made, no reason appears

why this estate should not be burdened to make it. In other

words, it seems but just that the consequences of the unfortunate

occurrence should fall upon the estate of the person committing

the injury, rather than upon that of the person who has suffered

it.’

One eminent law writer has doubted if there ought to be any

responsibility in such a case. “ In the case of a compos mantis,”

~

Wrongs by' Lunatics, etc. The case of an injury suffered at
the hands of a lunatic furnishes us with an apt illustration. Let
it be supposed that one of this unfortunate class meets a traveler on the highway, and, by force, or by the terror of his threats,
takes from him Lis horse and vehicle, and abuses or destroys them.
In a sane person this may have been highway robbery; but the
lnnatic is incapable of a criminal intent, and therefore commits
no crime. Neither is the case one in wh.ich a contract to pay for
the property, or tor the injury, can be implied, for the law can
imp!~· no contract relations where the capacity to enter into them
_is withheld. But a plain wrong has been done, because the traveler has been forcibly depriYed of his property; and if the person
at whose han1ls the wrong has been suffered is po~sessed of an
estate from ·which compensation can be made, no reason appears
why this estate should not be burdened to make it. In other
words, it seems but just that the consequences of the unfortunate
occurrence should fall upon the estate of the person committing
the injury, rather than upon that of the person who has suflered

it.I

he says, “although the intent be not decisive, still the act pun-

ished is that of a party competent to foresee and guard against

the consequences of his conduct; and inevitable accident has

always been held an excuse. In the case of a lunatic it may be

urged both that no good policy requires the interposition of the

law, and that the act belongs to the class of cases which may well

be termed inevitable accident.”'

’ Lambert o. Bersey, L. Raym. 421.

See Berscy e. Olliott, L. Raym. 467.

' Morse 0. C1'n\vi'Ol'(l, 17 Vt. 499; S.

C. Ewell's Leading Cases, 635.

' Sedgwick on Damages, 455. The

cases on the subject of the liability

One eminent law writer has doubted if there ought to be any
responsibility in such a case. "In the case of a compos mentis,"
lae says, •' although the intent be not dec~isive, still the act pnni,hed is that of a party competent to foresee and guard against
the consequences of his conduct; and inevitable accident has
always been held an excuse. In the case of a lunatic it may be
urged both that no good policy requires the interposition of the
law, and that the act belongs to the class of cases which may well
be termed inevitable accident." •

of persons non compo; are well col-

locn.-d in Ordronaux’sJudicial Aspects

of Insanity. Chapter VII. '

• Lambert "· Bersey, L. Raym. 421.
See Bersey·"· Olliott, L. Raym. 467.
1 llorae "· Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; S.
C. Ewell's Leading Vases, fJM.
• Sedgwick on Damages, 435. The

c~es on the subject of the liability
of persons rwn wmpo1 are well collected in Ordronaux's Judicial Aapecta
of Insanity, Chapter VII.
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This view has plausibility, and it would be perfectly sound
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and unanswerable if punishment were the object of the law when

persons unsound in mind are the wrong doers. But when we

ﬁnd that compensation for an injury received is all that the law

demands, the plausibility disappears. Undoubtedly there is some

appearance of hardship-—even of injustice—in compelling one

to respond for that which, for want of the control of reason, he

was unable to avoid; that it is imposing upon a person already

visited with the inexpressible calamity of mental obscurity an

obligation to observe the same care and precaution respecting the

rights of others that the law demands of one in the full posses-

sion of his faculties. But the question of liability in these cases,

as well as in others, is a question of policy; and it is to be dis-

posed of as would be the question whether the incompetent per-

son should be supported at the expense of the public, or of his

neighbors, or at the expense of his own estate. If his mental

disorder makes him dependent, and at the same time prompts

him to commit injuries, there seems to be no greater reason for

imposing upon the neighbors or the public one set of these con-

sequences rather than the other; no more propriety or justice in

making others bear the losses resulting from his unreasoning

fury when it is spent upon them or their property, than there
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would be in calling upon them to pay the expense of his conﬁne-

ment in‘an asylum when his own estate is ample for the purpose.

All questions of public policy must be settled on a considera-

tion of what on the whole is the rule that will best subserve the

general welfare. Among, the considerations bearing on the

proper rule in the case of an incompetent person are such as

relate to the appointment of a committee or guardian empowered

by law to take charge of him and restrain his action so as to pre-

vent injury to himself or to others. The appointment of this

custodian is properly attended to by relatives or friends; those

who have a personal or family interest in him, or who might he

entitled to succeed to his estate if it were preserved. WOllld it

not be an important stimulus to their action if the estate is to

be held responsible for all injuries committed by him to others;

and would it not tend to indifference on their part if the law

were to leave any injured party to bear the loss without redress‘?

Unless these questions can be answered in the negative, the roa-

sons for holding his own estate responsible seem conclusive; for

W ' “ mi

This view has plausibility, and it would be perfectly sound
and unanswerable if punishment were the object of the law when
. persons unsound in mind are the wrong doers. But when we
find that compensation for an injury received is all that the law
demands, the plausibility disappears. Undoubtedly there is some
appearance of hardship- even of injustice- in compelling one
to respond for that which, for want of the control of reason, he
was unable to avoid; that it is imposing upon a person already
visited with the inexpressible calamity of mental obscurity an
obligation to observe the same care and precaution respecting the
l'ights of others that the law demands of one in the full possrt>sion of his faculties. But the question of liaoility in these cases,
as well as in others, is a question of policy; and it is to be disposed of as would be the question whether the incompetent person should be supported at the expense of the public, or of his
neighbors, or at the expense of his own estate. If his mental
disorder makes him dependent, and at the same time prompts
him to commit injuries, there seems to be no greater reason f(u·
imposing upon the neighbors or the public one set of these consequences rather than the other; no more propriety or justice in
making others bear the losses resulting ti·om his unreasoning
fury when it is spent upon them or their property, than there
would be in calling upon them to pay the expense of his confinement in 'an asylum when his own estate is ample for the purpose.
All questions of public policy must be settled on a consideration of what on the whole is the rule that will best subset·ve the
general welfare. Among. the considerations bearing on the
proper rule in the case of an incompetent person are such as
relate to the appointment of a committee or guardian ernpowere1l
by law to take charge of him and restrain his action so as to prevent injury to himself or to others. The appointment of this
custodian is properly attended to by relatives or friends; tho"e
who have a personal or family interest in him, or who might he
entitled to succeed to his estate if it were preserved. Would it
not be an important stimulus to their action if the estate is to
be held responsible for all injurie::; committed by him to others;
and would it not tend to indifference on their part if the law
were to leave any injured party to bear the loss without redressj
Unless these questions can be answe1·ed in the negative, the rt>asous for holding his own estate responsible seem conclusive; tor
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the State at large is deeply concerned in having all incompetent
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persons in charge of competent and responsible guardians, whose

101

business it shall be to care for them and to guard both them and

the public against such injuries as would be likely to result from

their condition.

Another important consideration is derived from the fact that

the distinction between insanity and the cunning of malice is

not always sutﬁciently clear for ready detection, and a rule of

irresponsibility in respect to such persons would be likely to

result in similar diﬁiculties in civil cases to those which have

brought the administration of criminal law into disrepute where-

ever the plea of insanity is interposed. Nothing could present

to the depraved mind a stronger temptation to simulate insanity

for purposes of mischief and revenge than a rule of law which

would give full immunity in case the deception proved successful,

and which would put at risk where it did not only the amount

of actual injury inﬂicted; and this, too, in the case of those dis-

orders, real or pretended, the evidences of which are often

so vague, intangible and deceptive that experts sometimes fail

to see them when they unquestionably exist, and perceive them

with distinctness when they do not. It is generally believed,

and with abundant reason, that sometimes in the administration
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of the criminal law, persons who are abnormal only in ungov-

ernable passion and depravity escape the proper consequences of

their criminal conduct on a plea of mental disease; and on the

other hand a careful observation of the workings of criminal tri-

bunals will leave upon the mind no doubt that the jury that

should dispassionately try the question of criminal responsibility,

is sometimes urged on and impelled by public passion and clamor

to ﬁnd in the freaks of delusion the evidences of criminal intent

and depravity, and to convict and punish those who are only

deserving of compassion. That evils of this sort are inseparable

from the administration of the criminal law must probably be

admitted; but they have no necessary place where only civil

ndress is given, and it seems better to exclude them by an inva-

riable rule that mental disease or inﬁrmity shall be no defense to

an action for tort.

The reasons that have controlled in these cases are not very

clearly set forth by the authorities, but the law has always held

insane persons and other incompetents responsible for damages

the State at large is deeply concerned in having all incompetElnt
persons in charge of competent and responsible guardians, wl10se
business it shall be to care for them and to guard both them and
the public against such injuries as would be likely to result from
their condition.
Another important consideration is derived from the fact that
the distinction between insanity and the cunning of' malice is
not always sufficiently clear for ready detection, and a rule of
irresponsibility in r£'spect to such persons would be likely to
result in similar difficulties in civil cases to those which have
brought the administr'l\tion of criminal law into disrepute whereever the plea of insanity is interposed. Nothing could present
to the dllpraved mind a stronger tE'mptation to simulate insanity
for purposes of mischief and revenge than a rule of law which
would give full immunity in case the deception proved successful,
and which would put at risk where it did not only the amount
of actual injury inflicted; and this, too, in the case of those disorders, real or pretended, the evidences of which are often
ao vague, intangible and deceptive that experts sometimes fail
to see them when they unquestionably exist, and perceive them
with distinctness when they do not. It is generally believed,
and with abundant reason, that sometimes in the administration
of the criminal law, persons who are abnormal only in ungovernable passion and depravity escape t!te proper conseqnenees of
their criminal conduct on a plea of mental disease; and on the
other hand a careful observation of the workings of criminal tribunals will leave upon the nJind no donbt that the jury that
should dispassionately try the question of criminal responsibility,
is sometimes urged on and impelled by public passion and clamor
to find in the freaks of delusion the e\•idences of criminal intent
and dqm\\·ity, and to com·ict anrl pnni:;h those who are only
deserving of Cl•tnpassion. That eYils of this sort nrc inseparable
from the administration of the criminal law must probahiy be
admitted; but they have no n<'Ct:!S~ary place where only civil
:rtdress is given, and it seems better to exclude them by an invariable rnle that mental disease or infirmity shall be no defense to
an action for tort.
The reasons that have controlled in these cases are not very
• clearly set forth by th~ authoritiea, ':>ut the law has always held
inaane persons and other incompetents responsible for damages
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resulting from their tortious actions,‘ and it has given all the

usual remedies against them, even to the very severe one of the
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taking of the body in execution while that barbarous mode of

compelling redress was allowable in other cases.’

But it does not follow that the responsibility of persons men-

tally incompetent should be co-extensive in all respects with that

of other persons. If compensation to the person wronged is

what is aimed at, the difference in some cases will be very mani-

fest; for sometimes that which might be seriously injurious if

done by a person sui jzwis, will be perfectly harmless when the

actor is insane. In other cases where that which is done is

unquestionably injurious, the extent of the injury will depend

very largely on the presence or absence of an actual evil design.

An illustration of the class last mentioned is afforded by the case

of Krom v. /S'ch00nmaker.' There a magistrate was sued for

issuing void process on which the plaintiff was arrested. The

case, on its facts, seemed one of gross outrage. It was proved

that the magistrate had no complaint before him; that he refused

bail after the arrest, and that he avowed a determination to pur-

sue the plaintiff until he should be incarcerated in prison under

a conviction. This made out a case of very serious oppression

and wrong, such as a ury would be warranted in condemning by
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a heavy award of what are sometimes called punitory or vindic-

tive damages. But when it was shown that the magistrate was

insane, all the aggravation of the wrong disappeared. A sane

man could only have done such an act from malice, and the outrage

and injury to the arrested party would be greatly enhanced by

the motive. The insane man could have no malice, but Wullld

probably act under the delusion that oﬁicial duty impelled him.

The aggravation of motive would consequently be wholly wanting.

While, therefore, the sane person might ustly be compelled to

pay damages proportioned to the malignity of his motives, the

insane person would make full reparation if he were required to

meet the actual damages which the injured party had suffered in

'2 Sannd. Pl. and Ev. 318, 1168; 1

Chit. Pl. '76; Shearm. & Redf. on Neg.

§ 51, 57; Broom Com. 684,857; Wea-

ver o. Ward, Hob. 134; Moore o.

Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Bush 0. Petti-

bone, 4 N. Y. 800; Krom '0. Schoon-

maker, 8 Barb. 650; Cross v. Kent,

32 Md. 581; Behrens o. McKenzie, 23

Iowa, 343; Lancaster Co. Bank v.

Moore, '78 Penn. St. 407, 412.

5' Er parle Leighton, 14 Mass. 207.

' 3 Barb. 650.

resulting from their tortious actions, 1 and it bas given all the
usual remedies ag-ainst them, even to the very se\·ere one of the
taking of the body in e~ecution while that baruarous mode of
compelling redress was allowable in other cascs. 2
But it does not follow that the responsibility of persons mentally incompetent should be co-extensive in all respects with that
of other persons. If compensation to the person wronged is
what is aimed at, the differ·ence in some cases will be very manifest; for sometimes that which might be seriously injurious if
done by a person sui juris, will be perfectly harmless when the
actor is insane. In other cases where that which is done is
unquestionably injurious, the extent of the injury will depend
very largely on the presence or absence of an actual evil design.
An illustration of the class last mentioned is afforded by the case
of Krom v. Sclwonmaker. • There a magistrate was sued for
issuing void process on which the plaintiff was arrested. The
case, on its facts, seemed one of gross outrage. It was proved
that the magistrate had no complaint before him; that he refused
bail after the arrest, and that he avowed a determination to pursue the plaintiff until he should be incarcerated in prison under
a conviction. This made out a case of very serious oppression
and wrong, such as a jury would be warranted in condemning by
a heavy award of what are sometimes called punitory or vindictive damages. But when it was shown that the magistrate was
insane, all the aggravation of the wrong disappeared. A sane
man could only have done such an act from malice, and the outrage
and injury to the arrested party would be greatly enhanced by
the motive. The insane man could have no malice, but wvnld
probably act under t.he delusion that official duty impelled him.
The aggravation of motive would consequently be wholly wanting.
While, therefore, the sane person might justly be compelled to
pay damages proportioned to the malignity of his motives, the
insane person would make full reparation if he were required to
meet the actual damages which the injured party had suffered in
2 Baund. Pl. and Ev. 818, 1168; 1
Obit. Pl. 76; Bhearm. & Red f. on Neg.
§ 51, 57; Broom Com. 684, 8fJ7; W c~~.o
ver "· Ward, Hob. 134; Moore "·
Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Bush "· Petti.
bone, 4 N.Y. 800; Krom o. Schoon.
1

maker, 8 Barb. 650; Cross "· Kent,
82 Md. 581; Behrens o. McKenzie, 23
Iowa, 843; Lancaster Co. Bank "·
Moore, 78 Penn. !;t. 407, 412.
1 Ex parte Leighton, 14 Mass. 207.
1 8 Barb. 650.
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person or estate, leaving wholly out of view any aggravation

which malice might have supplied.

This, it will be perceived, is a very important difference in the

responsibility of competent and incompetent persons in some

cases. But there are other cases in which the differences must

be greater still. It has been seen that in some cases malice is a

necessary ingredient in the tort. How can a non compos be

responsible in such cases; such, for instance, as malicious prose-

cution or libel? Legal malice certainly cannot be imputed to

one who in law is incompetent to harbor an intent. It would

seem a monstrous absurdity, for instance, if one were held

entitled to maintain an action for defamation of character for the

thoughtless babbling of an insane person to his keepers, or for

any wild communication he might send through the mail, or post

upon the wall. There can be no tort in these cases, because the

wrong lies in the intent, and an intent is an impossibility. The

rules which preclude criminal responsibility are strictly applicable

here, because there is an absence of the same necessary element.‘

And if, in the case of defamatory publications, it be said that

after all the requirement of malice as an element in the wrong is

only nominal, still there can be no tort, because presumptively
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the utterances, or rather publications, which proceed from a dis-

eased brain cannot injure.

Torts by Infants. The general rule is that an infant is respon-

sible for his torts. as any other person would be.’ The following

tzses are illustrations: Where boys of twelve and fourteen tres-

' See Dickinson 0. Barber, 9 Mass.

225; Homer e. Marshall. 5 Munf.4ti6;

Bryant u. Jackson, 6 Humph. 199;

Ye-ates v. Rel-d,4 Blackf. 463; Gates

0. Meredith, 7 lnd.4-10. In this last

case it. was decided that insanity,

though caused by drunkenness, would

penon or estate, leaving wholly out of vie\\ any aggravation
which malice might have supplied.
This, it will be perceived, is a very important difference in the
responsibility of competent and incompetent persons in some
cases. Bot there are other cases in which the differences most
be greater still. It has been seen that in some cases malice is a
necessary ingredient in the tort. How can a non c~ be
responsible in such cases; such, for instance, as malicious prosecution or libel 9 Legal malice certainly cannot be imputed to
one who in law is incompetent to harbor an intent. It would
t~eem a monstrous ab::mrdity, for instance, if one were held
t'lltitled to maintain an action for defamation of character for the
tboughtle~s babbling of an insane person to his keepers, or for
any wild communication he might send through the mail, or post
upon the wall. There can be no tort in these eases, because the
wrong lies in the intent, and an intent is an impost~ibility. The
roles which preclude criminal responsibility are strictly applicable
here, because there is an absence of the same necessary element.1
And if, in the case of defamatory publications, it be said that
after all the requirement of malice as an clement in the wrong is
only nominal, still there can be no tort, because presumptively
the utterances, or rather publications, which proceed from a diseaaed brain cannot injure.

preclude responsibility for what

would otherwise be slander. “Blan-

dt-r must be malicious. An idiot or

lunatic, no mutter from what cause he

became so. cannot be guilty of malice.

Torte by Intanta. The general rule is that an infant is responsible for hi~ tor~. as any other person would be.' The following
<SSe& are illustratiuns: \Vhere boys of twelve and fourteen tres-

He may indulge the auger of the

brute, but not the malice of one ‘ who

knows better.’ “ PERKINS, J. In

Horner v. Marshall, 5 Munf. 466, the

collection of a judgment for slander

was enjoined, on the ground that the

defendant at the time of the speaking

was in a state of partlal mental dc-

rangement on the subject to which

the speaking related.

' Burnard o. Haggis, 14 C. B. (N. s.)

45; Mills 0. Graham, 4 1-l.& P. 140;

Campbell 1;. Stakes, 2 Wend. 188;

Hnrtﬂcld 0. Roper, 21 Wend. 620;

Neal 0. Gillett, 28 Conn. 437; Sikes

o. Johnson, 16 Mass. 389; Walker 0.

Davis, 1 Gray, 506.

1 See DlcklD8on •· Barber, 9 Haas.
:aleS; Horner"· Marshall. 6Mnnf. .f(16;
Bryant e. Jnck.!lon, 6 Humph. 199;
Yf'ates e. Ret'<I, 4 8lackf. 468; Gates
e. lleredith, 7 Ind. 440. In this las&
cue It waa decided that in'l&llity,
thoagb caused by druokennesa, would
preclude l'eSJlOnl'libillty for what
would otbt•rwiso be slander. "Blandt>r mu~t be maltcious. An Idiot or
lunatic, on mauer from what cause he
btot·ame !10, cannot be guilty of mal ice.
He may indulge the anger of the
hrn&e, bnt not th<' malice of one 'who
knmn hc•tter.'" PERKI:ss, J. In

Borner "· Marshall, IS Hunf. -He, the
collection of a judgment for slander
was enjoined, on the ground that the
defendaot at the time of the speaking
was in a state of partial mental derangement on the subject to which
the speaking related.
1 Burnard e. Haggis, 14 C. B. (N. a.)
45; :Mills e. Graham, 4 H. & P. 140;
('ampbell e. Staketo~, 9 Wend. 1&4;
Hartfield e. Roper, 91 Wend. 620;
Neal "· Gillett, 28 Coon. 487; Bikf'B
e. Johnson, 16 Masa. 889; Walker o.
Davis, 1 Gray, IS06.
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passed upon a school district and disturbed the school ;‘ where a
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boy of six broke and entered the plaintiﬂ"s premises and broke

down and destroyed his shrubbery and ﬂowers;’ where an infant

committed a disseisin and ejectment was brought against him ;'

where an infant lessee carried oﬁ' and converted to his own use

crops to which he was not entitled ;‘ where an infant employé

embezzled his employcr’s property which had been committed to

his charge;‘ where an infant induced another to commit a tres-

pass," and so on.

In cases like the foregoing, the intent with which the wrongful

act is done is unimportant, except as it may, in some of them,

bear upon the quantum of damages. But in those eases in

which malice is a necessary ingredient in the wrong, an infant

may or may not be liable, according as his age and capacity may

justify imputing malice to him or preclude the idea of his

indulging it. The case of alleged defamation affords a suitable

illustration. The absurdity of a suit against a child three years

old would be suiﬁciently manifest, but not more so than the

granting of immunity to the malicious utterances of a youth of

twenty. And while it would be impossible to name any age

which should constitute the dividing line between responsibility

and irresponsibility in these and all similar cases, there would be
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no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that for all malicious

injuries the wrong doer should be held responsible if he has

arrived at an age and a maturity of mind which should render

‘ School District '0. Bragdon, 23 N.

H. 507.

’ Huchting 0. Engel, 17 Wis. 230.

‘ Marshall 1:. Wing. 50 Me. 62, citing

McOoon o. Smith, 3 Hill, 147; Beck-

ley 0. Newcomb. 24 N. H. 363.

‘ Baxter 1-. Bush, 29 Vt. 465, citing

Green o. Sperry. 16 Vt. 892. See. also,

Walker o. Davis, 1 Gray, 506; Green

12. Sperry, 16 Vt. 390; Oliver 1:. Mc-

Clellan, 21 Ala. 675. An infant stake-

holder of an illegal wager is liable in

passed upon a seho:>l district and disturbed the school ;• where a
hoy of six broke and entered the plaintiff's premises and broke
down and de~Stroyed his shrubbery and flowers;' where an infant
committed a disseisin and ejectment was brought against him;'
where an infant les~ce carried off and conl"erted to his own use
crops to which he was not entitled;• where an infant employ~
embezzled his employ(.'r's property which had been committed to
his charge;• where an infant ind11ced another to commit a trespass," and so on.
In cases like the foregoing, the intent with which the wrongful
ad is done is unimportant, except as it may, in some of them,
bear upon the quantum of damages. But in those cases in
which malice is a necessary ingredient in the wrong, an infant
may or may not be liable, according as his age and capacity may
jnsti(y imputing maiice to him or preclude the idea of his
indulging it. The ease of alleged defamation affords a suitable
illustration. The absurdity of a snit against a child three yean
old would be sufficiently manifest, but not more so than the
granting of immunity to the malicions utterances of a yonth of
twenty. And while it would be impossible to name any age
which should constitute the dividing line between responsibilit1
and irresponsibility in these and all similar cases, there would be
no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that for all maliciona
injuries the wrong doer should be held responsible if he baa
arrived at an age and a maturity of mind which should render

trover for a refusal to deliver back the

stakes on demand. Lewis v. Little-

ﬁeld, 15 Me. 233. But an infant is

not liable for conversion where the

relation between the parties is one of

bailment, and the real grievance of

the plaintiff is the failure of the in-

fant to perform his contract. Root 0.

Stevenson, 24 Ind. 115. See Curtin 0.

Patton, 11 S. & R. 305.

' Peigne v. Sutclilfc, 4 McCord, 33!.

Further, as to conversions, see Man-

by 1:. Scott, 1 Sid. 129; Bristow o.

Eastman, 1 Esp. 172; Conklin n.

'I‘hompson, 29 Barb. 218; Moore c.

E‘lSlllllll1, 1 Hun, 578; S. C. 4 N. Y.

Sup. Ct. (T. (6 C.) 37.

‘Bikes v. Johnson, 16 Mass. 389.

In respect to trespasscs, it is said in

this case, “ There is no exception in

the law in favor offemmu covert or

minors."

% * ‘ ‘_I¢_l

' School District 11. Bragdon, 28 N.
H . fi07.
1 Huchtinp; 11. Engel, 17 Wis. 280.
• Mar,.hall11. Wing, 50 Me. 62, citing
McCoon "· Smith, 8 Hill, 147; BE:ck.ley "· Newcomb, 24 N.H. 868.
'Baxt~r "· Bush, 29 Vl 4615, citing
Green"· Sperry. 16 Vl 892. See, also,
·walker e. Davis, 1 Gray, 506; Green
t~. Sperry, 16 Vt. 890; Olivt>r "·MeClellan, 21 Ala. 675. An infant lltakt>holdcr of an illf'gal wager is liable in
trover for a refusal to deliver back the
stakes on demand. Lewis "· Little.
flt>ld, 15 Mt>. 238. But an Infant ts
not liable for conversion where the
n·lntlon between the pzuties is one of

bailment, and the real grievance of
the plaintiff is the failure of the ln.
fant to perform his eontracl Root •·
Stevenson, 24 Ind. 1115. See Curtin •·
Patton, 11 S. & R. 3015.
I Peigne "·Sutcliffe. 4 McCord, e.
Further, as to conversions, see Manby "· Scott, 1 Sid. 129; Bristow •·
Eastman, 1 Esp. 172; Conklin e.
Thompson, 2g Barb. 218; Moore •·
E-•~tman, 1 Hun, 578; B. C. 4 N.Y.
Sup. Ct. (T. & C.) 37.
' Sikes fl. J olmson, 16 Maae. 889.
In respect to tre~passes, it is said in
this case, "There is no exception lD
thr law in favor of fmama CDNrl or
minors."
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him morally responsible for the consequences of intentional

action. All general statements that an infant is responsible like

any other person for his torts, are to be received with the qualiﬁ-

cation that the tort must not be one involving an element which,

in his particular case, must be wanting. If a. child less than

seven years of age cannot be held responsible for a larceny

because of defect of understanding and incapacity to harbor a

felonious intent, it would seem preposterous to hold him respon-

sible for a slander. the moral quality of which he would be much

less likely to appreciate, and injury from which must be purely

imaginary.

But not only is the fact of infancy important in cases in which

malice is an ingredient in the tort, but it is not without its inﬂu-

ence in other cases. Torts springing from negligence may be

instant-ed. While an infant is liable for these, the question of

actual maturity and capacity is important, not only as it may

hear upon the question whether negligence actually existed, but

also as it may guide in determining Whether the plaintiff in the

particular transaction was not himself chargeable with fault.‘

\\'hoever has transactions with a person of immature and slender

capacity, or is so brought into relations with such a person that
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the negligence of the latter may expose him to injury, may

reasonably on his own part be charged with a higher degree of

care and caution than could he required of him in the like deal-

ings or under similar circumstances with other persons. But,

putting aside all question of contributory want of care, on the

part of the person injured. the liability of the infant rests on the

same ground with that of other persons. If an injury has been

' Neal 0. Gillctt, 23 Conn. 487. In

this case infants from 13to 18 years

of age were sued in case for negli-

gently fr-iglitcning a horse in playing

againc of ball, causing him to run

away. Sam-oan, J., says. p. 442:

"Tho youngest of these deft-mhints

was thirteen years of age, and in the

absence of all proof to the eontrury,

must be presumed to have been eman-

cipated from the dominion of mere

him morally responsible for the consequences of intentional
action. AU general statement& tL.at an infant is responsible like
any other person for his torts, are to be received with the qualification that the tort must not be one involving an element which,
in his particular case, must be wanting. If a child less than
~~even years of age cannot be held responsible for a larceny
hecanae of defect of understanding and incapacity to harbor a
felonious intent, it would seem preposterous to hold him responflihle for a slander. the moral quality of which he would be much
)t>118 likely to appreciate, and injury from which must be purely
imaginary.
But not only is t11e fact of iufancy important in cases in which
111alice is an ingredient in the tort, but it is not without its influence in other cases. Torts springing from negligence may be
instanced. While an infant is liable for these, tho question of
at"tnal maturity and capacity is important, not only as it may
I~ upon the question whether negligence actually existed, but
al80 as it may guide in determining whether the plaintiff in the
particular transaction was not himself chargeable with fault.•
"yboever has transactions with a person of immature and slender
CHpacity, or is so brought into relations with such a person that
the negligence of the latter may expose him to injury, may
J'f':t.~nably on his own part be charged with a higher degree of
care and caution than could be required of him in the like dealings or under similar circumstances with other persons. But,
putting aside all qnestion of contributory want of care, on the
part of the person injured. the liability of the infant rests on the
same ground with that of other persons. If an injury has been

childish instincts; and we think lt

would be mischievous to hold that

persons of the age of thirteen years

are, on account of their youth alone,

absolved from the oblization to exer-

cise their rights with ordinary care.

It may not be easy to ﬁx upon the ex-

act age when childish instinct and

thoughllessness shall cease to be an

excuse for conduct which in an adult

would be considered and treated as a

want of ordinary care; but it is sum-

eient for the determination of this

point that these defendants had clear-

ly passed that age."

1 Neal •· Gillett, 23 Conn. 431.
In
tbis case Infants from 13 to 18 yeare
of &go! wt>rc sued in case for nt'gll.
J.rt>ntly fri::htcning a horse in playing
a ;..rume uf ball, t'-ausiog him to run
•uray. 8.A.:KPORD, J., says. p. 442:
•· The youngest of tbt'sc dt'f1•nclnnts
WI&B thirteen yeare of a~e, and in the
abltenoo of all proof to the runtrury,
must be presumed to have bet'n t'manclpated from the dominion of mere
child lab instincts; ""d we think It
would be mischievous to hold that

persona of the age or thirteen years
are, oo acrouot of th•·ir youth alone,
absolvt'd from the obli~ation &o exercise their rights with ordinary care.
IL may not be easy to fix upon lhe ex.
act age when childish in!ltinrt and
thoughtlessness shall ccnse to be an
excuse for conduct which in an adult
would be considered and treated as a
want of ordinary care; but it is suftlcient for the derermlnntion of thla
point that Ull'~ defendant.., had clearly passed thAt ago.n
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suffered by another for the want of ordinary care and prudence
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on his part, he is responsible.‘

What shall be deemed to constitute ordinary care and prudence

on his part is a question to be considered hereafter.

The fact that an act committed by an infant was advised or

eommanded by one occupying a position of inﬂuence or authority

over him is not important when an action of tort is brought

against him, as it might be in some cases, were a criminal prose-

cution to be instituted. The person who has sustained the injury

may always look for redress to the person committing it, and he

is under no obligation to inquire whether some other person may

not have been instrumental in causing it. That fact would be

important only in case he should elect to hold such other person

responsible. Therefore it is no defense for the infant, that in

what he did he was merely obeying his father’s command.’

An infant. as ‘the owner or occupant of lands, is under the

same responsibility with other persons for any nuisance created

or continued thereon to the prejudice or annoyance of his neigh-

bors, and for such negligent use or management of the same, by

himself or his servants, as would render any other owner or occu-

pant liable to an adjoining proprietor. Here, also, the intent is

immaterial. The wrong consists in the fact that enjoyment of
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one’s own property or rights is diminished or destroyed by an

improper or unreasonable use or misuse of the property of

another.

There are some cases, however, in which an infant cannot be

held liable as for tort, though on the same state of facts a person

of full age and legal capacity might be. The distinction is this:

If the wrong grows out of contract relations, and the real injury

consists in the non-performance of a contract into which the

party wronged has entered with an infant, the law will not per-

mit the former to enforce the contract indirectly by counting on

the infant’s neglect to perform it, or omission of duty under it

as a. tort. The reason is obvious: To permit this to be done

' “ This is necessary, because other-

wise there would be no redress for in-

juries committed by such persons,

and the anomaly might be witnessed

of a child, having abundant. wealth,

depriving another of his property

without compensation." Shearm. &

Redf. on Neg, § 5'7.

* Humphrey v. Douglass. 10 Vt. '71;

Scott 0. Watson, 46 Me. 362. See Till‘:

0. Tiﬂ't, 4 Denio, 175; Wilson v. Gur-

rnrd, 59 Ill. 51.

T H $11,,

suffered by another for the want of ordinary care and prudence
on his part, he is J'esponsible.'
What shall be deemed to constitute ordinary care and prudence
on his part is a question to be considered hereafter.
The fact that an act committed by an infant was advised or
commanded by one occupying a position of influence or authority
O'lf'er him is not important when an action of tort is brought
against him, as it might be in some cases, were a criminal prosecution to be instituted. The person who has sustained the injury
may always look for redress to the person committing it, and he
is nuder no obligation to inquire whether some other person may
not have been instrumental in causing it. That fact would be
important only in case he should elect to hold such other person
responsible. Therefore it is no defense for the infant, that in
what he did he was merely obeying his father's command.'
.An infant, as 'the owner or occupant of lands, is under the
same responsibility with other persons for any nuisance created
or continued thereon to the prejudice or annoyance of his neighbors, and for such negligent use or management of the same, hy
himself or his servants, as would rt:nder any other owner or occupant liable to an adjoining proprietor. Here, also, the intent is
immaterial. The w1·ong consists in the fact that enjoyment of
one's own property or rights is diminished or de~troyed by au
improper or unreasonable use or misuse of the property of
another.
There are some cases, however, in which an infant cannot he
held liable as tor tort, though on the same state of facts a person
of full age and legal capacity might be. The distinction is this:
If the wrong grows out of contract relations, and the real injury
consists in the non-performance of a contract into which the
party wronged has entered with an infant, the Jaw will not permit the forrnt:Jr to enforce the contract indirectly by counting on
the infant's neglect to perform it, or omission of duty under it
as a tort. The reason is obvious: To permit this to be done
1 "Thts is necessary, because other.
wise there would be no redress f<Jr injuries committed by such persons,
and the anomaly might be witnessed
of a child, having abundant wealth,
depriving another of his property

without compensation!• Shearm. &
Redf. on Neg, ~ :>7.
t Humphrey"· Douglass, 10 Vl 'il;
Scott t~. Watson, 46 lie. 362. Rce Tim
t~. Tifft, 4 Denio, 175; Wilson c. Garrard, 59 Ill. 51.
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would deprive the infant of that shield of protection which, in

matters of contract, the law has wisely placed before him. There-

fore, if case be brought against an infant for the immoderate use

and want of care of a horse which has been bailed to him, infancy

is a good defense; the gravarnen of the complaint being merely

a breach of the implied contract of bailment.' So infancy is a

defense to an action by a ship owner against his supercargo for a

breach of his instructions regarding a sale of the cargo, whereby

the same was lost or destroyed.’

So if an infant effects a sale by means of deception and fraud,

his infancy protects him. The general rule on this subject has

been given in a recent case as follows: “ An infant is liable in an

action ea: delicto for an actual and willful fraud only in cases in

which the form of action does not suppose that a contract has

existed; but where the gavamen of the fraud consists in a trans-

action which really originated in contract, the plea of infancy is

a good defense. For simple deceit on a contract of sale or

exchange there is no cause of action, unless some damage or

injury results from it; and proof of damage could not be made

without referring to and proving the contract. An action on the
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case for deceit on a sale is an aﬁirmance by the plaintiff of the

contract of sale; and the liability of the defendant in such an

action could not be established without taking notice of and

proving the contract.”‘ Lord Chief Justice Grass states the

same rule more concisely: “Where the substantial ground of

action rests on promises, the plaintiff cannot, by changing the

form of action, render a person liable who would not have been

liable on his promise.” ‘ l

And the same rule applies if, in the purchase of property, he

is guilty of fraud or deception, by means whereof the owner is

induced to make a sale.‘

' Jennings o. Rundall, 8 T. R 336.

See Manby u. Scott, 1 Sid. 129; Eaton

0. llill. 50 N. H. 235; Root v. Steven-

son, 24 Ind. 115.

' Vasse u. Smith, 6 Crauch, 126; S.

C.1 Am. Lead. (Jas. ‘£137; S. C‘. Ew-

ell's Lead. Cas. 195. See Studwell 0.

Shaptcr, 54 N. Y. 249.

'Gl!s0n 1:. Spear, 38 Vt. 311, per

Kai.wco,J. S. C. Ewcll's Lead. Gas.

201. See Graves o. Neville, 1 Keb.

778. In Word v. Vance, 1 Nott &

would deprive the infant of that shield of protection which, in
matters of contract, the law has wisely placed before him. Theretore, if case be brought against an infant for the immoderate nse
and want of care of a horse which has been bailed to him, infan<'y
is a good detEmse; the gravamen of the complaint being merely
a breach of the implied contract of bailment.' So infancy is a
defense to an action by a ship owner against his supercargo for a
breach of his instructions regarding a sale of the cargo, whereby
the same was lost or destroyed.'
So if an infant effects a sale by means of deception and frand,
his infancy protects him. The general rule on this subject has
been given in a recent case as follows: "An infant is liable in an
action e:zJ delicto tor an actual and willful fraud only in cases in
which the form of action does not suppose that a eontract has
aisted; but where the gravamen of the fraud consists in a transaction which really originated in contract, the plea of infancy is
a good defense. For simple deceit on a contract of sale or
exchange there is no cause of action, unless some damage or
injury results from it; and proof of damage could not be made
without referring to and proving the contract. An action on the
ease for deceit on a sale is an affirmance by the plaintiff of the
contract of sale; and the liability of the defendant in such an
action could not be established withont taking notice of and
proving the contract." 1 Lord Chief Justice GmBs states the
same rule more concisely: "Where the substantial ground of
action rests on promises, the plaintiff cannot, hy changing the
form of action~ render a person liable who would not have been
'
liable on his promi8e." 4
Ami the same rule applies if, in the purchase of property, he
ia guilty of fraud or deception, by means whereof the owner is
ind need to make a sale.'

McO., 197, an infant was held liable

in case on a false warranty, but the

point is apparently not much con-

8l(ll'I‘L‘(l.

‘ Green 0. Greenbank, 2 Malsli. 485.

' In Wallucc v.1iIorss,5lIill391,an

infant is held by the court, (( ownx,

J..) “chargeable by action for a tort

• Jennings e. Rundall, 8 T. R 886.
See llanby "· Scott, 1 Sid. 129: Eaton
e. Hill, liO N. H. 2M; Root D. 8teven.
BOD, 24 Ind. 11~.
•y,LSSe "· Smith, 6 Cranch, 126: 8.
C. 1 A.m. Lead. Cas. 2:37 ; B. C. Ew.
ell's Lead. Cas. 1~. &e Studwell e.
Shaptcr, M N.Y. 249.
• Gi!~Wn e. SpeiU", 38 Vt. 811, per
K&Lwoo,J. B. C. Ewell's Lead. Cas.

201. Bee Graves e. Neville, 1 Keb.
778. In Word "· Vance, 1 Nott &
Mc<J., 197, an infant was hehlllable
in case on a false warranty, but the
point is apparently not much considered.
• Green "· Greenbank, 2lfarsh. 48.1.
• In Wallucc 11. llors~. 5 Hill 391, an
infant is held by the court, (< ow&x,
J ..) "chargeable by uctlon for a torL
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is bailed to an infant for a deﬁnite purpose, and he does in respect

to it some speciﬁc wrongful act not warranted by the bailment,

and which would have rendered any other person responsible to

the bailor in an action as for a conversion, the infant is also liable

to a like action. Thus, it has been held that an infant who hires

a horse to go to a place agreed upon, but drives him to another,

in a different direction, is liable in trover for an unlawful con-

version of the horse.‘ Such an action, it is said, is not founded

on the contract, and it is not necessary to show the contract in a

suit for the conversion.’

It has also been held, that if an infant hires a horse, and is

guilty of such violence and cruelty as to cause its death, an action

of trespass may be maintained against him, though, had an action

been brought on the contract of bailment, infancy would have

been a defense. “ If the infant does any willful and positive act,

which amounts on his part to an election to disaﬁirm the contract,

the owner is entitled to the immediate possession. If he will-

fully and intentionally injures the animal, an action of trespass

lies against him for the tort. If he should sell the horse, an

action of trespass would lie, and his infancy would not protect

him.” But “if the plaintiff declares in case, he aﬁirms the con-
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tract of hiring, and the plea of infancy is a good defense to such

an action; for he cannot aﬁrm the contract, and at the same time,

by alleging a tortious breach thereof, deprive the defendant of

his plea of infancy.”' “ From the moment an infant becomes a

trcspasser,” it is said, in another case following this, “ his plea of

infancy fails him.” ‘ But as this doctrine rests upon the fact that

the plaintiff, who is allowed a choice of remedies in such cases,

in obtaining goods fraudulently, with

an intention not to pay for them ; but

this is explained in a subsequent case

as having been probably an action of

trover to recover the value of goods

obtained by false representations, and

the title to which consequently did

not pass.” Campbell 0. Perkins, 8 N.

Y. 430, 440.

' Homer 1.». Thwing, 3 Pick. 492; S.

C. Ewcll’s Lead. Cas. 188. See. also,

Fish 0. Ferris, 5 Ducr, 49; Woodman

0. llubburd, 25 N. H. 73; Towne v.

There are cases in which it has been decided that if property
is bailed to an infant for a definite purpose, and he does in respect
to it some specific wrongful act not warranted by the bailment;
and which would have reudered any other person responsible to
the bailor in an action as for a conversion, the infant is also liable
to a like action. Thus, it has been held that an infant who hiree
a horse to go to a place agreed upon, but drives him to another,
in a different direction, is liable in trover for an unlawful conversion of the horse.l Such an action~ it is said, is not founded
<>n the contract, and it is not necessar.r to show the contract in a
suit for the conversion.•
It has also been held, that if an infant hires a horse, and is
guilty of such violence and cruelty as to cause its death, an action
Qf trespass may be maintained against him, though, had an action
been bronght on the contract of bailment, infancy wonld have
been a defEmse. "It' the infant does any willful and positive act,
which amounts on his part to an election to disaffirm the contract,
the owner is entitled to the immediate possession. If he willfully and intentionally injures the animal, an action of trespasa
lies against him for the tort. If he should sell the horEe, ao
artion of trespass would lie, and his infancy would not protect
him." But "if the plaintiff declares in case, he affirms the contract of hiring, and the plea of infancy is a good defense to such
an action; for he cannot affirm the contract, and at the same time,
by alleging a tortious breach thereof, deprive the defendant <>f
his plea of infancy." 1 ., From the moment an infant becomes a
trespasser," it is said, in another case following this," his plea of
infancy fails him." • But as this doctrine rests npon the fact that
the plaintiff, who is allowed a choice of remedies in such cases,

\Vilt-y, 23 Vt. 355 ; Hall 0. Oorcoran,

107 Mass. 251; Schcnk v. Strong, 4 N.

J. 87.

' Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251,

256. See. om the general subject,

Tucker 0. Morcland, 10 Pct. 58.

‘ WAI.won.'rII, Chancellor, Camp-

bell v. Stakes. 2 Wend. 137, 143-4.

‘ Fish 0. Ferris, 5 Dner,50. And,

see, Moore o. Eastman, 1 Hun, 578;

s. o. 4 N. Y. sup. Ct. ('r. a 0431;

Lewis 0. Littlcﬁeld, 15 Me. 285; 1

Pars. on Cont. 264. Au infant hired a

in obtaining goods fraudulently, with
an intention not to pay for them ; but
this is explained in a subsequt>ut case
as having been probably an action of
trover to recover the vulue of goods
obtained by false representations, and
the title to which consequently did
not pass." Campbell tl. Perkins, 8 N.
Y. 430,440.
1 Homer "· Thwl ng, 8 Pick. 492; S.
C. Ewell's Lead. Cas. 188. See. also,
Fish"· Ferris, :S Duer, 49; Woodman
o. llubiJard, 25 N. H. 78; Towne •·

Wil(•y, 23 Vt. 855 ; llall e. Corcoran,
107 Mass. 2.)1; Schenk "·Strong, 4 H.
J. 87.
1 Hall e. Corcoran. 107 Mass. 251,
256. See, on... the general su'bj~
Tucker e. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58.
1 WALWORTn, Chancellor, Camp.
belle. Stakes, 2 Wend. 137, 1434
' Fish "· Ferris, 5 Duer, ISO. And,
see, Moore e. Eastman, 1 Hun, 578;
S. C. 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (T. & C.) 3'1;
Lewis "· LiltMield, lS Me. 235; 1
P~&rs. on ConL 264. An infamt hired a
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has elected to pursue that which is in form ea: delicto, instead of

109

that which sounds in contract, it is manifest that it cannot be

adopted as a general principle without taking from infants all

legal protection in a large class of contracts. The doctrine has

been sharply criticised in Pennsylvania, whose courts refuse to

follow it,‘ adopting, as applicable to such cases, the language of

Sir J amiss Marvsrmnn, that “ the form of the action cannot alter

the nature of the transaction,” and that, “though the non-per-

formance of that which is originally contract may he made the

subject of an action of tort, the foundation of that action must

still be in contract.” ’

But the weight of authority putting out of view any question

regarding the proper form of action would seem to be with the

New York cases.‘ .

The question whether an infant is liable in tort for falsely

representing himself to be of

mare to ride. He was told she was

not ﬁt for leaping. He allowed a

friend to take her, who undertook to

leap her over the fence, and she fell

and was killed. Brass, J: "The

hu elected to pursue that which is in form n d6liceo, instead of
that which sounds in coL tract, it is manifest that it cannot be
adopted as a general principle without taking from infants all
legal protection in a large class ot' contracts. The doctrine hM
been sharply criticised in Pennsylvania, whose courts refuse to
follow it,' adopting, as applicable to such cases, the language of
Sir J AXEs MaNSFIELD, that "the form of the action caunot alter
the nature of the transaction," and that, "though the non-performance of that which is origiually contract may he made the
subject uf an action of tort, the foundation of that action must
still be in contract." 1
But the weight of authority putting out of view any question
reg-.u·Jing the proper form of action would seem to be with the
New York

CR8CS. 1

rule is plain, both as to married
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women and infants, that you cannot,

by suing as delirto, change the na-

The question whether an infant is liable in tort for falsely
representing himself to be of full age, whereby he induces

ture and extent of their liability.

Herc, however, the mare was let for

the speciﬁc purpose of a. ride along

the road, and for the purpose of be-

ing ridden only by the defendant.

The defendant not only allows his

friend to mount, but allows him to

put the mare lo a fence, for which he

was told she was unﬂt. * * The

defendant is clearly responsible for

the wrong done. * ' To use the

mare as he did was an act of tort,

just as distinct from the contract as

if the dcl't-ndant had run a knife into

her and killed her." Burnard v. Hag-

ﬁe, 14 C. B. (K. B.) 45, 53, 52.

‘Wilt 0. Welsh, 6 Watts, 9. The

ground of this action was, that the

defendant, an infant, had hired a horse

to go to one place, and had driven him

to another and more distant place.

full age, whereby he induces

Declaration in trover. GIBSON, Ch.

J ., reviews the New York and Massa-

chusetts cases, and rejects them as

unsound, holding the defendant not

liable. Penrose 0. Curren, 3 ltawle,

351, was a similar case, except that

there the horse was killed by hard

usage. Says Rooans, J .: “ The

foundation of the action is contract,

and disguise it as you may, it is an

attempt to convert a suit OI iginnlly in

contract into a constructive tort, so as

to charge the infant." Approved in

Livingston 0. Cox, 6 Penn. St. 360,

363. Compare Root 0. Stevenson‘s

.~\dmr., 24 Ind. 115, 120.

' Wezill 0. King, 12 East, 452. And,

see, Stndwell o. Simpler. 54 N. Y. 2&9.

Compare Eaton 0. Hill, 50 N. H. 235,

240. In this last case it is held that

case will lie against an infant for a

positive wrongful act to property

bailed to him, and that it is not neces-

mare to ride. flo was told she was
not ft' for leaping. He allowed a
friend to take her. who undertook to
leap her uvcr the fence, and she fell
and was killed. BYLES, J: "The
rule is plain, both as to married
women and infunts, that you cannot,
by suing a delirto, change the 1111.ture and extent of their liability.
Here. however, the mare was let for
tbe sp{-cific purpose of a ride along
tbe ruad, and for the purpo!<e of being ridden only by the defendant.
The defendant not only allows his
friend to mount. bul allows him to
put the mare to a fence, for which he
· was told she was unfit. • • Tho
defendant is clearly rcspousiblc fur
the wrun.~ done. • • To use tho
marc :1s he did was an act of tort,
just I&S distinct from the contract as
if tbtl ddentlant bad run a knife into
her and killet.l her." Burnard"· Haggis, 14 C. B. (N. e.) 45, 53, 52.
'Wilt "· Welsh, 6 Watts, 9. The
ground of this action was, that the
defendant, an infant, had hired a horse
to go to one place, and had driven him
to another and more dhltant place.

Declaration In trover.

GIBSON,

Ch.

J., reviews the New York and Massa.
chusetttl cases, and rejects them as
unsound, holding the dcft·ntlant not
liable. Penrnse "· c"urrcn, S Hawle,
351, was a. similar cnse, except that
there the horse was killed by hard
usage. Says Roo Ens, J.: "Tho
foundation of the action is contract,
and disguise it as you may, it is an
attempt to convert a suit originally in
contract lntu a constructive tort, so s.i
to charge the lufant... Approved in
Livin~rston "· Cox, 6 Penn. St. 860,
363. Compare Rot•t "· Stevenson's
Admr., 24 Ind. 115, 120.
1 Weull "· King-, 12 East, 452.
And,
sec, Stmlwcll "· ::::hupter. 54 N.Y. 2-lO.
Compare Eaton "· Hill, 50 N. H. 23.1,
240. In this lust case it i~ held that
case will lie n~ainst an infnnt for a
positive wrongful act to property
bailed to him, and that it is not nccp,;.
sary, as was held in Campbell "·
Stakes, to bring trespnss. See, also,
Schenk"· Strong, 4 N.J. 87.
: See, besides the cases ref<•rred to
in Maine snd New H:tmp~hire, Story
on Sales, ~ ~; 1 Pl\rs. on Cool 816.
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another to contract with him to his prejudice, is one upon which

110
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great differences of judicial opinion have been expressed. In

England it is thoroughly established that he is not liable.‘ The

English cases have often been approved in this country, and the

tendency of authority here is with them.’ But other oases hold

the contrary.‘

‘ Johnson 0. Pye, 1 Lev. 169; 1 Sid.

258, and 1 Keb. 905; Price v. Hewett,

B Exch. 146; Liverpool, etc., Associa-

tion -0. Fairhurst, 9 Exch. 422; Bart-

another to contract with him to his prejudice, is one upon which
great differences of judicial opinion have been expressed. In
England it is thoroughly established that he is not liable.' The
English cases have often been approved in this country, and the
tendency of authority here is with them.• But other cases hold
the contrary.•

lett o. Wells, 31 L. J. Q. 13.57: S. C.

1 B. & S. 836; Wright v. Leonard, 11

J. Scott (N. s.), 258; De R00 v. Foster,

Ib. 272.

‘Brown 0. Dunham, 1 Root, 2'72;

Geer v. Hovey, Ib. 179; Wilt o. Welsh,

6 Watts, 9; Curtin 0. Patton, 11 S. &

R 309; Stoolfodz 0. Jenkins, 12 S.&R.

403; Livingston 0. Cox, 6 Penn. St.

360; Kean 0. Coleman, 89 Penn. St.

299; Brown 0. McCune, 5 Sandi". (S. C.)

224; Homer 0 Thwing, 3 Pick. 492;
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Merriam 0. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40;

Carpenter 0. Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142;

Burns v. Hill, 19 Geo. 22; Kilgore '0.

Jordan, 17 Texas, 341; Tucker 0.

Moreland, 10 Pet. 59.

’ See Ward v. Vance, 1 N. & Mc-

Cord, 197; Peigne 0. Sutlitfe, 4 Mc-

Cord, 887; Fitz /n. Hall, 9 N. H. 441;

Norris o. Vance, 3 Rich. 164; Sea-

hrook 0. Gregg, 2 S. C. (N. B.) 79. In

Fitz 1:. Hall, supra, PARKER, Ch. J.,

undertakes to lay (lown a general rule

its follows: “The principle," he says,

“ .\C@IIl5 to be that, if the tort or fraud

ol’ an infant arises from a breach of

contract, although there may have

been false representations or conceal-

ment respecting the subject matter of

it. the infant cannot be charged for

this breach of his promise or contract

by a change in the form of action.

But if the tort is subsequent to the

contract, and not a mere breach of it,

but a distinct. willful and positive

wrong in itself, then, although it may

be connected with a contract, the in-

fant is liable. The representation in

Johnson '0. Pye, and in the present case,

that the defendant was of full age.

was not part of the contract, nor did

it grow out of the contract, or in any

way result from it. It is not any part

of its terms, nor was it the considers

tion upon which the contract was

founded. No contract was matle about

the defendant's age. The sale of the

goods was not n. consideration for

this aﬂirmation or representation.

The representation was not a founda-

tion for an action of assumpsit. The

matter arises purely avdclicto. The

fraud was intended to induce, and did

induce, the plaintiff to make a con-

tract for the sale of the lots, but that

by no means makes it part and parcel

of the contract. It was antecedent to

the contract, and if an infant is liable

1 Johnson e. Pye, 1 Lev.169; 1 Bid.
2.'5!i, and 1 Keb. 9015; Price "· Hewett,
8 Exch. 146; Liverpool, etc., Association "· Fairhurst, 9 Excb. 422; Bart.
lett"· Wells, 81 L. J. Q. B. 57: EtC.
1 B. & 8. 836; Wright "· Leonard, 11
J. Scott (N. s.), 208; De Roo"· Foster,
lb. 272.
'Brown e. Dunham, 1 Root, 272;
Gcer "·Hovey, lb. 179; Wilt e. Welsh,
6 Watts, 9; Curtin"· Patton, 11 8. &
R 309; Stoolfodu.Jenkins, 12S.&R.
403; Livingston e. Cox, 6 Penn. St.
3!i0; Kean "· Coleman, 89 Penn. St.
299; Brown e. McCune, 5 S&Udf. (S.C.)
224: Homer" Thwing, 3 Pick. 492;
Merriam"· Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40;
Carpenter "· Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142;
Burus v. Hill, 19 Geo. 22; Kilgore e.
Jordan, 17 Texas, 841; Tucker e.
:Morelanri, 10 Pet. 59.
1 See Ward "· Vance, 1 N. & MeCord, 197; Peigne "· :;utlitl'e, 4 McCord, 387; Fitz "· Hall, 9 N. H. 441;
Norris "· Vance, S Hich. 164; Sea.lm>ok "· Gregg, 2 B. C. (N. 8.) 79. In
Fitz "· Hall, supra, PARKER, Ch. J.,
undertakes to lay down a general rule
m: follows: "The principle," he says,
">-eems to be thut, if the tort or fraud
of an infant arises from a breach of
contract, although there may have
ltl'en false representations or concealment respecting the subject matter of
it. the infant cannot be charged for
this breach of his promise or contract
by a change in tl.te form of action.
But if the tort is subsequent to the
contract. and not a mere breach of it,
but a distinct. willful and positive
wrong in itself, 1.hen, although it may

be connected with a contract, the In-

fant is liable. The representation in
J obnson "· Pye, and in the present case,
that the defendant was of full age,
was not part of the contract, nor did
it grow out of the contract, or in any
way result from il It is not any part
of its terms, nor was it the consideration upon which the contract was
founded. No contract was made about
the defendant's age. The sale of the
goods was not a consideration for
this affirmation or representation.
The representation was not a foundation for an action of assumpsiL The
matter arises purely a delicto. The
fraud was intended to induce, and did
induce, the plaintiff to make a contract for the sale of the lots, but that
by no means makes it part and parcel
of the contract. It was antecedent w
the contract, and if an infant is liable
for a positive wrong connected with
a contract, but arising after a contract
bas been made, he may well be answerable for one committed before
the contract was entered into, although it may have led to the contract."
This decision is pronounced by the
editors of the American Leading
Cases, rn their notes to Tucker tt.
Moreland, Vol. I., to be "clearly unsound," and they say that "the representation, by itself, was no~ actionable,
for it was not an injury, and the
avoidance of the contr11Ct, ·which
alone made it so, was the exercise of
a perfect legal right on the part of
thr> infant. The contract in such a
case as Fitz "· Hall furms an essential
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accords to an infant does not go so far as to vest in him the title

to property which he has obtained by fraud, or on a contract

which he disaflirms. If he still retains the property when the

contract is disailirmed, he must restore it on demand, and on his

failure to do so, the original owner may obtain it on replevin, or

recover its value in an action of trover.' And where the prop-

erty was obtained by fraud the infant has been held liable, though

the conversion took place before the time when the price was

payable by the terms of the fraudulent contract.’

As the doctrine respondeat superior rests upon the relation of

master and servant, which depends upon contract, actual or im-

part of the right of action, and no

liability growing out of contract can

be asserted against an infant. The

test of an action against an infant is,

whether a liability can be made out

without taking notice of the con-

The protection against perdonal responsibility which the law
accords to an infant does not go so far as to vest in him the title
to property which he has obtained by fraud, or on a contract
which he disaffirms. If he still retains the property when the
contract is disaffirmed, he must restore it on demand, and on his
failure to do so, the original owner may obtain it on replevin, or
recover its value in an action of trover.• And where the property was obtained by fraud the infant has been held liable, though
the conversion took place before the time when the price was
Jmyable by the terms of the fraudulent contract.'
As the doctrine 1'espondeat 8Up6riO'r rests upon the relation of
master and servant, which depends upon contract, actual or im-

tract." But Mr. Parsons, who ap-

proves the case, says the learned

editors mistook the real ground of

the decision in Fitz Q. Hall, which
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was that a fraudulent representation,

whereby money or goods are obtained

by an infant, is an actionable injury.

1 Pars. on Cont. 5th Ed. 318, note.

See Walker o. Davis, 1 Gray, 506. The

case was approved by Rnnmnnn, Ch.

J , in Towne v. Wiley, 23 Vt. 359, but

denied to be sound in Gilson 0. Spear,

38 Vt. 311, 315, in which it is said:

" We think that the fair result of the

American as well as of the English

cases is that an infant is liable in an

action an ddicto for an actual and

\\ illful fraud only in cases in which

lhe form of action does not suppose

that a contract has existed; but that

where the grammar of the fraud con-

sists in a transaction which really

originated in contract, the plea of

infancy is a good defense." The

principle thus stated would exclude

nmny cases in which it is admitted

an infant is liable. With deference

it may be suggeswd whether, where a

party has never intended to rely upon

the contract of an infant. or to have

any contract dealings at all with one,

justice to him and "protection" to

the infant does not require that the

fraud shall be dealt with in like man-

ner as would any other distinct tort-

ious act. In Eckstein n. Frank, 1

Duly, 884, Judge DALY denies the

soundness of Johnson u. Pye, and con-

siders lt overruled in New York by

Wallace 1:. Morss, 5 Hill, 392. All the

cases agree that, if an infant is sued

on his contract, his fraud will not

preclude his relying upon his infancy

as a defense in that suit. Burley 0.

Russell, 10 N. H. 184; Merriam 0.

Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40; Brown 0.

McCunc, 5 Saudi‘. (S. C.) 244; Stud-

well o. Shatter, 54 N. Y. 2&9. There

are statutes in some States rendering

infants responsible for their false as-

sertions of majority. See Schouler,

pan of the rigM of action, and no
liability growing out of contract can
bt! &Sl!Crted agKinst an infant. The
tt-st of an action against an infant is,
whether a liability can be made out
without taking notice of the contract." But .Mr. Parsons, who APproves the case, says the learned
editors mistook the real ground of
the decision in Fitz "· Hall, which
wRB that a fraudulent representation,
whereby money or goods are obtained
by an infllDt, is an actionable injury.
1 Pars. on Cont. lith Ed. 318, note.
S.·c Walker"· Davis, 1 Gray, 600. The
cJ&se wRS approved by REDFIELD, Ch. '
J , in Towne e. Wiley, 23 Vt. 859, but
dl·nied to be sound in Gilson e. B[Jcar,
a~:~ Vt. 311, 313, in which it is said:
"We think that &.he fair result of the
AIDerican as well as of the English
('a:les is that an Infant is liable in an
liCtion aJl delicto for an actual and
\\ illful fraud only in CliSes in which
tlcc form of action docs not suppose
that a contract has existed; but that
where the graru11v" of the fraud con.
sists in a transaction which really
originated in contract, the plea of
infancy is a good defense." The
principle thus stated would exclude
many cases in which it is admitted
an infant is liable. With deference
1L ma7 be suggea.ted. whether, where a

party has never intended to rely upon
the contract of an infant, or to have
any contract dealings at all with one,
justice to him and "protection 11 to
the infant does not require that the
fraud shall be dealt with in like manner u would any other distinct tort.
ious act. In Eckstein e. Frank, 1
Daly, 334, Judge DALY denies the
soundn('SS of Johnson"· Pye, and con.
siders it overruled in New York by
Wallace"· Morss, 6 Hill, 392. All the
cases agree that, if an infant is sued
on his contract, his fraud will not
preclude his relying upon his infancy
as a d<'fensc in that suit. Burley e.
Russell, 10 N. H. 184; !Ierrinm e.
Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40; Brown e.
llcCuue, .> S:mdf. (8. C.) 244; Stud.
well "· Shafter, 54 N.Y. 219. There
are statutes in some States rendering
infants responsible for their fnlse u.
sertions of majurity. See Scltouler,
Dom. Hcl. 570; Ewell'& Lead. Cas.
205,206.
'.Milia"· Graham, 1 New Rep.140;
Badger e. Phinnt·y, 15 .MilliS. 359;
Walker"· Davis, 1 Gray, 506; Kilgore
e. Johnson, 17 Texas, 841; Purs. on
Cont. ::itlt Ed. 819; Hccvc, Dom. Rei.
214; ~chouler, D•1m. Rei. 555.
• Walker "· Davis, 1 Gray, 006;
Bchouler, Dom. Rei. GM-t.
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plied, it is obvious that it can have no application in the case of
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an infant employer, and he, therefore, is not responsible for torts

of negligence by those in his service.‘ Nor can he be made a

trespasser by relation through the ratiﬁcation of a wrongful act

which another has assumed to do on his behalf, but without his

knowledge.’

It seems that if an infant tortiously convert the money of

another to his own use, or tortiously dispose of the property of

another, receiving money therefor, the tort may be waived and

assumpsit maintained.’ The reasons for this are well set forth

in a Vermont case.

‘Robbins o. Mount, 4 Robt. 553;

Sr. C. 33 How. Pr. 34.

' Burnhaln o. Seaverns, 101 Mass.

860. See Armitage 0. Widoe, 36 Mich.

124. Nor is he liable as inn-keeper

upon the custom of the realm._ Cross

plied, it is obvious that it can have no application in the case of
an infant employer, and he, therefore, is not responsible for tort&
of negligence by those in his service.' Nor can he be made a
trespasser by relation through the ratification of a wrongful act
which another has assumed to do on his behalf, but without his
knowledge.'
It seems that if an infant tortiously convert the money of
another to his own use, or tortiously dispose of the property of
another, receiving money therefor, tho tort may be waived and
assumpsit maintained.• The reasons for this are well set forth
in a Vermont case.

0. Andrews, Carth. 161; Cro. Eliz. 622.

'Bristow v. Eastman, 1 Esp 172;

Shaw v. Coﬁin, 53 Me. 254. See Peigne

v. Sutclitfe, 4 McCord, 387; Munger

0. Hess, 23 Barb. '75.
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‘ Elwcll v. Martin, 32 Vt. 217, Anms,

J.: “The defendant, a minor, tort-

iously, and without the knowledge or

consent of the plaintiﬂ', took from

him one hundred and ninety dollars

in money: is he liable therefor in as-

sumpsit for money had and received?

It is admitted that if he were an adult

he would be so liable. Where prop-

erty has been tortiously taken and

converted into money, the plaintiff

may sue in tort, or he may waive the

tort and sue in assumpsit. When it

is said that he waives the tort, it is

not meant that he does any act or

makes any averment in his declara-

tion to that effect. He simply brings

assumpsit instead of trespass or trover,

and thereby foregoes the advantage

he would have if he sued tortwise to

claim higher or exemplary damages,

and to proceed against the person of

the defendant. By bringing assump-

sit he pursues a remedy milder and

more favorable to the defendant. The

defendant cannot be worse and may

be better otf by being sued ea: am-

tractu. Such is the law as applicable

to adults.

“It is also admitted that the de-

fendant is liable for the tort, and that

the damages recoverable in an action

an dalicto cannot be less than the

money tortiously tukcn, which would

be the measure of damages in as-

sumpsit. But it is claimed that al-

though infancy is no bar to the cause

of action in tort, although the infant

is fully liable for the tort, still if the

plaintiff elect to sue in assumpsit,

then the infant, on account of the

form of action, can plead his infancy

in bur of the suit.

“ The pica of infancy is allowed to

protect the infant from imposition, to

shield him against the consequences

of his inexperience and ignorance.

1 Robbins e. Mount, .& Robl lSlS3;
& C. 83 How. Pr. 84.
1 Burnham "· Seavems, 101 Mass.
860. See Armitage "· Widoe, 116 Mich.
124. Nor is he liable as inn-keeper
upon the custom of the realm .. Cross
e. Andrews, Carth. 161; Cro. Eliz. 622.
1 Bristow "· Enstm11n, 1 Esp 172;
Shaw"· Coffin,~ Me. 2.34. See Peigne
"·Sutcliffe, 4 McCord, 387; :Munger
"· Hess, 28 Barb. 7/'i.
'Elwell 11. Martin, 82 Vt. 217, ADDIS,
J.: "The defendant, a minor, tortiously, and without the knowledge or
consent of the plaintiff, took from
him one hundred and nmcty dollars
in money: is he liable therefor in assumpsit for money had and received?
It is admitted that If he w<'re an adult
he would be so liable. Where prop.
erty has been tortiously tak<'n and
converted into money, the plaintiff
may sue in tort, or he may waive the
tort and sue in assumpsit. When it
is said that he waives the tort, it is
not ml'ant that he does any act or
makes any averment in his declara.
tion to that effect. He simply brings
assumpsit instead oftrcspt1SS or trover,
and thereby foregoes the advantage
he would have if he sued tortwise to
claim higher or exemplary damages,
and to proceed against the person or
t.he defendant. By bringing assump.
sit. he pursues a remedy milder and

more favorable to the defendant. The
def<'ndant cannot be worse and may
be better off by being sued t:~: et•n,.
lractu. Such is the law as applictLule
to adults.
"It is also admitted that the defendant is liable for the tort. and that
the damnges recoverable in an action
a dBlictu cannot be less thau the
money tortiously tnken, which would
be the mensure of dama~rs in assumpsit. But it Is claimed that although infancy is no bar to the cause
of action In tort, although the infant
is fully liable for the tort, still if the
plaintiff elect to sue in assumpsit,
U1en the infant, on account of the
form of action, can plead his infancy
In bar of the suit.
"The plea of infancy is allowed to
protect the infant from imposition, to
shiehl him against the conscquenc1·s
of his inexpt>rience and Ignorance.
Hence, his express promises do nnt
bind him. Even for ncccssarh·-..
which he mnst havt>, or otherwise he
would sturve, he is not liable by virtue of any expt·ess promise; for if he
promise to pay an unreasonable price
for them, he is not bound by such
promise, but only to pay a reasonaLio
price which is implied.
"As infancy d<>C~S not protect him
from the consequences of and liability for his tortious acts, why should

1’.-\llTl l-IS ll l'll.I)
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It has been decided in Illinois, that if an infant makes a. pur-
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chase for cash, and pretends to

it furnish him with defense against

them when sued ea: contractu instead

It has been decided in UlinoiR, that if an infant makes a purchase for cash, and pretends to make payment by delivery of a

of an deliao? The right to elect the

form of action belongs to the plain-

tiff. The infant cannot be injured,

but may be beneﬁted by being sued

in assumpsit. Why may not an in-

fant be allowed to have a milder

remedy brouzht against him as well

as adult tort lcasors?

"The promisc upon which he is

made liable is not an express one.

The law implies from it the wrongful

act. It is not a contract in which he

may have been cltcuted, and against

which infancy shit-lds him, but a will-

ml wrong which he has committed

against another, and in which the

law implies the obligation to make
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the restitution. Here the necessity is

to protect, not the infant, but socit ty.

The plea should cease when the rea-

son for it ceases. Although the action

is assumpsit, yet the substance is in

tort, and when the substance has been

made to appear by proof, we see no

rczthnn why the form of action which

is favorable to the infant may not be

maintained. In the sul)~t:tnce ot‘ the

proceedings there is no anomaly and

none as to the form which is not fully

answered by allowing such suits to

stand a§_':tinst. adults.

“The action, we think, is ihlly sus-

tained by authority. Bristow v. East-

man, rcponcd in 1 Esp. 172, and in

Pcake, 223, is an authority to show

that an infant who has embezzled

money may be sued for it in assump-

sit.

“As reported in Espinasae, it is a

dinct decision on the point. In

Peake it is said that the plaintiﬂ‘

proved that the defendant acknowl-

edged the fraud and promised to pay

after he came of age, so that the point

make payment by delivery of a

was not determined. In this view it

is but the doctrine of Lord Kenyon.

We notice, however, that the case is

more fully reported in Espinasse, and

seems to bear upon its face the marks

of greater accuracy and a more

thorough knowledge of the case.

“ The doctrine there held by Lord

Kenyon, that an infuut is liable in

assumpsit for mon'-y he has embez-

zled, has been recognized and adopted

by sevcral elementary writers on the

subject of infancy; by Judce Reeve,

in his Domestic Relations, 246; by

Prof. Grecnlcaf, 2 Grcenleaf's Ev.

Sec. 368, and by Story on Contracts,

p. 64. It is qut-stioned upon what

seems to us insuﬁlciont ground in an

article in the American Jurist, Janu-

It tbrnlab him with defE>nse against
1bem when sued ae contradrs iostcnd
ot a d6lido 1 The right to elect the
form of action belongs to the plaintiff. The infant cannot be injured,
but may be benefited by being sued
in lbi'Ump~it. Why may not an infant be allowed to have a milder
remelly brou~ht against him u well
u ~Mlult Lort 1ca~ors t
"The promis1• upon whkh be Ia
made liable is not an exprt's.'l one.
'lbe Jaw impJie!'l from it the wrongful
act. n is not a contruct in which he
may have bt"en cheated, and against
which infancy ~>hi!'ldtl him, but a willf•Jl wrong which ht.> has committt•d
against another, and in which the
Jaw implies the obligation to make
ahe restitution. Here the necessity is
to Jlrotect, not the infant, but society.
Tht> plea t~hould cease when the rea.
110n fi,r it ef'a.~. AJthou~h the action
b as>~umpsit, yet the suhstiUlce is in
tort, and when the substance has been
m!Mie to appear by proof, we see no
rell"on why the form of action which
Ia favorable to the infant may not be
maintained. In the sub.. ti\DCP of the
proc~in~s tht're is no anomaly and
none as to the form which is not fully
annrered by allowing such salta to
l'tand a;:ainst &~luJta.
.. The action, we think, Ia tally austalnt'<l by authority. Bristow c. Eastman, reported in 1 E~p. li2, and in
Peake, 223, is an authority to show
that an infant who has embezzled
money may be sued for it in assump.
•it.
" As reported In Eapln8811e, It Is a
dire-ct dccl<Jion on the point. In
Peake lt Ia A&id that &he plaintiff
proved that the defendant acknowled~ the traud and promised to pay
after he came of age, au that the polo&

8

was not determinPd. In this view It
Is bat the lloctrine of Lord Kenynn.
We notice, however, that the CI\IO is
more fully reported in Espin~. and
seems to bear upon ita face the marks
of grrater accun1cy and a more
thorou)Zh knowlt-dl{e of the CII..'W!.
"The doctrine tbt.>re held by Lord
Kenyon, that an infaut ia liable in
assump::oit for mon"y he has emucz.
zled, has been rccognizrd and adopted
by ~>Cv(•ral f'lemcntary writf'l'l! on the
subject of Infancy; by Judge Reeve,
in his Domestic Relations, 246; by
Prof. Greenleaf, 2 Orecnleaf'e Ev.
Bee. 868, and by Story on Contracts,
p. 64. It Ia qm·stioned upon what
seems to us insnfflcirnt ground in an
arti<•le in the Amt-rican Jurist, January. lti311. See, also, Bing. on Infancy,
p. 111. and 1 Am. Leading Ca.'!es, 261.
"The defendant has citetl several
easrs to show that to suP in a.<1sumpsit
the plaintiff mast waive the ton, and
that then the case must proceed u If
the money was reet>ived without
wron~, and the defendant only liable
for a breach of contract. Such is, unqu(•stionahly, the theory of the law,
and the prinriple i~ rt.>cognized in the
cases ciLed. Conant c. Raymond, 2
Aik. 248; J<':sher c. Jail Commis,iou.
ers, 8 Vt. 328; Young c. Ma111hall &
Poland, 21 E. C. L. 48'7 (8 Bing. 43).
"But this does not settle the qucs.
tion here at issue, whrther an infant
tortiously tak lng mon"y C'ILD ph•ad
tnfuncy in har wht.>n sued In BS..'IUmp.
sit, for the validity of a plea as a defense may, and ordinarily should
turn, not upon the form of the action,
but ita snb>~tnntial mrrit. Indeed, the
langtu\ge of Ch. J. Tindall, 1n the
case last cited. shows upon what
groWld<J and why a party may waive
the tort, and the reasons 188lgned

•
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check on a bank where he has no funds, the title to the property
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does not pass, and its value may be recovered in trover.‘

Torts by Drunkards. The fact that a tort was committed

while a defendant was intoxicated is no excuse whatever. This

has been held in actions for slander.’ It is conceivable. however,

check on a bank where he has no funds, the title to the property
does not pass, and its value mn.y be recovered in trover. 1

that the amount of the recovery might be considerably affected

by a showing that the wrong was committed under such condi-

tions that no one would have been likely to attach importance to

the utterances.

show that it may as well be waived

in the case of an infant as of an adult.

He speaks of it as a general rule, that

‘no party is bound to sue in tort,

where, by converting the action into

an action of contract, Iw does not pre-

irzrlice the defendant, and, generally

The fact that a tort was committed
while a defendant was intoxicated is no excuse whate\"er. This
l1as be~n held in actions for slander.' It is conceivable, however,
that the amount of the recovery might be considerably affected
by a showing that the wrong was committed nntler such conditions that no one would have been likely to attach importance to
the utterances.
Torts by Drunkards.

speaking. it is more favorable to the

defendant to be sued in contract.’

“ In the same case, Bosanquet and

Alderson, J udgcs, say that by waiving

the tort the plaintiff does not aﬁirm

the wrongful acts of the defendant,
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but merely waives his claim to dam-

ages for the wrong, and is content to

sue for the proceeds of the wrongful

act

“Our attention has been called to

the principle generally recognized

and established in this State in West

0. Moore, 14 Vt. 449, that where the

liability really arises by breach of a

contract, though accompanied by

fraud or tort, the plaintiff shall not

be allowed to change the form of

action and hold the infant liable an

deliclo for the tort. The reason of the

decisions stands upon the plain

ground of protecting the infant

against his liabilities really arising

upon contract. In tort the infant

might be liable for greater damages

than upon contract, and when the

substantive cause of action is upon

a contract, he ought not to be liable

at all The cases under this head are

numerous. Sometimes it is diiﬁcult

to tell which most prepondcrates, the

contract or the tort, and the rule

which has been sometimes applied as

a tort, that the conversion must be

willful, and not constructive by

breach of the contract, seems just in

theory, though very diﬂieult in prac-

tical application. See the cases on

this point collected in 1 Am. Lead.

Cases, 260, at seq. -

“But it by no means follows that

because an infant may not be made

liable for his contracts by changing

the form of action to tort, that he

shall not therefore be made liable ea:

contrartu, where he is in fact liable

for his wrongful acts. and the law

implies from them in all other cases

the promise and the duty of making

restitution. To extend to an infant

the privilege of defeating his legal

liability by setting up his infancy as

a defense, not to the cause of action,

~how

that it may as well be waived
in the case of an infant as of an adult.
He speaks of it as a general rule, that
• no party is bound to sue in tort,
where, by converting the action into
an action of contract, lte dou not pre;udie6 tM difendnnt, and, generally
speakin~. it is more favorable to the
defendant to be sued in cont•·act.'
"In the same case, Bosanq uet and
Aluerson, Judges, say that by waiving
the tort the plaintiff does not affirm
tho wrongful acts of the defendant,
but merely waives his claim to damages for the wrong, and is content to
sue for the proceeds of the wrongful
act.
"Our attention has been called to
the principle generally recognized
and established in this State in West
"· Moore, 14 Vt. 44!), that where the
liability really arises by breach of a
contract, though accompanied by
fraud or tort, the plaintitl" shall not
be allowed to chango tho form of
action and hold the infant linblc e-JJ
delicto for the tort. The reason of the
decisions stands upon the plain
ground of protecting the infant
against his liabilities really arising
upon contract. In tort the infant
might be Hable for greater damnges
than upon contract, and when the
substantive cause of action is upon
a contract, he ought not to be liable
at all. The caaea under this bead are

numerous. Bom('tim('s it Is difficult
to tell which most preponderates, the
contract or the tort, and the rule
which hi\S ooen sometimes applied u
a tort, that the conversion must be
willful, and not constructive by
breach of the contract, seems just in
theory, though very difficult in practical application. Bee the cases on
this point collected in 1 A.m. Lead.
Cuse.o~, 2GO, a srq.
"But it by no m('ans follows that
because an infant may not be made
liable for his contracts by changing
the form of action to tort, that he
shall not therefore be made liable a
contrlll'tu, where he is in fact liable
for his wron~?:ful acts. and the law
implies from them in all other cases
the promise and the duty of making
restitution. To extend to an infant
the privilege of defeating his legal
liability by setting up his infancy a.<~
a defense, not to the cause of action,
but to tile form in whicll it is declared
upon, would not, we think, be a reasonable conclusion from the acknowledged prineiplcs upon which the
privilege of infancy is granted to
him, and is not required by any of the
rules regulating the forms of action.
On the contrary, it would convert the
shield into a sword."
• .1\Iathews "· Cowan, 59 Ill. 841.
1 McKee tJ. Ingalls, 5 DL 80; Reed
"· Hlll'per, 25 Iowa, 8'7.
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Torts Committed under Duress. In general, one cannot ex-

(-1.156 a tort by showing that he committed it under duress. In

Tennessee, however, it has been decided that it is a good defense

to show that a tort was committed under the orders of the defend-

a.nt’s military superior, which at the time he was compelled to

obey.‘

Torts of Married Women. Wliere husband and wife jointly

commit a wrong, the action tlierefor is properly brought against

the husband alone, for the whole may be assumed to be his

Torts Committed under Duress. In general, one cannot ex<:use a tort by showing that he committed it under dnre:;s. In
Tennessee, however, it has been decided that it is a good defense
to show that a tort was committed under the orders of tho defendant's military superior, which at the time he was compelled to
obey.•

act.’ But, “as a general rule, a married woman is answer-

able for her wrongful acts, including frauds, and she may be

sued in respect of such acts jointly with her husband, or sep-

arately if she survives him. The liability is hers; though,

living with the husband, it must be enforced in an action against

her and him, which, to charge him, must be brought to a con-

clusion during their joint lives.”‘ If she survives him, the

suit may proceed against her separately.‘ There is a presump-

tion, however, corresponding to that which is made in the crim-

inal law, that if a \vrong is committed by the wife, in the pres-

once of her husband, it must have been committed by his consent

and under his inﬂuence, and, consequently, is his wrong rather
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than that of the wife, and should be redressed in a suit against

him alone.‘ But any such presumption is liable to be overthrown

by evidence.‘ “ The true view is,” says Mr. Bishop,’ “ that when

l McKee] o. Bass, 5 Cold. 151; Wal-

hr 0. Parker, 5 Cold. 476. In these

cases the dell-ndants were soldiers in

the confederate army, and mi ght, per-

hape, have justiﬂcd under the rules

of war. Compare Mitchell 0. Har-

mony, 18 How. 115. See Buron 0.

Denman, 2 Exch. 167, in which the

trespass of the defendant in breaking

up the harracoon of the plaintiff on

the coast of Africa, and freeing his

Torts of Married Women. Where husband and wife jointly
<:ommit a WI'Ong, the action therefor is properly brought against
the husband alone, for the whole may be assumed to be his
act.' Bnt, "a.s a general rule, a married woman is answernble filr her wrongful acts, including frauds, anu she may be
sued in respect of such t&cts jointly with her husband, or separately if she survives him. The liability is hers; though,
Jiving with the husband, it must be enforced in an action against
her and him, which, to charge him, must be brought to a condnsiqn during their joint lives.'" If she survives him, the
.-uit may proceed against her separately.• There is a presumption, however, corresponding to that which is made in the criminal law, that if a wrong is committed by the wife, in the prest·nce of her husband, it must have been committed by his consent
and under his influence, and, consequently, is his wrong rather
than that of the wife, and should be redressed in a suit floO'Rinst
him alone.• But any such presumption is liable to be o\·erthrown
by evidence.' "The true view is," says Mr. Bishop,'" that when

slaves, was held justiﬂed by the sub-

stqucnt ratiﬁcation of the act by the

government, this being equivalent to

a prior command.

' Com. Dig. Btlfull & Fcme. V.; 2

Sattnd. Pl.& Ev. 192; hlciieowen 0.

Johnson, 1 McCord,578; Cassin v. De-

lany, 38 N. Y. 178.

‘ WILLEB, J ., Wright 0. Leonard, 11

C. B. (rt. s.) 258, 266. lf a divorce takes

place between them, the husband is

no longer liable for her previous torts.

Capel 0. Powell, 17 C. B. (N. s.) ‘T43.

‘Cupel 0. Powell, 17 (J. B. (N. s.)

744; Smith o. Taylor, 11 Geo. 20, 22;

Estill 0. Fort. 2 Dana. 237; Hawk o.

Harman, 5 Binn. 43.

° Bulls. B1-nnett, 21 Ind. 427; Baker

o. Young, 44 Ill. 42; Brazil o. Moran,

8 Minn. 236.

° Miller 0. Sweitzer, 22 Mich. 891;

Cassie 0. Delaney, 38 N. Y. 178.

" Law of Married Women, Vol. 2,

§ 258.

• McKeel o. Bass, 5 (',old. 151; Wal.
ll'r o. Parker, 5 Cold. 476. In these
cases the defendants were soldiers in
the confederate army, and might, per.
haps. have justified under the rules
of war. Compare Mitchell "· lliLJ'.
mooy, 18 How. 115. See Buron o.
Denman, 2 Exch. 167, in which the
trespllSS of the defendant in breaking
up tbe barracoon of the plaintiff on
Lhe co11st of Africa, and freeing his
al~tves, wRB held justified by the sub.
M q ucnt ratification of the act by tho
guvernmcot. this being equivalent to
a prior C(\mrnnod.
• Com. Dig. Baron & Feme. V.; 2
&und. Pl. & Ev. 192; M.cKeowen 11.

Johnson, 1 }fcCord, 578; Cassin 11. De.
lany, 38 N.Y. 178.
1 WILLES. J., Wright"· Leonard,11
C. B. (N. 8.) 258,206. If 11 divorce takes
plnce between them, the busbnnd is
no longer liable for her previoll!l torts.
Capel"· Powell, 17 C. B. lN. s.) 743.
• Cupel "· Powell, 17 U. B. (N. 8.1
744; Smith"· Taylor, 11 Gco. 20, 22;
Estill 11. Fort, 2 Dana, 237; Hawk e.
Harman, 5 Binu. 43.
• llnllt~. Bl·nnett, 21 Ind. 427; Baker
" · Youn~. 44 Ill. 42; Brazil "· Moran,
8 1\linn. 230.
1 Miller 11. Sweitzer, 22 Mich. 891;
Cassino. Delancy, lm N. Y. 178.
'Law of Married Women, Vol. 2,
§258.

116 Till‘) LAW OF TORTB.

the husband is present during the commission of a tort by the
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wife, whether himself actually participating in it or not, prime

facie the wrong shall be deemed his alone; but both in civil and

criminal causes, this primafacie case may be rebutted, and each

of the two may be deemed, in law, the doer of the wrong, the

same as though they were unmarried.‘ Therefore, if husband

and wife join in a malicious prosecution, she being really an

active party as well as he, she may be joined with him as defend-

ant in an action to recover damages for it, though she performed

no act in which he was not present concurring." And it is the

same where they join in a battery.”' If the wife is the active

party in a tort, the declaration will either count upon the tort as

that of the wife alone, or as that of both husband and wife;‘

though, if the case be in trovcr, the conversion must be averrcd

to be for the use of the husband.‘ This was the common law

rule; but where, by statute, the wife retains and acquires real

and personal estate the same as a fe-mme sole, no reason is per-

ceived why she might not be charged with a conversion to her

own use.‘

But the element of contract is as important here as in the law

of infancy. The same reasons which would preclude the indirect

' Citing Marshall 0. Oakes, 51 Me.
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308; Warner -v. Moran, 60 Me. 227;

The Slate *0. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298;

Carleton 0. Haywood, 49 N. H. 314;

Simmons v. Brown, 5 R. I. 299; Tobey

0. Smith, 15 Gray, 535. The husband

and wife may be hel:l jointly liable

for a tort committed by her in his ab-

sence, if it is done at his instigation.

Handy o. Foley, 121 Mass. 259.

the husband is present during the commission of a tort by the
wife, whether himself actually participating in it or not, prim.a
fac-ie the wrong shall be deemed his alone; but both in civil and
criminal causes, this prima facie case may be rebutted, and each
of the two may be deemed, in law, the doer of the wrong, the
same as though they were unmarried.• Therefore, if husband
and wife join in a malicious pros~cution, she being really an
active party as well as he, she may be joiued with him as defend.
ant in an action to recover damages for it, though tihe performed
no act in which he was not present concurriug.' And it is the
1-'ame where they join in a battery." • If the wife is the acti \'e
pa.-ty in a tort, the decla.rution will either count upon the tort~
that of the wife alone, or as that of both husband and wife; •
though, if the case be in trover, the conversion must be averred
to be for the use of the husband.• This wati the common law
rule; but where, by statute, the wife rctain:1 and acquires real
and personal estate the same as a femme Bole, no reason is per.
ceived why she might not be charged with a co11 verBion to her
own use.•
But the element of contract is as important here as in the law
of infancy. The same reasons which would preclude the indirect

’ Referring to Cassin o. Delaney, 38

N. Y. 178. See, also, Simmons 1:.

Brown, 5. R. I. 299, and cases cited.

' Citing Roadcap 0. Sipe, 6 Grat. 213,

and Drnry 1:. Dennis, Yelv. 106. See,

also, Yeates 0. Reed, 4 Blackf. 463;

Estill 0. Fort, 2 Dana, 237; Baker 0.

Young, 44 Ill. 42; Keyworth 0. Hill,

3 B. & A. 685; Vine 0. Saunders, 4

Bing. (N. C.) 96.

‘ Bishop, Law of Married Women,

Vol. 2, § 259.

' Estill 0. Fort, 2 Dana, 237 ; Tobey

0. Smith, 15 Gray, 5115; Kowing v.

Manly, 49 N. Y. 192. 198; Shaw 0.

Hallihan, 46 Vt. 389; S. C. 14 Am.

Rep. 628. Compare Heckle e. Lurvey,

101 Mass. 344; S. C. 3 Am. Rep. 866.

‘Sec Hagebush 11. Ragland, 78 Ill.

40. “ Afemma covert is liable for fraud

committed by her in dealing with her

separate property, or by her husband,

as her agent, to the same extent as in-

diviiuals in all respects capable of

acting sui juz-is. Rowe v. Smith, 45

N. Y. 230; Baum 0. Mullen, 47 N. Y.

577. This liability necessarily re-

sults froin the capacity conferred on

her to acquire, hold and transfer prop

erty, and to deal with her separate 1:3-

tate, as if she were unmarried." An-

LEN,-1., in Vanneman 0. Powers, 56

N. Y. 39, 42.

Citing Marshall e. Oakes, IU Me.
808; Warner "· Moran, 60 Me. 227;
The State "· Clel\ves, 59 Me. 298 ;
Carleton e. Haywood, 49 N.H. 814;
Simmons e. Brown, 5 R. I. 299; Tobey
e. Smith, 15 Gray, 535. The husband
1\nd wife may be heU jointly liable
for a tort committed by her in his absence, if it is done at his instigation.
Handy e. Foley, 121 Mass. 2159.
1 Referring to Cassin e. Delaney, gs
N. Y. 178. See, also, Simmons e.
J~rown, 5. R.I. 299, and cases cited.
• Citing Roadcap e. Bipe, 6 Grat. 218,
and Drury CJ, Dennis, Yelv. 106. Bee,
also, Yeates e. Reed, 4 Blackf. 463;
Estill "· Fort, 2 Dana, 237 ; Baker e.
Young, 44 Ill. 42; Keyworth e. Hill,
8 B. & A. 685; Vine e. Saunders, 4:
Bing. (N.C.) 96.
• Bishop, Law of Married Women.
Vol. 2, § 259.
1

' Estill e. Fort, 2 Dana, 237 ; Tobey
e. Smith, 1~ Gray, 5:15; K:owing e.
Manly, 49 N. Y. 192. 198; Shaw •·
HallibBn, 46 Vt. 889 ; B. C. 14 Ani.
Rep. 628. Compare Heckle CJ. LufVt\y,
101 Mass. 844; B. C. 8 Am. Rep. 866.
• Bee Hagebush "· Ragland, 78 Ill.
.tO. " AfemmB cof!ert is I iable for fr~tud
committed by her in dealing with her
separate property, or by ber husband,
as her agent, to the same extent as indivi iuals in all respects capable of
acting mi jurit. Rowe "· Smith, .f.')
N. Y. 230; Baum e. Mullen, 47 N.Y.
1577. This liability necessarily re..
suits frow the capacity conferred on
her to acquire, hold and transfer property, and to deal with her separate t'State, as if she were unmarried." Air
LBN, J., in Vanneman e. Powers, 66
N.Y. 89, 42.
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redress of the infant’s breach of contract, by treating it as a tort,

117

will preclude the like redress in the case of the contract of a mar-

ried woman.‘ And here, also, we encounter the same diﬁiuulties

when we undertake to draw the line of distinction between cases

which are really, in their substance, cases of contract, though a

wrong may be involved, and cases in which a wrong stands apart

from the contract. The English cases, which hold, as we have

seen, that an infant cannot be made liable as for a tort for

falsely affirming that he is of age, and thereby effecting a con-

tract, are supported in their principle by others, which atiirm that

the wife may rely upon her coverture as a defense to contracts

obtained by her on a false assertion that she was unmarried.’

There is reasoning in some of these cases which does not appear

entirely satisfactory; for it assumes that if an action might be

supported for the breach of such a contract, “the wife would

lose the protection which the law gives her against contracts made

by her during coverture. * * For every such contract would

involve in itself a fraudulent representation of her capacity.”’

But we can hardly agree that the making of a contract involves

an assertion of competency to make a lawful contract. Such a

doctrine would make every contract by an infant involve a. false
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assertion of majority, which is thr from being the common under-

standing. It seems much more reasonable to act on a supposi-

tion that every person satisﬁes himself whether those with whom

he deals are competent to contract; and if he makes no inquiry

when dealing with one under disability, the sensible conclusion

is that he relies upon honor and integrity rather than upon legal

responsibility. It is quite certain that no one understands, when

a purchase is made on credit, that there is any implied assertion

by the buyer that he has property suﬂicieut to make good his

promise to pay. The seller is supposed to have informed him-

self on that point, and to consent to run the risk. But when the

‘ Bee Burnard 9. Haggis. 14 C B. that she and her children were in dea-

(ll. s.) 45.

‘See Cooper o. William, 1 Lev. 247;

1 Sid. 3'75; 2 Keb. 399, in which the

contract effected by means of the

fraud was a contract of marriasze.

Husband and wife are not liable for

the fraud of the wife in the purchase

by her of goods on a false assertion

titute circumstances. Woodward il.

Barnes, 46 Vt. 332; S. C. 14 Am. Rep.

626.

‘Pollock, C. B., in Adelphi Loan

redress of the infant's breach of contract, by treating it as a tort,
will preclude the like redress in the case of the contract of a married woman.• And here, also, we encounter the same difficultiea
when we undertake to draw the line of distinction between casea
which are really, in their substance, cases of contract, though a
wrong may be involved, and cases in which a wrong stands apart
from the contract. The English cases, which hold, as we have
seen, that an infant cannot be made liable as for a tort for
falsely affirming that he is of age, and thereby effecting a contract, are supported in their principle by others, which affirm that
the wife may rely upon her coverture as a defense to contracts
obtained by her on a false assertion that she was unmarried.'
There is reasoning in some of these cases which does not appear
entirely satisfactory; for it assumes that if an action might be
supported for the breach of such a contract, " the wife would
]ose the prqtection which the law gives her against contracts made
by her during coverture. * * For every such contract would
involve in itself a fraudulent representation of' her capacity."'
But we can hardly agree that the making of a contract involves
an assertion of competency to make a lawful contract. Such a
doctrine would make every contract by an infant involve a false
a~sertion of majority, which is far from being the common underetanding. It seems much more reasonable to act on a supposition that every person satisfies himself whether those with whom
be deals arc competent to contract; and if he makes no inquiry
when dealing with one under disability, the sensible conclusion
is that he relies upon honor and ;ntegrity rather than upon legal
n.-sponsibility. It is quite certain that no one understands, when
a purchase is made on credit, that there is any implied assertion
by the buyer that he has property snfficicnt to make guod his
promise to pRy. The seller is supposed to have informed him~elf on that point, and to consent to run the risk. Bot when the

Ass‘n 0. Fairhurst, 9 Exch. 422. See,

also, Wright o. Leonard, 11 C. B. (11.

s.) 256.

• See Burnard "· Ha,rgis. 14 0 B.
(lr. 1.) 45.
'See <:oopeu. Wilham, 1 Lev.247;
1 Sid. 87S; 9 Kcb. 399, in which the
contract etfcrte<l by means of the
fraud was a contract of marrla~Z;e.
Bubaod and wife are no& liable for
Ute fraud of the wife in the purchase
b7 her of aoocJ8 on a false uaerLion

that she and ber children wt>rt> in d~.
titute circumstances. Woodward r>.
Barnes, 46 Vt. 832; 8. C. 14 Am. Rep.
626.

• Pollock, C. B., in Adelphi Loan
Ass'n fl. Fairbur.;t, 9 Excb. 422. St'e,
also, Wright e. Leonard, 11 0. B.
B.) 256.
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seller refuses to deal, except after assurance of legal responsibilty,

this is an express refusal to assume the risk, and the doctrine

118

TJI 1<: I: A W

OF TOUTS.

that he nevertheless shall do so seems to us as questionable in

logic, as it certainly is in morals. But the authorities are as

above stated.‘

In the recent changes in the common law effected by statute

in the several States, whereby married women have been given

an independent power to make contracts and to control propert_\',

it is not very clear how far the law of torts has been modiﬁed.

\Ve should probably be safe in saying that so far as they give

validity to a married woman’s contracts, they put her on the

same footing with other persons, and when a failure to perform

a duty under a contract is in itself a tort, it may doubtless be

treated as such in a suit against a married woman. The same

would probably be true of any breach of a duty imposed upon a

married woman as owner of property which she possesses and

controls the same as if sole and unmarried. In Illinois it has

been decided that under the new statutes the husband is not

liable for a slander of the wife in which he did not participate,

though the statutes on the subject, which were supposed to have

changed the common law, were silent as regards her torts, and

only purported to secure to the woman her property and earnings
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and the full control and enjoyment thereof.‘ This is, perhaps, s

sound conclusion. Certainly the reasons on which the new legis-

lation proceeds are such as should leave the wife to respond alone

for her torts, for they assume that she is fully capable of con-

trolling her own actions, and can and will act independently of

her husband.‘

‘In Keen 0. Coleman, 39 Penn. St. would have only a moral bond or

299, a married woman had obtained

property on a false assertion that she

was a widow, giving her obligations

therefor. When proceedings were

taken to en force these, she relied upon

her coverture. Lowmu, Cl1.J.: “ She

may be liable to an action for the de-

ceit pracliced by her, but she had no

legal power to execute this bond, and

she cannot be legally bound. * ‘F

If a legal incapacity can be removed

by a fraudulent representation of ca-

seller refuses to deal, except after assurance of legal responsibilty,
this is an express refusal to assume the risk, and the doctrine
that he nevertheless shall do so seems to us as questionable in
logic, as it certainly is in morals. But the authorities are as
above stated. 1
In the recent changes in the common law effected by statute
in the several States, whereby married women have been given
an independent power to make contracts and to control property,
it is not very clear how far the la'v of torts has been modified.
We should probably be safe in saying that so far as they give
validity to a married woman's contracts, they put her on the
same tooting with other persons, and when a failure to perform
a duty onder a contract is in itself a tort, it may doubtless be
treated as such in a snit against a married woman. The same
wonld probably be true of any breach of a duty imposed upon a
married woman as owner of property which she possesses and
controls the same as if sole and unmarried. In Illinois it has
been decided that under the new statutes the husband is not
liable for a slander of the wife in which he did not participate,
though the statutes on the subject, which were supposed to have
changed the common law, were silent as regards her torts, and
only purported to secure to the woman her property and earnings
and the full control and enjoyment thereof.~ This is, perhaps, a
sound conclusion. Certainly the reasons on which the new legislation proceeds are such as should leave the wife to respond alone
for her torts, for they assume that she is fully capable of controlling her own actions, and can and will act independently of
her husband. •

pacity, then the legal incapacity

force, which is absurd."

’ Martin 0. Robson, 65 Ill. 129; S.

C. 16 Am. Rep. 578. See Chicago,

etc., R. R. Co. 0. Dickson, 77 Ill. 331.

‘ In Illinois, Michigan, and Iowa,

the statutes relative to the rights of

married women have been held to

entitle the wife to recover for her own

use the damages sulfered from a per-

sonal tort. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v.

Duuu,52 Ill. 260; Hennies 0. Vogel,

66 lll. 401; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Dickson, 67 Il]., 122; Berger v. Ja-

1 In Keen "· Coleman, 89 Penn. St.
299, a married woman had obtained
property on a false assertion that she
was a widow, giving her obligations
therefor. When proceedings were
taken to enforce these., she relied upon
her coverture. LowRIE, Ch. J.: '"She
may be liable to an action for the deceit practiced by her, but she had no
legal power to execute this bond, and
she cannot. be legally bound. •
•
If a legal incapacity can be removed
by a fraudulent representation of capacity, then the legal incapacity

would have only a moral bond or
force, which is absurd."
1 llartin e. Robson, 65 Ill. 129; S.
C. 16 Am. Rep. 578. See Chicago,
etc., R. R. Co."· Dickson, 77 Ill. 331.
1 In Illinois, Michigan, and Iowa,
the statutes relative to the rights of
married women have been held to
entitle the wife to recO\·er for her ow&
use the damages suffered from a personal tort. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co."·
Dunn, 52 Ill. 260; Hennies !!. Vogel,
66 Ill. 401; Chicago, etc., R. R Co. "·
Dickson, 67 Ill., 122; Berger "· Ja-
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Torts by Corporations. Corporations are responsible for the

wrongs committed or authorized by them, under substantially

the same rules which govern the responsibility of natural persons.

It was formerly supposed that those torts which involved the

element of evil intent, such as batteries, libels, and the like, could

not be committed by corporations, inasmuch as the State, in

granting rights for lawful purposes, had conferred no power to

commit unlawful acts; and such torts, committed by corporate

agents, must consequently be ultra hires, and the individual

wrongs of the agents themselves. But this idea no longer

obtains. It is true, as a rule, that as the corporation is created

for a particular purpose only, and endowed with powers to

accomplish that purpose, nothing can be done by it or in its

name that is not within the intent of its charter. It must indeed

act through agents and oﬁicers; but if these undertake to do

what the corporation is not empowered to do, their action cannot

impose a liability upon the corporation. An apt illustration is

the case of fraudulent representations made by an oﬁicer of a

national bank in the sale of railroad bonds on commission. As

the hank has no power to make such sales, the fraud is the indi-

vidual wrong of the oﬁicer.‘ But many torts are unintentional,
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and arise through neglect of agents and servants, while others,

though intentional, are committed by agents or servants in the

supposed interest of their employers, and under circumstances

which may justify them in believing that what they do is fairly

<-obs, 21 Mich. 215; Musselman 0.

Galligher, 82 Iowa, 383; Pancoast u.

Burnell, Id. 394: Mcwhirter v. Hat-

ten, 42 Iowa, 238; S. C. 20 Am. Rep.

618. In New York it is held that the

wii'e‘s time in the household still be-

longs to the husband, and therefore

he should sue for an injury which

disables her from performing house-

hold duties. Brooks 0. Schwerin, 54

'l'orta by Corporations. Corporations are responsible for the
wrongs committed or authorized by them, onder substantially
the same rules which govern the responsibility of natural person~.
It was formerly supposed that those torts which involved the
element of evil intent, such as batteries, libels, and the like, could
not be committed by corporations, inasmuch as the State, in
granting rights for lawful purposes, had conferred no power to
commit unlawfuJ acts; and such torts, committed by corporate
agents, mu~t consequently be ultra vire8, and the individual
wrongs of the agents themselves. But this idea no longer
obtains. It is true, as a role, that as the corporation is created
for a particular purpose only, and endowed with powers to
accomplish that purpose, nothing can be done by it or in its
name that is not within the intent of its charter. It must indeed
act through agents and officers; bu~ if these undertake to do
what the corporation is not empowered to do, their action cannot
impose a liability upon the corporation. An apt illustration is
the case of fraudulent representations made by an officer of a
national bank in the sale of railroad bonds on commission. As
the bank has no power to make such sales, the fraud is the indi,·idual wrong of the o:fficer.1 Bot many torts are unintentional,
and arise through neglect of agents and servants, while others,
though intentional, are committed by agents or servants in the
anpposed interest of their employers, and under eircnmstancf's
which may justi(y them in believing that what they do is fairly

N. Y. 343. And perhaps it would be

held in any of the Suites that the hus-

hand might still sue for the conse-

quential injuryto himself. See Me-

whirtcr 0. Hatten, 42 Iowa, 288; S. C.

20 Am. Rep. 618.

‘Wee-kler 0. First Nat‘l Bank, 42

Md. 581. The general rule that a

corporation is not liable for such

wrongs by its agents as arc beyond

the scope of corporate authority, is

recognized in Poulton o. Railway Co.,

L. R. 2 Q. 14. 534; Edwards u. Rail-

way Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 445; Walker o.

S. E. Railway Co., 5 C. P. 640; Alli-u

0. Railway Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 65;

Coleman o. Riches, 16 C. B. 104;

Udell o. Atherton, 7 H. & N. 172, 181;

Isaacs 0. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 47 N.

Y. 122; S. C. '7 Am. Rep. 418; Ill.

Cent. R. R. Co. u. Downey,18 Ill. 259;

Little Miami R. R. Co.o. Wetmorc,

19 Ohio N. S. 110.

<·obs, 21 Mich. 215; Musselman e.
Galligber, 82 Iowa, 383; P11ncoast e.
Burnell, Id. 394: :Mcwhirter o. Hat.
ten, 42 Iowa, 2-~; S. V. 20 Am. Rep.
Cl18. In New York it is held that ~be
wife's time in tbr! household still belongs to the husband, and therefore
be should sue for an injury which
diaables her from performing household duties. Brooks e. Schwerin, 54
N. Y. 843. And perhaps it would be
held in any of the Stutes that the husband might still sue for the consequential injury to himself. See Mewbirter e. Hatten, 42 Iowa, 288; S. C.
20 Am. Rep. 618.
1 Weckler e. Fil'1lt Nat'l Bank, 42

lid. 1>81. The general rule that a
corporation is not Hable for aucb
wrongs by its agents as are beyond
the scope of corporate authority, is
recognized In Poulton"· Railwuy Co.,
L. R. 2 Q.
384; Edwards "· Rail.
way Co., L. R. :S C. P. 445; Walker e.
8. E. Railway Co., 5 C. P. 640; All<·n
e. Railway Vo., L. R. 6 Q. B. 65;
Coleman e. Riches, 16 C. B. 104;
Udell "·Atherton, 7 H. & N. 172, 181;
Isaacs e. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 47 N.
Y. 122; 8. C. 7 Am. R~p. 418; Ill.
CenL R. R. Co. o. Downey, 181ll. 259;
Little Miami R. R Co. e. Wetmore,
19 Ohio N. 8. 110.

n.
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To deny redress against the corporation would in many cases be

a denial of all remedy. Therule is now well settled that, while

keeping within the apparent scope of corporate powers, corpora-

tions have a general capacity to render themselves liable for torts,

except for those where the tort consists in the breach of some

duty which from its nature could not be imposed upon or dis-

charged by a corporation. The rule of liability embraces not

only the negligences and omissions of its oﬂicers and agents who

are put in charge of or employed in the corporate business, but

also all tortious acts which have been authorized by the corpora-

tion, or which are done in pursuance of any general or special

authority to act in its behalf on the subject to which they relate,

or which the corporation has subsequently ratiﬁed.‘ And in

deciding upon this liability the disposition of the courts has been

to consider corporate officers, agents and servants as possessing a

large and liberal discretion, and to hold the corporation liable for

all their acts within the most extensive range of the corporate

powers.” This is just to the public, and it is not unreasonable

when regarded from the standpoint of the corporation, but will

tend to insure greater care and caution in the selection of those

who are to be entrusted with corporate affairs. Therefore a
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corporation may even be liable for an assault and battery, when

its agent in committing it was performing some act within the

limits of his authority, but wrongfully or with excessive force.‘

-' Mayor, etc , of Lyme Regi n. Hen-

ley, 1 Bing. (N. C.) 222, 240; Smith 0.

Birmingham Gas Co., 1 Ad. & El.

526; Maund v. Monmouthshire Co.,

4 M. & G. 452; Eastern R. R. C0. v.

Broom, 6 Exch. 314; Goﬂ‘ o. Great

Nor. R. R. Co., 3 El. & El. 672; Phila

delphia, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Quigley, 21

How. 202; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick.

511; Monument Nat’1 Bk. 0. Globe

\Vorks, 101 Mass. 57; Sheldon v.

authorized, and a part of their duty under their employment.
To deny redress against the corporation would in many cases be
a denial of all remedy. The.rule is now well settled that, while
keeping within the apparent scope of corporate powers, corporations have a general capacity to render themselves liable for torts,
except for those where the tort consi~ts in the breach of some
duty which from its nature could not be imposed upon or discharged by a corporation. The rule of liabil~ty embraces not
only the negligences and omissions of its officers and ~ooents who
are put in charge of or employed in the corporate busiuess, but
also all tortioui' acts which have been authorized by the corporation, or which are done in pursuance of any general or special
authority to act in its behalf on the subject to which they relate,
or which the corporation has sub\lequently 1·atified.' And in
deciding upon this liability the disposition of the courts has been
to consider corporate officers, agents and ser\·ants as po~scssing a
large and liberal discretion, and to hold the corporation liable for
all their acts within the most extensive range of the corporate
powers.s This is just to the public, and it is not unreasonable
when regarded from the standpoint of the corporation, but will
tend to insure greater care and caution in the selection of those
who arc to be entrusted with corporate affairs. Therefore a
corporation may even be liable for an assault and battery, when
its agent in committing it was perfot·ming some act within the
limits of his authority, but wrongfully or with excessive force.•

Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383; Brokaw -v.

New Jersey, etc., R. R. Co., N. J.

328.

’Redf. on Railways, 3d ed. 510,

citing Phil. & Read. R. R. Co. '0. Der-

hy, 14 How. 468, 483; Noyes v. "Rut

land & Burlington R. R. Co., 2'7 Vt.

110. See Hutchinson o. Western, etc.

R. R. Co., 6 Heisk. 634; Jetfcrsonville

R. R. Co. 0. Rogers. 38 Ind. 116.

' Monument Bank 0. Globe Works,

101 Mass. 57 ; Ramsden v. Boston, etc.,

R. R. Co.,104 Mass. 117; Brokaw 0.

New Jersey, etc., R. R. Co., 32 N. J.

828; Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. 12. Dunn,

19 Ohio (N. s.) 162; Passenger R. lt.

C0. 0. Young, 21 Ohio (N. s) 518; S.

C. 8 Am. Rep. TS; Baltimore, etc., [L

R. Cn.1J. Blochcr, 27 Md. 277; God-

dard v. Grand Trunk ll. R. Co.,5T

Me.202; S. C.2 Am. Rep. 39; Hanson

1:. European, etc., R. R. Co., 62 Me. 84;

S. O. 16 Am. Rep. 404; Higgins 0.

\Vatervliet T. & R. Co., 44 N, Y. 23;

b‘. (J. '7 Am. Rep. 293; St. Louis. etc.,

. 1 Mayor, etc, of Lyme Hegis11. Henley, 1 Bing. (N.C.) 222, 240; Smit.h "·
Birmingham Gas Co., 1 Ad. & El.
526; Maund "· Monmouthshire Co.,
4 M. & G. 452; Ens tern R. R. Co. 11.
Broom, 6 Exch. 814; Goff 11. Great
Nor. H. R. Co., 3 El. & EI. 672; Philadelphia, etc .. R. R. Co. t~. Quigley, 21
How. 202; Thayer "· Boston, 10 Pick.
611; Monument Nat'l Bk. "'· Globe
Works, 101 lJa(;s. 57; Sheldon "·
Kalamazoo, 24 !licb. 383; Brokaw ·o.
N{~w Jersey, etc., R. R. Co., 32 N.J.

828.

• Redf. on RailwRys, 8d ed. :no.
citing Phil. & Reucl. R. R. Co."'· Derhy. 14 How. 468, 48:3; Noyes 11. Hutlund & Burlington H. R. Co., 27 Yt.

110. See Hutchinson 11. Western, etc.
R. R. Co .. 6 Heisk. 6:34; J eftcrsonville
R. R. Co. "· Hugel's, :11:1 Ind. 110.
• Monument Bank"· Globe Worb.
101 Mass. 57; Ram ~den "· Boston, etc.,
R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 117; Brokaw "·
New Jersey, e:tc., R. R Co., 82 N. J.
828; Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. 11. Dunn.
19 Ohio (N. s.) 162; Pnssenger R. H.
Co.'l:l. Young, 21 Ohio (N.s) 518; 8.
C. 8 Am. Rt•p. 78; Haiti more. etr.., H.
R. Co. "· Blocher, 27 Md. 277; Goddard !l. GI'I\nd Trunk n. R. Co., 57
!k202; S.C.2 Am. Hep.39; H11nson
"· European. etc., R R. Co., 62 lle. 84;
S. C. 16 Am. Rep. -104; Higgins "'·
·watervliet 1'. & H.. Co., 44 N_. Y. 23;
::;. C. 7 Am. Rep. 293 ; SL Louis, etc.,
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The rule is illustrated by the case of an oﬂicial report of the

corporation, made through its board of direction, in which is

embodied a libel on a business rival. .Such a libel is a corporate

wrong, because the report is a corporate act, and the directors

were acting within the scope of their authority in making it.

Had the board ordered the publication of any other paper in the

supposed interest of the corporation, it would have been equally

a corporate act, and a libel contained in it a corporate wrong.‘

If, on the other hand, some servant of the corporation, who

supposed he might advance its interests by decryirg the business

of a rival, were to proceed to do so by communications in the

daily press, it is plain that these, though having in view the

same purpose which the publication by the oﬂicial board was

meant to accomplish, can in no sense bc regarded as corporate

acts. They have not the corporate authorization; they are not

made within the apparent scope of the servant’s duty; and the

tort is consequently an individual tort purely and solely, and

redress must be sought accordingly. ,

The same reasons that sustain an action against a corporation

for a libel wouldsustain one for a malicious prosecution; and

though there are cases which hold that no such action can be
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supported,’ the better doctrine we should say was that laid down

by some other courts which have sustained such actions.‘ A

corporation may also be liable for false imprisonment, under

circumstances corresponding to those which would sustain an

action for any other forcible wrong.‘

R. R. ('0. 0. Dulby, 19 Ill. 353; Eust-

ern Counties R. R. Co. 0. Broom, 6

I-Ixch. 314.

' Whitﬁeld 0. Southeastern R. R. Co.,

El. Bl. & El. 115, 121; Philadelphia,

etc., R. R. Co. 0. Quigley, 21 llow.

202; Maynard 0. Fireu1nn’s, etc., Ins.

Co., 34 (Yul. 48; Aldrich 0. Press

Printing Co.. 9 Minn. 133.

’ Childs v. Bank of Mis.-zouri.1T Mo.

213; Owslcy 0. Montgomery, etc., R.

The rule is illustrated by the case of an official report of the
«>rporation, made through its board of direction, in which is
embodied a libel on a business rival: . Such a libel is a corporate
wrong, because the report is a corporate act, and the directol'l';
were acting within the scope of their authority in making it.
Had the board ordered the publication of any other paper in the
suppot;ed inte~t of the corporation, it would ha\·e been e<Ittally
a corporate act, apd a libel contained in it a corporate wrong. 1
If, on the other hand, some servant of the corporation, who
snpJlOscd he might advance its interests by decryil•g the business
of a rival, were to proceed to do so by communications in the
daily press, it is plain that these, though having in view the
same purpose which the publication by the official board was
meant to necomplish, can in no sense be regardt..>d as corporate
acts. They have not the corporate authorization; they are not
· made within the apparent scope of the servant's duty; and the
tort is consequently an individual tort purely and solely, and
redress must be sought a<.-cordingly. ,
The same ~ns that sustain an action against a corporation
f()r a libel would. sustain one for a malicious prosecution; and
though there are cases which hold that no such action can be
supported,~ the better doctrine we should say was that laid down
by some other courts which have sustained such actions.' A
·curporation may also be liable for false imprisonment, under
circumstances corresponding to those which would sustain an
action for any other fbrcible wrong!

R. Co., 37 Ala. 560.

‘ Vance v. Erie R. R. Co., 32 N. J.

3134; Goodspced v. Rust Iladdnm Bunk.

82 Conn. 530: Copley v. Sewing Ma-

chine Co., 2 Woods, 494; Fcnton 0.

Sewing Machine Co., 9 Phil. (Penn)

189: Walker v. S. Eastern R. R Co.,

L. R. 5 C. P. 610. In Green v. Omni-

bus Co., '7 C. B. (N. s.) 290, 302, EARL,

C. J., says: “ I take the whole tenor

of the authorities to show that an

action for a wrong docs lie against a

corporation, when the act of the cor-

poration - the thing done — is within

the purpose of the corporation; and

it has been done in such a manner as

to constitute what would be an action-

able wrong if done by a private indi-

vidual."

' Goff 1:. Great Western R. R Co., 3

El. & El. 672 ; Roe v. Birkcnhead,etc.,

R. R. ('o. e. Dalby, 19 lll. 8:>3; Eastem Counties R. R. Co. e. Broom, 6
Exch. 314.
1 Whitflf'ld e. SouthE-astern R. R Co.,
El. Bl. & El. 115, 121; Philadelphia,
ct<·~ R U. Co. e. Quiglt·y, 21 How.
20'l; )laynard e. Fircmnn's, etc., Ins.
Cu., M Cal. .(8 : Aldrich tl. Pre.<~s
Printin~ Co .. 9 Minn. 13.1.
• Childs e. Bank of llist~ouri.li Mo.
213; OW!'ley tl. Montgumt!l'y, etc., R.
ll C.o .• :n Ala. 660.
• Vance "· Erie R. R C.o., 82 N.J.
334; Goodspero u. F..ast Ila,ldam Bunk,
32 Conn. 580: Coph·y "· Sew in~ llaehme Co.. I Woodll, 4D4; Fenton e.

Sewing Machine Co., 9 Phil. (Penn)
189: Walker e. S. Eastern R. R Co.,
L. R. 5 C. P. 640. In Green"· Omni.
bus Co., 7 C. B. (N. s.} 2110, 802, EARL,
C. J ., says: "I take the whole tenor

of the authorities to show that an
artion for a wrong doC's lie against a.
corporation, when the act of Uw corporation- the thing done- is wiLhin
the purpot>e of the corpuratiuu; anti
i~ bas been done in surb a mannt'r as
to con11titute what would be an action.
able wrong if done by a private individual."
'Goff"· Great Wl'stern R R. Co., 3
El. & El. 672 ; Roe "· Birkenhead, etc.,
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A corporation may also be liable for frauds. “ Strictly speak-
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ing, a corporation cannot itself be guilty of fraud. But where a

corporation is formed for the purpose of carrying on a trading or

other speculation for proﬁt, such as forming a railway, these

objects can only be accomplished through the agency of indi-

viduals; and there can be no doubt that if the agents employed

conduct themselves fraudulently, so that if they had been acting

for private employers the persons for whom they were acting

would have been affected by their fraud, the same principles

must prevail where the principal under whom the agent acts is

a corporation.” ‘

While the agent keeps within the limits of his authority, there

is a legal unity between the corporation and its agent, as much

when his acts are wrongful and tortious as when they are

rightful.’ And a corporation has even been held responsible for

a fraudulent issue of certiﬁcates of stock by its authorized agent,

though the issue was in excess of its capital stock.’

We have no occasion to follow this subject further at this time,

as the rules regarding the liability of corporations for the acts

of their agents and oﬁicers are the same with those which apply

as between masters and servants generally, and will be considered

in another place.
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Wliat has been said on this subject will apply to public cor-

porations as well as to private. Towns, counties, villages and

cities must respond for such torts of their oﬁicers, agents and

servants as have been committed or suffered by corporate

authority. S0 far as the rules which apply to them are peculiar,

they will be examined liereafter. ~ '

Even the State or the General Government may be guilty of

R. R. Co., 7 Exch. 36. The corpora-

tion is not liable if what was done by

the servants was not in the line of

duty. Allen o. London, etc., R. R. Co.,

L_ R_ 6 Q. B. 65; Poulton 0. London,

etc., R R Co., 2 Q. B. 534; Edwards

o. London, etc., R. R. Co., L. R. 5 C.

P. 445.

' Ranger v. Great Western R. R. Co.,

5 II. L. Cus. 71, 86, per Lord Chan-

cellor CRANWORTH. And see Barwick

0. Eng. Joint Stock Co., L. R. 2 Exch.

258; Concord Bank v. Gregg, 14 N.

__.

H. 881 ; Scoﬂeld, etc., Co. o. State, 54

Geo. 635; N. Y., etc., R. R. Co. e.

Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 80.

“New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Bailey, 40 Miss 895. See Bruif 0.

Mali, 36 N. Y. 200.

' New York, etc.,R. R.Co v. Schuy-

ler,84 N. Y. 30; Tome o. Parkesburgh

Br. R. R. Co., 39 Md. 36. See Mer-

chants’ Bank 0. State Bank, 10 Wall.

604; Atlantic Bank e. Merchants’

Bank, 10 Gray, 532.

A corporation may also be liable for frauds. d Strictly speaking, a corporation cannot itself be guilty of fraud. But where a
corporation is formed for the purpose of carrying on a trading or
other speculation for profit, such as forming a railway, these
objects .can only be accomplished through the agency of individuals; and there can be no doubt that if tl1e agents employed
conduct themselves fraudulently, so that if they had been acting
for private employers the persons for whom they were acting
would have been affected by their fraud, the same principles
must prevail where the principal under whom the agent acts is
a corporation." 1
While the agent keeps within the limits of his authority, there
is a legal unity between the corporation and its agent, as much
when his acts are wrongful and tortious as when they are
rightful.' And a corporation has even been held responsible for
a fraudulent i88ue of certificates of stock by its authorized agent,
though the issue was in excess of its capital stock.1
We have no occasion to follow this subject further at this time,
u the rules regarding the liability of corporations tor the acts
of their agents and officers are the same with those which apply
as between masters and servants generally, and will be considered
in another pla<.-e.
What has been said on this subject will apply to public corporations as well as to private. Towns, counties, villages and
cities must respond for such torts of their officers, agents and
servants as have been committed or suffered by corporate
authority. So far as the rules which apply to them are pecu·liar,
·
they will be examined hereafter.
Even the State or the General Government may be guilty of
R R Co., 7 Excb. 86. The corporation is not liable if what was done by
the servants was not in the line of
duty. Allen"· London, etc., R. R. Co.,
L. R. 6 Q. B. 65; Poulton "· London,
etc., R. R. Co., 2 Q. B. 534; Edwards
"· London, etc., R R. Co., L. R. 5 C.
P. 445.
1 HIUlger "·Great Western R R Co.,
G H. L. Cas. 71, 86, per Lord Chan-

cellor CRANWOB.TB. And see Barwiek
Eng. Joint Stock Co., L. R. 2 Exch.
258; Concord Bank"· Gregg, 1( N.
11.

H. 881 ; Scofield, etc., Co. "· State, M
Geo. 635; N. Y., etc., R. R. Co. e.
Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 80.
1 N cw Orleans, etc., R
R. Co. e.
Bailey, 40 Miss 895. Bee Brutr e.
Mali, 36 N. Y. 200.
1 New York,etc.,R. R.Co "· BchuyJer,84 N.Y. 30; Tomet~. Parkesburgh
Br. R R. Co., 89 Md. 86. Bee .Merchants' Bank "· State Bank, 10 Wall.
604; Atlantic Bank e . .Merchants•
Bank, 10 Gray, 532.
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individual wrongs; for while each is a sovereignty, it is a cor-

123

poration also, and as such capable of doing wrongful acts. The

diﬂiculty here is with the remedy, not with the right. No

sovereignty is subject to suits, except with its own consent.‘

But either this consent is given by general law, or some tribunal

is established with power to hear all just claims. Or if neither

of these is done, the tort remains; and it is always to be pre-

sumed that the legislative authority will make the proper

provision for redress when its attention is directed to the injury.

‘United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch, How. 286; Hill 0. United States, 9

189; Osborn 0. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. How. 386.

738; United States c. McLemore, 4

individual wrongs; for while each is a sovereignty, it is a corJlOr&tion also, and as such capable of doing wrongful acts. The
difficulty here is with the remedy, not with the right. No
sovereignty is subject to snits, except with its own consent.'
But either this consent is given by general law, or some tribunal
is established with power to hear all just claims. Or if neither
of these is done, the tort remains; and it is always to be presumed that the legislative authority will make the proper
provision for redress when its attention is directed to the injury.
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1 United States o. Peters, 15 Craneh,
188; Oaborn o. Bank of U. 8., 9 Wheat.
'l88; United Statea •· :McLemore, '

Bow. 286; Hill e. United Statea, 9
Bow. 886.
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WRONGS IN WHICH TWO on MORE PERSONS PARTICIPATE.

Classiﬁcation. Wrongs, as respects the number of persons

who may be responsible for their commission, are either indi-

vidual or joint. Some wrongs are in their nature necessarily indi-

vidual, because it is impossible that two or more should together

commit them. The case of the oral utterance of defamatory

words is an instance; this is an individual act, because there can

be no joint utterance. He alone can be liable who spoke the

words; and if two or more utter the sameslander at the same

time, still the utterance of each is individual, and must be the

subject of a separate proceeding tor redress.‘ It has been said,

CHAPTER V.

however, that if several unite in singing the same defamatory

song, the singing may be treated as the joint slander of al1;’ but

WRONGS IN WHICH TWO OR MORE PERSONS PARTICIPATE.

this is on grounds that distinguish it from an ordinary speaking;

each speaker having his part in a joint utterance, and the indi-

vidual voice being a part only of what reaches the ear of the

hearer as a whole.

Conspiracy. On the other hand, some torts are in their nature

joint torts, because the action of several is required to accom-

plish them. Reference is not had here to the physical ability to

accomplish the wrongful act, such as might be required in over-
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turning a house or in checking by a dam the ﬂow of a rapid

river, but to some element in the wrong that consists in the con-

currence of two or more actors. Such a case would be acou-

spiracy to ruin one in his reputation, or to defraud him of his

' Chamberlain o. Goodwin, Cro. Jac. ' Divlum, Thomas 0. Rumsey, 6

647: Swithin 0. Vincent. 2Wils. 227; Johns. 26, 32. Even here, however,

Clmmberlaine 0. Willmore, Palm. we suppose the person wronged might

813; Patten 0. Gurney, 17 Mass. 182; bring his separate action for the tenor

State v.Roulstone,3 Sneed,107 ; Webb - slander, the bass slander, etc.

0. Cecil, 9 B. Mon. 198.

Classification. Wrongs, as respects the number of persons
who may be responsible for their commission, are either indi,·idual or joint. Some wrongs are in their nature ueccs:;arily individual, because it is impossible that two or more should together
commit them. The case of the oral utterance of defamatory
words is an instance; this is an individnal act, becanse there can
be no joint utterance. He alone can be liable who spoke the
words; and if two or more utter the same'slander at the same
time, still the utterance of each is individual, and must be the
subject of a separate proceeding for redress.' It has been said,
however, that if several unite in singing the same defamatory
song, the singing may be treated as the joint slander of all;' but
this is on grounds that distinguish it from an ordinary speaking;
each speaker having his part in a joint utterance, and the individual voice being a part only of what reaches the ear of the
hearer as a whole.
Conspiracy. On the other hand, some torts are in their nature
joint torts, because the action of several is required to accomplish them. Reference is not had Twre to the physical ability to
accomplish the wrongful act, such as might be required in overturning a house or in checking by a dam the flow of a rapid
river, but to some element in the wrong that consit:.ts in the concurrence of two or more actors. Such a case would be a conspiracy to rnin one in his reputation, or to defraud him of his
1 Chamberlain"· Goodwin, Cro..Jnc.
647: Swithin "· Vincent. 2 Wits. 227;
Chamberlaine "· Willmore, Palm.
313; Patten "· Gurney, 17 Mnss. 182;
State"· Roulstone, 3 Sneed, 107; Webb
e. Cecil, 9 B. 1\lon. 198.

1 Di,.tum, Thomas "· Rumsey, 6
Johns. 26, :l2. Even here, however,
we suppose the person wronged might
bring his separate action for the tenor
slander, the bass slander, etc.

JOINT WRONGS.'

.TOI!'fT WRONGS.'
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property; originating in combination, and carried out by joint

action, or at least in pursuance of the joint arrangement and

understanding.‘ If conduct is complained of which only becomes

actionable because of the dishonest combination to accomplish

some wrongful act, this combination must be shown, and one man

cannot combine with himself; he must have associates. It is

seldom, if ever, however, that a case can occur in which a man

may not have redress without counting on the joint wrong; for

the injury accomplished by means of the conspiracy may be

treated as a distinct wrong in itself, irrespective of the steps that

led to it. The general rule is, that a conspiracy cannot be made

the subject of a civil action unless something is done which, with-

out the conspiracy, would give a right of action.’ The damage

is the gist of the action, not the conspiracy;' and though the

conspiracy may be said to be of itself a thing amiss, it must nev-

crtheless, until something has been accomplished in pursuance

of it, be looked upon as a mere unfulﬁlled intention of several to do

mischief.‘ When the mischief is accomplished, the conspiracy

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

becomes important, as it affects the means and measure of redress;

for the party wronged may loo]; beyond the actual participants

in committing the injury, and join with them as defendants all

who conspired to accomplish it. The signiﬁcance of the con-

:-piraey consists, therefore, in this: That it gives the person

injured a remedy against parties not otherwise connected with

the wrong. It is also signiﬁcant as constituting matter of aggra-

vation. and as such tending to increase the plaintiﬁ"s recovery.‘

As it is the wrong accomplished —in other words, the depri-

' Saunders v. Freeman, Plow. 209;

Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St. 151;

llutchins 0. Hutchins,'7 Hill, 104; S.

(1 Bigelow, Lead Cas. on Torts, 207;

Brannock v. Bouldin, 4 Ired. 61.

'Saville 0. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym.

374; Cottcrell 0. Jones, 11 C. B. 713;

Sheple 0. Page, 12 Vt. 519; Patten 0.

property; originating in combination, and carried ont by joint
action, or at least in pursuance of the joint arrangement and
understanding.1 If conduct is complained of which only becomes
actionable because of the dishonest combination to acoomplh:h
eome wrongful act, this combination mnst be shown, and one man
cannot combine with himself; he must have associates. It is
seldom, if ever, however, that a case can occur in which a man
may not have redress without counting on the joint wrong; fur
the injury accomplished by means of the conspiracy may be
treated as a distinct wrong in itself, irrespecth·e of the ste1's that
led to it. The general rule is, that a conspiracy cannot be made
the subject of a civil action unless something is done which, withoat the conspiracy, wonld give a right of action.• The damage
i~ the gist of the action, not the conspiracy; 1 and though the
conspiracy may be said to be of it~elf a thing amis:;, it must nev{•rtheless, until something has been accomplished in pursuance
of it, be looked upon as a mere unfulfilled intention of several to do
mischief.• When the mischief is accomplished, the conspiracy
becomes important, as it affects the means and measure of redress;
for the party wronged may lou~ beyond the actual participants
in committing the injury, and join with them as defendants all
who conspired to accomplisb it. The Rignificance of the coot-piracy consists, therefore, in this: That it gives the person
injured a remedy a~rainst parties not otherwise connected with
the wrong. It is also a;ignitiet\ut as constituting matter of aggravation. and as such tending to increase the plaintiff's recovery!
As it is the wrong accomplished -in other words, the depn-

Gurney, 17 Mass. 186; Eason v. Pct-

way, 1 Dev. & Bat. 44; Kimball 0.

Harman, 34 Md.407; S. C.6Am. Rep.

340; Laverty 0. Van Arsdale, 65 Penn.

St. 507; Parker u. Huntingdon, 2 Gray,

124; Bowen 0. Matheson, 14 Allen,

499; Herron 0. Hughes, 25 Cal. 555;

Page 0. Parker, 40 N. H. 47; Same 0.

Same, 43 N. H. 363.

’ Jones o. Baker, '7 Cow. 445; Hutch-

ins 0. Hutchius, '7 Hill, 104; Slit-plea.

Page, 12 Vt. 519; Laverty o. Van Ars.

dale, 65 Penn. St. 507; Adler o. Fen-

ton, 24 How. 407.

' Kimball v. Harman, 34 Md. 407;

S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 840; Place v. Min.

ster, 65 N. Y. 89; Cottercll 0. Jones,

11 C. B. 713.

' Kimball v. Harman, 34 Md. 407.

In an action against several for deceit

by false representations, a fraudulent

combination to deceive and defraud

• Saunders "· Freeman, Plow. 200;
Burton t. Fulton, 49 Penn. St. 1:;1;
Hutchins"· Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104; B.
( ·. Bigelow, Lead Cas. on Torts, 207;
Brannock e. Bouldin, .( Ired. 61.
' Saville "· Roberts, 1 Ld. RlLym.
3i.(; Cotterell •· Jones, 11 C. B. 713;
Hheple "· Page, 19 Vt. 519; Patten "·
Gorney, 17 :M!I.SS. 186; Eason "· Pet.
way, 1 Dev. & Bat. 44; Kimball tl.
llarman, M lid. 407; B. C. 6 Am. R<.•p.
340; r.veny "·Van Andale, 65 Penn.
8L 507; Parker •· Huntingdon, 2 Gray,
lt4; Bowen •· llatbeaon, 14 Allen,
.-; Herron •· llaghea, 25 Cal. G5ti;

Page"· Parker, 40 N. H. 47; Same"·
Bnml.", 43 N.H. 363.
1 Jones e. Baker, 7 Cow. 445; Hutch.
ins"· Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104; 8lll•ple"
Page, 12 Vt. 519; Laverty"· Van A.ra.
dale, O.''i Penn. St. 607; Adler "· Fen.
too, 24 How. 407.

• Kimball "· Harman, 34 Md. 407;
8. C. 6 Am. Rep. 840; Place 11. }lin.
strr, 65 N. Y. 89; Cotterell e. Jonett,
11 C. B. 713.

' Kimball 11. Harman, 84 }ld. 407.
In an action against several for deceit
by false representRtions, a fraudulent
combination to det·eive and defraud
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vation of some right— that must support the action, it follows

•
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that if what the plaintiﬂ' has been deprived of was not a. right

at all, but an advantage merely hoped for, he cannot maintain his

suit. Therefore, he cannot maintain an action for conspiring to

induce one not to make him a gratuity by will; he having no

legal right to such gratuity.‘ Nor can he have an action for con-

spiracy to induce his debtor to put his property out of his hands;

since the fraudulent transfer leaves it still subject to legal process.‘

Nor, in general, will an action lie for conspiracy to induce one to

violate his contract; though it would seem that some cases might

be so extraordinary in their facts as to be exceptions to this

general rule.’

Though a conspiracy is charged, yet if on the trial, the evi-

dence connects but one person with the wrong actually committed,

the plaintiff may recover against him as if he had been sued

alone.‘

must be shown; but when it is shown,

any act of one in furtherance of the

conspiracy is the act of all. Brinkley

0. Platt, 40 Md. 529. Mere silent ap-

proval of an unlawful act does not

render one liable as a conspirator.
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Brannock 0. Bouldin, 4 Ired. 61.

‘Hutchins 0. Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104.

vation of some right- that must 1mpport the action, it follows
that if what the plaintifF has been deprived of was not a right
at all, but an advantage merely hoped for, he cannot maintain his
suit. Therefore, he cannot maintain an action for conspiring to
induce one not to make him a gratuity by will; he having no
legal right to such gratuity.1 Nor can he have an action for conspiracy to induce his debtor to pnt his property out of his hands;
since the fraudulent transfer leaves it still subject to legal process.'
Nor, in general, will an action lie for conspiracy to induce one to
violate his contract; though it would seem that some cases might
be so extraordinary in their facts as to be exceptions to this
general role.•
Though a conspiracy ie charged, yet if on the trial, the evidence connects bot one person with the wrong actnally committed,
the plaintiff may recover against him as if he had been sued
alone.•

Austin 0. Barrows, 41 Conn. 287.

A conspiracy to ruin an actor by

hisses, groans, etc., during his per-

formances may be actionable, though

the public have a right to manifest

disapproval of an acmr‘s perform-

ance. The wrong consists in the com-

bination to do it unfairly and of mul-

ice. Gregory 1:. Brunswick, 6 M. 85

G. 205. That a conspirator expected

to derive no proﬁt from the wrong is

immaterial to his responsibility.

Stockley o. Hornidge, 8 C. & P. ll.

‘ READ, J. “This is an action

upon the case in the nature of a con-

spiracy against the defendants for

falsely and maliciously combining

and conspiring to prevent the plain-

tilf from obtaining employment as a

school teacher, and by reason of which

combination and conspiracy he was

deprived of employment as a school-

teacher, and prevented from earning

support for himself and his family as

such. The damage sustained by the

plainl.iﬂ' is the ground of the action,

not the conspiracy. ‘Where the ac-

tion is brought against two or more,

as concerned in the wrong done, it is

necessary, in order to recover against

all of them, to prove a combination

orjoint act of all. For this purpose

it may be important to establish the

allegation of a conspiracy. But it‘ it

turn out on the trial that only one was

concerned, the plaintiff may still re-

cover, the same as if such one had been

sued alone. The conspiracy or combi-

nation is nothing, so far as sustaining

the action goes, the foundation of it

being the actual damage done to the

party.’ Hutchins v. Hulchins,7 Hill,

104; Jones 0. Baker, 7 Cowen, 445;

Pa|kcr -u. Huntington, 2 Gray, 1%

The court was therefore clearly in

must be shown; but when it is shown,
any act of one in furtherance of the
con"piracy is the act of all. Brinkley
"· Platt, 40 Md. 529. Mere silent approval of an unlawful act does not
render one liable as a conspirator.
Brannock tl. Bouldin, 4: Ired. 61.
'Hutehins "· Ilutchins, 7 Hill, 104:.
\ustin tl. Barrows, 4:1 Conn. 287.
A. conspiracy to ruin an actor by
hisses, groans, etc., during his per.
formances may be actionable, though
thl! public have a right to manifrst
disapproval of an actor's perform.
ance. The wrong consists in the com.
l>ination to do it unfairly and of mal.
ice. Gregory "· Brunswick, 6 !I. &
G. 20:5. That a conspirator expected
to derive no profit from the wrong Is
immntcrh1l to his responsibility.
~Hockley"'· Hornidge, 8 C. & P. 11.
'HI.!:,\D, J. "This is an action
upon the case in the nature of n conspiracy against U1e defendants for
falsely and maliciously combining
and conspiring to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining employment as a
school teacher, and by reason of which

combination and conspiracy he was
deprived of employment as a school.
teacher, and prevented from earning
support for himself and his family 88
such. The damage sustained by tho
plaintiff is tho ground of the action,
not tho conspiracy. 'Where the action is brought against two or more,
as concerned in the wrong done, it Ia
necessary, in order to recover agaioat
all of them, to prove a combination
or joint act of all. For this purpose
it may be important to establish the
allegation of a conspiracy. But if it
turn out nn the trial that only one was
concerned, the plaintiff may still recover, the same as if such one had been
sued alone. The conspiracy or combination Is nothing, so f'u.r as sustaining
the action goes, the foundation of it
being the actual damage done to the
party.' Hutchins"'· Hutchins, 7 Hill,
tOt; Jones "'· Baker, 7 Cowen, 44.5;
Pa1kcr "'· Huntington, 2 Gray, 124..
The court was therefore clearly in
error in saying there could be no re..
covery against one only." Laverty •·
VanArsdale, 65 Penn. Bl 507,509.

JOINT wnonos. 127

J'OINT WRONGS.

What constitutes Participation. Most wrongs may be com-
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mitted either by one person or by several. When several par-

ticipate, they may do so in different ways, atdifferent times, and

in very unequal proportions. One may plan, another may pro-

cure the men to execute, others may be the actual instruments in

accomplishing the mischief, but the legal blame will rest upon

all as joint actors. In some cases one may also become a joint

wrong-doer by consenting to and ratifying what has been done

by others. But this cannot be done by merely approving a wrong,

or by expressing pleasure or satisfaction at its being accomplished.‘

Adopt-ion of a. Wrong. In order to constitute one a wrong

doer by ratiﬁcation, the original act must have been done in his

interest. or been intended to further some purpose of his own.

Lord COKE, on this subject, says : “He that agreeth to a trespass

after it is done is no trespasser, unless the trespass was done to

his use or for his beneﬁt, and then his agreement subsequent

What constitutes Participation. Most wrongs may be committed either by one person or by several. When several participate, they may do so in different ways, at different times, and
in very uneqnal proportions. One may plan, another may procure the men to execute, others may be the actual instruments in
accomplishing the mischief, but the legal blame will rest opou
all as joint actors. In some cases one may also become a joint
wrong.doer by consenting to and ratifying what has been done
by others. But this cannot be done by merely approving a wrong,
or by expressing pleasure or satisfaction at its being accomplished.'

amounteth to a eommandment.”’ Chief Justice Tmnsu. pre-

sents the same principle more fully, in the following language:

“That an act for another by a. person not assuming to act for

himself but for such other person, though without any precedent

authority whatever, becomes the act of the prinicpal if subse-

quently ratiﬁed by him, is the known and well established rule
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of law. In that case the principal is bound by the act, whether

it be for his detriment or his advantage, and whether it be

' Thus, where one who knew that a

bailee of a team had hired it to go to

one place, rode with him to another,

in violation of the b:1ilee’s duty, it

was held he was not liable as a tres-

passer in so doing. Hubbard v. Hunt,

41 VI. 876. See, also, Langdon 1;.

Bruce, 27 Vt. 657. One who sees a

fraud being accomplished before his

eyes, by inducing a person to l)l‘C()ll)G

surety for another who is irrespon-

sible, does not become liable for the

In order to constitute one a wrong
doer by ratification, the original act must have been done in his
interest. or been intended to further some purpose of his own.
Lord CoKK, on this subject, says: "He that agreeth to a trespass
after it is done is no trespasser, unless the trespass was done to
his use or tor his benefit, and then his agreement subsequent
amounteth to a commandment.'" Chief Justice TINDALL presents the same principle more fully, in the following language:
"That an act for another by a person not assuming to act tor
himself but tor such other person, thoug-h without any precedent
authority whatever, becomes the act of the prinicpal if subsequently ratified by him, is the known and well established rule
of law. In that case the principal is bound by the act, whether
it be for his detriment or his advantage, and whether it be
Adoption of a Wrong.

fraud by merely failing to put the

party on his guard. “ If the defend-

ants merely knew of the designs and

contrivances of the principal party to

impose on the plaintiff, that would not

be a conspiracy, though they did not,

as they might, disclose the matter thus

known by them." linrrm, Ch. J., in

Brannock u. Bouldiu, 4 Ircd. 61.

‘ 4 Inst. 317. See Eastern Counties

R. R Co. 0. Broom, 6 Exch. 314; Hull

0. Piekersgill, 1 B. & B. 2512; Wilson

0. Tumman, 6 M. & Gr. 236; Harri-

son p. Mitchell. 13 Ln. Ann. 260; Col-

lins Q. Waggoner, Bret-so, 26; Bever-

idgc ti. R1l\\‘SHll, 51 Ill. 501; Allred u.

l3ray.41Mo. 481; Grnml q. Van Vlec-1;,

09 Ill. 479; Vanderbilt 0. Turnpike

Co., 2 N. Y. 479; Brainerd v. Dun-

ning. 80 N. Y. 211. The government

is liahlc for the illegal acts of its offl-

cers which it eXp1'0s~‘l_)' adopts. Wig-

gins v. United States, 3 Ct. Claims, 412.

Bee Buron 0. Denmun, 2 Exch. 167.

Thus, where one who knew that a
bailee of a team had hired it to go to
one place. rode with him to another,
in violation of the b:dlee's duty, it
was held he was not liable as a trespa.sser in so doing. Hubbard v. Hunt,
41 VL 376. Sec, also, Langdon "·
Bruce, 27 Vt. 657. One who seos a
fraud being nrcomplishPd bPfore his
t-yes, by inducing a person to bPcome
:-~urety for another who is irresponsible, does not become liable for the
fmud by merely failing to put thu
party on his guard. "If the deft>ndants merely knew of the dPsigns and
contrivances of the principal party to
impose on the plaintiff, that would not
be a conspiracy, though they did not,
1

as they might, disclose the matter thus
known by them." HUFFIN, Ch. J., In
Brannock"· Bouldin, 4 Ired. 61.
t 4 Inst. 317. See Ea,.,tern Counties
R. R Co."· Broom, 6 Exch. 314; Hull
"· Pickt"rsgill, 1 B. & B. 2~2; Wilson
"· Tumman, 6 M. & Gr. 236; Harrison~- ~litche!l, 13 La. Ann. 2GO; Collins t'· Waggl)ner, Brc·•·sP, ::!6; Beveridge v. Rawson, 51 Ill. .'iO!; Allred"·
llray, 41 ~[o. 4S 1; Gnm•l ('.Van Vlerk,
69 Ill. 479; Vaudcr!Jilt "· Turnpike
Co., 2 N. Y. 479; Brainerd "· Dunning, 30 N. Y. 211. The government
is liahle for the illegal nets of its offi.
cers which it expres•ly ntlnpt<~. Wig.
gins v. United States, 3 Ct. Claims, 412.
See Buron e. Denman, 2 Excb. 167.
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founded on a tort or a contract, to the same extent as by, and
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with all the consequences that follow from, the same act done by

his previous authority. Such was precisely the distinction taken

in the Year Book, 7 Hen. 4, fo. 35,— that if the bailiff took the

heriot claiming property in himself, the subsequent agreement

of the lord would not amount to a ratiﬁcation of his authority,

as bailiff at the time; but if he took it at the time as bailiff of

the lord, the subsequent ratiﬁcation by the lord made him bailiff

at the time. The same distinction is also laid down by A.\'m-;a-

son, Ch. J., in Godbolt’s Reports, 109. ‘If one have cause to

distrain my goods, and a stranger, of his own wrong, without

any warrant or authority given him by the other, takes my goods,

not as servant or bailiff to the other, and I bring an action of

trespass against him, can he excuse himself by saying that he did

it as his bailiff or servant? Can he also father his misdemeanor

upon another? He cannot; for once he was a trespasser and his

intent was manifest.’ ”‘ The ratiﬁcation should also be with

full knowledge of the facts, or with the purpose of the party,

without inquiry, to take the consequences upon himself.’ It is

not conclusive that the party receives and appropriates a beneﬁt

from what is done,’ or that he employs counsel to defend the tres-

passer,‘ or that he takes steps in the direction of a compromise.‘
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These are acts which any one may do for another as matter pf

friendship or favor merely, and without contemplating further

responsibility than is involved in the acts themselves.

But while the mere expression of approval of a wrong. or

gratiﬁcation at its commission, would not of itself constitute a

legal injury, by relation or otherwise, there may, perhaps, be an

exception to this general rule in the case of a Wrong which one

' Wilson '0. Tumman. 6 M. & Gr. 236. Wall, 1; Knight 0. Nelson, 117 Mass.

242. Sec, also, Bird 0. Brown, 4 Exch.

786, 798. It was held in Wilson v.

Tumman that if a shcritl‘ had made

himself liable as trespasser, the sub-

sequent ratiﬁcation of his act by the

the plaintiff would not make him a

trespasser also; the sherilf not being

his agent, but the agent of the law.

Following this decision are Tilt 0.

Jarvis, '7 U. C. C. P. 145; McLeod 0.

Fortune, 19 U. O. Q. B. 98. But see

Murray 0. Lovejoy, 2 ()liﬂ'. 191, and 3

458.

' Lewis 0. Read, 13 M. & W. 834»;

Adams 0. Freeman, 9 Johns. 118.

' Hyde e. Cooper, 26 Vt. 552; Lewis

o. Read, 13 M. & W. 834.

‘ Buttrick 0. Lowell, 1 Allen, 1'72;

Eastern Counties R. R. Co. e. Broom,

6 Exch. 314. See Woollen 0. Wright,

1 H. & C. 554.

‘ Roe 0. Birkenhead, etc., Railway

Co., '7 Exch. 86; S. C. 7 Eng. L. and

Eq. 54-6. ‘

founded on a tort or a contract, to the same extent as by, aud
with all the consequences that follow from, the same act done by
his previous authority. Such was precisely the distinction taken
in the Year Book, 7 Hen. 4, fo. 35,- that if the bailifF took the
heriot claiming property in himself, the subsequent agreement
of the lord would not amount to a ratification of his aothorityt
as bailiff at the time; but if he took it at the time as bailiff of
the lord, the subsequent ratification by the lord made him bailiff
at the time. The same distinction is also laid down by ANDEKSON, Ch. J., in Godbolt's Reports, 109. 'If one have canse to
distrain my goods, and a stranger, of his own wrong, without
any warrant or authority given him by the other, takes my goods,
not as servant or bailiff to the other, and I bring an action of
trespass against him, can he excuse himself by saying that he did
it as his bailiff or servant¥ Can he also father his misdemeanor
upon another! He cannot; for once he was a trespasser and his
intent was manifest.' " 1 The ratification should also be with
full knowledge of the facts, or with the purpose of the party,
without inquiry, to take the con~equences upon l1imself.' It is
not conclusive that the party receives and appropriates a benefit
from what is done,• or that he employs counsel to detl:md the trespasser,4 or that he takes steps in the direction of a compromise.•
These are acts which any one may do for another as matter pf
friendship or favor merely, and without contemplating further
responsibility than is involved in the acts themselves.
But while the mere expression of approval of a wrong. or
gratification at its commission, would not of itself constitute a
legal injury, by relation or otherwise, there may, perhaps, be an
exception to tltis general rule in the case of a wrong which one
1 Wilson o. Tum man, 6 M. & Gr. 286,
242. Bee, also, Bird o. Brown, 4: Exch.
786, 798. It was held in Wilson o.
Tumman that if a sheriff had made
himself liable as trespasser, the subsequent. ratification of his act by the
the plaintiff would not make him a
trespasser also; the sheriff not being
his agent, but the agent of the law.
Following this decision are Tilt o.
Jarvia, 7 U. 0. 0. P. 1~; .McLeod o.
Fonune, 19 U. C. Q. B. 98. But see
llWTay o. Lovejoy, 2 Oliff. 191, !Uld 8

Wall, 1; Knight o. Nelson,117 llllSB.
458.
1 Lewis "· Read, 18 M. & W. 834;
Adams o. Freeman, 0 Johns. 118.
1 Hyde o. Cooper, 26 Vt. S52; Lewis
e. Read, 18 M. & W. 834.
' Buttrick o. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172;
Eastern Counties R. R. Co. o. Broom,
6 Exch. 814. See Woollen e. Wright,

1 H.&C.M4.
1 Roe e. Birkenhead, etc., Railway
Co., 7 Exch. 86; S. 0. 7 Eng. L. and

Eq.M6.
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does in excess of authority while in the employ of another. The

129

question what the master’s authority will authorize and cover is

primarily one between the parties to the contract of service; and

we see no reason to question that the master may enlarge it retro-

spectively, so as to make it embrace any action which the servant

has done in reliance upon or under pretence of it. And it is

diﬂicult to distinguish an approval of the act from an adoption,

under the circumstances indicated.

Questions of ratiﬁcation often arise between the party to a suit

and the otlicer who serves his process.‘ Whatever the oﬁicer is,

by his process, commanded to do, is understood to be directed by

the party himself, who causes the writ to be issued and delivered

to the oﬁicer, that the exigency thereof may be complied with.

Therefore, to the extent of the command, the party is responsible

for what the oiiicer shall do; but as the process would be a full

protection if legal, it follows that there can be no liability of the

party, because of obedience to the command of the process,

unless the process itself was issued without authority. Sup-

posing the process to be legal, there may still be liability on the

part of the oﬁicer, if he shall overstep his authority, or shall take

the goods of one person when commanded to take those of

another, and in other like cases. But in these cases the party to
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the writ is neither morally nor technically responsible for the

departure from the command of the writ, unless he advised or

assisted the otlicer therein.’ More neglect to interpose objection

is not sufficient, nor, it seems, is an expression of opinion that

the oﬂicer's proceedings are warranted by law.’ But where a

plaintiff and his attorney were aware of all the facts concerning

the levy upon property not belonging to the defendant in the

writ, approved of it, and on request refused to consent to its

being released, they were held jointly liable with the oﬂicer as

trespassers.‘ Many cases go further than this, and hold the party

‘Perkin 0. Proctor, 9 Wils. 882; Averill o. Williams, 4 Dcnio, 295;

Parsons 0. Lloyd,3Wils. 341; Barker Chapman o. Douglass, 5 Daly, 244;

e. Braham, 8 Wils. 877; Currey 0. Abbott 0. Kimball, 19 Vt. 551. See

Pringle, 11 Johns. 444; McGuinty 0. Bisscll e. Gold, 1 \Vend. 210; Tay-

Herrick. 5 Wend. 2-10. lor o.Trask,'7 Cow. 249; Byudacker 0.

' Wilson u.Tumman, 6 M. & G. 244; Brossc, 51 Ill. 357.

Wiiitmore v. Greene, 13 M. & W. 104; ' Hyde 0. Cooper, 26 Vt. 552.

Walley 0. M‘Connell, 18 Q. B. 911; ‘ Cook 0. Hopper, 23 Mich. 511.

9

does in excess of authority while in the employ of another. The
question what the master's authority will authorize and cover is
primarily one between the parties to the contract of service; and
we see no reason to question that the master may enlarge it retro1pecth·ely, so as to make it embrace any action which the servant
has done in reliance upon or under pretence of' it. And it is
difficult to distinguish an approval of the act from an adoption,
under the circumstances indicated.
Questions of ratification often arise between the party to a snit
and the officer who sen·es his process.• 'Vhatever the officer is,
by his process, commanded to do, is understood to be directed by
the party himself, who causes the writ to be issued and delh·ered
to t.he officer, that the exigency thereof may be comp1ied with.
Therefore, to the extent of the command, the party is responsible
for what the officer shall do; but as the process would be a full
protection if legal, it follows that there can be no liability of the
party, because of obedience to the command of the process,
unless the process itself was issued without anthority. Supposing the process to be legal, there may still be liability on the
part of the officer, if he shall overstep his authority, or shall take
the goods of one person when commanded to take those of
another, and in other like cases. But in thc5e cases the party to
the writ is neither morally nor technically responsible for tho
departure from the command of the writ, unless he advised or
assisted the officer therein.• Mere neglect to interpose oldcction
is not sufficient, nor, it seems, is an expression of opinion that
the officer's proceedings are warranted by law.• But where a
plaintiff and his attorney were aware of all the facts concerning
the levy upon property not belonging to the defendant in the
writ, approved of it, and on request refused to consent to its
being released, they were held jointly liable with the officer as
trespassers. • Many cases go further thap this, and hold the party
1 Perkin "· Proctor, 9 Wila. 892;
Parsons tl. Lloyd, S Wils. 841; Barker
•· Braham, 8 Wils. 877; Currey e.
Pringle, 11 Johns. 444; McGuinty e.
Herrick, 5 Wend. 240.
• Wilson D. Tum man, 6 Jl. & n. 244:;
Whitmore.,. Greene, IS Jl. & W. 104;
Wallq e. JI'Coonell, 18 Q. B. 911;

9

Averill e. Williams, 4: D(!nio, 295;
Chapman tl. Douglass, IS Daly, 244;
Abbott e. Kimball, 19 Vt. 551. See
Bissell tl. Gold, 1 Wend. 210; Tay.
lor e. Trask, 7 Cow. 249; Byndacker e.
Brossc, 51 Ill. 857.
• Hyde e. Cooper, 26 Vl 552.
• Cook •· Hopper, 2S :Mich. Gll.
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responsible where the oﬁicer has departed from the command of

his writ, or from his instructions, if the party has afterwards

approved what was done, and has taken, or is seeking to take, a

beneﬁt from it.‘ Where, however, the plaintiff receives only

such beneﬁts as he would have been entitled to under a lawful

service of the writ, he cannot, from this fact alone, be held to be

a participant in the oiﬁcer’s trespasses.’

' See Tompkins 0. Haile, 3 Wend.

406; Root v. Chandler, 10 Wend. 111;

Allen o. Crary, 10 Wcnd. 349; Davis

v. Newkirk, 5 Denio, 94; Ball 0.

responsible where the officer has departed from the command of
his writ, or from his instructions, if the party has afterwards
approved what was done, and has taken, or is seeking to take, a
benefit from it.' Where, however, the plaintiff receives only
such benefits as he would have been entitled to under a lawful
service of the writ, he cannot, from this fact alone, be held to be
a participant in the officet·'s trespasses.'

Looinis. 20 N. Y. 412; Leach v. Fran-

cis, 41 Vt. 6'70; Stroud v. Humble, 2

La. Ann. 930; Bonnel v. Dunn, 2/8 N.

J. 153; Knight 0. Nelson, 117 Mass.

458; Wetzell 0. Waters, 18 Mo. 896;

Nelson o. (look, 17 Ill. 443; Syn-

dacker 0. Brosse, 51 Ill. 857; Bever-

idge 1:. Rawson, 51 Ill. 504; Deal 0.

Bogue, 20 Penn. St. 228.

’ Hyde v. Cooper, 26 Vt. 552. The

case was one in which an- oﬂicer had
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proceeded -to sell property on execu-

tion without suiﬁcient notice. The

plaintiﬂ‘ in the execution was sued in

trespass as a participant in the wrong.

It appeared that before the sale he

had expressed the opinion that the

notice was suﬂicient, and also that

he received the money on execution.

REDFIELD, Ch. J., “As a general

rule, perhaps, where the mistake is

one of fact, and such as makes the

oiﬁcer a trespasser, and the party

knowing all the facts, consents to

take the avails of a sale, or where he

counseled the very act, which creates

the liability of the oﬁicer, he is im-

plicated to the same extent as the oﬁi-

cer. But when the party does not

direct or control the course of the of-

ﬁeer, but requires him to proceed at

his peril, and the ofiieer makes a mis-

take of law in judging of his oiﬁcial

duty, whereby he becomes a tres-

passer, even by relation, the party is

not affected by it, even when he re-

ceives money, which is the result of

such irregularity, although he was

aware of the course pursued by the

oﬂicer. He is not liable unless he

consents to the oﬂl'icer's course, or

subsequently adopts it. And if ho

does that, he cannot maintain an

action against the oﬂicer for doing

the act, and the consequence would

be that, if receiving the avails of a

sale on execution were to be regarded

in all cases as amounting to a ratiﬁ-

cation of the conduct of the otﬁcer,

in the sale, it must preclude the cred-

itor from.all suits against the omcer

on that account: which has never

been so regarded. The party may al-

ways take money, which the olliccr

informs him he has legally collected,

without assuming the responsibility

of indorsing the perfect legality of

the entire detail of the oﬂicer's oﬁicial

1 See Tompkins "· Haile, 3 Wend.
406; Root"· Chandler, 10 Wend. 111;
Allen "· Crary, 10 Wend. 349; Davis
11. Newkirk, 5 Denio, 94; Ball o.
Loomis, 29 N.Y. 412; Leach"· Francis, 41 Vt. 670; Stroud"· Humble, 2
La. Ann. 930; Bonnf') "·Dunn, 28 N.
J. 153; Knight"· Nelson, 117 :Mass.
458; W etzell o. W atcrs, 18 1tlo. 890;
Nelson "· Cook, 17 Ill. 443; Syndocker o. Bros!:le, 51 Ill. 857; Beveridge o. Rawson, 51 Ill. 1504; Deal o.
Bogue, 20 Penn. St. 228.
t Hyde 11. Cooper, 26 Vt. 552.
The
case was one in which an· officer had
proceeded to sell property on execution without sufficient notice. Tho
plaintiff in the execution was sued in
trespass as a participant in the wrong.
It appeared that before t11e sale he
had expressed the opinion that the
notice was sufllcicnt, and also that
he received the money on execution.
REDFIELD, Ch. J., "As a general
rule, perhaps, where the mistake is
one of fact, and such as makes tho
officer a trespasser, and tho party
knowing all the facts, consents to
take the avails of t1 sale, or where he
counseled the very act, which creates
the liability of the officer, he is implicated to Ute same extent as the om.
cer. But when the party does not
direct or control the course of the officer, but requires him to proceed at
his peril, and the officer makes a rn istake of law in judging of his official
duty, whereby he becomes a trespasser, even by relation, the party is
not affected by it, even when he re-

ceives money, which is the result of
such irregularity, although he waa
aware of the course pursuell by the
officer. He is not liable unless he
consents to the officer's course; or
subsequently adopts iL And if ho
does that, he cannot maintain an
action against the officer for doing
lhe act, and tho consequence would
be that, if receiving the avails of a
sale on execution were to be regarded
in all cases as amounting to a ratification of the conduct of the officer,
in the sale, it must preclude tho creditor from. all suits against the oftlcer
on that account: which bas never
been so regarded. The party may always take money, which the officer
informs him he bas legally collected,
without assuming the responsibility
of indorsing the perfect legality of
the entire detail of the officer's official
conduct in the mntter.
"For if the officer is compelled to
refund to the debtor, on account of
his irregularity of procedure, that
will not affect the right of the creditor to retain the money. He is still
entitled to retain the money against
the officer. And tho party cannot
claim the money of tho creditor,
without thereby affirming the sale.
So that the creditor's accepting the
amount of money, for which the
property is sold, is no more a ratift.
cation of the conduct of the officer
than if he took the money of the om.
cer on any other llnbiiity. The money
is the officer's, whether he was a trespasser or not, and he is, at all events,
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and the oﬁieer is by the former giving to the latter a bond of

indemnity, or other security, against the consequences of his

action.‘

Participation by Attorneys. An attorney who delivers a writ

to an oﬂicer for service does not personally assume any responsi-

bility in respect thereto, except to this extent, that he is under-

One Ill'ethod of ratification as between the party to the snit
and the officer is by the former giving to the latter a bond ot'
indemnity, or other security, against the consequences of his
action.'

stood as directing the otiicer to proceed to obey the command of

the writ. If, therefore, the writ is illegal, and the oﬂicer makes

himself a trespasser in serving it, the attorney is liable as joint

trespasser with him.’ But if the oﬂicer exceeds the command

of the writ, or does anything which its command, if legal, would

not justify, the attorney is not responsible,‘ unless he counsels

or assists in it, in which case his liability rests upon the same

ground as that of any other participant in a trespass.‘ If an

attorney sues out an illegal writ, the party for whom he acts is

so far identiﬁed with him in the proceedings that he is responsi_

ble for what is done under it;‘ but the plaintiff is not respon-

sible for any illegal action taken or directed by the attorney,

liable to the creditor. If the sale was

irregular,that is his loss, and he must

still pay the creditor; and accepting
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the money is but taking pay for tho

oﬁicer’s liability to the creditor for

his default in the sale if it was irreg-

ular. So that, in any view of the

case, there is no ground of implicat-

ing the defendant."

The case of Lewis 0. Read, 18 M.

Participation by Attorneys. An attorney who delivers a writ
to an officer for service does not pet·sonally assume any responsibility in respect thereto, except to this extent, that he is under&tood as directing the officer to proceed to obey the command of
the writ. It~ therefore, the writ is illegal, and the officer makes
himself a trespasser in ser\•ing it, the attorney is liable as joint
trespasser with him.• But if the officer exceeds the commantl
of the writ, or does anything which its command, if legal~ would
not justi(y, the attorney is not responsible,' unless he counsels
or as~ists in it, in which case his liability rests upon the same
ground as that of any other participant in a trespass.' If an
attorney sues ont an illegal writ, the party for whom he acts is
se far identified with him in the proceedings that he is responsi.
ble for what is done under it; • but the plaintiff is not responsible for any illegal action taken or directed by the attorney,

& W. S31, lays down the same doc-

trine. That was a case in which bui-

liffs dislraiued goods not belonging

to the tenant and not on the demised

premises. These were sold and the

landlord received the proceeds. Held,

not to make him liable unless he rati-

ﬁed the act of the bailiffs with knowl-

edge of the irregularity, or chose,

without inquiry, to adopt their acts

and take upon himself all risks.

‘Murray -v. Lovejny, 2 Clilf. 191,

and 3 Wal. 1; Herring 0. Hoppock,

, .--0--Q

15 N. Y. 409, 418; Root o. Chandler,

10 Wend. 110; Knight 0. Nelson, 117

Mass. 458; Lewis 0. Johns, 34 Cal.

629; Crossman o. Owen, 62 Me. 528.

It may be done in much less formal

manner. See Bishop u. Viscountess

Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824.

' Burnap 0. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535.

' Seaton v. Cordray, Wright (Ohio),

102; Averill 0. Williams, 1 Dcnio,

501; Adams 1:. Freeman, 9 Johns. 118;

Vanderbilt 0. Turnpike Co., 2 N. Y.

479; Ford v. Williams, 13 N Y. 577;

Cook v. Hopper, 23 Mich. 511. ‘

‘ Hardy '0. Ker-ler, 56 lll. 152; Cook

0. Hopper, 23 Mich. 511.

' Barker 0. Braham, 8 Wils. 368;

Bates v. Pilling, 6 B. & C. 38; Foster

0. Wiley, 27 Mich. 244; S. C. 15 Am.

Rep. 185; Newberry v. Lee, 3 Hill,

523; Armstrong 0. Dubois, 4 Keyes,

291.

liable to the creditor. If the sale was
irregular, that is his loss, and he must
still pay the creditor; and accepting
the money Is but taking pay for the
officer's liability to the creditor for
his default in \he sale if it was irreg.
ular. So that, in any view of the
case, there is no ground of implicu~
ing the defendant...
The case of Lewis "· Read, 18 M.
& W. 8!3 ~. lays down the same doctrine. That was a case in which bai.
liffs dhstrained gootls not belonging
to the tenant and not on the demised
premises. These were sold and the
landlord received the proceeds. Ht.l£l,
not to make him liable unless be ratified the act of the bailiff:~ with knowledge of the irregularity, or chose,
without Inquiry, to adopt their acts
and take upon himself all risks.
1 Murray "· Lovejoy, 2 Cliff. 191,
and 8 Wal. 1; Herring "· Hoppock,

1:S N.Y. 409, 418; Root "· Chandler,
10 Wend. 110; Knight"· Nelson, 117
Mass. 458; Lewis "· Johns, 84 CaL
629; Crossman "· Owen, 62 Me. li28.
It may be done in much less formal
manner. See Bi.~hop o. Viscountess
:Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824.
1 Burnap"· l\lnrsh, 13 Ill. 535.
1 Seaton "· Cordray, Wright (Ohio),
102; Ave1·ill "· Williams, 1 Denio,
501; Adams"· Freeman, 9 Johns.118;
Vanderbilt "· Turnpike Co., 2 N.Y.
479; Ford "·Williams, 18 N Y. 577;
Cook"· Hopper, 23 :1\lich. 511. '
'Hardy"· K<'C'ler, 56 Ill. 152; Cook
e. Hopper, 23 ~llch. 511.
' Barker "· Brnhnm, 8 Wils. 808;
Bat<'s v. Pilling, 6 B. & C. :38; Fostl!r
"·Wiley, 27 Mich. 244; S.C. 15 Am.
Rep. 185; Newberry "· Lee, S Hill,
523; Armstrong "· Dubois, 4 Keyes,
291.
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and which was not justiﬁed by any authority he had given.‘

Wrongs by Deputies. Whenever an officer is authorized by

law to appoint a deputy who shall be empowered to perform his

ofﬁcial duties, the rule is general that the principal shall respond

which the plaintiff did not advise, consent to, or participate in,
and which was not justified by any authority he had gh•en.1

for all the deputy’s znisfeasances or nonfeasanees, while he acts

by color of his appointment. Taking the case of the sheriff as

an illustration, the rule is laid down very clearly in the numerous

cases cited in the margin, that the sheriff is liable to the plaintiff

in the writ for the deputy’s misconduct or neglect to his injury.’

But he is also liable for the deputy’s misfeasances and non-

feasances which injure the defendant‘ or any third person.‘

Nevertheless, the fact that the sheriff is responsible does not

relieve the deputy, who is equally liable with the sheriff for all

his positive n1isfeasances;' but when a mere neglect to perform

anoﬂieial duty is complained of, only the sherilf can be sued,

because only upon him does the otlicial duty rest.‘ '

General Rules of Joint Liability. Proceeding now to a par-

ticular examination of the rules of liability where the fault is

‘ Freeman 0. Rosher, 13 Q. B. 780;

Ferguson 1;. Terry, 1 B. Mon. 96;

Adams v. Freeman, 9 Johns. 118; Fox
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o. Jackson, 8 Barb. 855; Welsch 0.

Cochran, 63 N. Y. 181; S. C. 20 Am.

Rep. 519.

' Blunts. Sheppard,1 Mo.219; Mar-

shall 0. Hosmcr, 4 Mass. 60; Esty -0.

Wrongs by Deputies. Whenever an officer is authorized by
law to appoint a deputy who shall be empowered to perform his
official duties, the rule is general that the principal shall respond
for all the deputy's misfeasances or nonfeasances, while he acts
by color of his appointment. Taking the case of the sheriff as
an illustration, the rule is laid down very clearly in the numeroui>
cases cited in the margin, that the sheriff is liable to the plaintitf
in the writ for the deputy's misconduct or neglect to his injnry.•
But he is also liable for the deputy's misfeasances and nonfeasances which injure the defendant • or any third person.•
Nevertheless, the fact that the sheriff is responsible does not
relieve the deputy, who is equally liable with the sheriff for all
his positive misfeasances; • but when a mere neglect to perform
an ·official dnty is complained of, only the sheriff can be sued,because only upon him does the official duty rest.•
·

Chandler, '7 Mass. 464‘; M‘lntyre 12.

Trumbull, 7 Johns. 35; Curtis 0. Fay,

87 Barb. 61; Pond o. Leman, 45 Barb.

General Rules of Joint Liability. Proceeding now to a particular examination of the rules of liability where the fault is

152; Mason v. Ide, 30 Vt. 697; Seaver

11. Pierce, 42 Vt. 325; Btimpson 0.

Pie1'ce, 42 Vt. 334; Whitney 0. Farrar,

51 Me. 418; Remlinger 0. Weyker, 22

Wis. 383; Clute 0. Goodell, 2 McLean,

193.

‘ Woodgnte 0. Knatchbull, 2 T. R.

148; Grunnell v. Phillips, 1 Mass. 529;

Knowlton 0. Bartlett, 1 Pick. 270. See

Morgan 0. Chester, 4 Conn. 387;

Waterbury v. Westervelt, 9 N. Y. 598.

‘ Ackworth 0. Kempe, Doug. 41;

Campbell 0. Phelps, 17 Mass. 244;

Norton 0. Nye, 56 Me. 211. But the

sherilf is not liable to a third party

who is merely injured as surety for

the defendant by some misconduct of

the deputy. Harrington 0. Ward, 9

Mass. 251. i

' Purrington 0. Loring, 7 Mass. 888;

Ross 1:. Philbriek, 39 Me. 29; Rem-

linger o. Weyker, 22 Wis. 383. '

° Cameron a. Reynolds, Cowp. 403;

Hutchinson o. Parkhurst, 1 Aik. 258;

Buck *0. Ashley, 87 Vt. 475; Armistead

0. Marks, 1 Wash. (Va.) 325; Rose o.

Lane, 3 Humph. 218; Paddock o.

Cameron, 8 Cow. 212. The rule

seems to be dilfercnt in Massachu-

setts. Draper 0. Arnold, 12 Mass. 449.

On his special promise to pay money

collected on execution the deputy

may be held. Tuttle o. Love, 7 Johns.

470; Rose v. Laue, 3 Humph. 218;

Abbott 0. Kimball, 19 Vt. 551.

Freeman 1:1. Rosher, 18 Q. B. '780;
Ferguson "· Terry, 1 B. :Mon. 96;
Adams "· Freeman, 9 Johns. 118; Fox
"· Jackson, 8 Barb. 855; Welsch "·
Cochran, 63 N. Y. 181; 8. 0. 20 Am.
Rcp.IH9.
• Bluntfl. Sheppard, 1 :Mo. 219; Mar.
shall t~. Hosmer, 4 Mass. 60; Esty "·
Chamller, 7 Mass. 464 ; :M'lntyre "·
Trumbull, 7 Johns. 35; 'curtis "· Fay,
87 Barb. 6!; Pond t~. Leman, 45 Barb.
152; Mason 11. Ide, 30 Vt. 697; Seaver
t~. Pierce, 42 Vt. 825; Stimpson "·
Pierce, 42 Vt. 834; Whitney"· Farrar,
51 :Me. 418; Remlinger"· Weyker, 22
Wis. 883; Clute"· Goodell, 2 McLean,
193.
• Woodgate 1:1. Knatchbull, 2 T. R.
148; Grunnell t~. Phillips, 1 Mass. 529;
Knowlton"· Bartlett, 1 Pick. 270. See
Morgan "· Chester. 4 Conn. 887;
Waterbury"· Westervelt, 9 N. Y. 598.
• Ackworth "· Kempe, Doug. 41;
1

Campbell "· Phelps, 17 }lass. 244;
Norton t~. Nyc, 56 lie. 211. But the
sheriff is not liabl(\ to a tllird party
who is merely injured as surety for
the defendant by some misconduct of
the deputy. Harrington "· Ward, 9
Mass. 251.
·
1 Purrington t~. Loring, 7 Mass. 388;
Ross "· Philbrick, 89 1\Ie. 29; Rem.
linger"· Wcyker, 22 Wis. 388.
·
• Cameron "· Reynolds, Cowp. 403;
Hutchinson"· Parkhurst, 1 Aik. 258;
Buck"· Ashley, 37 Vt. 475; Armistead
"·Marks, 1 Wash. (Va.) 825; Rose t~.
Lane, 8 Humph. 218; Paddock "·
Cameron, 8 Cow. 212. The rule
seems to be different in :Massachu.
setts. Draper "·Arnold, 12 Muss. 440.
On his special promise to pay money
collected on execution the deputy
mny be held. Tuttle "· Love, '7 J ohna.
470; Rose "· Lane, 8 Humph. 218 0
Abbott"· Kimball, 19 Vt. 551.
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be convenient to classify the wrongs into those of intent and

those not of intent, inasmuch as the existence of wrongful intent

is in many cases of the highest importance.

1. Wrongs Intended. Where several persons unite in an act

which constitutes a wrong to another, intending at the time to

commit it, or doing it under circumstances which fairly charge

them with intending the consequences which follow, it is a very

legally or otherwise chargeable to more than one person, it will
be convenient to classi(y the wrongs into those of intent and
those not of intent, inasmuch as the existence of wrongful intent
is in many cases of the highest importance.

reasonable and just rule of law which compels each to assume

and bear the responsibility of the misconduct of all.‘ To require

the party injured to ascertain and point out how much of the

injury was done by one person and how much by another, or

what share of responsibility is fairly attributable to each as

between themselves, and to leave this to be apportioned among

them by the ury according to the mischief found to have been

done by each, would, in many cases, be equivalent to a practical

denial of justice. The law does not require this, but on the

other hand permits the party injured to treat all concerned in

the injury as constituting together one party, by their joint

co-operation accomplishing certain injurious results, and liable

to respond to him in a gross sum as damages.‘

But while the law permits all the wrong-doers to be proceeded
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against jointly, it also leaves the party injured at liberty to pur-

sue any one of them severally, or any number less than the

whole, and to enforce his remedy regardless of the participation

of the others. While the wrong is joint it is also in contempla-

tion of law several; the wrong of one man in beating another is

not the less his personal wrong because of a third person having

held the assaulted party while another delivered the blows, or

because still others stood by, and by force or threats prevented

‘Miller 0. Fenton, 11 Paige, 18;

Nelson o. Cook, 17 Ill. 443; Turner 0.

Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310; Mchlunnus

0. Lee, 43 Mo. 206; Wallace 1:. Miller,

15 La. Ann. 449; Lewis v. Johns, 34

Cal. 629; Shepherd o. McQuiikin, 2

W. Va. 90; Woodbridge v. Conner, 49

Me. 353; Brown 1:. Perkins, 1 Allen,

89; Burden n. Fcich,109 Mass.1-54;

Johnson 0. Barber, 10 Ill. 425.

‘Page v. Freeman, 19 Mo. 421-,

Wright o. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Haw-

kins 11. Halton, 1 N. & McC. 818;

Knickerbacker u. Colver, 8 Cow.

111; Knott v. Cunningham. 2 Sueed,

1. Wrongs Intended. Where several persons unite in an act
which constitutes a wrong to another, intending at the time to
commit it, or doing it nnder circumstances which fairly charge
them with intending the consequences which fol10\V 1 it is a very
reasonable and just rule of law which compels each to assume
and bear the responsibility of the misconduct of all.' To require
the party injured to ascertain and point out how much of the
injury was done by one person and how much by another, or
what share of responsibility is fairly attributable to each as
between themselves, and to leave this to be apportioned among
them by the jnry accordiug to the mischief found to have been
done by each, would, in many cases, be equivalent to a practical
denial of justice. The law does not require this, but on the
other hand permits tho party injured to treat all concerned in
the injury as constituting together one party, by their join~
co-operation accomplishing certain injurious results, and liable
to respond to him in a gross sum as damages.'
But while the law permits all the wrong-doers to be proceeded
against jointly, it also leaves the party injured at liberty to pursue any ooe of them severally, or any number less than the
whole, and to enforce his remedy regardless of the participation
of the others. While the wrong is joint it is also in contemplation of law several; the wrong of one man in beating another is
not the less his personal wrong because of a third person having
held the assaulted party while another delivered the blowe, or
because still others stood by, and by force or threats prevented

204; McGchce v. Shuﬁ-r, 15 Texas,

198; Turner 0. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa,

310; Wheeler 0. Worcester, 10 Allen,

591.

1 Miller "· Fenton, 11 Paige, 18;
Nelson"· Cook, 17 Ill. 443; Turneu.
Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310; McMannus
e. Lee, 48 Mo. 206; Wallace"· Miller,
15 La. Ann. 449; Lewis "·Johns, 34
Cal. 629; Shepherd 11. McQuilkin, 2
W.Va. 90; Woodbridge"· Conner, 49
lrle. 853 : Brown e. Perkins, 1 Allen,
89; Barden 11. Felch, lOU Mssa. 154;
Johnlon •· Barber, 10 Ill. 425.

1 Psge e. Freeman, 19 Mo. 421 ;
Wright e. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Haw.
kina "· Hatton, 1 N. & McC. 818;
Koickerbackcr D. Colver, 8 Cow.
111; Knott "· Cunningham, 2 Sneed,
204 ; McGehee "· Shafer, 15 Texas,
198 ; Turner e. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa,
810; Wheeler e. Worcester, 10 Allen,

591.
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the intervention of the police. The oﬂicer who serves a void
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writ is not the less an individual wrong-doer because of the

magistrate being liable for having issued it. And while in such

cases the person injured may pursue all, so he may pursue any

number of those who were legally chargeable with the wrong;

if one is sued alone, it is no defense to him that others are not

brought in to share the responsibility; if all are sued, one cannot

excuse himself by showing the insigniﬁcance of his participa-

tion as compared with that of others.‘ The rules regarding

remedies which are applied to breaches of contracts are obviously

inapplicable here. When contracts are distinct, though they

may be as intimately related as are contracts for the different

classes of work on the same building, the breach of both cannot

be redressed in the same suit, because neither contractor is

legally concerned with the conduct of the other, and to unite a

controversy with each in one action would only breed confusion

and difﬁculty, since the issues must be distinct, and separate

results must be reached in the judgment. On the other hand,

if two jointly undertake the work, it is the right of both to be

made parties when complaint is made of non-performance; the

other party has accepted their joint undertaking, and he cannot

elect to separate in his suit those who have not consented to
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sever in their contract. The case of wrong-doers is wholly dif-

ferent; the party injured has not assented to their action; he

has not agreed what the consequences shall be if one or more

shall trespass upon his rights, nor is he morally under obligation

to pursue his remedy in any particular form because of that

form being most to their convenience. \Vhatever course is seem-

ingly most for his interest, it is just that he should be at liberty

to select. ‘

‘Farcbrother o. Ansley, 1 Camp.

848; Wilson v. Milncr, 2 Camp. 452;

Pitcher 0. Bailey, 8 East, 171; Booth

o. Hodgson, 6. T. R. 405; Mcrrywea-

ther v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186; Vnse 0.

Grant, 15 Mass. 505; Wheeler v. Wor-

cester, 10 Allen, 591; Campbell 0.

Phelps. 1 Pick. 62 ; Wilford 1:. Grant,

Kirby, 114 ; Thweatt '0. J ones, 1 Rand.

328; Dupuy r. Johnson, 1 Bibb, 562;

Acheson v Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Wal-

lace 0. Miller, 15 La. Ann. 449 ; Moore

0. Appleton. 26 Ala. 633; Rhea 0.

White, 3 Head, 121 ; Murphy 0. Wil-

the intervention of the polit.-e. The officer ~ho serves a void
writ is not the less an individual wrong-doer because of the
magistrate being liable for having issued it. And while in such
cases the person injured may pursue all, so he may pursue any
number of those who were legally chargeable with the wrong;
if one is llned alone, it is no defense to him that others are not
brought in to share the responsibility; if all are sued, one cannot
excuse himself by showing the insignificance of his participation as compared with that of others.' The rules regarding
. remedies which are applied to breaches of contracts are obviously
inapplicable here. When contracts are distinct, though they
may be as intimately related as are contracts for the different
classes of work on the same building, the breach of both cannot
be redressed in the sarfle suit, because neither contractor is
legally concerned with the conduct of the other, and to unite a
controversy with each in one action would only breed confusion
and difficulty, since the issues must be distinct, and separate
results must be reached in the judgment. On the other hand,
if two jointly undertake the work, it is the right of both to be
made parties when complaint is made of non-performance; the
other party has accepted their joint undertaking, and he cannot
elect to separate in his snit those who have not consented to
sever in their contract. The case of wrong-doers is wholly different; the party injured has not assented to their action; he
}laS not agreed what the COnseqneiJCCS shall be if one or more
shall trespass upon his rights, nor is he morally under obligation
to pursue his remedy in any particular form because of that
form being most to their convenience. '\Vhatever course is seemingly most for his interest, it is just that he should be at liberty
to select.
'

son, 44 Mo. 313; Silvers 0. Nerdlinger,

30 Ind. 53; Bishop 0. Ely, 9 Johns.

294; Williams 1:. Sheldon, 10 Weud.

654; Mayne 0. Griswold, 3 Sandi‘ 463.

The plaintiff may even bring diﬂ‘er-

ent forms of action against the diﬂ'er-

ent participants in the wrong; as

trespass against one, trover against

another, and so on. DuBose v. Marx,

52 Ala. 506.

·

1 Farcbrother 11. Ansley, 1 Cn.mp.
848; Wilson e. :Milner, 2 Camp. 452;
Pitcher 11. Bailey, 8 East, 171 ; Booth
11. Hodgson, 6. T. R. 405 ; .Merryweather 11. Nixao, 8 T . U. 186; Vose e.
Qrant, 15 Mass. 505; Wheeler 11. Worcester, 10 Allen, 591; Campbell e.
Phelps, 1 Pick. 62; Wilford 11. Grant,
Kirby,114; Thwcattv. Joncs,1 Rand.
828; Dupuy 11. Johnson, 1 Bibb, 562;
Acheson , Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Wal.
lace e. Miller, 15 La. Ann. 449 ; Moore

e. Appleton. 26 Ala. 633; Rhea 11.
White, 3 Head, 121 ; Murphy "· Wil.
son, 44 }[o. 318; Silvers v. N crdlinger,
SO Ind. 53; Bishop 11. Ely, 9 Johns.
294; Williams 11. Sheldon, 10 Wend.
654; :Mayne 11. Griswold, 3 Sand f. 463.
The plaintiff may even bring differ.
cnt forms of action ngl\inst the diff(•r.
ent participants in the wrong; as
t1·espass against one, trover a~h.inst
another, and so on. DuBose e. Marx.
52 Ala. 506.
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Nor, after suit is brought, can there be any apportionment of

responsibility, whether the suit be against one or against all.
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Each is responsible for the whole, and the degree of his blame-

ableness as between himself and his associates is immaterial.‘

When the contributory action of all accomplishes a particular

result, it is unimportant to the party injured that one contributed

much to the injury and another little; the one least guilty is

liable for all, because he aided in accomplishing all.’

To charge one with participation in a wrong, it is generally

essential that he should personally have contributed to it; but

this, as has already been shown, may have been by advising or

procuring it to be done, when he did not otherwise take part in

it. In some cases, also, the ratiﬁcation of the act is suﬁicient;

and in all cases where one has obtained possession of the property

of another without right, he is a wrong-doer in retaining it, irre-

spective of any questions regarding the liability of others. It

was once held in Massachusetts that a sheriff who was not pres-

ent when his deputy, in the service of a writ, committed a tres-

pass, could not be held liable as joint trespasser with him; ’ but

the better doctrine is, that the sheriff, by construction of law, is

always present with the deputy who bears his process, and is

legally responsible for his acts.‘ In New York, the oﬁicer who
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attached goods, the otlicer who tool< them from him on an exe-

cution in the attachment suit, and the plaintiff in that suit were

all held responsible as joint wrong-doers.‘ In Iowa, where an

oﬂicer attached goods in favor of several plaintiﬁs, and by virtue

“The huntsman who trespasses up- cecd to apportion it among the de-

on the plaintiﬂ"s grounds with his fendants, this apportionment is a nul-

dogs, followed by n. great number of

people on foot and on horseback, who

trample down and destroy crops, is

responsible for the whole injury.

Hume 0. Oldacre,1 Stark. 351. If ac-

tion is brought agaiust one of several

wrong-doers, the judgment should be

what the most culpable ought to pay,

whether the th-t"<-ndant be that person

or not Bell o. Morrison, 27 Miss. 68.

Nor, after suit is brought, can there be any apportionment of
responsibility, whether the suit be against one or against all.
Each is responsible for the whole, and the degree of his blame- ..
ableness as between himself and his associates is immaterial!
When the contributory action of all accomplishes a particular
ramlt, it is unimportant to the party injured that one contributed
much to the injury and another little; the one least guilty is
liable for all, because he aided in accomplishing all.'
To charge one with participation in a wrong, it is generally
essential that he should personally have contributed to it; but
this, as has already been shown, may have been by advising or
procuring it to be done, when he did not otherwise take part in
it. In some cases, also, the ratification of the act is sufficient;
and in all cases where one has obtained possession of the property
of another without right, he is a wrong-doer in retaining it, irrespective of any questions regarding the liability bf others. It
was once held in Massachusetts that a sheriff who was not present when his deputy, in the service of a writ, committed a trespass, could not be held liable as joint trespasser with him; • but
the better doctrine is, that the sheriff, by construction of law, is
always present with the deputy who bears his process, and is
legally responsible tor his acts.' In New York, the officer who
attached goods, the otlicer who too~ them from him on an execution in the attachment snit, and the plaintiff in that suit were
all held responsible as joint wrong-doers.• In Iowa, where au
officer attached goods in favor of several plaintiffs, and by virtue

’Berry 0. Fletcher, 1 Dill. 67, '71.

Where a jury, in an action against

several wrong-doers. return a verdict

for a certain amount, and then pro-

lity. Currier 0. Swan, 68 Me. 323.

‘Campbell 0. Phelps, 1 Pick. 62.

See Moulton 0. Norton, 5 Barb. 286.

‘ Morgan o. Chester, 4 Conn. 387;

King‘ o. Orser, 4 Duer. 431; Water-

bury o. Wcstcrvt-lt,9 N. Y. 598; Balme

0. Hutton, 9 Bing. 471, 474.

‘Sprague v. Kneelnnd, 10 \Ven<l.

101. If one sells and another buys

goods, knowing of the claim of an-

other, the latter may hold them jointly

liable for a conversion. Babcock u.

Gill, 10 Johns. 287.

1 ·Tbe huntsman who trespasses upon the plaintitl"'s grounds with his
dogs, followed by a great number of
people on foot and on horscb:\ck, who
trample down and drstroy crops, is
responsible for the whole injury.
llume 17. Oldacre, 1 Stark. 851. If action is brought against one of scvcml
wrong-doers, the jud)!ment should be
what the most cult>able ought to pay,
whether the drf(•ndant be that person
or not. Bell 17. Mnrrison, 27 Miss. 68.
1 Berry 17. Fletcher, 1 Dill. 67, 71.
Where a jury, in an action agniust
Feveral wrong-doers. return a verdict
for a ccHain amount, and then pro-

ceed to apportion it among the de.
fendants, this apportionment is a nul.
lity. Currier e. Swan, 63 Me. 323.
'Cnmpbcil e. Phelps, 1 Pick. 62.
Bee Moulton e. Norton, 5 Barb. 286.
' Morgan 17. Chester, 4 Conn. 387;
King t~. Orser, 4 Duer, 481; Water.
buryt~. Wrstervelt,9 N. Y.598; Balme
t~. Hutton, 9 Bing. 471, 4i4.
1 Sprague t~. Kneeland, 10 'Vend.
Hit. If one sclls and another buys
goods, knowing or the claim of 811other, the latter mny hold them jointly
liable for a conversion. Babcock 11.
Gill, 10 Johns. 28'7.
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of several writs, the plaintiffs in these writs, though present

together at the time of the levy, were held not liable to a joint
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action, unless concert and co-operation between them was made

out.‘ But this conclusion may well be doubted. In Massachu-

setts, where different creditors, acting separately and without

concert, caused their creditor to be arrested on their several writs

by the same oﬁicer, their joint liability was aﬂirmed on reasons

that seem conclusive.’ And concert and co-operation may doubt-

less make a joint wrong of several acts not otherwise connected,‘

and which, without co-operation, could only be treated as iride-

pendent trespasses.‘

When the suit is against several joint wrong-doers, the judg-

ment must be fora single sum against all the parties found

responsible.‘ As it may happen that this judgment may not be

against all the parties liable, either because the plaintiff was not

at ﬁrst aware of the full extent of the combination which has

injured him, or because he was unable, when ﬁrst suing, to obtain

service on all the parties connected with it, it becomes a question

of importance whether, after thus proceeding against a part, he

may afterwards sue others. And the question is the same if,

having voluntarily elected to pursue a part only, he ﬁnds, after

obtaining judgment, that the pecuniary responsibility is not what
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he had supposed. ‘

Whateve1' may have been the reason for proceeding at ﬁrst

against less than the whole, it is conceded on all sides that a pre-

vious suit avainst one or more is no bar to a new suit aeainst the

5

others, even though the ﬁrst suit be pending, or have Si-oceeded

‘Eddy v. Howard, 28 Iowa. 1'75.

Compare Ellis v. Howard, 1'7 Vt. 330.

' See Higby 0. Williams, 16 Johns.

215.

‘Stone 1;. Dickinson, 5 Allen, 29.

BIGELOW, Ch. J., in delivering the

opinion of the ‘court, instances the

case of the levy of several writs in

favor of ditferent parties on the same

goods, by the same ofﬂcer, as one in

which a joint liability would be un-

questionable. Whcrc a sheriff wrong-

of several writs, the plaintiffs in these writs, though present
together at the time of the levy, were held not liable to a joint
action, unless concert and co-operation between them was made
out.' But this conclusion may well be donbted. In Massaehnsetts, where different creditors, acting separately and without
concert, caused their creditor to be arrested on their several writs
by the same officer, their joint liability was affirmed on reasons
that seem conclusive.2 And concert and co-operation may doubtless make a joint wrong of several a('ts not otherwise connected,'
and which, without co-operation, could only be treated as independent trespasses!
When the suit is against several joint wrong-doers, the judgment mnst be for a single sum against all the parties found
responsible.• As it may happen that this judgm<'nt may not be
against all the parties liable, either because the plaintiff was not
at first aware of the full extent of the combination which has
injured him, or bel!ftnse he was unable, when first suing, to obtain
service on all the parties connected with it, it becomes a question
of importance whether, after thus proceeding against a 1)art, ho
may afterwards sue others. And the question is the same if,
having voluntarily elected to pursue a part only, he finds, after
obtaining judgment, that the pecuniary responsibility is not what
he had supposed.
Whatever may have been the reason for proceeding at first
against less than the whole, it is conceded on all sides that a previous snit against one or more is no bar to a new snit ~0'8inst the
others, even though the first suit be pending, or have proceeded

fully, while goods are in his possession

under a previous wrongful levy, at-

taches them again. he and the attach-

ing creditor are jointly liable. Cox

0. Hall, 18 Vt. 191.

‘ Of the necessity of co-operation in

some form to constitute the joint

wrong, see Bard o. Yohu, 26 Penn. St.

482. Mere presence is not suﬂicient.

Berry e. Fletcher, 1 Dill. 67.

5 In South Carolina, at an early day,

the practice of apportioning damages

among wrong-doers, by the verdict,

appears to have been sanctioned and

established. Smith o. Singleton, 8

McMul.184. But see Berry 1:. Fletch-

er, l Dill. 67.

'Eddy fl. Howard, 28 Iowa, 1715,
Compare Ellis"· Howard, 17 Vt. 330.
1 Stone t~. Dickinson, 5 Allen, 29.
BIGELOW, Cb. J., in· delivering the
opinion of the ·court, instances the
case of the levy of several writs in
favor of dill'erent parties on the same
goods, by the same officer, as one in
which a joint lbbility would be un.
questionable. Where a sheriff wrongfully, while goods are in his possession
under 1\ previous wrongful levy, attaches them again, he and the attaching creditor arc jointly liable. Cox
"· Hall, 18 Vt. 191.

1 See Higby t~. Williams, 16 Johoa.
215.
• Of the necessity of co-operation in
some form to constitute the join$
wrong, see Bard"· Yohn, 26 Penn. St.
482. Mere presence is not suftlcien~.
Berry fl. Fletcher, 1 Dill. 67.
' In South Carolina, at an early day,
tho practice of apportioningdamagee
among wrong-doers, by the verdict,
appears to havtS been sanctioned and
established. Smith "· Singleton, t
1\lcMul. 18!. But see Berry fl. Fletch.
er, 1 Dill. 67.
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to judgment when the second is brought. The second, or even a
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subsequent suit may proceed until a stage has been reached in
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some one of them at which the plaintiff is deemed in law to have

either received satisfaction, or to have elected to rely upon one

proceeding for his remedy to the abandonment of the others.

But the authorities are not agreed as to what that stage is.

The rule laid down in Brown v. Wootton is that a recovery and

judgment in a suit against one joint wrong-doer is a bar to any

further action against others. The action was trover for the con-

version of certain plate. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff

had theretofore brought suit for the same conversion against one

J. S., and had recovered udgment in that suit, and taken the body

in execution. “ All the court held the plea to be good, for the

cause of action being against divers, for which damages uncer-

tain are recoverable, and the plaintiff having udgment against

one person for damages certain, that which was uncertain before

is reduced in re1nju(lz'catum and to certainty, which takes away

the action against the others; and therefore POPIIAM said: If one

hath judgment to recover in trespass against one, and damages

are certain, although he be not satisﬁed, yet he shall not have a

new action for this trespass. By the same reason e contra, if one

hath cause of action against two, and obtain judgment against
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one, he shall not have remedy against the other, and the alleging

that he hath the one in execution for this cause is not an answer

to the purpose; and the difference between this case and the case

of debt upon an obligation against two, is because there every

one is chargeable and liable to the entire debt, and therefore a

recovery against one is not a bar against the other until satisfac-

tion. FIJNNER said: That in case of trespass, after the judgment

given, the property of the goods is changed, so as he may not

seize them again. Wherefore, by all the court nullo contradic-

anti, nor any of the defendant’s counsel being there, it was

adjudged for the defendant.” ‘

This case has been followed in England,‘ but, except in Vir-

ginia‘ and Rhode Island,‘ it has not met with favor in this

' Brown 0. Wootton, Cro. Jae. 73; 584. Sec Adams 0. Ham. 5

Yelv, 67, B. 292; Sloan o. Creasor, 22

’ Buckland 0. Johnson. 15 C. B. 145; B. 127.

King o. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 4!!-1, 504; ' Wilkes 0. Jackson, 2 H. & H.355.

Brinsmead v. Harrison, L. R. 6 C. P. ‘ Hunt o. Bates, 7 R. I. 217.

F5?‘-

F39
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to judgment when the second is brought. The second, or even a
subscc1uent suit may proceed until a stage has been reached in
some one of them at which the plaintiff is deemed in law to have
either received satisfaction, or to have elected to rely upon one
proceeding for his remedy to the abandonment of the others.
But the authorities are not agreed as to what that stage is.
The role laid down in Brown v. Wootton is that a recovery and
judgment in a suit against one joint wrong-doer is a bar to any
further action against others. The action was tro,·er for the convert:ion of certain plate. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff
had theretofore brought suit for the same conversion against one
J. S., and had recovered judgment in that snit, and taken the body
in execution. ''All the court held the plea. to be good, for t.he
cause of action being against divers, tor which damages uncertain are recoverable, and the plaintiff having judgment against
one person for damages certain, that which was unc.-ertain before
is reduced in J'emjudicatltm and to certainty, which takes away
the action against the others; and therefore PoPIIUI said: If one
bath judgment to recover in trespass against one, and damages
are certain, although he be not satisfied, yet he shall not have a
new action for this trespas8. By the same reason e contra, if one
hath cause of action ~oainst two, and obtain judgment against
one, he shall not ha,·e remed_y against the other, and the alleging
that he hath the one in execution for this cause is not an answer
to the purpose; and the difference between this case and the case
of debt upon an obligation against two, is becanf\e there every
one is chargeable and Hable to the entire debt, and therefore a
recovery against one is not a bar against the other nntil satisfaction. FENNER said: That in case of trespass, after the judgment
given, the property of the goods is changed, so as he may not
seize them again. Wherefore, by all the court n·ullo contradicanti, nor any of the deftmdant's counsel being there, it was
adjudged for the defendant." 1
This case has been followed in England,' but, except in Virginia • and Rhode Island,• it has not mot with favor in this
Brown v. Wootton, Cro. Jac. 78;
Yelv. 67.
• Bucklandt~.Jobnson, 15 C. B. 14.';;
King"· Hoare, 18 M. & W. 4!14, 504;
Brinsmt'ad tl. Harrison, L. R. 6 C. P.
1

684. Sec Adams "· HRm. 5 U. C. Q.
B. 292; Sloan •· Crcasor, 22 U. C. Q.
B.127.
• Wilkes e. Jackson, 2 H. & ll.SM.
'Hunt •· Bat.ea, 7 R. I. 217.
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country. It was expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court
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of New York, when presided over by Chief Justice Knxr, and

was pronounced by him to be a departure from the earlier English

decisions.‘ The rule laid down by that eminent jurist, and which

has since been generally followed in this country, is, that the

party injured may bring separate suits against the wrong-doers,

and proceed to judgment in each; and that no bar arises as to

any of them until satisfaction is received.’ In Tennessee it is

agreed that a judgment against one joint wrong-doer is not of

itselfa bar to suits against the others; but it is said that “the

more reasonable doctrine, on the other hand, is, that as each of

the wrong-doers is liable for his own act, separate actions may be

brought at the same time, or successively, against each of the

several trespassers, in each of which the plaintiff may proceed to

judgment. But as he can claim or enforce only one satisfaction

for the same injury, he must elect against which of the several

he will proceed to execution for the satisfaction of his damages.

If the several assessments vary in amount, he may elect to take

the larger sum, or, if the defendants be not all solvent, he may

elect to proceed against the solvent party. And such election,

followed by actual satisfaction of that particular judgment, will

preclude the plaintiff from proceeding against either of the other
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defendants upon the judgments recovered against them, except

for the costs of the respective cases, which he may enforce the

collection of by execution.” ' In some other States it is held

that when execution is taken out by the plaintiff on one judg-

'Livingston 1:. Bishop, 1 Johns.

290, followed Knickerbacker o. Col-

ver, 8 Cow. 111.

' New York: Livingston 0. Bishop,

1 Johns. 290. Kentucky: Elliott v.

Porter, 5 Dana, 299; Sharp v. Gray,5

B. Mon. 4; United Society a. Under-

wood, 11 Bush, 265; S. C. 21 Am. Rep.

214. Massachusetts: Elliott 0. Hay-

den, 104 Mass 180; Knight v. Nel-

son, 117 Mass. 458. See Stone v. Dick-

inson, 5 Allen, 29; Brown 0. Cam-

country. It was expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court
of New York, when presided over by Chief Justice KENT, and
was pronounced by him to be a departure from the earlier English
decisions.' The rule laid down by that eminent jurist, and which
has since been generally followed in this country, is, that the
party injured may bring separate suits against the wrong-doers,
and proceed to judgment in each; and that no bar arises as to
any of them until satisfaction is received.' In Tennessee it is
agreed that a judgment against one joint wrong-doer is not of
itself a bar to suits against the others; but it is said that "the
more reasonable doctrine, on the other band, is, that as each of
the wrong-doers is liable for his own act, separate actions may be
brought at the same time, or successively, against each of the
several trespassers, in each of which the plaintiff may proceed to
judgment. But as he can claim or entorc.-e only one satisfaction
for the same injury, he must elect against which of the several
he will proceed to execn tion for the satisfaction of his damages.
If the several assessments vary in amount, he may elect to take
the lart;er sum, or, if the defendants be not all solvent, he may
elect to proceed against the solvent party. And such election,
followed by actual satisfaction of that particular judgment, will
preclude the plaintiff from proceeding against either of the other
defendants npon the judgments recovered against them, except
tor the costs of the respective cases, which he may enforce the
collection of by execution." • In some other States it is held
that when execution is taken out by the plaintiff on one jndg-

bridge, 3 Allen, 474. W est Virginia :

Griﬂie 0. McClung, 5 \V. Va. 131.

Uonnectiout: Morgan 0. Chester, 4

Conn. 387; Aycr o. Ashmead, 31

Conn. 447. Ohio: Wrightv Lathrop,

2 Ohio, 83. Vermont: Sanderson o.

Caldwell, 2 Aik.195; Stewart v. Mar-

tin, 16 Vt. 397. Iowa: Turner '0.

Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310. Texas .'

McGehee 0. Sliafer, 15 Texas, 198.

'Knott 0. Cunningham, 2 Snead,

204, 210. This is a little blind, but

the inference from it seems warranted,

that if execution on one judgment

proves unavailable, it may be re-

turned, and one taken out on another.

'l‘hc earlier casc of Christian o. Hoo-

ver, 6 Yerg. 505, is in accord with the

New York cases and the general cur-

rent of American authority.

1 Livingston "· Hishop, 1 Johns.
200, followed Knickerbacker "· Colver, 8 Cow. 111.
1 New York: Livingston "· Bishop,
1 Johns. 2!JO. Kentucky: Elliott 11.
Porter, 5 Dana, 299; Sharp 'D. Gray, 5
B. Mon. 4; United Society "·Under.
wood, 11 Bush, 265; S.C. 21 Am. Rep.
214. Massachusetts: Elliott "· HtLYden, 104 :Mass 180; Knight 1!. N e}.
son, 117 Mass. 458. See Stone11. Dickinson, 5 Allen, 29; Brown "· Cambridge, 3 Allen, 474. West Virginia:
Griffie "· McClung, I> W. Va. 131.
Oonnecti~ : Morgan "· Chester, 4
Conn. ~7; Ayer 11. Ashmead, 81

Conn. 447. Ohio: Wright fl. Lathrop,
Vermont : Sanderson "·
Caldwell, 2 Aik. 195; Stewart 11. Martin, 16 Vt. 897. Iowa: Turner "·
Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 810. Tezas:
McGehee 'D. Shafer, 15 Texas, UIS.
1 Knott "· Cunningham, 2 Sneed,
204, 210. This is a little blind, but
the Inference from it seems warranted,
that if execution on one judgment
proves unavailable, it may be returned, and one taken out on another.
The earlier case of Christian "· Hoo.
ver, 6 Yerg. 505, is in accord with the
New York cases and the general current of American authority.

2 Ohio, 83.
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ment, he has thereby made his ﬁnal election. “Hence, a ﬁnal

judgment and an execution, or an order for an execution against
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one of several joint trespassers is a discharge of all the others.”'

The doctrine which prevails in the majority of the States has

met with the approval of the federal courts,’ and there seems to

be no good reason why it should not be generally accepted and

followed.’ ‘

Enforcing satisfaction of his damages by the collection of one

judgment, will not preclude the plaintiff from collecting his

costs in other judgments. He is entitled to take out executions

for their collection.‘ ,

It is to be observed in respect to the point above considered,

where the bar accrues in favor of some of the wrong-doers by

reason of what has been received from or done in respect to one

or more others, that the bar arises not from any particular form

that the proceeding assumes, but from the fact that the injured

party has actually received satisfaction, or what in law is deemed

the equivalent. Therefore, ‘if he accepts the satisfaction volun-

tarily made by one, that is a bar as to all.‘ But it has been

‘Indiana: Allen 0. Wheatley, 3

Blackt‘. E32; approved in Fleming 0.

McDonald, 50 Ind. 278. Maine:
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White 0. Philbrick, 5 Me. 147. Ala»

bama: Golding v. Hall, 9 Port. 169;

Blaun v. Crocheron,2OAla. 3'20. Mia-

souri: Page 0. Freeman, 19 Mo. 421.

Jllichigan : Boardman v. Acer. 13

Mich. 77. Compare Brady 0. Whit-

ney, 24 Mich. 154; Kenyon 1:. Wood-

ment, he has thereby made his final election. 11 Hence, a final
judgment and an execution, or an drder for an execution against
one of several joint trespassers is a discharge of all the others." 1
The doctrine which prevails in the majority of the States has
met with the approval of the federal courts,s and there seems to
be no good reason why it should not be generally accepted and
followed. s
"
Enforcing satisfaction of his damages by the collection of one
judgment, will not preclude the plaintiff from <:ollecting his
costs in other ju~gments. He is entitled to take out executions
for their collection.• \
·It is to be observed in respect to the point above considered,
where the bar accrues in favor of some of the wrong.doers by
reason of what has been re<:eived from or done in respect to one
or more others, that the bar arises not from any particuiar form
that the pro::ceding assumes, but from the fact that the injured
party has actually received satisfaction, or what in law is deemed
tho equivalent. Therefore, If he accepts the satisfaction voluntarily made by one, that is a bar as to all.' But it has been

ruﬁ‘, 33 Mich. 310. If judgment is

taken against one alone, tender of

payment upon that is no bar, unless

the plaintiff elects to receive it.

Blann v. Crocherou, 20 Ala. 320.

’ Murray e. Lovejoy, 2 Cliﬁ'. 191;

S. C. 3 Wal. 1.

' Perhaps if a levy on chattels has

been made, suﬂicient to satisfy the

judgment, that should at least sus-

pend all ﬂlrther remedy for the time.

See Kenyon e.Woodruﬁ', 33 Mich. 310;

F. & M. Bank 0. Kingsley, 2 Doug.

(Mich) 3'79 ; Freeman on Judgments,

§ 475, and cases cited.

‘Windham o. Wither, Slra. 515;

Livingston 0. Bishop, 1 Johns. 290,

293; Knickerhaeker v. Colver, 8 Cow.

111; First Nat. Bank 0. Piano Co.,45

Ind. 5; Aycr 0. Ashmcad, 31 Conn.

447.

‘ Turner 1:. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 810.

Release to one releases all. McGehee

.e. Shafer. 15 Tex. 198. Note taken

from one, but not paid, is no satisfac-

tion. Ayer 0. Ashmead,31 Conn. 447,

lays (lowu the general rule. See Al-

lison o. Connor, 36 Mich. 283; Gil-

patrick 0. Hunter, 24 Me. 18; Ellis v.

Bitzer, 2 Ohio, 89; Bronson o. Fitz-

hugh,1 Hill, 185. Where a convict

in the penitentiary received injuries

while employed by contractors, un-

der charge of the penitentiary oili-

cers, and he presented to the legisla-

ture a petition for relief. and a sum

was granted to and received by him:

Held, that this was a bar to any suit

against the contractors, as the relief

received from the State implied that

I Indiana: Allen il. Wheatley, 8
Blackf. E32; approved in Fleming e.
llcDonald, 50 Ind. 278. MaiM:
White t. Philbrick, 5 Me. 147. Alabama: Golding "· Hall, 9 Port. 169;
Blann"· Crocht'ron, 20 Ala. s·~o. Mileouri: Pl'ge tl. Freeman, 19 Mo. 421.
.llichigan : Boardman "· Acer. 13
llich. 77. Compare Brady "· Whit.
ney, 24 Mich. 1M; Kenyon "·Woodruff, 83 Mich. 310. If judgment is
taken against one alone, tender of
payment upon that is no bar, unless
the plaintiff elects to receive iL
Blann tl. Crocheron, 20 Ala. 320.
1 Murray il. Lovejoy, 2 Cliff. 191;
B. C. 3 Wal. 1.
• Perhaps if a levy on chattels has
been made, sufficient to satisfy the
judgment, that should at. least suspend all further remedy for the time.
Bee Kenyon tl. Woodruff, 33 Mich. 310;
F. & M. Bank tl. Kingsley, 2 Doug.
(l(ich.) 8'79; Freeman on Judgments,
§ ~75, and cases cited.

• Windham il. Wither, Stra. ln!i;
Livingston tl. Bishop, 1 Johns. 2HO,
203; Knickerlmcker "· Colver, 8 Cow.
111; First Nat. Bank tl. Piano Co.,45
Ind. 5; Ayer c. Ash mend, 31 Conn.
447.
6 Turner tl. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310.
Release to one releases all. McGehee
. il. Shafer, 15 Tex. 198. N otc taken
from one, but not paid, is no satisfaCtion. Ayer "· A•hmead, 31 Conn. 447,
lays down the gcncrul rule. Sec Allison "· Connor, 86 Mich. 283; Oilpatrick c. Hunter, 24 ?tie. 18; Ellis"·
Bitzer, 2 Ohio, 89; Brunson tl. Fitz.
hugh, 1 Hill, 185. Where a convict
in the pt.>nitcntiary received injuries
while employed by contractors, un.
der charge of the penitentiary offi.
cc1-s, and he pregcnted to the lcgisltL·
ture a petition for relief, and a sum
was ,;ranted to and received by him:
Held, that this was a bar to any suit
against the contrnctors, as the relief
received from the State implied tb11t
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decided in Indiana that where the wrong consisted in the con-

version by two of certain speciﬁc items of property, it was com-

petent to settle with one on his returning a part of what had

been taken, and to proceed afterward against the other.‘ The

decision was expressly conﬁned to the speciﬁc facts, and could

not safely be carried very far. But where property has been con-

verted, a settlement in respect to a part of it is no bar to a suit

for the conversion of the remainder.’

2. Wrongs not Intended. Passing now to the class of unin-

tended wrongs, we ﬁnd them to consist most commonly in the

neglect to perform some duty which the party has assumed by

contract, or which the law has imposed because of oﬁicial position

decided in Indiana that where the wrong consisted in the conversion by two of certain specific items of property, it was competent to settle with one on his returning a part of what had
been taken, and to proceed afterward against the other. 1 The
decision was expressly confined to the specific facts, and could
not safely be carried very tar. But where property has been converted, a settlement in respect to a part of it is no bar to a suit
for the conversion of' the remainder.•

or of some special relation. In such cases several persons may

be found blamable, but it does not follow that all can be held

liable to the party wronged. The rule is general in such eases,

that the legal wrong is chargeable only to the party who, by his

contract, assumed the duty, or upon whom the law imposed it;

in other words, as the breach of duty constitutes the wrong, the

person who, in legal contemplation, is wrong-doer is the person

who was burdened with the duty, and who has failed in its per-

formance. The exceptions to the rule must be of those cases in
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which the act or omission constitutes in itself a positive wrong,

independent of any conventional or statutory duty; in which case

the party chargeable with it may be held liable, whether subject

to the conventional or statutory duty or not. An illustration

may, perhaps, make this point suﬂieiently plain.

A common carrier undertakes for the transportation of goods

from Mississippi to the seaboard. His duty by law is to carry

safely and deliver within a reasonable time, and if he fails to do

so he can only excuse himself by showing that the delays or

injuries have resulted from the act of God or of the public

enemy. Let it be supposed that the servants of the carrier are

negligent in the performance of their tasks; they do not load the

the State was a joint wrong-doer.

Metz 1:. Soule, 40 Iowa, 236.

‘Fitzgerald 0. Smith, 1 Ind. 810.

‘1\{c()i-illis v. Hawes, 38 Me. 566;

citing Benbridgc 1:. Day, 1 Salk, 218.

There are statutes in some States

which permit parties to settle with

one or more who are jointly liable

to them, without discharging the

others. Settlement with one not lia-

ble wns held, in Turner v. Hitchcock,

20 Iowa, 310, not to bar suits against

those who were. Citing Wilson 0.

Reed, 3 Johns. 175.

2. Wrongs not Intended. Passing now to the class of unintended wrongs, we find them to consist most commonly in the
n£'glcct to perform some duty which the party has assumed by
eon tract, or which the law has imposed because of ofticial position
or of some special relation. In such cases several persons may
be found blamable, but it does not follow that all can be held
liable to the party wronged. The rule is general in such cases,
that the legal wrong is chargeable only to the party who, by his
contract, assumed the duty, or upon \\'hom the law imposed it;
in other words, as the breach of duty constitutes the wrong, the
person who, in legal contemplation, is wrong-doer is the person
who was burdened with the duty, and who has failed in its performance. The exceptions to the rule must be of those cases in
which the act or omission constitutes in itself a positive wrong,
independent of any conventional or statutory duty; in which case
the party chargeable with it may be held liable, whether subject
to the conventional or statutory duty or not. An illustration
may, perhaps, make this point sufficiently plain.
A common carrier undertakes for the transportation of goods
from .Mississippi to the seaboard. His duty by law is to carry
safely and deliver within a reasonable time, and if he fails to do
so he can only excuse himself by showing that the delays or
injuries have resulted from the act of God or of the public
enemy. Let it be supposed that the servants of the carrier are
negligent in the performance of their tasks; they do not load the
the State was a joint wrong-doer.
Metz "· Soule, 40 Iowa, 236.
1 Fitzgerald "· Smith, 1 Ind. 810.
1 McCrillis "· Hawes, 8B Me. 566 ;
citing Ben bridge"· Day, 1 Salk, 218.
There are statutes in some States
which permit parties to settle with

one or more who are jointly liable
to them, without discharging the
others. Settlement with one not liable was held, in Turner "· Hitchcock,
20 Iowa, 310, not to bar suits against
those who were. Citing Wilson •·
Reed, 8 Johns. 17/S.
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goods promptly, or they delay trains unreasonably on the road,

141

and in consequence, when the goods reach their destination, an

advantageous market that should have been secured is lost. On

these facts it is plain that there has been a breach of the duty

owing to the consignor; and a breach, too, for which the servants

of the carrier are blamable. But when \ve proceed to inquire

whose duty has not been observed, it is equally plain that it is

not that of the servant, for with him the consignor had entered

into no relations whatever. The servant owes duties to the car-

rier, his master, by whom he may be called to account for his

negligence; but no third party by whom he has not been em-

ployed, can presume to hold him to responsibility for unfaithful

service. The consignor must, therefore, ﬁnd his remedy against

the party he employed, and the latter, if he has trusted to negli-

gent servants, mnst assume the responsibility.‘ .

The case supposed is one of mere neglect to do with legal

promptness what duty required the master to do or have done.

On the other hand, if the’ servant by some distinct and positive

wrongful act shall destroy or injure the goods, there is in contem-

plation of law a wrong not only by the master but by the servant

also: by the master, because his conventional duty to carry and

deliver safely the goods entrusted to him has failed in perform-
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ance, and by the servant because, while the wrong done by him is

a breach of his contract relations with the master, it would equally

be a wrong to the owner of the goods if no such contract relations

existed. In making out a cause of action it might be necessary

to show the duty in order to bring the responsibility home to the

party who was not an active participant in the injury; but who-

ever was personally instrumental would be responsible, whether

he had assumed any conventional duty or not. The obligation

to abstain from positive wrongs rests upon every one, and does

not depend upon contracts or other circumstances.

A similar illustration may be drawn from the class of duties

springing from the ownership of lands. One may have upon his

lands an excavation, which leaves the land of his neighbor with-

out sufilcient collateral support. If the land in this condition

is left in charge of his servant, who understands the danger to

the neighbor’s interests, he ought, perhaps,_considering the ques-

' Shearm. & Redf. on Neg., § 111.

goods promptly, or they delay trains unreasonably on the road,
and in consequence, when the goods reach their destination, an
advantageous market that should have been secured is lost. On
these facts it is plain that there has been a breach of the duty
owing to the consignor; and a breach, too, for which the servant&
of the carrier are blRmable. But when we proceed to inquire
whose duty has not been observed, it is equally plain that it is
not that of the servant, for with him tho consignor had entered
into no relations whatever. The eervant owes duties to the carrier, his master, by whom he may be called to account for his
negligence; but no third party by whom he has not been employed, can presume to hold him to responsibility for unfaithful
service. The consignor must, therefore, find his remedy against
the party he employed, and the latter: if he has trusted to negligent servants, must assume the responsibility. 1 .
The case supposed is one of mere neglect to do with legal
promptness what duty required the master to do or have done.
On the other hand, if thl servant by some distinct and positive
wrongful act shall destroy or injure the goods, there is in contemplation of law a wrong not only by tho master but by the servant
also: by the master, because his eom·entional dnty to carry and
deliver safely the goous entrusted to him has failed in performance, and by the servant because, while the wrong done by him is
a breach of his contract relations with the master, it would equally
be a wrong to the owner of the goode. if no such contract relations
existed. In making out a cause of action it might be necessary
to show the duty in order to bring the responsibility home to the
party who was not an acti\·e participant in the injury; bnt whoever was personally instrumental would be responsible, whether
l1e bad assumed any conventional duty or not. The obligation
to abstain from positive wrongs rests upon every one, and docs
not depend upon contracts or other circumstances.
A similar illustration may be drawn from the class of duties
sprin~ing from the ownership of lands. One may have upon his
lands an excavation, which leaves the land of his neighbor without sufficient collateral support. If the land in this condition
is left in charge of his servant, who understands the danger to
the neighbor's interests, he ought, perhaps, considering the qucsJ

Bbcarm. & Redf. on Neg.,§ 111.

•
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tion as one of moral obligation, to take such steps as would pre-

vent the threatened injury; but the legal duty to do so is imposed

not on him, but on his master, and the master alone can he

looked to, in case injury should occur. But if the servant him-

self, in the absence of the master, were to dig the pit, his per-

sonal responsibility for the resulting injury might be insisted

upon. The distinction here is between an injury which might

have been avoided by active steps which the law did not require

of the servant, and an injury which his negligence has caused.

Negligence is always unlawful.‘

The case of carriers of persons is a conspicuous instance in

which the failure of a servant to observe due care may constitute

a legal wrong to third parties, and render him and his master

jointly responsible. In undertaking to carry, the carrier assumes

the duty to carry safely, so far as the highest vigilance will enable

him to do so. A railroad company, acting as such carrier,

employs an engineer, whose duty to the company is to run the

train with skill and prudence. Now, although there are no con-

tract relations between the engineer and the person who is to be

carried, yet, when an individual is placed in a position of respon-

sibility, and the property, and especially the persons of others,

are entrusted to his prudence, his skill, and his ﬁdelity, so that
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his negligence may iuﬁict serious, and, perhaps, irreparable

injury, it is reasonable that the law should make it the right of

every person thus cireumstanced to demand from him a vigilance

corresponding to the responsibility. And this we understand to

be the rule.’ The negligence in such cases is that of both master

and servant, and the liability, as in other cases where two or more

are chargeable with a wrong, may be enforced in a suit against

‘oue or against both.’ The joint liability would seem to be still

' Richardson '0. Kimball, 28 Me.

463.

’ Hutchinson v. York, etc. R. R. Co.,

5 Exch. 343, 350, per ALDEKSON. B.

McMillan o. Suratoga, etc., R. lt. Co.,

20 Barb. 449, 454, per ALLEN, Ch. J .

See Shearm. & Rcdf. on Neg. §§ 112,

115.

‘ Cary '0. Webster, 1 Str. 480; Wil-

son o. Peto, 6 Moore, 47; Johnson 0.

Barber, 10 Ill. 425; Carman o. Steu-

benville, etc., R. R. Co. 4 Ohio, (N. s.)

899; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358,

..
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tion as one of moral obligation, to take snch steps as would prevent the threatened injury; but the legal duty to do so is imposed
not on him, but on his master, and the master alone can he
looked to, in case injnry should occur. But if the servant himself~ in the absence of the master, were to dig the pit, his personal responsibility for the resulting injury might be insisted
upon. The distinction here is between an injury which might
have been avoided by active steps which the law did not require
of the servant, and an injnry ,which his negligence has caused.
Negligence is always nnlawfuJ.l
The case of carriers of persons is a conspicuous instance in
which tho failure of a servant to observe due care may constitute
a legal wrrJng to third parties, and render him and his master
jointly responsible. In undertaking to carry, the carrier assumes
the duty to carry safely, so far as the highest vigilance will enable
him to do so. A railroad company, acting as such carrier,
employs an engineer, whose duty to the company is to run the
train with skill and prudence. Now, although there are no <.~on
tract relations between the engineer and the person who is to be
carried, yet, when an individual is placed in a position of responsibility, and the property, and especially the persons of others,
are entrusted to his prudence, his skill, and his fidelity, so that
his negligence may inflict serious, and, perhaps, irreparable
injury, it i8 reasonable that the law should make it the right of
every person thus circumstanced to demand from him a vigilance
corresponding to the responsibility. And this we understand to
be the rule.• The negligence in such cases is that of both master
and .servant, and the liability, as in other cases where two or more
are chargeable with a wrong, may be enforced in a suit against
'one or against both.• The joint liability would seem to be still

363; Bailey o. Bailey, 61 Me. 361;

Wright 0. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343;

Suydam o. Moore, 8 Barb. 358; Mont-

fort 1;. Hughes, 3 E. D. Smith, 591.

Perhaps the courts of Massachusetts

would not sustain a joint liability,

unless the master was present and

participating. See Parsons o. Win-

chell, 5 Cush. 592. In New York the

1 Richardson "· Kimball, 28 Me.
463.
9 Hutchinson tl. York, etc. R. R. Co.,
!i Exch. 343, 350, per ALDKRSON. B.
!lcl\lillan "· Stlratoga, etc., H. H. Co.,
20 Barb. 449, 454, per AI.LEN, Ch. J.
See Shcarm. & Rcdf. on Neg.§§ 112,
115.
1 Cary"· Webster, 1 Str. 480; Wilson "· Pcto, 6 Moore, 47; Johnson "·
Barber, 10 Ill. 425; Carman o. Stcu-

benville, etc., R. R. Co. 4 Ohio, {N. s.)
899: Suydam "· 1\loore, 8 Barb. 858,
363; Bailey "· Bailey, 61 Me. 861;
Wright "· Wilcox, 19 Wend. 348;
Suydl\m "· Moore, 8 Barb. 858; llontfurt "'· Hughes, 3 E. D. Smith, 591.
Perhaps the courts of llassachusetts
would not sustain a joint liability,
unless the master was present and
participating. See P!J.rsons "· Winchell, 5 Cush. 5!12. In New York the
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ance to the property or person being carried. When a train con-

ductor puts a man off the cars without justification, or commits

an assault on a passenger in the cars, or runs his train past a

station where passengers are to be left, or is guilty of any other

misconduct of a like nature, the person injured is under no obli-

gation to look beyond him for redress. Nevertheless, he may, at

his option, unite the railroad company as a defendant, or sue it

separately.‘ And in the case of carriers of persons, the obliga-

tion not to expose life or limb to injury by negligence is one

which is independent of contract relations, and exists, whether a

consideration has been received for the carriage or not. The

duty to carry safely one who is received for carriage is a public

duty, and a contract or the payment of fare is not necessary to

create it.’ This is the rule which has been applied to railroad

companies, and it should be the rule governing individuals who

are not common carriers. If a person volunteers, through him-

self or his servants, to transport others by modes or under cir-

cumstances calculated to expose them to danger, he should be

held to assume the duty of care in so doing, and the duty to make

compensation, in case he should become the instrument of a

negligent injury to his charge.
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The case of a libel in a newspaper may give us a further illus-

tration of joint and several liability for a tort. A libel may be

written by a subordinate and published in the paper without the

knowledge of the proprietor, but the proprietor will nevertheless

be responsible, though the publication may have been entirely

against his desire, and offensive to him when brought to his

doctrine of the text is considered un-

questionable. See Phelps v. Wait. 30

N. Y. '78. The Massachusetts cloc-

trine was followed in Campbell o.

Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552; S. C.

16 Am. Rep. 503.

' Goddard 0. Grand Trunk li. R Co.,

57 Me. 202; S. C. 2 Am. Rep. 39;

Burnham 0. Grand Trunk R. R. Co.,

63 Me. 298; S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 220;

Priest 0. Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., 40

llow. Pr. 456; Coleman 0. N. Y. &

plainer where the servant is guilty of a positive act of misfeasance to the property or person being carried. When a train conductor puts a man off the cars without justification, or commits
an assault on a passenger in the cars, or runs his train past a
station where passengers are to be left, or is guilty of any other
misconduct of a like nature, the person injured is onder no obligation to look beyond him for redress. Nevertheless, he may, at
his option, unite the railroad company as a defendant, or sue it
separately.• And in the case of carriers of persons, the obligation not to expose life or limb to injury by negligence is one
which is independent of contract relations, and exists, whether a
consideration has been received for the carriage or not. The
duty to carry safely one who is received for carriage is a public
duty, and a contract or the payment of fare is not necessary to
create it.' This is the rule which has been applied to railroad
compapies, and it should be the rule governing individuals who
are not common carriers. If a person volunteers, through himself or his servants, to tPansport others by modes or under circumstances calculated to expose them to danger, he should be
held to assume the duty of care in so doing, and the dnty to make
compensation, in case he should become the instrument of a
negligent injury to his charge.
The case of a libel in a newspaper may give us a further illustration of joint and several liability for a tort. A libel may be
written by a subordinate and published in the paper without the
knowledge of the proprietor, bnt the proprietor will nevertheless
be responsible, thongh the publication may have been entirely
against his desire, and offensive to him when brought to his

N. H. R. R. Co., 106 Mass. 160; Red-

ding 0. South Carolina R. R. Co., 8 S.

C. Rep. 1; S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 681 ;

Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. o. Bloehcr,

27 Md. 277; Moore 0. Fitchburg R.

R. Co., 4 Gray, 465 ; Pennsylvania R.

R. Co. o. Vandiver, 42 Penn. 365;

Brokaw v. New Jersey R. R. Co., 32

N. J. 323; Kline 11. Central Paciﬁc

R. R. Co., 39 Cal. 687.

' Nolton 0. Western R. R. Co., 15

N. Y. 444; Derby 0. llemling R. R.

Co., 14 How. 468; Jacohus o. St. Paul

R. R. Co., 20 Minn. 125; lllarsliall 1!.

York, etc. Railway Co., 11 C. B. 655.

doctrine of the text is considered unquestionallle. See Phelps v. Wnit, 30
N. Y. 78. The Massachusetts doc.
trine was followed in Campbell t~.
Portland Sug:1 r Co., 62 lie. 552; S. C.
16 A.m. Rep. 503.
• Goddard o. Grand Trunk H. R Co.,
:S7 Me. 202; S. C. 2 A.m. Rep. 30;
Burnham o. Grand Trunk R R. Co.,
68 }(e. 298; S. C. 18 A.m. Hep. 220;
Priest o. Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., 40
How. Pr. 456; Coleman o. N. Y. &
N.H. R. R. Co., 106 Mass. lf>O; Redding •· South Carolina R. R. Co., 8 B.

C. Rep. 1 ; S. C. 16 Am. fiep. 681 ;
Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. t1. Blocher,
27 :Md. 277; Moore t~. Fitchburg R.
R Co., 4 Gray, 465; Pennsylvania R.
R. Co. t~. Vandiver, 42 Penn. 365;
Brokaw tl. New Jersey R. R. Co., 32
N. J. S2S ; Kline tl. Central Pacific
H. H. Co., 30 Cal. 587.
1 N olton o. Western R. R. Co., 15
N. Y. 444; Derby G. Heading R. R.
Co .. 14 How. 4 1i8; Jacobus tl. St. Paul
H. R. CJ., 20 Minn. 125; Marshall •·
York, etc. Railway Co.. 11 C. B. 653.
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knowledge. The publication of the paper is in law his act,
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whether managed by him in person or intrusted to agents; and

if he fails to exclude libelous matter he fails in that supervision

of his own business which is due to the public, and he cannot

excuse himself by showing that he did not authorize a wrong

which it was his duty to guard against and render impossible.‘

But the subordinate is responsible also, because he, like every

other person, is under obligation at all times and in all positions

to abstain from inﬂicting the injury of defamation.

A corporation has been held responsible to persons to whom

its agent, acting within the apparent scope of his powers, had

issued fraudulent certiﬁcates of stock, whereby they were

defrauded." The responsibility of both principal and agent here

would seem unquestionable, the agent being the active wrong-

doer and the principal responsible for his acts.

Contribution and Indemnity as Between Wrong-Doers. As

under the rules already laid down the party wronged may, at his

election, compel any one of the parties chargeable with the act,

or any number less than the whole, to compensate him for the

injury, it becomes a consideration of the highest importance to

the person or persons thus singled out and compelled to bear the

loss, whether the others who were equally liable may be coin-

knowledge. The publication of the paper is in law his act,
whether man~~ by him in person or intrusted to agents; and
if be fails to exclude libelous matter he fails in that supervision
of his own business which is due to the public, and he cannot
excuse himself by showing that he did not authorize a wrong
which it was his duty to guard against and render impossible!
But the subordinate is responsible also, because he, like every
other person, is under obligation at all times and in all positions .
to abstain from inflicting the injury of defamation.
A corporation has been held responsible to persons to whom
its agent, acting within the apparent scope of his powers, had
issued fraudulent certificates of stock, whereby they were
defrauded.• The responsibility of both principal and agent here
would seem unquestionable, the agent being the active wrongdoer and the principal responsible for his acts.
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pelled to contribute for his relief. On this subject there is a

general rule, and there are also some very important exceptions.

The general rule may be found expressed in the maxim that no

man can make his own misconduct the ground for an action in

his own favor. If he suffers because of his own wrong-doing,

the law will not relieve him. The law cannot recognize equities

as s irinrrinv from a wrone in favor of one concerned in commit-

lDae

ting 1t.‘

' Dunn o. Hall, 1 Ind. 844; Buckley

0. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152; Perrett 0.

Times Newspaper, 25 La. Ann.170;

Dole 0. Lyon, 10 Johns. 446; Wilson

0. Noonan, 27 Wis. 598.

' New York & N. H. R. R. C0. 0.

Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 593 ; Same v. Same,

34 N. Y. 30. See Bridgeport Bank 0.

N. Y. & N. H. R. R Co., 80 Conn.

231.

'Merryweather o. Nixan, 8 '1‘. R.

186; Pearson '0. Skelton, 1 M. &W.

504; Wooley 0. Butte, 2 C. & P. 417;

Contribution and Indemnity as Between Wrong-Doers.

As

under the rules already laid down the party wronged may, at his
election, compel any one of the parties chargeable with the act,
or any number less than the whole, to compensate him for the
injury, it becomes a consideration of the highest importance to
the person or persons thus singled out and compelled to hear the
loss, whether the others who were equally liable may he compelled to contribute for his relief. On this subject there is a
general rule, and there are also some very important ex(:eptions.
The general rule may be found expressed in the maxim that no
man can make his own misconduct the ground for an action in
his own favor. If he suffers because of his own wrong-doing,
the law will not relieve him. The law cannot recognize equities
as springing from a wrong in favor of one concerned in committing it.'

Adamson u. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 65; Gol-

hurn v. Putmore, 1 C. M. & R. '73;

Mitchell 1:. Cockburne, 2 H. Bl. 379;

Cumpston 0. Lambert, 18 Ohio, 81;

Selz 0. Unna, 1 Biss. 521; S C. in

Error, 6 Wal. 327 ; Minnis e. Johnson,

1 Duv. 171; Armstrong Co. 0. Clarion

· 1

Dunn e. Hall, 1 Ind. 844 ; Buckley

e. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152; Perrett v.
Times Newspaper, 25 La. Ann. 170 ;
Dole e. Lyon, 10 Johns. 446; Wilson
e. Noonan, 27 Wis. 5!18.
• New York & N. H. R R Co."·
Bchuyler,17 N.Y. 593; Same e. Same,
84 N. Y. 80. See Bridgeport Bank e.
N.Y. & N. H. R R. Co., 80 Conn.

281.

• Merryweather e. Nixan, 8 T. R.
186; Pearson e. Skelton, 1 M. & W.
604; Wooley e. Batte, 2 C. & P. 417;
Adamson v• .'Jarvis, 4 Bing. 6B; QJl.
burn e. Patmore, 1 C. M. & R. 78 ;
Mitchell v. Cockburne, 2 H. Bl. 879;
Cumpston e. Lambert, 18 Ohio, 81 ;
Selz e. Unna, 1 Bi88. 621; B. C. in
Error,6 Wal. 827; Minnis e. Johnson,
1 Duv. 171; Armstrong Co. e. Clarion
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But there are some exceptions to the general rule which rest

145

upon reasons at least as forcible as those which support the rule

itself. They are of cases where, although the law holds all the

parties liable as wrong-doers to the injured party, yet as between

themselves some of them may not be wrong-doers at all, and

their equity to require the others to respond for all the damages

may be complete. There are many such cases where the wrongs

are unintentional, or where the party, by reason of some relation,

is made chargeable with the conduct of others.

A case in point is where a railroad company is made to pay

damages for an injury caused by the carelessness of one of its

servants.‘ Here the injured party may justly hold both the

company and its servants to responsibility; but the actual

wrong, so far as it is one in morals, is on the part of the servant

alone, and the company is holden only through its obligation to

be accountable for the action of those to whom it entrusts its

business. As between the company and its servant the latter

alone is the wrong-doer, and in calling upon him for indemnity,

the company bases no claim upon its own misfeasance or default,

but upon that of the servant himself.’

On the other hand, suppose the servant to be directed by the

oﬂicers of the company to do a certain act which it turns out
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they had no right to do, and for doing which he is made to pay

damages. Here, if the act was a plain and manifest wrong, as

would be leaving the cars to commit a battery, the servant can

have no indemnity, because he must have known the act to be

unlawful; but if the act directed was one he had reason to sup-

pose was legai, and he obeyed directions on that supposition, it

Co., 66 Penn. St. 218; Philadelphia o. ages to a person for a personal injury,

Collins, 68 Penn. St. 106 ; Coventry v.

Barton, 17 Johns. 142 ; Stone 0.

Hooker. 9 Cow. 154; Miller o. Fcnton,

11 Paige, 18; Rhea 0. White, 8 Head.

121; Anderson 0. Saylors, Id. 551 ;

Percy 1:. Clary, 82 Md. %5; Spalding

0. Oakes, 42 Vt. 343.

' Where the owner or occupant of

premises creates a nuisance in the

sidewalk adjoining the same, without

the authority of the municipal au-

thorities, either express or implied,

But there are some exceptions to the general rnle which rest
npon reasons at least as forcible as those which support the rule
itself. They are of cases where, although the law holds all the
parties liable as wrong-doers to the injure<} party, yet as between
themselves some of them may not be wrong-doers at all, and
their equity to require the others to respond for all the damages
may be complete. There are many such cases where the wrongs
are unintentional, or where the party, by ~eason of some relation,
is made chargeable with the conduct of others.
A case in point is where a railroad company is made to pay
damages for an injury caused by the carelessness of one of its
servants.' Here the injured party may justly hold both the
company and its servants to responsibility; but the actual
wrong, so far as it is one in morals, is on the part of the servant
alone, and the company is holden only through its obligation to
be accountable for the action of those to whom it entrusts its
business. As between the company and its servant the latter
alone is the wrong-doer, and in calling upon him for indemnity,
the company bases no claim upon its own misfea..~nce or default,
but upon that of the ser:vant himself.'
On the other hand, suppose the servant to be directed by the
officers of the company to do a certain act which it tnrns out
they had no right to do, and for doing which he is made to pay
damages. Here, if the act was a plain and manifest wrong, ns
would be leaving the cars to commit a battery, the servant can
have no indemnity, because he must have known the Ret to be
unlawful; but if the act directed was one he had reason to suppose was legal, and he obeyed directions on that supposition, it

and the city is compelled to pay dum-

caused by the same, the author of

such anuisance will be responsible

to the city for the damages so paid

by it. Gridley v. City of Blooming-

ton, 68 Ill. 47. Sec Chicago o. Rob-

bins, 2 Black, 418.

'See Muinwaring 0. Brandon, 8

Taunt. 202; S. C. 2 Moore, 125; Res-

pass o. Morton, Hardin, 234; Smith v.

Foran, 43 Conn. 244; B. U. 21 Am.

Rep. 647; Grand Trunk R. R. Co. 1:.

Latham, 68 Me. 1'77.

10

Co., 66 Penn. St. 218 t Philadelphia 11.
Collins, 68 Penn. St. 106 ; Coventry 11.
Barton, 17 Johns. 142; Stone "·
Hooker, 9 Cow. 154 ; ~!iller tl. Fenton,
11 Paige, 18 ; Rhea 11. White, 8 Head.
121; Anderson 11. Saylors, Id. 551;
Percy 11. Ulury, 82 Mu. 2:45: Spalding
11. Oakes, 42 Vt. 343.
• Where the owner or occupant of
premises creates a nuisance in the
aldewalk adjoining the same, without
the authority of the municipal authorities, either express or implied,
and Lhe city Is compelled w pay d~~om-

10

ages to a person for a personallnjury,
caused by the same, the author of
such a nuisance will be rcsponsilJlu
to the city for tl1e damages so pai<l
by it. Gridley 11. City of Blooming.
ton, 68 Ill. 47. Sec Chicago 11. Robbios, 2 Black, 418.
1 See l!aiowaring 11. Brandon. 8
Taunt. 202 ; M. C. 2 .Moore, 12(; ; HesPI\88 11. !lorton, Hardin, 234; Smith tt.
Foran, 43 Conn. 244 ; S. u. 21 An1.
Rep. 647; Grand Trunk R. R Co. 1:.
Latham, 68 .Me. 177.
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would ill become the railroad company to demand that he be
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treated as a wrong-doer when called upon to indemnify him

against the consequences of the act its oﬂicers had directed. In

such a case the servant is not in morals a wrong-doer at all, and

his claim to indemnity would be based upon a faithful obedience

to orders which he had a right to presume were rightful, nothing

to the contrary appearing.‘ '

A similar case is presented where an oﬁicer executes imperfect

or defective process under a promise of indemnity, or in good

faith serves process on the wrong person or property, on a like

promise, or at the special request or under the direction of the

plaintiff. In general, as already stated, the oﬁicer must take

upon himself the responsibility for all action which purports to

he oﬁicial,’ and if he serves void process, or renders himself a

trcspasser in the service of valid process, it does not excuse him

that he had for the purpose the participation or the advice of

the plaintiff or his attorney; that fact only makes another party

liable with him. Neither will that fact entitle him to indemnity,

for the parties are both wrong-doers, and each is a free agent

in what is done, not being at all under the control of the other.

But if the question of law or of fact is in doubt, it is not

incompetent for the oﬁicer to allow the party suing out process
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to take upon himself the responsibility; and when he does so

and agrees to indemnify the oﬂiccr, the agreement may be en-

forced. This is upon the same ground, that though as to the

party injured both may be technically in the wrong, it is not so

as between the parties themselves.’ Such cases may be con-

, S’

I

‘ Humplirics '0. Pratt, 2 D. & Clark,

288; Morris v. Broklcy, 8 East. 172,

note ; Walker '0. Hunter. 2 M. G. & S.

324; Bond s. Ward, '7 Mass. 125;

Spangler -v. Commonwealth, 16 S. 8:

R. 68; Commonwealth 0. Van Dyke,

57 Penn. St. 34; Tarr '0. Northcy, 17

Me. 113; Howard v. Clark, 43 Mo.

344; Chamberlain 0. Bcller, 18 N. Y.

115; Howe 1:. Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co.,

37 N. Y. 297; Nelson 1:. Cook, 17 Ill.

446; Grace s. Mitchell, 31 Wis. 5233;

S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 613; Long 0. Ne-

ville, 36 Cal. 455.

’ Nelson 1:. Cook, 1'7 I11. 443.

Nelson s. C% 1'7 Ill. 443 ; Cross-

man v. Owen, t‘ Me. 528. As to the

right of an oﬂicer to demand indem-

nity, see Commonwealth v. Van Dyke.

57 Penn. St. 34; Chamberlain 0. Bel-

ler, 18 N. Y. 115; Smith v. Cicotte, 11

Mich. 383 ; Grace o. Mitchell, 31 Wis.

533; S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 613. A prom-

ise to indemnify against liability for

an act not known at the time to be

unlawful is valid. Coventry 1:. Bar-

ton, 17 Johns. 142; Stone v. Hooker,

9 Cow. 154; Armstrong 0. Clarion

Co., 66 Penn. St. 218; S. C. 5 Am.

Rep. 368; Avery 0. Halsey, 14 Pick.

would ill become the railroad company to demand that he be
treated as a wrong-doer wh{m called upon to indemnify him
against the consequences of the act its officers had directed. In
such a case the servant is not in morals a wrong-doer at all, and
his claim to indemnity would be based upon a faithful obedience
to orders which he had a right to presume were rightful, nothing
to the contrary appearing.'
A similar case is presented where an officer executes imperfect
or defective process under a promise of indemnity, or in good
faith serves process on the wrong person or property. on a like
promise, or at the special request or under the direction of the
plaintiff. In general, as already stated, the officer must take
upon himself the responsibility for all action which purports to
be official,' and if he serves void process, or renders himself a
trespasser in the service of valid I>rocess, it does not excuse him
that he had for the purpose the participation or the advitre of
the plaintiff or his attorney; that fact only makes another party
liable with him. Neither will that fact entitle him to indemnity,
for the parties are both wrong-doers, and each is a free agent
in what is done, not being at all under the control of the other.
Bnt if the question of law or of fact is in doubt~ it is not
incompetent tor the officer to allow the party suing out process
to take upon himself the responsibility; and when he does so
and agrees to indemnify the officer, the agreement may be enforced. This is upon the same ground, that tl10ugh as to the
party injured both may be technically in the wrong, it is not so
as between the parties themselves.• Such cases may be con-

Pratt~

' Humphries"·
2 D. & Clark,
288; Morris "· Broklcy, 8 East. 172,
note; Walker"· Hunter. 2 M. G. & S.
324; Bond "· Ward, 7 Mass. 123;
Spangler "· Commonwealth, 16 S. &
R. 68; Commonwealth "· Van Dyke,
57 Penn. St. 34; Tarr "·Northey, 17
:\Ic. 113 ; Howard "· Clark, 43 ?tlo.
344; Chamberlain o. Beller, 18 N. Y.
115 ; Howe o. Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co.,
37 N.Y. 297; Nelson "- Cook, 17 Ill.
446; Grace o. ?tlitchell, 31 Wis. 5:33;
S.C. 11 Am. Rep. 618; Long "· Neville, 86 Cal. 456.
'Nelson"· Cook, 17 Ill. 448.

c4~n.

I Nelson"·
443; Crossman "· Owen, J'iie. 528. As to the
right of an officer to demand indemnity, se.e Commonwealth"· Van Dyke.
57 Penn. St. 34; Chamberlain "· Beller, 18 N. Y. 115; Hmith o. Cicotte, 11
l\lich. 383; Grace o. :Mitchell, 31 Wis.
533 ; S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 613. A promise to indemnify against liability for
an act not known at the time to be
unlawful is valid. Coventry "· Barton, 17 Johns. 142; 8tone "· Hooker,
9 Cow. 154; Armstrong "· Clarion
Co., 66 Penn. St. 218 ; S. C. 5 Am.
Rep. 368; Avery '· Halsey, 14: Pick.

..
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trasted with cases in which the thing done was a palpable wrong,

such, for instance, as the publication of a libel, in which even the
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most formal agreement to indemnify‘_will be void.‘ '

The foregoing are cases of indemity; that is to say, cases in

which the party actually in the wrong was compelled to relieve

of the whole burden the party only technically in the wrong.

But there are cases of contribution which are supported by

reasons equally satisfactory. Two persons, we will suppose, are

jointly concerned in a transaction, and in carrying it out accord-

ing to arrangement and without any intent to injure others,

they are nevertheless made liable by some invasion of another's

right. Here, if one were compelled to make good the loss, we

should say his right to contribution was undoubted. As between

himself and his associate he was not a wrong-doer at all.’

An attempt has been made in some cases to lay down a gen-

eral rule by which it may be determined in every case whether

the party is or is not entitled to contribution. Thus, in Ohio,

174. Where an oﬁcer is induced by

the false statements of another as to

the ownership of certain property, to

take it into his possession, and is sued

and compelled to pay damages for so
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doing, he is entitled to indemnity from

the party guilty of the fraud and those

assisting him therein. Kenyon 0.

Woodrutf. 33 Mich. 310. '

trnsted with eases in which the thing done was a palpable wrong,
such, tor instance, a.s the publication of a. libel, in which even the
most formal agreement to indemnif,>;,.,_will be void.'
The foregoing are cases of inde~ty; that is to say, cases in
which the party actually in the wrong was compelled to relieve
of the whole burden the party only technically in the wrong.
llut there are casetJ of contribution which are supported by
reacons equally satisfactory. Two persons, we will suppose, are
jointly concerned in a transaction, and in carrying it out according to arrangement and without any intent to injure others,
they are neverthclebS made liable by some invasion of another\;
right. Here, if one were compelled to make good the loss, wo
should say hi::! right to contribution was undoubted. As between
himself and his associate he was not a wrong-doer at all.'
An attempt has been made in some cases tO lay down a general rule by which it may be determined in every case whcthet·
the party is or is not entitled to contribution. Thus, in Ohio,

' Shackell 0. Rosier, 2 Bing. (N. C.)

634; Arnold 0. Clitford, 2 Sumner,

238; Atkins o. Johnson, 43 Vt. 78;

S. (7. 5 Am. Rep. 260. See Nelson 0.

(‘ook, 17 Ill. 443. An agreement by a

prisoner that if the oﬂicer will permit

him to go at. large he will appear at

the time of trial or will pay the cred-

itor’s debt, is void, and if the oﬂicer

renders himself liable by accepting

it and permitting the prisoner to go,

he can recover no indemnity, his act

being unlawful. Pitcher 0. Bailey. 8

East. 171; De Mesnil u. Dakln, L. R.

3 Q. B. 1'7; Riley v. Whittiker, 49 N.

H. 145; Ayer v. Hutchins, 4 Mass.

870; Appleby 1:. Clark. 10 Mass. 59;

Hopkinson v. Leeds, 78 Penn. 5t. 396.

' Bailey 0. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455;

Wooley v. Butte, 2 C. & P. 41'? ; Pear-

son v. Skelton, 1 M. & W. 504; Hor-

bach’s Administrator o. Elder. 18

Penn. St. 33: Moore o. Appleton, 2|;

Ala. 633. This rule has been applied

to one of several oﬂieers of a corpora-

tion who had been held liable to a

creditor of the corporation for the

neglect of all to ﬁle certain certiﬁcates

as required by statute. “ By accepting

their positions as oﬁlcers," it was

said, “they impliedly agreed that

they would make and publish the an-

nual certificate, and failing in this,

that they would become responsible

to the .cretlitors of the corporation.

While engaged, therefore, in a lawful

business, they have been guilty of a

neglect which has Gxposetl them to

this liability.” As between them-

selves, therefore. the rules of con-

tribution that prevnil between joint

contractors. rather than those between

joint tort feasors, ought to apply.

174. Where an oftlcer is induced by
tuc f11he statemeuts of another us to
the ownership of certain property, to
take it into his possession, 1\Dd is sued
and compelled to pay damag·es for so
doing, he is entitled to indemnity from
the party guilty of tl!e fraud and those
Msisting him therein. Kenyon c.
Woodruff. 3!ll\lich. 310.
1 Shackell "· Rosier, 2 Bing. (N. C.)
6.'U; Arnold "· Cliftord, 2 Sumner,
ZJS; Atkins "· Johnson, 43 Vt. 78;
S. C. 5 Am. Rep. 260. See Nelson "·
Cook, 17 Ill. 44.3. An ngreement by a
prisoner that if the officer will permit
him to go at lru~c he will appear at
the time of trial or will pay the cred.
itor's debt, is void, and if the officer
renders himself liable by accepting
it and permitting the prisoner to go,
he can recoYer no indemnity, his act
lx•ing unlawful. Pitcher "· Bailey. 8

East. 171; De .M(::jnil "· Dakin, L. R.
U Q. B. 17; Riley"· Whittike1·, 49 N.
H. 145: Ayer "· Hutchins, 4 :&lass.
870; Appleby tl. Clark. 10 MllSs. 59 ;
Hopkinson "· Leeds, 78 Penn. l)t. 396.

1 Bailey "· Bussing, 28 Conn. 4M;
Wooley"· Batte, 2 C. & P. 417; Pearson "· Skl.'lton, 1 :U. & W. 504; Harbach's Administrator tl. Elder, 18
Penn. St. :-18: Moore "· Appleton, 211
Ala. 6::1:1. This rule hilS been applied
to one of SE!vcral officers of a corpor&tion who had been held liablo to "
creditor of the corporation for the
nej!lect of all to file certuin certiticatcs
as required by statute. "By ncrepting
their positions as officers," it wa.~
said, "they implie1lly agreed that
they would make and publish the annual certificate, and failing in thiR,
that tlwy would tX'come responsible
to the .creditors of the cortloration.
While en~nged, therefore, in a lllwfnl
businrs..q, they have ht>en guilty of a
ne~lt>ct which has exposed them to
this liability." As between themseh·es, thereli1re. the rule~ of contribution that pre\"l\il bt•tween joint
coutrnctors. rather thlln those \){>tween
joint tort feasors, ought to apply.
Nickerson "· Wheeler, 118 Jrlaas. 295,

2U8.
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the judicial conclusion is, that “the common sense rule and the
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legal rule are the same, namely, that when parties think they are

doing a legal and proper act, contribution will be had; but

when the parties are conscious of doing a wrong, courts will not

interfere.” ‘

This statement is a little inaccurate, in that it denies redress

in the cases only in which parties are conscious of wrong-doing.

There are many cases in which the absence of consciousness of

wrong could not excuse a man either in law or morals. An English

case states the rule more concisely as follows: “The rule that the

wrong-doers cannot have redress or contribution against each other

is conﬁned to cases where the person seeking redress must be pre-

sumed to have known that he was doing an unlawful act.” ’ If

he knew the act was illegal, or if the circumstances were such as

to render ignorance of the illegality inexcusable, then he will be

left by the law where his wrongful action has placed him.‘

It may be thought that the maxim that the law will not relieve

a party from the consequences of his own wrong-doing partakes

more of severity to the particular person singled out by the

' Acheson 0. Miller, 2 Ohio, (N. s.)

203. This was acase of contribution

as between sureties, a part of whom
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had become trespassers in an endeavor

to enforce payment of the debt by the

principal. Compare Grund 0. Van

Vleck, 69 Ill. 479, where a partner,

not present, and not consenting to the

suing out of an illegal distress war-

rant, was hcld not responsible in tres-

the judicial conclusion is, that "the common sense role and the
legal rule are the same, namely, that when parties think they are
doing ·a legal and proper act, contribution will be had; but
when the parties are conscious of doing a wrong, courts will not
interfere." •
This statement is a little inaccurate, in that it denies redress
in the cases only in which parties are conscious of wrong-doing.
There are many cases in which the absence of consciousness of
wrong could not excuse a man either in law or morals. An English
case states the rule more concisely as follows: " The rule that the
wrong-doers cannot have redress or contribution against each other
is confined to cases where the person seeking redress must be presumed to have known that he was doing au unlawful act."~ If
he knew the act was illegal, or if the circumstances were snch as
to render ignorance of the illegality inexcusable, then he will be
left by the law where his wrongful action has placed him. •
It may be thought that the maxim that the law will not relieve
a party from the consequences of his own wrong-doing partakes
more of severity to the particular person singled ont by the

pass, because of that relation. Citing

Pctrie 0. Lamont. 1 C. & M. 57. If

not responsible to the principal ac-

tion, he could not, we suppose, be

held entitled to contribute on the

ground merely of a possible beneﬁt

from the proceedings. See, further,

Ives v. J ones, 3 Ired. 538; Bryan 0.

Landon, 5 '[‘homp., etc., (N. Y.) 594.

' Adamson 11. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66, 73,

per Bnsr, C. J. See Bctts v.Gibbins,

2 Ad. & El. 5'7, 74; Humphreys v.

Pratt, 2 Dow. & Cl. 288; Avery 0. Hal-

sey, 14 Pick. 174; Jacobs 0. Pollard,

10 Cush. 287, 289, per Blonmw, J.

‘The right of contribution has

been applied to the case of two coun-

ties, one of which had been com-

pelled to pay damages to a person

who had been injured by the break-

ing down of a bridge which both

were under obligation to maintain.

Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co., 66

Penn. St. 218. In Vermont it has

been held that where one of two joint

owners of a vicious animal was com-

pelled to pay damages to a party in-

jured through the animal not being

kept under restraint, he could not re-

cover contribulion of the other, al-

though thelutter was in charge of the

animal when the injury occurred.

Spalding o. Oaks, 42 Vt. 343. If the

wrong consist in an assault on the

person, and not merely a trespass to

property, no contribution can be de-

manded, however innocent of wrong

intent the wrong-docr may be. Cump-

ston 0. Lambert, 18 Ohio, 81.

1 Acheson 11. Miller, 2 Ohio, (N. s.)
208. This was a case of contribution
aa between sureties, a. part of whom
had become trespa.ssen in an endeavor
to enforce payment of the debt by the
principal. Compare Grund t!. Van
Vleck. 69 Ill. 479, where a partner,
not present, and not consenting to the
suing out of an illegal distress war.
rant, was held not responsible in trespass, because of that relation. Citing
Petrie 11. Lamont. 1 C. & M. li7. If
not responsible to the principal aCtion, he could not, we suppose, be
held entitled to contribute on the
ground merely of a possible benefit
from the proceedings. See, further,
I ves 11. Jones, 8 Ired. 538 ; Bryan 11.
Landon, 5 Thomp., etc., (N. Y.) 594.
1 A.damson 11. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66, 73,
per BEsT, C. J. See Betts "'·Gibbins,
2 Ad. & EI. 67, 74; Humphreys 11.
Pratt, 2 Dow. & CI. 288; Avery t!. Halsey, 14 Pick. 174; Jacobs 11. Pollard,
10 Cush. 287, 289, per BIGELOW, J.

• The right of contribution has
been applied to the case of two counties, one of which had been compelled to pay damages to a persnn
who hl\d been injured by the brenklng down or a bridge wllich both
were under obligation to maintain.
Armstrong Co. 11. Clarion Co., 66
Penn. St. 218. In Vermont it has
been held that where one of two joint
ownerg of 11. vicious animal was compelled to p:ly dnmngcs to a pnrty injured through the animal not being
kept under restraint, he could not recover contribution of the other, although the latter was in charge of the
animal wllcn the injury occurred.
Spalding tl. Oaks, 42 Vt. 843. If the
wrong consist in au assault on the
person, and not merely a trespass to
property, no contribution can be demanded, however innocent of wrong
intent the wrong.doer may be. Cump.
ston 11. Lambert, 18 Ohio, 81.
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right to punish him, but is it right to exempt from punishment

others equally guilty? If strict justice, as between individuals

were all that was aimed at, we should be compelled to answer

this question in the negative; and we must therefore look further

for the reason of the rule.

It has already been intimated that the rule, as we have given

it, is one of very general application, and not by any means con-

ﬁned to cases of joint torts. Whoever, by his pleadings in any

court of justice, avows that he has been engaged with others in

an unlawful action, or has concerted with them an unlawful

enterprise, and that in arranging for or carrying it out he has

been unfairly treated by his associates, or has suffered an injus-

tice which they should redress, will be met by the refusal of

the court to look any further than his complaint, which it will

at once order dismissed. The following reasons may be assigned

for this action: 1. The discouragement of all illegal transactions

by distinctly apprising every person who engages in them that

the risk he incurs is not merely of being compelled to share with

the others the loss that may follow, for this, in many cases would

be insigniﬁcant, and in all cases would be small in proportion to

the size and formidable character of the combination. He is,
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therefore, given to understand that whoever takes part in an ille-

gal transaction must do so under a responsibility only measured

by the whole extent of the injury or loss; an understanding very

well calculated to make men to hesitate who, under a different

rule, would be disposed to give full scope to evil inclinations.

But 2. The State, from a consideration of its own pecuniary

interests, and of the interests of other litigants, may wisely refuse

to assist in adjusting equities between persons who have been

engaged in unlawful action. The expense of administering jus-

tice is always a large item in the State’s expenditures, and one

which must be borne by the common contributions of the people.

Where one has suffered from participation in an unlawful under-

taking, what justice can there be in any demand on his part that

the State shall supply courts and officers and incur expense to

indemnify him against a loss he has encountered through a dis-

regard of its laws? Here the question is not merely one of what

is right, as between himself and his associates, but what is best

for the interest of the State. When that question is up for con-

plainti:ff' for pursuit, than it does of general jnstice. It may be
right to punish him, but is it right to exempt from punishment
others eq,ually guilty¥ If strict justice, as between individuals
were all that was aimed at, we should be compelled to answer
this question in the negative; and we must therefore look further
for the reason of the rule.
It has already been intimated that the role, as we have given
it, is one of very general applicntion, and not by any means confined to cases of joint torts. Whoever, by his pleadings in any
court of justice, avows that he has been engaged with others in
au unlawful action, or has concerted with them an unlawful
enterprise, and that in arranging for or carrying it out he has
been unfairly treated by his associates, or has suffered an injuatice which they should redress, will be met by th~ refusal of
the court to look any further than his complaint, which it will
at once order dismissed. The following reason~ may be assigned
for this action: 1. The discouragement of all illegal transactions
by distinctly apprising every person who engages in them that
the risk he incurs is not merely of being compelled to share with
the others the loss that may follow, for this, in many cases would
be insignificant, and in all cases would be small in proportion to
the size and formidable character of the combination. He is,
therefore, given to understand that whoever takes part in an illegal transaction must do so under a responsibility only measured
by the whole extent of the injury or loss; an understanding very
well calculated to make men to hesitate who, under a different
rule, would be disposed to give full scope to evil inclinations.
llnt 2. The State, from a consideration of its own pecuniary
interests, and of the interests of other litigants, may wisely refuse
to assist in adjusting equities between persons who have been
engaged in unlawful action. The expense of administering justice is always a large item in the State's expenditures, and one
which rnnst be borne by the common contributions of the people.
Where one has suffered from participation in an unlawful undertaking, what justice can there be in any demand on his part that
the State shall supply courts and officers and incur expense to
indemnify him Bo"'8inst a loss he has encountered through a disregard of" its laws¥ Here tho question is not merely one of what
is right, as between himself and his associates, bnt what is best
for the interest of the State. When that question is np for con-
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able diﬁiculties and necessary evils connected with litigation

which multiply rapidly as the cases increase in number. Courts

and juries, at the best, are but imperfect instruments for the

accomplishment of justice; and the greater the volume of litiga-

tion, the less is the attention which any particular ease is likely

to receive, and the greater the probability that right may be

overcome by artiﬁce, or by a false and deceptive exposition of

the facts. Trusty ustice must follow after wrong with deliberate

and measured tread; and every honest litigant in seeking it must

be more or less impeded, when those who have no just claim

on the consideration of the court are allowed to push their com-

plaints before it. It is not necessary to look further for reasons

in support of the rule to which attention has been directed.

The application of this rule to the cases of partnerships and

corporations is somewhat peculiar. A corporation is an artiﬁcial

person, and the artiﬁcial personality is to be considered in its

legal transactions, instead of the personality of its members. A

partnership is also, for all the legitimate purposes of its business,

a legal entity, though it is taken notice of and reached by legal

process only through the personality of its members. There may

be wrongs by corporations, and wrongs by partnerships; and
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where these consist in a mere breach of conventional duty, it has

been seen already that those only are to be pursued upon whom

the duty rests, which, in these cases, would be the partnership or

corporation; and when the association is made responsible, the

members necessarily share the loss in proportion to their respect-

ive interests. On the other hand, if an individual is made respon-

sible for a tort committed in the service of any joint association,

his right to indemnity must be governed by the rules which pre-

vail in the relation of master and servant, and which need not

be repeated here.‘

ll If one in the employ of a cor-

poration commits a distinct trespass,

which he must have known to be

such. it is immaterial who encour-

aged, (lireeted, or commanded it; and

if his own negligence has brought in-

jury upon another, he alone is liable,

and cannot insist on being indem-

niﬁed. Poulton 0. London & S.

W. R. R. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 53.’);

Evansville & C. R. R. Co. 0. Baum,

26 Ind. '70; ll]. Central R. R. Co. 0.

Downey, 18 Ill. 259; Vanderbilt v.

The R. T. Co., 2 N. Y. 479; Foster 17.

Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 478; Rounds v.

- sideration, the fact is not to be overlooked that there are unavoidable difficulties and nec-essary evils connected with litigation
which multiply rapidly as the cases increase in number. Courts
and juries, at the hest, are but imperfect instruments for the
accompli~hment of justice; and the greater the volume of litigation, the less is the attention which any particular case is likely
to receive, and the greater the probability that right may be
overcome by artifice, or by a false and deeeptive exposition of
the facts. Trusty justic-e must follow after wrong with deliberate
and measured tread; and e\·ery honest litigant in seeking it must
be more or less impcdeu, when those who have no just. claim
on the coasideration of the court are allowed to push their complaints before it. It is not nece:::sary to look further for reasons
in support of the rule to which attention has been directed.
The application of this rule to the cases of partnerships and
corporations is somewhat peculiar. A corporation is an artificial
perilon, anti the artificial personality is to be considered in its
legal transactions, instead of the personality of its members. A
partnerl'hip is al8o, for all the legitimate purposes of its business,
a legal entity, though it is taken notice of and reached by legal
process only through the personality of its members. There may
be wrvngs by corporations, and wrongs by partnerships; and
where thL·sc consist in a mere breach of conventional duty, it has
been seen already that those only are to be pursued upon whom
the duty ret:ih>, which, in these cases, would be tlte partnership or
corporation; and when the as~oeiation is made responsible, the
members necessarily share the lo~s in proportion to their respective intercstl:i. On the other hand, if an individual is made responsible for a tort committed in the service of any joint ast'ociationt
his right to indemnity mnst be governed by the rules which prevail in the relation of master and servant, and which need not
be repeated here.'

D. L. & W. R. R. Co.,3 Hun. 329; Kir-

by 0. Penn. R. R. Co., '76 Penn. St. 506,

509; Waller v. Martin, 1'7 B. Mon.

\

'1 If one in the employ of a corporation commits a distinct trespass,
whieh he must have known to be
such. it is imm1ttcrial who encouraged, di rccted, or commanded it; and
if his Olen neg I igcnce has brought injury upon 1\nothcr, he alone is liable,
and cannot insist on being indemnified. Poulton "· I..ondon & S.

W. R. R Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 5:3.')~
.Evansville & C. R. H. Co. "· Bnum,
26 Ind. 70 ; Ill. Central R. R. Co. "·
Downey, 18 Ill. 259; Vanderbilt c.
The H. T. Co., 2 N. Y. 47U; I<,oster "·
Es!!ex Bank, 17 ~ln.ss. 47t!; Hounds"·
D. L. & W. R. R. Co.,S Hun. 329; Kir.
by "· Penn. R. R. Co., 76 Penn. St. 506,
.')09; Waller "· ~brtin, 17 B. Mon.
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the rule which refuses redress to one participating in a wrong

may be had where two persons are engaged in the same unlawful

enterprise or action, and in prosecuting it one is injured by the

negligence of the other.‘ The case of a riot may be instaneed,

in which several persons are engaged destroying property or

inﬂicting personal injuries on third parties, and in the course

of it one unintentionally inﬂicts injury upon one of his associates.

The case stated is perceived to be one where the injured party,

but for the element of wrong which it involves on his part, would

unquestionably have been entitled to redress. Had he, for

example, been a mere passer-by,’ or had a like injury occurred to

him through the negligence of another, while engaged in play,

or under any circumstances which charged him with no illegality

and no negligence, the rule of law would have been clear, and

his right to redress unquestionable. Another case like that of

the riot, in principle, would be that of two smugglers, one of

whom owns the vessel by which the illegal venture is made, and

the other undertakes to manage it, but carelessly strands it while

running illegally into port. Still another may be suggested, of

parties engaging in sports on Sunday, when they are illegal, in

the course of which one is injured, for want of due care on the
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part of the other. In all the cases supposed, the party injured

must undertake to trace his injury to the negligen'ce of the other;

but in doihg so, he will show that at the time he was engaged in

unlawful action, and that it was only because ot' such action that

the opportunity was afforded for the negligent injury. The

injury, therefore, is as directly traceable to his own breach of the

law as to the negligence of his associate; each has combined to

produce it, and without both it could not have occurred. Wliat

the plaintiff must ask, therefore, must be this: That the law shall

relieve him from the consequences of his disregard of the law;

and this, as already stated, it will refuse to do.“ His demand is

based upon his own violation of duty to the political society.

181; Little Miami R. R. Co. o. Wet- was a participant in the fraudulent

more, 19 Ohio St. 110. purpose.

' See Wallace 0. Cannon, 38 Geo. ' Juuics r. Campbell, 5 C. & P. 372.

I99. Also, Peacock v. Terry, 0 Gco. ' It mi,-:,ht also be snid that where

I37, where one sought to recover for one engages with others in a breach

fraud in a transaction in which he of the law, he is chargeable with want

Injury Sustained in Wrong-doing. A further illustration of
the rule which refuses redress to one participating in a wrong
may be had where two persons are engaged in the same unlawful
enterprise or action, and in prosecuting it one is injured hy the
neglibrence of the other.• The case of a riot may be instanced,
in which several persons are engaged dC'Stroying property or
inflicting personal injuries on third parties, and in the court;e
of it one unintentionally inflicts injury upon one of his associates.
The case stated is perceived to be one where the injured party,
but for the element of wrong which it involves on his part, would
nnque:;tionably have been entitled to redress. llad be, for
example, been a mere passer-by,' or had a like injury O<.'Cnrred to
him thrungh the negligence of another, while engaged in play,
ur under any circumstance:> which cha1·gcd him with no illegality
and uo negligence, tho rule of law would have been clear, and
his right to redress nnqne:>tionable. Ar:wther case like that of
the riot, in principle, would be that of two smugglers, one of
whom owns the vessel by which the illegal venture is made, and
the other undertakes to manage it, but carclc,.;sly strands it while
running illegally into port. Still auother may be suggested, of
parties engaging in sports on Sunday, when they are illegal, in
the cour:>e of which one is injured, for want of due care on the
part of the other. In all the cases snppo~cd, the party injured
must uthlertake to trace his injury to the negligen'ec of the other;
but in doii1g su, he will t;]ww that at the time he was engaged in
unlawful action, and that it was only because of 8nch action that
the opportunity was afl'urdcd for the negligent injury. The
injury, therefore, is as directly traceable tq his own breach of the
law as to the negligence of his associate; each h8.!! combined to
prodU<."' it, and without both it could not have occurred. What
the plR.intift' must ask, therefore, mu;;t be thiR: That the law shall
relieve him from the consequences of his disregard of the law;
and this, as already stated, it will refuse to do.' His demand is
based upon his own violation of duty to the political society.
181; Little ~liami R R. Co. t~. Wetmore, 19 Ohio 8t. 110.
• S<'e 'Yallnce "· C'11.nnon, 88 Geo.
tOO. Al~o. Pt•ncock r. Terry, 0 Geo.
137, wller£> one sought to rt•rover for
fraud In a trnn~nrtion In whirh he

wns a participant in the fmtHiulrnt
purpPsc.
1 .JnnH•s r. Campbell, /j C. & P. 8";2.
1 It might f11so be ~nid tl111t wher·!'
one cngug-es with others In a breach
of the law, be is chargt•ablc with want

•
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The cases which most often occur in which this principle is
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involved are those in which the negligent party is wholly blame-

less, except for his negligence, and only the injured party has

been guilty of intentional breach of the law. Many of these

cases arise under the laws forbidding the transaction of ordinary

business on Sunday, and also forbidding travel on that day,

except for purposes of necessity or charity. Under these statutes

one who engages in business, or travels on that day, is presump-

tively engaged in an illegal transaction, and if he claims com-

pensation for an injury resulting from it, he must rebut the

presumption by showing that what he did was necessary or had

a benevolent purposes.‘ This rule has been applied in the case

of suits against a town or city for injury received on Sunday, in

consequence of defects in the highway which the corporation

was bound, by statute, to keep in repair. In such a case, unless

the plaintiff shows a justiﬁable cause for being abroad on the

street, he cannot recover.’ If he can show that he was on his

way to attend religious services, he makes out a suﬁicient cause;

and, in this country, where religious opinion is free and entire

religious equality is the rule of the law, no inquiry concerning

the character of the services can be raised beyond this: \Vas the

party on his way to the meeting for the honest purpose of divine
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worship and religious instruction? If so, the errors and absurd-

ities of his belief, and the nature of the services, provided the

laws of morality and public decency are not violated, are matters

which concern only himself.‘ So, if he can show that he was

only passing from one part of his premises to another for the

of due care. so that his injury at the Co.,14 Allen,485 ; Hinckley 1:. Pcnob-

hands of one of his associates is to

be attributed to the concurring negli-

gence of both. Or it may be said

that usually it it is only reckless par-

ties who plan and engage in unlawful

action, and therefore the want of care

and prudence on the part of the asso-

ciates ought to be asssumcd as one

of the probable concomitants, the

risks of which each must be under-

stood to take upon himself when he

engages in the unlawful act.

•

The cases which most often occur in which this principle is
involved are those in which the negligent party is wholly blamelea~, except for his negligence~ and only the injured party has
been gnilty of intentional breach of the law. Many of these
cases arise under the laws forbidding the tmnsaction of ordinary
business on Snnday~ and also forbidding travel on that day,
except for purposes of necessity or charity. Under these statntes
one who engages in business, or travels on that day, is presumptively engaged in an illegal transaction, and if he claims compensation for an injury resulting from it, he must rebut the
presumption by showing that what he did was necessary or had
a benevolent pnrposes. 1 This rule has been applied in the case
of suits against a town or city for injury received on Snnda.y, in
consequence of defects in the highway which the corporation
was bound~ by statute, to keep in repair. In such a case, unless
the plaintiff shows a justifiable cause for being abroad on the
street, he cannot recover.' If he can show that he was on his
way to attend religious services, he makes out a sufficient cause;
and, in this country, where religious opinion is free and entire
religious equality is the rule of the law, no inquiry concerning
the character of the services can be raised beyond this: Was the
party on his way to the meeting for the honest purpose of divine
worship and re.ligious instruction W If so, the errors and absurdities of his belief, and the nature of the services, provided the
laws of morality and public decency are not violated, are matters
which concern only himself.• So, if he can show that he was
only passing from one part of his premises to another for the

' Bosworth 0. Swansey, 10 Met. 363,

363; Stanton u. Metropolitan R. R.

scot, 42 Me. 89.

“ Bosworth v. Swansey, 10 Met 363;

Jones 1:. Andover, 10 Allen, 18; John-

son v. Irasburg, 47 Vt. 28; S. C. 19

Am. Rep. 111; Connolly v. Boston,

117 Mass. 64; S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 396;

Hinckley 0. Pcnobscot, 42 Me. 89;

Tillock v. Webb, 56 Me. 100; Crntty

v. Bangor, 57 Me. 423; S. C. 2 Am.

Rep. 56.

‘In Feital 0. Middlcscx R. R. Co.,

109 Mass. 398, a woman was injured

through the negligence of a railroad

company on her way home from a

of due care, so that his injury at the
hands of one of his associates is to
be attributt'd to the concurring negligence of both. Or it may be said
that usually it it is only reckless parties who plan and engage in unlawful
action, and therefore the want of care
and prudence on the part of the associates ought to be asssumcd as one
of the probable concomitunts, the
risks of which each must be understood to take upon himself when he
engages in the unlawful act.
1 Bosworth~. Bwnnscy, 10 llct. 363,
361 ; Stanton ~. Metropolitan R. R.

Co., 14 Allen, 485 ; Hinckley"· Penobscot, 42 Me. 89.
• Bosworth "· Swansey, 10 l\Iet 368;
Jones"· Andover, 10 Allen, 18; John.
son "· Irasburg, 47 Vt. 28 ; B. C. 19
Am. Rep. 111 ; Connolly ~. Boston,
117 llsss. 64; B. C. 19 Am. Rep. 396;
Hinckley ~. Penobscot, 42 Me. 89 ;
Tillock "· Webb, 56 Me. 100; Cratty
"· Bangor, 57 Me. 423; B. C. 2 Am.
Rep. 56.
1 In Feital ~. Middlesex R. R. Co.,
109 MI\Ss, 308, a woman was injured
throngh the negligence of a railroad
company on her way home from a
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going to witness his neighbor’s will, or to have his own will

executed,‘ or to visit the sick or the poor, or to do any other act

which it is morally ﬁt and proper should be done on that day,‘

he thereby relieves his conduct from the imputation of illegality

by thus making it appear either that, in the legal sense of the

term, he was not traveling at all, or that his travel was for a

charitable purpose, or was justiﬁed by the necessity of the case.‘

And the authorities fully warrant us in saying that the words

charity and necessity, in the statutes, are not to receive any

narrow or teclmieal construction, but a sensible one that will

embrace all cases not fairly within the mischief intended to be

prevented. As has been said in Illinois, the moral ﬁtness and

propriety of what was done are not to be judged of in the

abstract, but are to be determined under the circumstances of

each particular case.‘ In Massachusetts, it has been decided that

one who, on Sunday, travels several miles to visit a stranger and

is injured by the negligence of the railway company, cannot

recover for the injury unless some special occasion of necessity

or charity can be shown for the visit.“ In contrast with this is

spiritualist meeting. As a part. of the

exercises at the meeting was an ex-
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hibition of " spiritual manifesta-

tions ;” but these she did not attend,

and she gave evidence that she be-

lieved in spiritualism, and attended

the meeting as a matter of conscience

and for worship. Com, J .: “ The

necessity of traveling, within the ex-

ception in the Lord's Day Act, is to a

necessary care of his stock, or looking after his stray cattle, or
going to witness his neighbor's will, or to have his own will
executed,' or to visit the sick or the poor, or to do any other act
which it is morally fit and proper should be done on that day,'
he thereby relieves his conduct from the imputation of illegality
by thus making it appear either that, in the legal sense of the
term, he was not traveling at all, or that his tra,·el was for a
charitable purpose, or was justified by the necessit,Y of the case.•
And the authorities fully warrant us in saying that the words
charity and necessity, in the statutes, are not to receive any
narrow or technical construction, but a sensible one that will
embrace all cases not fairly within the mischief intended to be
prevented. As has been said in Illinois, the moral fitness and
propriety of what was done are not to be judged of in the
ahstract, but are to be detel'lnined under the circumstances of
each particular case.• In Massachusetts, it has been decided that
one who, on Sunday, travels several miles to visit a stranger and
is injured by the negligence of the railway company, cannot
recover tor the injury unless some special occasion of necessity
or charity can be shown for the visit.• In contrast with this is

great extent determined by its moral

ﬁtness and propriety, and it would

have been erroneous to have ruled, as

matter of law, that traveling for such

a purpose was not within the excep-

tion. llennctt 0. Brooks, 9 Allen, 118;

Commonwealth v. Sampson, 97 Mass.

407 ; llamilton 0. Boston, 14 Allen,

475. It was for the jury to say, upon

all the evidence. whether the meeting

was of the character claimed by the

plaintiff, and whether she attended it

for the honest purpose of divine wor-

ship nnd religious instruction.”

' We should think this areasonable

deduction from Bennett v. Brooks, 9

Allen. 118, in which the execution of

a will on Sunday was held proper

and lawful.

' Commonwealth v. Knox, 6 Mass.

'76; Johnson e. People, 31 Ill. 469.

See Logan o. Mathews, 6 Penn. St. 417.

’ See the Massachusetts statutes re-

viewed in Hamilton o. Boston, 14

Allen, 475. In that case it was held

that a person walking a short. distance

with a friend for exercise on Sunday

was not violating the statute against

traveling on that day, and might re-

cover for an injury suffered by reason

of a defect in the street.

‘ Johnson 0. People, 31 Ill. 469.

' Stanton 0. Metropolitan R. R. Co.,

14 Allen, 485. The suit was against

a street railway company for an in-

jury attributed to their negligence

while plaintiff was being carried on

one ol their cars. GRAY, J.: " It is

spiritualist meeting. As a part of the
exercises at the meeting was an exhibition of •• spiritual manifestations:" but these she did not attend,
and she gave evidence that she believed in spirituali!\m, and attended
the meeting as a matter of consciPncc
and. for worship. COLT, J.: "The
necessity of traveling, wilhin the exception in the Lord's Da.y Act, is to a
~treat extent determined by its moral
fitness and propriety, and it would
have been erroneous to have ruled, as
matter of law, that traveling for such
a purpose was not within the exception. llennett "· Brooks, 9 Allen, 118;
Commonwealth "· Sampson, 97 Mass.
407: Hamillon "· Boston, 14 Allen,
(75. It was for the jury to say, upon
all the evidence. whether the meeting
was of the character claimed by tho
plaintiff, and whether she uttended it
for the honest purpose of dh·ine worship and religious ins~ructiou."

t We should think this a reasonable
deduction from Bennett "· Brooks, 9
Allen. 118, in which the execution of
a will on Sunday was held proper
and lawful.
1 Commonwealth "· Knox, 6 Ma.ss.
76: Johnson "· People, 31 Ill. 469.
See Logan"· :ltlathews, 6 Penn. SL 417.
'See the }lassl\Chusetts statutes reviewed in Hamilton "· Boston, 14
Allen, 475. In that case It was held
that a person walking a short distance
with a friend for exercise on Sunday
was not violating the stntute ugain.st
traveling on that dny, and might recovflr for an injury sutrercd by reason
of a defect in the street.
• Johnson"· People, 31 Ill. 400.
1 Stanton"· Metropolitan R. R. Co.,
14 Allen, 485. The suit w11S against
a street railway compnny for an injury attributed to their negligence
while plaintiff was being carried on
one ol their cars. GR.\ v, J.: ''It is
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the ease in Vermont where the plaintiﬁ' was injured when travel-
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ing eight miles to visit his young children, who were living with

an aunt, and in which he was held to be ustiﬁed on the ground

of necessity. The necessity intended by the statute, it was said,

was a moral and not a physical necessity. An act which, under

the circumstances, is ﬁt and proper to be done, is not prohibited.

The plaintiff could not fully discharge his obligations to his

children without being where they were. Under these circum-

stances it was morally proper for him to travel to them, and no

other facts or circumstances were necessary to show the ﬁtness

of his traveling. His duties to his children arose out of his

relations to them; the propriety of the journey out of its neces-

sity to the discharge of his duties.‘

not and could not be denied that the

plaintiff was ‘traveling,’ within the

meaning of these statutes, at the time

of suffering the injury complained of.

He was proceeding in a street car

drawn by horses from Chnrlestown,

entirely across the city of Boston, in

the case in Vermont where the plaintiff was injured when traveling eight miles to visit his young children, who were living with
an aunt, and in which he was held to be justified on the ground
of necessity. The necessity intended by the statute, it was said,
was a moral and not a physical m·cessity. An act which, under
the circumtitances, is fit and proper to be done, is not prohibited.
The plaintiff <..'Ould not fully diseharge his obligations to his
children without being where they were. Under these circum~;tan'ces it was morally proper for him to travel to them, and fl()
other facts or circumstances were necessary to show the fitness
of his traveling. His duties to his children arotie out of his
relations to them; the propriety of the journey out of its necesbity to the discharge of his duties.'

which he resided, to Roxbury, on the

opposite side. .
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“It is equally clear that he was not

traveling from necessity or charity.

He had left Boston on the morning

of the same day, and spent the greater

part of the day in Charlestown, for

the purpose of collecting a debt. A

negotiation between a creditor and

his debtor, or any other act done for

the purposes of private gain, under

no apparent or extraordinary emer-

gency, is neither necessary nor chari-

table in any sense. E1: purte Preston,

2 Ves. & B. 312; Phillips v. Innes, 4

(Tl. & Fin. 234; Bennett 0. Brooks, 9

Allen, 120; Jones 1:. Andover, 10

Allen, 18. lIis subsequent visit to a

friend of his companion, who does

not appear to have been any relation

or friend of his own, was equally un-

necessary upon the most liberal con-

struction of the statute. Pearce 0.

Atwood, 13 Mass. 351 ; Flagg 1:. Mill-

hury, 4 Cush. 244 ; Logan 1:. Mathews,

6 Penn. State R. 417.

“Being engaged in a violation of

law, without which he would not have

received the injury sued for, the plain-

tiff cannot obtain redress in acourt

of justice. Way v. Foster, 1 Allen,

408; Hamilton v. Boston, ante 477.

The opposite view, approved by the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in

Mohney 0. Cook, 26 Penn. State R.

342, and by Mr. Justice Gama, in

Philadelphia, etc., R. R. v. Philadcl

phia, etc., 'l‘owboat Co., 23 How. 218,

is inconsistent with the established

law of the Commonwealth.

" The defendants may have been

justified in running their cars for the

purpose of transporting passengers

to and from public worship, or for

otlierneeessary or charitable objects.

But the fact that the defendants were

acting lawfully would not protect the

plaintiﬂ‘ in unlawful traveling, or in-

crease his right to maintain an action

not and could not be denied that the
plaintiff ~as 'travel mg.' within the
meaning of these statutes, at the time
of suffering the injury complained of.
He was proceeding in a street car
drawn by horses from Charlestown,
entirely across the city of Boston, in
which he resided, to Hoxbury, on the
opposite side.
"It is equally clear that he was not
traveling from necessity or charity.
He had left Boston on the morning
of the same day, and spent the greater
part of the uay in Charlestown, for
the purpose of' collecting n debt. A
negotiation between a creditor and
his debtor, or any other act done for
the purposes of private gain, under
uo apparent or extraordinary emergency, is neither necrssary nor charitable in any sense. Ex parte Preston,
2 Ves. & B. 312; Phillips "· Innes, 4
( :1. & Fin. 234 ; Beunett "· Brooks, 9
Allen, 120; Jones "· Andover, 10
Allen, 18. His subsequent visit to a
friend of his companion, who dues
not appear to have been any relation
or fl'iend of his own, was equally unncct>ssary upon the most liberal construction of the statute. Pearce "·
Atwood, 11:1 :Mass. 3.">1 ; Flu~r.~ "· l\lill.
bury, 4 Cush. 244 ; Logan "·:Mathews,
6 Penn. t:itate R. 417.

"Being engaged in a violation of
law, without which be would not have
received the injury sued for, the plaintiff cannot obtain redress in a court
of justice. Way "· Fo!lter, 1 All('n,
408; Hamilton "· Bn!lton, ante 477.
The opposite view, approved by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
:Mohney "· Cook, 26 PE>nn. Stnte H.
342, and by .Mr.•Ju<:tir.e GRIKR, in
PhiiRdrlphia, etc., H. R. "· Phila.dcl
phia, etc., Towboat Co., 23 How. 218,
is incomoishmt with the established
law of the Commonwealth.
"The defl·ndants mny have bPen
justified in running their cars for the
purpose of tran!lpnrting pa!lsengcrs
to and from public worship, or for
other .necessary or churitablc objects.
But the fact th11t the defendants were
acting lawfully would not pi'Otect thu
plaintiff in unlawful traveling, or increase his right to maintain an uction
against them. Commonwealth "·
Knox, 6 Mass. 78 ; ~lyers v. State, 1
Conn. 502 ; Scully v. Commonwealth,
35 Penn. StateR. ."Hl." Sec, further,
Smith "· Boston & )Iaine R. H. Co.,
120 ~la:-~s. 490; B. C. 21 Am. Hep. 5:.18.
' \VHEKLER, J., in .McUlary t'. Low.
ell, 44 Vt. 116, 118 ; S. C. !:! Am. Hcp.
366. On the generl\l subject :see, also,
Uommonwt·nlth "·Sampson, !)7 Mass.
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Other cases in which relief to one injured while violating the

Sunday laws has been denied are the following: A party aiding

the owner to clear out his wheel pit and injured while doing so

by the negligence of the owner; ‘ one defrauded in an exchange

of horses on that day,’ one who lets to another a horse to be

ridden or driven on Sunday, and ﬁnds it injured by negligent or

immoderate driving;’ but this doctrine has been often ques-

tioned, and at last has been overruled in the State where it

originated.‘

The eases arising under the Sunday laws must be considered

in connection with a familiar principle in the la.w of civil Wrongs,

which, as applied by other courts, would leave them without sup-

port. The principle is, that to deprive a party of redress because

of his own illegal conduct, the illegality must have contributed

to the injury. Applying this to the case of injuries received

from defects in the highway while traveling on the Sunday, the

following has been said of it: “To make good the defense (of

illegality) it must appear that a relation existed between the act

or violation of law, on the part of the plaintiff, and the injury or
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accident of which he complains, and the relation must have been

such as to have caused or helped to cause the injury or accident,

not in a remote or speculative sense, but in the natural and ordi-

nary course of events as one event-is known to precede or follow

another. It must have been some act, omission or fault naturally

and ordinarily calculated to produce the injury, or from which

the injury or accident might naturally and reasonably have been

anticipated under the circumstances. It is obvious that a viola-

tion of the Sunday law is not of itself an act, Omission or fault

-107; Commonwealth 0. Josselyn, Ib. another, and retained by the defend-

411; Connolly 0. Boston, 117 Mass.

64; S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 396; Gorman

v. Lowell, Ib. 65. For a son to hire a

horse to visit his father on Sunday is

not illegal. Logan c. Mathews, 6

Penn. St. 417.

'McGrath 0. Merwin. 112 Mass.

467; S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 119.

- ' Robeson c. French. 12 Met. 24. In

Other cases in which relief to one injured while violating the
Sunday laws has been denied are the following: A party aiding
the owner to clear out his wheel pit and injured while doing so
by the negligence of the owner;' one defrauded in an exchange
of horses on that day;' one who lets to another a horse to be
ridden or driven on Sunday, and finds it injured by negligent or
immoderate driving; • but this doctrine has been often questioned, and at last has been overruled in the State where it
originated.·
The cases arising under the Sunday laws must be considered
in connection with a familiar ptinciple in the law of civil wrongs,
which, as applied by other courts, would leave them without support. The principle is, that to deprive a party of redress because
of his own illegal conduct, the illegality must have contributed
to the injury. Applying this to the case of injuries received
from defects in the highway while traveling on the Sunday, the
following has been said of it: "To make good the defEmse (of
illegality) it must appear that a relation existed between the act
or violation of law, on the part of the plaintiff, and the injury or
accident of which he complain~, and the relation must have been
such as to ha¥e caused or helped to cause the injury or aceidcut,
not in a remote or speculative senRe, but in the natural and ordinary course of events as one event-is known to precede or follow
another. It must have been some act, omission or tanlt naturally
and ordinarily calculated to produc::c the injury, or from which
the injury or accident might naturally and re~onably have been
anticipated under the circumstances. It is obvious that a violation of the Sunday law is not of itself ~n act, omh;sion or fault

Myers v. Meinrath, 101 Mass. 366, it

was decided that an action will not

lie for the conversion of n chattel

delivered on Sunday in exchange for

ant notwithstanding the return of

the other by the plaintiff. Compare

Tucker 0. Mowrey, 12 Mich. 378.

‘ Gregg v. Wyman, 4 Cush. 322. See

Parker v. Latner, 60 Me. -528; Whel-

don v. (‘h:\ppel, B R. I. 230, 233.

‘ See Woodman 1:. Hubbard, 25 N.

H. 67 ; Morton v. Glosler, 46 Me. 520 ;

Sutton 0. Wnuwatosa, ‘.29 Wis. 21; S. C.

9 Am. Rep. 534; Hall c. Corcorun,

107 Mass. 251 ; S. (‘. 9 Am. Rep. 30;

Harrison v. Marshall, 4 E. D. Smith,

271.

407; Commonwealth "· Jo~s<>lyn, lb.
.U1; Connolly "· Boston, 117 Mass.
6-l ; S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 396 ; Gorman
11. Lowell, lb. 65. For a son to hire a
horae to visit his father on Sunday is
not illegal. Logan "· Mathews, 6
Penn. St. 417.
1 llcGrath "· Merwin, 112 Mass.
4G7 ; S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 119.
· ' Robeson "· French, 12 Met. 2!. In
llyers "· llcinrath, 101 Mass. 366, it
waa decided that an action will not
lie Cor the conversion of a chattel
delivered on Sunday in exchange for

anothcr, and n·tained by the defenrt•
ant notwithstanding the return of
the other by the plaintiff. Compare
Tucker o. llowrcy, 12 llich. Sit!.
I Gregg "·Wyman, 4 cu~b. a22. See
Parker "· Latner, 60 Me. 52!:1 ; Whet.
don 11. Chappel, 8 R. I. 230, 233.
'Sec Woodman "· Hubbard, 2t5 N.
67; Morton t:. Gloster, 46 :&It>. 5:!0;
Sutton"· WauwatoKa, 29 Wis. 21; S.C.
9 Am. Rep. 534 ; llall "· Corcoran,
107 lla.~s. 251 ; S . ('. 9 Am. R<>p. 80;
Harrison "· llllrsball, 4 E. D. Smith,
2i1.

n.
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of this kind, with reference to a defect in the highway or in
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a bridge over which a traveler may be passing, unlawfully

though it may be. The fact that the traveler may be violating

this law of the State, has no natural or necessary tendency to

cause the injury which may happen to him from the defect. All

other conditions and circumstances remaining the same, the same

accident or injury would have happened on any other day as

well. The same natural causes would have produced the same

result on any other day, and the time of the accident or injury,

as that it was on Sunday, is wholly immaterial so far as the cause

of it or the question of contributory negligence is concerned.

In this respect it would be wholly immaterial, also, that the

traveler was within the exceptions of the statute, and traveling

on an errand of necessity or charity, and so was lawfully upon

the highway.’ ’ ‘

‘Sutton 0. Wauwatosa, 29 ’Wis. 21,

28. In this case the Massachusetts

cases are examined, and their sound-

ness denied in an able opinion by

DIXON, Ch. J. The principle he re-

lies upon was fully recognized in

Massachusetts, in a case in which one
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sued for an injury to his vehicle

of this kind, with reference to a defect in the highway or in
a bridge over which a traveler may be passing, unlawfully
though it may be. The fact that the traveler may be violating
this law of the State, has no natural or necessary tendency to
cause the injury which may happen to him from the defect. All
{)ther conditions and circumstances remaining the same, the s~me
a<'Cidcnt or injury would ha\'e happened on any other day as
well. The same natural eanses would have produced the same
result on any other day, and the time of the accident or injury,
as that it was on Sunday, is wholly immaterial so far as the cause
of it or the question of contributory negligence is concerned.
In this respect it would be wholly immaterial, also, that the
traveler was within the exceptions of the statute, and traveling
Qn an errand of necessity or charity, and so was ]awfully upon
the highway."'

which, at the time, was standing in a

public street in a manner prohibited

by city ordinance, and where not-

withstanding he was held entitled to

recover. Steele v. Burkhardt, 104

Mass. 59; S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 191. Cit.

ing Jones 0. Andover, 10 Allen, 20,

and distinguishing Gregg o. Wyman,

4 Cush. 322, and Way v. Foster, 1 Al-

len, 408, “where the plaintiff was

obliged to lay the foundation of his

action in his own violation of law."

In Holt 0. Green, 73 Penn. St. 198,

200; S. O. 18 Am. Rep. 737. Manctm,

_J., says: “The test whether a demand

connected with an illegal transaction

is capable of being enforced by law,

is whether the plaintiff requires the

aid of the illegal transaction to estab-

lish his case. Swan 1:. Scott, 11 S. &

R. 164; Thomas n. Brady, 10 Penn.

St. 170; Scott v. Duffy, 14 Penn. St.

20. If a plaintitf cannot open his

case without showing that he has

broken the law, a court will not as-

sist him. Thomas o. Brady, supra.

It has been well said that the objec-

tion may oftcn sound very ill in the

mouth of a defendant, but it is not for

his sake the. objection is allowed; it

is founded on general principles of

policy which he shall have the ad-

vantage of, contrary to the real justice

between the parties. That principle

of public policy is, that no court will

lend its aid to a party who grounds

his action upon an immoral or upon

an illegal act. Mitchell 0. Smith, 1

Binn. 118; Seidenbender 0. Charles’s

Admrs., 4 S. & R. 159. The principle

to be extracted from all the cases is,

that the law will not lend its support

to a claim founded on its own viola

tion. Coppell 1;. Hall, '7 Wall. 558."

In Mohney o. Cook, 26 Penn. St.

842, the fact that the plaintiff was

1 Sutton e. Wauwatosa, 29 ·Wis. 21,
28. In this case the Massachusetts
cases are examined, and their soundness denied in an able opinloD by
DrxoN, Ch. J. The principle he relics upon was fully recognized in
Massachusetts, in a case in which one
-sued for an injury to his vehicle
which, at the time, was standing in a
public street in a manner prohibited
by city ordinance, and where not.
withstanding he was held entitled to
recover. Steele "· Burkhardt, 104
Mass. 59; S. C. 6 Am. Hep. 191. Cit.
ing Jones 11. Andover, 10 Allen, 20,
and distinguishing Gregg"· Wyman,
4 Cush. 822, and Way 11. Foster, 1 Allen, 408, "where the plaintifl' was
ol.Jligcd to lay the foundation of his
action in his own violation of law."
In Holt "· Green, 73 Penn. St. 198,
200; S. C. 18 Am. Hcp. 737. liERCUR,
.J ., suys: "The test whether a demand
connected with an illegal transaction
is capable of being enforced by law,
is whether the plaintiff requires the
aid of the illegal transaction to establish his case. Swan ~. Scutt, 11 S. &
R. 164; Thomas "· Brady, 10 Penn.
.St. 170; Scott o. Duffy, 14 Penn. St.

20. If a plaintiff cannot open hlJ
case wilhout showing that he baa
broken the law, a court will not usist him. Thomas e. Brady, supra.
It has been well said that the obje~
tion may often sound very ill in the
mouth of a defendant, but it is not for
his sake the. objection is allowed; U
is founded on general principles or
policy which lte shall have the advantage of, contrary to the real justice
between the parties. That principle
of public policy is, that no court will
lend its aid to a party who grounds
his action upon an immoral or upon
an illl•gal act. MitciJell 11. Smith, 1
Binn. 118; Seiden bender "· Charles's
Admrs., 4 S. & R.159. The principle
to be extracted from all the case.'! is,
that the law will not lend its support
to a claim founded on its own viola.
tion. Coppell11. Hall, 7 Wall. 558."
In Mohney e. Cook, 26 Penn. St.
842, the fact that the plaintiff was
navigating a stream in violation of
the Sunday laws was held no bar to a
recovery against one who, by erecting
an obstruction in the stream, caused
an injury to the boat. But the law in
that case provided a specific remedr
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And in New York, where the carriers of passengers have a
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right to transport persons on Sunday for some purposes, it has

been decided that all who are carried by them are entitled to pro-

tection against their negligence, and may recover for a negligent

injury, irrespective of the purpose for which they were traveling.‘

And we should say that the weight of authority at this time was

in favor of the doctrine so clearly stated by the Wisconsin court,

and which had previously been announced by the courts of Penn-

sylvania and New Hampshire, and by the Federal Supreme

Court.’

The fact that a party injured was at the time violating the

law, does not put him out of the protection of the law; he is

never put by the law at the mercy of others. If he is negli-

for its violation, which, in the opinion

ofthe court, precluded any other. And

denying to him re(lress for an injury

would, in effect, be imposing a further

penalty.

' Carroll 0. Staten Island R. R. ct,

58 N. Y. 126; S. C. 1'7 Am. Rep. 231,

And in New York, where the carriers of passengers have a
right to transport persons on Sunday for some purposes, it has
been decided that all who are carried by them are entitled to protection against their negligence, and may recover for a negligent
injury, irrespective of the purpose for which they were traveling. 1
And we should say that the weight of authority at this time was
in favor of the doctrine so clearly stated by the Wisconsin court,
and which had previously been announced by the courts of Pennsylvania and New Hampshire, and by the Federal Supreme
Court.'
The fact that a party injured was at the time violating the
law, does not put him out of the protection of the law; he is
never put by the law at the mercy of others. If he is negli-

citing and relying upon Philadel-

phia, etc., R. R. Co. o. Towboat Co.,
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23 How. 209. The case seems to be

grounded in part on the fact that the

contract to carry was legal on the

part of the railroad company, and

the obligation to carry with care was

incident to it. Merritt 0. Earle, 29

N. Y. 115, decides that the fact that a

contract for the carriage of property

was made on Sunday will not pre-

elude a recovery for a loss thereof.

A bailment on Sunday does not

change the title, and the bailor may

recover as for a conversion, if the

bailee fails in performance and con.

verts the property to his own use.

Dwight o. Brewster, 1 Pick. 50. See

Lewis 0. Littletield, 15 Me. 2133; Logan

r. Mathews, 6 Penn. St. 417; Stewart

:1. Davis, 31 Ark.518; Phalen v. Clark,

I9 Conn. 421.

’ Woodman 0. Hubbard, 25 N. H.

6'? ; Norris o. Litchﬁeld, 35 N. H.271;

Corley 0. Bath, Id. 530; Dutton 0.

Weare, 17 N. H. 84; Mohney o. Cook,

26 Penn. St. 342; Philadelphia, etc.,

R. R. Co. v. Towboat Co., 23 How.

209. See Hamilton o. Goding, 55

Me. 419; Whelden 0. Chappel, 8 R I.

230; Armstrong e. Toler,11 Wheat.

258. The following cases have more

or less bearing in the same direction:

Alger o. Lowell, 3 Allen, 402; Bigge-

low 0. Reed, 51 Me. 32-3; Davis 0.

Mann, 10 M. & W. 548. In the case

of Baker v. Portland, 58 Me. 199; S.

C. 4 Am. Rep. 274, B.\nRows.J., con.

siders the subject with great care, and

reaches the same conclusion with the

court in Wisconsin. The action was

one brought against the city for an

injury occasioned by a defective way.

The plaintiff at the time was driving

more than six miles an hour, in viola-

tion ofa city ordinance. The Judge

told the jury this was no defense, pro-

vided the fast driving did not in any

degree contribute to produce the in-

for ita violation, which, in the opinion
oCtl1e court, precluded any other. And
denying to him redress for an injury
would, in effect, be imposing a further
penalty.
1 Carroll "· Staten Island R. R. C6.,
r,s N.Y. 126; S.C. 17 Am. &p. 231,
r·iting and relying upon Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. "· Towboat Co.,
23 How. 209. The case seems to be
grounded in part on the fact that the
contract to carry was legal on the
part of thP. railroad company, and
\he obligation to carry with care was
incident to it. Merritt D. Earle, 29
N.Y. 1Hi, decide!i that the fact that a
contract for ilie carria.ge of property
was made on Sunday will not preclude a recovery for a loss thereof.
A bailment on Sunday does no~
change the title, and the bailor may
recover as for a conversion, if the
bailee fails in pcrformnnce and con.
verts the properly tu his own use.
Dwight "· Brewster, 1 Pick. 50. See
Lewis"· Littlefield, 15 Me. 233; Logan
r. linthews, 6 Penn. St. 417; Stewart
r.. Davis, 31 Ark. 518; Phalen o. Clark,
19 Conn. 421.
' Woodman v. Hubbard, 25 N. H.
6'l; Norris v. Litchfield, 85 N. H. 271;
Corley v. Bath, Id. 680 ; Dutton o.

Weare, 17 N.H. 34; Mohney"· Cook,
26 Penn. St. 342; Philadelphia, etc.t
R. R. Co. o. Towboat Co., 23 How.
209. Sec Hamilton "· Goding, 55
Me. 41\1; Whelden "· Chappel, 8 R. I.
230 ; Armstrong "· Toler, 11 WheaL
258. The following cases have moru
or less bearing in the same direction:
Alger "· Lowell, 8 Allen, 402; Bigelow "· Heed, 51 Me. 32-.j; Davis "·
:MIUln, 10 :1\1. & W. 548. In the case
of Baker t>. Portland, 58 Me. 100; S.
C. 4 Am. Rep. 274, B.\nnows. J., considers the subject with ~reat care, and
reaches the same conclusion with the
court in Whlconsin. The action was
one brought against the city for an
injur·y occasioned by a defective way.
Th1:1 plaintiff at the time was driving
more than six miles un hour, in violation of a city ordinance. The Judge
told the jury this was no defense, provided the fast driving did not in any
degree contribute to produce the injuries complained of. Held, correct.
But if one uses the highway for an
illegal horse race, he is entitled to no
redress for an injury received in consequence of the way being out of
repair. McCarthy v. Portland, 67 Me.

167.
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gently injured in the highway, he may have redress, notwith-
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standing at the time he was on the wrong side of the way,

provided this fact did not contribute to the injury.‘ So a party

who engages in an unlawful game may recover for an injury

suffered while playing it,’ and so may one who participates in a

race and is willfully run down by his competitor.‘

‘ Baker o. Portland, 58 Me. 199; S.

C. 4 Am. Rep. 274; Daniels 0. Clegg,

28 Mich. 32. See Stewart v. Machias

Port, 48 Me. 477; Morton o. Gloster,

gently injured in the highway, he may have redress, notwithstanding at the time he was on the wrong side ot' the way,
providE..>d this fact did not contribute to the injury/ & a party
who engages in an unlawful game may recover for an injury
suffered while playing it,' and so may one who participates in a
race and is willfully run down by his competitor.1

46 Me. 520. The fact that a vessel

run into and injured by another was

at the time disregarding the law in

any particular, only bears on the

question of negligence, and is not

conclusive against a recovery of dam-

ages for the injury suffered from the

collision. Blanchard v. Steamboat

Co., 59 N. Y. 292 ; Hoffman 0. Union

Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 385.

' Etchberry v. Leiville, 2 Hilton, 40.

'1tIi-mnrcx, J.: “It appears from
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the bill of exceptions to have been

fully proved upon the trial that the

defendant willfully ran down the

plaintiff and broke his sleigh, as is

alleged in the declaration. No justi-

ﬁcation or legal excuse of this act

was asserted or attempted to be shown

by the defendant; but he was permit-

ted, against the plaintiﬂ"s objection,

to introduce evidence tending to

prove that it was done while the par-

ties were trotting horses in competi-

tion with each other for a purse of

money, the ownership of which was

to be determined by the issue of the

race. And it was ruled by the pre-

siding judge, that if this fact was

established, no action could be main-

tained by the plaintitf to recover coin-

pensation for the damages he had

sustained, even though the injury

complained of was willfully inﬂicted.

Under such instructions the jury re-

turned a verdict for the defendant.

" We presume it may be assumed

as an undisputed principle of law,

that no action will lie to recover a

demand, or a supposed claim for dam-

ages, if. to establish it, the plaintitT

requires aid from an illegal transac-

tion, or is under the necessity of

showing, and depending in any de-

gree upon, an illegal agreement. to

which he himself had been a party.

Gregg o. Wyman, 4 Cush. 322; Wood-

man e Hubbard, 5 Foster, 67; Phalen

0. Clark, 19 Conn. 421; Simpson 0.

Bloss, 7 Taunt. 246. But this princi-

pje will not sustain the ruling of the

court, which went far beyond it and

laid down a much broader and more

comprehensive doctrine. Taken with-

out qualitication, and just as they

were given to the jury, the instruc-

tions import that, if two persons are

engaged in the same unlawful enter-

prise, each of them, during the con-

' Baker e. Portland, 58 Me. 199; S.
C. 4 Am. Rep. 274; Daniels e. Clegg,
2R 1\lic·h. 82. &>e Stewart e. llachias
Port, 4t! Me. 477; Morton e. Gloster,
46 lie. 520. The fact that a vessel
run into and injured by another was
· at the time disregarding the law in
any particul&r, only bears on the
question of negligence, and is not
conclusive against a recovery of dam.
ages for the injury suffered from the
colliE>ion. Blanchard "· Steamboat
Co., 59 N. Y. 292: Hoffman e. Union
Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 885.
t Etch berry e. Lei ville, 2 Hilton, 40.
I MERRIOK, J.: .. n appears from
the bill of exceptions to have been
fully proved upon the trial that the
d1•fendant willfully ran down the
plaintiff and broke his sleigh, as is
alleged in the declaration. No justification or legal excuse of this act
was asserted or attempted to be shown
by the defendant; but he was permitted, against the plaintiff 'a objection,
to introduce evidence tending to
prove that it was done while the par.
til•s were trotting horses in competi.
tion with each other for a purse of
money, the ownership of which was
to be determined by the issue of the
race. And it was ruled by the pre.
siding judge, that if this fact was
established, no action could be maintained by the plaintiff to recover com.
pensation for the damages he had
sustained, even though the injury
complained of was willfully inflicted.
t;'nder such instructions the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
·• We presume it may be assumed

.. •n undisputed pnnciple or law,
that no action will lie to recover a
demand, or a supposed claim for dam.
ages, If, to establish It, the plaintiff
requires aid from an illegal &.ransaction, or is under the necessity of
showing, and depending in any de..
gree upon, an illell'al agreement. to
which he himself had been a party.
Greggt~. Wyman, 4 Cush. 822; Woodmane Hubbard,5 Foster, 07; Phalen
e. Clark, 19 Conn. 421 ; Simpson "·
Bloss, 7 Taunt. 246. But this princi.
ple will not sustain the ruling of the
~urt, which went far beyond it and
laid down a much broader and more
comprehensive doctrine. Taken without qualiftcRtlon, and just as they
were given to the jury, the lnstruetions import that, if two persons are
engaged in the same unlawful enter.
prise, each of them, during the continuance of such engAgement, is lrre..
sponsible for willful injuries done to
the property of the other. No such
proposition as this can be true. He
who violates the law must suffer its
penalties, but yet in all other respects
he is under its protection and entitled
to the benefits of its remedies.
" But in this case the plaintiff had
no occasion to show, in order to main.
tain his action, that he was engaged,
at the time his property was injured,
in any unlawful pursuit, or that he
bad previously made any illegal contract. It is true that, when he suffered
the injury, he was acting in violation
of the law; for all horse trotting upon
wagers for money is expressly declared by statute to be a misdemeanor
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_ By the decisions it is settled that if two persons voluntarily

engage in a'ﬁght, which implies a license by each that the other

may strike him, this license being illegal and void, either )arty

injured by the other may have his action for the battery.‘ )1 Fur-

ther illustrations of the general principle may be found in those

cases in which it has been decided that even a trespasser may

demand redress when the injury he receives cannot be justified

as a necessary and moderate employment of force in defense of

one’s person or possessions.’

punishable by ﬁne and imprisonment.

St. 1846, c. 200. But neither the con-

tract nor the race had, so far as ap-

pears from the facts reported in the

, By the decisions it is settled that if' two persons voluntarily
engage in a-fight, which implies a license by each that the otbcr
may strike him, this lk-ense being ille1:,ral and void, eitherj>arty
injured by the other may have his action for the battery! Further illustrations of the general principle may be found in those
eases in which it has been decided that even a trespasser may
demand redress when the injury he receives cannot be justified
as a necessary and moderate employment of force in defense of
<me's person or pos8essions.s

bill of exceptions, or from the intima-

tions of thc court in its ruling, any-

thing to do with the trespass commit-

ted upon the property of the plaintitf.

That he had no occasion to show into

what stipulations the parties had en-

tered, or what were the rules or regu-

lations by which they were governed
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in the race, or whether they were in

fact engaged in any such buainess at

all, is apparent from the course of

the proceedings at the trial. The

plaintiff introduced evidence tend-

ing to prove the wrongful acts com-

plained of in the writ, and the dam-

age done to his property, and there

rested his case. If nothing more had

been shown, he would clearly have

been entitled to recover. He had not

attempted to derive assistance either

from an illegal contract or an illegal

transaction. It was the defendant,

and not the plaintiff, who had occa-

sion to invoke assistance from proof

of the illegal agreement and conduct

in which both parties had equally

participated. From such sources

neither of the parties should have

been permitted to derive a beneﬁt.

The plaintiﬂ‘ sought nothing of this

kind, and the mutual misconduct of

the parties in one particular cannot

exempt the defendant from his obli-

gation to respond for the injurious

consequences of his own illegal mis-

behavior in another.” Welch o. Wes-

son, 6 Gray, 505.

‘Boulter 0. Clark, Bull. N. P. 16:

Mathew 1:. Ollerton, Comb. 218 ; Lo-

gan o. Austin, 1 Stew. 476; Hannen

0. Edes, 15 Mass. 346; Brown 0. Gor-

don, 1 Gray, 182; Stout o. Wren, 1

Hawks, 420; Bell o. Ilansley, 3 Jones

(N. C.), 131; Dole v. Erskine, 35 N. H.

503; Adams 0. Waggoner, 33 Ind.

531 ; S. C. 5Am. Rt-p.230; Bartlett r.

Churchill, 24 Vt. 218. The statutory

penalty for refusing to send a mes-

sage by telegraph is incurred, though

the nlessatge was intended to accom-

plish an immoral purpose. Western

U. Tel. Co. o. Ferguson, 57 Ind. 495.

' Bird e. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628;

Looniis 0. Terry, 17 Wend. 496 ; Sher-

fry o. Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58; Curtis 0.

punishable by ftne and imprisonment.
SL 1&46, c. 200. But neither the contract nor the race had, so far aa ap.
peiU"B from the facta reported in the
bill of excf'ptions, or from the intimations of the court in its ruling, anything to do with the trespass committed upon the property of the plaintiff.
That he had no occasion to show into
what stipulations the parties had entered, or what were the rules or regulations by which they were governed
in the race, or whether they were in
fact engaged in any such bu.&ine!Js at
all, is apparf'nt from the course of
Ule proceedings at. the trial. The
plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove the wrongful acts complained of in the writ, and the dam"~ dono to his property, and there
l'f'Sted his case. If nothing more had
been shown, he would clt>arly have
been entiLled to recover. He had not.
attempted to derive assistance either
from an illegal contract. or an illegal
transaction. It was Ule defendant,
and not the plaintiff, who had occasion to invoke a.~istance from proof
of the illegal agreement and conduct
in which both parties had equally
participa&ed. From such eourcee

neither of the parties should have
been p<>rmitted to derive a benefit.
The plaintiff sought nothing of thl11
kind, and the mutual misconduct of
the parties in one particular cannot
exempt the defendant from his obligation to respond for the injurious
consequences of his own Hlegal misbehavior in another." Welch e. Wesson, 6 Gray, 505.
• Boulter e. l1ark, Bull. N. P. 16:
Mathew "· Ollerton, ('omb. 218 : Lo.
gan e. Austin, 1 Stew. 476; Hannen
e. Ed~ 15 llass. 346; Brown e. Gordon, 1 Gray, 182; Stout "· Wren, 1
Hawks, 420; Bell"· Hansley, 3 Jones
(N.C.), 181; Dole"· Er~kine, 35 N.H.
1>03; Adams "· Waggoner, 83 Ind.
631 ; B. C. 6 Am. Rt>p. 2:.10 : Bartlett r.
Churchill, 24 VL 218. The statutory
penalty for refusing to send a met>sage by telt•graph iR incurred, though
the message Willi intended to accompli!lb an immoral purpose. Western
U. Tel. Co. e. Jo'erguson, li7 Ind. 495.
• Bird e. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628;
Loomis"· Terry, 17 Wend. 496: Bherfry "· Bartley, 4 Sneed, li8 ; Curtis •·
Carson, 2 N. H. 639: Ogden •· Olay.
comb, 52 Ill. 866.
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waorres AFFECTING PERSONAL sncmtrrv.

In this chapter will be considered those wrongs which aﬁ'ect

the bodily organization of individuals, or which deprive them

of their rightful liberty of movement. These are wrongs which

have no necessary relation to an ownership of property, though

in some cases the extent of the injury may be affected by such

ownership, and in others rights in property may be so involved

that the same acts may be innocent or injurious, when they would

take the opposite character, were no such rights in question. In

OHAPTER VI.

the course of what is said it will appear that, as regards the person

itself -- the bodily existence — the purpose of the law is to estab-

lish such rules as shall constitute a complete protection against

any violence whatsoever, whether perceptible injury results from

WRONGS AFFECTING PERSONAL SECURITY.

it or not. Such rules are as practicable here as they are imprac-

ticable in some cases of rights of a more indeﬁnite and intang-

ible character; such, for example, as the right to protection in

reputation.

AQAULTS AND BATTERIES.

Assaults. An assault is an attempt, with unlawful force, to

inﬂict bodily injury upon another, accompanied with the appa-

rent present ability to give eifect to the attempt if not prevented.
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Such would be the raising of the hand in anger, with an appar-

ent purpose to strike, and suﬂiciently near to enable the purpose

to be carried into effect; the pointing of a loaded pistol at one

who is within its range; ‘ the pointing of a pistol not loaded at

‘Not if he is not within range. James, 1 C. & K. 530. But to put

Tarver v. State, 43 Ala. 354. Threat- one’s hand upon his sword, and

cning to shoot, with pistol in hand, say, “If it were not assize time

is an assault, though it be neither I would not take such language

cocked nor loaded. State 0. Church, from you,” is no assault. Redman

63 N. C. 15. Compare Regina v. 0. Edolfe, 1 Mod. 3. Neither is it,

In this chapter will be consi<lered those wrongs which affect
the bodily organization of individuals, or which deprive them
of their rightful liberty of movement. These are wrongs which
have no necessary relation to an ownership of property~ though
in some cases the extent of the injury may be affected by sueh
ownership, and in others rights in property may be so involved
that the same acts may be innocent or injurious, when they would
take the opposite character, were no such rights in question. In
the course of what is said it will appear that, as regards the person
itself- the bodily existence- the pnrpose of the law is to establish snch rules as shall constitute a complete protection against
any violence whatsoever, whether perceptible injury results from
it or not. Such rules are as practicable here as they are impracticable in some cases of rights of a more indefinite and intangible character; such, for example, as the right to protection in
reputation.
.A93AULTS AND BATIERIF.B.

An assault is an attempt~ with unlawful force, to
inflict bodily injury upon another, accompanied with the apparent present ability to give effect to the attempt if not prevented.
Such would be the raising of the hand in anger, with an apparent purpose to strike, and sufficiently near to enable the purpose
to be carried into effect; the pointing of a loaded pistol at one
who is within its range; 1 the pointing of a pistol not loaded at
Assaults.

1 Not if he Is not within range.
Tarver "· State, 43 Ala. 854. Threat.
ening to shoot, with pistol in hand,
is an assault, though it be neither
cocked nor loaded. State "· Church,
68 N. C. 15. Compare Regina e.

James, 1 C. & K. 680. But to put
one's hand upon his sword, and
say, " If it were not assize time
I would not take such language
from you," Is no assault. Redman
e. Edolfe, 1 Mod. 8. Neither ia i~
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one who is not aware of that fact, and making an apparent
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attempt to shoot; ‘ shaking a whip or the ﬁst in a man’s face in

anger;’ riding or running after him in threatening and hostile

manner with a club or other weapon,‘ and the like. The right

that is invaded here indicates the nature of the wrong. Every

person has a right to complete and perfect immunity from hos-

tile assaults that threaten danger to his person; “a right to live

in society without being put in fear of personal harm.” ‘

if one presents a pistol, accom-

panied by words which negative

an intent to employ it. Blake -0.

Barnard, 9 C. & P. 626. Words alone

never constitute an assault. State 0.

one who is not aware of that fact, and making an apparent
attempt to shoot;' shaking a whip or the fist in a man's face in
anger; • riding or running after him in threatening and hostile
manner with a club or other weapon,' and the like. The right
that is invaded here indicates the nature of the wrong. Every
person has a right to complete and perfect immunity from hostile assaults that threaten danger to his person; "a right to live
in society without being put in fear of personal harm."•

Mooney, Phil. (N. C.) 434; Smith 0.

State, 39 Miss. 521; Warren 0. State,

33 Tex. 517. But where one drew a

pistol, and pointing it at a man who

attempted to stop histcam, exclaimed,

“I will shoot any man who attempts

to stop my mules,” held,to be an as-

sault. UHALMERB, J.: “A man has

the legal right to protect his properly
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against trespass, opposing force to

force. If, therefore, the offer had

simply been to commit a common as-

sault, as by declaring that he would

strike with his hand, or with some

implement or weapon not dangerous,

Hairston would have been guilty of

no offense. If a man takes my hat,

or otters to do so. against my will, and

I, drawing back my hand, declare

that I will strike if he docs not for-

bear, I only meet the trespass by an

otfer to use such force as may be ap-

propriate and necessary. But I can-

not at once leap to an assault with

deadly weapons and a threat to kill.

If I were to kill under such circum-

stances, the killing would bemurder;

and hence I have made an assault

which, if carried into a battery, with

fatal results, would constitute the

gravest crime. As no trespass upon

property will primarily justify the

taking of life, so an offer to com-

mit a trespass cannot justify an as-

sault with a deadly weapon, accom-

panied by a threat to kill unless the

party dcsisls. The means adopted are

disproportionate to, and not sane-

tioned by, the end sought. We think,

therefore, that Hairston might well

have been convicted of an assault.

Morgan's Case, 8 Ired. 186; Myer-

ﬂeld‘s Case, Phil. (N. C.) 108; Smith

v. State, 39 Miss. 521." Hairston 0.

State, 54 Miss. 689, 693.

' Beach o. Hancock, 27 N. H. 223;

Regina o. St. George, 9 C. & P. 483;

Richels 0. State, 1 Sneed, 606. See

Rapp v. Commonwealth, 14 B. Mon.

614; State v. Cherry. 11 Ir-ed. 475.

' See People 0. Yslas, 2'7 Cal. 630;

State v. Rawles, 65 N. C. 334. In this

last case it is held that where several

persons, with implements that maybe

used for offensive purposes, including

a gun, follow another, though at a

it one presents a pistol, accompanied by words which negative
an intent to employ lt. Bluke .,,
Barnard, 9C.& P.6·~. Words alone
never C<'nstitute an assault. State e.
Mooney, Phil. (N. C.) 434; Smith e.
8tate, 89 :Miss. 621; Warren e. State,
38 Tex. 317. But where one drew a
pistol, and pointing U at a man who
attempted to stop his team, exclaimed,
"I will shoot any man who attempts
k> atop my mules," Mld, to be an as.
sault. CIIALllERB, J.: "A man has
the legal right to protect his property
against trespa..~, opposing force to
force. If, therefore, the offer had
simply been to commit. a common as.
sault, 88 by dP.claring that he would
strike with his hand, or with some
implement or weapon not dangerous,
Bainton would have been guilty of
no offense. If a man takes my hat,
or offers to do so, against my will, and.
I, drawing back my hand, declare
that I wlll strike it he does not forbear, I only meet the trespass by an
offer to use such force 88 may be ap.
proprlate and nece8SllJ'Y. But I can.not at once leap to an assault with
deadly weRpons and a threat to kill.
U I were to kill under su<'h circumstances, the killing would be murder;
and hence I have made an assault
which, if carried Into a battery, with
fa&al results, would constitute the
gravest crime. As no trespass upon
JM'9pel1y will primarily justify the
taking of life, so an offer to commie a V'elpa88 cannot j118\ify an u.

11

sault with a deadly weapon, accompanied by a threat to kill unleSII the
party desists. The means adopted are
dbproportionate to, and not sanctioned by, the end sought. We think,
therefore, that Hairston might well
have been convicted or an assault.
Morgan's Case, 8 Ired. 186; llyertl.cld's Cuse, Phil. (N. C.) 108; Smith
e. State, 39 Miss. 521." Hairston o.
State, M Miss. 689, 698.
1 Beach e. Hancock, 27 N.H. 223;
Regina e. t3t. George, 9 C. & P. 41:!3;
Richels o. State, 1 Sneed, 606. See
Rapp 11. Commonwealth, 14 B. Mon.
614; State e. Cherry. 11 Ired. 473.
• See People e. Yslas, 27 Cal. 630;
State"· Rawles, 65 N.C. 834. In this
last case it is held that where several
persons, with imph•ments that may be
used for offensive purposes, including
a gun, follow another, though at a
considerable distance, and, by threat.
enlng and insulting language, put
him in f<>ar, and drive him out of hla
way, it is an assault.
1 Mortln e. Shoppe, 8 C. & P. 878.
llaklng apparently an attempt to rille
over one is an 1111sault. State "· Sims,
8 Strob. 187. It is an assault upon
a woman to chase atler her, callin~
upon her to stop, with an apparent
purpose to commit a rape upon her,
though she Is not overtaken. State e.
Neeley, 74 N. C.~; 8. C. 21 Am.
Rep. 406.
• GILOIIBIBT, J .• In Beach e. Han.
cock, 27 N.H., 223, 229. The juda:e
b'Uly aaya: "Without mch HC1ll'ity
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Batteries. A successful assault becomes a battery. 'A bat-

tery consists in an injury actually done to the person of another

in an angry or rcvengeful, or rude or insolent manner, as by spit-

ting in his face, or in any way touching him in anger, or violently

jostling him out of the way.‘ The wrong here consists, not in

the touching, so much as in the manner or spirit in which it is

done, and the question of bodily pain and injury is important

only as affecting the damages. Thus, to lay hands on another

in a hostile manner is a battery, though no damage follows; but

to touch another. merely to attract his attention, is no battery,

and not unlawful.’ And to push gently against one, in the

endeavor to make way through a crowd, is no battery; but to do

so rudely and insolently is, and may justify damages proportioned

to the rudeness.‘

Batteries assented to. It is implied, in an assault or battery,

that it is committed against the assent of the person assaulted;

but there are some things a man can never assent to, and there-

Batteries. A successful assault becomes a battery. · A battery consists in an injury actually done to the person of another
in an angry or revengeful, or rude or insolent manner, as by spitting in his face, or in any way touching him in anger, or violently
jostling him out of the way.' The wrong here consists, not in
the touching, so much as in the manner or spirit in which it is
done, and the question of bodily pain and injury is important
only as affecting the damages. Thus, to lay hands on another
in a hostile manner is a battery, though no damage follows; but
to touch another, merely to attract his attention, is no batter;·,
and not unlawful.' And to push gently against one, in the
endeavor to make way through a crowd, is no battery; but to do
so rudely and insolently is, and may justi(y damages proportioned
to the rudeness.•

fore his license in such cases can constitute no excuse. He can

never consent, for instance, to the taking of his own life. His
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life is not his to take or give away; it would be criminal in him

to take it, and equally criminal in any one else who should

deprive him of it by his consent. The person who, in a duel,

kills another, is not suffered to plead the previous arrangements

and the voluntary exposure to death by agreement, as any excuse

whatever. The life of an individual is guarded in the interest

of the State, and not in the interest of the individual alone; and

not his life only is protected, but his person as well. Consent

cannot justify an assault. '

But suppose, in the duel one is not killed, but only wounded;

may he have an action against his adversary for this injury? If

there is any reason why he may not, it must be because he has

consented to what has been done. Valenti not ﬁt injuria. But

if he had no right or power to consent, and the consent expressed

society loses most of its value. Peace

and order and domestic happiness

inexpressibly more precious than

mere forms of government, cannot be

enjoyed without the sense of perfect

security.” '

‘1 Hawk. P. C. 263; Coward s.

Baddeley, 4 H. & N. 478; Bigelow,

Lead. Cas. on Torts, 231.

' Coward e. Baddeley, 4 H. & N.

478.

’ Cole v. Turner, 6 Mod. 149; Bige-

Batteries assented to. It is implied, in an assault or battery,
that it is committed against the assent of the person assaulted;
, but there are some things a man can never assent to, and theretore his license in such cases can constitute no excuse. He can
never consent, for instance, to the taking of his own life. His
life is not his to take or give away; it would be criminal in him
to take it, and equally criminal in any one else who should
deprive him of it by his consent. The person who, in a duel,
kills another, is not suffered to plead the pre\'ious arrangements
and the voluntary exposure to death by agreement, as any excuse
whatever. The life of an individual is guarded in the interest
of the State, and not in the interest of the individual alone; and
not his life only is protected, but his person as well. Consent
cannot jnsti(y an assault.
But suppose, in the duel one is not killed, bnt only wounded;
may be have an action against his adversary for this injuryW If
there is any reason why he may not, it must be because he has
consented to what has been done. Volenti not fit injuria. But
if he had no right or power to consent, and the consent expressed

low, Lead. Cas. on Torts, 231.

society loseR most of its value. Peace
and order and domestic happiness
inexpressibly n1ore precious than
mere forms of government, cannot be
enjoyed without the sen.se of perfect
security."
·
'1 Hawk. P. C. 268; Coward c.

Baddeley, 4 H. & N. 478; Bigelow,
Lead. Cas. on Torts, 231.
' Coward "· Baddeley, 4 H. & N.
478.
1 Cole "· Turner, 6 Mod. 149; Bige.
low, Lead. Cas. on Torts, 281.
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in words was wholly illegal and void, the question then is, how a
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consent which the law forbids can be accepted in law as a legal

protection?

Consent is generallya full and perfect shield when that is com-

plained of as a civil injury which was consented to. A man cannot

complain of a nuisance, the erection of which he concurred in

or countenanced. He is not injured by a negligence which is

partly chargeable to his own fault. A man may not even com-

plain of the adultery of his wife, which he connived at or assented

to. If he concurs in the dishonor of his bed, the law will not

give him redress, because he is not wronged. These cases are

plain enough, because they are cases in which the questions arise

between the parties alone.

But in case of a breach of the peace it is different. The State

is wronged by this, and forbids it on public grounds. If men

ﬁght, the State will punish them. If one is injured, the law will

not listen to an excuse based on a breach of the law. There are

three parties here, one being the State, which, for its own good,

does not suffer the others to deal on a basis of contract with the

public peace. The rule of law is therefore clear and unquestion-

able, that consent to an assault is no justiﬁcationf. The excep-

tion to this general rule embraces only those cases in which that
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to which assent is given is matter of indifference to public order;

such as slight batteries in play or lawful games,’ such unimportant

injuries, as even when they constitute technical wrongs, may well

be overlooked and excused by the party injured, if not done

of deliberate malice. But an injury, even in sport, would be an

assault, if itiwent beyond what was admissible in sports of the

sort, and was intentional.‘

Deception may sometimes be equivalent to force as an ingre-

' Bnller, N. P., 16; Stephens, N. P.,

211; Mather v. Ollerwn, Comb. 218;

Hannen 0. Edcs, 15 Mass. 346; Stout

0. Wren, 1 Hawks. 420; Bell 0. Hans-

ley, 3 Jones. (N. C.) 131; Logan o.

Austin, 1 Stew. 476; Adams o. Wag.

goner, 33 Ind. 531; "S. O. 5 Am. Rep.

231; Commonwealth v. Collbcrg, 119

Mass. 530; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 828.

This case comments upon and dis-

sents from State 0. Beck, 1 Hill, (S.

C.) 363, and Champer v. State. 14 Ohl01

(N. s.) 437, in which it was held that

in words was wholly illegal and l"oid, the question then is, how a
consent which the law forbids can be accepted in law as a legal
protection!
Consent is generally a full and perfect shield when that is complained of as a civil injury which was consented to. A man cannot
<:omplain of a nuisance, the erection of which he concurred in
or countenan<.:ed. He is not injured by a negligence which is
partly chargeable to his own fault. A man may not even com}'lain of the adultery of his wife, which he connived at or assented
to. If he concurs in the dishonor of his bed, the law will not
give him redress, because he is not wronged. These cases are
plain enough, because they are cases in which the questions arise
between the parties alone.
But in case of a breach of the peace it is different. The State
is wronged by this, and forbids it on public grounds. If men
fight, the State will punish them. If one is injured, the law will
not listen to an excuse based on a breach of the law. There are
three parties here, one being the State, which, for its own good,
does not suffer the others to deal on a basis of contract with the
public peace. The rule of law is therefore clear and unquestion·
able, that consent to an assault is no justification.•, The exception to this general rule embraces only tho3e cases in which that
to which assent is given is matter of indifference to public order;
such as slight batteries hi play or lawful games,~ such unimportant
injuries, as even when they constitu~e technical wrongs, may we11
be overlooked and excused by the party injured, if not done
of deliberate malice. But an injury, even in sport, would be an
assault, if it.went beyond what was admissible in sports of the
sort, and was intentional.'
Deception may sometimes be equivalent to force as an ingre-

a ﬁght by agreement was not an as

sault.

‘ If one is injured in mutual play,

it is no battery, unless there was an

intention to injure. Fitzgerald u.

Cavin, 110 Mass. 153.

' See Christoohersono. Bare,11 Q. B.

473, 477.

I Buller, N. P., 18; Stephens, N. P.,
911; Mather "· Ollcrton, Comb. 218;
Hannen "· EdCII, 1:i MllSS. 846; Stout
e. Wren, 1 Hawks. 420; Bell e. Hans.
lt>y, 8 JonPB, (N. C.) 181; Logan "·
Austin, 1 Stew. 476; Adams e. Wag.
goner, 88 Ind. 531; ·S. 0. GAm. Rep.
231; Commonwealth " · Collbcrg, 119
M.asa. 530; t;. C. 20 Am. Rep. 828.

This case comments upon and dis.
BeDW ftom State o. Beck, 1 Hill, (S.

C.) 363, and Champeu. State, 14 Ohio.
(!i. s.) 437, In which it was held that
a fight by agreement waa not an as.
sault.
If one is Injured In mutual play,
It .i!l no battery, unless there was an
fntl'ntion to injure. Fitzgerald e.
Cavin, 110 }[ass. 153.
• See Christoohenonv. Bare, 11 Q. B.
478,477.
1
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dient in an assault. Thus it'has been said in Massachusetts:
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“ It‘ one should hand an explosive substance to another, and

induce him to take it by misrepresenting or concealing its dan-

gerous qualities, and the other, ignorant of its character, should

receive it and cause it to explode in his pocket or hand, and

should be injured by it, the offending party would be guilty of

a battery, and that would necessarily include an assault; although

he might not be guilty even of an assault if the substance failed

to explode, or tailed to cause any injury. It would be the same

if it exploded in his mouth or stomach. If that which causes

the injury is set in motion by the wrongful act of the defendant,

it cannot be material whether it acts upon the person injured

externally or internally, by mechanical or chemical force.” ‘

This was said in a case in which a party was prosecuted as for a.

criminal assault and battery for delivering to another something

to be eaten, in which a deleterious drug was concealed, intending

that the latter should eat it and be affected by it, as actually took

place. The deceit by means of which the person was induced to

take the drug was, it was said, a fraud upon the will, equivalent

to force in overpowering it.‘

Intent. In batteries there must always be an intent, express

or implied, to do the injury; and therefore an accidental hurt, in
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which the actor was blameless, is no battery. But it is not

essential that the precise injury which was done should have been

designed. One who hurls a missile into a crowd may have no

one in view as the object of injury, but he commits a battery

upon the person struck.’ So if two persons ﬁght, and uninten-

tionally one strikes a third, this is a battery of the latter, and is

not excused as mere accident, for the purpose was to strike an

unlawful blow to the injury of some one.‘

dient in an assault. Thus it ·has been said in Massachusetts:
"If one should hand an explosive substance to another, and
induce him to take it by misrepresenting or concealing its dangerous qualities, and the other, ignorant of its character, should
receive it and cause it to explode in his pocket or hand, and
should be injured by it, the offending party would be guilty of
a battery, and that would necessarily include an assault; although
he might not be guilty even of an assault if the substance failed
to explode, or failed to cause any injury. It would be the same
if it exploded in his mouth or stomach. If that which causes
the injury is set in motion by the wrongful act of the defendant,
it cannot be material whether it acts upon the person injured
externally or internally, by mechanical or chemical force.'' '
This was said in a case in which a party was prosecuted as for a
criminal &Stoault and battery for delivering to another something
to be eaten, in which a deleterious drug was concealed, intending
that the latter should eat it and be aficcted by it, as actually took
place. The deceit by means of which the person was induced to
take the drug was, it was said, a fraud upon the will, equivalent
to force in overpowering it.'

8 C. & P. 660, and disproving Regina

'0. Hanson, 2 C. & K. 912. If one has

'W1=:LLs, J.. in Commonwealth 0.

Stratton, 114 Mass. 303; S. C. 19 Am.

Rep. 350.

' Citing Commonwealth o. Burke,

105 Mass. 3'76; S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 531;

Commonwealth 0. Stratton, 114 Mass.

303; S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 350; Regina

0. Loch, 12 Cox C. C. 244; Regina 0.

Sinclair, 13 Id. 28 Regina '0. Button,

a right to enter into the possession of

lands, deception to obtain a peaceable

entry does not make it wrongful.

Stearus 0. Sampson, 59 Me. 568.

Intent. In batteries there must always be an intent, express
or implied, to do the injury; and therefore an accidental hurt, in
which the actor was blameless, is no battery. But it is not
essential that the precise injury which was done should have beeu
designed. One who hurls 11. missile into a crowd may have no
oue in view as the object of injm·y, but he commits a battery
upon the person struck.' So if two persons fight, and unintentionally one strikes a third, this is a battery of the latter, and is
not excused as mere accident, for the purpose was to strike an
unlawful blow to the injury of some one.'

‘ Scott 0. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892.

‘ James v. Campbell, 5 C. & P. 872.

• WELLS, J., in Commonwealth "·
Stratton, 114 Mass. 803; B. C. 19 Am.
Rep. 350.
1 Citing Commonwealth "· Burke,
105 Mass. 876; B. C. 7 Am. Rep. 531;
Commonwealth "· Stratton, 114 Mass.
803; B. C. 19 Am. Rep. 800; Regina
"· Loch, 12 Cox C. C. 244; Regina "·
Sinclair, 18 Id. 28 Regina"· Hutton,

8 C. & P. 660, and disproving Regina
"· Hanson, 2 C. & K. 912. If one ba~
a right to enter into the possession of
lands, deception to obtain a peaceable
entry does not make it wrongful.
Stearns e. Sampson, 59 Me. 668.
• Scott"· Shepherd, 2 W. HI. 892.
'James"· Campbell, 50. & P. 872.
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there may sometimes be lawful justiﬁcation. Thus, the right of

one person to complete immunity may be waived by such

unlawful action on his part as renders necessary, or at least

excusable, the employment of force to resist him. An instance

is where one attempts a battery of another, in which case the

latter is not obliged to submit until an officer can be found or a

suit commenced; but he may oppose violence to violence, and the

limit to his privilege to do so is only this: that he must not

employ a degree of force not called for in self-defense; he must

not inﬂict serious injuries unnecessarily in repelling slight inju-

ries; nor take life unless life or limb is in danger, nor even then

if, by retreating, he can safely avoid such extremity.‘ When he

exceeds the limits of necessary protection, and employs excessive

force, he becomes a trespasser himself, and his assailant may

recover damages from him for repelling the assault with a vio-

lence not called for.’ l n such a case each party may have an

action against the other: the one for the original assault, and the

other for the assault which commences with the employment of

excessive force.’ But in New York it has been held that the

latter alone can have a remedy in such a case; a conclusion that
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seems to attach more importance to the apparent anomaly ot

giving to each party a remedy on the same state of facts than to

substantial justice, or to the principles which underlie legal

remedies.‘

‘As to the obligation of one vio- 'Cockcroﬂ 0. Smith, Salk. 642;

lently assaulted to retreat, see Haynes

0. State, 1'7 Geo. 465; Tweedy 0. State, 5

Iowa, -133; State -v. Dixon, 75 N. C. 2'75;

People iv. Harper, Edm. Scl. Gas. 180.

As to the limit of violence in self-

defense, the following are recent cases:

State 0. Kennedy, 20 Iowa, 569; State

0. Bhippey, 10 Minn. 228; Erwin 0-

State, 29 Ohio (R. s.), 186; Murray 0.

Commonwealth, '79 Penn. St. 811;

Roach 1:. People, '17 Ill. 25; Holloway

Battery in Belt- protection. In any case of forcible assaults
on the person, as in other cases of actions seemingly unlawful,
there may sometimes be lawful justification. Thus, the right of
one person to complete immunity may be waived by such
unlawful action on his part as renders necessary, or at least
excusable, the employment of for·ce to resist him. An instance
is where one attempts a battery of another, in which case the
latter is not obliged to submit until an officer can be found or a
suit commenced; hut he may oppose violence to violence, and the
limit to his privilege to uo so is only this: that he must not
employ a degree of force not called for in self-det(mse; he must
not inflict serious injuries nnnece::'sarily in repelling slight injuries; nor take lite unl(1ss life or limb is in danger, nor even then
if, by retreating, he can safely avoid such extremity.• When he
exceeds the limits of necessary protection, and employs excessive
force, he becomes a trespasser hirmelf, and his assailant may
recover damages from him for repelling the assault with a violence not called for. • 1n such a ca.so each party may have an
action against the other: the one for the original assault, and thl'
other for the assault which oommenees with the employment of
excessive force.• But in New York it has been held that the
latter alone can have a remedy in such a case; a conclusion that
seems to attach more importance to the apparent anomaly of
giving to each party a remedy on the same state of facts than to
substantial justice, or to the principles which underlie legal
remedies.'

0. Commonwealth, 11 Bush, 344; Lewis

0. State, 61 Ala. 1; Eiland o. State, 62

Ala. 322; Irwin 0. State, 43 Tex. 236;

McPherson 0. State, 29 Ark. 225.

State 0. Wood, 1 Bay, 351; Elliott s.

Brown, 2 Wend. 497; Curtis o. Car-

son, 2 N. H. 539; Dole 0. Erskine, 35

N. H. 503; Philbrick v. Foster, 4 Ind.

442; Bartlett 0. Churchill, 2-1Vt. 218;

Brown 0. Gordon, 1 Gray, 182. See

Ogden 0. Claycomb, 52 Ill. 365; Rid-

dle 0. State, 49 Ala. 389. An unlawful

arrest may be resisted like any other

unlawful assault Williams v. State,

44 Ala. 41, and authorities cited.

‘ Dole o. Erskine, 85 N. H. 503, 610.

And, see, Gizler 0. Witzel, 82 Ill.

822; Ogden 0. Claycomb, 52 Ill. 365.

‘ Elliott o. Brown, 2 Wend, 497. In

1 Aa to the obligation of one violently RSsaulted to retreat, see Haynes
"· State, 17 Geo. 461); Tweedy"· State, tS
Iowa, 483; State"· Dixon, 75 N. C. 275;
People "· Harper, Edm. Sci. Cas. 180.
A.a to the limit of violence in selfdefense, the following are recent cnses:
State fl. Kennedy, 20 Iowa, 569; State
fl. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223; Erwin flo
State, 29 Ohio (N. e.), 186; Murray tJ.
Commonwealth, 79 Penn. St. 811;
Roach fl. People, 77 Dl. 25; Holloway
"·Commonwealth, 11 Busb,344; Lewis
"· State, In Ala. 1; Eiland fl. Btnte, 52
Ala. 322 ; Irwin fl. State, 43 Tex. 236 ;
:HcPbenon "· State, 29 Ark. 223.

1 Cockcroft tJ. Smith, Balk. 642;
State"· Wood, 1 Bay, 851; Elliott 11.
Brown, 2 Wend. 497; Curtis "· Carson, 2 N.H. tS39; Dole fl. Erskine, 86
N.H. 503; Philbrick"· Foster,4 Ind.
442; Bartlett fl. Churchill, 24 Vt. 218;
Brown fl. G!'rdon, 1 Gray, 182. St·e
Ogden "· Claycomb, 52 Ill. 865; Rid.
die 11. State, 49 Ala. :l89. An unlawful
arrest may be resi!lted like any other
unlawful assaulL Williams 11. Stat<•,
44 Ala. 41, and authorities cited.
' Dole fl. Erskine, 35 N. H. 503, tSlO.
And, see, Gizler "· Witzel, 82 111.
822; Ogden "· ClaJcomb, 52 Ill. SM.
' Elliott 11. Brown, 2 Wend, 497. In
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There can be no higher justiﬁcation for the employment of

force than that which a woman may make in defense of her

chastity; and, if necessary, it may extend to the taking of life.

But the necessity should be apparent on the facts as they then

Dole v. Erskine, 35 N. H. 503, 510,

There can be no higher justification for the employment uf
force than that which a woman may make in defense of her
chastity; and, if necessary, it may extend to the taking of life.
But the necessity should be apparent on the facts as they then

Easrnxn, J., questions the doctrine

of this case in the following lan-

guage: "Up to the time that the ex-

cess is used, the party assaulted is in

the right. Until he exceeds the

bounds of self-defense he has com-

mitted no breach of the peace, and

has done no act for which he is lia

ble; while his assailant, up to that

time, is in the wrong, and is liable

for his illegal acts. Now, can this

cause of action which the assailed

party has for the injury inﬂicted upon

him, and which may have been se-
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vere, be lost by acts of violence sub-

sequently committed by himself?

Can the assault and battery, which

the assailant himself has committed,

be merged in or set olf against the

excessive force used by the assailed

party? Unless this be so, and the

party ﬁrst commencing the assault

and inﬂicting the blows, and thus

giving to the other side a cause of

action, can have the wrong thus done

and the cause of action thus given

wiped out by the excessive castiga-

-tion he receives from the other party,

theh each party may maintain a sep-

arate action: the one that is assailed

for the assault and battery ﬁrst com-

mitted upon him, and the assailant

for the exc -ss of force used upon him

beyond what was necessary for self-

defense.

“We think that these are not mat-

ters of set-oif; that the one cannot be

merged into the other, and that each

party has been guilty of a wrong for

which he has made himself liable to

the other. There have, in effect, been

two trespasses committed: the one by

the assailant in commencing the as-

sault, and the other by the assailed

party in using the excessive force.

And, upon principle, we do not see

why the one can be an answer to the

other, any more than an assault com-

mitted by one party on one day can

be set oﬂE' against one committed by

the other party on another day. The

only dillbrence would seem to consist

in the length of time that had elapsed

between the two trespasses. In a case

where excessive force is used, the

party using it is innocent up to the

the time that he exceeds the bounds

of self-defense. When he uses the

excessive force, he then. for the ﬁrst

time, becomes a trespasser. And

wherein consists the ditference, ex-

Dole "· Erskine, 35 N. H. 503, 510,
J., questions the doctrine
of this case in the following lan.
guage: "Up to the time that the ex.
cess is used, the party aRsaulted is in
the right. Until he exceeds the·
bounds of self-defense he has com.
mitted no breach of the peace, and
has done no act for which he is liable; while his assaihmt, up to that
time, is in the wrong, and is liable
for his illegal acts. Now, can this
cause of action which the assailed
party has for the injury inflicted upon
bim, and which may have been severe, be lost by acts of violence subsequently committed by himself 1
Can the assault and battery, which
the assailant himself has committed,
be merged in or set off against the
excessive force used by the assailed
party t Unless this be so, and the
party first commencing the assault
and innicting the blows, and thus
giving to the other side a cause of
action, can have the wrong thus done
and the cause of action thus given
wiped out by the excessive castiga.
•tion he receives from the other party,
then each party may maintain a separate action: the one that is assailed
for the assault und battery first com.
mitted upon him, and tile assailant
for the t•xc '"s of force used upon him
beyond what was necesstlry for self.
defense.
"We think that these are not mat.
ters of set-off; that the one cannot be
mergt:d into the other, and that each
party has been guilty of a wrong for
which be has made himself liable to
the other. There have, in effect, been
two trespasses committed: the one by
the assailant in commencing the asEABTl4AN,

sault, and the other by the assailed
party in using the excessive force.
And, upon principle, we do not see
why the one can be an answer to the
other, any more than an assault com.
mitted by one party on one day can
be set off against one committ\ld by
the other party on another day. The
only difi'crence would seem to consist
in the length of time that had elapsed
between the two trespasses. In a case
where excessive force is used, the
party using it is innocent up to the
the time that he exceeds the bounds
of self-defense. When he uses the
excessive force; he then, for the first
time, becomes a trespasser. And
wherein consists the difference, except it be that of time, between a
trespass committed by him then and
one committed by him on the person
the day after ?
"In Elliot 12. Brown, it is conceded
that both parties may be indicted and
both be criminally punished, not.
withstanding it was there held that a
civil action can be maintained only
against him who has been guilty of
the excess. If this be so, nnd each
party can be criminally punished,
then each must have been guilty of
an assault and battery upon the other;
and if thus guilty, why should not a
civil action be maintained by ellch?
It would seem tilat tile fact that both
arc indictable shows that each is in
the wrong as to the other, and that
each has a cause of action agai~st
the other, and that such caus<; of
action may be successfully prosecuted, unless one is to be set oft'
a~ainst the other. That torts are not
the subjects of set.off is entirely
clear.
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presented themselves to her mind.‘ And what the woman may

do for herself she may doubtless call in the aid of others to assist

her in.

As words never constitute an assault, neither will they justify

the employment of force in protection against them, however

gross or abusive they may be.’ There are probably exceptions

to this general statement in the ease of words grossly insulting

to females; at least one would be excused where grossly vulgar

and insulting language was employed in the presence of his

family, if he were promptly to put a stop to it by force.

Defense of Family. Such force as one may employ in his

own defense he may also employ in defense of his wife, his child,

or ‘any member of his family.‘ But to revenge the wrongs of

himself or of his family is no part of his legal right, and when

the danger is repelled, ustiﬁcation for the further use of violence

presented themselves to her mind! And what the woman may
do for herself she may doubtless call in the aid of othet·s to assist
her in.
As words never co'nstitnte an assault, neither will they justify
the employment of force in protection against them, however
gross or abusive they may be.' There are probably exceptions
to this general statement in the case of words grossly insulting
to females; at least one would be excused where grossly vulgar
and insulting language wati employed in the presence of his
family, if he were promptly to put a stop to it by force.

is at an end.‘

Defense of Possessions. One may also justify an assault or

battery committed in defending his possession of property,

either personal or real, subject to the same restriction that he

must not employ excessive force.‘ He 1nay not only resist an
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“ We arrive, then, at the conclusion

that the causes of action existing in

such cases cannot he set oil‘. the one

against the other, nor merged, the one

Defense of Family. Such force as one may employ in his
own defcnf;C he may also employ in defen11e of his wife, his child,
or ·any mem her of his family.' But to re•enge the wrongs of
himself or of his family is no part of his legal right, and when
the danger is repelled, justification for the further use of violence
is at an end. 4

into the other, but that each party

may maintain an action for the injury

received: the assailed party for the

assault ﬁrst cmnmitted upon him, and

the assailant for the excess above

what was necessary for self-defense.

Defense of Possessions. One may also justify an assault or
battery committed in defending his possession of property,
either personal or real, subject to the same restriction that he
must not employ exct:ssive force.• He may not only resist an

“This rule, it appears to us, will

d0'morc justice to the‘ parties, and

more credit to the law, than the other,

for by it the party who commenced

the assault, and who has been the

moving cause of the diﬂieulty, is

made to answer in money, instead of

having his assault merged in the one

which he has provoked, and which

has been inflicted upon him by his

antagronist."

' See llawk. P. C. ch. 28 § 22. See,

also, Staten 0. State, 30 Miss. 619;

Briggs v State, 29 Geo. 728.

' Richardson v. Zuntz. 26 La. Ann.

818; State v. Martin,30 Wis. 216; Sor.

genfrei 0. Schradcr, 75 Ill. 897; Mur-

ray v. Boyne, 42 Mo. 472.

‘Patten e. People, 18 Mich. 814;

Commonwealth 0. Malone, 114 Mass.

295; Stoneman e. Commonwealth, 25

Grat. 887; Staten 1:. The State, 30 Miss.

619; State v. Johnson, 75 N. C. 17-L;

Tickt-ll 1;. Read, Loﬁ't. 215.

‘Cockcroft e. Smith, 11 Mod. 43;

Regina v. Driscoll, Car. & M. 21-L;

State v. Gibson, 10 Ired. 214; Barfoot

v. Reynolds. 2 Stra. 953; Regina v.

Driscoll, 1 C. & M. 214.

‘ Abt v. Burgheim, 80 Ill. 92; Ayrr-s

0. Birtch, 35 Mich. 501; Green 1:. God-

dard, 2 Salk. 641. The intentional

taking of life in resisting a trespass

can never be justiﬁed. 1 Russ. on

"We arrive, tben, at the conclusion
that the causes of action e:t1sting in
:<uch CR.'IC'S cannot he !'Pt off. the one
ap:ainst the other, nor mergC'd, the one
into U1e other, but that each party
may maintain an action for the injury
recci.,..ed: the &!'sailed party for the
115snult first committed upon him, and
the a..'ISAilllnt for tho exet•ss above
what was nec<'~~nry for self-defense.
"This rule, it appears to us, will
do· more j ustiee to the" parties, and
more crC'dit to the lnw, than the other,
for by it the party who commenced
the a..o;;sault, aml who lULl:! been the
IUU\'ill!r CI\USC of the difficulty, is
made to answer in money, instcnd of
having his assault mergt•tl in the one
w!Jicb he has provoked, and which
has been inliictctl upon him by his
antal!on Ist."
1 t:iec Hawk. P. C. ch. 28 § 22. See,

also, Staten "· State, SO AI iss. 610;
Brig;;s c Stnte, 29 Gco. 723.
1 Hichar,lson tt. Zuntz. 26 La. Ann.
818; Htnte !1. ~lnrtin, 30 Wis. 21fl; Sor.
genfrel "· Schrader, 7/i Ill. 897; 1\lur.
ray"· Boyne, 42 )lo. 472.
1 Patten "· People, 18 Mich. 814;
Commonwealth "· Malone, 114 )[a....s.
295; Stoneman "· Commonwealth, 25
Grat. 887; Statt·n e. The State, 30 lliss.
619; :Stale e. Johnson, 75 N. C. 174;
Tiekt'll "· Read, Lofft 2l:i.
4 Cockcroft "· Smith, 11 Mod. 4-'l;
RC'Jdna "· D1·iscoll, Car. & ~1. 214;
Stater. Gii.Json, 10 Ired. 214: Barfoot
"· Hcynolds. 2 :Stra. 9;)3; Rq;iun r .
Driscoll, 1 C. & )l, 214.
• Abt "· Burghcim, 80 Ill. 92; AyrPi
"· Birtch, 3.') llich. GOI; Green "· Gl>(l.
dard, 2 Salk. 641. The intentional
taking of life in t't'si~ting a trcspu"'"'
can never be justified. 1 Rnss. on
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aggression upon his property, but if his possession is actually
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invaded, he may employ force to remove the intruder, if the

latter fail to go on request. In the language of the law, his

defense will be, that he laid his hands gently on the trespasser

and removed him by the employment of so much force as was

necessary, and no more.‘ But although one is permitted to

defend a right by force, it docs not follow that he is at liberty to

recover by force a right which is denied; the latter can only be

justiﬁed in extreme cases, such as would justify force in pre-

venting crime or in arresting offenders.’

Spring Guns. Spring guns are sometimes set on private

grounds as a defense against trespassers. The setting of these

instruments is not of itself an unlawful act;' but if a trespasser

is killed or seriously injured by one, the only defense the person

setting it can make is that the injury was inﬂicted in defense of

his freehold. But the force that causes homicide or dangerous

aggression upon his property, but if bis pPS~ession is actually
invaded, be may employ force to remove the intruder, if the
latter fail to go on request. In the language of the law, his
defense will be, that he laid his hands gently on the trespasser
and removed him by the employment of so much force as was
necessary, and no more. 1 But although one is permitted to
defend a right by force, it does not follow that he is at liberty to
recover by torcc a right which is denied; the latter can only be
justified in extreme cases, such as would justify force in preventing crime or in arresting offenders.'

injury is clearly excessive, and, therefore, not justiﬁable.‘ A

killing to repel a mere trespass to property is never justiﬁable,‘

though one may resist to any extent the forcible taking from

Crimes, 220; 4th ed. 1027. The owner

of land isjustiﬁable in beating a tres-

passer only when the battery is neces-
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sary to the defense of his property.

Stachlin 0. Dcstrehan, 2 La. Ann 1019.

He may remove a trespasser from his

premises, using no more force than

may be ncedful for that purpose.

McCarty 0. Fremont, 23 Cal. 196;

Woodnian 0. Howell, 45 Ill. B67;

Beecher 1:. Parm ele, 9 Vt. 352; People

Spring Guns.

Spring guns are sometimes set on private
grounds as a defense against trespassers. The setting of these
inatruments is not of it~elt' an unlawful act; • but if a trespasser
is killed or seriously injured by one, the only defense the person
setting it can make is that the injury was inflicted in defense of
his freehold. Bnt the force that causes homicide or dangerous
injury is clearly exces~ive, and, therefore, not justifiable.' A
killing to repel a mere trespass to property is never justifiable,'
though one may resist to any extent the forcible taking from

o. Payne, 8 Cal. 341; People 0. Batch-

elder, 2'7 Cal. 69.

A man assaulted in his dwelling is

not obliged to retreat, but may defend

his possession to the last extremity.

Pond 1:. People, 8 Mich. 150; Pitford

'0. Armstrong, Wright (Ohio), 94. He

may kill a burglar breaking in.

McPherson v. State, 22 Geo. 478. See,

further, Thompson 0. State, 55 Geo.

4'7; Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 243;

Wall 0. State, 51 Ind. 453; State 0.

Stockton, 61 Mo. 382; State 0. Abbott,

8 W. Va. 741; State o. Burwell, 68 N.

C. 661.

1 Harrison 1;. Harrison, 43 Vt. 417.

' It is no defense to an action for

an assault and battery that the de-

fendant had an irrevocable license to

enter upon plaintiti"s land to remove

personal property, and that in the at

tempt to exercise it the plaintiff with-

stood him. Chureliill u. Hulbert, 110

Muss. 42; S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 578.

Citing Sampson 0. Henry, 13 Pick.

386; Commonwealth v. Haley, 4Allen,

318.

' State 0. Moore, 31 Conn. 479.

‘ Bird '0. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628;

Gray o. Combs, 7 J. J. Marsh. 478;

Hooker o. Miller, 37 Iowa, 613; S. C.

18 Am. Rep. 18; Aldrich 0. Wright,

53 N. H. 398, 404; S. C. 16 Am. Rep.

339.

5 State 0. Vance, 17 Iowa, 138. Sec

Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wcnd. 496.

Crimea, 220; 4th ed. 1027. The owner
of 1&.¢ is Justifiable in beating a tree.
p8SSer only when the battery is necessary to the defense of his property.
Stach lint~. Destrehan, 2 La. Ann 1019.
He may remove a tresp888er from his
premises, using no more force than
may be needful for that purpose.
McC-'srty "· Fremont, 28 Cal. 196;
Woodman t~. Howell, 4lS Ill. 867;
Beecher t~. Parmele, 9 Vt. 852; People
"· Payne, 8 Cal. 841; People "· Batchelder, 2'l Cal. 69.
A man assaulted ln his dwelling Is
not obliged to retreat, but may defend
his possession to the last extremity.
Pond t~. People, 8 Mich. 150; Pitford
t~. Armstrong, Wright (Ohio), 94. He
may kill a burglar breaking in.
McPherson o. State, 22 Geo. 478. Bee,
further, Thompson "· State, 55 Geo.
47; Palmore "· State, 29 Ark. 248;
Wall t~. State, lU Ind. 453; State "·
Stockton, 611tlo. 882; State "·Abbott,

8 W. Va. '741; State"· Burwell, 68 N.
c. 661.
1 Harrison"· Harrison, 43 Vt. 41'7.
t It is no defense to an action for
an as~>ault and battery that the defendant had an irrevocable license to
enter upon plaintiff's land to remove
personal property, and that in the at.
tempt to exercise it the plaintiff withstood him. Churchill"· Hulbert,110
Mass. 42; B. C. 14 Am. Rep. 578.
Citing Sampson "· Henry, 18 Pick.
886; Commonwealth"· Haley, 4Allen,
818.
• State "· Moore, 81 Conn. 479.
• Bird "· Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628;
Gray "· Combs, 7 J. J. Marsh. 478;
Hooker t~. Miller, 87 Iowa, 618; B. C.
18 Am. Rep. 18; Aldrich 11. Wright,
53 N.H. 898, 404; B. C.16 Am. Rep.
889.
1 State"· Vance, 17 Iowa, 188. Bee
Loomis o. Terry, 17 Wend. 496.
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himself, without authority of law, of that which is his own, and

any criminal assault upon person or premises.

Ferocious Dogs. The use of ferocious animals in defense of

himself, without authority of law, of that which is his own, and
any crimin11.l assault upon per&on or premises.

property, like the use of spring guns, may, under some circum-

stances, be the employment of unlawful force. Much would

depend upon the circumstances, the character of the animal and

the probability of his doing extreme injury.‘

VVhat has been said of spring guns and ferocious dogs will

apply to any dangerous means employed against trespassers, and

by which one might be seriously injured without previous

warning.

Excessive Force a Question of Fact. The question whether

the force employed in defense of person, family, or property, is

excessive, must generally be one of fact. Some cases are so clear

that the judge would be warranted in saying that as matter

of law the force was or was not excessive; but they are not

Ferocious Dogs. The use of ferocious animals in defense of
property, like the m;e of spring gnns, may, under some circumstances, be the employment of unlawful force. Much would
depend upon the circumstances, the character of the animal and
the probability of his doing extreme injury.'
"\\""hat has been said of spring guns and ferocious dogs will
apply to any dangerous means employed against trespassers, and
by which one might be seriously injured without pre,·ions
warning.

numerous.’

FA LQE IMPRISONMENT.

The Nature of the Wrong. False imprisonment is a wrong
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akin to the wrongs of assault and battery, and consists in imposing,

by force or threats, of an unlawful restraint upon a man’s free-

dom of locomotion.’ P1-ima facie any restraint put by fear or

iorce upon the actions of another is unlawful and constitutes a

false imprisonment, unless a showing of justiﬁcatiou makes it a

‘ This subject will be referred to in

Excessive Force a Question of Faot. The question whether
the force employed in det(mse of person, family, or property, is
excessive, must generally be one of fact. Some cases are so clear
that the judge woulrl be warranted in saying that as matter
of law the force was or was not ex<:essive; but they are not
numerous.'

the chapter which considers the re-

sponsibility of owners of property for

FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

injuries done or occasioned by it.

' Commonwealth o. Bush, 112 Mass.

280; Edwards 0. Leavitt, 46 Vt. 126;

Commonwealth 0. Mann, 116 Mass.

58; Hanson 1:. European, etc., R. R.

Co., 62 Me. 84; S. C. 16 Am. Rep.

404; Currier o. Swan, 63 Me. 323. An

unintentional injury inﬂicted in self-

defense and without negligence, is no

The Nature of the Wrong. False imprisonment is a wrong
akin to the wrongs of assault and battery, and consists in imposing,
by force or threats, of an unlawful restraint upon a man's freedom of locomotion.' P1·i1na .facie any restraint put by fear or
force upon the actions of another is unlawful and constitutes a
false imprisonment, unless a showing of justification makes it a

assault. Morris e. Platt, 32 Conn. 75;

Paxton 1:. Boyer, 67 Ill. 132; S. C. 16

Am. Rep. 615. Where B. seized A. by

the arm and swung him violently

around two or three times, then let-

ting him go, and as a result of this

force he came violently againt C..

who, in instantly pushing him away,

pushed him against a hook, whereby

he was injured, it was held that B.,

not C., was responsible in trespass for

this injury. Ricker v. Freeman, 50

N. H. 420; S. C. 9 Am. Rep. 267. This

decision follows the celebrated squib

case of Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl.

892, referred to, ante, p. 71.

' Pa-rrnnson, J ., in Bird o. Jones, '7

Q. B. 742, 752; Crowell 0. Gleason, 10

Me. 325.

1 This subject will be referred to in
the chapter which considers the re.
sponsi bility of owners of property for
injuries done or occasioned by it.
'Commonwealth"· Bush, 112 Mass.
280; Edwards "· Leuvitt, 46 Vt. 126;
Commonwealth tJ. 1\lann, 116 :Mass.
58; Hanson "· European, etc., R R.
Co., 62 }[e. 84; 8. C. 16 Am. Rep.
404; Currier "· Swan, 63 lie. 323. An
unintentional injury inflicted in self.
defense and without ncgli~cncc, is no
assault. Morl'is ~. P!Rtt,1:12 Conn. 75:
Paxton ,, Boyer, 67 Ill. 1:32: 8. C. 16
Am. Rep. 615. Where B. seized A. by
the arm and swung hlm violently

around two or three times, then let.
ting him go, and as a result of thia
force he came violently againt C.,
who, in instantly pushing him away,
pushed him agRinst a hook, whereby
he wus injured, it was held that B.,
not C., waa responsible in trespass for
this injury. Ricker ,, Freemnn, ;)()
N. H.-420; 8. C.9Am. Rep. 267. This
decision follows the celebrated squib
caac of Scott "· Shepherd, 2 W. Bl.
892, refened to, ante, p. 71.
1 PATTERBON, J., ia Bird"· Jones, 7
Q. B. 742, 752; Crowell"· Gleason, 10

Me. 825.
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true or legal imprisonment. Therefore, if an ofﬁcer, without

process or with void process, notiﬁes a person that he arrests
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him, and the person so notiﬁed submits and accompanies him,

this is an imprisonment. “ It is the fact of compulsory submis-

sion which brings a person into imprisonment; and impending

and threatened physical violence, which to all appearance can

only be avoided by submission, operates as effectually if sub-

mitted to as if the arrest had been forcibly accomplished without

such submission. There are cases in which a party who does

not submit cannot be regarded as arrested until his person is

touched; but when he does submit no such necessity exists.“

“If the party is under restraint, and the oflicer manifests an

intention to make a caption, it is not necessary there should be

actual contact.” ’ Just as little will constitute imprisonment by

others than ofﬁcers. To tell one on a f'erry that he shall not leave

it until a certain demand is paid, is an imprisonment if one sub-

mits through fear, though the person is not touched and no

actual violence offered.’ But it is no imprisonment to turn one

from the way he desires to go, if he is not otherwise restrained,

and is at liberty to go back or t.o go elsewhere than in the direc-

tion he was started in. It is a wrong which may be redressed in

an action on the case, but it is not an imprisonment.‘
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Restraints in certain Relations. The justiﬁcation of impris-

onment may be either under process or without process. In

certain relations a degree of restraint is permitted by the law,

for which no writ or legal process of any sort is usually required.

The following are the cases referred to: The parent in respect to

the child, the guardian in respect to the ward, the master in

respect to his apprentice, the teacher in respect to his pupil, and

the bail in respect to his principal. The latter it is usual to regulate

by statute, and one of the regulations is, that arrest and impris-

onment shall not take place without the exhibition of proper

papers showing the relation and the rights under it. The others

true or legal imprisonment. Therefore, if an officer, without
process or with void pro<.-ess, notifies a person that he arrests
him, and the pe1·son so notified submits and accompanies him,
this is an imprisonment. "It is the fact of compulsory submission which brings a pe1·son into imprisonment; and impending
and threatened physical violence, which to all appearance can
only be avoided by submission, operates as effectually if submitted to as if the arrest had been forcibly accomplished without
such submission. There are cases in which a party who does
not submit cannot Le regarded as arr&;ted until his person is
touched; but when he does submit no such nooeosity exists.'''
"If the party is under restraint, and the officer manifests an
intention to make a caption, it is not necessary there should be
actual contact." 2 Just as little will constitute imprisonment by
others than officers. To tell one on a ferry that he shall not leave
it until a certa.in demand is paid, is an imprisonment if one submits through fear, though the person is not touched and no
actual violence offered.' But it is no imprisonment to turn one
from the way he desires to go, if he is not otherwise restrained,
and is at liberty to go back or to go elsewhere than in the direction he was started in. It is a wrong which may be redressed in
an action on the case, but it is not an imprisonment!

are cases resting upon principles which are so familiar that little

’ CAMPBELL, J .. in Brushaber o. o. Jones, 7 Q. B 742; Warner 0. Rid-

Stegemann, 22 Mich. 266. 269. And, diford, 4 C. B. (N. s.) 180.

see, Pike v. Hanson, 9 N. H. 491. 3 Smith v. State, 7 Humph. 43, 45.

' VAUGHAN, J., in Graingcr o. Hill, ‘ Bird 0. Jones, 7 Q. B. 742.

4 Bing. (N. C.) 212, 222. And, see, Bird

Restraints in certain Relations. The jut~tification of imprisonment may be either under process or without process. In
certain relations a degree of restraint is permitted by the law,
for which no writ or legal proeess of any sort is usually required.
The following are the cases referred to: The parent in respect to
the child, the guardian in respect to the ward, the master in
respect to his apprentice, the teacher in l'CS}Ject to his pupil, and
the bail in resl'ect to his principa.l. The latter it is usual to regulate
by statute, and one of the regulations is, that arrest and imprisonment shall not take place without the exhibition of proper
papers showing the relation and the rights under it. The others
are cases resting upon principles which are so tamiliar that little
1 CAMPBELL, J., in Brushaber 11.
Stegemann, 22 Mich. 266. 269. And,
see, Pike v. Hanson, 9 N. H. 491.
t VAUGHAN, J., in Grainger 11. Hill,
4 Bing. (N. <..:.) 212, 222. And, see, Bird

"·Jones, 7 Q. B 742; Warner 11. Rid.
diford, 4 C. B. (N. s.) 180.
3 Smith tl. State, 7 Humph. 43, 45.
• Bird 11. Jones, 7 Q. B. 742.
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need be said concerning them here. Restraints are admissible

171

within such limits as the parent, guardian, teacher, or master, in

the exercise of a sound discretion, may decide to be necessary.

To a certain extent a judicial power is vested in him which

others are not at liberty to interfere with, except in a case of

manifest abuse. To take by itself the case of the parent, though

the old ideas regarding the need of severity and strict discipline

have to a large extent passed away, the father may still not only

restrain the liberty of his infant child, but he may, as reason

shall seem to him to require, inﬂict corporal punishment for

misbehavior. The limit to his authority is that uncertain limit

that the correction must be moderate, and dictated by reason and

not by passion.‘ If he plainly exceeds all bounds, he is liable to

criminal prosecution, but it seems never to have been held that

the child might maintain a personal action for his injury. In

principle there seems to be no reason why such an action should

not be sustained; but the policy of permitting actions that thus

invite the child to contest the parent's authority is so questiona-

ble, that we may well doubt if the right will ever be sanctioned.

A guardian of the person of his ward has a right of personal

restraint corresponding to that of the parent, but without, in
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general, the power of ehastisement. That power would probably

be possessed in extreme youth if the ward were received into

the family of the guardian, who thus was placed, in respect to

him, in loco parentis.

The relation of master and apprentice is formed under stat-

utes, and these give the master the authority he possesses. A

power of restraint to a limited extent, to compel performance of

duties under the articles, he probably possesses, but it is not

clear that this is true generally. By the English law the master

possessed the authority of moderate personal chastisement when

his judgment advised it.’ -

The teacher to whom a child is committed by his parents or

guardian has also the right of restraint, and even of punish-

ment, to compel obedience to lawful orders. Like the parent's,

the authority must be exercised with moderation, and while all

1 Johnson v. State, 2 Humph. 283; contract for service is not liable to

\Vinterburn 1:. Brooks, 2 C. & K. 16. punishment by the master. Schouler

' See Penn 0. Ward, 2 C. M. & R. Dom. Rel. 616; Mathews 0. Terry, 10

888. One employed for another under Conn. 455.

I, I

O

need be said concerning them here. Restraints are admissible
within such limits as the parent, guardian, teacher, or master, in
the exercise of a sound discretion, may decide to be necessary.
To a certain extent a judicial power is vested in him which
others are not at liberty to interfere with, except in a case of
manifest ahuse. To tnke by itself the case of the parent, though
the old ideas regarding the need of severity and strict discipline
have to a large extent passed away, the fatiler may still not only
:restrain the liberty of his infant child, but he may, as reason
shall seem to him to require, inflict corporal punishment fur
misbehavior. The limit to his authority is that uu<..-ertain limit
that the correction must be moderate, and dictated by reason and
not by 1)assion. • If l1e plainly exceeds all bounds, he is liable t<>
criminal prosecution, but it seems never to have been held that
the child might maintain a personal action for his injury. ln
principle there seems to be no reason why such an action should
not be sustained; but the policy of permittiug actions that thua
invite the child to contest the pareufs authority is so queationable, that we may well doubt if the right will ever be sanctioned.
A guardian of the. person of his ward has a right of personal
restraint corresponding to that of the parent, but without, in
general, the power of cha~tisement. That power would probably
be possessed in extreme youth if the ward were recei\·ed into
the family of the guardian, who thus was pla<.'ed, in respect to
him, in loco parent~.
The relation of master and apprentice is formed under statutes, and these give the master the authority he possesses. A
power of restraint to a limited extent, to compel performance of
duties under the articles, he probably possesses, bnt it is not
clear that this is true generally. By the English law the maRter
possessed the authority of moderate personal chastisement when
his judgment advised it.'
The teacher to whom a child is committed by his parents or
guardian has also the right of restraint, and even of punishment, to compel obedience to lawful orders. J..ike the parent"~,
the authority must be exercised with moderation, and while all
I Johnson ,, State, 2 Humph. 283;
W'interburn ,. Brooks, 2 C. & K. 1().
1 Bee Penn ,. Ward. 2 C. M. & It
838. One employed for another under

"·

contract for s<>rvicc is not liable to
punishment by the mastPr. Schouler
Dom. Rcl. 616; M~~othew:; ,. Terry, 10
Vonn. 455.
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presumptions favor the correctness of his action,‘ yet, in a clear
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case of abuse of authority, he may be held liable as for a criminal

assault, and also in a civil suit for damages.’

The authority of the bail in respect to his principal, for whose

conduct he has become responsible, is to arrest and surrender

him in exoneration of his liability. It is a limited authority

and must be exercised without needless violence or annoyance.’

Circumstances may place one in authority over another, when

restraint would not only become excusable, but a duty. Thus,

the safety of a ship, its passengers and crew, might depend upon

the strict subordination of all persons on board; and all persons

must then, of necessity, submit themselves to the proper orders of

the master.‘

Requisites of Legal Process. Excepting the cases already

named, and a few more which will be referred to further on, who-

ever would ustify an arrest must have legal process duly emanat-

ing from some judicial authority. This process must be pleaded,

and it must have certain requisites, in orderto render it available

as a defense. Speaking generally, these requisites are the fol-

lowing: It must have been issued by a court or ofﬁcer having

presumptions favor the correctness of his action,' yet, in a clear
case of abuse of authority, he may be held liable as for a criminal
assault, and also in a civil suit for damages.'
The authority of the bail in respect to his principal, for whose
condnct he has become responsible, is to arrest and surrender
him in exoneration of his liability. It is a limited authority
and must be exercised without needless violence or annoyance.•
Circumstances may place one in authority over another, when
restraint would not only become excusable, but a duty. Thus,
the safety of' a ship, its passengers and crew, might depend upon
the strict sub,,rdination of all persons on board; and all persons
must then, of necessity, submit themselves to the proper orders of
the master.•

authority of law to issue such process, and there must be nothing

on the face of the process apprising the oﬂirxar tolwhorn it is
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delivered for service, that in the particular case there was no

authority for issuing it. When the process will bear this test,

the oﬂicer is protected in obeying its command.

As the rules of protection by process are the same, whether

unlawful restraint upon the person is in question, or unlawful

intermeddling with goods, it will be convenient to postpone a

particular consideration of them until trespasses to property are

discussed. In this place only a few very general rules will be

mentioned.

LL» .,.

61-5 g;n>....

‘Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind 290;

State v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & Bat.

365; Commonwealth 0. Randall, 4

Gray, 36; Hathaway ~v. Rice, 19 Vt. 102.

" Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray,

36; Lander 1:. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114. It

has been held that if the child’s

parent gives him directions what to

do, the teacher has no right to punish

FD:-l~

F

- rm.

the child for obeying them. Morrow

Requisites of Legal Process.

Excepting the cases already
named, and a few more which will be referred to further on, whoever would justify an arrest must have legal process duly emanating from some judicial authority. This process must be pleaded,
and it must have certain requisites, in order to render it available
' as a defense. Speaking generally, these requisites are the following: It mnst have been issued by a court or officer having
authority of law to issue such process, and there must be nothing
on the face of the process apprising the officer to' whom it is
delivered for service, that in the particular case there was no
authority for issuing it. When the process will bear this test,
the officer is protected in obeying its command.
As the rules of protection by pro<..-ess are the same, whether
unlawful restraint upon the person is in question, or unlawful
intermeddling with goods, it will be convenient to postpone a
particular consideration of them until trespasses to property are
discussed. In this place only a few very general rules will be
mentioned.

v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59. If such direc-

tions interfered with school regula-

tions, expulsion would seem to be the

proper remedy. 1

5 See Cooley, Ooust. Lim. 341, and

note.

' Brown '0. Howard, 14 Johns. 119;

Flemming v. Ball, 1 Bay, 3.
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'Cooper tl. McJunkin, 4 Tnd 290;
State "· Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & Bat.
865; Commonwealth tl. Randall, 4
Gray, 86; Hathaway 'll. Rice, 19 Vt. 102.
• Commonwealth tl. Randall, 4 Gray,
86; Lander 'll. Seaver, 82 Vt. 114. It
has been held that if the child's
parent gives him directions what to
do, the teacher has no right to punish
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the child tor obeying them. Morrow
Wood, 85 Wis. 59. If such directions interfered with school regulations, expulsion would seem to be the
proper remedy. "f
' See Cooley, Const. Lim. 841, and
note.
'Brown tl. Howard, 14 Johns. 119;
Flemming tl. Ball, 1 Bay, 8.
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1. A writ may be absolutely void because it does not emanate
from the court or officer purporting to issue it. This may happen because it is forged, or because some unauthorized person has
assumed to fill ont and issue process in the name of a magistrate. It has been decided in New York, and also in Illinois,
that if a justice of the prnce, who, by law, has authority to issue
writs in person, shall deliver blanks to an officer, with leave to
fill them up at discretion, and then issue them, such permission
would be void, and the writs issued in pursuance of it nullities!
It should be said that in those States the justice is the clerk of
his court, as well as the judge of it.
2. A writ may be void becanse it proceeds from a court or
magistrate having, by law, no jurisdiction of the subject matter,
either generally, or to the extent to which it has been assumed.
Illustrations of this will be gi•en in another place. It is enough
to say now, that when this defect exists, it will generally appear
on the face of the proceeding, though the rule is by no means
universal.•
3. The writ may also be void because it emanates from an
inferior conrt or officer, whose jurisdiction is never presumed, but
must be shown, and is not shown on the face of the proceedings.
In such cases there may have been jurisdiction in fact, but
hecanse it is not shown, it is as if it did not exist. If, for
example, a magistrate ist:ues a warrant for committing one to
prison without reciting therein an accm;ation, a trial, and a conviction, he issues a proC'ess which is apparently unwarranted, and
the officer to whom it is delivered is bound to know that he would
not be protected in serving it.•

LI

“ 'vI"'n.

1. A writ may be absolutely void because it does not emanate

from the court or oﬁieer purporting to issue it. This may hap-

pen because it is forged, or because some unauthorized person has

assumed to ﬁll out and issue process in the name of a magis-

trate. It has been decided in New York, and also in Illinois,

that if a justice of the peace, who, by law, has authority to issue

writs in person, shall deliver blanks to an oﬁicer, with leave to

ﬁll them up at discretion, and then issue them, such permission

would be void, and the writs issued in pursuance of it nullities.'

It should be said that in those States the justice is the clerk of

his court, as well as the judge of it.

2. A writ may be void because it proceeds from a court or

magistrate having, by law, no jurisdiction of the subject matter,

either generally, or to the extent to which it has been assumed.

Illustrations of this will be given in another place. It is enough

to say now, that when this defect exists, it will generally appear

on the face of the proceeding, though the rule is by no means

universal.’
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3. The writ may also be void because it emanates from an

inferior court or oﬂicer, whose jurisdiction is never presumed, but

must be shown, and is not shown on the face of the proceedings.

In such cases there may have been jurisdiction in fact, but

because it is not shown, it is as it‘ it did not exist. If, for

example, a magistrate issues a warrant for committing one to

prison without reciting therein an accusation, a trial, and a con-

viction, he issues a process which is apparently unwarranted, and

the otﬁcer to whom it is delivered is bound to know that he would

not be protected in serving it.‘

' Pierce 0. Hubbard, 10 Johns. 405;

People v. Smith, 20 Johns. 63; Rat'-

fcrty v. People, 69 Ill. 111; S. C. 72

lll.37; S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 601. See,

also, Burslem v. Fern. 2 Wils. 47.

' But where the jurisdiction de-

pends not on matter of law, but on

matter of fact which the court or

magistrate is to pass upon,thc deci-

sion upon it is conclusive, and a pro-

I Pierce~.

tection not only to the oﬂlccr serving

also. Brittain o. Kinnard, 1 Brod. &

B. 432; Mather o. Hood, 8 Johns. 44;

Mackaboy 0. Commonwealth, 2 Virg.

Cas. 268; Clarke 0. May, 2 Gray, 410;

State 0. Scott, 1 Bailey, 294; Wall v.

Trumbull, l6 Mich. 228; Sheldon 0.

Wright, 5 N. Y. 497; Freeman on

Judgments, § 523, and cases cited.

' The otﬁcer is bound to know the

law, and that his writ is bad on its

••

face, if such is the fact. Grumon c.

Raymond, 1 Conn. 39; Lewis v. Avery,

8 Vt 287; Clayton v.ScotL 45 Vt. 386.

In serving a valid process, he is lia-

ble only for acts not authorized by it.

Gage 0. Barnes, 11 Vt. 195; Churchill

Hubbanl, 10 Johns. 405;
Sm lth, 20 J uhns. tJ3; Raf.
r~rty ~. People, 69 Ill. 111; S. C. 72
Ill. 37; B. C. 18 Am. Rep. 601. See,
aleo. Bnrslcm "· Fern. 2 Wils. 47.
'But where the jurisdiction <1~
pencls not on matter of law, but on
matter of fact which the court or
10agistrate is to pass upon, the dcci.
!'ion upon it is conclusin•, nml a prQ·
tection not only to the officer serving
process, bot to the court or magistrate

People

process, but to the court or magistrate

...

•J

~·

'

11.

alao. Brittain ~- Kinnard, 1 Brod. &
B. 432; Mather 11. Hood, 8 Johns. 44;

llackaboy e. Commonwealth, 2 Virg.
Cas. 2ti8; Clarke "· lhy, 2 Gray, 410;
State 11. Scott, 1 BrLiley, 211-!; Wall 11.
Trumbull, 16 )lich. 2:!8; Sheldon "·
Wright, IS N. Y. 4!l7; Freeman on
Jud~meuts, § 523. and cases cited.
1 The officer is bound to know the
law, and that his writ is bad on its
face, if such is the fact. Grumon c.
Raymond,t Conn. 3D; Lewis 1:1. Avery,
B Vt. 287; Clayton 11. Scott. 45 Vt. 386.
In serving a valid procct!S, he is lia.
ble only for acts not Ruthorized by it.
Gage ~. Barnes, 11 Vt. 195; (,'borchill
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4. The writ may also be void for many other reasons, such as

that it is tested of a Sunday or other day which is dies non for

such process, or that it was issued without compliance with some_

statutory requisite which is a condition precedent, and shows the

defect on its face, or for other defects, which will be more partic-

ularly referred to hereafter. It is enough to repeat here that the

writ which an oﬂicer can justify himself in serving must be a

valid writ, and that those concerned in issuing it must be able by

the law to justify its issue.

Arrest without Warrant. There are sometimes circumstances

which in themselves are a command of arrest as imperative as

could be any command by oflicial authority. These cases, in

general, are plain, and they rest upon the inherent right of society

to defend itself against sudden assaults, not by regular proceed-

4. The writ may also be void for many other reasons, such as
that it is tested of a Sunday or other day which is dies non for
such process, or that it was issued without compliance with some.
statutory requisite which is a condition precedent, and sho\vs the
defect on its face, or for other defects, which will be more particularly referred to hereafter. It is enough to repeat here that the
writ which an officer can justify himself in serving must be a
·valid writ, and that those concerned in issuing it must be able by
the law to justify its issue.

ings merely, but, in emergencies, by the spontaneous action of its

members.

In all civil cases it is not supposed that public justice will

suffer, or that any one can be seriously injured or incommoded

by any such delay in arresting a wrong-doer as may be requisite

to obtain proper legal process. Neither, in general, can any sim-

ilar delay be supposed prejudicial in the case of minor offenses

against the State. But it may be reasonably expected that a
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felon will ﬂee from justice if an opportunity is afforded him, and

also that, if he knows he is suspected, he will do what may be in

his power to obliterate the evidences of his crime. In these cir-

cumstances are found forcible reasons for prompt action in his

arrest; but the reasons would be still more imperative if the

criminal conduct was discovered before the crime was complete.

If one were detected in maliciously setting ﬁre to his neigh-

boi-’s house, the moral obligation to make immediate arrest, and

the legal right to do so would be equally plain. They might not

be so imperative or so clear in the case of some other felonies,

but the diﬁ'erence' would be in degree only.

v. Churchill, 12 Vt. 661. But. for such

acts he may be treated as a trespnsser.

(joﬂin v. Field, '7 Cush. 355; Morse v.

Reed, 28 Me. 481; Smith -v. Gates, 21

Pick. 55; Gordon 0. Clifford, 28 N. H.

402; Cate o. Cats,44N. H.211. This

is so, even where that which he did

was done by command of his official

superior, who, in giving the com-

mand, exceeded his lawful authority.

Griﬂin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Jones

v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush, 84.

Arrest without Warrant. There are sometimes circumstances
which in themselves are a command of arrest as imperative as
could be any command by official authority. These cases, in
general, are plain, and they rest upon the inherent right of society
to defend itself against sudden assaults, not by regular proceedings merely, but, in emergencies, by the spontaneous action of its
members.
In all civil cases it is not supposed that public justice will
suffer, or that any one can be seriously injured or incommoded
by any such delay in arresting a wrong-doer as may be requisite
to obtain proper legal process. Neither, in general, can any similar delay be supposed prejudicial in the case of minor offenses
against the State. But it may be reasonably expected that a
felon will flee from justice if an opportunity is aftorded him, and
also that, if he knows he is suspected, he will do what may be in
his power to obliterate the evidences of his crime. In these circumstances are found forcible reasons for prompt action in his
arrest; but the reasons would be still more imperative if the
criminal conduct was discovered before the crime was complete.
If one were detected in maliciously setting fire to his neighbor's bouse, the moral obligation to make immediate arrest, and
the legal right to do so would be equally plain. They might not
he so imperative or so clear in the case of some other felonies,
but the difference· would be in degree only.
"· Churchill, 12 Vt. 661. But. for such
acts he may be treated as a trespasser.
Coffln "· Field, 7 Cush. 355; Morse"·
Reed, 28 Me. 481 ; Smith "· Gates, 21
Pick. 55; Gordon"· Clifford, 28 N.H.
402; Cate ~'· Cate,44N. H.211. This

is so, even where that which he did
was done by command of his official
superior, who, in giving the command, exceeded his lawful authority.
Griffin "· Wilcox, 21 Ind. 870; Jones
"· Commonwealth, 1 Bnsh, 84.
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When the propriety of _ an arrest without process is in ques-

tion, the problem always is, how to harmonize the individual

right to liberty with the public right to protection. Where process

issues, the proceedings required in obtaining it constitute a stifli-

cient precaution against causeless arrests: the magistrate decides

on the facts presented to him that suﬂicient reason exists. But

if one without this protection were to arrest upon his own judg-

ment, he ought to be able, when called upon, to show that his

judgment was warranted. To do this he should show either—

1. A felony actually committed; and

2. Facts that had come to his knowledge which justiﬁed him

in suspecting the person arrested to be the felon; or

3. A felony being committed, and an arrest to stay and pre-

vent it.‘

This seems to be the least that could be required; the fact of

felony, and personal knowledge of the guilt of the particular

person, or reason for suspecting him; and if one errs in these par-

ticulars, it is better that he be left to take the consequences, than

that they be visited upon an innocent party who is improperly
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arrested.’ But a peace oﬁieer may properly be treated with more

indulgence, because he is specially charged with a duty in the

enforcement of the laws. If by him an arrest is made on rea-

sonable grounds of belief, he will be excused, even though it

appear afterwards that in fact no felony had been committed.‘

F orcible breaches of the peace, in affrays, riots, etc., are placed,

as regards arrest without warrant, on the footing of felonies.

' Ruloﬂ v. People, 45 N. Y. 213;

Keenan e. State, 8 Wis. 132. Where

an officer arrested a woman and took

her to the station on no other justiﬁ-

vation than that of vague hearsay

and suspicion of a third person that

she had had something to do with

making way with a missing person,

When the propriety of. an arrest without process is in question, the problem always is, how to harmonize the indhidual
right to liberty with the public right to protection. Where process
issues, the proceedings required in obtaining it constitute a snfficient precaution against causeless arrests: the magistrate decides
on the fact~:~ pa·esented to him that sufficient reason exists. But
if one without this protection were to arrest upon his own judgment, he ought to be able, when called upon, to show that his
judgment was warranted. To do this he should show either!. A felony actually committed; and
2. Facts that had come to his knowledge which justified him
in suspecting the person arrested to be the felon; or
3. A felony being committed, and an arrest to stay and prevent it:
This seems to be the least that could be required; the fact of
felony, and personal knowledge of the guilt of the particular
person, or reaf'on for suspecting him; and if one errs in these particulars, it is better that he be left to take the consequences, than
that they be visited upon an innocent party who is improperly
arrested.' But a peace officer may properly be treated with more
indulgence, because he is specially charged with a duty in the
enforcement of the laws. If by him an arrest is made on reasonable grounds of belief, he will be excn:;ed, even though it
appear afterwards that in fact no felony had been committed.•
Forcible breaches of the peace, in affrays, riot~, etc., are placed,
as regards arrest without warrant, on the footing of felonies.

the ollicer himself making no in-

quiry whatever into the facts, the ar-

rest was held totally unwarranted.

Somerville 0. Richards, 37 Mich. 290.

An arrest by a constable out of his

jurisdiction must. be regarded as an

arrest without warrant, even though

he may have a warrant which com-

manded the arrest within his juris-

diction. Krug 0. Ward, 77 Ill. 608.

' Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend.3-'30; Com-

monwealth 1:. Deacon, 8 S. & R. 47;

State v. Roane, 2 Dev. 58; Brockway

o. Crawford, 3 Jones N. C. 434; Eancs

0. State, 6 Humph. 53 ; Long o. State,

12 Geo. 293; Reuck o. McGrc-gor, 82

N.J. '20; State v. Holmes, 4S N. II. 8'77.

' Marsh 0. Loader, 14 C. B. (N. s.)

535; Lawrence 0. Hedger, 8 Tauut.

14; Davis 0. Russell, 5 Bing. 354, 365;

Wakcly o. Hart, 6 Binn. 316; Burns

0. Erben,40 N. Y. 463; Ilolh-y v. Mix,

8 Wend. 35'); Rohan 0. Suwin, 5 Cush.

281; Drennan 0. People, 10 Mich. 169.

1 Roloff "· People, 45 N. Y. 218;
Keenan "· State, 8 Wis. 132. Where
an officer arrested a woman and took
her to the station on no other ju~tift
t•atlon than that of vague hcarsa~
and suspicion of a third person that
she bact bad sometl1ing to do with
making way with a missing person,
the officer himql'lf making no inquiry whatever into tlle facts, the arrest was held totally unwarranted.
Somenllle "· Rkhards, 37 Mich. 290.
An arrest by a constab1e out of his
jurisdiction must be regarded as an
arrest without warrant, even though
he may have a warrant which com-

mandcd the arrest within his jurisdietion. Krug "· W11rd, 77 Ill. 608.
1 Holl«:>y "· Mix,8 Wcnd.350; Com.
moo wealth "· Dencon, 8 S. & R. 47;
State "· Roane, 2 Dev. 58; Brockway
"·Crawford, 8 Jones N.C. 434; Eanes
"· State, 6 Humph. 53; Lon~"· State,
12 Ueo. 2!1a; Rcuck "· McGregor, 82
N.J. 70; l;tate tl. 1-lohues, 4" N. II. 377.
1 }Iarsh "· Loader, 14 C. B. (N. s.)
535; Lawrence "· Hedger, 8 Taunt.
14; Davis"· Russell, ti Bing. 354, 365;
Wakely "· Hart, 6 Binn. 816 ; Burns
"· Erbcn, 40 N.Y. 46.'3; IIollt·y "· ~lix,
8 Wend. 35·1; Rohan"· Sawin, 5 Cusb.
281; Drennan e. People, 10 Mich. 169.
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The reason for this is found in their tendency to lead to serious,
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and perhaps fatal, injuries.‘ Peace oﬁicers are also allowed, with-

ont warrant, to enforce the ordinary laws of police by the arrest of

vagrants, and drunken and disorderly persons, detaining them

for the action of the proper police magistrates.’ And it is said,

by an old writer on criminal law, that “it hath been adjudged

that any one may apprehend a common notorious cheat, going

about the country with false dice, and being actually caught

playing with them, in order to have him before a justice of the

peace, for the public good requires the utmost discouragement of

all such persons, and the restraining of private persons from

arresting them without a warrant from a magistrate would often

give them an opportunity for esca.ping.”" These remarks will

apply to professional gamblers and cheats on the public thorough-

fares; if they are found plying their unlawful vocation there,

they are properly and justly classed with night walkers and

other persons without reputable means of support, and who prey

in one form or another on the public.

Imprisonment of Insane Persons. The imprisonment of per-

sons alleged to be insane is likely, in some eases, to lead to injus-

tice, and demands some special attention. In the vast majority

of cases in which persons are restrained of their liberty for sup-
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posed insanity, there has been no adjudication whatever. The

father discovers that his child is disordered in mind, and he

places him in an asylum. The husband does the same with his

wife, or the wife with her husband, Generally this is proper and

commendable, if affection or a sense of duty has prompted and

The reason for this is found in their tendency to lead to serious,
and perhaps fatal, injories. 1 Peace officers are also allowed, without warrant, to enforce the ordinary laws of police by the arrest of
vagrants, and drunken and disorderly persons, detaining them
for the action of the proper police magistrates.' And it is said,
by an old writer pn criminal law, that "it hath been adjudged
that any one may apprehend a common notorious cheat, going
about the country with false dice, and being actually caught
playing with them, in order to have him before a justice of the
peace, for the public good requires the utmost discouragement of
all such persons, and the restraining of private persons from
arresting them without a warrant from a magistrate would often
give them an opportunity for escaping." •· These remarks will
apply to professional gamblers and cheats on the public thoroughfares; if they are found plying their unlawful vocation there,
they are properly and justly classed with night walkers and
other persons without reputable means of support, and who prey
in one form or another on the public.

governed the action; but when there is no legal supervision, it is

always possible that the motive may be a base instead of a just

‘ Respublica v. Montgomery, 1

Yeates, 419; City Council 0. Payne,

2 N. & McCord,475; Slate v. Brown,

5 Harr. (Del.) 505:, Phillips '0. Trull,

11 Johns. 487 ;, Vandeveer o. Mattocks,

3 Ind. 4'79.

' But the fact that one at the time

orderly has been recently intoxicated

is no justiﬂcation for arrest without

warrant. Newton 0. Locklin, '77 Ill.

103. If a peace oﬂicer arrests one

without warrant on an oral complaint

by another, and handcuffs and eon-

ﬁnes him, he will be held liable for

Imprisonment of Insane Persons. The Imprisonment of persons alleged to be insane is likely, in some cases, to lead to injustice, and demands some special attention. In the vast majority
of cases in which persons are restrained of their liberty for supposed insanity, there has been no adjudication whatever. The
father discovers that his child is disordered in mind, and he
places him in an asylum. The husband does the same with his
wife, or the wife with her husband, Generally this is proper and
commendable, if affection or a sense of duty has prompted and
governed the action; but when there is no legal supervision, it is
always possible that the motive may be a base instead of a just

false imprisonment, if it turns out

that he was innocent. Griﬂin u. Cole-

man, 4 H. 80 N. 265.

' Hawk. P. C. 2 c. 12,§ 20. That

one in the night time, disobeying the

orders of the city board of health,

in a manner dangerous to the public

health, may be arrested without war-

rant, see Mitchell v. Lemon, 34 Md.

176

1 Respublica
u. Montgomery, 1
Yeat1•s, 419; City Council t), Payne,
2 N. & McCord, 475; State "· Brown,
5 Harr. (Del.) 505; Phillips t), Trull,
11 Johns. 487 ;, Vandeveer"· Mattocks,
8 Ind. 479.
' But the fact that one at the time
orderly has been recently intoxicated
is no justification for arrest without
warrant. Newton o. Locklin, 77 Ill.
108. If a peace omcer arrests one
without warrant on an oral complaint

by another, and handcuffs and con.
fines him, he will be held liable for
false imprisonment, if it turns out
that he was innocent. Grimn "· Coleman, 4 H. & N. 265.
• Hawk. P. C. 2 c. 12, § 20. That
one in the night time, disobeying the
orders of the city board of health,
In a manner dangerous to the public
health, may be arrested without war.
rant, see Mitchell o. Lemon, 84 Md.
176

l—l

AF.lo'EOTING PJo:RSONAL SEOUBITY.

-1

177

-4

A'Fl<‘EC'1‘lNG PERSONA L SECURITY.

one. The diiﬁculty of obtaining redress in such cases is sutii-

ciently serious to require most careful consideration for the

general subject.

The rights and liabilities of parties in the case of such conﬁne-

ment may be considered under two heads:

1. When there has been no adjudication.

2. When an adjudication has taken place and a judicial deela»

ration of insanity has resulted.

Under the right of self-defense there must undoubtedly be

authority to seize and restrain any person incapable of controlling

his own actions, and whose being at large endangers the safety

or property of others.‘ Humanity requires that the restraint

should be suited to the unfortunate condition, and should have

in view the restoration to reason, if that be possible; but regu-

lations for that purpose must be by the arrangement of parties

concerned, or they must be prescribed by law. \Vhere an arrest

is made merely for protection, it is only required of the person

making it that he treat the person arrested with the utmost

kindness and consideration consistent with the safety of others,
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and that he do no more in imposing restraint than protection

requires. But he must make sure of his facts, and be certain

that they will justify him. As in arresting a supposed felon, so

in this case, it is not an honest belief on his part, or purity of

motive, that can afford protection: he assumes to be both accuser

and judge, and the consequences of any error are very properly

visited upon him.’ If there is no insanity, the party arrested

may rightfully resist, even to the extent of inﬂicting fatal inju-

ries; and he may recover exemplary damages for the injury and

disgrace which he suffers in the attempt to ﬁx upon him the

stigma and the disabilities of mental unsoundness.

But not every insane person is a dangerous person. Nothing

can be more harmless to others than a person aﬁiicted with some

of the milder forms of insanity. If self-protection, and not the

beneﬁt of the supposed insane person, is made the justification

for conﬁnement without adjudication, it must wholly fail in such

cases.‘ lt is not insanity that excuses, but insanity of a type that

' Every man for his own protection C. 11 Am. Rep. 323. The fact that a

may restrain the fury of a lunatic. deputy constable acted under the or-

Brookshaw 0. Hopkins, Lotft. 235. ders of his principal is no excuse. Id.

' Look 0. Dean, 108 Mass. 116; B. ' Anderdon o. Burrows, 4 C. & P_

12

one. 'n1e difficulty of obtaining redress in such euee is sufficiently serious to require most careful consitleration for the
general so bjeet.
The rights and liabilities of parties in the case of such confinement may be considered under two heads:
1. When there has been no adj udicatioo.
2. When an adjudication has taken place and a judicial declaration of insanity has resulted.
Under the right of self-defense there must undoubtedly be
authority to seize and restrain any person incapable of controlling
his own actions, and whose being at largo endangers the satety
or property of others.' Humanity requires that the restraint
should be suited to the unfortunate condition, and should have
in view the restoration to reason, if that be possible; but regulations for that unrpose must be by the arrangement of parties
concerned, or they must be prescribed by law. Where an arrest
is made merely for protection, it is only required of the perc10n
making it that he treat the person arrested with the utmost
kindness and consideration con~:~istent with tho safety of others,
and that he do no more in imposing restraint than protection
requires. But he must make sure of his facts, and be certain
that they will justit)' him. As in arresting a suppotled felon, so
in this case, it is nut an honest beliet' on his part, or purity of
motive, that can afford protection: he assumes to be both accuser
and judge, and the consequences of any error are very properly
visited upon him.• If there is no insanity, th~ party arrested
may rightfully resist, even to the extent of inflicting iatal injuries; and he may recover exemplary damages for the injury and
disgrace which he suffers in the attempt to fix upon him the
stigma an4 the disabilities of' mental unsoundness.
But not every insane p3rson is a dangerous person. Nothing
can be more harmless to others than a person afBicted with some
of the milder forms of insanity. If self-protection, and not the
benefit of the supposed insane person, is made tha justification
for confinement without adjudication, it must wholly ftLil in such
euea.' It is not insanity that excuses, but insanity of a type that
• Knr,y mu for hil oWD protection
reatraiD the tory of a lnnatic.
Broobhaw •· Hopldaa, Lol\. SM.
' Look •• DeaD, 108 )(... 116; 8.

uuw

12

C. 11 Am. Rep. 318. The fact thal a
deputy constable acted under the or.
dera or hla princl pal t. no ucuae. ld.
1 Anderdoa •· Burrowa, 41 C. • Jl>.
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impels the person to acts which endanger the rights of others.
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If the State has made provision for the care of insane persons,

it will be proper to commit them to such asylums as may have

been provided, but if either private individual or oﬁieer shall

take the responsibility of doing this without previous adjudica-

tion, he must take on his personal responsibility the risk of all

errors.

It is sometimes provided by statute that no one shall be

restrained of his liberty as an insane person except upon the

certiﬁcate of a reputable physician, or, perhaps, of more than

one. Such a certiﬁcate may prevent injustice in some cases, but

as a physician is not a judicial officer, and has no judicial powers,

it is not an adjudication, and cannot be given the force of law so

as to protect parties who imprison one not insane in fact.‘ It

might assist in showing that the parties had acted in good faith,

and tlierefore ought not to be visited with exemplary damages;

but it could not bind the party whose reason had been eon-

demned without ahearing. Nothing buta. judicial investigation,

instituted for the purpose of trying the question of sanity, and

in which the supposed non compos is allowed the opportunity of

being heard, can conclude him.’

210; Scott 0. Wahan, 8 Fost. & Finl.
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328; Look v. Deen, 108 Mass. 116;

S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 323: Lott v. Sweet,

33 Mich. 308. See Commonwealth 0.

Kirkbride, 3 Brewster, 586.

' See Underwood o. People, 32

Mich. 1; S. O. 20 Am. Rep. 633.

‘Those cases in which one has

commitled an act which, in a sane

person, would be a crime, and has

impels the person to acts which endanger the rights of others.
If the State has made provision for the care of insane persons,
it will be proper to commit them to such asylums as may have
been provided, but if either private individual or officer shall
take the responsibility of doing this without previous adjudication, he must take on his personal responsibility the risk of all
errors.
It is sometimes provided by statute that no one shall be
restrained of his liberty as an insane person except upon the
certificate of a reputable physician, or, perhaps, of more than
one. Such a certificate may pre\·ent injustice in some cases, but
as a physician is not a judicial officer, and has no judicial powers,
it is not an adjudication, and <·annot be given the force of law so
as to protect parties who imprison one not insane in fact.' It
might assist in showing thRt the parties had acted in good faith,
and tl{CJ·etore ought not to be visited with exemplary damages;
but it could not bind .the party whose reason had been condemned without a hearing. Nothing but a judicial investigation,
iustituted for the purpose of trying the question of sanity, and
in which the supposed non compos is allowed the opportunity of
being heard, can conclude him.•

been acquitted on the ground of in-

sanity, are always embarrassing. If

the verdict is right on the facts, the

principle on which he is acquitted is

plain enough. No one can commit a

crime who is incapable of harboring

a criminal intent. The diilicult ques-

tion concerns what shall be done with

him afterward. And one would nat-

urally suppose that this question

ought not to be a ditﬁcult one. If a

person, from mental disease, is unable

to control his own actions, and is im-

pelled by delusions or frenzy to com-

mit violence upon others, he ought

to be subjected to legal restraint.

The popular belief is, however, that

in a large proportion of these cases

the defense of insanity was a fraud,

or at least the suggestion of insanity

has been seized upon as an excuse

for discharging a guilty’ person for

whose acquittal the jury could sug-

gest no other reason. This belief has

subjected the administration of the

law to much criticism; and by some

unthinking people the law itself is

assailed. The fault in such cases is

that the jury, improperly actuated by

sympathy, assign one reason for an

acquittal, when the real reason is

something quite different. They say,

"We acquit because of insanity,"

when in their hearts they mean, “ We

210; Scott"· Waban, 8 Fost. & Finl.
328; Look "· Dcen, 108 Mass. 116;
8. C. 11 Alll. Rep. 323; Lott "· Sweet,
a3 Mich. 308. See Commonwealth"·
Kirkbride, 8 Brewster, 586.
1 See Underwood "·
People, 82
:Mich. 1; 8. C. 20 Am. Rep. 633.
• Those cases in which one haa
committed an acL which, in a sane
person, would be a crime, and has
been acquitted on the ground of insanity, are always embarrllSsing. If
the veruict is right on the facts, the
principle on which he i~ acquitted is
plain enough. No one can commit a
crime who is incapable of harboring
a criminallntt·nt. The difficult qu('Stion concerns what shall be done with
him afterward. And one would naturally suppose that this question
ought not to be a dimcult one. If a
person, from mental disease, is unable

to control his own actions, and Is impelled by delusions or frenzy to com.
mit violence upon others, he ought
to be ~objected to legal restraint.
The popular belief is, however, that
ln a large proportion of these cases
the deft•nsc of insanity was a fraud,
or at least the suggt·stion of insanity
bas been seized upon as an excuse
for discharging a guilty- person for
whose acquittal the jury could suggest no other reason. This belief hBB
subjected the administration of the
law to much critici .~m; and by some
unthinking people the law itself is
assailed. The f1u1lt in such cases is
that the jury, improperly acluateu by
sympathy, assign one reason for an
acquittul, when the real reason is
something quite different. They say,
"We acquit because of insanity,"
when in their hearta they mean, "We
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But an insane person, without any adjudication, may also

lawfully be restrained of his liberty for his own beneﬁt, either
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because it is Il€CL‘>‘S?l.l‘y to protect him against a tendency to

suicide or to stray away from those who would care for him, or

because a proper medical treatment requires it. The restraint

for this purpose may be imposed under the direction of those

acquit because we think the act ex-

cusable on grounds the law does not

accept as an excuse." They assign a

valid excuse because they know the

rt-al excuse is not valid. Shall a party

But an insane person, without any adjudication, may also
lawfully be restrained of his liberty for his own benefit, either
because it is necessary to protect him against a tendency to
~oicide or to stray away from those who would care for him, or
because a proper medical treatment requires it. The ~traint
for this purpose may Le imposed under the direction of those·

thus excused be turned loose upon

society! This is the problem. Cer-

tainly if he is insane he ought not to

be, and the verdict of the jury must

be accepted as conclusive that at the

time to which their inquiry was di-

rected he was insane in fact. But

that time was not the time of the

trial; it was the time of the alleged

criminal act. Suppose, now, it be

provided by legislation that a person
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thus acquitted shall be committed to

an asylum as a permanent inmate;

is this admissible?

The diﬁieulties in the way of such

legislation are the following: 1. There

has as yet been no adjudication that

the person at the time of acquittal is

insane, and, if not, he cannot law-

fully be conﬁned. An insanity which

has passed away cannot excuse an

imprisonment. 2. If it be allowable

to assume that an insanity found to

exist at one time still continues, and

on that ground to commit the party

to an asylum as presumptively in-

sane, still the supposed non compo:

would have a right to disprove this

presumption at any time. To deny

him the right to have his case inves-

tigated on the facts at any time,

would be to distinguish his cusc from

that of other insane persons; and

this must bejustiﬁed on some legal

ground. It certainly could not be

justified op the ground that the jury

had rendered an improper verdict;

the verdict must be taken as correct.

But as no other ground can possibly

be suggested. it must follow that the

restraint of liberty, though based up-

on averdict which found the exist-

ence of insanity, must be made to

cease whenever a judicial investiga-

tion, which ls a matter of right, shall

dt-tcrlnine that insanity does not ex-

ist. lt is not possible constitutionally

to provide that one shall be impris-

oned as an insane person who can

show that he is not insane at all.

Neither is it competent to order one

conﬁned until certain designated oili-

cers, on their voluntary investigation.

shall certify that reason is restored.

Underwood o. People, 32 Mich. 1. If

these cases are miscllicvous, the rem-

edy is to be found in a correction of

the public sentiment which tolerates,

arqnlt because we think the act ex.
<'Usable on grounds the law docs not
accept as an excuse." They assign a
valid excuse because they know the
rl·al excuse is not valid. Shall a party
thus excused be turned loose upon
t.ocicty? This is the problem. Cer.
tainly if he is imtlnc he ought not to
be, and the verdict of the jury must
be accepted as conclusive that at the
time to which their inquiry WllS di.
rceted he was insane in fact. But
that time was not the time of the
trial; it was the time of the alleged
criminal act. Suppo:~e, nuw, it be
}lrovided by legislution that a person
thus acquitted shAll be committed to
an asylum as a prrm11nent inmate;
is this admi:~sible?
The difficulties in the way of such
legislation arc the following: 1. There
has as yet been no adjudication that
the person at the time of acquittal is
insane, and, if not, he cannot law.
fully be confined. An insanity which
has pnssed away cannot excu:;.e an
imprisonment. 2. If it be allowable
&o assume that an insanity found to
exist at one time still continues, and
on that ground to commit the party
to an asylum as presumptively insane, still the suppo:~cd no16 oompotJ
\\'OUld hove a right to disprove thill
presumption at any time. To deny
him the right to have his case inv<·stig-ated on the facts at any time,
would be to distinguish his cusc from
that of other insane persons; and
this must be justified on some legal
ground. It certainly could not be

justified op. the ground that the jury
bad rendered an improper verdict;
the verdict must be tak<>n as correct.
But as no other ground can possibly
be suggested, it must follow that the
restraint of liberty, though b:1scd upon a verdict which found the existence of insanity, must be rnadt> to
cease whenever a judicial investlga..
tion, which is a matter of right, shall
determine that insanity does not exist. It is not po~sihlc constitutionally
to provide that one shnll be impri"oned as an insane person who can
show that he is not insane at all.
Neither is it compl:tent to order one
confined until certain designated officers, on their voluntary investigation,
shall certify that reason is restored.
Underwood"· People, 32 Mich.l. If
these cnses nre mis<'hicvous, the rem.
edy is to be found in a correction of
the public sentiment which tolerates,
and indeed invites, improper conviCtions, and not in setting aside fundawrntnl principles.
Selectmen and overseers of the poor
have no authority u nffi··io to control
and restrain persons of unsound
mind. Like all other persons they
may, from the nece,sity of the CtJSe,
confine them for a reasonable time to
pren·nt mischief, until proper pro.
cc£'ding~ con be hnd for the appoint.
ment of a guardian. No one can
confine an insane person indefinitely,
t:xcrpt uudt-r the sanction and upou
compliance with the formnlitics of
the law. Colby"· Jackson. 12 N.H.
1500.
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who, by reason of relationship, are the proper custodians of the
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person, or by the State acting through its proper oﬁieers.'

What is said here concerning persons insane will apply to all

who, by reason of relationship, are the proper custodians of the
j)erson, or by the State acting through its proper officers.•
What is said here concerning persons insane will apply to all
who, by reason of disease or .mental infirmity of any sort, are
incapable of subjecting their actions to the control of reason.

who, by reason of disease or_1nental inﬁrmity of any sort, are

incapable of subjecting their actions to the control of reason.

MA Ll CIOUS PROSECUTION.

The Nature of the Wrong. It is the lawful right of every

man, who believes he has a just demand against another, to insti-

tute a suit and endeavor to obtain the proper redress. If his

belief proves to be unfounded, his groundless proceedings may

possibly cause a very serious injury to the defendant; the mere

MALICIOUS PROSEOUTION.

assertion of a serious claim at law being capable, in some cir-

cumstances, of affecting materially one’s standing and-credit.

But to treat that as a legal wrong which consists merely in

asserting a claim which cannot satisfactorily be established,

would be plainly impolitic and unjust. The failure to sustain it

might possibly have come from the death of a witness or other

loss of testimony, from false evidence, from a mistake of law in

•·

the judge, from misconduct in the jury, from any cause rather

than fault in the plaintiff himself. To compel him, as the pen-

alty for instituting a suit he cannot sustain, to pay the costs oi

adefense is generally all that is just, and is suﬁicient to make
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persons cautious about instituting suits which they have reason

to believe are baseless.

It is equally the lawful right of every man to institute or set

on foot criminal proceedings wherever he believes a public

offense has been committed. Here the injury is likely to be

more serious if the proceeding is unwarranted, but here, also, it

would be both unjust and impolitic to make the prosecution

which fails an actionable wrong. In some cases complainants

are required to become responsible for costs, but this is usually

the only liability. _

Nevertheless it is a duty which every man owes to every other

not to institute proceedings maliciously, which he has no good

reason to believe are ustiﬁed by the facts and the law. There-

fore, an action as for a tort will lie when there is a concurrence

of the following circumstances:

' Ordronaux, Judicial Aspects of Insanity, p. xxxviii. Introd.

•

The Nature of the Wrong. It is the lawful right of every
man, who believes he has a just demand against another, to institute a snit and endeavor to obtain the proper redress. If his
belief proves to be unfounded, his groundlet's proceedings may
possibly cause a very serious injury to the def{mdant; the mere
assertion of a serious claim at law being capable, in s~m1e circumstances, of affecting materially one's standing and ·-eredit.
Bot to treat that as a legal wrong which consists merely in
tt.sserting a claim which cannot satisfactorily be established,
would be plainly impolitic and unjust. The failure to sustain it
might possibly have come from the death of a witue.:>s or other
loss of testimony, from false evidence, from a mistake of law in
the judge, from misconduct in the jury, from any cause rather
than fault in the plaintiff himself. To compel him, as the pen.
alty for instituting a suit he cannot sustain, to pay the costs of
a defense is generally all that is just, and is sufficient to make
persons cautious about instituting suits which they have reason
to believe are baseless.
It is equally the lawful right of eYery man to institute or set
on foot crjminal proceediugs wherever he believes a public
oftEmse has been committed. Here the injury is likely to be
more serious if the proceeding is unwarranted, but here, also, it
would be both unjust and impolitic to make the prosecution
which fails an actionable wrong. In some cases complainants
are required to become responsible for costs, but this is usually
the only liability.
.
Nevertheless it is a duty which everyman owes to every other
not to institute proceedings maliciously, which he has no good
reason to believe are justified by the facts and the law. Therefore, an action as tor a tort will lie when there is a concurrence
of the following circumstances:
1

Ordronaux, Judicial Aspects of Insanity, p. uxvill. Introd.
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1. A suit or proceeding . has been instituted without any
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probable cause therefor.

2. The motive in instituting it was malicious.

3. The prosecution has terminated in the acquittal or dis-

charge of the accused.

Each of these circumstances requires separate attention. And

what is said in this place will concern criminal proceedings only.

Probable Cause. The ﬁrst of these is the existence of pro-

bable cause. This involves a consideration of what the facts are,

and what are the reasonable deductions from the facts. It is,

therefore, what is denominated a mixed question of law and fact.

If the facts are not in dispute the question is for the court,‘ but

1. A suit or proceeding. has been instituted without any
probable cause therefor.
2. The motive in instituting it was malicjons.
8. The prosecution has terminated in the acquittal or dis-charge of the accused.
Each of these circumstances requires separate attentfon. And
what is said in this place will concern criminal proceedings only.

upon disputed facts the jury must be left to pass.’ Many judges

have attempted to deﬁne what shall constitute probable cause.

Says Chief Justice TINDALLZ “ There must be a reasonable cause,

such as would operate on the mind of a discreet man; there

must be a probable cause, such as would operate on the mind of

a reasonable man.”' Another eminent judge has said, “There

must be such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary

caution and prudence to believe and entertain an honest and

strong suspicion that the person is guilty.”‘ Says another:

‘ Busst v. Gibbons, 6 H. & N. 912;

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Boyd v. Cross, 85 Md. 194; McWil-

liams v. Hoban, 42 Md. 56; Speck 0.

Judson. 63 Me. 207; Cooper 0. Wal-

dron. 50 Me. 80; Sweet o. Negus, 80

Mich. 406; Chapman 0. Cawrey, 50

Ill. 512; Thompson 0. Force, 65 Ill.

370; Swaim a. Stafford, 4 Ired. 892;

Harkrader 0. Moore, 4% Cal. 144;

Pangburn 0. Bull, 1 Wend. 345: Mas-

ten v. Deyo, 2 Wend. 424; Ulmer 0.

Probable Cause.

The first of these is the existence of probable cause. This involves a consideration of what the facts are,
and what are the reasonable deductions from the facts. It i!-', ·
therefore, what is denominated a mixed question of law and fact.
If the facts are not in dispute the question is for the court/ but
upon di11puted facts the jury must be left to pass." .Many jndges
have attempted to define what shall constitute probable cause.
Says Chief Justice TINDALL: "There must be a reasonable cause,
such as would operate on tho mind of a discreet man; there
most be a probable cause, snch as would operate on the mind of
a reasonable man." 1 Another eminent judge has said, "There
most be such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary
-caution and prudence to believe and entertain an honest and
strong suspicion that the person is guilty." • Says another:

Leland, 1 Me. 135.

' Humphries 0. Parker, 52 Me. 502;

Driggs 1:. Burton, 44Vt.124; Heyne

0. Blair, 62 N. Y. 19; Travis n. Smith,

1 Penn. St. 234; Cole 0. Curtis, 16

Minn. 182; Sims v. McL<'ndon,3 Strob.

557; Ulmcr 1:. Leland, 1 Me. 135.

' Broad 1:. Ham, 5 Bing. (N. C.) 722.

‘ SHAW, Ch. J., in Bacon o. Towne,

4 Cush. 217, 238. " If every man who

suffers by the perpetration of a crime

were bound, under the penalty of

heavy damages, to ascertain before he

commences a prosecution that he lifts

such evidence as will insure a convic-

tion, few prosecutions would be set

on foot, the guilty would escape

while conclusive evidence was sought

for; offenses of every grade would,

for the most part, go unpunished, and

the penal law would be scarcely more

than a dead letter. The law, there-

fore, protects the prosecutor if he

have reasonable or probable ground

for the prosecution. that is, if he have

such ground as would induce a man

of ordinary prudence and discretion

to believe in the guilt and to expect

the conviction of the person suspect-

ed, and if he acts in good faith on

such belief and expectation." Faris

v. Starke, 3 B. Mon. 4, 6, per MAB-

smmn, Ch. J. The belief may be

•

Busst fl. Gibbons, 6 H. & N. 912;
Boyd o. Cr068, 83 Md. 194; Me Williams "· Hol>an, 42 Md. IS6; Speck 11.
Judson. 63 Me. 207; Cooper "· Waldron, 00 Me. 80; Sweet fl. Negus, 80
:Mich. 406; Chapman fl. Cawrey, 50
Ill. 512; Thompson fl. Foree, 65 Ill.
8'70; Swaim fl. Stafford, 4 Ired. 892;
Harkrader fl. Moore, 44 Cal. 144;
Paugburn fl. Bull, 1 Wend. 845: Mas1en 11. Deyo, 2 Wend. 424; Ulmer "·
Leland, 1 Me. 1M.
1 Humphries fl. Parker, ~2 M.t-. M2;
Driggs 11. Burton, « Vt. 124; Heyne
e. Blair, 62 N.Y. 19; Travis 11. Smith,
1 Penn. St. 234; Cole "· Curtis, 16
Minn. 182; Sims fl. }[cLendon, 3 Strob.
M7; Ulmer fl. Leland, 1 Me. 135.
1 Broad"· Ham, 5 Bing. (N.C.) 722.
• SHAW, Ch. J., in Bacon"· Towne,
4 Cush. 217, 288. "If every man who
•al'era by Ute perpetration of a crime
1

were bound, onder the penalty of
heavy damages, to Ascertain before he
commences a prosecution that he ha.'l
such evidence as will lnsnre a conviCtion, few prosecutions would be set
on foot, Ute guilty would escape
while conclusive evidence was sought
for; offenses of every grade would,
for the most part, go unpunished, and
the penal la&w would be scarcely more
than a dead letter. The law, therefore, protects the prosecutor if he
have reasonable or probable ground
for the prosecution. that is, if he hav~
such ground as would induce a man
of ordinary prudence and discretion
to believe in the guilt and to expect
the conviction of the person suspected, and if he acts in good faith on
such belief and expectation." Faris
11. Starke, 3 B. Mon. 4, 6, per Jrb.a.
llHAJ.L, Ch. J. The belief may be
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“Anything which will create in the mind of a reasonable man
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the belief that a felony existed, and that the party charged was

in any way concerned in it, is probable cause.” ‘ mere belief,

therefore, that cause exists is not suﬁicient, for one may believe

on suspicion and suspect without cause, or his belief may pro-

ceed from some mental peculiarity of his own; there must be

such grounds of belief as would inﬂuence the mind of a reasona-

ble person, and nothing short of this could justify a serious and

formal charge against another.’ Still, some allowance must be

made for the excitement under which prosecutions for supposed

offenses against the complainant himself are almost necessaril_v

instituted. The complainant cannot be required to act with the

same impartiality and absence of prejudicein drawing his con-

based upon purely circumstantial evi-

dence. Raulston -v. J ackson, 1 Sneed,

128.

'O’Ns:rLL, Ch. J ., in Braveboy 0.

Cockﬂcld, 2 McMul. 270, 274.

' Mowry 0. Whipple, 8 R. I. 360;

Farnam o. Feeley, 56 N. Y. 451;

"Anything which will create in the mind of a reasonable man
the belief that a felony existed, and that the party charged was
in any way concerned in it, is probable cause." 1 A_ mere belief,
therefore, that cause exi8ts is not sufficient, for one may believe
on suspicion and suspect without cause, or his belief may proceed f"ro.m some mental peculiarity of his own; there must be
such grounds of belief as would influence the mind of a reasonable person, and nothing short of this could justify a serious and
formal charge against another! Still, sorue allowance must be
made for the excitement under which prosecutions· for supposed
ofltmses against the complainant himself are almost necessarily
instituted. The complainant cannot be required to act with the
same impartiality and absence of prejudice" in drawing his con-

Wlneblddle 1:. Porterﬂeld, 9 Penn. St.

187, 139; Collins v. Hayte,50 Ill. 353;
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Hall o. Suydam, 6 Barb. 83, 89. In

Fagnan 0. Knox, 66 N. Y. 525, 526,

Cannon, Ch. J .. says: “The question

of what constitutes probable cause

does not depend upon whether the

offense has been committed in fact,

nor whether the accused is guilty or

innocent,but upon the prosecutor’s be-

lief, based upon reasonable grounds.

Bacon o. Towne, 4 Cush. 217. The

prosecutor may act upon appearances ;

if the apparent facts are such

that a discreet and prudent person

would be led to the belief that the

accused had committed a crime, he

will not be liable in this action, al-

though it may turn out that the ac-

cused was innocent. Carl o. Ayres,

58 N. Y. 14. If there is an honest

belief of guilt, and there exist rea-

sonable grounds for such belief‘, the

party will he justiﬁed. But however

suspicious the appearances may be

from existing circumstances. if the

prosecutor has knowledge of facts

which will explain the suspicious

appearances and exonerate the ac-

cused from a criminal charge, he can-

not justify a prosecution by putting

forth the prime jhcie circumstances

and excluding those within his

knowledge which tend to prove in-

nocence." Such a case must be pre-

sented to the mind as would induce

a sober, sensible and discreet person

to act upon it. Barron 0. Mason, 81

Vt. 189. Sec Spengler o. Davy, 15

Grat. 381; Bauer 0. Clay, 8 Kan. 580;

Boyd o. Cross. 35 Md. 194; Travis 0.

Smith, 1 Penn. St. 234; Shaul 0.

Brown, 28 Iowa, 37; S. 0.4 Am. Rep.

151; Gallaway 0. Burr, 32 Mich. 332;

Gee v. Patterson, 63 Me. 49. There

should be such a state of facts and

circumstances as would induce men

of ordinary prudence and conscience

to believe the charge to be true.

based upon purely circumstantial evi.
dence. Raulston tl. Jackson, 1 Sneed,
128.
1 O'NEILL, Ch. J., in Braveboy t1.
Cockfield, 2 Mcl[ul. 270, 274.
•!lowry "· Wllipple, 8 R. I. 360;
l<'arnam tl. Feel"y, 56 N. Y. ~1 ;
Wlneblddle fl. Porterfield, 9 Penn. St.
187, 189; Collins "· Hayte, 50 Ill. 853;
Hall 11. Suydam, 6 Barb. 83, 89. In
Fagnan tl. Knox, 66 N.Y. 525, 526,
CHURCH, Ch. J., says: "The question
of what constitute~ probable cause
does not depend upon whether the
offense bas been committed in f~:~ct,
nor whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, but upon the prosecutor's belief, based upon reasonable grounds.
Bacon tl. Towne, 4 Cush. 217. The
prosecuto1· may act upon appearances;
if the apparent facts are such
that a discreet and prudent person
would be led to the belief that the
accused had committed a crime, be
wlll not be liable in this action, although it may turn out that the ac.
cused was innocent. Carl "· Ayres,
58 N. Y. 14. If there is an honest
belief of guilt, and there exist reasonable grounds for such belief, the
party will be justified. But however
suspicious the appearances may bo

from existing circumstances. if the
prosecutor has knowledge of facts
which will explain the suspicious
appearances and exonerate the ac.
cused from a criminal charge, he cannot justify a prosecution by putting
forth tlte pr!"mrt "jr1cie circumstances
and excluding those within his
knowledge which tend to prove innocence." Such a cnso must oo presented to the mind as w~uld induce
a sober, sen~ible and discreet person
to act upon it. Bnrron "· }[nson, 31
Vt. 18D. See Spengler "· Davy, 15
Grat. 381; Bauer "· Clny, 8 Kau. 580•
lloyd "· Cross. 35 Md. 1!)4; Travis tt.
Smith, 1 Penn. St. 2;lt; Shaul c.
Brown, 2S Iowa. 37; B. C. 4 Am. Reo.
151; Gallaway "· Burr, 32 !lich. 332 •
Gee "· Patterson, 63 lie. 49. There
should be such a state of facts and
circumstances as would induce men
of ordinary prudence and conscience
to believe the charge to be true.
Driggs "· Burton, 44 Vt. 124. Bee,
fnrther, Stone "· Stevens, 12 Cunn.
219; Jacks "· Stimpson, 13 III. 701>
Lawrence tl. Lanning, 4 Ind. 194;
Bank of British N. A tl. Strong, 1
App. Cas., Pl"iv. Coun. 307; B. C. 16
Moak, 24.
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clusions as to the guilt of the accused that a person entirely

disinterested would deliberately do, any more than a person

assaulted could be expected to judge of his danger with the like

coolness and impartiality.‘ And all that can be required of him

is that he shall act as a reasonable and prudent man would be

likely to act under like circumstances.‘

The test of probable cause is to be applied as of the time

when the action complained of was taken; and if upon the facts

then known the party had no probable cause for action, it will

be no protection to him that facts came to his knowledge after-

wards that might have constituted a justiﬁcation had he betu

aware of them.‘ Neither is he justiﬁed if he knew the facts,

but did not believe them.‘

i

Advice of Counsel?/It may perhaps turn out that the com-

plainant, instead of relying upon his own judgment, has taken

the advice of counsel learned in the law and acted upon that.

This should be safer and more reliable than his own judgment,

elusions as to the guilt of the accused that a person entirely
disinterested would deliberately do, any more th~n a person
usaulted could be expected to judge of his danger with the like
coolness and impartiality.• And all that can be required of him
ie that he shall act as a reasonable and pruuent man would be
likely to act under like circumtttan<.-es.'
The test of probable cause is to be applied as of the time
when the action complained of was taken; and if upon the fact~
then known the party had no probable cause for action, it will
be no protection to him that facts came to his knowledge afterwards that might have constituted a justification had he be< n
aware of them.• Neither is he justified if he knew the facts,
but did not believe them.•

not only because it is the advice of one who can view the facts

calmly and dispassionately, but because he is capable of judging
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of the facts in their legal bearings. A prudent man is therefore

expected to take such advice; and when he does so and places all

the facts before his counsel, and acts upon his opinion, proof of

the fact makes out a case of probable cause,‘ provided the dis-

closure appears to have been full and fair, and not to have with-

held any of the material facts.‘ But the advice must be that of

’ Cole 0. Curtis, 16 Minn. 182.

' Bournc o. Stout, 62 Ill. 261.

’ Delcgal 0. Highley, 3 Bing. (N. C.)

950; Bell 0. Pearcy, 5 Ired. 83; John-

son o. Chambers. 10 Ired. (N. C.) L.

287; Galloway v. Stewart, 49 Ind. 150;

S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 677; Skidmore 0.

Bricker, 77 Ill. 164; Josselyn o. Mc-

Allister, 25 Mich. 45; Foshay v. Fer-

guson, 2 Denlo, 617. See Sims 17.

Advice of Cou.nse~t may perhaps turn out that the complainant, instead of relying upon his own judgment, has tnken
the advice of counsel learned in the law and acted upon that.
This should be safer and more reliable than his own judgment,
not only because it is the advice of one who can view the facts
calmly and dispassionately, bnt because he is capable of judging
of the facts in their legal bearings. A prudent man is therefore
expected to take such advice; and when he does so and plac~s all
the facts before his counsel, and acts upon his opiniou, proof of
the fact makes out a case of probable cause,• provided the disclosure appears to have been fall and fair, and not to have withheld any ot' the material facta.' Bat the advice must be that of

li'Lcndon, B Strob. 557.

‘ See cases cited in last note; also

Bigelow, Lead. Cas. on Torts, 198.

%0.

’ llavcnga o. Mackintosh, 2 B. & C.

G93; Stone 0. Swift, 4 Pick. 389; Wal-

ter 0. Sample, ‘L3 Penn. St. 275; Hall

0. Suydam, 6 Barb. 83; Olmstead o.

Partridge, 16 Gray, 381; Ames 0. Sni-

der, 69 Ill. 3'76; Wicker 0. Hotchkiss,

62 Ill. 107; S. C. 14 Am. Rcp. 75;

Burgett v. Burgett, 43 Ind. 78.

‘Ash 0. Marlow, 20 Ohio, 111-J;

Walter v. Sample, 25 Penn. St. 275;

Kimmcl 0. Henry, 64 Ill. 503; Slmtp

0. Johnston, 59 Mo. 557; Cooper v.

Utterbach, 37 Md. 28‘); Bliss 0. Wy-

mun, '7 Cal. 257. In Ravcngu o. Mack-

intosh, 2 Burn. & Cress. 692, 605, it is

said to be “a question for the jury

whether he acted banaﬁdc on the opi-

nion, bclieving that he had a cause

of action.” And on this point, st-0

Ross o. Innis, 26 Ill. 259, 279; Center

la,‘

1 Cole .,, Curtis, 16 llioo. 182.
• Bourne o. Stout, 62 Ill. 261.
• I>P.lt'gal o. HiA"hley, 8 Bing. (N.C.)
IGO; Bell il. Pearcy, S Ired. 83; J oho1100 o. CbambeN. tO Ired. (N.C.) L.
187; Galloway 11. Stewart, 49 Ind. 150;
8. C. 19 Am. Rep. 677; Skidmore v.
Bricker, 77 Ill. 164; Jos.>~elyo il. ~[c.
Allister, 25 Mich. 4lS; Foshay e. Fer.
gusoo, 2 Den:o, 817. See Sims o.
ll'Lendoo, 8 Strob. 5.57.
• Sec ca.ses cited iD last note; also
Bigelow, Lead. Cus. on Torts, 19o,

too.
1 Uavt·nga il. Mackiotosb, 2 B. & C.
Cl88; S\ttoe o. S~.~rift,-4 Pick.889; Wal\er "· 8tuuple, 2J Penn. St. 275; Ball

o. Suydam, 6 Barb. 83; Olmstead •·
Partridge, 16 Gray, 381; Ames e. Soi.
der, 69 Ill. 376; Wicker e. Hotchkiss,
62 lll. 107; S. C. 1-l Am. &·p. 7.>;
Burgett e. Burgett, 43 lad. 78.
'.Ash o. llarlow, 20 Ohio, lUI;
Walter il. Sam pie, 25 J>cnb. St. 275;
Kimmel .,, Hrnry, MIll. 5U:i; Shurp
o. J obnston, 59 .Mo. 557; Coc,per 11.
Utterbacb, 87 Md. 282; Bliss"· Wy.
man, 7 Cal. 257. Ia Rawnga "· )[1\ck.
intosh, 2 Burn. & <:reS9. 0112, G!l8, it i$
said to be "a question for the jury
whether he acted bonafide oo the opi.
nion, believing that. bo bud a C&U!o6
of action." .And oo this polot, St·o
Rosa o. Innis, 26 Ill.~. 279; Center
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a person accepted and licensed by the courts as one learned in

184
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the law and competent to be adviser to clients and to the court;

and if one chooses to accept and rely upon the opinion and

advice of a justice of the peace or other layman, he may do so

in aid of his own judgment, but it cannot afford him any pro-

tection.‘ Moreover, when he places himself under the guidance

of counsel, if facts subsequently come to his knowledge which

seem to be important, it is his duty to communicate these to

counsel, if he expects to rely upon his advice as a justification

in the steps subsequently taken.’

Proof of Want of Probable Cause. The burden of proof to

show a want of probable cause is upon the plaintiﬁ’. In other

words, the want of probable cause will not be inferred from the

mere failure of the prosecution.‘ Nor does malice establish a-

want of probable cause, because, as is well said in one case, a

person actuated by the plainest malice may nevertheless have a

a person ~cepted and licensed by the courts as one learned in
the law and competent to be adviser to clients and to the court;
and if one chooses to accept and rely upon the opinion and
advice of a justice of the peace or other layman, he may do so
in aid of his own judgment, but it cannot afford him any protection! Moreover, when he places himself under the guidance
of counsel, if facts subsequently come to his knowledge which
seem to be important, it is his duty to communicate these to
counsel, if he expects to rely upon his advice as a justification
in the steps subsequently tak~n.'

justiﬁable reason for prosecution; ‘ and, indeed, the offense itselt,

or the belief in its having been committed. is likely to excite

malice. An acquittal and discharge by a magistrate having power

to bind over, is evidence of want of probable cause, as is the ignor-

ing of a bill by a grand ury.‘ But neither of these is conclusive.

o. Spring. 2 Iowa, 393; Eastman 0.
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Keasor, 44 N. H. 518; Potter v. Scale,

8 Cal. 217; Joss:-lyn v. McAllister, 22

Mich. 300; Williams '0. Vanmeter, 8

Mo. 339; Hill 1:. Palm. 38 Mo. 13.

'Ol|nstcatl v. Partridge, 16 Gray,

381; Heal '0. Robeson, 8 Ired. 276;

Straus v. Young, 36 Md. 246; Bur-

gctt '0. Burgctt, 48 Ind. 78; Stanton

o. Hurt, 27 Mich. 539; Murphy 0.

Larson, '77 Ill. 172.

Proof of Want of Probable Cause. The borden of proof to
show a want of probable cause is upon the plaintiil In other
words, the want of probable cause will not be inferred from the
mere failure of the prosecution.• Nor does malice establish a·
want of probable cause, because, as is well said in one case, a
person actuated by the plainest malice may nevertheless have a.
justifiable reason for prosecution; • and, indeed, the offense itseh,
or the belief in its having been committed. is likely to excite
malice. An acquittal and discharge by a magiRtrate having power
to bind over, is evidence of want of probable cause, as is the ignoring of a bill by a grand jury.• But neither of these is conclusive.

' Cole 1:. Curtis, 16 Minn. 182; Ash

'0. Marlow, 20 Ohio, 119.

‘Boyd '0. Cross, 35 Md. 194, and

cases cited; Good 1:. French, 115

Mass. 201; Levy '0. Brennan, 39 Cal.

485; Wilkinson o. Arnold, 11 Ind. 45.

‘TINDALL, Ch. J., in Willians v.

Taylor, 6 Bing. 183, 186. And, see,

Heyne 1;. Blair, 62 N. Y. 19, 22; Fo-

shay 0. Ferguson, 2 Denio, 617 ; Skid-

more o. Bricker, '77 Ill. 164; Krug o.

Ward, 77 Ill. 603; Chapman v. Caw-

rey, 50 Ill. 512; Capcrson '0. Sproule,

39 Mo. 39; Hall 0. Hawkins. 5

Hutnph. 357; Bell 1:. Pearcy, 5 Ired.

83; Center 0. Spring, 2 Clarke (Iowa),

393; Cloon 0. Gerry, 13 Gray, 201;

Kidder *0. Purkhurst, 3 Allen, 398;

Wade 0. Walden, 23 Ill. 425; Chap-

man o. Cawrey, 50 Ill. 512; Travis 0.

Smith, 1 Penn. St. 234.

'Mitchinson n. Cross. 58 Ill. 366;

Cooper v. Uttcrbach, 37 Md. 282; Is-

rael v. Brooks, 23 lll. 575; Sapping-

ton o. Watson, 50 Mo. 83. In Gaven

v. Sou. Pac. R. R. Co., it was held

that where a party had been examined

and held to bail, the fact that the

grand jury ignored the bill did not

prove want of probable cause. On

the subject of want of probable cause,

see Flickinger 0. Wa'gner, 46 Md. 581.

Ti‘?

Spring, 2 Iowa, 398; Eastman tl.
Keasor, 44 N. H. 518; Potter tl. Sc:tle,
8 Cal. 217; Jossdyn "·McAllister, 22
Mich. 800; Williams fl. Vanmeter, 8
Mo. 339; Hill v. Palm. 38 Mo. 13.
1 Olmstead v. Partridge, 16 Gray,
881 ; Beal 11. Robeson, 8 Ired. 276;
Straus "· Young, 86 Md. 246 ; Burgett 11. Burgett, 43 Ind. 78; Stanton
11. Hart, 27 Mich. 1539; Murphy e.
Larson, 77 Ill. 172.
• Cole t. Curtis, 16 Minn. 182; Ash
fl. Marlow, 20 Ohio, 119.
• Boyd v. Cross, 35 Md. 194, and
cases cited ; Good 11. French, 115
llass. 201 ; Levy "· Brannan, 39 Cal.
485 ; Wilkinson 11. Arnold, 11 Ind. 45.
4 TINDALL, Ch. J., in Willinns 11.
Taylor, 6 Bing. 188, 186. And, see,
Heyne 11. Blair, 62 N. Y. 19, 22 : Foshay 11. Ferguson, 2 Denio, 617: Skidmore"· Bricker, 77 Ill. 16i; Krug fl.

fl.

Ward, 77 Ill. 603; Chapman

fl. Caw.
Sproule,
39 Mo. 89: Hall "· Hawkins. IS
Humph. 357; Bell 11. Pearcy, IS Ired.
88; Center 11. Spring, 2 Clarke (Iowa),
393 : Cloon fl. Gerry, 13 Gray, 201 ;
Kidder fl. Parkhurst, 3 Allen, 898 ;
Wade 11. Walden, 23 Ill. 425; Chap.
man 11. Cawrey, 50 Ill. 1512 ; Travis "·
Smith, 1 Penn. St. 2;34.
• Mitchinson fl. Cross, 58 Ill. 366 ;
Cooper 11. Utterbach, 87 Md. 282 ; Israel v. Brooks, 23 Ill. 575; Sapping.
ton"· Watson, 50 !tio. 88. In Gaven
"· Sou. Pac. R. R. Co., it was held
that where a party had been examined
and held to bail, the fnct that the
grand jury ignored the bill did not
prove want of probable cause. On
the subject of want of probable cause,
see Flickinger tl. Wagner, 46 Md. 581.

rey, ;;o Ill. 512; Cnpcrson
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If the defendant is convicted in the ﬁrst instance and appeals,

185

and is acquitted in the appellate court, the conviction below is

conclusive of probable cause.‘

Malice. The burden of proving that the prosecution was

malicious is also upon the plaintiff.’ If a want of probable cause

is shown, malice may be inferred; but the deduction is not a

If the defendant is convicted in the first inatanoo and appeals,
and is acquitted in the appellate court, the conviction below is
oonclusive of probaJ>le cause.'

necessary one,” and the mere discontinuance of a criminal pros-

ecution, or the acquittal of the accused, will establish for the

purposes of this suit neither malice nor want of probable cause.‘

But if an arrest is made in a civil suit which is afterward volun-

tarily discontinued, the discontinuance has been held to furnish

primafacie evidence of a want of probable cause.‘ Legal malice

is made out by showing that the proceeding was instituted from

any improper or wrongful motive, and it is not essential that

actual malevolence or corrupt design be shown.‘ Sometimes the

accompanying circmnstanees show the bad motive very clearly,

as for instance, where an arrest on an unfounded criminal charge

was made use of to compel the surrender of securities to which

both parties were equally entitled.’ This is a sort of malice

suﬁiciently common to need special mention.

'Griﬂ's 0. Bcllars, 4 Dev. & Bat.

176; Whitney o. Peckham, 15 Mass.
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242; Payson 0. Caswell, 22 Me. 212;

Witham 0. Gowen, 14 Me. 362.

’ Divtz 0. Lanzﬁtt, 63 Penn. St. 234;

Purcell v. McNamara, 9 East, 361;

Savil o. Roberts, 1 Salk. 14,15; Wil-

lans v. Taylor; 6 Bing‘. 183; Mc-

Known e. Hunter, 30 N. Y. 625;

Flickinger v. Wagner, 46 Md. 581

‘ Pangburn 0. Bull, 1 Wend. 345;

The burden of proving that the prosecution was
malicions is also upon the plaintiff.• If a want of probable cause
is shown, malice may be inferred; but the deduction is not a
necessary one,• and the mere discontinuance of a criminal prosecution, or the acquittal of the accused, will establish for the
purposes of this suit neither malice nor want of probable cause.•
But if an arrest is made in a civil snit which is afterward voluntarily diseontinued, the discontinuance has been held to furnish
prima facie evidence of a want of probable cause.• Legal malice
is made ont by showing that the proceeding was instituted from
any improper or wrongful motive, and it is not essential that
actual malevolence or corrupt design be shown.• Sometimes the
accompanying circnmstanoos ~how the bad motive very clearly,
as for instan<..-e, wltere an arrest on an unfounded criminal charge
was made usc of to compel the surrender of securities to which
both partiell were equally entitled.y This is a sort of malioe
sufficiently common to need special mention.
Jlalioe.

Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439;

Dietz o. Laugﬂtt, 63 Penn. St. 234;

Mowry o. Whipple. 8 R. I. 360; Cooper

o. Utterbach, 37 Md. 282; Harpham

0. Whitney, 77 Ill. 82; ilolliduy o.

Sterling, 62 Mo. 821; Ewing n. Sun-

fm-d, 19 Ala. 605 ; ilarkrnder v. Moore,

44 Cal. 144; Paukett 0. Livermore, 5

Clarke (Iowa), 277.

‘Willnns v. Taylor, 6 Bing. 188;

Yocum 0. Polly, 1 B. Mon. 358 ; Skid-

more o. Brieker, 77 Ill. 164; Kidder

0. Parkhurst, 8 Allen, 893.

‘ Burhans v. Sanford, 19 Wend.417;

Nicholson 0. Coghill, 4 B. & C. 21;

Green 0. Cochran, 48 Iowa, 544.

' Page 0. Cashing, 38 Me. 523;

Barron o. Mason. 81 Vt. 189; Harp-

ham 11. Whitney, 77 Ill. 32. Thejury

are the exclusive judges of malice.

Munns 0. Dupont, 3 Wasli. C. C. 81 ;

Center 0. Spring, 2 Clarke (Iowa), 393 ;

Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B. & A. 587.

" Kimball u. Bates, 50 Me. 806. See

Willuns z~. Taylor. 6 Bing.183; Brown

0. Randall. 36 Conn. 56; Krug v.Ward,

'77 lll. 603; Prough o. Entriken, 11

Penn. St. 81; Schmidt 0. Weidman,

63 Penn. St. 1'13.

1 Grift's •· ScHara. -' Dev. & Bat.
1'76 ; Whitney fl. Peckham, 13 Mass.
~ ; Payson •· Caswell, 22 Me. 212 :
Witham •· Gowen, 1• Me. 362.
• Dietz fl. Lan~fltt, 6;J Penn. St. 234;
Purcell e. :McNamara. 9 East, 861;
Savtl fl. Roberta, 1 Salk. 14, 13; Wlllana e. Taylor; 6 Bing. 183; MeKnown fl. Hunter, 80 N. Y. 623;
FUckin~r fl. Wafl'ner, 46 Md. IS81
• Pangburn •· Bull, 1 Wend. 843;
:Merriam fl. Mitchell, 18 :Me. -'S9 ;
Dietz "· Langfttt, 63 Penn. SL 2M ;
Mowry o. Whipple, 8 R.I. 360; Cooper
"· Ctterbach, 87 Md. 282: HRrpham
e. Whitney, 77 Ill. 82 : llollidRy tl.
Sterling, 6'a Mo. 821 ; Ewing "· Sanford, 19 Ala. 60:l: Harkrader tl. Moore,
.U Cal. 14-'; PaukeU fl. Livermore, G
Clarke (Iowa), 1'77.

t Willans fl. Taylor, 6 Bing. 188;
Yocom fl. Polly, 1 B. Mon. 858: Skid.
more "· Bricker, 77 Ill. 164 ; Kidder
e. Parkhurst, 8 Allen, 893.
' Burhans fl. Sanford, 19 Wend. -'17;
Nicholson fl. Cogbill, -' B. & C. 91 ;
Green fl. Cochran, 48 Iowa, M4.
• Pftge fl. Cushing, 88 Me. lS28;
Barron fl. Mason, 81 Vt. 189 ; Harp-

bam "· Whitney, ?7 Ill. 82. The jury
•re the exclusive judges of malice.
:Moons fl. Dupont, :l Wash. C. C. 81:
Center e. Spring, 2 Clarkfl (Iown), 898 ;
:Mitchell "·Jenkins, 5 B. & A. G87.
' Kimh~All11. BRtes, 50 Me. 808. See
Willans r. Taylor. 6 Bing. 183; Broq
"·Randall. 86 Conn.IS6; Krug o.Ward,
77 Ill. IJ03 ; Prough fl. Entriken, 11
Penn. St. 81 ; Schmidt •· Weidman,
68 Penn. 8&. 118.
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What is an end of the Proceeding. The termination of the
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proceeding must, in general, be by a ﬁnal acquittal.‘ It is not

enough that the parties in a case which they might lawfully settle,

have eﬁ'ected a compromise, and thereby terminated it.’ Or that

the defendant was discharged because the offense was misuamed

in the papers, or because of formal defects.’ But if the proceed-

ing is ewparte to hold to bail, and the accused party has no

opportunity to disprove the case made against him, he may main-

tain the suit, notwithstanding he was required to give bail;‘ and

so he may, if on a preliminary examination before a magistrate

on charge of crime he is discharged.‘ Whether the entry of a

nolle prosequi by the prosecuting oﬂicer is a suﬁicient discharge

has been made a question. In some cases "it has been held that it

wa.s;° but other cases hold the contrary.’ The reason assigned

in these last cases is, that the ﬁnding of the grand jury is some

evidence of probable cause, and another indictment may be

found on the same complaint. But the reasonable rule seems

to be, that the technical prerequisite is only that the particular

prosecution be disposed of in such a manner that this cannot

be revived, and the prosecutor, if he proceeds further, will be

put to a new one.‘

' Bacon 0. Towns, 4 Cush. 217;
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Boyd 0. Cross, 35 Md. 194; Kirkpat-

rick o. Kirkpatrick, 39 Penn. St. 288;

Williams 0. Woodhouse, 8 Dev. (N.

C.) L. 257.

' McCormick u. Sisson, 7 Cow. 715;

Hamilburgh 0. Shephard, 119 Mass.

30; Mayer o. Walter, 64 Penn. St. 283.

But it‘ one compounds under protest

to procure his discharge, this does

What ia an end of the Proceeding. The termmation of the
proceeding must, in general, be by a final acquittal. 1 It is not
enough that the parties in a case which they might lawfully settle,
have effected a compromise, and thereby terminated it.' Or that
the defendant waz:; discharged because the offense was misnamed
in the papers, or because of formal defects.• But if the prot-ceding is eaJ pzrte to hold to bail, and the accused party has no
opportunity to disprove the case mad~ against him, he may maintain the suit, notwithstanding he was required to give bail; • and
so he may, if on a preliminary examination before a magistrate
on charge of crime he is discharged: Whether the entry of a.
nolle prosequi by the prosecuting officer is a sufficient discharge
has been made a question. In somecases·it has been held that it
was; • but other casl3s hold the contrary.' The reason assigned
in these last cases is! that the finding of the grand jury is some
evidence of probable cause, and another indictment may be
found on the same complaint. But the reasonable rule seems
to be, that the technical prerequisite is only that the particular
prosecution be disposed of in such a manner that this cannot
be revived, and the prosecutor, if he proceeds further, will be
put to a new one.•

not afterward estop him from show-

ing the groundlessness and malice

of the proceeding. Morton v. Young,

55 Me. 24.

' Sears o. Hathaway. 12 Cal. 277.

* Stewart o. Gromett, 7 C. B. (N. s.)

191.

‘ Cardival 0. Smith, 109 Mass. 158;

S. C. 12 Am. Rep. 582; Sayles 0.

Briggs, 4 Met. 421 ; Burkett v. Lanata,

15 La. Ann. 337.

" Brown 11. Randall, 36 Conn. 56; S.

C. 4 Am. Rep. 34; Hays 0. Blizzard,

30 Ind. 457; Chapman o. Woods. 6

Blackf. 504; Stanton 0. Hart, 27 Mich.

539. ‘

1 Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush. 217; Par-

ker o. Farley, 10 Cush. 279; Brown v.

Lakeman, 12 Cush. 482; Curdival v.

Smith, 109 Muss. 159; S. O. 12 Am.

Rep. 582.

‘Clark o. Cleveland, 6 Hill. 844,

347. See Cardival r. Smith, 109 Mass.

159; Driggs 0. Burton, 44 Vt. 124. It

has been held that if one institutes a

criminal proceeding, and is the pros-

ecuting Witness therein, but fails to

appear aﬂer several adjournnicnts,

and the accused, for that reason. is

suffered to go at liberty, this is surﬁ-

cient termination of the prosecution,

even though there be no record of the

discharge. Leever o. Harnill,57 Ind.

423.

1 Bacon "· Towne, 4 Cush. 217;
Boyd"· Cross, 3li Md. 194; Kirkpatrick "· Kirkpatrick, 89 Penn. St. 288;
Williams fl, Woodhouse, 8 Dev. (N.
C.) L. 21'17.
t McCormick fl. Sisson, 7 Cow. 715;
Hamilburgh fl. Shephard, 119 llns!l.
30; Mayer"· Walter, 64 Penn. St. 283.
But if one compounds unller protest
to procure his discharge, this docs
not afterward estop him from showing the groundlessness and mnlice
of the proceed ing. Morton fl. Young,
55 Me. 24.
• Sears fl. Hathaway, 12 Cal. 277.
' Stewart fl. Gromeu., 7 C. B. (N. a.)
191.
a Cardival "· Smith, 109 Mass. 1~8;
B. C. 12 A.m. Rep. 582; Sayles fl.
Briggs, 4 }let. 421 ; Burkett"· Lanata,
15 La. Ann. 887.
• Brown fl. Randall, 86 Conn. 56; B.

C. 4 A.m. Hep. 84; Hays fl. Blizzard,
30 Ind. 457; Chapman "· Woods. 6
Blackf. 504; Stanton"· Hart, 27 .ltlich.
539.
, Bacon fl. Towne, 4 Cush. 217; Parker"· Farley, 10 Cu;~h. 27!.1; Brown o.
Lakeman, 12 Cush. 482; Cnrdival "·
Smith, 10!1 Mass. 11'19; S. C. 12 Am.
Rep. 582.
• Clark o. Cleveland, 6 Hill, 844,
847. See CurJivnl P. Smith, 109 Ma!ls.
159; Drig~s -o. Burton, 44 Vt. 124. It
has be<>n held that if one inititutes "
criminal proceeding, and is the prosecuting witness therein, but fails to
appear after several adjournmcnt.i,
and the accused, for that reason, is
auH'ered to go at liberty. this is sulfi.
cient termination of the prosecution,
even though there be no record of the
discharge. Leever fl. Hamill, 57 Ind.

423.
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a malicious prosecution are jointly and severally responsible; it

is not necessary that all should have been complainants.‘ But if

one merely furnishes the prosecuting oﬂicer with the facts, and

the latter, on his own judgment, commences a prosecution, mak-

ing use of the former as a witness, this is not a prosecution by

the witness, and unless he interferes improperly afterwards, he

cannot be held responsible as having instituted it.’

Malicious Civil Suits. In some cases an action may be main-

tained for the malicious institution of a civil suit, but the authori-

ties are not entirely agreed what cases are embraced within the

rule. The case of the malicious institution of proceedings in

bankruptcy is undoubtedly one. If these are instituted mali_

Joint Liability. All concerned in originating and carrying on
a malicious prosecution are jointly and severally responsible; it
is not necessary that all should have been complainants.' But if
one merely furnishes the prosecuting officer with the facts, nnd
the latter, on his own judgment, commences a prosecution, mnking use of the former as a witness, this is not a prosecution by
the witness, and unless he interferes improperly afterwards, he
cannot be l1eld responsible as having instituted it.•

ciously, and without probable cause, and terminate without an

adjudication of bankruptcy, an action will lie for the damages

sustained. “The general grounds of this action are, that the

commission was falsely and maliciously sued out, that the plain-

tiﬁ' has been greatly damaged thereby, seandalized upon record,

and put to great charges in obtaining a supersedeas to the ‘com-

mission: here is falsehood and malice in the defendant. and

great wrong done to the plaintiff thereby. Now, wherever

there is an injury done to a man’s property by a false and mali-
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cious prosecution, it is most reasonable he should have an action

to repair himself.” '

The case of a civil suit begun maliciously, and without prob-

able cause, by the arrest of the party, is another.‘ So is the case

of a suit comm'enced by an attachment of property; the reasons

which support the action in that case being much the same with

those which have been found suﬁicient where commission in

bankruptcy is sued out.‘ And in Ohio it has been held that the

' Stansbury 0. Fogle, 3'7 Md. 369;

Clements 1:. Ohrly, 2 C. & K. 686.

’ See Murphy 0. Walters, 34 Mich.

180. This was a case of false impris-

onment, but the rule must be the same

in malicious prosecution.

' See in Chapman o. Plckersgill, 2

Wils. 145. and Farley 0. Danks, 4 El.

& Bl. 493; Wliitworth 0. Hull, 2 B. &

Ad. G95.

‘ Collins o. Hayte, 60 Ill. 887, 353;

Burhans 0. Sanford, 19 Wend. 417;

Wailkiils v. Baird, 6 Muss. 506; Aus-

iin 0. Debnam, 3 B. & C. 139; Sin-

Jlalioious Civil Suits. In some cases an action may be maintained for the malicious institution of a civil suit, bnt the authorities are not entirely agreed what cases are embt-aced within the·
rule. The case of the malicious institution of proceedings in
bankruptcy is undoubtedly one. If these are instituted maliciously, and without probable cause, and terminate without an
adjudication of bankruptcy, an action will lie tor the dama.g<>s
austained. "The ~eneral grounds of this action are, that the
commission was falsely and maliciously sned ont, that the plaintiff has been greatly damaged thereby, scandalized upon record,
and put to great charges in obtaining a supersedeas to the ·commission: here is falsehood anq malice in the defendant. and
great wron~ done to the plaintiff thereby. Now, wherever
there is an injury done to a man's property by a false and malicious prosecution, it is most reasonable he should have an action
to repair himself." •
The case of a civil suit begun maliciously, and without prohable cause, by the arrest of the party, is another.• So is the case
of a suit comm~nced by an attachment of property; the reasons
which support the action in that ca8e being much the same with
those which have been found sufficient where commission in
bankruptcy is sued out.• And in Ohiu it has been held that the

clair o. Eldred, 4 Taunt. 7. The vol-

untary discontinuance of such a suit

is prima facio evidence of want of

probable cause, but to surfer a judg_

ment of non pros., or as in case of

nonsuit, is not. Burhans 0. Sanford,

19 Wend. 417.

‘Preston 0. Cooper, 1 Dill. 589;

1 Stansbury c. Fogle, 87 l\lll. 369;
Clement@ "· Ohrly, 2 C. & K. 636.
'Sec Murphy tl. Walt('rs, 34 "Mich.
180. This was a c11se of false impri~
onment, but the rule must be the same
in malicious prosecution.
1 Bee in Chapman c. Plckersgill, 2
Wila. 14:5, and Farley c. Danks, 4 El.
& Bl. 493; Whitworth tl. Hull, 2 B. &
Ad. 696.
• Collina "· Hayte, 60 Ill. 887, 353;

Burhans c. Banford, 11) Wend. 417;
Watkin!! o. Baird, 6 Mass. GOf.l; Austin "· Debnam, 3 B. & C. 189: Sinclair o. Elrlred, 4 Taunt. 7. The voluntary discontinuance of such a suit
is prima faci~ evidence of want of
probable cause, but to suffer a judgmolt of non proa., or as in case of
nonsuit, is not. Burhans o. Banford,
19 Wend. 417.
• Preston· c. Cooper, 1 Dill. 589;
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suit will lie, even though there may have been a valid cause of
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action, if in fact there was no probable cause for the attachment,

and it was taken out maliciously; also, that it is not essential in

such a case that the suit in attachment should be ﬁrst terminated.‘

If, however, the validity of the attachment was allowed to be

tested, and its justification inquired into, in some distinct pro-

ceeding while the suit itself was pending, we should say that a

suit for maliciously suing out the writ could not be brought

until the writ itself was dissolved or quashed.

Still another case in which an action will lie for the malicious

institution of unfounded proceedings notcriminal in their nature,

is where they are taken to have the party declared insane, and

put under guardianship. Such proceedings are almost neces-

sarily damaging beyond what a civil suit can well be; and, if

unfounded and malicious, deserve more than a mere punishment

in costs.’

In some eases it has been held that an action may be main-

tained for the malicious institution, without probable cause, of

any_ civil suit which has terminated in favor of the defendant; '

but the English authorities do not justify this statement, and

there is much good reason in what has been said in a Pennsyl-

Williams 0. Hunter, 3 Hawks. 545;
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Wood 0;. Wcir,5 B. Mon.544; McCul-

lough v. Grishobber,-1 W. & S. 201;

Walscr o. Thies. 56 Mo.89; Holliday

o. Sterling, 62 Mo. 321; Fullenwider

o. McWilliams, 7 Bush, 889; Speng-

ler 0. Davy, 15 Grat. 381; Hayden v.

Shed, 11 Mass. 500; Lindsay 1-. Lar-

ned, 1'7 Mass. 190; Pierce e. Thomp-

son, 6 Pick. 193; Nelson o. Dauielson,

suit will lie, even though there may have been a valid cause of
action, it' in fact there Wl\8 no probable cause for the attachment,
and it was taken out maliciously; also, that it is not essential in
such a case that the suit in attachment should be first terminated.'
If, howe\·er, the validity of the attachment was allowed to be
tested, and ita justification inqpired into, in some distinct proceeding while the suit itself was pending, we should say that a
suit for maliciously suing out the writ could not be brought
until the writ itself was dissolved or quashE.'d.
Still another ease in which an action will lie for the malicious
iust.itution of unfounded proceedings not criminal in their nature,
is where they are taken to have the party declared insane, and
put under guardianship. Such proceedings are almost necessarily damaging beyond what a civil snit can well be; and, if
unfounded and malicious, deserve more than a mere punishment
in costs.2
In some eases it has been held that an action may be maintained for the malicious institution, without probable cause, of
any. civil suit which has terminated in favor of the defendant; 1
but the English authorities do not justify this statement, and
there is much good reason in what has been said in a Ponnsyl-

82 lll. 545. If the defendant was not

served with process in the attachment

suit, it is not necessary for him to

show that it terminated in his favor.

Bump 0. Betts,19 Wend. 421. The

fact that the plaintiff, in bringing

suit, was compelled to give an indem-

nity bond, will not protect him

against an action for the malicious

suit. Lawrence v. Hagerman, 56 Ill.

68; S. C.8Am. Rep. 674. See Burnap

0. Wight, 14 Ill. 301.

' Fortman 0. Rottier, 8 Ohio, (N. s.)

548, citing and relying upon Tomlin.

son o. Warner, 9 Ohio, 104.

' Loekenour 0. Sides, 57 Ind. 860.

In Colorado it has been held that an

action will lie for falsely “suing out

and prosecuting before the Commis-

sioner of the General Land Oﬂicc of

the United States, an oﬂiccr having

jurisdiction, etc., a caveat impeach-

ing the plaintiff's entry [of public

lands] on the ground and allegation

of fraud." Hoyt 1-. Macon, 2 Col. 118.

' See Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209;

S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 316, where the sub

ject was fully and carefully exam-

ined. Also, Whipple 0 Fuller, 11

Conn. 581; Marbourg v. Smith, 11

Kaus. 554; Burnap v. Albert, Taney,

244; Cox 9. Taylor’s Admr. 10 B. Mon.

17.

Williams c. Hunter, 8 Hawks. 5~;
Wood"· Weir,5 B. Mon.544; McCullough "· Grishobber, 4 W. & S. 201;
Walserv. Thies. 56 Mo.89; Holliday
v. Sterling, 62 Mo. 821; Fullenwider
"· McWilliams, 7 Bnsh, 889; Bpeng.
ler e. Dtwy, 15 Grat. 381; Hayden e.
Shed, 11 ~lass. 500; Lindsay "· Larned, 17 Mn.sR. 190; Pierce "· Thomp.
son, 6 Pick. 193; Nelson 11. Danielson,
82 Ill. 545. If the defendant was not
served with process in the attachment
suit, it is not nccC'ssnry for him to
show that it terminated in his favor.
Bump v. Betts, 10 Wend. 421. The
fact that the plaintiff, in bringing
suit, was compelled to give an indemnity bond, will not protect him
against an action for the malicious
suit. Lawrence "· Hagerman, 56 Ill.
68; B. C. 8 Am. Rep. 674. See Burnap
e. Wight, 14 Ill. 301.

'Fortman"· Rottier, 8 Ohio, (N. s.)
548, citing and relying upon Tomlinson"· Warner, 9 Ohio, 104.
1 Lockenour "· Sides, 37 Ind. 880.
In Colorado it has been held that an
action will lie fllr falsely "suing out
and prosecuting before the Commie.
sionea· of the General Laud Office of
the United States, an officer having
jurisdiction, etc., a caveat impeaching the plaintiff's entry [of public
lands] on the ground and allegation
of fruud." Hoyt t:. Macon, 2 Col. 118.
1 See Closson"· Staples, 42 Vt. 209;
B. C. 1 Am. Rep. 816, where the subject was fully and carefully examined. Also, Whipple " Fuller, 11
Conn. 581; Marbourg "· Smith, 11
Kans. 554; Burnap ll. Aluert, Taney,
244; Cox'· Taylor's Admr. 10 B. lloD..
17.
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vmiia case, that “if the person be not arrested, or his property

189'

seized, it is unimportant how futile and unfounded the action

might be; as the plaintiﬂ, in consideration oi law, is punished by

the payment of eosts.”' If every suit may be retried on an

allegation of malice, the evils would be intolerable, and the malice

in each subsequent suit would be likely to be greater than in the

ﬁrst.

Malicious Abuse of Process. If proaass, either civil or crim-

inal. is willfully made use of for a purpose not justiﬁed by the

law, this is abuse for which an action will lie. The following

are illustrations: Entering up a judgment and suing out execu-

tion after the demand is satisﬁed; ' suing out an attachment for

'Vania case, that " if the person be not arrested, or his property
~~eized, it is unimportant how futile and unfounded the nction
might be; as the plaintiff, in consideration Ol law, is punished by
the payment of costs." 1 If every suit may be retried on an
allegation of malice, the evils would be intolerable. ~nd the mal iee
in each subsequent suit would be likely to be greater than in the
first.

an amount greatly in excess of the debt;' causing an arrest

for more than is due;‘ levying an execution for an excessive

amount; ' causing an arrest when the party cannot procure bail,

' Snaaswoon, J., in Mayer v. Wal-

ter, 64 Penn. St. 283, citing Ray v.

Law, 1 Pet. C. C. 207; Kramer 0.

Stock, 10 Watts, 115.

’ Barnett 0. Reed, 51 Penn. St. 190.

' Savage v. Brewer, 16 Pick. -L53.

‘Jcnings 0. Florence,2 C. B. (N.

139
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s.) 467; Austin c. Debnam, 3 B. & C.

Jlalioious Abuse of ProoeBS. If process, either civil or criminal, is willfully made use of for a purpose not justified by the
law, this is abuse for which an action will lie. The fo1lowing
are illustrations: Entering up a judgment and suing out execution after the demand is satisfied; 1 suing out an attachment for
an amount greatly in excess of the debt; • causing an arrest
for more than is due; • levying an execution for an excessive
amount; 1 causing an arrest when the party cannot procure bail,

‘Bommer 0. Wilt, 4 S. & R. 19;

Churchill 0. Siggers. 3 El. & Bl. 929.

In this ease, Lord CAMPBELL, Ch. J.,

says, p. 937: "To put into force the

process of the law inalieiously. and

without any reasonable or probable

cause, is wrongful; and, if thereby an-

other is prejudiced in property or per-

son, there is that conjunction of injury

and loss which is the foundation of

an action on the case. Process of ex-

ecution on a judgment seeking to ob-

tain satisfaction for the sum recovered

is prima facts lawful; and the cred-

itor cannot be rendered liable to an

action, the debtor merely alleging

and proving that the judgment had

been partly satisﬁed, and that execu-

tion was sued out for a larger sum

than remained due upon the judg-

ment. Without malice and the want

of probable cause, the only remedy

for the judgment-debtor is to apply

to the court or a judge that he may

be discharged, and that satisfaction

may be entered up on the payment of

the balance justly due. But it would

not be creditable to ourjurisprudence

if t-he debtor had no remedy by an

action whore his person is, or his

goods have been taken in execution

for a larger sum than remained due

on the judgment, this having been

done by the creditor maliciously and

without reasonable or probable cause:

t‘. e., the creditor well knowing that

the sum for which the execution is

sued out is excessive, and his motive

being to oppress and injure the

debtor. The court or judge, to whom

a summary application is made for

the debtor's liberation, can give no

redress beyond putting an end to the

process of execution on payment of

the sum due, although, by the excess,

1 8BAR8WOOD, J .. in Mayer e. Walter, 64 Penn. St. ~. citing Ray e.
Law, 1 Pet. C. C. 207; Kramer ,,
Stock, 10 Watts, 115.
1 Barnett 11. Reed, t51 Penn. St. 190.
• Savn~ 11. Brewer, 16 Pick. 4.'53.
'Jenini,~ 11. Florence, 2 V. B. (N.
s.) 46i; Austin 11. Debnam, 3 B. & C.

139
1 S<immer ,. Wilt, 4 B. & R. 19;
Churchill e. Siggen. 8 El. & Bl. 029.
In this case, Lord CAm'BELL, Ch. J.,
saya, p. U3i: •• To put into force tile
proct.>ss of llie law maliciuu~:~ly, and
without any reusonable or probable
t·aue, is \\'rongfpl; and. if thereby anolhcr is prejudiced in property or person, lhere is til at conjunction of mjury
and 101111 which is llio foundation of
an action on the case. Pruce:>s of ex.
t•cntion on a judgment seeking to ob.
tain satisfaction for llie sum recovered
is primG facu lawful; and the cred.
itor cannot be rendered liable to an
action, the debtor merely alleging
and proving that the judgment had
been partly satisfied, and that execution was sued out for a larger sum
&haD remained due upon the judg-

mt>nL Without malice and the wane
of probable cause, the only remedy
for tile jullgmcut.clcbtor is to apply
to the court or a judge thnt he may
be dischargl"<l, and that satisfaction
may be entered up on the payment of
the balu.uce justly due. But it would
not be crulitablc to our jurisprudence
if the debtor had no remedy by an
action wh(•rc his pt'n~on i~. or hIs
goods hnve been taken in cxecution
for a larger sum thnn remained due
on the jlhlgment, this having bccu
done by the creditor maliciously and
without rcnsonahlc or probable cause:
s. ~.the creditor well knowing that
the sum for which the exe1·ution is
sued out is excessive, and his motive
being to oppress and injure the
debtor. The court or judge, to whom
a summary application is ronde for
tile debtor's liberation, can give no
redress beyond putting an end to the
process of cxccut ion on payment of
the sum due, althnngh, by llie excess,
the debtor may have suffered long
imprisonment, and have been utterly
ruined ln his circumstance.."
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and keeping him imprisoned until, by stress thereof, he is com-
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pelled to surrender property to which the other is not entitled.‘

In these cases, proof of actual malice is not important, except as

it may tend to aggravate damages; it is enough that the process

was willfully abused to accomplish some unlawful purpose.‘

Arrests for an Ulterior Purpose. One way in which process

is sometimes abused, is by making use of it to accomplish not

the ostensible purpose for which it is taken out. but some other

purpose for which it is an illegitimate and unlawful means. An

and keeping him imprisoned until, by stress thereof, he is compelled to surrender property to whihh the other is not entitled.'
In these cases, proof of actual malice is not important, except 88
it may tend to aggra,·ate damages; it is enough that the process
was willfqlly abused to accomplish some unlawful purpose.•

illustration is where, by means of a subpoena, and on pretence of

desiring his testimony, a person is brought within the reach of

process which otherwise could not have been served upon him.

Here there may in strictncss be no unlawful action. and possibly

no suit would lie; but it is the duty ot' the court, where the ser-

vice of the writ is brought about by deception through abuse of

other process, or by any unlawful act, to take care that no beneﬁt

be derived from it. The effectual mode to accomplish this will

be to set aside the service as unauthorized. It has, therefore,

been very justly said that the courts will not tolerate service of

process on any person who, for that purpose, has been deceitfully

brought within their jurisdiction; a court will also protect from

arrest “eundo et re/7eund0,” not only the parties, but also the
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witnesses, who, in obedience to its process, or in furtherance of

its proceedings, appear within its urisdiction.' So, if a party is

detained over Sunday, when civil process cannot be served, and

is arrested the next day, he will be discharged,‘ and so if he is

detained on a void writ, or one that has become functus o_ﬁicio,'

or without any writ at all, until one shall be obtained! So if

service is accomplished by unlawfully breaking into a dwelling-

house.’ The principle is, that no one shall derive ad vantage from

‘Grainger o. Hill, 4 Bing. N. C.

212; Krug 0. Ward, 77 Ill. 603.

’ See Stewart v. Cole, 46 Ala. 646.

-" ltonmsou. J., in Slade o. Joseph,

5 Duly, 187. See Luttin 0. Benin, 11

Mod. 50; United States 0. Edme, 9 S.

6.: R. 147; Goupilo. Simnnson,3 Abb.

Pr. 474. The court will not sanction

any attempt to bring a party within its

jurisdiction by fraud or misrepresen-

tation. Carpenter v. Spooner, 2 Sandi‘.

717, 718; Baker 0. Wales, 45 How. Pr.

137; McNab 1:. Bennett, 64 Ill. 158.

‘ Lyford '0. Tyrrcl, Austr. 85; Wells

Arrests for an Ulterior Purpose. One way in which process
is sometimes abused, is by making nse of it to accomplish not
the ostensible purpose for which it is taken out, but some other
purpose tor which it is an illegitimate and unlawful means. An
illustration is where, by means of a snbpmna, and on pretence of
desiring his testimony, a person is brought within the reach of
process which otherwise could not have been served upon him.
Here there may in strictnrss be no unlawful action. and possibly
no suit would lie; but it is the duty of the court, where the service of the writ is brought about by deception through abuse of
other prucess, or by any unlawful act, to take care that no benefit
be derived from it. The effectual mode to accomplish this will
.be to set aside the service as unauthorized. It has, therefore,
been very justly said that the courts will not tolerate service of
process on any person who, for that purpose, has been deceitfully
brought within their jurisdiction; a court will also protect from
arrest '' eundo et 'rerleunrlo," not only the parties, but also the
witnesses, who, in obeJience to its process, or in furtherance qf
its proceedings, appear within its jurisdiction.' So, if a party is
detained over Sunday, when civil process cannot be served, and
is arrested the next day, he will be discharged; • am) so if he is
detained on a void writ, or one that has become functU8 officio,•
or without any writ at all, until one shall be obtained.! So if
f'ervice is accomplished by unlawfully breaking into a dwellinghouse,, The principle is, that no one shall derive advantage from

0. Gurney, 8 B. & C. 769.

‘Loveridge 12. Plaistow, 2 H. Bl.

23; Er parts Wilson, 1 Atk. 152.

' Birch o. Prodger, 4 B. 8; P. 135;

Barlow 0. Hall, 2 Anstr. 462.

" Ilsley 0. Nichols, 12 Pick. 270;

People o. Hubbard, 24 Wend. 369;

Swain 0. Mizncr, 8 Gray, 182.

1 Gr.1inger "· Hill, 4 Bi1,1g. N. 0.
212; Krug "· Wnrd, 77 Ill. 603.
1 See Stewart t~. C'ole, 4li Ala. 646.
= HomNSON, J., in Blade "·Joseph,
5 Daly, 187. See Luttin t~. Benin, 11
Mod. 50; United Statrs "· Edmc, 9 8.
& R. 147; Goupil"· Simonson, 3 Abb.
Pr. 474. The court will not Sllllction
any attempt to bring a party within its
jurisdiction by fraud or misrepresentation. Carpenter". Spooner, 2 Randf.

717, 718; Baker"· Wales, 45 How. Pr.
137; MeN ab c. Bennett, 64: Ill. 158.
• Lyford"· Tyrrcl, Austr. 85; Wells
e. Gurney. 8 B. & C. 769.
' Loveridge "· Plaistow, 2 H. Bl.
2:>; Ex part~ Wilson, 1 Atk. 152.
• Birch "· Prodger, 4 B. & P. 13tS;
Barlow "· Hall, 2 Anstr. 462.
, llsley "· Nichols, 12 Pick. 270;
People "· Hubbard, 24 Wend. 869;
Swain e. Mizner, 8 Gray, 182.
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abuse of the process of the courts, or by his own fraud or other

191

misconduct. And the principle should apply to cases where the

process of extradition, either as between the States or as between

one sovereignty and another, is resorted to for the purpose of

obtaining service of civil process.‘

In some of the cases above mentioned, an action for false

imprisonment would lie; but where there has been no actual

illegal detention, the fraudulent use of the process to bring one

within a jurisdiction must be actionable.’

Omcer Serving his own Process. The law will not permit an

ollicer to serve process in a case in which he is a party or is the

complainant. “The law wisely foreseeing that the ministers of

justice should be freed, as far as practicable, from all the im-

proper bias which may result from self-interest, has declared

that no man shall be his own oﬁicer, and that no one shall in his

own person, and by his own hand, do himself right by legal pro-

cess. Therefore, where an oﬂicer is interested, it declares that

another shall act; and this, in principle, applies to all, though to

some with greater, others with less, force.” ' Nor can any reason-

able distinction be taken as respects the nature of the process or

the degree of interest; the broad ground is the safest, that no

oﬁicer who is interested in a suit, or who is even a party to it
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without interest, shall serve any process appertaining to it from

the commencement to the conclusion.‘ This is by no means a

mere technical rule, but as the law, upon very imperative reasons,

makes oﬂicial returns conclusive for very many purposes, a

diﬁ'erent doctrine would be equivalent, in numerous cases, to

making the ollieer judge in his own cause, and placing the other

party at his mercy. A service, therefore, by the oﬂicer in such a

case must be a mere nullity.‘

1 See Wharton, Conf. L. § 2965; In

re Hawes, 4 Am. Law Times Rep. (11.

s.) 524.

' Where those not privy to the fraud

obtain service by means thereof, such

service is vulid. Blade 0. Joseph,

5 Duly, 187. See State o. Ross. 21

Iowa, 467; Adriance o. Lagrave, 59

N. Y. 110.

* Cowocx, J., in Bingletary 0. Car-

tar, 1 Bailey, 467.

‘ Singlctaryo Carter, 1 Bailey. 467;

Knott 1:. Jurboe, 1 Met. (l{y.) 504;

Gage 17. Gl'.'1ﬂ‘=i|i, 11 Mass. 181; Cham-

abuse of the process of the courts, or by his own fraud or other
misconduct And the principle should apply to cases where the
process of extradition, either as between the States or as between
one sovereignty and another, is re8orted to for the purpose of
obtaining service of civil process.1
In some of the cases above mentioned, an action for false
. imprisonment would lie; but where there has been no actual
illegal detention, the fraudulent use of the process to bring one
within a jurisdiction must be actionable.•
om.cer Serving his own Prooeas. The law will not permit an
officer to serve proeess in a case in which he is a pRrty or is the
complainant. "The law wisely foreseeing that the ministers of
justice should be freed, as far as practicable, from all the improper bias which may result from self-interest, has declarE!(l
that no man shall be his own officer, and that no one shall in his
own person, and by his own hand, do himself right by legal process. Therefore, where an officer is interested, it declares that
another shall act; and this, in principle, applies to all, though to
some with greater, others with less, force.'' • Nor can any reasonable distinction be taken as respects the nR.ture of the process or
the degree of interest; the broad ground is the safest. that no
officer who is interested in a suit, or who is e\'en a party to it
without interest, shall serve any process appe1·taining to it from
the commencement to the conclusion.' This is by no means a
mere technical rule, but as the law, upon very impcrl\tive reasons,
makes official returns conclusive for very many purposes, a
different doctrine would be cquh·nlent, in numerous cases! to
making the ofHccr judge in his own cause, and placing the other
party at his mercy. A service, therefore, by the officer in such a
case must be a mere nullity.•

bers 0. Thomas, 8 A. K. Marsh,

536; Boykin 0. Edwards, 21 Ala. 261;

Woods 0. Gilson, 17 Ill. 21S; Ford 0.

Dyer, 26 Miss. 2-13; Filkins o. 0‘b'ulli-

van, '29 lll. 5'34.

° It is sometimes forbidden by stat-

ute, but where that is the case the

statute is generally looked upon In

1 See Wharton, Conf. L. § 2963; In
re Hawes, 4 Am. Law Times Hep. (N.

B.)

524.

Where those not privy to the fraud
obtain service by means thereof, such
service is ulid. Blade e. Joseph,
6 Daly, 187. Bee l:!tate e. Ross, 21
Iowa, 467; Adriance e. Lagrave, 59
N. Y.llO.
• CoLCOCK, J., In Singletary e. Car.
&er, 1 Bailey, ~.
t

• Singletary e Carter, 1 fialley. 467;
Knott v. J urboe, 1 1\I d. (Ky.) 504;
Gage 11. Graffan, 111tla.•s. 181; Chambers e. Thomas, 8 A. K. 1\larsb,
536; Boykin e. Edwards, 21 Ala. 261;
Woods"· Gilson, 17 Ill. 218; Forti e.

Dyer, 26 1\liss. 243; ~'ilk ins e. O'bullivao, 'i9 Ill. 524.
• It is sometimes forbidden lJy statute, but v.·here that is Lhe case tho
statute is generally looked upon u

t-I
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Where an oﬂicer cannot act, neither can the deputy, since the

deputy can act only for him and in his name.‘ And if the

oﬂicer is not a party, but is the husband of a party, this also

would disqualify him.’

Arrest of Privileged Persons. The arrest of a person privi-

Where an officer cannot act, neither can the deputy, since the
deputy can act only for him and in his name.' And if the
officer is not a party, but is the husband of a party, this also
would disqualify him.•

leged from arrest is not a trespass, even though the oﬂicer may

be aware of the facts. It is only voidable; the party may waive

his privilege, or at his option he may apply for his discharge to

the court in which the suit is commenced, or on habeas cor}/us,‘ '

and where the privilege is given on public grounds, or for the

beneﬁt of another, he may be discharged on the proper applica-

tion of any one concerned. Thus, if a witness is arrested while

in attendance on court as such, the party who has subpoenaed

him may move for his discharge, or the court, of its own motion,

may order it.

aﬂimﬁng common law principles.

Sec Knott 0. J arboe, 1 Met. (Ky.) 504.

' Gage 0. Grntlau, 11 Mass. 181;

May 0. \Valtcrs, 2 l\IcCord, 470.
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’ See Scanlan 0. Turner, 1 Bailey,

421. The exclusion ought to go fur-

Arrest of Privileged Persons. The arrest of a person privileged from arrest is not a trespRSs~ even though the officer may
be aware of tho facts. It is only voidable; the party may waive
his privilege, or at his option he may apply for his discharge to
the conrt in which the suit is commenced, or on habeas corpus; 1
and where the privilege is given on public grounds, or for the
benefit of another, he may be discharged on the proper application of any one concerned. Thus, if a witness is arrested while
in attendance on court as such, the party who has subprenaed
him may move for his discharge, or the court, of its own motion,
may order it.

ther, aud embrace near kinship, and

perhaps does. One diﬂlculty may be

encountered in some of our statutes,

which make provision for a service

by some other oﬂlcer when a sheriff

is interested or a party, but do not go

further.

It is held in New York that the

oﬂicer may serve the process in his

own favor by which suit is com-

menced, if it is not process of arrest.

Bennet o. Fuller, 4 Johns. 486; Tuttle

0. Hunt, 2 Cow. 436; Putnam 0. Man,

8 Wend. 202. The danger of such a

doctrine is perceived in the last case,

in which it is held that the constw

ble’s return of service of a summons

in his own favor is not traversable.

‘Blight -v. Fisher, Pet. C. C. 41;

Tarlton 0. Fisher, Doug. 671; Mag-

nny '0. Burt, 5 Q. B. 381; Yearsley 0.

Hcane, 14 M. & W. 322, 334; Fletcher

1:. Baxter, 2 Aik. 224; Waterman 0.

Merritt, '7 R. I. 345; Fox 0. Wood, 1

Rawlc, 143; Aldrich 1:. Aldrich, 8

Met. 102; Wilmarth o. Burt, '7 Met.

257.

aftlrmlng common law principles.
Bee Knott "· Jarboe, 1 Met. (Ky.) li04..
1 Gage "· Graffan, 11 Mass. 181;
May"· Walters, 2 McCord, 470.
1 Bee Scanlan f), Turner, 1 Bailey,
421. The exclusion ought to go fur.
tber, and em brace near kinship, and
perhaps does. One difficulty may be
encountered in some of our statutes,
which make provision for a service
by some other officer when a sheriff
is interested or a party, but do not go
further.
It Is held in New York that the
officer may serve the process in his
own favor by which suit is commenced, if it ia not process ot arrest.

Bennet fl. Fuller, 4 Johns. 486; Tuttle
.,, Hunt, 9 Cow. 436; Putnam"· Man,
8 Wend. 202. The danger of such a
doctrine is perceived in the last case,
in which it is held that the constable's return of service of a summons
in his own fa.vor is not traversable.
1 Blight ·11. Fisher, Pet. C. C. 41;
Tarlton fl. Fisher, Doug. 671; Mag.
nay"· Burt, 5 Q. B. 381; Yearsley "·
Beane, 14M. & W. 322, 334; Fletcher
.,, Baxter, 2 Aik. 224; W atermiUl "·
Merritt, 7 R.I. 34li; Fox fl. Wood, 1
Rawle, 143; Aldrich tJ, Aldrich, 8
Met. 102; Wilmarth .,, Burt, 7 Met.
IIS7.
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THE waonos or smnnna AND LIBEL.

-

The wrong of a malicious prosecution, which was considered

in the preceding chapter, is akin to the wrongs known under the

designation of slander and libel. Though it is injurious in that

it is likely to subject the party to expense and trouble to make

good his defense, it is also a most effective species of defamation,

the defamatory matter being not only published, but made more

formal, and apparently authoritative, by the machinery of the

OHAPTER VII.

la\v being made use of for the purpose.

Slander and libel are different names for the same wrong accom-

plished in different ways. Slander is oral defamation published

without legal excuse, and libel is defamation published by means

THE WRONGS OF BLANDER AND LIBEL.

of writing, printing, pictures, images, or anything that is the

object of the sense of sight.‘

By defamation is understood a false publication, calculated to

bring one into disrepute.

Publication. In a legal sense, there is no wrong until the

defamatory charge or representation is given to the world. This

is done when it is put before one or more third persons; it is

then said to be published. To say to a 1nan’s face any evil thing
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concerning him is no defamation; for though it may be annoy-

ing, aggravating, and possibly injurious to him in its effect upon

his mind, and indirectly upon his business, still there is as yet

no publication, and consequently nothing to affect the party’s

reputation. The reputation is not assailed, and cannot presum-

ably be injured when the false charge 'is made only to the party

himself.

If the party who is thus falsely accused repeats it to others,

‘Mr. Townsend, in his Treatise on many deﬁnitions which have been

Slander and Libel, § 21, note, collects given of these wrongs.

13

The wrong of a malicious prosecution, which was considered
in the preceding chapter, is akin to the wrongs known under the
designation of slander and libel. Though it is injurious in that
it is likely to subject ti1e party to expense and trouble to make
~d his defense, it is also a most effecti'"e species of defamation,
the defamatory matter being not only published, but made more
formal, and apparently authoritative, by the machinery of the
law bein~ made use of for the purpose.
Slander and libel are different names for the ~;arne wrong accomplished in different ways. Slander is oral defamation published
without legal excuse, and libel is defamation published by means
of writing, printing, pictures, jmages, or ltnythinp; that is the
object of the sense of sight.'
By defamation is understood a false publication, calculated to
bring one into disrepute.
Publication. In a legal sense, there is no wrong until the
defamatory charge or representation is given to the world. This
is done when it is put before one or more third pertions; it is
then said to be published. To say to a man's face any evil thing
concerning him is no defamation; for though it may be annoying, aggra\·ating, and possibly injurious to him in its effect upon
his mind, and indirectly upon his business, still there is as yet
no publication, and consequently nothing to affect the party's
reputation. The reputation is not assailed, and cannot presumably be injured when the false charge 'is made only to the party
himself:
If the party who is thus falsely accused repeats it to others,
1 lfr. Townsend, in bfa Treatise on
Slander and Libel, § 21, no1.e, collects

13

many definitions which have been
given or these wrongs.
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by way of complaint or otherwise, it may then become public,

but it is still no slander, because the publication is not made by

1H4

THE LAW OF 'l.'OBTS.

the defamer. He has, it is true, uttered the charge, but he has

not published it; and the responsibility is upon the accused him-

self, if, by his own act, he brings it before the public. So a

defamatory writing is no libel so long as it remains in the pos-

session of the composer, and is seen by no one else; but if he

keeps such a paper in his possession, he must, at his peril, see

that it does not fall into the hands of others; if it does, the pub-

lication is in law attributable to him as the party who originated

the wrong, and was the means of its becoming injurious. But

delivering the writing to the party himself is no more a publica-

tion of a libel than would be the addressing to him of defamatory

words.‘

Publication implies volition and actual or presumed wrongful

intent. Therefore, if one who acts in a public or quasi public

capacity, or as agent of another, receives a defamatory paper to

carry and deliver to a third person, and he does so in good faith,

and without knowledge of the contents, as an express agent might

carry and deliver letters, or a servant, on his master's command,

do the same. this is'no publication by him, though it would be

by the sender when delivery is made.’ But in general, all per-
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sons in any manner instrumental in making or procuring to be

made the defamatory publication are jointly and severally respon-

sible therefor. Therefore, one, in the course of whose business a

libel is published by his agent, may be joined with the agent

in an action for the publication, or may be proceeded against

as principal, under the doctrine respondeat supu-Eur. But if the

agent publishes an injurious charge without the assent of his

principal, express or implied, the agent alone can be held account-

able. Where no express assent or authorization is made, the

question whether assent is to be implied, is often a somewhat

' Whether it would be a publication

of the libel if it is only delivered to

the agent of the party, who is sent by

his principal for it, qucra. The de-

cision in Brunswick v Harmer, 14 Q.

B. 185, is in the atlirumtive. Com-

pute Haynes v. Leland, 29 Me. 233;

Sutton 0. Smith, 13 Mo. 120. That is

no publication of a slander which is

spoken in a foreign language which

the hearer does not understand. Kiene

'0. Ruff, 1 Iowa, 482.

’ Townshend on Slander and Libel,

§ 121. It is no publication by one

who picks up and delivers a sealed

by way of complaint or otherwise, it may then become public,
bnt it is still no slander, because the publication is not made by
the defamer. He has, it is true, uttered the charge, but he has
not published it; and the responsibility is upon the accused himsdf, if, by his own act, he brings it before the public. So a
defamatory writing is no libel so long as it remains in the possession of the composer, and is seen by no one else; but if he
keeps such a paper in his possession, he must, at his peril, see
that it does not fall into the hands of others; ~f it does, the publication is in law attributable to him as the party who originated
the wrong, and was the means of its becoming injurious. Bot
delivering the writing to the party himself is no more a publication of a libel than would be the addressing to him of defamatory
words.1
Publication implies volition and actual or presumed wrongful
intent. Therefore, if one who acts in a public or quasi public
capacity, or as agent of another, receives a defamatory paper to
carry and delh·er to a third person, and he does so in good faith,
aud without knowledge of the contents, as an express agent might
carry and deliver letters, or a servant, on ltis master's command,
do the same. this is•no publication by him, though it would be
by the sender when delivery is made.' But in general, all persons in any manner instrumental in making or procuring to be
made the defamatory publication are jointly and severally responsible therefor. Therefore, one, in the course of whose business a
libel is published by his agent, may be joined with the agent
in an action tor the publication, or may be pro<.'Ct:lded ~rainst
as principal, under the doctrine respondeat 8UplriCJ7'. But if the
agent publishes an injurious charge without the assent of his
principal, express or implied, the agent alone can be held accountable. Where no express assent or authorization is made, the
quet.ition whether assent is to be implied, is often a somowhat

letter, the contents of which are un-

known to him. Fonvllle v. M’Nease,

Dudley, 803.

I Whether it would be a publication
of t.he libel if it is only delh·crcd to
t.he agent of the party, who ts sent by
his principal for it, quere. The decision in Brunswick tl Harmer, 14 Q.
B. 185, is in the affirmative. Cuw.
plll'e Haynes "· Leland, 29 lie. 2a3;
Sutton e. Smith, 18 Mo. 120. ThM is
no publication of a slander which is

spoken in a foreign langu&gc which
the hearer does not understand. Kiene
e. Ruff, 1 Iowa, 482.
• TownslH·nd on Slander and Libel,
§ 121. It is no publication by one
who picks up and delivers a sealed
letter, the contents of which arc un.
known to him. Fonville e. M'Neaae.
Dudley, 808.
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diﬂicnlt one, and must be determined by the nature of the agency,

the course of the business, etc. Thus, the assent of the pro-
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prietor of a business must be presumed to have been given to

the reports, advertisements, etc., published by his agents in man-

aging it, and to the letters written by them in carrying it on;'

but when the party to a suit places his case in the hands of an

attorney, he has not the ordinary supervision of a. principal over

l;is business, and cannot be understood as authorizing the case

to be conducted in any other than a lawful and legitimate way;

and he is therefore not responsible if the attorney shall insert

defamatory matter in his pleadings. or abuse his privilege of

speech in addressing the jury, unless his express assent is shown.’

The publisher of a newspaper must, at his peril, see that the

supervision of his business is such as to exclude all libellous pub-

lications, and he is responsible, though one is made without his

knowledge, and notwithstanding stringent regulations made by

himself, which, if observed, would have prevented it.‘ This

liability is not planted on the ground merely of the duty of the

principal to see that his business is managed in good faith and

with proper care, but it corresponds to the li_ability of one who,

having brought upon his premises something extremely liable to

inﬂict great and irreparable injury, is required at all events
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to make good the injury resulting from the inadequacy of his

precautions.‘

snsnnnn.

Words Actionable per se. Certain publications are said to

be actionable per se. By this is meant that an action will lie for

making them without proof of actual injury, because their neces-

sary or natural and proximate consequence would be to cause

‘Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. o.

Quigley, 21 How. 202; ltlaynard 0.

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. 34 Cal., 48.

‘Hardin 0. Cumstock, 2 A. K.

Marsh, 480.

‘Pt-rrett *0. Times Newspaper, 25

La. Ann. 170; Buckley 1:. Knapp, 48

~lifficnlt one,

and must be determined by the nature of the agency,
the course of the business, etc. Thus, the assent of the proprietor of a business must be presumed to have been given to
the reports, advertisements, etc., published by his agents in managing it, and to the letters written by them in carrying it on; •
hut when the party to a suit places his mse in the hands of an
attorney, he has not the ordinary supervision of a principal over
ltis business, and cannot be understood as authorizing the case
to be conducted iu any other than a lawful and legitimate way;
and he is therefore not responsible if the attorney shall insert
defamatory matter in his pleadings, or abuse his privilC'ge of
speech in addressing the jury, unless his express assent is ~hown.•
The publisher of a newspaper must, at his peril, see that the
supervision of his busin('SS is such as to exclude all libellous publications, and he is responsible, though one is made without his
knowledge, and notwithstanding stringent regulations mad~ by
himself, which, if observed, would have prevented it.• This
liability is not planted on the ground merely of the dnty of the
principal to see that his business is managed in good faith and
with proper care, but it corresponds to the l~bility of one who,
having brought upon his premises something extremely liable to
inflict great and irreparable injury, is requir<->d at all events
to make good the injury resulting from the inadequacy of his
precautions.•

110.152; Storey 0. Wallace, 60 lll. 51;

(‘ommonweallh lo. Morgan, 107 Muss.

199; Scripps -0. Reilly, 35 Mich. 371;

Same Case, 87 Mich. —; Andres o.

Wells, 7 Johns. 260; Dunn 0. Hall,

1 Incl. 845.

‘ A journalist cannot protect him-

self‘ from the consequences of pub-

Words Actionable per se.

Certain publications are said to
be actionable per 86. By this is meant that an action will lie for
making them without proof of actual injury, because their necessary or natural and proximate conr:;equence would be to cause

lishing a libel by assurances of its

1rntht'nlnr-ss, and by a contract of

imlvmnity from the writer. Atkins

v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 78. But if he pub-

lishes an article, supposing it tn be

innocent, as upon its fare it seems

to he. he may be excused. See Smith

0. Ashley, ll Met. 867.

a Pblladelpbla, etc., R. R. Co. e.
21 How. 20'~; lfaynnrd "·
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 34 Cal., 48. ·
1 Hardin e. Comstock, S A. K.
11arah, 480.
' PerreLl tt. Timu N ew~p!lpcr, 21i
La. Ann. 170; Buckley tl. Knapp, 48
:Mo. 152; Storey11. Wl\llace, 60 Ill. 51;
('ommonw<'nlth e. ~[organ, 107 }[nss.
198; fkripps "· &·illy, 35 Mich. Sit;
Same Case, 87 Mich. - ; Andres tl.
Qni~tley,

Wells, 7 Johns. 260; Dunn e. Hall,
1 Ind. 345.
'A journalist cannot protect him~If from the <'ODS(•qlll'DCCS of publishin~ a libel by assurances of 1114
truthfnlrwss, and by a contract of
imh·mnity from the writer. Atkins
"· John!!on, 43 Vt. 78. But if be publishes an article, supposing It tu be
inno<'I.'Dt, 118 upon ita fare it seems
to be, he may be excused. See Smitb
e. Ashley, 11 Mel 867.
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injury to the person of whom they are spoken, and therefore

injury is to be presumed.’ In the case of certain other publica-

tions no such presumption can be made, because observation does

not justify a like conclusion. Therefore, in such cases, the pub-

lications are only actionable on averment and proof that injury

which the law can notice actually followed as a natural and

proximate consequence.

In the recent case of Pollard v. Lyon, spoken words, as a

cause of action. are classiﬁed by Mr. Justice CLIFFORD as follows:

“ 1. Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party

the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpi-

tude, for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted

and punished. 2. \Vords falsely spoken of aperson which impute

that the party is infected with some contagious disease, where if

the charge is true, it would exclude the party from society.

3. Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which impute

to the party unﬁtness to perform the duties of an office or employ-

ment of proﬁt, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the

duties of such an ofﬁce or employment. 4. Defamatory words

falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in his or

her profession or trade. 5. Defamatory words falsely spoken of
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a person which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the

party special damage.” '

The ﬁrst four of these classes are of words actionable per se.

The ﬁfth embraces cases which are actionable only when the

special damage is averred.

Brief notice will be taken of these several classes.

1. Words which impute to the Party an Indictable Oﬁ‘ense.

It is agreed on all hands that it is not always prima facie act-

ionable to impute to one an act which is subject to indictment

and punishment. Importance in the law of defamation is

attached to the inherent nature of the indictable act, and ﬂl>()

to the punishment which the law assigns to it. In the leading

case of Brooker v. Oojin, the following was given as the test:

“ In case the charge, if true, will subject the party charged to an

indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or subject him

to an infamous punishment, then the words will be in themselves

‘ Townshend on Slander and Libel, ' Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. Rep. 225,

§ 14s. 226.

\

e ?¥ €_____§_i___,

liiJnry to the person of whom they are spoken, and therefore
injury is to be presumed.' In the case of certain other publications no such presumption can be made, because observation does
not justify a like conclusion. Therefore, in such cases, the publications are only actionable on averment and proof that injury
which the law can notice actually followed as a natural and
proxima.to consequence.
In the recent case of Pollard v. Lyon, spoken words, as a
cause of action, are classified by Mr. Justice CLIFFORD as follows:
"1. Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party
the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charg-e is true, may be indicted
and punished. 2. 'Vords falsely spoken .of a person which impute
that the party is infected with some contagious disea:>e, where if
the charge is true~ it would exclude the party from society.
3. Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which impute
to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment of profit, 'or the want of integrity in the discharge of the
duties of such an office or employment. 4. Defamatory words
falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in his or
her profession or trade. 5. Defamatory words falsely spoken of
a person which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the
party special damage." 1
The first tour of these classes are of words actionable per se.
The fifth embraces cases which are actionable only when the
special damage is averred.
Brief notice will be taken of these several classes.

1. Words which impute to the Party an Indictable Offense.
It is agreed on all hands that it is not always prima facie actionable to impute to one an act which is subject to indictment
and punishment. Importance in the law of defamation is
attached to the inherent nature of the indictable act, and aJ:.o
to the pnnif>hment which the law assigns to it. In the leading
case of Brooker v. Goffin, the following was given as the test:
"In case the charge, if true, will subject the party charged to an
indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or subject him
to an infamous punishment, then the words will be in themselves
1 Townshend

i 148.

on Blander and Libel,

1 Pollard "· Lyon, 91 U. B. Rep. 225,
226.
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actionable; ” and this test has been accepted and applied so often

197

and so generally that it may now be accepted as settled law.‘

' See Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. Rep.

225; Anonymous, 60 N. Y. 263. In

actionable;" and this test has been accepted and applied so often
and so generally that it may now be accepted as settled law.•

Miller u. Parish, 8 Pick. 384. 385. Pan-

Xnn, C. J., says: “ It is objected that a

fulsc and malicious charge of fornica-

tion against a female will not sustain

an action of slander, because fornica-

tion is not a crime at common law, and

is not punishable by statute with igno-

minious punishment. We do not

think that the objection is valid; for

whenever an offense is charged which,

if proved, may subject the party to a

punishment, though not ignominious,

but which brings disgrace upon the

party falsely accused, such an accu-

sation is actionable."

The above rule approved in Cox v.

Bunker, Morris, 269. In Perdue 0.
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Burnett, Minor, (Ala) 138, the words,

“ You have altered the marks of four

of my hogs,” were held in themselves

actionable, as they charge an act in-

volving moral turpitude, and an in-

diclable offense, although the punish-

ment may not be infamous.

They must convey a charge of some

act criminal in itself, and indictable

as such. and subject in the party to

an infamous punishment or some

oﬂ'cnse involving moral turpitude.

McCuen v. Ludlum, 17 N. J. 12.

In Gosling 0. Morgan, 32 Penn. St.

273, 2'75, the undisturbed authority of

the leading cases of Bhaifer o. Kim-

zer, 1 Binn. 537; McC1ury v. Ross, 5

Binn. 218, and Andreas o. Koppen-

l1eafer,3 B. & R. 255, establishes the

principle that " words spoken of a

private person are only actionable

when they contain a plain imputa-

tion not merely of some indictable

offense, but one of an infamous char-

acter, or subject to an infamous

and disgraceful punishment.“ S. P.

Klumph 0. Dunn, 66 Penn. St. 141;

Hoag u. Hatch, 23 Conn. 585, 590. It

is not sutilcient that they imputc to a

person merely the violation of a penal

or criminal law, but that they charge

him with a crime, which involves

moral turpitude, or would subject

him to an infamous punE.~'hmenl.

To the same effect are Dottarer 0.

Bushey, 16 Penn. St. 204, 209; Stitzell

0. Reynolds, 67 Penn. St. 54, 57.

In Ranger 0. Goodrich, 17 Wis. '78,

80, per P.\mn,J.: “It is a general

rule that words charging another

with a crime involving moral turpi-

tude punishable by law are action-

able.”

In Montgomery v. Deeley, 3 Wis.

709, 712. the court quote Brooks o.

Cotﬁn, 5 Johnson, 188, recognizing

the same lest.

1 See Pollard "· Lyon, 91 U. S. Rep.
223; Anonymous, 60 N. Y. 263. In
Miller"· Parish, 8 Pick. 384, 385. PARKER, C. J., says: "It is objected that a
fulsc and malicious charge of fornic&tion against a female will not sustain
an action of slander, bee~msc fornica.
tion is not a crime at common law, and
is not punishable by statute with ignoDtinious punishment. We do not
think that the objection is valid; for
whenever an offense is charged which,
If proved, may subject the party to a
punishment, though not ignominious,
but which brings disgrace upon the
party falsely accused, such an accuaation is actionable."
The above rule approved in Cox "·
Bunker, Morris, 269. In Perdue "·
Burnett, Minor, (Ala.) 138, the words,
" You have nl tcred the marks of four
of my hogs," were held in themselves
actionable, as they chnr.~e an act involving moral turpitude, and an indiclable offense, although the punishment may not be infamous.
T11cy must convey a charge of some
act criminal in itself, and indit~table
aa such. and subject in the party to
an infumf)US punishment or some
offense involving moral turpitude.
McCuen"· Ludlum, 17 N.J. 12.
In Gosling"· :Morgan, 32 Penn. St.
273,275, the undisturbed authority of
the leading cases of Shaffer e. Kintzer, 1 Hinn. 537; McClary 11. Ross, 5
Binn. 211::1, and Andreas "· Koppenbeafer, 8 S. & R. 255, establishes the
principle that "words spoken of a
private person are only actionable
when they contain a plain imputation not merely of some indictable
oft'en~M~, but one of an infamous charac~r. or subject to an infamous
ud disgraceful punishment." S. P.
Xlumph ._ Dunn, 66 Penn. t:Jt. 141;

Hoag 11. Hatch, 23 Conn. ii85, 590. I&
Is not sufficient that they Impute to a
person merely the violation of a penal
or criminal law, but that they charge
him with o. crime, which involves
moral turpitude, or would subject
him to an infamous Jllmr~hmcnt.
To the same cffl·ct arc Dottnrer "·
Bushey, 16 Penn. Ht. 201-, 20D; t:'titzell
e. Reyuulus, 67 Pl·un. St. 54, 57.
In Ranger tl. Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78,
80, per PAINE, J.: " It. is a ge>neral
rule that words chnrginA" another
with a crime involving mural turpitude punil:~hallle by law are actionable."
In 1\fontgomery "· Dcdey, 3 Wis.
'2'09, 712, the court quote Brooks .,,
Coffin, 6 Johnson, 188, recognizing
the sumo test.
In Filbcr tl. Dautermann, 20 Wis.
518, 520, the court say: "This is certainly 'a crime involvin~t moral turpitude,' and subjects the party guilty
of its commission to 'an infamous
punishment,'" citing above '\\'isconsin cnses, nnd Bcnaway "· Conyne, 8
Chand. (Wis.) 214.
Hollingsworth"· Shaw, 19 Ohio St.
430, 433: "These aulborities, and the
general current of decisions, warrant
us in saying that to rt•nder words actionablt' per 1e, on the ground tlmt
they impute criminality to the plaintiff, they must, 1st, be such as charge
him with an indictable offense; and,
2d, the otlcnsc charged must involve a
high degree of moral turpitude, or
subject the offender to infamous punishment."
In Davis "· Brown, 27 Ohio St. 820,
828, "The words must import a charge
of an indictable offenst>, involving
moral turpitude or inf11moua puniahml'nl."
Same rule in Dial e. Holter, 6 Ohio
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In the application of this test results have been worked out

in some cases which cannot be said to be entirely satisfactory.

Thus, it has been held in Pennsylvania that to charge one with

having made a libel is slanderous; the punishment at the com-

imon law having been infamous, and the offense itself, in its

higher degree, being infamous.‘ And in New York, to charge

one with removing landmarks is held slanderous, on the ground

that the offense involves moral turpitude.’ On the other hand,

whatever the moral turpitude involved in the act, it is generally

agreed that it is not actionable per se to charge it if it is not

indictable, even though it be punishable as disorderly conduct.

Therefore, to charge a female with being a common prostitute is

held not actionable without averment of special damage, though

it is ditlicult to eonceive that any other charge can be more likely

to injure, and the conduct itself is punishable as vagrancy.' So,

St. 228, 241, and in Alfele o. Wright,

1'7 Ohio St. 238, 241.

See, further, Perdue o. Burnett, Mi-

nor, (A1a.) 138; lloward 0. Stephen-

son, 2 Const. Rep. (S. C.) 408; Gage 0.

Shelton, 3 Rich. 242.

Some eases go further, and seem to

In the application of this test resnlts have been worked out
in some cases which cannot be said to be entirely satisfactory.
Thus, it bas been held in Pennsylvania that to charge one with
having made a libel is slanderous; the punishment at the common law having been infamous, ami the offeme itself, in its
higher degree, being infamous.' And in New York, to charge
one with removing landmarks is held slanderous, on the ground
that the offense in\'olves· moral tnrpitude.1 On the other hand,
whatever the moral turpitude involved in the act, it is generally
agreed that it is not actionable per 88 to charge it if it is not
indictable, even though it be punishable as disorderly conduct.
Therefore, to charge a female with being a common prostitute is
held not actionable without averment of special damage, though
it is difficult to conceive that any other charge can be more likely
to injure, and the conduct itself is punishable as vagrancy.• So,
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require that, in order to render the

charge actionable per ea, the act im-

puted shall not only be subject to an

infamous punishment, but also in-

volve moral turpitude. Thus, in

Redway 0. Gray, 31 Vt. 292, 298, the

court, through Pommn, J., say: " We

think that in addition to the olfensc

charged being punished eorporeally,

it must impute moral turpitude, and

the true reason why assaults, and

breaches of the peace, and violations

of the liquor law, are not such of-

fenses as make words charging them

actionable, is because they do not

necessarily, and in a legal sense, im-

ply moral turpitude. The offense of

larceny does necessarily imply it, and

there is no distinction between grand

and petty larceny in this respect."

See, also, Smith v. Smith, 2 Snced, 473.

' Andres 0. Koppenheafer, 3 S. & R.

255.

‘Young o. Miller, 3 Hill, 21. See

Todd '0. Rough, 10 8: R18; Beck

v. Stitzel, 21 Penn. -. . 522; Hoag -1:.

Hatch, 23 Conn. 585; Townshend on

Slander and Libel, § 155, and cases

cited. The grade of crime—whether

felony or mlstl0l1l('{ll10l'—i5 immate-

rial. Young 0. Miller, 3 Hill, 24, and

cases cited. In l\IIl~Sil(3lll1SBl.i3 it has

been held actionable per an to charge

a woman with drunkenness; that of-

fense being subject to disgraceful

punishment. Brown 1:. Nickerson, 5

Gray, 1. To accuse one of committing

an assault and battery is not per so

slanderous. Billings v.Wing,7 Vt. 439.

Theieharge may be made in indirect

terms or by way of interrogation;

Gorham 0. Ives, 2 Wend. 53-1; Gibson

v. Williiims, 4 Wend. 320; or by way

of expressing belief merely. Dot-

tarer 0. Bushby, 16 Penn. St. 204.

Where dogs are the subject of lar-

ceny it is actionable per ea to charge

St. 228, 241, and in Alfele tl. Wright,
• Young "· 'Mill<>r, 3 Hill, 21. See
17 Ohio St. 238, 241.
Todd "· Rough, 10 8 & R. 18; Beck
See, further, Perdue tl. Burnett, Mi- "· 8titzcl, 21 Penn. St. 522; Hoag tl.
nor, (Ala.) 138; llownrd tl. l::!tephen. Hatcll, 23 Cunn. 58.); Townshend on
aon, 2 Con st. Rep. (8. C.) 408; Gage tl. Sbmder and Libel, § 1~.'>, and cases
cited. The !!rad<> of crime-whetlwr
Shelton, 3 Rich. 242.
Some case<J go further, and seem to felony or misdemPanor-is immaterequire that, in order to render tile · rial. Young -o. 1\llller, 3 Hill, 24, and
charge actionable JJer ae, the act im. cases cited. In ]!Ja,sachu>~etts it has
puted shall not only be subjt·ct to an been held aclionahle per se to charge
infamous punishment, but also in- a woman with drunkenness; that ofvolve moral turpitude. Thus, in tense being subject to disgraceful
Re!lway tl. Gray, 31 Vt. 202, 298, the punishment. Brown "· Nickerson, 5
court, through PoJ.AND, J., say: "We Gray, 1. To accuse one of committing
think that in addition to the offense an B!<sault and battery is not per s~J
cllarged being punished corporeally, slan<IProus. Billings v.Wing, 7 Vt. 489.
it must impute moral turpitude, and Tlw.charge may be made in indirect
the true reason why assaults, and terms or hy way of interrogation;
breaches of the peace, and violations Gorham tl. lve~. 2 Wend. 5:J-!; Uibson
of the liquor law, are not such of. tl. Willinms, 4 Wend. 320; or by way
fenses as make words clmrging them of expn•ssing belief merely. Dotu.ctionable, is because they do not uu·er o. Bushby, 16 Penn. St. 20!.
Where dogs are tile subject of larnecessarily, and in a legal sense, imceny it is actionable per se to charge
ply moral turpitude. The offense of
larceny does nece!lsarily imply it, and one with stealing a dog. Harrington
there is no distinction between grund tl. Miles, 11 Kan. 480; 8. C. 15 Am.
IUld petty larceny in this respect." Rep. 355.
• Brooker ~. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188;.
Bee, also, Smith"· Smith, 2 Sneed, 473.
1 Andres 11. K<,ppenbeafcr, 8 S. & R.
S. C. Bigelow, Lend. Cas. on TortJJ,
77. See Keiler tl. Lessford, 2 Cranch,
255.
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to charge one with having sworn falsely, without connecting the

charge with any pending proceedings in court, is not actionable,

because, though the taking of a false oath may be disgraceful, it

is not an indictable offense, unless taken under such circum-

stances as would make it perjury.‘ And, however positive may

be the charge, if it is accompanied with words which qualify the

meaning, and show to the bystanders that the act imputed is not

criminal, this is no slander, since the charge, taken together,

does not convey to the minds of those who hear it an imputation

of criminal conduct. Thus, it would not be slanderous per se

to say: “ He is a thief; he has stolen my land;” land not being

the subject of larceny, and one part of the charge being relieved

of its criminal character by the other part.’

190; Pollard 0. Lyon, 91 U. S. Rep.

225; Bisscll v. Cornell, 24 Wend. 354;

Terwilliger 0. Wands, 1'7 N. Y. 54;

Wilson v. Goit, 17 N. Y. 442; S'an-

ﬂeld 0. Boyer, 6 Har. & J. 248;

Woodbury v. Thompson, 3 N. H. 194;

to charge one with having sworn falz'cly, without connecting the
charge with any pending proceedings in conrt, is not actionable,
because, though the taking of a false oath may be disgraceful, it
is not an indictable offense, unless taken under such circumstances as would make it perjury! And, however positive may
be the charge, if it is accompanied with words which qnalify tlte
meaning, and show to the bystanders that the act imputed is not
criminal, this is no slander, sin<.oe the charge, taken together,
does not convey to the minds of those who hear it an impntation
of criminal conduct. Titus, it \Votlld not be slanderous per R8
to say: '• lie is a thie!,; he has stolen my land;" land not being
the sobjt•ct of larceny, and one part of the charge bei.1g relieved
of ita criminal character by the other part.'

Boyd v. Brent, 3 Brcv. 241; Underhill

o. Welton, 32 Vt. 40; Castleberry ~v.

Kelly, 26 Geo. 606; W. v. L., 2 Nott

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

& McCord, 204; Berry o. Cartcr, 4

Stew. & Port. 387; Elliott r. Ailsberry,

2 Bihb, 473; Linney v. Maton, 18

Texas, 449; McQueen o. Fulgham, 27

Texas, 463. In Massachusetts this

rule is rejected, and the imputation

of unchnstity to a female is held act-

ionable pvr se. Miller v. Parish, 8

Pick. 884. But fornication is there

indictable and punishable by ﬁne,

and in case the ﬁne is not paid, by

imprisonment. In Wisconsin, where

fornication is made punishable by

statute, it is actionable to char_;c it.

Mayer r. Schlcichtcr, 2!) Wis. 646. So,

also, in Iowa Cox r. Bunker, Morris,

269; Haynes e. Ritchcy, 30 Iowa, 76.

And, scc, Frisbic v. Fowler, 2 Conn.

707; $cxton 0. Todd, Wriglit, 317;

Wilson c. Runyan, Wright, 651; Ma-

lone 0. Stewart, 15 Ohio, 319. In the

following States to imputc unchastity

to a female is actionable by statutes:

Alabama, Maryland, North Unrolina,

South Carolina, Kentucky, Missouri,

Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, New

York.

The wrongful act of a third party,

induced by the slander, will not sup-

port an action where the words are

not actionable per se. Vicars v. Wil-

cocks; 8 East. 1. As to what will

constitute special injury. see Moody

o. Baker, 5 Cow. 413; Pcttibone v.

Simpson, 66 Barb. 492; Bench u.Ran-

ncy, 2 Hill, 2309; Davies e. Solomon,

L. R. '7 Q. B. 112.

‘Ward v. Clark, 2 Johns. 10, and

cases cited. But to say of one, “Ile

has sworn to a damned lie, and I will

put him through for it,” is ht-ld act-

tiunable, as implying that the false

oath was tuken undcr such circum-

stances as made it punishable. Crone

v. Angel]. 14 Mich. 3-10; Brown v.

Hanson, 53 Geo. G32; Gilnian v. Low-

till, B Wcn(l. 573; Sll0l'\\‘0od 1:. Chuce,

190; Pollard ~. Lyon, 91 U. 8. Rep.
925; BIAAell "·Cornell, 24 Wend. aM;
Terwilliger "· WaDds, 1'1 N. Y. 54;
Wilson t~. Goit, 17 N. Y. 442; S•sn.
fleld ~- Boyer, 6 Bar. & J. 248;
Woodbmy tl. Thompson, 8 N.H. 194;
Boyd "· Brent, 8 Brev. 241; Underbill
e. Welton, 82 VL 40; Castleberry tl.
Kelly, 26 Gro. 606; W. "· L., 2 Nott
& :McCord, 204; Berry t'. Carter, j
Stew. & Port. 387; Elliott"· Allsberry,
I Bibb, 4'78; Linney o. Maton, 18
Texas, 449; McQueen "· Fulgham, 27
Texas, 463. In llassachusc.•tts this
rule Is rejected, and the imputation
of 1JnChastity to a female is held act..
ionable Pfr Be. :Yiller "· Parish, 8
Pick. 884. But fornication Is there
indictable and p11nishable by 6ne,
1Utd in ca.qe the tine is not paid, by
imprisonment.. In Wisconsin, where
forniootlon Is m11de puoi~Jhable by
a&atute, it is actionable to charge It
11ayer r. Schlcichter, 29 Wis. 646. So,
Rlao, in Iowa. Cox r. Bunker, Morris,
289; Haynes tt. Ritchey, ao Iowa, 76.
And, St.>e, Frisbie o. Fowler, 2 Conn.
'10'1; Sexton ~. Todd, Wright, 817;
Wilson "· Runyan, Wright, 651 ; Ma.
lone o. Stewart, 11) Obio, 319. In the
following States to Impute unchastity
to a female is actlonaLle by statutes:
Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina,

South Carolina, Kentucky, lllssourl,
Michigan. IJJinois, Indiana, New
York.
The wrongful act of a third party,
Induced by the slandl'r, will not aup.
port an action where the words are
not actionable pw ae. Vicars e~. WU.
cocks; 8 E118t. 1. Aa ~ wbat will
constitnte special injury, see Moody
"· Baker, 5 Cow. 418; Pettibone "·
Simpson, 66 Barb. 492; Beach "·Ran.
ney, 2 Hill, :i09; Davies tl. Solomon,
L. R. 7 Q. B. 112.
'Ward "· Clark, 2 Johns. 10, and
cases cited. But to sny of one, "lie
has sworn to a damned lie, and I will
put him through for it," is hdu act..
tlonable, as implying that the fill~
oath was taken uodt•r llllch circum.
11tanccs as made it punb.hable. Crone
tt. Angell. 14 llkh. 340; Brown "·
Hanson, 53 Gco. 632; Gilman r. Low.
ell, 8 Wend. 578; Sherwood r. Chace,
11 Wt•nd. 38; Coons r. Hobioson, 3
Barb. G2S; SpO<mer "· Ket:ler, 51 N.
Y. 527. Words are actionable whiclt
Imply a false oath in a judicial pro.
cceding, although no such procct"Jiug
existed. Bricker "· Potbi, 12 Penn.
St. 200.

' Stitzell t'. Reynolds, 67 Peon. St.
M; Ogden"· Rilcy,14 N.J. 186; t:u.
derhlll ~.Welton, 32 Vt. 40; llc<.:ah·b
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It has been sometimes supposed that the reason for holding
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an imputation of an indictable offense slanderous was, that it

imperiled the party and exposed him to the risk of prosecution

and punishment; but the authorities are not consistent with this

view. The charge of criminal conduct for which punishment

has been inﬂicted, or which has been pardoned, or a prosecution

for which is barred by the statute of limitations, will support an

action under corresponding circumstances to those which sup-

port one where the charge, if true, would still subject the party

to punishment.‘ It is not, therefore, the danger that might

follow from the charge, but the disgrace of the scandal that

constitutes the injury. And to say of ‘one, “He is a perjured

villain,” is actionable to the same extent as to charge him with

perjury in a. particular suit; the word perjnred necessarily

implying the commission by him of a crime.’

2. Words which impute to the Party a Contagious or Infec-

tious Disease. The reason for holding such words actionable is,

that they tend to exclude the party from society; and therefore

o. Smith, 22 Iowa, 212; Edgerly 0.

Swain, 32 N. H. 4'78; Ayers '0. Grider,

15 Ill. 37; Norton 12. Lucld, 5 N. H.

203; Trabue 12. Mays, 3 Dana, 138;
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Williitms '0. Hill, 19 Wend. 305; Dex-

It has been sometimes supposed that the reason for holding
an imputation of an indictable offense slanderous was, that it
imperiJcd the party and exposed him to the risk of prosecution
and punishment; but the authorities are not consistent with this
view. The charge of criminal conduct for which punishment
has been inflicted, or which has been pardoned, or a prosecution
for which is barred by th~ statute of limitations, will support an
action under corresponding circumstances to those which support one where the charge, if true, would still subject the party
to punishment. 1 It is not, therefore, the danger that might
follow from the charge, but the disgrace of the scandal that
constitutes the injury. And to say of ·one, "He is a perjured
villain," is actionable to the same exten~ as to charge him with
perjury in a particular sl{it; the word perjured necessaril1
implying the commission by him of a cri~e.'

ter '0. Taber, 12 Johns. 239; Crone 0.

Aug-el],14 Mich. 340. Sec Phillips e.

Barber, '7 Wend. 439; Parmer e. An-

derson, 33 Ala. 78; Pcgram v. Styron,

1 Bayley, 595; Perry e. Man, 1 R. I.

2. Words which impute to the Party a Contagious or Inteotious Disease. The reason for holding such words actionable is,

that they tend to exclude the party from society; and therefore

263; Miller 1;. Johnson, '79 Ill. 58;

Wright 0. Lindsay, 20 Ala. 428; Blan-

chard v. Fisk, 2 N. H. 398; Cock v.

Weatherby, 13 Miss. 333; Allen v.

Hillman, 12 Pick. 101.

‘ Carpenter -v. Tarrant, Cas. Temp.

Hardw. 339; Smith '0. Stewart, 5

Penn. St. 372; Holley o. Burgess, 9

Ala. 728; Van Ankin o. Wcstfnll, 14

Johns. 233; Krebs '0. Oliver, 12 Gray,

239; Shipp v. McCraw, 3 Murph. 463.

A child too young to be punishable

for a crime may nevertheless main-

tain an action for slander in charging

him withit. Stewartv.Howe,17 111.71.

_ ,2 -ii’

’ Sabin iv. Angel], 46 Vt. 740, charge

that one is a thief. Noonnn '0. Orton,

32 Wis. 106, charge of perjury. See,

also, Fisher o. Rotcreau, 2 McCord,

189; Hogg v. Wilson, 1 Nott & Mc.

216; Little '0. Barlow, 26 Geo. 423;

Pierson v. Steortz, Morris, 136; Mc-

Kee v. Ingalls, 5 Ill. 30; Van Akin 0.

Caler, 48 Barb. 58; Davis 1;.-Johnston,

2 Bailey, 579; Kennedy 0. Gilford, 19

Wend. 296. It has often been de-

cided that to charge one with having

been a convict is actionable per ae.

Sec Smith v. Stewart, 5 Penn. St. 372,

where the previous eases are collected.

Also, Indianapolis Sun v. Horrell, 53

Ind. 527. To sny of one, "I know

enough that he has done to send him

to the penitentiary," is actionable par

se. Johnson v. Shields, 25 N. J. 116.

To say of one, “ He was once accused

of stealing a horse; he sued the ac-

cusers, and at the trial a verdict was

brought in for the defendants," is

equivalent to a charge that he is

' Sabin "'· Angell, 46 Vt. 740, charge
"· Smith, 22 Iowa, 242; Edgerly "·
Swai!l, 82 N. H. 478; Ayers v. Grider, .thst one is a thief. Noonan"· Orton,
15 Ill. 87; Norton "'· Ludd, 5 N. H. 32 Wis. 106, charge of perjury. Bee,
203; Trabue v. ~lays, 3 Dana, 188; also, Fisher "· Uotereau, 2 McCord,
Williams v. Hill, 19 Wend. 30.3; Dex- 189; Hogg "'· Wilson, 1 Nott & Me.
ter "· Taber, 12 Johns. 2:39; Crone "'· 216; Little "'· Barlow, 26 Geo. 428;
Angell, 14 Mich. 340. Sec Phillips"'· Pierson "· Steorlz, liorri.", 186; McBarber, 7 Wend. 439; Parmer"'· An. Kee v. Ingalls, 5 Ill. 30; Van Akin e.
derson, 33 Ala. 78; Pegram 11. Styron, Caler, 48 Barb. 58; Davis"'· Johnston,
1 Bayley, 595; Perry "·Man, 1 R. I. 2 :Sailey, 579; Kennedy 11. Gifford, 19
263; )li1ler "· Johnson, 79 Ill. 58; Wend. 296. It has often been de.
Wright"'· Lindsay, 20 Ala. 428; Blan- cided that to charge one with having
chard v. Fisk, 2 N.H. 398; Cock "· been a convict is actionable pw Bt.
Weatherby, 18 Miss. 838; Allen "'· Sec Smith "'· Stewart, 5 Penn. St. 872,
Hillman, 12 Pick. 101.
where the previous cases arc collected.
1 Carpenler "· Tarrant, Cas. Temp.
Also, Indianapolis Sun v. HorreJl, 58
Hardw. 339; Smith e. StewiLl·t, IS IDd. 527. To say of one, •• I know
Penn. St. 372; Holley "'· Burgess, 9 enough that he has done to send him
Ala. 728; Van Ankin "'· WrstfHll, 14 to the penitentiary," is actionable Pl1'
Johns. 233; Krebs"· Oliver, 12 Gray, ae. Johnson"'· Shields, 25 N.J. 116.
239; Shipp"· McCraw, 3 Murph. 463. To say of one, "He was once accused
A child too young to be punishable of stealing a horse ; he sued the acfor a crime may nevertheless main- cusers, and at the trial a verdict was
tain an action for slander in charging brought In for the defendants," is
him with it. Btewarh. Howe, 171ll. 71. equivalent to a charge that he Ia
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the charge should impute the existence of the disease at the
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time.‘ What diseases would be embraced within this rule is not

certain, but it is probable that at the present day only those

which are contagious or infectious, and which are also usually

brought upon one by disreputable practices: and the list would

perhaps be limited to venereal diseases.’

3. Words Damaging as respects Oﬂiee or Profession. This

class of cases, in order to be prima jizcie actionable, must

clearly appear to be spoken of the party in respect to his oﬁice,

profession or employment. and if the words counted on do not

by themselves show this, the declaration must contain the neces-

the clu~.rge should impute the cxi~tence of the disease at the
time.' What dit:eases would be embraced within this rule is not
certain, but it is probable that at the present day only those
which are contagious or infedious, and which are also usually
brought upon oue by disreputable practices: and the list would
perhaps be limited to venereal diseases.w

sary averments to connect them.‘ An illustration of such a

slander is when a professional man is charged with general pro-

fessional ignorance or incompetency.‘

guilty of larceny. Johnson o. St.

Louis Dispatch Co., 65 Mo. 539.

‘ Taylor v. Hall, 2 Strn. 1189; Wil-

liams 0. Holdredgc, 22 Barb. 396;

Carslakc 12. Mapledornm, 2 '1‘. R. 473;

Nichols v. Gray, 2 Ind. 82.

’ Sce Watson 12. McCarthy, 2 Kelly,

57; Irons v. Field, 9 R. I. 216; Nich-
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ols v. Guy, 2 Ind. 82; Kaucher u. Blinn,

8. Words Damaging as respects Office or Profession. This
class of cases, in order to be prima facie actionable, must
clearly appear to be spoken of the party in respect to his office,
proti.'8sion or employment, and if the words counted on do not
by themselves show this, the declaration m11st contain the nPcessary a\·erments to connect them.• An illnF-tration of such a
slander is when a professional man is charged with general professional ignorance or incompetency.•

29 Ohio, (N. s.) 62.

'Ayre v. Craven, 2 Ad. & El. 7.

‘ Camp 0. Martin, 23 Conn. 86. See

Ayre v. Craven, 2 Ad. & El. 7; Jones

0. Diver, 22 Ind. 184; Sumner 1:. Ut-

lcy, 7 Conn. 258; Camp r. Martin,

23 Conn. 86; Sccor r. Harris, 18 Barb.

425; Carroll e. White. 33 Barb. 615;

Rice 0. Cottrel, 5 R I. 340; Cases of

slanders of physiciwns; Rich 0. Cav-

cnaugh. 2 Penn. St. 187; Gooclenow

o. Tappnn, 1 Ohio, 60; Garr v. Sclden,

6 Barb. 416; Chipman 0. Cook, 2

Tyler, 456; Cases of slundcrs of law-

yers; McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binn. 178;

Hayncr u. Cowden, 27 Ohio. tn. s)

292; Hartley o. Herring, 8 T. R. 130;

Gnllwey -0. Marshall, 24 Eng. L. & E.

463; Chaddock v. Briggs, 18 Muss.

248; Cases of slandcrs of clcrgymen.

The following are further illustra-

tions: Charge that the postmaster

would rob the mail. Craig o. Brown,

5 Blackt". 44; charge that the chief

engineer of the ﬁre department was

drunk at a ﬁre, Gottbehuct. 1:. Hub-

achek, 36 Wis. 515; statement of a

justice of the peace, in connection

with his oﬁice, that he is a rascal, vil-

lain and liar, King v. Cliuundlcr, 2

Rayin. 1363. And, see. Lindsey 0.

Smith, 7 Johns. 359; Gove a. Blethen,

21 Minn. 80. But the rule does not

apply if at the time the words were

spoken the party had ceased to hold

the ofﬂcc. Gibbs o. Prices, Styles,

231; Collins 0. Mellen, Cro. (.‘ar. 282;

Bellamy e. Burch, 16 M. & W. 590;

Forward o. Adams, 7 Wend. 204; Ed-

wards v._Howell, 10 Ircd. 211; Allen

o. Hillman, 12 Pick. 101. Soto nssail

the character or integrity of a judge.

Robbins e. Trendwuy, 2 J.J.Mursl1.

540; Hook v. Hackney, 16 S. & R.

BS5. Or of a justice of the peace.

Oram 1:. Franklin, 5 Blackf. 42. Or

JrOilty of larceny. Johnson "· St.
Loui>~ Dispatch Co., 65 l\lo. 1i:m.
I Taylor tt. Hall, 2 Stra. 1180; Williams "· Holdredge, 22 Burb. 396;
C1U'slnke "· )[aplcdoram, 2 1'. R. 4.73;
NichPls t. Gray, 2 Ind. 82.
'See Watson"· McCarthy, 2 Kelly,
67; Irons"· Fil'lcl, 9 R. I. 216; Nichols"· Guy, 2 Ind. 82; Kaucher o. Blinn,
29 Ohio, (N. s.) 62.
'Ayre 11. Craven, 2 Ad. & El. 7.
4 Can1p 11. Martin, 23 Conn. 8!1. Sec
.A.yre 11. Craven, 2 Ad. & El. 7; J onc:s
~. Diver, 22 Ind. 18-1; Sumner "· Utley, 7 Conn. 258; Cnmp e. ~lurtin,
23 Conn. 86; Secor r . H nrrh~. 18 Durb.
425; Carroll "· White. aa Barb. 615;
Rice "· Cottrel, 5 R I. 840; Cuses of
alunders of physichns; Rich "· Cavenaugh. 2 Penn. St. 187; Goodenow
tl. Tappan, 1 Ohio, 60; Garr "· &·!den,
6 Darb. 416; Chipman "· Cook, 2
Tyler, 456; Cases nf slanders of law.
yers; :McMillan v. Birch,l Binn. 178;
Hayner "· Cowden, 27 Ohio, (N. 8)
292; Hartley "· llcrring, 8 T. R. taO;
Gnllwey '1!. Marshall, 24 Eng. L. & E.
463; Chaclllnck "· Briggs, 13 !luss.
248; CRSes of slanders of clergymen.
The following are further illustra-

tions: Chnrgc that the pm•tmaster
would rob the mt\il, Craig"· Brnwn,
5 Blackf. 44; charge that the chief
engineer of the fire dl'partment waa
drunk at a fire, Gottbehuet "· IIubachl'k, 3G Wis. f.ilu; statement of a
jtt.ttice of the peace, in connection
with his office, that be is a rascal, villain and liar, King "· Clumndler, 2
Rnym. 131.i3. And, sec, Lindsey e.
Smith, 7 Johns. 350; Gove 1l. Blethen,
21 ::\linn. 80. But the rule docs not
npply if at the time the words were
spoken the party had censed to bold
the office. Gibbs "· Prices, Styles,
2:.11; Collins 11. Mellen, Crn. Car. 289;
Bellamy "· Burch, 16 )(. & W. 590;
FoJ'W>trd "· Adams, 7 Wend. 204; Ed.
wards o.. Howell, 10 Ired. 211; Allen
fl. Hillman, 12 Pick. 101. So to assail
the cburneter or intc·~rity of a jud,!,re.
Hobbins "· Tr<•ndwny. 2 J. J. :&Iarsh.
540; Hook "· IInckney, 16 S. & R.
R85. Or of a justice of the peace.
Omm "· Franklin, 5 Blackf. 42. Or
of a circuit cour1 commissioner. Lao.
sing "· Carpenter, 9 Wis. 540. To
churge a certificated master mariner
with drunkenness while in command
of his vessel at sea, wus held actiona.
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4. To bring a ease within the fourth class mentioned, the

imputation must he such as is calculated to aﬁ'ect the party

prejudieially in the business in which he is engaged. Therefore,

a false charge that in respect to one person might be slanderous,

if made in respect to another would support no action. The

reason would be that in the one case it would be almost certainly

injurious, while in the other no presumption of injury would

arise. Thus, if it be said of a day laborer, “ He is a bankrupt,”

the remark, so far as his business is concerned, is perfectly harm-

less, while if the same remark were made of a merchant, or of

any one to whose business a good ﬁnancial credit was indispen-

sable, the natural and probable tendency would be to inﬂict an

injury which would be serious and might be disastrous.‘ The

merchant is therefore slandered when his pecuniary credit is

impugned; the day laborer is not.

The rules which protect persons against slanders in their busi-

ness are nevertheless applicable to all kinds and all grades of

business; to the day laborer and the servant as much as to the

banker, the broker or the merchant.“ And while men engaged in
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ble in Irwin 0. Brandwood, 2 Hurl. &

Uolt. 960. So to charge a clergyman

with incontinence. Gallwey 0. Mar-

shall, 9 Exch. ‘.294.

‘Brown 1:. Smith. 13 C. B. 599;

Wott 1:. (fomstock, '7 Cow. 654; Sewall

4. To bring a c.ase within the fourth class mentioned, the
imputation must be such as is calculated to affect the party
prrjndicially in the business in which he is engaged. Therefore,
a false charge that in respect to one person might be slanderous,
if made in respect tn another would support no action. Tho
reason would be that in the one case it would be almost certainly
injurious, while in the other no presumption of injury would
arise. Thus, if it be said of a day laborer, "He is a bankrupt,''
the remark, so far as his bnsinefls is concerned, is perfectly harmless, while if the same remark were made of a merchant, or of
any one to whose business a good financial credit was indispensable, the natural and probable tendency would be to inflict an
injury wllich would be serious and might be disastrous.• The
merd1ant is therefore slandered when his pecuniary credit is
impugned; the day laborer is not.
The rules which 1)rotect persons ~inst slanders in their business are nevertheless applicable to all kinds and all grades of
business; to the day laborer and the servant as much as to the
hanker, the broker or the merchant.• And while men engaged in

1». Catlin, 3 Wend. 291; Ostrom v.

Ualkins, 5 Wend. 263; Nelson 0. Bor-

chenius, 52 111.236 To call a drover

a bankrupt is actionable. Lewis 0.

Hawley, 2 Day, 495. The following

cases relating to other callings illus-

trate the rule: Phillips iv. lluefer, 1

Penn. St. 62; Burtch ~v. Nickerson, 1'1

Johns. 217; Fitzgerald 0. Redﬁeld, 51

Barb. 484; Orr '0. Skoﬁeld, 56 Me.

483; Fowles 12. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20.

It is not actionable to say of a dealer

that his goods are bad or inferior to

those dealt in by another, where no

deceit or wrong is imputed to him.

Tobias v. Hariand, 4 Wend. 537. In

Riding 1:. Smith, 1 Exch. Div. 91; S. C.

16 Moak, 547, an action by a trader

was sustained for words charging his

wife, who was his assistant in busi-

ness, with having committed adultery

on the premises, special damage

being proved. Ponnocx, B.: " The

courts have at all times been extreme-

ly careful as to verbal slander; but

where you ﬁnd that the nature of the

words is such that damages would

naturally follow from their being ut-

tered, and that damage has arisen,

then there is a cause of action. * *

The words were spoken on a public

occasion, when the clergyman was

about to read himself in, in order that

he might become the incumbent of

the parish, and the defendant, in the

presence of four persons at least, ut-

tered the words with regard to his con-

duct with the wife of the plaintiff.”

’ Terry 1:. Hooper, 1 Lev. 115. Any

charge of dishonesty, spoken of one

in connection with his business,

hie in Irwin "· Brandwood, 2 Hurl. &
Coil 960. Bo to charge a clergyman
with incontinence. Gallwey "· Mar.
shall, 9 Excb. 294.
J Brown "· Smith. 18 C. B. 599;
Mott "· Comstock, 7 Cow. 654; Sewall
fl. Catlin, 8 Wend. 291; Ostrom "·
Calkins, 5 Wend. 263; Nelson"· Bor.
chen ius, 62 Ill. 286 To call a drover
a bankrupt is actionable. Lewis "·
Hawley, 2 Day, 495. The following
cases relating to other callings illustrate the rule: Phillips ·o. Hcefcr, 1
Penn. St. 62; Burtch"· Nickerson,17
Johns. 217; Fitzgerald"· Redfield, 51
Barb. 484:; Orr "· Skofield, 56 Mo.
483; Fowles "· Bowen, 80 N. Y. 20.
It is not actionable to say of a dealer
that his goods are bad or inferi1.1r to
those dealt in by another, where no
deceit or wrong is imputed to him.
Tobias "· Harland, 4 Wend. 537. In
Riding1l. Smith, 1 Exch. Div. 91; S.C.
16 lloak, 547, an action by a tradPr
was sustained for words charging his

wife, who was his assistant fn bu!'liness, with having committed adultery
on the premises, special damage
being provud. POLI..OCK, B.: "Tho
courts have at all times been extreme.
ly careful as to verbal slander; but
where you find that the nature of tho
words is such that damages W<'Uid
naturally fullow from their being uttered, and that damage has arisen,
then there is a cause of action. • •
The words were spoken on a public
occasion, when the clergyman was
about to read himself in, in order that
be might become the incumbent of
the parish, and the defendant, in tho
presence of four persons at least, uttered the words with regard to his conduct with the wife of the plaintitl'."
1 Terry "· Hooper, 1 Lev. 115. Any
charge of dishonesty, spoken of one
in connection with his business,
whereby his character in such business may be injuriously affected, is
actionable. Orr "· Bkofield, 56 :Me.
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rival business may puff their own wares, and will be excused for
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any extravagance of statement, so long as they do not unjustly

assail the business of their rivals, yet they have no more liberty

in making unfounded and injurious imputations against rivals

to the prejudice of their business than they have upon other

persons, but must keep within the same limits of truth and

fairness.‘

5. Words Not Actionable per se. The ﬁfth class of cases

embraces all those in which the untruthful statement is not

deemed in law to be necessarily of a damagingcharaeter, but

which can be and is shown to have been damaging in the partic-

ri\'al business may pnfl:' their own wares, and will be excused for
any extravagauce of stlltemcnt, so loug a.s they do not unjustly
assail the business of their rivals, yet they have no more Hberty
in making- unfounded and injurious imputations against rivals
to the prejudice of their business than they have upon other
persons, but mu:it keep within the same limits of truth and
fairness.•

ular case, by reason of special circumstances which are set out

in the declaration. Thus, if one say of another, “He is a rogue,”

the law will not imply a resulting injury; but if it be shown

that in consequence of the imputation he was discharged from

488; Backus o. Richardson, 5 Johns.

476.

‘ Young v. Macros. 32 L. J. Q, B. 6,

S. C. 3 Best & Smith, 264, was a case

where a mineral oil merchant pub-

lished a chemist‘s report which re-

ﬂected unfavorably upon the oil
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sold by a rival merchant. It was

The fifth class of cattes
embraces all those in which the untruthful statement is not
deemed iu law to be ne<.oessarily of a damn~ing. character, but
which can be and is shown to have been damaging in the particular case, by reason of special circumstances whieh are ~;et out
in the decluration. Thus, if one ~ay of another," He is a rogue,''
the law will not imply a resulting injury; bnt if it be shown
that in consequence of the imputation he was discharged from
5. Words Not Actionable per se.

held that the action would not lie,

provided the report was the result of

1 bona ﬁdc analysis of the oils, and

contained nothing known to the de-

fendant as false at the time of pub-

lication. In Boynton 1:. Remington,

3Allcn, 397, it was held no libel upon

adealer in coal, in L., who had ad-

vertised genuinc Franklin coal for

sale, to publish the following adver-

tisement: “ Caution. The subscribers,

the only shippers of the true and ori-

ginal Franklin coal, notice that other

coal dealers in L. than our agent, J. 8.,

advertise Franklin coal. We lake this

method of cuutioning the public

against buying of other parties than

J. 8., if they hope to get the genuine

article, as we have neither sold nor

shipped any Franklin coal to any

party in L. except our agent, J. S.”

\

Of this Bronnow, O. J., says: “This

was within the privilege of fair deal-

ing, and cannot be tortured into a

disparagement of the plaintiﬂ"s char-

acter.” But in Harman 0. Delaney,

2 Stra. 898, it was held actionable

to indulge in general reﬂections upon

the character of a party and his con-

duct of his business. So in \'Vt-155 @_

Whittemorc, 28 Mich. 366, it was

held actionable per so to publish of

an agent for the Seinwuy pianos, but

who had formerly been agent for both

that and the Kuube pianos, that he

had in every instance while holding

such double agency, recommended

the Knabe piano as the best, and ad-

vised his customers to buy that, as

being superior in every respect to the

other. S00, also, Wt-stern Countit-<

Manure Co. o. Ln\\'es, etc., Co., L. R. 9

Exch. 218; S. C. 10 Monk, 391. It is

a species of slander of credit for a

banker to rt-fuse to honor the check

488; Backus "· Richardson,~ Johns.
.f76.
'Young "· Mncroo, 82 L. J. Q. B. 6,
B. C. 3 Best & Smith, 264, was a case
where a mineral oil merchant published a chemh.t's report which rc..
Oectcd unfavorably upon the oil
sold by a rivtLI merchanL It was
held that the action would not lie,
provided the repurt was the result of
a bona fld~ analysis of the oils, and
contained nothing known to the defendant as false at the time of pub.
lication. In Boynton tl, Hemington,
S Allen, 397, it was held no lillel upon
a dE.'aler in coal, in L., who bad advertised ge•1ulno Franklin coal for
sale, to pulllish the following aJvcr.
ti.sement: "Caution. The subscribers,
the only shippers of tl1e true and original Franklin coal, notice that other
coal dealel'!! in L. than our agent,J. 8.,
1\dvertise Franklin cnal. We take this
method of cautioning the public
against buying of other parties than
J. B., If they hope to get the gc·nuiuc
article, as we have neither sold nor
abipped any Franklin coal to any
party in L. except our agent, J. B."

Of this BJGRLOW, C. J., says: "This
was within the privilege of fair dealing, and cannot oo tortured into a
disparagement of the plaintiff's character." But in Hnrman "· DelanPy,
2 Btra. 898, it was held nctionallle
to indulge in general•·eftectious upon
the character of a pnrty und his con.
duct of his lmsine>~s. So in Weiss t:.
Whittemore, 28 )!ich. 866, It was
held actioual•lc pr.r If to pull! ish of
an agent for the S·einwuy pi:1nos, but
who had f<Jrmerly been agent for both
that and the Knabe pianos. that he
had in every instance while holding
such double agency, recommended
the Knabe plnno as the llest, and ad.
vil;ed hi11 cu~ton)('rs to buy that, as
being superior in every respl'ct to the
other. Sec, also, Wl'slern Counlic.;
:Manure Co. "· Lawes, t•lc., Co., L. R. 9
Exch. 218; S. C. 10 ![oak, 391. It is
a specit•s of slander of credit for a
banker to tl'fnsc to honor the chec·k
of his customer who bas money on
dcpnsiL subject to C'all, and an action
mny be maintained for the rt.•fu~al.
)[arzetti tl. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415;
Rolin tl. Steward, 14 C. B. 59.j,
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an employment, or was refused employment, the special injury is
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thus made to appear.‘ So, although to say of a female that she

is unchaste is generally held not actionable where unchastity is

not made a punishable crime, yet if the woman can show that

because of the imputation she lost a contemplated marriage, or

suffered in any manner a pecuniary loss, she is entitled to legal

redress.’ It is not thought necessary to attempt any enumera-

tion of the cases in which such actions are sustained, as it could

be to little purpose in illustrating adoctrine so general. The

injury must be pecuniary in its nature, but it is immaterial

whether it be great or small, except as the amount of the recov-

ery will depend upon it.’

LIBEL.

Compared with Slander. The difference between slander and

libel is sometimes said to be this: the one is oral defamation

and the other is defamation propagated by printing, pictures, or

other means open to the sight. There is, however, a difference

in the substance of what shall constitute an actionable charge.

It is perfectly reasonable to allow greater liberty of vocal speech

ari employment, or was refused employment, tho special injury is
thus made to appear.' So, although to say of a female that she
is unchaste is generaUy held not actionable where unchastity is
not made a punishable crime, yet if' the woman can Ehow that
because of the imputation she lost a contemplated marriage, or
snffered in any manner a pecuniary loss, she is entitled to legal
redress.' It is not thought necessary to attempt any enumeration of' the cases in which such actions are sustained, as it could
be to little purpose in illustrating a doctrine so general. The
injnry must be pecuniary in itS nature, but it is immaterial
whether it be great or small, except as the amount of the recovery will depend upon it.•

than of writing or printing, for two very plain reasons:

LIBEL.

1. Vocal utterance does not imply the same degree of delibera-

tion; it is more likely to be the expression of momentary passion
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or excitement, and is not so 0;’ en to the implication of settled

malice. Therefore, if one shall say of his neighbor, “He is a

rascal,” there is no very strong probability that the expression

will be received by by-standers as anything more than a mere

vituperative epithet, indicative of the feelings of the uttcrer,

rather than of his convictions. Therefore, to such oral expres-

‘ Oakley 0. Farrington, 1 Johns.

Cus. 129. So where the terms “cheat

and swindler” are used. Odiorne 0.

Bacon, 6 Cush. 185.

’ Shcperd e. Wakeman, 1 Sid. '79;

Reston '0. Promfeict, Cro. Eliz. 639;

Davis v. Gardiner, 4 Co. 16; Davies 0.

Solomon, L. R. '7 Q. B. 112; Moody o.

Baker, 5 Cowen, 351; Olmstead 0.

Miller, 1 Wend. 510; Williams v. Hill,

19 Weud. 305; Pettibone e. Simpson,

66 Barb. 492; Underhill 0. Welton, 32

Vt. 40.

‘ Beach 0. Ranney, 2 Hill. 309; Baa

Compared with Sla.nder. The difference between slander ani

libel is sometimes said to be this: the one is oral defamation
and the other is defamation propagated by printing, pictures, or
other means open to the sight. There i8, however, a difference
in the substance of what shall constitute an actionable charge.
It is perfectly reasonable to allow greater liberty of vocal speech
than of writing or printing, for two very plain reasons:
1. Vocal utterance does not imply the same degree of deliberation; it is more likely to be the expression of momentary paRsion
or excitement: and is not so oren to the implication of settled
malice. Therefore, if one shall say of his neighbor," He is a
rascal," there is no very strong probability that the expression
will be received by by-standers as anything more than a mere
vituperative epithet, indicative of the feelings of the utterer,
rather than of his convictious. Therefore, to such oral expres-

sil p. Elmore, 65 Barb. 627; S. (1.43

N. Y. 561, and the ca~es cited above.

It was once held in New York that

mere mental distress, physical illness

and inability to labor occasioned by

the aspersion, were suﬂicient special

damage to sustain an action. Bradt

o. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253; Fuller v.

Fenner, 16 Barb. 333. But these cases

are overruled. Terwilliger '0. Wands,

17 N. Y. 54; Wilson 0. Goit, 1'7 N. Y.

442.

1 Oakley "· Farrington, 1 Johns.
Cas. 120. So where the terms "cheat
and swindler" are used. Odiorne fl,
Bacon, 6 Cush. 1R5.
t Sheperd "· Wakeman, 1 Sid. 79;
Reston "· Promleict, Cro. Eliz. 639;
Davis 'D. Gardiner, 4 Co. 16; Davies "·
Solomon, L. R. 7 Q. B. 112; Moody"·
Baker, 5 Cowen, U51; Olmstead "·
Miller, 1 Wend. 510; Williams"· Hill,
19 Weud. 305; Pettibone t>. Simpson,
60 Barb. 492; Underbill"· Welton, :32

·n.40.

'Beach "· Ranney, 2 Hill. 309; Bu
sil ,. Elmore, 65 Barb. 627; S. C. 48
N. Y. 561, and the ca·cs cited above.
It was once held in New York that
mere mental distress, physical illneu
and inability to labor occasioned by
the aspersion, WE:re sufficient special
damag~:~ to sustain an action. Bradt
o. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253; Fuller "·
Fenner, 16 Barb. 333. But these caso:t
are overruled. Terwilliger'!). Wand'
17 N.Y. 54; Wilson o. Goit, 17 N.Y.
44~.
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sions little importance is generally attached. On the other hand

the same words deliberately written or printed and afterward

placed before the public, usually justify an inference that they

are the expression of settled conviction, and they affect the public

mind accordingly.

2. An oral charge is merely heard, and the agency of the

wrong-doer in inﬂicting injury is at an end when the utterance

has died upon the ear. But the written or printed charge may

pass from hand to hand indeﬁnitely and for many years. It is

an ever continuous defamation so long as that by means of which

it is communicated remains in existence.

These reasons are taken notice of in the law, and some charges

are held to be p1'im.</rfacie actionable as libel that are not actiona-

ble as oral slander, unless there be averment and proof that

actual injury has resulted. In other words, injury is presumed

to follow the apparently deliberate act of putting the charge in

writing or print, or of suggesting it by means of picture or

effigy, where a mere vocal utterance to the same effect might be

disregarded as probably harmless.

Classiﬁcation of Libellous Charges. In libel, as in slander,

defamatory publications are classiﬁed as publications actionable

per se, and publications actionable on averment and proof of
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special damage. In the first class are embraced all cases of pub-

lications which would be actionable per ea if made orally. These

cases, therefore, require no further attention. It also embraces

all other cases where the additional gravity imparted to the charge

by the publication can fairly be supposed to make it damaging.

Thus, to say of a man, “I look upon him as a rascal,” is no
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•
aions little importance is generally attached. On the other hand
the same words deliberately written or printed and afterward
placed before the public, usually justify an inference that they
are the expression of settled conviction, and they affect the public
mind accordingly.
2. An oral charge is merely heard, and the agency of the
wrong-doer in inflicting iujury is at an end when the utterance
has died upon the ear. But the written or printed charge may
pass from hand to hand indefinitely and for many years. It is
an ever continuous defamation so long as that by means of which
it is communicated remains in existence.
These reasons are taken notice of in the law, and some charges
are l1cld to be primafucie actionable as libel that are not actionable as oral slander, unless there he averment and proof that
actual injury has resulted. In other words, injury is presumed
to follow the appareutly deliberate act of putting the charge in
writing or print, or of suggesting it by means of picture or
effigy, where a mere vocal utt<>rance to the same effect might be
disregarded as probably harm less.

slander, unless shown to be damaging; but if it be published of

him in one of the public journals, the presumption that injury

follows is reasonable and legitimate.‘ So, to call a man in print

“ an imp of the devil and cowardly snail” is libellous, though an

oral imputation of the sort would be presumably harmless.’ So,

to charge a teacher with falsehood in a report made to the oﬁicial

board, and with general untrnthfulness, is libellous per ea.‘ The

‘ Williams 0. Karnes, 4 Humph. 9; ' Price 0. Whitely. 50 Mo. 439 Sec

Cropp 0. Tilney, 3 Salk, 226; J. An- Atwill 0. Mackintosh, 120 Muss. 177;

son 0. Stewart, 1 T. R. 748. See Whit Cary Iv. Allen, 39 Wis. 481.

ney o. Janesville Gazttte, 5 Bias. 330. ‘ Lindley 0. Horton, 2'7 Conn. 58.

Classification or Libellous Charges. In libel, as in slander,
defamatory publications are classified as publications actional•le
per 86, and publications actionable on averment and proof of
special damage. In tha first class are embrac.oed all cases of publications which would be actionable per 88 if made orally. These
cases, therefore, require no further attention. It also ern1Jracct4
all other cases where the additional gra,·ity imparted to the char~
by the publication can fairly be supposed to make it damaging.
'flms, to say of a man, "I look upon him as a rascal," is no
slander, unless shown to be damaging; but if it he publi::;hctl of
him in one of the public journals, the presumption that injury
follows is reasonable and legitimate! So, to call a man in print
"an imp of the devil and cowardly snail" is lihellons, thou~h nn
oral imputation of the sort would Le presumably harmless.' So,
to charge a teacher with falsehood in a repnrt made to the official
hoard, and with general untruthfulness, is libellous per 86.' The
1 Williams "· Karnes, ~ Humph. 9;
Cropp "· Tilney, S Salk, 226 ; J. AnIIOD "·Stewart, 1 T. R. 748. Bee Whit..
ne1•· Janesville Guctte, G Bias. 330.

1 Price "· Whitely, 50 Mo. 489
Bee
Atwill "· Mackintosh, 120 M88&. 177;
Cary "· Allen, 89 Wis. 481.
' Lindley a. Horton, 27 Conn. 58.
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general rule is stated thus: Any false and malicious writing pub-

lished of another is libellous per se, when its tendency is to
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render him contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or

expose him to public hatred or contempt, or hinder virtuous men

from associating with him.‘ “The nature of the charge,” it is

said in one case, “must be such the court can legally presume

[the plaintiff] has been degraded in the estimation of his acquaint-

ances, or of the public, or has suffered some other loss, either in

his property, character, or business, or in his domestic or social

relations in consequence of the publication.” ' A published

charge that the plaintiff, being a member of a certain political

party, at one of its nominating conventions, offered a certain

resolution, under the inﬂuence of a bribe, is a charge of this

character. “When a citizen undertakes to exercise any of his

political privileges, it is certainly his duty to act upon public

considerations; to be inﬂuenced in such a matter by pecuniary

motives, though it may not be punishable in some cases as a

crime, is always disgraceful. Every one who, for a bribe, gives

his vote or his inﬂuence to a candidate for nomination to a public

position, does such act in secret, thus showing, by his avoidance

of the public gaze, his consciousness of the unworthy part he is

playing. Therefore, to print and publish that a man has been

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

guilty of such an act must necessarily be to hold him up to the

derision and contempt of the community.” ’ So, to publish of

one, “His slanderous reports nearly ruined some of our best

merchants ” is libellous.‘ So it is to publish, “He did a good

thing in his sober moments, in the way of collecting soldiers’

'Lindley '0. Horton, 27 Conn. 58,

61; Thomas v. Croswell, 7 Johns.

‘Z64; Clark o. Binney, 2 Pick. 115;

l\Ic(‘orkle o. Burriss, 5 Binn. 349;

Price 0. VVhitely, 50 Mo. 439; Hand

0. Winton, 38 N. J. 122.

’ Stone ~v. Cooper, 2 Denio, 290.

' BEASLEY, Ch. J., in Hand v. Win-

ton. 38 N. J. 122. So it is libellous

to charge a man with being a drunk-

ard, a cuckold, a tory. LU1\II’I-UN, J.

“ I never yet saw the mun who liked

to be considered a sot or drunkard.

general rule is stated thus: Any false and malicious writing published of another is libellous per 88, when its tendency is to
render him contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or
expose him to public hatred or contempt, or hinder virtuous men
from associating with him.1 "The nature of the charge," it is
said in one case, "must be such the court can legally presume
[the plaintiff] bas been degraded in the estimation of his acquaintances, or of the public, or has suffered some other loss, either in
his property, character, or business, or in his domestic or social
relations in consequence of the publication." • A published
charge that the plaintiff, being a member of a certain political
party, at one of its nominating conventions, offered a certain
resolution, under the influence of a bribe, is a charge of this
character. "When a citizen undertakes to exercise any of his
political privileges, it is certainly his duty to act upon public
considerations; to be influenced in such a matter by pecuniary
motives, though it may not be punishable in some cases as a
crime, is always disgraceful. Every one who, for a bribe, gives
his vote or his influence to a candidate for nomination to a public
position, does such act in s~cret, thus showing, by his avoidance
of the public gaze, his consciousness of the unworthy part he is
playing. Therefore, to print and publish that a man has been
guilty of such an act must necessarily be to hold him up to the
derision and contempt of the community." • So, to publish ot'
one, " His slanderous reports nearly ruined some of our beat
merchants" is libellous.• So it is to publish, ''He did a good
thing in his sober moments, in the way of collecting soldiers'

Noah, the ﬁrst drunken man, became

thereby an object of ridicule to his

own son. It was the third part of the

then male world that manifested this

mockery for this habit, and the other

two-thirds did but conceal it. ‘l ‘F

But this paper did not stop with im-

puting excessive debauchery to old

man Thompson; it alleges further

that he was dccnyed into his cups for

the purpose of beingmade a cuckold.

If this charge would not expose him

to universal scorn and contempt, I

know not what would.” Giles u. State,

6 Geo. 276-283.

‘ Cramer v. N oonan, 4 Wis. 231.

J Lindley fl. Horton, 27 Conn. 58,
61 ; Thomaa fl. Croswell, 7 Johns.
~114; Clark fl. Binney, 2 Pick. 11~;
:McCorkle fl. Burriss, 5 Binn. 849;
Price"· Whitely, 50 ?tlo. 439; Hand
fl. Winton, 38 N.J. 122.
t Stone "'· Cooper, 2 Dl.'nio, 299.
• BEASI.EY, Ch. J ., in llnnd "· Win.
ton, 38 N.J. 122. So it is libellous
to charge a man with being a drunkard, a cuckold, a tory. LmtPKrN, J.
•• I never yet saw tbe man who liked
to be considered a sot or drunkard.
Noah, the first drunken man, became
thereby an object of ridicule to his

own son. It was the third part of the
then male world that manifested this
mockery for this habit, and the other
two-thirds did but conceal it • •
But this paper did not stop with im.
puting excessive debauchery to old
man Thompson; it alleges further
that he waa decoyed into his cups for
the purpose of being made a cuckold.
If this charge would not expose him
to universal scorn and contempt, I
know not what would." Giles fl. State.
6 Geo. 276-288.
'Cramer"· Noonan, 4 Wis. 931.
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claims against the government, for a fearful percentage. The

blood money he got from’ the boys in blue in this way is sup-

posed to be a big thing,” etc.‘ So it is to publish, “ He appears

to have been in collusion with ruiﬁans.” ’ So, since the belief

that one is not in his right mind has anatural tendency to with-

draw from him the association of his fellows, to publish of one

that he is insane, and a ﬁt person to be sent to the lunatic asy-

lum, is libellous.‘ But it is not libellous to say of a merchant,

he has refused to contribute his mite with his fellow merchants

to water the street in front of his store: this may possibly have

some tendency to induce an ill opinion of him; but as it implies

neither moral nor legal wrong, but at most only a want of liber-

ality, it is not libellous.‘ Acts which neither the moral code nor

the law of the land requires, it cannot be libellous to charge him

with not performing. '

Besides the publications mentioned, any untrue and malicious

charge which is published in writing or print is libellous when

damage is shown to have resulted as a natural and proximate

consequence.
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When the words published are actionable per se, it is the duty

of the court so to instruct the jury.’

Truth asaDefense. The truth of the injurious charge is a

defense to a civil action, though it is not always a. defense to a

criminal prosecution. But even in a civil suit it is necessary to

plead it specially.’ The law implies the falsehood of a damaging

Sanderson o. Caldwell, 45 N. Y.

39$.

' Snyder v. Fulmn,34 Md. 128; and

see Woodard 0. Eastman, 118 Mass.

claims against the government, for a tearful percentage. The
blood money he got from the boys in blue in this way is supposed to be a big thing," ete.1 So it is to publish, "lie appears
to have been in collusion with ruffians." 1 So, since the belief
that one is not in his right mind has a natural tendency to withdraw from him the association of his fellows, to publish of one
that he is insane, and a fit person to be sent to the lunatic asylum, is 1ibellous.' But it is not libellous to say of a merchant,
he has refused to contribute his mite with his fellow merchants
to water the street in front of his store: this may possibly have
some tendency to induce an ill opinion of him; but us it implies
neither mornl nor legal wrong, but at most only a want of liberality, it is not libellous.• Acts which neither the moral code uor
the law of the land requires, it cannot be libellous to charge him
with not performing.
Besides the publications mentioned, any untrne and malicious
charge which is published in writing or print is libellous when
damage is shown to have resulted as a natural and proximate ,
consequence.
When the words published are actionable p6r 11e, it is the duty
of the court so to instruct the jury!

403; Day 0. Backus, 31 Mich. 241;

Stilwell 1:. Barter, 19 Wend. 487; Hart

0. Reed, 1 B. Mon. 166

' Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461.

4 People v. Jerome, 1 Mich. 142.

5 Gollbchuct v. IIubacl1ek,86 Wis.

Truth as a Defen.ae. The truth of the injurious charge is a
defense to a civil action, though it is not always a defense to a
criminal prosecution. But even in a civil snit it is necessary to
plead it specially.' The law implies the falsehood of a damaging

515. So in slander. Filber u. Dante!‘-

mann, 28 Wis. 134..

' Updegrove -v. Zimmerman, 13

Penn. St. 610; Porter v. Botkins, 50

Penn. St. 484; Barns '0. Webb, 1 Ty-

ler, 17; Hutchinson 0. Vlfhcelcr, 35

Vt. 330; Sheahan 1;. Collins, 20 Ill.

325; Thomas 0. Dunaway 80 Ill. 373;

Van Ankin v. Westlall, 14 Johns. 233;

Wormoulh 0. Cramer, 3 Wend. 395;

Beardsley 0. Bridgman, 17 Iowa, 290;

Thompson o. Bowers, 1 Doug. Mich.

3531; Huson 0. Dale, 19 Mich. 17;

Treat v. Browning, 4 ('onn. 408; Kel-

ley u. Dillon, 5 Ind. 4'26: Knight n.

Foster, 39 N. H. 576; Jurnigan 0.

Fleming, 43 Miss. 710; Bourland v.

Eidson, 8 Grutt. 27; Scott 0. McKin-

nish. 15 Ala. 662. If, however, the

communication was privileged, so as

not to be actionable, in the absence

of malice, the truth may he shown

without being pleaded. Chapman 12.

Calder, 14 Penn. St. 365; Edwards 0.

*‘aL "

.,,_

Sanderson e. Caldwell, 46 N.Y.
898.
1 Snyder D. Fulton, 8! Md. 128; and
see Woodard e. Eastman, 118 MBSS.
4Q3; Day to. BackuR, 81 Mich. 241;
Stilwell "·Barter, 19 Wend. 487; Han
D. Rred, 1 B. )[on. 166
• Perkins ~. Mitchell, 81 Barb. 461.
• People"· Jerome, 1 Mich. 142.
s GottlK'bUel "· llnbacbek, 86 Wis.
IU5. 8o in slaoder. Filber v. DauterUll\nn, 28 Wis. 13-1
• t;pdegrove "· Zimmerman, 18
Peon. St. 619; Porter "· BotkinR, 5!l
Penn. St. 484; Baros "· Webb, 1 Tyler, 17; llutchioson e. Wheeler, 85
Vt. 880; Sheahan e. Collloa, 20 Dl.

825; Thomas "· Dunaway 80 Ill. 873;
Yan Ankin "·Westfall, 14Johns. 238;
W ormouth e. Cramer, 8 Wend. 30/i ;
Beard !I ley e. Bridgman, 17 Iowa, 200;
Thompson tl. Bowers, 1 Doug. Mich.
321; Huson"· Dale, 19 llich. 17;
Treat D. Browning, 4 C'onn. 408; Kelley "· Dillon, I) Ind. 4~1J; Knight"·
Fostrr, 39 N. H. 570; Jarnig!Ul e.
Fleming, 48 lliss. 710; Bourland "·
Eidson, 8 Gratt. 27 • Brott e..McKio.
nish, 15 Ala. 662. If, however, the
communication was privilegl·d, so as
not to be actionable, in the absence ·
of malice, the truth may he shown
without being pleaded. Chapman e.
Calder, 14 Peon. St. BM; Edwards •·
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charge, and will not suffer it to be brought in question unless the

TIIE LAW · OF TORTS.

plaintiﬁ' by the pleadings is apprised of the purpose to do so.‘

charge, and will not suffer it to be brought in question unless the
plaintiff by the pleadings is apprised of the purpose to do so.'
Where the charge complained of imputes to the plaintiff criminal conduct, and the truth is relied upon as a justification, it is
sufficient to support the plea by a prcponderence of evidenCe; it
ia not nec:essa.ry that the crime be made out beyond a reasonable
doubt.' This is a general rule whcr~ the question of criminality
is made an issue in a civil suit; it is sufficient to establish it by
such evidence as would support any other fact involved in a civil
coutroversy.• Some cases, however, dissent from this doctrine,
and require the same strict proof of the charge that would be
required if the party were on triRl for the alleged crime; that is,
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Words alleged to be libellous will receive an innocent construction if they are fairly susceptible of it, and when it is
uncertain whether they convey a defamatory imputation th~
question is one for the jury.•

Where the charge complained of imputes to the plaintiff crim-

inal conduct, and the truth is relied upon as a justiﬁcation, it is

sufficient to support the plea by a preponderence of evidence; it

is not necessary that the crime be made out beyond a reasonable

doubt.’ This is a general rule where the question of criminality

is made an issue in a civil suit; it is suﬁieient to establish it by

such evidence as would support any other fact involved in a civil

controversy.‘ Seine eases, however, dissent from this doctrine,

and require the same strict proof of the charge that would be

required if the party were on trial for the alleged crime; that is,

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‘

Words alleged to be libellous will receive an innocent con-

struction if they are fairly susceptible of it, and when it is

uncertain whether they convey a defamatory imputation the

question is one for the jury.‘

Chandler, 14 Mich. 471. The truth

of the charge cannot be proved in

mitigation of damages when not

pleaded. Thompson 0. Bowers, 1

Doug. Mich. 321, and cases cited.
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‘ It is questionable whether the law

ought not to hold truthful publica-

tions libellous in some cases, where

they relate to matters that no one has

any business to bring before the pub-

lic at all, and are made with no other

purpose than to annoy and subject to

ridicule. Thus it is conceivable that

the most innocent acts in a man's pri-

vate life, or personal peculiarities, for

which he is in no way responsible,

may be so made use of by a mischiev-

ous person as to destroy the comfort of

life; and it seems unreasonable that

no personal redress can be had. The

criminal law sometimes punishes

truthful publications where they are

made without justifiable occasion;

and if the fact stated, conceding its

truth, is notof a character that should

alfect one injuriously, and the dam-

aging consequence results from the

artful and persistent manner in which

the publisher places it before the pub-

lic, it would seem that there ought to

be some remedy besides such as the

public authorities may see ﬁt to pur-

sue.

’ Ellis 0. Buzzcll, 60 Me. 209; S. C.

11 Am. Rep. 204; Matthews o. Hunt-

lcy,9 N. H. 146; Kincade 0. Brad-

shaw, 3 Hawks. 63.

' Schmidt 1:. N. Y. Union Ins Co., 1

Gray, 5'39; Gordon o. Parinelee, 15

Gray, 413; Scott 0. Home Ins. Co., 1

Dill. 105; Elliott 0. Vun Buren, 33

Mich. 49; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 668;

Wzisliington Ins. Co. 0. Wilsr>n, 7 Wis.

169; Blaeser o. Milwaukee, etc., Ins.

Co., 87 Wis. 31; S. 0.19 Am. Rep.

747; Knowles '0. Scribner, 57 Me. 495;

Marshall 0. Thames, etc., Ins. Co., 43

Mo. 586; Rothschild 0. Am. Cent. Ins.

Co., 62 Mo. 356.

‘ Chalmers 0. Shackell. 6 C. & P.

475; Thurlell 0. Beaumont, 1 Bing.

339; Willmett 0. Hanner, 8 C. & D.

•

Chandler, 14 Mich. 471. The truth
of the charge cannot be proved in
mitigation of damages when not
pleaded. Thompson "· Bowers, 1
Doug. 1tficb. 821, and cases cited.
1 It is questionable whether the law
ought not to hold truthful publica..
tiona libdlous in some cu~cs, where
they relate to mutters thut no one has
any business to bring before the public at all, and are made with no other
purpose than to annoy and subject to
ridicule. Thus it is conceivable that
the most innocent acts in a man's private life, or personal peculiarities, for
which he is in no way responsible,
may be so made use of by a mischievous person as to destroy the comfort of
life; and it seems unreasonable that
no personal retlress can be had. The
ct·iminal law sometimes punishes
truthful publications where they are
made without justitluble occasion;
and if the fact stated, concedmg ita
truth, Is not of a character that should
affect one injuriously, and the damaging consequence result& from the
artful and persistent manner in which

the publisher places lt before the pub.
lie, it would seem that there ought to
be some remedy besi~lcs such as the
public authorities may see fit to pursue.
1 Ellis "· Buzzell, 60 Me. 200; B. C.
11 Am. Rep. 204; Matthews"· Hunt .
ley, 9 N. H. 146; Kincade "· Bradshaw, 3 Hawk,;. 63.
1 Schmidt tl. N.Y. Union Ins Co., 1
Gray, 5~0; Gordon "· Parmelee, 15
Gray, 413; Scott "· Home lns. Co., 1
Dill. 10;:;; Elliott "· Van Buren, 33
Mich. 49; 8. C. 20 Am. Rep. 668;
Washington Ins. Co."· Wilson, 7 Wis.
169; Blacser "· Milwaukee, etc., Ins.
Co., 37 Wis. at; S. C. 19 Am. Hrp.
747; Knowles 'D. Scribner, 57 :&le. 495;
?tlarshall "·Thames, etc., Ins. Co., 43
Mo. 586; Rothschild"· Am. Vent. Ins.
Co., 62 .&lo. 356.
• Chalmers "· Shackell, 6 C. & P.
475; Thurtell "· Beaumont, 1 Bing.
839; Willmett "· Hanner, 8 C. & D.
695; Fountain "·West, 28 Iowa, 9;
Ellis"· Lindley, 88 Iowa, 461; Tucker
o. Call, 45 Ind. 81.
• Mulligan e. Cole, L. R. 10 Q. B.
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substantially as laid.‘ The rule of the common law is, that an

unsuccessful attempt to justify may be taken into account in

aggravation of damages;' but this rule is abolished by statute

in some States.

Malice. The deﬁnitions of slander and libel usually includes

malice as one of the necessary ingredients. From what has

already appeared, however, it is manifest that they must employ

this word in some other than the ordinary sense. In many

When the truth is relied upon as a defense, it must be provecl
substantially as laid. 1 The rule of the common law is, that an
unsuccessful attempt to justify may be taken into account in
aggravation of damages; 1 but this rule is abolished by statute
in some States.

cases of aggravated injury, there is really no malice at all, and

no intent to injure; at most, there is only thoughtlessness or

negligence; as where one thoughtlessly repeats a rumor, or a

newspaper publisher copies from some other paper an article

concerning a stranger, which he supposes to be true, but which

is not so in fact. Sometimes there is not even negligence; as

where a publisher has taken all reasonable precautions to prevent

untrue and injurious publications, and one nevertheless creeps

in as the result of accidental circumstances. In all such cases

the absence of malice may be important to protect one against

exemplary damages; but it eannvot bar the action. It seems

misleading, therefore, to employ the terms malice, and malicious,

in deﬁning these wrongs; and, in a. legal sense, as used they
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can only mean that the false and injurious publication has been

made without legal excuse. One may be excused in morals and

yet not in law; it is the protection of the party injured the law

aims at not the punishment of bad motive instivatinrr bad

7OD

action in the party injuring him.‘

549; B. C. 14 Moak, 852; Jenner o.

A’Bcckett, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; S. C. 1

Monk, 9; Thompson 0. Grimes, 5 Ind.

3&5.

' Carpenter o. Bailey, 56 N. H. 283;

Evarts o. Smith, 19 Mich. 55; Whit-

temore 0. Weiss, 33 Mich. B48; Pal-

mer o. Smith, 21 Minn. 419; Sheehey

v. Coklcy, 43 Iowa, 183; S. C. 22 Am.

Rep. 236.

' Root 0. Ki.ng.7 Cow. 613; German

0. Button, 32 Penn. St. 247; Upde-

grove o. Zimmerman, 13 Penn. St.

Jrlalice. The definitions of slander and libel usually includes
malice as one of the necessary ingredients. From what has
already appt>ared, however, it is manifest that they must employ
this word in some other than the ordinary sense. In many
cases of aggt·avated injury, there is really no malice at all, and
no intent to injure; at most, there is only thoughtlessness or
negligence; as where one thoughtlessly repeats a rumor, or a
newt'paper publisher copies from some other paper an article
('Oncerning a stranger, which he supposes to be true, but which
is not so in fact. Sometimes there is not even negli1:,rence; as
where a publisher has taken all reasonable precautions to prevent
untrue and injurious publications, and one nevertheless creeps
in as the result of accidental circumstances. In all such cai'es
the absence of malice may be important to protect one against
exemplary damages; but it canoot bar the action. It seems
misleading, therefore, to employ the terms malice, and malieious,
in defining these wrongs; and, in a legal sense, as used they
can only mean that tho false and injurious publication has been
made without legal excuse. One may be excused in morals and
yet not in law; it is the protection of the party injured the law
aims at, not the punishment of bad motive instigating bad
action in the party injuring him.'

619; Freeman u. Tinslcy, 50 111. 497;

Harbison 0. Shook, 41 Ill. 141; Cav-

anaugh o. Austin, 42 Vt. 576.

' “ Malice, in common ucccptatlon,

means ill will against a person, but

in its legal sense it means a wrongful

act done intentionally without just

cause or excuse." BAYLEY, J ., in

Bromuge 0. Prosser,4 B. & C. 255.

Malice is alleged in the declaration,

"rather to exclude the supposition

that the publication may have been

made on some innocent occasion

than for any other purpose." Annoi '1',

Ch. J., in Duncan 0. Thwaites, 3 B. its

14

M9; 8. 0. 14 Moak, 852; Jenner e.
A' Beckett, L. R 7 Q. B. 11; B. C. 1
Moak, 9; Thompson •· Grimes, li Ind.
886.
1 Carpenter tl. Bailey,li6 N.H. 283;
Evarts "· Smith, 19 Mich. 55; Whit.
temore tl. Weiss, 88 Mich. 848; Pal.
mer tl. Smith, 21 .Minn. 419; Sheehcy
"· Cokley, 43 Iowa, 183; B. C. 22 Am.
Rep. 236.
1 Root •· Kwg, 7 Cow. 613; Gorman
e. Sutton, 82 Penn. St. 247; Upde.
grove •· Zimmerman, 18 Penn. St.
618; Freeman t1. Tin11ley,60 Ill. 497;

14

Harbison e. Shook, ·U Til. 141; Cav.
anaugh tl. Austin, 42 Vt. 576.
• "Malice, in common acceptation,
means ill will against a person, but
in its legal sensu it means a wrongful
act done intentionally without just
cuuse or excuse." BAYLEY, J., in
Bromage tl. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 255.
Malice is alleged in the dcclaratinn,
"rather to exclude the supposition
that the publication may have been
mnde on some innocent occasiou
than for any other purpose." ABBOTT,
Ch. J., in Du.ncan •· Thwaltea_ 8 B. &
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There are some cases, however, in which the existence of

malice, or of such recklessness or negligence as in other branches

PRIVILKG ED CASKS.
of the law is received as the equivalent of malice, is absolutely

essential to the action. This will be readily understood when

the fact is called to the mind that the law of slander and libel

concerns the administration ofjustice in all its departments, and

has much to do with the discussion of public affairs in the jour-

nals of the day and otherwise, and with all public transactions.

A question of defamation is therefore not always a question

merely of private scandal; it may, on the other hand, involve

questions of the highest public importance. The forms of defa-

mation are numerous and varied. A man may be defamed by

an unjust removal from oﬂice on unfounded charges; by injurious

testimony given in courts of justice; by the unwarranted deduc-

tions of counsel in presenting his case adversely to the jury, and

in many other ways where, notwithstanding, the agent in the

injury was wholly free from legal fault. Thus, a great public

character may, perhaps, suﬂ'er in reputation all his life time from

an impeachment for an offense never in fact committed; yet if

the impeachment was instituted in good faith, and on grounds

apparently suﬁicient,' those concerned in it only performed a
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public duty. We unhesitatingly recognize the fact that in many

cases, however damaging it may be to individuals, there should

and must be legal immunity for free speaking, and that justice

and the cause of good government would suffer if it were other-

wise. With duty often comes a responsibility to speak openly

and act fearlessly, let the consequences be what they may; and

the party upon whom the duty was imposed must be left account-

able to conscience alone, or perhaps to a supervising public sen-

C. 556, 585. See Moore v. Stevenson,

27 Conn. 14. Belief in the truth of

the charge, and the absence of ill will

toward the defendant, cannot be

proved as a defense to an action for

defamation. Smart 0. Blanchard, 42

N. H. 137; Lick '0. Owen, 47 Cal. 252;

Wilson v. Noonan, 35 Wis. 321. That

malice is implied from the falsity of

the charge, see Hatch v. Potter, '7 Ill.

725; Rcarick 0. Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77;

Pennington v. Mocks, 46 Mo. 217;

Mousler '0. Harding, 33 Ind. 176; In-

dianapolis Su-n v. Horrcll, 53 Ind. 527;

Moore v. Butler, 48 N. H. 161; Dillard

There are some cases, however, in which the existence of
malice, or of such recklessness or negligence as in other branches
of the law is received as the equivalent of malice, is Rbsolutely
essential to the action. This will be readily understood when
the fact is called to the mind that the law of slander and libel
concerns the administration of justice in all its departments, and
has much to do with the discussion of public affairs in the journals of the day and otherwise, and with all public transactions.
A question of defamation is therefore not always a question
merely of private sC'andal; it may, on the other hand, involve
questions of the highest public importance. The forms of detamation are numerous and varied. A Jnan may be defamed by
an unjuRt removal from office on unfounded <~barges; by injurious
testimony given in courts of justice; by the unwarranted deductions of counsel in presenting his case adversely to the jury, and
in many other ways where, notwithstanding, the agent in the
injury was wholly free from legal fault. Thus, a great public
character may, perhaps, sufl:er in reputation all his lite time from
an impeachment for an offense never in fact committed; yet if
the impeachment was instituted in good faith, and on grounds
apparently sufficient; those concerned in it only performed a
public duty. We unhesitatingly recognize the fact that in many
cases, however damaging it may be to individuals, there shonlci
and must be legal immunity for free speaking, and that justice
and the cause of good government would suffer if it were otherwise. With duty often comes a responsibi1ity to speak openly
and act fearlessly, let the consequences be what they may; and
the party upon whom the duty was imposed must be left accountable to conscience alone, or perhaps to a supervising public sen-

0. Collins, 25 Grat. 343; King 0. Root,

4 Wend. 113; Lick v. Owen, 47 Cal.

252; Parker 0. Lewis, 2 Green (Iowa),

811.

C. 556, 585. Bee Moore '11. Stevenson,
27 Conn. 14. Belief in the truth of
the charge, and the absence of ill will
toward the defendant, cannot be
proved as a. defense to an action for
defamation. Smart "· Blanchard, 42
N. H. 137; Lick 1l. Owen, 47 Cal. 2;i2;
Wilson". Noonan, a5 Wis. 321. That
malice is implied from the falsity of
the charge, see Hatch "· Potter, 7 Ill.

725; Rearick "· Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77;
Pennington "· Meeks, 46 Mo. 217;
.Mousier "· Harding, 33 Ind. 176; In.
dianapoli~ SUT~ 11. Horrell, 53 Ind. 527;
:Moore v. Butler, 48 N. H. 161; Dillard
"· Collins, 25 Grat. 343; King "· Hoot,
4 Wend. 118; Lick "'· Owen, 47 Cal.
252; Parker "· Lewis,2 Green (Iowa),
811.
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the witness, for instance, were he under the necessity of calcu-

lating, when giving his testimony, not merely whether it satisﬁed

his conscience, but also whether he could prove it to be true

should he be sued for slander in giving it‘? ‘It is beyond doubt,

that to subject him to such responsibility would at least detract

largely from the reliability of evidence, and multiply the oppor-

tunities for operating upon the fears of witnesses to the serious

detriment of justice. '

The difﬁculties‘ in some of these cases are taken notice of by

the law, and are provided against as far as is possible by the rule

that the person whose duty it is to speak shall be privileged to

speak freely. The reasons for giving him protection, however,

are not the same in all cases: in some they seem to be conclusive

and absolute; in others they operate with less force and with less

couclusiveness; and the differences have not been overlooked in

the classiﬁcation of cases which has been made by the authorities.

This classiﬁcation may be given as follows:

1. Cases absolutely privileged, so that no action will lie, even

though it be averred that the injurious publication was both false

and malicious.

2. Cases privileged, but only to this extent: that the circum-
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stances are held to preclude any presumption of malice, but still

leave the party responsible if both falsehood and malice are

aﬂirmatively shown.

Cases of Absolute Privilege. Of the cases absolutely pro-

tected, that of the \vitnv.<.~' in judicial proceedings has already

been alluded to. No action will lie against him at the suit of

the party injured by his false testimony, even though malice be

charged; but he must be left to be dealt with by the criminal

law.‘ The rule assumes, however, that he will not wander from

1 Revis v. Smith, 18 O. B. 126; Hen- L. R. Q. B. 25-‘i. Same vase, on appeal,

derson 0. Broomhend, 4 H. & N. 569; 7 Eng. and Irish Appeal Cases, 744.

Seaman 0. Netht-rclift.1 C. P. Div. What a witness says in testimony

540; Marsh 0. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. is privileged, even if the court at-

809; Terry 0. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. tempted to stop him, provided he had

375; Smith v. Howard, 28 Iowa, 51. a right to say it as an explanatory

timent, bnt not to the courts. What would be the condition of
the witness, for instance, were he under the necessity of calculating, when giving his testimony, not merely whether jt satisfied
his conscience, but also whether he could prove it to be true
should he be sued for slander in giving it¥ It is beyond doubt,
that to subject him to such responsibility would at least detract
largely from the reliability of evidence, and multiply the opportunities for operating upon the fears of witnesses to the serious
detriment of justice.
The difficulties' in some of these cnses are taken notice of by
the law, and are provided against as far as is possible by the role
that the person whose duty it is to speak shall be privileged to
speak freely. The reasons for giving him protection, however,
are not the same in all cases: in some they seem to be conelusive
and absolute; in others they operate with less force and with le~~s
conclusiveness; and the differences ha•;e not been overlooked in
the cla!lsification of cases which has been made by the authorities.
This classification may be given as follows:
1. Cases absolutely privileged, so that no action will lie, even
though it be averred that the injurious publication was both false
and malicious.
2. Ca:;es privil£>ged, bnt only to this extent: that the circumstances are held to preclude any p1·esumption of malice, but still
leave the party responsible if both falsehood and malice are
affirmatively shown.

The protection extends to evideneo part of an answer he had made. Sva-

given before a military court oi‘ in- man o. Nethercliﬂ, 1 O. P. Div. 540;

quiry. Dawkins 0. Lord Rokeby, 8 S. C. 18 Moak, 176.

Cases of Absolute Privilege.

Of the cases absolutely protected, tlu~t of the witness in judicial proceedings has already
been alluded to. No action will lie against him at the snit of
the party injured by his false testimony, e\'en though malice be
charged; but he must be left to be dealt with by the criminal
law.' The rule assumes, however, that he will not wander from
I nevis"· Smith, 18 c. B.126; Hrn.
derson "· liroomhead, 4 H. & N. M9;
Seaman "· NetlH'rclift. 1 C. P. Div.
MO; !Iarsh "· Ellsworth, 50 N. Y.
SOD; Terry "· Fellows, 21 La. Ann.
3i3; Smith "· Howard, 28 Iowa, 51.
The protectiim extend~ to evidcnco
given before a military court of inquiry. Dawkins t1. Lord .Rokeby, 8

L. R. Q. B. ~/l1. Haml' rnse. on appl'nl,
'1 Eng. and Iri~b Appeal Cases, 744.
What a witnc,;s say!'! in testimony
is privllrged, even if the court attempted to ~top him, pro,·ided be had
a right to say lt a.<~ an explanatory
part of an answer he had made. St•a.
man "· N f'thercl ift, 1 0. P. DiT. 540;
S.C. 18 Mcmk, 176.
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fying to that which is impertinent and immaterial, and which

has not been called out by questions of counsel.‘ The case of

jurors speaking freely to their fellows in the consultations of the

jury-room, concerning the proper subject-matter of their delib-

erations, is one of like protection.‘ The case of the party pre-

senting his case to court or jury, or of counsel standing in his

place doing the same, is also one of absolute privilege. Says

Chief Justice Srmw, “ VVe take the rule to be well settled by the

authorities that words spoken in the course of judicial proceed-

ings, though they are such as impute crime to another, and

therefore if spoken elsewhere would import malice and be act-

ionable themselves, are not actionable, if they are applicable and

pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The question, therefore,

in such cases is, not whether the words spoken are true, not

whether they are actionable in themselves, but whether they were

spoken in the course of judicial proceedings, and whether they

are relevant or pertinent to the cause or subject of the inquiry.

And in determining what is pertinent, much latitude must he

allowed to the judgment and discretion of those who are intrusted

with the conduct of a cause in court, and a much larger allow-

ance made for the ardent and excited feelings with which a party,

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

or counsel who naturally and almost necessarily identiﬁes himself

with his client, may become animated, by constantly regarding

one side only of an interesting and animated controversey, in

which the dearest rights of such party may become involved.

And if these feelings sometimes manifest themselves in strong

invectives, or exaggerated expressions, beyond what the occasion

would strictly justify, it is to be recollected that this is said to a

It has been held, however, that one

not a party to a suit may have an

action against another also not a

party, for suborning witnesses to tes-

tify falsely in that action, whereby

his cluu‘actcr was defamed. Rice 0.

Coolidge, 121 Mass. 393. In' other

eases it has been held that such a suit

would not lie by a party to the action,

because it would be in effect to over-

haul the merits of an action already

conclusively tried as between the par-

ties. Bostwick o. Lewis, 2 Day, 447;

Smith o. Lewis, 3 Johns. 157; Dunlap

the case in giving his testimony, and abuse his prtvilege by testifying to that which is impertinent and immaterial, and which
has not been cal1ed out by questions of counsel! The case of
jurors speaking freely to their fellows in the consultations of the
jury-room, concerning the proper subject-matter of their deliberations, is one of like protection.' The case of the party presenting his case to oourt or jury, or of counsel standing in his
place doing the same, is also one of absolnte privilege. Says
Chief Justice SHAw, "'Ve take the rule to be well settled by the
authorities that words spoken in the course of judicial proceeding-s, though they are such as impute crime to another, and
therefore if spoken elsewhCI·e would import malice and be actionable themselves, are not Actionable, if they are applicable and
pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The question, therefore,
in such cases is, not whether lhe words spoken are true, not
whether they are actionable in themselves, but whether they were
spoken in the course of judicial proceedings, and whether they
are relevant or pertinent to the cause or subject of the inquiry.
And in determining what is pertinent, much latitude must be
allowed to the judgment and discretion of those who are intrusted
with the conduct of a cause in court, and a much larger allowance made for the ardent and excited feelings with which a party,
or counsel who naturally and almost necessarily identifies him.,elf
with his client, may become animated, by constantly regarding
one side only of au interesting and animated controversey, in
which the dearest rights of such party may become involved.
And if these feelings sometimes manifest themselves in strong
invectives, or exaggerated expressions, beyond what the occasion
would strictly justify, it is to be recollected that this is said to a

0. Glidden, 31 Me. 435.

' White 0. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 161;

S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 504; Calkins o.

Sumner, 13 Wis. 193; Kidder e. Park

hurst, 3 Allen, 893; Smith v. Howard,

28 Iowa, 51; Barnes o. McCrate, 32

Me. 442.

' Dunham o. Powers, 42 Vt. 1; Rec-

tor u. Smith, 11 Iowa, 302.

if >—i~ i

It bas been held, however, that one
not a party to a suit may have an
action against another also not a
party, for suborning witnesses totes.
tify falsely in that action, whereby
his character was defamed. Rice"·
Coolidge, 121 l'tlass. 893. In· other
cases it has been held that such a suit
would not lie by a party to the action,
because it would be in effect to overhaul the merits of an action already
conclusively tried as between the par.

ties. Bostwick"· Lewis, 2 Day, 447 ;
Smith"· Lcwis,3 Johns. 157; Dunlap
fl. G1idden, 31 Me. 435.
1 White e. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 161;
B. C. 1 Am. Rep. 504; Calkins "·
Sumner, 18 Wis. 193; Kidder "· Park
burst, 8 Allen, 893; Smith"· Howurtl,
28 Iowa, 51; Barnes "· McCrate, 32
)le. 442.
1 Dunham "· Powers, 42 Vt. 1; Rector •· Smith, 11 Iowa, 802.
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judge who hears both sides, in whose mind the exaggerated
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statement may be at once controlled and met by evidence and

argument of a contrary tendency from the other party, and who,

from the impartiality of his position, will naturally give to an

exaggerated assertion, not warranted by the occasion, no more

weight than it deserves. Still, this privilege must be restrained

by some limit, and we consider that limit to be this: that a party

or counsel shall not avail himself of his situation to gratify

private malice by uttering slanderous expressions, either against

a party, witness, or third person, which have no relation to the

cause or subject-matter of the inquiry. Subject to this restric-

tion, it is, on the whole, for the public interest, and best calculated

to subserve the purposes of justice, to allow counsel full freedom

of speech, in conducting the cases and advocating and sustaining

the rights of their constituents; and this freedom of discussion

ought not to be impaired by numerous and reﬁned distinctions.” '

This is a clear statement of a wise and proper general rule, with

its just limitations.

A legislator has a protection which is even more complete and

absolute, because, in his case, it is not permitted to question

elsewhere what he may have said in speech or debate, except for

the purposes of political redress in elections. It is customary in
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the American constitutions to declare this exemption from

responsibility in positive terms; but it exists independent of

such a declaration as a necessary principle in free government;

and this has been recognized ever since the ease of the six mem-

bers, whom an attempt was made to arrest and punish for their

action in Parliament in the time of Charles the First. It is not

permissible, in the case of legislators, to raise the question

whether what they may have said or written was or was not per-

‘Hoar v.Wor>d, 8 Met. 193. Sec,

also, Brook o. Montague, Cro. J ac. 90;

Hodgson 0. Scarlett, 1 B. & Ald. 282;

McMillan 0. Birch, 1 Binn. 178; Ring

0. Wl1ccle1', '7 Cow. 725; Hastings 0.

Lusk, 22 Wend. 410; Mower o. Wat-

son, 11 Vt. 536; Lea 0. White, 4 Sneed,

111; Marshall 0. Gunter, 6 Rich. 4l9;

Ruohs 1:. Backer, 6 Heisk. 395; Lester

o. Thurmond, 51 Geo. 118; Jennings n.

Paine, 4 Wis. B58; Lawson 0. Hicks,

38 Ala. 279; Brow v. Hathaway, 13

Allen, 239.

judge who hears both sides, in whose mind the exaggerated
statement may be at once controlled and met by evidence and
argument of a contrary tendency from the other party, and who,
from the impartiality of his position, will naturally give to an
exaggerated assertion, not warranted by the occasion, no more
weight than it deserves. Still, this privilege mn~>t be restrained
by some limit, and we consider that limit to be this: that a party
or counsel shall not avail himself of his situation to gratify
private malice by uttering slanderous expressions, either against
a party, witness, or third person, which have no relation to the
cause or subject-matter of the inquiry. Subject to this restriction, it is, on the whole, for the public int~rest, and best calculated
to subserve the purposes of justice, to allow counsel full freedom
of speech, in conducting the cases and advol'.ating and su:;taining
the rights of' their constituents; and this freedom of discussion
ought not to be impaired by numerous and 1·efined distinctions."'
This is a clear statement of a wise and proper general rule, with
its just limitations.
A legislator has a protection which is even more complete and
absolute, because, in his case, it is not permitted to question
elsewhere what he may have said in speech or debate, except for
the purposes of political redress in elections. It is cnstoma1·y in
the American constitutions to declare this exemption from
responsibility in positive terms; but it exists independent of
such a declaration as a nece:;Eary priuciple in free government;
and this has been recognized ever since the case of the "'ix members, whom an attempt was made to arrest and punish for their
action in Parliament in the time of Charles the First. It is not
permissible, in the case of legislators, to raise the question
whether what they may have said or written was or was not per-

Translating from a foreign lan-

guage into the English, without

malice, and for the beneﬁt of an at

torney, is privileged. Zuckerman v.

Sonnenschein, 62 Ill. 115.

Communications between client

and counsel arc privileged. Wood 0.

Thornly, 08 111. 464.

1 Hoar "·Wood, 8 Met. 198.
Bee,
also, Brook 11. Montague, Cro. J ae. 90;
Hodgson"· Scl&l'lett, 1 B. & Ald. 282;
McMillan"· Birch, 1 Binn. 178; Hing
e. Wheeler, 7 Cow. 7~5; Hastings "·
Lusk, 22 Wend. 410; :Mower "· Watson, 11 Vt. 530; Leat!. White, 4 Sneed,
111; Marshall"· Gunter, 6 Rich. 419;
Ruohs "· Backer,6 Heisk. 305; Lester
e. Thurmond, 51 Geo. 118; Jennings"·
Paine, 4 Wis. 858; Lawson "·Hicks,

as

Ala. 27&; Brow "· Hathaway, 18

Allen, 280.

Translating from a foreign language into the English, withou'
malice, and for the benefit of an attorney, is privileged. Zuckerman "·
Sonnenschein, 02 Ill. 115.
Communications between client
and couuscl are privileged. Woode.
'l'bornly, :>8lll. 464.
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tinent to what was before them for oﬁicial action; it is enough
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that at the time they were acting as legislators, either at the

sessions of the House of which they were members, or upon one

of its committees.‘ Whether a like privilege would be conceded

to members of inferior bodies. possessing certain legislative func-

tions, such as city councils, boards of supervisors, etc., is not so

clear. Undoubtedly they would be privileged; but they occupy

a somewhat different position from legislators proper. The latter

constitute an independent department of the government, and as

such are not subject to judicial supervision and control, and their

judgment of what their duty requires them to say should be

conclusive. But the members of these inferior bodies have no

such independent powers, and are suﬁiciently protected if the

law exempts them from responsibility for whatever is said by

them which is pertinent to any inquiry or investigation pending

or proposed before them, but leaves them accountable when they

wander from the subject in hand to assail others.

The executive of the nation and the governors of the several

States are exempt from responsibility to individuals for their

oﬁicial utterances. So are all judges of courts and judicial oﬁi-

cers, while acting within the limits of their jurisdiction.’

The pleadings and other papers ﬁled by parties in the course
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of judicial proceedings, are privileged, so long as they do not

wander from what is material to libel parties.“ So are affidavits

made for commencing proceedings before magistrates, and the

preliminary proceedings and information taken or given for

bringing supposed guilty parties to justice.‘

Cases Conditionally Privileged. The cases only conditionally

privileged are those in which the utterance or publication is on

' Coﬂin 0. Coﬂin, 4 Mass. 1; State

0. Burnbam, 9 N. H. B4; Perkins 0.

Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461.

' Townsliend on Slander and Libel,

§ 227; Scott 9. Stansﬁeld, L. R. B

Excli. 220.

' Astley '0.Younge, 1 Burr. 807; Hen-

derson o. Broombead, 4 H. & N. 570;

Wyatt. o. Buell, 47 Cal. 624; Vausse o.

Lee, 1 Hill (S. C.), 197; Lea 1;. White,

tinent to what was before them for official action; it is enough
that at the time they were acting as legislators, either at the
sessions of the Honse of which they were members, or upon one
of its committees! Whether a like I>rivilege would be conceded
to members of inferior bodies. possessing certain legislative functions, such as city oonncils, boards of supervisors, etc., is not so
clear. Undoubtedly they would be privileged; bnt they occupy
a somewhat different position from legislators proper. The latter
constitute an indepen~ent department of the government, and as
such are not snbje<:t to judicial supervision and control, and their
judgment of what their duty requires them to say should be
conclusive. But the rpembers of thc~e inferior bodies have nu
such independent })Owers, and are sufficiently protected it" the
law exempts them trom responsibility for whatever is said by
them which is pertinent to any inquiry or investigation pending
or proposed before them, bnt leaves them &eClHmtable when they
wander from the subject in hand to B.:)S&il others.
The executive of the nation and the govemora of the several
States are exempt from responsibility to individuals for their
official utterances. So are all judges of courts and judicial officers, while acting within the limits of their jurisdiction.'
The pleadings and other papers filed by parties in the course·
of judicial proceedings, are privileged, so long as they do not
wander from what is material to libel parties.• So are affidavits
made for commencing proceedings before magistrates, and the
preliminary proceedings and information taken or given for
bringing supposed guilty parties to justice.•

4 Sneed, 111; Garr o. Selden, 4 N. Y.

cases Con,ditionally Privileged. The cases only conditionally

91; Hardin 0. Cumstock, 2 A. K.

Marsh. 480; Strauss o. Meyer, 48 Ill.

385; Spaids 0. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289. A

privileged are those in which the utterance or publication is on

bill in ehuncery prepared by counsel

and sworn to, but never ﬁled, is pri-

vileged. Burnham 0. Roberts, 70 Ill.

19.

‘Allen 0. Crofoot, 2 Wend. 515;

Hartock v. Reddick, 6 Blackf. 255;

Briggs v. Byrd, 12 Ired. 377. Sec

Worthington '0. Scribner, 109 Mass.

487; S. C. 12 Am. Rep. 736; Ealnes 1:.

Whittaker, 123 Mass. 342.

Coffin e. Coffin, ( Mass. 1; State
Burnham, 9 N.H. 84; Perkins e.
lllt.cbell, 81 Barb. (61.
• Townshend on Slander and Libel,
§ 227; Scott e. Stansfield, L. R. 8
Exch. 220.
• AaUey e.Younge, 1 Burr. 807; Henderson e. Broombead, 4 H. & N. 570;
Wyatt e. Buell, (7 Cal. 624; Vaussee.
Lee, 1 Hill (8. C.), 197; Lea e. White,
4 Sneed, 111; Garr e. Selden, 4 N.Y.
91 i Hardin e. Comstock, 2 A. K.
1

il.

Marsh. 480; Strauss e. Meyer, 48 Ill.
885; Spaids e. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289. A
bill in chancery prepared by cuunsel
ami sworn to, but never filed, is privileged. Burnham e. Roberts, 70 Ill.
19.
4 Allen e. Crofoot, 2 Wend. 515 ;·
Hartock e. Reddick, 6 Bluckf. 25/S;
Briggs e. Byrd, 12 Ired. 377. See
Worthington e. 8cribner, 109 Mass.
487; 8. C. 12 Am. Rep. 786; Eamea .,_
Whittaker, 123 Mass. 842.
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a lawful occasion, which fully protects it, unless the occasion has

been abused to gratify malice or ill will. A petition to the

executive, or other appointing power, in favor of an applicant

for an otﬁce, or a remonstrancc against such an applicant, is a

publication thus privileged. No action will lie for false state-

ments contained in it, unless it be shown that it was both false

and malicious.‘ And this rule will apply to petitions, applica-

tions and remonstrances of all sorts addressed by the citizen to

any oﬂicer or oﬁicial body, asking what such oﬁicer or body may

lawfully grant, or renionstrating against anything which it might

lawfully withhold. It is a necessary part of the right of peti-

tion that such papers, presented in good faith, should be pro-

tected.‘ And it is privileged while being circulated as well as

after it is presented.’ All oﬂieial communications made by an

oﬁicer in the discharge of a public duty are under the like pro-

tection.‘ So are all communications by members of corporate

bodies, churches and other voluntary societies, addressed to the

body or any oﬁicial thereof, and stating facts, which, if true, it is

proper should be thus communicated.
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' Thorn e. Blanchard, 5 Johns. 508;

Bodwcll v. Osgood, 3 Pick. 370; Har-

ris e. Huntington, 2 Tyler, 129; Gray

0. Pcntland, 2 S. & 11.23; Larkin 0.

Noonan, 19 Wis. 82; Whitney o. Allen,

62 Ill. 472; Vanarsdale v. Luvcrty,

a lawful occasion, which folly protects it, unless the ()('casion bas
been abused to gratify malice or ill will. A petition to the
executive, or other appointing power, in favor of an applicant
for an office, or a remonstrance against such an applicant, is a
publication thus privilet,red. No action will lie for false statementa contained in it, unless it be shown that it was both faltte
and malicious.1 And this role will apply to petitions, applications and remonstrnn<."t's of all sorts addn.·~sed by the citizen to
any officer or offieial body, asking what such officer or body may
lawfully grant, or renion:;trating against anything which it migl1t
lawfully withhold. It is a necessary part of the right of petition that such papers, presented in good faith, should be protected.' Aud it is privileged wl1ile being circulated as well as
after it is presented.• All official communications made by an
officer in the discharge of a public duty are onder the like protection.' So are all communications by members of corporate
bodies, churches and other voluntary societies, addressed to the
body or any official thereof, and smting facta, which, if true, it ill
proper should be thu~ communicated:

09 Penn St. 103.

' Lake v. King, 1 Lev. 240; Reid 0.

DeLorme, 2 Brcv. T6; Thorn o. Blan-

chard, 5 Johns. 508: Vunarsdale 0.

Laverty, 69 Penn. St. 103; Venderzee

o. McGregor, 12 Wend. 54-‘); Howard

e. Thompson, 21 Wend. 319; Bradley

e. Heath, 12 Pick. 163.

' Vanderzee c. McGregor, 12 Wend.

545; Streety 0:. Wood. 15 Barb. 105.

But it must be addressed to the au-

thority having power to give the

relief asked. Fairmau v. Ives, 5 B. &

Ald. 642; Hosmcr 1:. Lovcland, 19

Barb. 111. See Milam o. Burnsides, 1

Brev. 295. And a paper which as-

sllmcs the form of a petition, but is

never presented, or meant to be, has

no protection. State 0. Burnham, 9

N. H. 34.

‘ Statements made by patron of a

school to the trustees, charging bad

character in one of the teachers, is

privilered. Ilarwood v. Kt.-cch,4 Hun,

38!). The privileged cases of this class

are well enumerated by Emm-;'r'r, J.,

in Perkins 0. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461,

467. And, see, Hurt e. Von Gumpach,

L. R. 4 Priv. Council, -131); S. C. 4

Monk, 138.

' liershaw 0. Bailey, 1 Exch.’i'-13;

Farnsworth o. Storrs, 5 Cush. 412;

Chapman 0. Calder, 14 Penn. St. 365;

O‘Donughuc 0. McGovern, 23 Wend.

26; Ilaight 1:. Cornell, 15 Conn. 74;

Servatius 0. Pichcl, 34 Wis. 29‘);

Streety 0. Wood, 15 Barb. 105; Van

Wyck 0. Aspinwall, 1'7 N. Y. 1110.

That pertinent statements. made at a

town meeting, are privileged, see

Smith 0. liiggins, 16 Gray, 251. So

1 Thorn e. Blanebard,li Johns. 508;
Bodwell fl.-Osgood, 3 Pick. 870; Harris "· Huntington, 2 Tylf'r, 129; Gray
"· Pentland, 2 B. & R. 23; Larkin e.
Noonan, 1\J Wis. 82; Whitney e. Allen,
62 Ill. 47:!; Vanarsdale e. Laveny,
1.19 Pt•nn Bl 108.
• Lake "· King, 1 Lev. 240; Reid e.
DfoLorme, 2 Brev. 76; Thorn e. Blanchard, li Johns. 508; Vnnnrsdale "·
Laverty, 69 Penn. St. 103; Venderzee
e. :McGregor, 12 Wend. 64.\; Howard
e. Thompson, 21 Wend. 819; Bradley
e. Heath, 12 Pick. 168.
• Vanderzee"· McGregor, 12 Wend.
~; Streety e. Wond, 13 B:ub. 106.
But it must be addrc::;scd to the au.
thority having power to give the
relief asked. Fairman "· lvct~, ti B. &
Ald. 642; Hosmer e. Lo\'claud, 19
Uarb.111. :;ee Milam e. Burnsidt>s, 1
Brcv. 29~. And a paper which assumes the fhrm of a petition, but is
never presented, or meant to be, bas

no protection. State •· Burnham, 9

N.H. 84.
• Statements made by patron of a
school to the trustees, charging bad
character in one or the teachers, is
privileged. Harwood "· Kt--cch, 4 Huu,
389. The privllt>ged c.l.•n•s of this cia.:•~>
are well enumer11ted by EMMKTT, J.,
in Perkins e. Mitchell, 81 Burb. 461,
467. And, sec, Hart"· Von Gumpsch,
L. R 4 Prlv. Council, 4311; B. C. 4
Moak, 188.
1 llersbaw •· Bailey, 1 Etch. 743;
Fa.rnt~worth e. Sto~n, 6 Cush. 41:3;
Chapman e. Calder, 14 Penn. ::it. 363;
O'Donaghue e. )lcGm·ern, 23 Wend.
26; Ila.i~ht e. Cornell, 15 Conn. 74;
Bervatius e. Plchel, 84 Wis. 29'~;
Streety e. Wood, 15 Barb. 1o.l; VllD
Wyck e. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 1110.
That pertinent statements. uuule at a
town mct>ting, are privilei[cd, ace
Smith e. Higgins. 16 Gray, 2:»1. So
are communicatiooa between meru.
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I Cases Privileged on Individual Reasons. Other cases have

THE LAW OF TORTS.

an aspect less important in the public considerations that bear

upon them, but are still entitled to the same privilege, because a

like duty demands the same freedom of speech, though the com-

munication may concern only the PU!‘-:Oll to whom it is addressed

and the person concerning whom it is made.‘ As an illustration

the case may be taken of the father who discusses with his

daughter the character, habits, reputation and abilities of one

who has sought her hand in marriage. In such a case it is plain

that not only ought the discussion to be privileged, but that the

father ought to be at liberty to speak not merely what he knows,

hut what he believes and suspects.’ To require him at his peril

to keep strictly within the limits of what he could prove to be

true, would be to make no allowance for the conﬁdence properly

belonging to the relation, or for the agitation and alarm which

paternal feelings would naturally experience when an alliance

believed to be improper was proposed. The case suggested is

one of a large class of cases in which the like privilege is allowed

and in which it is necessary to show not only that the communi-

cation was false, but also that it was made with evil intent.

Conﬁdential communications between one and his professional

adviser, whether legal, medical, or spiritual, should be and are
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shielded with the same protection.‘ So are conﬁdential com-

munications between a principal and his agent in any matter

bers of the same church in the course

of church discipline. Jarvis v. Hath-

way, 3 Johns. 180; Smith 1:. Youmans,

3 Hill (S. C.), 85; York o. Pease, 2

Gray, 282; Lucas 0. (Jase, 9 Bush. 297.

As to what are privileged statements

and communications in church dis-

cipline, see Farnsworth o. Storrs, 5

Cush. 412; Servatius 0. Pichel, 84

Wis. 292. A bishop’s charge to his

clergy is privileged. Laughton v.

, Cues Privileged on Individual Beaaons. Other cases have
aa aspect less important in the public considerations that bear:
upon them, but are still entitled to the same privilege, becanse a
like duty demands the same freedom of speech, though the communication may concern only the pereon t~ whom it is addressed
and the person conl'erning whom it is made.• As an illustration
the case may be taken of the father who discusses with his
daughter the character, habits, reputation and abilities of one
who has sought her hand in marriage. In such a case it is plain
that not only ought the discussion to be privileged, but that the
father onght to ht• at liberty to ~'peak not merely what he knows,
hut what he believes and su~pecto.• To require him at his peril
to keep strictly within the limits of what he could prove to b~
trne, would be to make no allowan<.:e for the confidence properly
belonging to the relation, or tor the agitation and alarm which
paternal feelings would naturally experience when an alliance
believed to be improper was proposed. The case suggested is
one of a large class of cases in which the like privilege is allowed
and in which it is neccs:;ary to show not only that the communication was false, but also that it was made with evil intent.
Confidential communications between one and his professional
adviser, whether legal, medical, or spiritual, should be and are
shielded with the same protection.• 8o are confidential communications between a principal and his agent in any matter

Bishop of Sodor & Man. L. R. 4

Priv. Council, 495; S. C. 4 Moak, 162.

‘A communication privileged as

between the sender and receiver, may

lose the privilege, if sent unneces-

sarily by postal card or postal tele-

gram. Williamson v. Freer, L. R. 9

C. P. 393; S. C. 10 Monk, 225.

‘Todd '0. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88.

See Joanncs o. Bennett, 5 Allen, 170.

Reports by one employed by a father

to ascertain the standing of his

daugl1ter’s husband, made to the

father and mother, are privileged.

Atwill 0. Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177.

1‘ But there is no privilege to a

priest in making charges against

members of his congregation in rela-

tion to their business from the pulpit.

Fitzgerald v. Robinson, 112 Mass. 371.

Nor is there any privilege to a

stranger who interferes in negotia-

tions of marriage, though there would

be to a near relative. Joannes v. Ben-

nett. 5 Allen, 170. Compare Coxhead

o. Richards, 2 M. G. 8: S. 569; Bennett

0. Deacon, Id. 628.

bers of the same church in the course
of church discipline. Jarvis"· Hathway, 3 Johns. 180; Smith"· Youmans,
8 Hill (8. C.), SO; York "· Pease, 2
Gray, 282; Lucas o. Case, 9 Bush. 297.
.As to what IU'C privileged statements
and communications in church discipline, see Farnsworth "· Storrs, li
Cush. 412; Servatiua e. Pichel, 84
Wis. 292. A. bishop's charge to his
clergy is privileged. Laughton e.
Bishop of Bodor & Mao, L. R. 4
Priv. Council, 495; S.C. 4 Moak,162.
1 A communication privileged as
between the sender and receiver, may
lose the privilege, if sent unnecessarily by postal card or postal telegram. Williamson "· Freer, L. R. 9
C. P. 898; B. C. 10 Moak, 225.

• Todd "· Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88.
Bee Joannes "· Bennett, li Allen, 170.
Reporta by one employed by a father
to ascertain the standing of hla
daughter's husband, made to the
father and mother, are privileged.
A.twill "· Mackintosh, 120 ll888. 17'7.
1 But there is no privilege to a
priest in making charges against
members of his congregation in relation to their business from the pt.lpil
Fitzgerald "· Robinson, 112 Mass. 871.
Nor is there any privilege to a
stranger who interferes in negotiations of marriage, though there would
be to a near relative. Joannea "·Bennett, 5 Allen, 170. Compare Coxhead
e. Richards, 2 M.G. & 8.009; Bennett
e. Deacon, ld. 628.
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connected with the business.‘ And where conﬁdential inquiries

217

are made concerning the character and conduct of servants, or

the responsibility of tradesmen, and the like, by one having an

interest in knowing, and of one who may be supposed to have

had special opportunity in his own dealings or affairs to acquire

the information, the answers are in like manner privileged.’ But

if one makes it his business to furnish to others information

concerning the character, habits, standing and responsibility of

tradesmen, his business is not privileged, and he must justify

his reports by the truth.‘

Liberty of the Press. The several State constitutions, like the

federal constitution, have been careful to preserve the freedom

of the press. They have not, however. undertaken to deﬁne it,

and what is meant by it is not made very plain by the author-

ities. On one point all are agreed, namely, that the freedom of

the press implies exemption from censorship, and a right in all

connected with the business.' And where confidenti81 inqmnes
are made concerning the character and conduct of servants, or
the responsibility of tradesmen, and the like, by one having an
interest in knowing, and of one who may be supposed to ha,·e
had special opportunity in his own dealings or affairs to acquire
the information, the answers are in like manner privileged.' Bnt
if one makes it his business to furnish to others information
concerning the character, habits, standing and responsibility of
tradesmen, his business is not privileged, and he must justify
his reports by the truth.'

persons to publish what they may see ﬁt, being responsible for

the abuse of the right.‘ But whether the conductor of a public

journal has any privilege above others in publishing, is not

so clear. The freedom of the press was undoubtedly intended to

be secured on public grounds, and the general purpose may be

said to be, to preclude those in authority from making use of the
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machinery of the law to prevent full discussion of political and

other matters in which the public are concerned. With this end

‘Washburn 0. Cooke, 3 Dcnio, 110; ' Taylor 0. Church, 8 N. Y. 452;

Knowles 0. Peck, 42 Conn. 386; S. O.

19 Am. Rep. 542. So are those be-

tween a patron of a school and the

trustees concerning the character of

a teacher. Harwood v. Keech, 4 Hun,

889.

' Pattlson v. Jones, 8 B. 8: C. 578;

Storey v. Challands, 8 C. & P. 284;

Dunman o. Bigg,1 Camp. 269, note;

Amann 0. Damm, 8 C. B. (N. s.\ 597;

Bradley 0. Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Elam

Liberty of the Press. The several State constitutions, like the
federal constitution, have been careful to preserve the freedom
of the press. They have not, howe\·er. undertaken to define it,
and what is meant by it is not made ver.v plain by the authorities. On one point all are agreed, namely, that the freedom of
the press implies exemption from censorship, and a right in aJI
persons to publish what they may see fit, being responsible tor
the abuse of the right.• But whether ~he conductor of a pnblie
journal has any privilege aboYe others in publi~hing, is not
eo clear. The freedom of the prc~s was undoubtedly intended to
be secured on public grounds, and the general purpose may hE
said to be, to preclude those in authority from making uso of the
mac·hinery of the law to prevent full di~cussion of political and
other matters in which the public are concerned. With this end

0. Badger, 23 Ill. -49.8; White v. Nich-

ols, 3 How. 266; Lewis o. Chapman,

16 N. Y. 3'75; Fowles o. Bowen, 30

N. Y. 20; Noonan o. Orton, 32 Wis.

106; Hatch 0. Lane, 105 Mass. 894;

Atwill o. Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 1'77.

Orlnsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y. 477;

Sunderlin 0. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188.

See Beardsley o. Tnppan, 5 Blatch.

497. The owner of a building which

has been set on ﬂre may cnution per-

sons in the building against pnrtic

nlar persons suspected of being the

incendiary. Lawler v. Earle, 5 Allen,

22. The landlord may caution the

tenant respecting the character of

subtenants. Knight '0. Gibbs, 8 Nev.

80 Man. 469; B. C. 1 A. & E. 43.

‘ Story on Const. § 1889; 2 Kent,

1'7; Rawle on Const. Ch. 10; Cooley

Const. Lim. 420; 4 BI. Com. 151; Com-

monwealth o. Blending, 3 Pick. 804.

Washburn"· Cooke, 8 Denio, 110;
Knowles •· Peck, 42 Conn. 386; B. 0.
19 A.m. Rep. M2. So are those between a patron of a school and the
trustees concerning the chara<"ter nf
a teacher. Harwood e. Keech, 4 Hun,
889.
t Pattison "· Jones, 8 B. & 0. lS78;
Storey v. Chnllands, 8 C. & P. 234;
Dunman "· Bigg, 1 Camp. 269. note;
Amann "· Damm, 8 C. B. (:R. a.1 5D7;
Bradley"· Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Ehlm
e. Badger, 23 Ill. 4D8; White "· Nichols, 8 IIow. 266; I.~wis "·Chapman,
16 N. Y. S7lS; Fowles fl, Bowen, 80
N. Y. 20; Noonan "· Orton, 82 Wis.
106; Hatch "· Lane, 103 Mass. 894;
.A.twlll e. Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177.
1

Taylor "· Church, 8 N. Y. 462;
Ormsby "· Doug188:!, 87 N. Y. 477;
Sunderlin"· Bradstreet, 46 N.Y. 188.
See Benrtlsley e. Tappan, lS Blatch.
497. The owner of a building which
hu been set on 6re may cnutlon per.
sons in the building against partie.
ular persons suspected of being the
incendiary. Lawler "·Earle, lS Allen,
22. The landlord may caution tbt'
tenant respecting the character of
sub-tenanta. Knight"· Gibbs, 8 NeT.
& Man. 46D; 8. C. 1 A. & E. 43.
' Story on Const. ~ 1&:!9; 2 Kent,
17; Rawle on Oonst. Oh. 10; Cooley
Const. Lim. 420; 4 Bl. Com. 1lS1; Commonwealth "· Blanding, 8 Pick. 80'1
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in view not only must freedom of discussion be permitted, but
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there must be exemption afterward from liability for any pub-

lication made in good faith, and in the belief in its truth, the

making of which, if true, would be justified by the occasion.

There should consequently be freedom in discussing, in good

faith, the character, the habits, and mental and moral qualiﬁca-

tions of any person presenting himself, or presented by his

friends, as a candidate for a public oﬁice, either to the electors or

to a board or ofﬁcer having powers of appointment.‘ The same

freedom of discussion should be allowed when the character and

oﬂieial conduct of one holding a public office is in question, and

in all cases where the matter discussed is one of general public

interest.‘

The public press is also allowed to give full reports of judicial

trials and hearings, provided they are not ea: parte merely, and

are not indecent or blasphemous.‘ But such reports must be

conﬁned to the actual proceedings, and must contain no defama-

§ Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1; King v.

Root, 4 Wend. 113; Hint v. Bennett,

4 E. D. Smith, 647; S.C.19 N. Y. 1'73;

Curtis v. Mussey, 6 Gray, 261 ; Aldrich

v. Printing Co., 9 Minn. 133; Mayrant

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

0. Richardson, 1 N. & McC. 348. See

Gathercole 1:. Miall, 15 M. & W. 319;

Purcell 0. Sowler, L. R. 1 C. P. Div.

in view not only must freedom of discussion be permitted, but
there must be exemption afterward from liability for my pub..
lieation made in good faith, and in the belief in its truth, the
making of which, if true, would be justified by the occasion.
There should consequently be freedom in diACussing, in good
faith, the character, the habits, and mental and moral qualifications of any person presenting himself, or presented by his
friends, as a candidate for a public office, either to the electors or
to a board or officer having powers of appointment.• The same
freedom of discussion should be allowed when the character and
official conduct of one holding a public office is in question, and
in a11 cases where the matter discussed is one of general pnblie
interest.,
The pubfic press is also allowed to give full reports of judicial
trials and hearings, provided they are not ~ parl8 merely, and
are not indecent or blasllhemous.• Bnt such reports mnst be
confined to the actual proceedings, and most contain no defama-

781; S. C. in Error, 2 C. P. Div. 215.

' Purcell o. Sowler, 1 C. P. Div. 781;

Wason o. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. '73:

Kelley 0. Sherloch, L. R. 1 Q. B. 686;

Kelley 0. Tinling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 699;

Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 211. As

to what is mutter of public interest,

see Purcell v. Sowler, L. R. 2 C. P.

Div. 215, qualifying the decision in

the court below. Also, Davis ~v. Dun-

can, L. R. 9 C. P. 396; S. C. 10 Moak,

228; Henwood v. Harrison, L. R. '7 O.

P. 606; S. C.3Moak,398. The trus-

tee of a mining corporation is not

such a public oﬁlcer as to render the

incumbent amenable to criticism

through newspapers, as in case of

persons ﬁlling public oﬁices of trust

and conﬁdence, in the proper admin-

istration of which the community

has an interest Wilson 0. Fitch, 41

Cal. 363.

The directors of a society for pro-

moting female medical education,

may, in a published report, caution

the public against trusting a person

who had formerly been employed to

obtain and collect subs;-riptions on

their behalf, but has since been dis-

missed, if the caution is given in

good faith, and is required for the

protection of the corporation and the

public. B101-:1.ow, J.: “A party can-

not be held responsible for a state-

ment or publication tending to dis-

parage private character, if it is called

for by the ordinary exigencies of

social duty, or is necessary and

proper to enable him to protect his

own interest, or that of another, pro-

vided it is made in good faith and

without a willful design to defame."

Gussett v. Gilbert, 6 Gray, 9-}, 97,

citing Toogood v. Spying, 1 C. M. &

~

Lewtu. Few, 5 Johns. 1; King e.

Root, 4 Wend. ll:i; H.mt e. .Bennett,
4E. D. Smith, 647: 8 . 0 . 19 N. Y.173;
Curtis o. Mussey, 6 Gray, 261; Aldrich

e. Printing Co., 9 llinn. 183; Mayrant
e. Richardson, 1 N. & McC. 848. See
Gathercole "· Miall, 15 ll. & W. 819;
Purcell e. Bowler, L. R. 1 C. P. Div.
781; S. C. in Error, 2 C. P. Div. 213.
1 Purcell e. Sowler, 1 C. P. Div. 781;
Wason e. Wnltcr, L. R. 4 Q. B. 78:
Kelley e. Hherloch, L. R. 1 Q. B. 686;
Kelley e. Tinling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 699;
Palmer e. Concord, 48 N.H. 211. A.s
to what is matter of public interc~t,
see Purcell e. Bowler, L. R 2 C. P.
Div. 215, qualifying the decision in
the court below. Also, Davis e. Duncan, L. R. 9 C. P. 396; 8. C. 10 Moak,
228; Henwood fl. Harrison, L. R. 7 C.
P. 606; B. C. 8 llosk, 808. The trustee of a mining corporation is not
such a public officer as to render the
incumbent amenable to criticism
thJ;"ough newspspcrs, as in case of
persons filling public offices of trust
and confidence, in the propPr adminIstration of which the community

bas an interest. Wilson e. Fitch, 41
Csl. 868.
The directors of a society for pro.
moting female medical education,
may, ln a pubHshed report, caution
the public against trusting a persoa
who had formerly Leen employed to
obtain and collect subs~·riptions on
their behalf, but has since been dismissed, if the caution Is given in
good faith, and is required for the
protection of the corporation and the
public. BIGKLOW, J.: "A party CRD·
not be held responsible for a stat~
ment or publication tending to disparage private character, If it is Clllled
for by the ordinary exigencies of
social duty, or is necessary and
proper to enable him to protect his
own interest, or that of another, pro..
vided it is made in good faith and
without a willful design to defame."
Gassett o. Gilbert. 6 Gray, 94, 97,
citing Toogood "· Spying, 1 C. }[. &
R. 193; Child e. AiDeck, 9 B. & C.
408, and other cases.
1 Hoare e. Silverlock, 9 C. B. 20;
Lewis e. Levy, El. B. & El. 587; Ry.
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tory observations, headings, or comments.‘ The reason why the
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publication of em parts proceedings is not privileged is, that it

has a tendency “ to prejudge those whom the law still presumes

to be innocent, and to poison the source of justice." '

The privilege of the press is not conﬁned to those who publish

newspapers and other serials, but extends to all who make use

of it to place information before the public.

No privilege seems to be accorded to the publication of news;

but publishers will not be held liable in exemplary damages for the

appearance in their journals of false items of intelligence with-

out their personal knowledge, where they have been guilty of no

negligence in the selection of the agents through whom the pub-

lication has been made, and have not been accustomed habitually

to make their journals the vehicle of detraction and malice;‘ and

the press may lawfully warn the public against the conduct and

ails c. Leader, L. R. 1 Exeh. 296;

Terry 0. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 8'75;

Gazette Co. 1:. Timberlake, 10 Ohio,

(N. s ) 548; Torrey 0. Field, 10 Vt. 353;

Saunders 0. Baxter, 6 Heisk. 369;

Storey o. Wallace, 60 Ill. 51. The

privilege extends to proceedings in
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the nature of trials in voluntary asso-

tory observations, headings, or comments.' The reason why the
publication of tJ:IJ parU proceedings is not privileged is, that it
has a tendency "to prejudge those whom the law still presumes
to be innocent, and to poison the source of justice:' •
The privilege of the press is not confined to those who publish
newspapers and other serials, but extends to all who make use
of it to place information before the public.
No privilege seems to be accorded to the publication of r..ews;
but publishers will not be held liable in exemplary damages for the
appearance in their journals of false items of intelligence without their personal knowledb~' where they have been guilty of nonegligence in the selection of the agents through whom the publication has been made, and have not been accustomed habitually
to make their joun1als the vehicle of detraction and malice; • and
the press may lawfully warn the public against the conduct and

ciations; us, for example, a medical

society. Burrows o. Bell, '7 Gray, 301.

' Stiles u. Nokcs, 7 East. 493; Del-

cgal '0. Highley, 8 Bing. N. C. 950;

Thomas o. Croswell, 7 Johns. 264;

Pittock 1:. O’Niell, 68 Penn. St. 253;

S. C. 3 Am. Rep. 544; Usher 1.1. Seve-

rance, 20 Me. 9; Scripps v. Reilly, 35

Mich. 871; Story v. Wallace, 60 Ill. 51.

‘Per ELLENBOROUGII, Ch. J., in

Rex 0. Fisher, 2 Camp. 563. See

Duncan v. Thwaites, 8 B. & C. 556;

Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & (3.473; Charlton

0. Watton, 6 C. & P. 385; Bchrens v.

Allen, B Fost. & Fin. 135; Huff 0.

Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120; Stanley v.Webb,

4 Sandi‘. 21; Matthews 0. Beach, 5

Sandi‘. 256; Usher o. Severance, 20

Me. 9. But if the result of an aparte

proceeding is that the accused party

is discharged, the proceeding, it

seems, may be published. Curry 0.

Walter, 1 B. & P. 525; Lewis a. Levy,

El. Bl.& El. 537. A member of a

legislative body, it is said in England,

is not privileged in publishing the

words of a speech made by him to

the House. Rex o. Lord Abingdon. 1

Esp. 226; Rex 0. Creevy, 1 M. & S.

273. But in this country, whore the

publication of s‘pl3(‘(‘ll(.‘s' and debates

is made by authority of law, it would

seem that the privilege to publish

must be as broad as the privilege to

speak. In Louisiana it is held that a

newspaper is pl'l\'il0g1'd in publishing

the testimony taken bell-re aCongres-

sional committee. Terry o. Follows,

2l La. Ann. 875. There is no privi-

lege in publishing a slnmh-r uttered

by a murderer at the gallows. Sun-

ford 0. Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20. Nor

merely because the publication rclatcs

toamatter of public interest. Wil-

son v._ Fitch, 41 Cal. 363.

' Sec Barrows v. Bell, 7 Gray, 301.

alia "· Leader, L. R. 1 Exch. 296;
Terry "· Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 875;
G~ Co. "· Timberlake, 10 Ohio,
(R. 8) M8; Torrey"· Field, 10 Vt. 3:i3;
Saunders "· Haxter, 6 lleisk. 869 ;
Storey "· Wallace, 60 Ill. 51. The
privilege extends to proceedings in
the nature of trials in voluntary as!IOclations; as, for example, a mctlical
BOClety. Barrows"· Bell, 7 Gray, 301.
a Stiles "·Nokes, 7 East. 493; Dcl.
<'gal "· Highley, 3 Bing. N.C. fJ!iO;
Thomas e. Croswell, 7 John!!. 26-l;
Pittock e. O'Niell. 68 Penn. St. 2;i3;
8. C. 3 Am. Rt!p. 544; Usher "· Seve.
ranee, 20 Me. 9; Scripps fl. Reilly, 35
Mich. 871; Story"· Wallace, 60 Ill. :'it.
• Per ELLRNnnRouorr, Ch. J., in
Rex e. Fisher, 2 Camp. 563. See
Duncan "· Tbwaites, S B. & C. 5.')6;
Flint "· Pike, 4 B. & C. 473; Charlton
e. Watton, 6 C. & P. 885; Behrens 11.
• Allen, 8 Fost. & Fin. l:J5; Huff "·
Bt>nnett,4Sandf.120; Stanley!l.Webb,
4 Sandf. 21; MAtthews e. Bench, 5
8andf. 256; Usher "· Severanee, 20
lie. 9. But if the result of an u part~
proceeding is that the secuRed party
Ia discharged, the procerding, It
eeems, may be published. Curry fl.

Walter, 1 B. & P . 525; Lewis "·Levy,
El. Bl. & El. 537. A member of a
legislative body, ft is said in Engl:l.nd,
is not privilcgt.>d in publi:ihing the
Vtords of a Sp('ecll made by him to
the House. Rex 11. Lord Abin;rdton, 1
Esp. 226; Rex "· Creevy. 1 ll. & ~278. But in this country, where the
publication of spec!'hcs and tlcbatc·~
is made by authority of Ju,v, it woulll
seem that the privilege to publish
must be ll!l broad as the privilege to
speak. In Louisiana it is ht•ld that a
newspaper is prh·ileg<·d in publishing
the testimony tllken bl·f"re :l Congressional committee. Terry "· Fellows~
21 La. Ann. 1175. Tlu•re is no privilege in publishing a slnn,lt·r utrered
by a murderer at the gallows. 8un.
ford "· Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20. Nor
merely b<.'cause the puhl ication rell\lf'S
to a mntler of public interest. Wil.
son "·)•'itch, 41 Cal. naa.
1 Sec Bm·rows "· Bell, 7 Gray, 801.
• D.u"lg Poat Co. e. llc.A.rthur, 16
Mir.h. 447; Perrett " · N e\v Orleans
Timu, 2.') La. Ann. 170: Scripps "·
Reilly, S.'i Mi<'h. 871; Gih~'ln fl. Cincinnati Enquirer, 5 Cent. L. Jour. 31:!0.
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motives of those who are believed to be disloyal, or to threaten

TIIJ<; J,A W 0.1<' TORTS.

the peace of the State; and the fair and honest discussion of

matters of public interest is always privileged.‘

Repeating Slanders and Libels. There is no privilege in repeat-

ing defamatory publications. Therefore it is no defense that the

defendant only repeated what had been told him by another

motives of those who are believed to be disloyal, or to threaten
the peace of the State; and the fair and honest discussion of
matters of public interest is always privileged.'

whose name he gives, or copied into his newspaper a charge

originating elsewhere, or published it as an advertisement or com-

munication. Sometimes the fact may mitigate damages, but it

cannot excuse the publication.’ Neither is it a defense that a

report was current and generally believed that the plaintiff was

guilty of what was imputed to him,“ or that the publication pro-

fessed to give a rumor merely.‘

Slander of Property. A, person may be as seriously injured

by misrepresentation of his property as by the slander of him-

self in respect to his business; and, indeed, the two often go

together. But there may be misrepresentation in respect to par-

ticular articles of property not connected with one’s business,

and where the injury will concern the property alone. Such mis-

representation is actionable, provided it is malicious and dam-

‘ Kinyon u. Palmer, 18 Iowa, 377.

Repeating Slanders and Libels. There is no privilege in repeating defamatory publications. Therefor"' it is no dct{mse that the
def~ndant only repeated what had been told him by another
whose name he gh·es, or copied into his newspaper a charge
originating elsewhere, or published it as an advertisement or communication. Sometimes the iact may mitigate damages, hut it
cannot excuse the publication.' Neither is it a ddtmse that a
report was current and generally believed that the plaintiff was
guilty of what was imputed to him,' or that the publication professed to give a rumor merely.•

The result of a trial may be given as
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an item of news. Whitney 0. Janes-

ville Gazette, 5 Biss. 830.

' Rex 0. Newman, 1 El. & Bl. 268;

Parker 0. McQueen, 8 B. Mon. 16;

Hampton v. Wilson, 4 Dev. 468;

Keney 0. McLaughlin, 5 Gray, 3;

Evans 0. Smith, 5 T. B. Mon. 363;

Hotchkiss 0. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 510;

Sheahan 0. Collins, 20 Ill. 325; Mc-

Donald o. Woodruif, 2 Dill. 244;

Slander of Property. 4 person may be as seriously injured
by misrepresentation of his property as by the slander of himself in respect to his business; and, indeed, the two often go
together. But there may be misrepresentation in respect to particular articles of property not connected with one's business,
and where the injury will concern the property alone. Such misrepresentation is actionable, provided it is malicious and dam-

Suns v. Joerris, 14 Wis. 66:5.

“Moberly '0. Preston, 8 Mo. 462;

Knight '0. Foster, 89 N. H. 576; Cade

0. Rcdditt, 15 La. Ann. 492; Clarkson

0. M’Carty, 5 Blackf. 574; Johnston

0. Lance, '7 Ired. 448; Perrett 0. Times

Newspaper, 25 La. Ann. 1'70.

' Wheeler '0. Shields, 3 Ill. 348; Ma-

son 1;. Mason, 4 N. H. 110. See

Thompson o. Bowers, 1 Doug. (Mich.)

821; Treat 0. Browning, 4 Conn. 408;

State 0. Butnam, 15 La. Ann. 166.

Giving with the publication the name

of the author is no protection. Dole

0. Lyon. 10 Johns. 447; Cates v. Kel-

logg, 9 Ind. 506; Haines 0. Welling,

7 Ohio, 253; Fowler '0. Chichester, 26

Ohio, (N. s.) 9; Cummei-ford v. McAl-

voy, 15 Ill. 311; Inman o. Foster, B

Wend. 602. Nor is ita defense theta

rumor existed previous to the publi-

cation to the same effect. Haskins 1:.

Lumsden, 10 Wis. 359; Knights. Fos-

ter,39 N. H. 576; Carpenterv. Bailey,

53 N. H. 590; Skinner 0. Powers, 1

Wend. 451; Beardsley o. Bridgman,

17 Iowa, 290. But the fact may miti-

gate damages. Farr 0. Rasco, 9 Mich.

353.

1 Kinyon "·Palmer, 18 Iowa, 877.
Thompson fl. Bowers, 1 Doug. (Mich.)
The result of a trial may be given as S21; Tl'eat "· Browning, 4 Conn. 408;
an item of news. Whitney"· Janes- State "· Butnam, 15 La. Ann. 166.
Giving with the publication the name
ville Gazett~. 5 Biss. 830.
1 Rex"· Newman, 1 El. & Bl. 268;
of the author is no protection. Dole
Parker "· McQueen, 8 B. :Mon. 16; "· Lyon. 10 Johns. 4-!i; Cates "· KelHampton "· Wilson, 4 Dcv. 468; lo~g. 9 Ind. 506; Haines "·Welling,
Keney it. McLaughlin, li Gmy, 3; . 7 Ohio, 253; Fowler"· Chichester, 26
Evans "· Smith, 5 T. B. Mon. 303; Ohio, (N. s.) 9; Cummerford 11. McAJ.
HotchkiM 11. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 510; voy, 15 Ill. 311; Inman "· Foster, 8
Sheahan 11. Collins, 20 Ill. 325; lie- Wend. 602. Nor is ita defense that&
Donald "· Woodruff, 2 Dill. 244; rumor existed previous to the publiSnns 11. Joerris, 14 Wis. 66:.1.
cation to the same efl'cct. Haskins •·
3 Moberly 11. Preston, 8 Mo. 462;
Lumsden, 10 Wis. 359; Knighttl. FosKnight v. Foster, 89 N. H. 576; Cade
ter, 39 N. H. 576; Carpenterv. Bailey,
"·Redditt, 15 La. Ann. 492; Clarkson 53 N. H. 500; Skinner "· Powers, 1
11. M'Carty, IS Blackf. 574; Johnston
Wend. .W1; Beardsley "· Bridgman,
"·Lance, 7 Ired. 448; Perrett"· Timu 17 Iowa, 200. But the fact may miti.
Newspaper, 25 J~a. Ann. 170.
gate damages. Farr 11. Rasco, 9 Mich.
' Wheeler"· Shields, 8 Ill. 348; Ma. 853.
:BOn "· Mason, 4 N. H. 110. See
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aging; but malice will not be presumed, and damage must be

BLANDER AND LIBEL.

alleged and proved.‘ _

221

Slander of Title. An action lies for maliciously slandering the

title to the plaintiﬁ"s property; but here, as in slander of prop-

erty, it is necessary to aver and prove both malice and damage.

aging; but malice will not be presumed, and damage must be
alleged and proved.1

The action rests upon the general principle that when one injures

another by any wrongful and malicious conduct, he is liable in

an action on the special case.’ It is of course never wrongful

for one to assert a title in himself to property, or to seek to

establish it by judicial proceedings, provided this is done in

good faith; and good faith must be presumed while the proceed-

ings are pending; but we have seen that after they are disposed

of, an action may lie, if malice and want of probable cause be

made out.‘

' Gott 0. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 285; S. ’ Malaehy v. Sopcr, 3 Bing. (N. C.)

C. 23 Am. Rep. 322. If the falsity of 871. In this ease and in Bige1ow’s

the representations is proved, and in- notes thereto, Lead. Cas. 54~59, the

jury resulting therefrom, it is said authorities are fully collected.

malice is to be presumed. Swan 0. ‘See ante, p.180.
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Tappan, 5 Cush. 104.

Slander of Title. An action lies for maliciously slandering the
title to the plaintiff's property; bnt here, as in slander of property, it is necessary to aver and prove both malice and damage.
The action rests upon the general principle that when one injures
another by any wrongful and malicious conduct, he is liable in
an action on the special case.• It is of course never wrongful
for one to assert a ti tie in himself to property, or to seek to
establish it by judicial proceedings, provided this is done in
good faith; and good faith must be presumed while the proceedings are pending; but we have seen that after they are disposed
of, an ~ction may lie, if malioo and want of probable cause be
made out.•
1 Gott tt. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235; 8.
C. 28 Am. Rep. 822. If the falsity of
the representations is proved, and in.
jary resulting therefrom, it is said
malice is to be presumed. Swan o.
Tappan, G Cuah. l<>i.

1 Malachy "· Soper, 8 Bing. (N. C.)
871. In this case and in Bigelow's
notes thereto, Lead. Cas. ~9, &he
authorities are fully collected.
1 See ante, p. 180.
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CHAPTER VIII.

222

THJ: LAW OF TORTS.

INJURIES T0 FAMILY RIGHTS.

Family Rights. In a. previous chapter it has been said that

the common law, while it took notice of rights as pertaining to

certain relations of life, did not recognize the family, as such, as

constituting a legal entity, and as having rights as an association

of persons.‘ The reasons for this are to be found in the barbar-

ous condition of society when the common law was forming; a

condition when physical force counted for very much more than

now, when serfdom and villianage very largely prevailed, and

when wife and children were to husband and father rather ser-

vants and dependants than equals, and were expected to look to

CHAPTER VIII.

him for protection against wrongs at the hands of others. The

husband and father, in a primitive state of society, is naturally

INJURIES TO FAMILY RIGHTS.

regarded as the representative of the family, and rights in which

all are concerned may be expected to ﬁnd their best protection

through him. Social changes have been going on more rapidly

in modern times than the modiﬁcation of legal principles, and

the common law of family rights is, in most particulars, not

greatly different now from what it was when it tolerated a man

in inﬂicting personal chastiseinent on his wife or his marriage-

able daughter.
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Wrongs to the Husband. While thus the husband and father

was recognized as the head and representative of the family, it

was impossible, in some cases, that the ordinary remedies for

civil injuries should be allowed as between the various members.

How, for instance, was the husband to have civil redress for any

wrong suffered at the hands of the wife? He could not have it

by way of award of damages, for the wife’s property, so far as it

was personal, and the usufruet and enjoyment of it, so far as it

Ante, p. 48.

Family Bights. In a previous chapter it has been said that
the common law, while it took notice of rights as pertaining to
certain relations of life, did not recognize the family, as such, as
constituting a legal entity, and as having rights as an association
of persons.' The reasons for this are to be found in tho barbarous condition of society when the common law was forming; a
condition when physical force counted for very much more than
now, when sertaom and villianage very largely prevailed, and
when wite and children were to husband and father rather servants and dependants than equals, and were expected to look to
him tor protection against wrongs at the hands of others. The
husband and father, in a primitive state of society, is naturally
regarded as the representative of the family, and rights in which
all are concerned may be expected to find their best protection
through him. Social changes have been going on more rapidly
in modern times than the modification of legal principles, ancJ
the common law of family rights is, in most particulars, not
~reatly different now from what it was when it tolerated a man
in inflicting personal chastisement on his wife or his marriageable daughter.

Wrongs to the Husband. While thns the husband and father
was recognized as the head and representative of the family, it
was impossible, in some cases, that the ordinary remedies for
civil injlll·ies should be allowed as between the various members.
How, for instance, was the hu~band to have civil redress tor any
wrong suffered at the hands of the wife~ He could not have it
by way of award of damages, for the wife's property, so far as it
was personal, and the usufruct and enjoyment of it, so far as it
Ante, p.4S.

INJURIES TO FAMILY RIGHTS.

INJURIES TO FAVILY RIGHTS.
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was real, were transferred to the husband by the marriage. For

gross breaches of the marriage covenant the spiritual courts

might decree a separation, and the supreme legislative authority

might dissolve the marriage relation; but other civil redress the

husband could not have. He must protect his rights as husband

by physical restraint or correction.

The right of the husband to inﬂict personal chastisement upon

the wife has probably entirely passed away.‘ There are, indeed,

some recognitions of it within a few years last past, but the

spirit of the age rejects it as a reminiscence of barbarism.' It

cannot be aflii-med that an action can be sustained by the wife for

an assault upon her by the husband, but such an assault would

be taken notice of by the criminal law as an offense against the

State. And from any forcible restraint put upon the actions of

the wife, and which would constitute an imprisonment, the wife

might have relief on lntbeas corpus.

If we direct attention to the remedies which, at the common

law, the husband might‘ have against third persons, for a viola-

tion of his rights as husband, we ﬁnd them all grounded upon or
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permeated with the ideas which mark their origin in a rough

and uncultivated society.

1. He might have redress against third persons for an injury

suﬂ'ered by him in respect to the property which the wife had

brought him. But as such redress would rest upon principles

which are common to other cases, it calls for no special comment

here.

'Peannan 0. Peannan, 1 Swab. & “Whatever the old books may say

Trist. 609; People 0. Winters, 2 Park.

C. R 10; Commonwealth 0. McAfee,

108 Mass 458.

' In State 0. Rhodes, 1 Phil. (N. O.)

453, it is said that, although the laws

of the State (lo not recognize the

right of the husband towhip his wife,

yet that the courts will not interfere

was real, were transferred to the husband by the marriage. For
gross breaches ot' the marriage covenant the spiritual courts
might decree a separation, and the supreme legislative authority
might dissolve the marriage relation; but other civil redress the
husband could not have. He mnst protect his rights as husband
by physical restraint or correction.
The right of the husband to inflict personal chastisement upon
the wife has probably entirely passed away.• There are, indeed,
some recognitions of it within a few years la.st past, but the
spirit ot' the age rejects it as a reminiscence of barbarism.' It
cannot be afiit·med that an action can be sustained by the wife for
an assault upon her by the husband, but such an assault would
be taken notice of by the criminal law as an offense a.gainst the
State. And from any forcible restraint put upon the actions of
the wife, and which would constitute an imprisonment, the wife
might have relief on lwbeas corpus.
If we direct attention to the remedies which, at the common
law, the husband might· have against third persons, for a violation of his rights as husband, we find them all grounded upon or
permeated with the ideas which mark their origin in a rough
and uncultivated society.
1. He might have redress against third pcr~ons for an injury
suffered by him in respect to the property which the wite had
brought him. But as snch redre:<s would rest upon principles
which aro common to othe1: cases, it calls for no special comment
here.

to punish him for moderate correc-

tion ot’ her, even though there had

been no provocation. One ls naturally

a little curious to know what can be

moderate correction where there has

been no fault. In Poor 1:. Poor, 8 N.

H. 807, 313, Rtcnannsou, Ch. J ., says:

upon the subject, there never was, in

my opinion, in the relation between

husband and wife, when rightly un-

derstood, anything that gave to the

husband the right to reduce a refrac-

tory wife to obedience." In the same

case, however, the judge says that

when the wife “ is ill treated on ac-

count of her own misconduct, her

remedy is in a reform of her manners,

unless the return from the husband is

wholly unjustified by the provoca-

tion, and quite out of proportion to

the offense." P. 816.

1 Peannan c. PeannRn, 1 Rwab. &
''Whatever the olc1 books may aay
Trist. 609; People"· Winters, 2 Park.
npon the subject, there never was, in
C. R 10; Commonwealth 1!. JtlcA.fee, my opinion, in the relation between
108 Mass 4.'58.
· husband and wife, when rightly un1 In State n. Rhodes, 1 Phil. (N. 0.)
derstood, anything that gave to the
4.'>3, it is said that, although the laws
husband the right to re1luce a refracof the State do not recognize the tory wife to obetli£>nce." In the same
right of the husband to whip his wife,
case, howevl.'r, the judge says that
yet that the courL'! will not intcrft>re when the wife "is ill treated on acto punish him for moderate correc- count of her own misconduct, hrr
tion of her, even though there hnd
remedy is in a reform of her manner~.
b£>en no provocation. One Is naturally
unless the return from the husband is
a little curious to know what can be
wholly unjustified by the provoca.
moderate correction where there hns tion, and quite out of proportion to
been no fault. In Poor •· Poor, .s N. the offense." P. 816.
H. 80'7, 818, RICBAllDSON, Ch. J., says:
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2. He might have a special action on the case against one who
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should seduce his wife or entice her away from him.‘ The

ground of such an action is the inﬂiction upon the husband of

some one or more of the following injuries: 1. Dishonor of the

marriage bed. 2. Loss of the wife’s affections.’ 3. Loss of the

comfort of the wife’s society. 4. Total loss of the wife’s services

where she absconds from the husband, and probable diminished

value of services where she does not. 5. The mortiﬁcation and

sense of shame that most usually accompany this most serious of

domestic wrongs. The extent of the injury in any case must

depend in great measure upon the previous relations of the par-

ties. If these were cordial and affectionate, and such as are

expected to exist when a suitable marriage has been formed

under a proper sense of the obligations and responsibilities that

belong to it, the wrong of the seducer who succeeds in with-

drawing the wife’s affections from her husband, and induces her

to live with him a life of shame, it is impossible adequately to

measure. If, on the other hand, the husband was a libertine, and

has brought shame upon his family by his own notorious miscon-

duct, and if the wife, after the destruction of her affection by his

own abuse and misconduct, has ﬁnally surrendered her own

honor, it is diﬁicult to understand what claim he can have to
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legal consideration. And between these extreme cases there may

be numerous others diﬁ"e1'ing so widely in their facts that, while

it may be wise to give a right of action in all, yet the measure

' Winsmore 0. Greenbank, Willes,

577; Wecdon o. Timbrell,5T. R357;

Babe 0. I-Innna. 5 Ohio, 530; Preston

0. Bowers, 13 Ohio, (N. s.) 1; Hadley

0. Heywood. 121 Mass. 236; Barbee u.

Armstead, 10 Ired. 530; Crose 0. Rut.

ledge, 81 Ill. 266; Conway 1:. Nicol,

34 Iowa, 533.

' In Hcermance 0. James, 47 Barb.

120, an action was sustained by a

husband against one who was alleged

to have poisoned and prejudiced the

2. He might have a SI)ecial action on the case agamst one who
should seduce his wife or entice her away from him. 1 The
ground of such an action is the infliction upon the husband of
some one or more of the following injuries: 1. Dishonor of the
marriage bed. 2. Loss of the wife's affections.' 3. Loss of the
comfort of the wife's society. 4. Total loss of the wife's services
where she absconds from the husband, and probable diminished
value of services where she does not. 5. The mortification and
sense of shame that most usually accompany this most serious of
domestic wrongs. The extent of the injury in any case must
depend in great measure upon the previous relations of the parties. If these were cordial and affectionate, and such as are
expected to exist when a suitable marriage has been formed
under a proper sense of the obligations and responsibilities that
belong to it, the wrong of the sedncer who sncceeds in withdrawing the wife's affections from her husband, and induces her
to live with him a life of shame, it is impossible adequately to
measure. If, on the other hand, the husband was a libertine, and
has brought shame upon his family by his own notorious misconduct, and if the wife, after the destruction of her affection by his
own abnse and misconduct, has finally surrendered her own
honor, it is difficult to understand what claim he can have to
legal consideration. And between these extreme cases there may
be numerous others differing so widely in their facts that, while
it may be wise to give a right of action in all, yet the measure

mind of his wife against him, alien-

ated her aifections, counselled and

aided her to commence proceedings

for divorce, whereby she refused to

recognize or receive him as her hus-

band, though she did not abandon

him. The judge says her remaining

with him under the circumstances

“ would rather add the provocation

of insult to the keenuess of suffering.

It would continue before him a pres-

ent, living. irritating, aggravating, if

not consuming, source of grief, which

even her absence might in a measure

relieve.” One who secretly sold laud-

anurn to awife, which she used as a

beverage, whereby her health was

greatly impaired, was held liable to

the husband as being guilty of assist-

ing her in the violation of her duty

as wife. Hoard o. Peck, 56 Barb. 202.

Wlnsmore e. Greenbank, Willes,
677; Weedon"· Timbrell,6 T. R.357;
Rabe e. Hnnna, 5 Ohio, 530; Preston
e. Bowers, 13 Ohio, (N. s.) 1; Hadley
e. Heywood, 121 Mass. 236; Barbee"··
Armstead, 10 Ired. 530; Crose "· Rut.
ledge, 81 Ill. 266; Conway e. Nicol,
84 Iowa, 533.
1 In Heermance "·James, 47 Batb.
120, an action was sustained by a
husband against one who was alleged
to have poisoned and prejudiced the
mind of his wife against him, alien.
ated her affections, counselled and
aided her to commence proceedings
for divorce, whereby she refused to
recognize or receive him as her bus.
1

band, though she did not abandon
him. The judge says her remaining
with him un•1er the circumstances
"would rather add the provocation
of insult to the keenness of suffering.
It would continue before him a pres·
ent, living. irritating, aggravating, if
not consuming, source of grief, which
even her absence might in a measure
relieve." One who secretly sold laudanum to a wife, which she used as a
beverage, whereby her health was
greatly impaired, was held liable to
the husband as being guilty of assist.
iog her in the violation of her duty
as wife. Hoard •· Peck, IS6 Barb. 202.

INJURIES TO FAMILY RIGHTS.

INJt:'RIES TO }'AHILY RIGIITS.

L0

225

l\'1

U!

of redress must be left largely to the discretion of the proper

legal tribunal, which sha.ll be at liberty to award much or little,

according as they ﬁnd that much or little has been lost by the

complaining party.‘ And even though the husband may himself

have been chargeable with no wrong in his marital relations, yet

if the wife's affections were withdrawn from him before the

defendant is chargeable with interference, the fact is important

as bearing upon the question of damages.‘ The action for

seducing the wife away from the husband is by no means eon-

ﬁned to the ease of improper and adulterous relations; but it

extends to all cases of wrongful interference in the family aﬁ'airs

of others whereby the wife is induced to leave the husband, or to

so conduct herself that the comfort of the married life is des-

troyed. If, however, the interference is by the parents of the

wife, on an assumption that the wife is ill treated to an extent

that justiﬁes her in withdrawing from her husband’s society and

control, it mayreasonably be presumed that they have acted with

commendable motives, and a clear ease of want of justiﬁcation

may be justly required to be shown before they should be held
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responsible.‘ One who merely harbors a wife who, without his

consent. has left her husband, and thereby encourages her in with-

holding from him the performance of marital duties, will be liable

for so doing if she left without justiﬁcation, but not otherwise.‘

' The bad character of the husband

will not mitigate damages, unless he

be guilty of unehastity or other wrong

to the wife herself. Norton o. War-

ner, 9 Conn. 172.

' The wit‘e’s letters or statements

may be proved to show the previous

state of their relations, and of her

of redress must be left largely to the discretion of the proper
legal tribunal, which shaH be at liberty to award much or little,
according as they find that much or little has been lost by the
complaining party} And even though the husband may himself
have been chargeable with no wrong in his marital relations, yet
if the wife's affections we1·e withdrawn from him before the
defendant is chargeable with interference, the fact is important
as bearing upon the question of damages.' The action for
seducing the wife away from the husband is by no means contined to the case of improper and adulterous relations; but it
extends to all cases of wrongful interference in the family affairs
of others whereby the wife is induced to leave the husband, or to
so conduct herself that the <.-omtort of the married lite is destroyed. If, however, the interference is by the parents of the
wife, on an assumption that the wite is ill treated to an extent
that justifies her in withdrawing from her husband's society and
control, it may reasonably be presumed that they have acted with
commendable motives, and a clear case of want of justification
may be justly required to be shown before they should be held
responsible.• One who merely harbors a wite who, without his
consent, has left her husband, and thereby encourages her in withholding from him the performance of' marital duties, will be liable
for so doing if she left without justification, but not otherwise!

feelings toward her husband. Willis

0. Bernard, 8 Bing. 376; Gilchrist 0.

Bale, 8 Watts. 355; Palmer 0. Crook,

7 Gray, 418. In Hadley 0. Heywood,

121 Mass. 236, 239. it is said that “ any

unhappy relations existing between

the plaintiff and his wife, not caused

by the conduct of the defendant, may

aﬂ'ect the question of damages, and

were properly submitted to the jury;

but they were in no sense a justitica-

tlon or palliation of the defendant's

conduct. They are not allowed to

affect. the damages because the acts

of the defendant are less reprehensi-

ble, but because the conduct of the

husband is such that the injury which

such acts occasion is less lhun other-

wise it might have been." One who

receives a wife to his home who was

treated with cruelty by her husband,

cannot recover from the husband for

her support if one of his motives in

receiving her was to facilitate adul-

terous intereourse. Almy 1:. Wilcox,

110 Mass. 443.

‘ Hulcheson 0. Peck, 5 Johns. 196;

Bennett v. Sinith,21 Barb. 439; Camp-

bell o. Carter, 3 Daly, 165.

‘ Philip 0. Squire, Pcake, N. P. 82;

Barnes 0. Allen, 80 Barb. 663.

15

• The bad chBracter of the husband
will not mitigate dRmagc·s, unless be
be guilty of unchastity or other wrong
to the wife herself. Norton e. Warner, D Conn.172.
• The wife's letters or statements
may be proved to show the previous
a~te of their relations, o.nd of her
feelings toward her husbRnd. Willis
e. Bernard, 8 Bing. 370; Gilchrist e.
&le, 8 Watts, 35:>; P.tlmer e. Crook,
7 GrRy, 4HI. In Hadley e. Heywood,
121 Mass. 236, 2.'l9, it is suid that "any
unhappy relations u:isting between
the plaintiff und his wife, not caused
by the conduct of the defendant, may
affect the question ot' dam:tges, and
were properly submitted to the jury;
but they were in no sense a justiftca.
don or palllati~n of the defendant'•

15

conduct. They are not allowed to
affect the damages because the acta
of the defendant are less reprehensible, but because the conduct of the
husband is such that the injm·y which
such acts occasion is les.i than other.
wise it mi;ht have been.'' One who
receives a wife to his home who was
treated with cruelty by h(~r husband,
cannot recover from the husband for
her support if one of his motives in
receiving her was to facilitate adulterous intercourse. Almy "· Wilcox,
110 Moss. 44:1.
s Hutcheson e. Peck, IS Johns. 196;
Bennett"· l::lmith, 21 Barb. 430; Camp.
bell fl. Curter, 8 Daly, 165.
'Philip fl. Squire, Peake, N. P. 82;
Baroea v. Allen, SO Barb. 068.
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Wrongs to the Wife. For an injury to the wife, either inten-

tionally or negligently caused, which deprives her of the ability

to perform services, or lessens that ability, the husband may

maintain an action for the loss of service, and also for any inci-

dental loss or damage, such as moneys expended in care and

medical treatment, and the like.‘ But if the injury resulted in

her death, this cannot, at the common law, be taken into account,

either as the ground of action or as an aggravation of damages,

and the husband’s recovery must be limited to the loss suffered

intermediate the injury and death.’

The term services, when employed to indicate the ground on

which the husband is allowed to maintain an action, is used in a

peculiar sense, and fails to express to the common mind the exact

legal idea intended by it. \Vl1atever may have been the case

formerly, or may now be the case in some states of society, ser-

vice, in the sense of labor or assistance, such as a servant might

perform or render, is not always given by or expected from the

wife; and if an action were to put distinctly in issue the loss of such

services, it might, perhaps, be shown in the most serious cases
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that there was really no loss at all. But it could not be reason-

able that the wrong-doer should escape responsibility because the

family he has wronged were in such circumstances, moved in such

circles, and were subject to such claims, by reason of public posi-

tion or otherwise, that physical labor by the wife was neither

expected nor desired. The word service has come to us in this

connection from the times in which the action originated, and it

implies whatever of aid, assistance, comfort and society the wife

would be expected to render to or bestow upon her husband,

under the circumstances and in the condition in which they may

be placed, whatever those may be. That services in the ordinary

sense were not rendered atiall would be immaterial and irrele-

vant, except as the fact might, under some circumstances, tend

to show a want of conjugal regard and aﬁection, and thereby

tend to mitigate the damages.‘

' Matteson o. N. Y. Cont. R. R. Co.,

35 N. Y. 487; Hopkins 0. Atlantic,

etc., R. R. Co., 94 U. S. 11; Barnes 0.

Martin, 15 Wis. 210; Kavanaugli 0.

Junesville, 24 Wis. 618; Smith 0. St.

Joseph, 55 Mo. 456; Fuller o. Narma-

tuck R. R. Co., 21 Conn. 657, 570;

McKinney u. Stage Co., 4 Iowa, 420;

Mowry 1:. Chaney, 43 Iowa, 609; Ber-

gcr 1:. Jacobs, 21 Mich. 215.

’ [Iyatt 1:. Adams, 16 Mich. 180.

Wrongs to the Wife. For an injury to the wife, either intentionally or negligently caused, which deprives her of the ability
to perform services, or lessens that ability, the husband may
maintain an action for the loss of service, and also for any incidental loss or damage, such as moneys expended in care and
medical treatment, and the like.' But if the injury re;;ultcd in
her death, this cannot, at the common law, be taken into account,
either as the ground of action or as an aggravation of damages,
and the husband's recovery must be limited to the loss suffered
intermediate the injury and death.'
The term services, when employed to indicate the ground on
which the hushand is allowed to maintain an action, is used in a
peculiar sense, and fails to express tQ the common mind the exact
legal idea intended by it. 'Vhatever may have been the case
formerly, or may now be the case in some states of society, service, in the E-ense of labor or assistance, such as a ser\·ant might
perform or render, is not always given by or expected from the
wife; and if an action were to put distinctly in issue the loss of such
servk-es, it might, perhaps, be shown in the most serious cases
that there was really no loss at all. But it could not be reasonable that the wrong-doer should escape responsibility because the
t'N.mily he has wronged were in such circumstances, moved in such
circles, and were subject to such claims, by reason of public position or otherwise, that physical labor by the wife was neither
expected nor desired. The word service has come to us in this
connection from the times in which the action originated, and it
implies whatever of aid, assistance, comfort and society the wife
would be expect(."{} to render to or bestow upon her husband,
under the circumstances and in the condition in which they may
be placed, whatever those may be. That ser,•ices in the ordinary
sense were not rende~d l.t 'all would be immaterial and irrelevant, except as the fact might, under some circumstances, tend
to show a want of conjugal regard and affection, and thereby
tend to mitigate the damages.•

Bee Pack 1:. New York, 3 N. Y. 489.

' Perhaps if a voluntary separation

has taken place between husband and

• Matteson fl. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co.,
M N. Y. 487; Hopkins fl. Atlantic,
etc., R. R. Co., 94 U. 8. 11 ; Barnes "·
Martin, 15 Wis. 2-lO; Karvanaugh "·
Jamesville, 24 Wis. 618; Smith "· SL.
Joseph, 55 Mo. 456; Fuller"· Nauga\uck R. R. eo.. 21 Conn. 5J7, 570;

McKinney fl. Stage Co., 4: Iowa, GO;
Mowry 11. Chaney, 48 Iowa, 600; Ber.
gcr "·Jacobs, 21 Mich. 215.
t Hyatt "· Adams, 16 1\lich. 180.
See Pack"· New York, 8 N.Y. 489.
1 Perhaps if a voluntary separation
baa taken place between huaband aDd
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Actions by the Wife. For an injury suﬁlred by the wife in

her person, such as would give a right of action to any other per-

son, a suit might be instituted in the joint name of the husband

and wife. This suit would be distinct from that which the hus-

band might institute for the loss of services and expenses, and

would embrace damages for physical and mental suffering.‘ The

damages recovered, however, would belong to the husband alone.

_ 415 * ~ 7 i ' ' i ‘ *1 1 of the

Action by Wife for Loss of Society of l terest

Husband. 1 frgm

A wife may maintain an action for the loss of the -'

society and companionship of her husband, against ‘“I’“t“'

one who wrongfully induces and procures her hus- ‘"1 the

band to abandon or send her away. But the acts ll °"l"

of defendant causing the injury must have been ma. mi the

lieious. ie hus-

In such an action the declarations of the husband °f his

Actions by the Wife. For an injury suffered by the wife in
her person, such as would give a right of action to any other person, a suit might be instituted in the joint name of the husband
and wife. This suit would be distinct from that which the husl,a.nd might institute for the loss of services and expensos, and
would embrace damages for physical and mental suffering.1 The
damages recovered, however, would belong to the husband alone.

.

~~

l

Action by Wife for Loss of Society of terest
Husband.
from
•
A wife may maintain an action for the lose of the

made in the absence of the defendant, as to the cause 3" full

of his abandoning or putting his wife away, are in-

admissible. .hc wife,

Westlake v. Westlake. Supreme Court of 32,3";-

Ohio, May 3, 1879. aducedn
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:t'ore her

he utter-

band re-

:special

‘the con-

.C C0117‘

Jstﬂlnﬂl

it being

Thambcr

_ J _' - . __ _ - e_J'emoved

jury to the wife survives on her death

society and companionship of her husband, against
one who wrongfully induces and procures her bus·
band to abandon or send her away. Bot the acts
of defendant causing the injury must have been ma.
licious.
In such an action the declarations of the husband
made in the absence of the defendant, as to the cause
of his abandoning or putting his wife away, are inadmi!Bible.
Westlake v. Westlake. Supreme Court of
Ohio, May 3, 1879.

tive. Not-cross v. Stuart, 50 Me. 87.

See, also, Crozier v. Bryant, 4 Bibb,

174; Pattve v. IIarrin_-_'ton, 11 Pick.

221. At. the common law the action

would have abated under such cir-

eumstanees, but on the death of tho

husband, the wife surviving, it would

110; Lynch 0. Knight, 9 H. L. Gas.

thence to the House of Lords. Lord

Chancellor CAMPBELL held that the

action might have been maintained

had the act of the hushrind. in refus-

ing to live with his wife, been reason-

able under the Clt‘(:llll't\il1l1"0S, which,

in his opinion, it was not. Lord

CRANW0lt'l‘H 1-Xp1'e.~'s('tl his concur-

renee, but Lord \\'|-:NsLEYn \LE denied

that an action for the loss ot'the consort-

ium from the wrongful act of the (le-

fendant would lie in any case. The

1 aaid ot

~duced"

~hamber

have survived to her.

'2 Kent, 182; Reeve, Dom. Rel.

.he wife,

for con.

:li,re her
he utter.
band re! specinl
'thecon.c eourt
J!>taioed
tt being

in favor ot' her personal representa-

\

cputaon the
h or in
1at the
ae bus.
of his
::m full

jury to"' the wife sun· ive:~ on her d<'ath
in favor of her pl•rsonal rcprrsenta.
'live. Norcross v. Stunrt, 50 llt>. 87.
Sl·c, also, Crozier v. Bryant, 4 Bibb,
174; Path'c 11. Harrington, 11 Pick.
221. At the commnn law the act10n
would have ahat<•d under such cir.
rumstanccs, but on the death of tho
busband, the wife surviving, it would
have survived to her.
1 2 Kent., 182: RPrvc, Dom. Rei.

110; Lynch "· Knight, 9 H. L. Caa.

--.J"emoved
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thence to tht• Ilou:m of Lnnls. Lord

Chnncellor CAMPDELL held that the
action mi~ht have been maintained
hat! the act of the hn~ h~nd. in refu ...
ing to Jive with his wife, been reason.
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that un net inn for tlu• loss of the co1tllr•rtium from tho wrongful act of the dc>.
fendant wouhl lie In any cue. The

228 THE LAW or roars.

dominion and control of the property purchased or otherwise
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acquired by her, the marital relation would not protect the hus-

band against an action for any unlawful interference with the

property.‘ But even under these statutes the wife cannot main-

tain an action against her husband for a personal injury." Even

after divorce the wife cannot sue the husband for a personal tort

committed by him upon her while the relation existed.‘

Action by the Parent. The injury which one may suffer in

the relation of parent seems, at the common law, to be limited to

an action for the recovery of damages for being deprived of the

ehild’s services. The action is therefore planted rather upon a

loss in the character of the master of a servant than in that of

dominion and control of the property purchased or otherwise
acquired by her, the marital relation would not protect the husband against an action for any unlawful interference with the
property.' Bnt even under these statutes the wife cannot maintain an action against her husband for a personal injury.s Even
after divorce the wife cannot sue the husband for a personal tort
committed by him upon her while the relation existed.'

the head of a family. This sometimes leads to results which are

extraordinary, for it seems to foll0\v, as a necessary consequence,

that if the child, from want of maturity or other cause, is inca-

pable of rendering service, the parent can suffer no pecuniary

injury, and therefore can maintain no action when the child is

abducted or injured. Such have been the decisions.‘

judgment was reversed. We see no

reason why such an action should not

be supported, where, by statute, the

wife is allowed, for her own benefit,
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to sue for personal wrongs sulfered

by her.

' Emerson '0. Clayton, 32 Ill. 492;

Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129; Chest

nut 0. Chestnut, '77 Ill. 346; Stark-

wealher 0. Smith, 6 Mich. 377. The

Action by the Parent. The injury which one may su:ffcr in
the relation of parent seems, at the common law, to be limited to
an action for the recovery of damages for being deprived of the
child's se~vices. The action is therefore planted rather upon a
loss in the character of the master of a servant than in that of
the head of a family. This sometimes leads to results which are
extraordinary, for it seems to follow, as a necessary consequence,
that if the child, from want of maturity or other cause, is incapable of rendering service, the parent can suffer no pecuniary
injury, and therefore can maintain no action when the child is
abducted or injured. Such have been the decisions.'

husband, where such statutes exist,

cannot bring trover against a third

person for the conversion of the wife's

property. Taylor v. Jones, 62 Ala.

'78.

‘Peters o. Peters, 42 Iowa, 182;

Longendyke 0. Lon gendyke, 44 Barb.

366. And it seems lllu husband is still

liable for the carrying on by the wife

of an illegal business on her own ao-

count. Commonwealth v. Barry, 115

Mass 146; S. C.2 Green Cr. Rep. 285,

and note.

'Longendyke 0. Longendyke, 44

Barb. 366; Peters 0. Peters, 4.2 Iowa,

182; Abbott 0. Abbott, 67 Me. 304;

Phillips o. Barnet, 1 Q. B. Div. 436; S.

C. 17 Monk, 100. These were trespass

for assault and battery committed

while the marriage relation existed,

and action brought after divorce.

Frecthy 0. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, was

an action of slander brought under

like circumstances.

‘ Hall 0. Hollander, 7 D. & Ry. 133;

S.C. 4 B. & C. 660; Eager 0. Grim-

wood, 1 W., H. 8: G. 61; Grinnell o.

Wells, 7 M. 8.: G. 1038; S. 0.8 Scott

N. R. 741. In this last case it is inti-

mated that for the abduction of a

helpless child there can be no action,

because the child is incapable of per-

forming scrvices. But we doubt the

the soundness of the doctrine. The

services of a child, no more than those

of a wife, are to be estimated by the

merely physical and gross standard;

they do not consist in the hewing of

wood and drawing of water merely,

but they are such returns of aﬁection

judgment Wl\8 reversed. We see no
reason why such an action should not
be supported, where, by statute, the
wife is allowed, for her own benefit,
to sue for personal wrongs suffered
by her.
1 Emerson "· Clayton, 82 Ill. 492;
Martin "· Robson, 65 Ill. 129; Chest.
nut "· Chestnut, 77 Ill. 340; Stark.
weather tl. Smith, 0 Mich. 377. The
husband, where such statutes exist,
cannot bring trover against a third
person for the conversion of the wife's
property. Taylor "· Jones, o2 Ala.
78.
1 Peters 11. Peters, 42 Iowa, 182;
Longendyke tl. Lon!!rndyke, 44 Darb.
366. And it seemsth.: husband is still
liable for the carrying on by the wife
of w• illegal business on her own account. Commonwealth tl. Barry, 115
Mass 146; 8. C. 2 Ureen Cr. Hep. 285,
and note.
1 Longendyke e. Longendyke, 4-l
Barb. 866; Peters e. Peters, 42 Iowa,

182; Abbott "· Abbott, 67 Me. SOt;
Phillipn. Barnet) 1 Q. B. Div.436; S.
C. 17 Monk, 100. These were tre~p11ss
for assault and battery committed
while the marriage relation existed,
and action brought after divorce.
Frecthy tl. Freethy, 42 Barb. 041, WRB
an action of slBnder brought under
like circumstances.
' Hal111. Hollander, 7 D. & Ry. 133;
B. C. 4 B. & C. 600; Enger tl. Grimwood, 1 W., H. & G. 61; Grinnell e.
Wells, 7 1tl. & G. 1033; ~.C. 8 ScoU
N. R. 741. In this last case it is intimated that for the abduction of a
helpless child there can be no action,
because the child is incapable of per.
forming services. But we doubt the
the soundness of the doctrine. The
services of a child, no more than those
ot' a wife, are to be estimated by the
merely physical and gross standard;
they do not consist in the hewing of
wood and drawing of water merely,
but they are such returns of affection
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Loss of service to the parent may be occasioned by enticing

INJURIES TO FAMILY RIGHTS.

229

the child away,‘ by forcibly abducting the child,’ by beating or

otherwise purposely injuring the child,‘ by a negligent injury

which disables the child from labor,‘ and in case of a female

child, by seduction. In some of these cases there may be two

wrongs: One to the parent, in depriving him of the child’s ser-

vices; and one to the child, to his personal injury. But the right

of action in each, being distinct rights, cannot be joined.‘

Where the charge is that defendant has enticed the child away

from the parent, his motive for his action is important, and may

sometimes furnish him with justiﬁeation. \Vhatever induces

the child to leave the parent, or, after leaving, to remain away

from him, may in law constitute enticement; but to receive and

shelter a child from parental abuse may sometimes be a moral

duty, and therefore jnstiﬁable. In New Hampshire it has been

said that if one give protection and shelter to a child, with a view

or intent of enabling or encouraging him to keep away from his

father, or with the knowledge that it aided or encouraged him to

keep away, this would be wrongful and actionable conduct.‘ A

as the child, in his condition, is capa-

ble of; and many a parent has been

made to feel that these. in the case of
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atﬂicted and helpless children, are

often beyond all estimate. To abduct

a child who, if afterward abandoned

and thrown upon the world. will be

capable of caring for himself, or be

likely to be cared for by others, in the

expectation of remuneration by his

Loss of service to the parent may be occasioned by enticing
tho child away,• by forcibly abducting the child,' by beating or
otherwise purposely injuring the child,' by a negligent injury
which disnules the child from labor,' and in case of a female
child, by seduction. In some of these cases there may be two
wrongs: One to the parent, in depr~ving him of the child's services; and one to the child, to his }1ersonal injury. Bnt the right
of action in each, Leing distinct rights, cannot be joi~:ed.•
Where the charge is that defendant has enticed the child away
from the pn.1·ent, his motive for his action is important, and may
sometimes furnish him with justification. Whatc\·cr induces
the child to lea,·e the parent, or, after leaving, tD remain away
irom him, may in la\v constitute enticement; but to receive and
shelter a chilu from parental abuse may sometimes be a moral
dnty, and therefore justifiable. In New Hampshire it has been
said that if one give protection and shelter to a child, with a view
or intent of enabling or encouraging him to keep away from his
father, or with the knowledge that it aided or encouraged him to
keep away, this would be wrongfnl and actionable conduct.' A

future labors, is a venial wrong, and

avery slight injury, in comparison

with the carrying oﬂ' of one who, if

then abandoned, will be presently and

prospectively helpless, and therefore

abandoned to probable wantaud mis-

ery. Cornpare Dennis 0. Clark. 2

Cush. 847. In any event the parent

might recover for trouble and expense

in the case, nursing, etc., of the in-

jured child. Durden o. Barnett, '7

Ala. 169; Dennis 0. Clark, supra.

‘And this, whether the child be

male or female. Sherwood 0. I-lull, 3

Sumn. 127; Bundy a. Dodson, 28 Ind.

295; Everett v. Sherfey, 1 Iowa, 356;

(laughcy e. Smith, 47 N.Y. 244; Plum-

mer 0. Webb, 4 Mason, 380; Stowe 0.

Heywood, 7 Allen, 118; Sargent 0.

Mathewson, 38 N. H. 54. But knowl-

edge in the defendant of the relation

should be averrcd. Butterﬂeld 1:. Ash-

ley, 6 Cush. 249, and cases cited.

' Magoo 0. Holland, 27 N. J. 86,

' Hoover 0. Ileim, '1 Watts, 62;

Hammer 1:. Pierce, 5 Ilarr. 1'71; Cow-

den o. Wriglit, 24 Wend. 429; Whit-

ney v. Hitchcock, 4 Dcnio, 461;

Klingman 0. Holmes, 54 Mu. 304.

‘ Karr 0. Parks, 44 Cal. 46. It has

been held in Indiana, that where one

suffered anegligcnt injury in his own

person, and by the same negligence

his wife and child were injured, this

was all, as to him, one cause of ac-

tion. Cincinnati, ctc., R. R. C0. o.

Chester, 5'7 Ind. 297.

' Rogers v. Smith, 1'7 Ind. 323.

‘ Sargent 0. Mathewson, 38 N. H.

54.

u the child: In hie condition, Is capa.
b1e of; and many a parent has been
m.We to feel that these, in the case of
amictcd and helpless children, are
often beyond all estimate. To abduct
a child who, if afterward abandoned
and thrown upon the world. will be
capable of caring for himself, or be
likely to be cared for by others, in the
expectation of remuneration by his
future labors, Is a venial wrong, and
a very slight injury, in comparison
with the carrying oft' of one who, if
then abandoned, will be pre-sently and
prospectively helpless, and therefore
abandoned to probable want and misery. Compare Dennis e. Clark, 2
Cuah. 34'7. In any event the parent
might recover for trouble and expense
In the caae, nursing, etc., of the injured child. Durden "· Barnett, 7
Ala. 169; Drnnis e. Clark, supra.
' And this, whether the child be
male or female. Sherwood"· Hull, 3
Sumn..127; Bundy e. Dodaon, 28 Ind.

2M; Everette. Sherfey, 1 Iowa, 838;
Caughey"· Smith, 4'7 N.Y. 244; Plum.
mer"· Webb, 4 :Mason, 880; Stowe e.
Heywood, '1 Allen, 118; Sargent e.
Mathewson, 38 N.H. 54. But know).
edge in the defendant of the relRtion
should be averred. Butterfield •· Ash.
ley, 6 Cusb. 240, and cases cited.
1 :&IRgee •· Holhmd, 27 N. J. 86,
• Hoover "· Hcim, 7 Watts, 62;
Hammer"· Pierce, IS Harr. 1'71; Cow.
den "·Wright, 2! Wend. 429; Whit.
ney e. Hitchcock, 4 Denio, 461;
Klingman"· Holmt>s, 54 Mo. 304.
• Karr "· Pnrks, 44 Cal. 46. It bas
been held In Indiana, that where one
suffered a negligent injury in his own
person, and by the same negligence
his wife and child were injured, Lhia
wns all, as to him, one cause of action. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. •·
Cl1ester, 57 Ind. 297.
• Rogel'S "· Smith, 17 Ind. 823.
1 Sargen' e. Mathewson, 88 N. lt
M.
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similar rule has been laid down in Iowa, where one who had
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employed a runaway child, without knowledge of his misconduct,

was held liable for retaining him in his service after notice that

the father objected, but not before.‘

In Connecticut it was held, at an early day, that the father

might sustain an action against one who enticed his minor

daughter from his service, and procured her to be married to

another person without his consent. The marriage, however,

was averred to be fraudulent, and to have been procured in order

to obtain the discharge of a relative of the defendant from a

prosecution for bastardy; and it was also averred that the mar-

riage had been- annulled by the legislature for the fraud.’ In

Kentucky, where no fraud in the marriage was aver_red, it was

decided that the action might be sustained for enticing the minor

daughter from her mother’s service and procuring her to be mar-

ried, but that the recovery of damages must be restricted to the

time which elapsed previous to the, time when the marriage act-

ually took place.‘ In Massachusetts it is denied with much good

reason that any such action can be maintained — the girl being

of the age of legal consent—even though by statute the conduct

of the defendant would have been punishable as a crime.‘ The

reason is tersely and clearly stated in the opinion: “ The law of
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marriage entirely overrides the general principles of right of the

parent to the services of the child, or the duties from one to the

other as servant and master, by allowing the female child to ter-

minate it at any moment after she arrives at the age of twelve

years, by uniting herself to some one in marriage. If the mar-

riage of the daughter was a legal act, from the time of its con-

summation the daughter was legally discharged from all further

duties to perform service for her parent, having assumed new

relations inconsistent therewith.”

Where seduction of a daughter is the injury complained of,

some of the anomalies of basing the right of recovery upon the

loss of services are deserving of special notice. A statement of

the conclusions of the judicial mind under different sets of cir-

eumstances will show what these anomalies are.

‘ Everett o. Sherfey, 1 Iowa, 356. ' Jones v. Tcvis, 4 Lltt. 25 (1823)

See, to the same effect, Butterﬂeld e. ‘ Hervey 0. Moseley, '7 Gray, 479.

Ashley, 6 Cush. 249. See, also, Goodwin o. Thompson, 2

' Hills 0. Hebert, 2 Root, 48 (1793). Greene (Iowa), 829.

similar rule has been laid down in Iow~t, where one who had
employed a runaway child, without knowledge of his misconduct,
was held liable for retaining him in his service after notice that
the father objected, but not before.'
In Connecticut it was held, at an early day, that the father
might sustain an action ag\1-inst one who enticed his minor
daughter from his service, and procm·ed her to be married to
auother person without his con~cnt. The marriage, however,
was averred to be frnudulent, and to have been procured in order
to obtain the dischart,"' of a relative of the defendant from a
prosecution for bastardy; and it was also averred that the marriage had been· annulled by the legislature for the fraud. 1 In
Kentucky, where no fraud in the marriage was aver,red, it was
decided that the action might be sustained tor enticing the minor
<..laughter from her mother's service and procuring her to be married, but that the reco\'ery of damages must be restricted to the
time which elapsed previous to the. time when the marriage actually took place.• In MasRachnset.ts it is denied with much good
reason that any such action can be maintained- the girl being
of the age of legal consent-even though by statute the conduct
of the defendant would have been punishable as a crime.• The
reason is tersely and clearly stated in the opinion: "The law of
marriage entirely overrides tl1e general priuciples of right of the
parent to the services of the child, or the duties from one to the
other as servant and master, by allowing the female child to terminate it at any moment after she arri\·es at the age of twelve
years, by uniting herself to some one in marriage. If the ma.r.
riage of the daughter was a legal act, from the time of its consummation the dau~hter was legally dischargecl from all further
duties to perform service for her parent, having assumed new
relations inconsistent therewith."
Where seduction of a daughter is the injury complained of,
some of the anomalies of basing the right of recover·y upon the
loss of services are deserving of special notice. A statement of
the conclnsions of the judicial mind under different sets of circumstances will show what these anomalies are.
1 Everett "· Sherfey, 1 Iowa, 856.
See, to the same effect, Butterfield 11.
.Ashley, 6 Cush. 2!9.
• Hills"· Hobert, 2 Root, 48 (1793).

Jones "· Tevis, 4 Lttt. 25 (1823)
' Hc1·vey "· Moseley, 7 Gray, 479.
See, also, Goodwin "· Thompson, S
Greene (Iowa), 329.
1
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First —— The father suing for this injury in the case of a daugh-

JN.JUBIES TO li'Aliii.Y BIGHTS.

231

ter actually at the time being a member of his household, is

entitled to recover in his capacity of actual master for a loss of

services consequent upon any diminished ability in the daughter

to render services. That an actual loss is suﬁerecl under such

circumstances the law will conclusively presume, and evidence

that the daughter was accustomed to render no service will not be

received. And while this supposed loss will constitute the nom-

inal ground of recovery, a substantial award of damages will be

supported, based on the injury to the parental feelings and the

shame and mortiﬁcation which must follow from such a wrong.

To this also may be added any pecuniary expense which the

parent has been put to for care, medical attendance, etc.‘

Second — If the daughter at the time was not actually a mem-

ber of the fathei-’s household, yet if she were not in the actual

service of another, and the father had a right to recall her to his

own service, he may maintain the action the same as if she act-

ually had beeurecalled or had returned.’

T/tz'1'd—But if the daughter was actually in the service of

another, no action could be maintained by the parent, because the

‘Bennett u. Allcott. 2 T. R. 166;

Manvell 0. Thomson, 2 C. & P. 303;
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Thompson 0. Ross, 5 H. & N. 16;

Harris 0. Butler, 2 M. & W. 539;

Blaymire o. Haley. 6 M. & W. 55;

Hedges u. Tagg, L.'R. 7 Exch. 283;

Clark 0. Fitch. 2 Wend. 459; Hewitt

0. Prime, 21 Wend. 79; Bartley v.

Richtmyer, 4 N. Y. 38; Knight o.

Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 413; White v. Nel-

Firwt-The father suing for this injury in the ense of a daughter actually at the time being a member of his household, ia
entitled to recover in his capacity of actual master for a loss of
serviecs consequent upon any diminished ability in the daughter
to render services. That an actual loss is suffered onder such
circumstances the law will conclusively presume, and evidence
that the daughter was accustomed to render no service will not be
received. And while this supposed loss will constitute the nominal ground of recovery, a substantial award of damages will be
supported, based on the injury to the parental feelings and the
shame and mortification which most follow from such a wrong.
To this also may be added any pecuniary expense which the
parent has been put to for care, medical attendance, etc/
Second-If the daughter at the time was not actually a member of the father's household, yet if she were not in the actual
service of another, and the father had a right to recall her to his
own service, he may maintain the action the same as if she actually had beeu 'recalled or had returned.'
Third -Bot if the daughter was actually in the service of
another, no action could be maintained by the parent, because the

lis, 31 N. Y. 405; Furman 0. Van Sise,

56N. Y 4335; Kennedy 1:. Shea, 110

Mass. 147; llowland 0. Howland, 114

Mass. 517; Blanchard o. Ilsley, 120

Mass.-R57; S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 5:35;

McAulay o. Birkhcad, 13 Ircd. 28;

Vessel 0. Cole, 10 Mo. G34; Emery o.

Gnwen, 4 Me. 33.

' Bolton o. Miller, 6 Ind. 265; Bart-

ley 0. Richlmycr, 4 N. Y. 38; Martin

0. Payne, 9 Johns. 387; Mulvehall u.

Millward, 11 N. Y. EH13; liornketh o.

Barr, B Berg. & R. 36; Kennedy 0.

Shea, 110 Mass. 147; Van Horne v.

Freeman, 6 N. J. 822; Mercer 0.

Walmslcy, 5 H. & J. 27; White 0.

Murtland, 71 Ill. 250; Roberts o. Con-

nolly, 14 Ala. 239 In Terry o. Hutch-

inson, L. ll. 8 Q. B. 599, it is held that

the moment an actual service of the

daughter with another is terminated,

even though it be wrongfully, and

she intends to return to her father, he

has a right to her scwices, and may

maintain the action. Sec Ellington

v. Ellington, 47 Miss. 329; Van llorn

o. Freeman, 6 N. J. 322. In Blan-

chard o. Ilsley, 120 Mass. 4-S7. S. C. 21

Am. Rep. 535, tho woman who was

seduced resided at the time in the

family of a married sister, without

paying for her hoard, but with no

agreement with her father or herself

for any payment for services: Halli,

that the sister's husband could not

sue, as master, for her seduction.

• Benneu e. .Allcott. 9 T. R 166;
Kanvell e. Thomson, 9 C. & P. 803;
Thompson e. Ross, li H. & N. 16;
Harris e. Butler, 9 )1. & W. o:J9;
Blaymire e. Haley, 6 ll. & W. 55;
Hed~ e. TAgg, L'R. 7 Exch. 2d3;
Clark e. Fitch. 2 Wend. 459; HewlU
t1. Prime, 21 Wend. 79: Bartley e.
Rlcbtmyer, 4: N. Y. 38; Knight e.
Wilcox, 14 N.Y. 418; White e. Ncl.
lie,:n N.Y. 403; Furman e. Van Sise,
ti6 N. Y 4:15: Kennedy "· Shea. 110
Mass. 147; Howland e. Howland, 114:
Mass. li17; Blanchard "· Ilsley, 120
)(ass. 487; B. C. 21 Am. Rep. 5:ki;
)(eA.ulay 11. Birkhead, 18 Ired. 28;
Vossel e. Cole, 10 .Mo. 034; Emery e.
G()wen, 4 lie. 33.
• Bolton e. Miller, 6 Ind. 266; Bart.
ley e. Richtmyer, 4 N. Y. 38; HarLin
•· Payne, 9 Johns. ~7; Mulvehall e.
Millward, 11 N.Y. a43; Hornketh •·
Barr, 8 Berg. & R. 36; Kennedy • ·

Shea, 110 Mass. 147; Vnn. Borne o.
Freeman, 6 N. J . 82'.3: Mercer e.
Walmsley, 6 H. & J. 27; White o.
Mortland, 71 Ill. 250; Roberts o. Connelly, 14 Ala. 231) In Terry o. Hutchinson, L. R. 8 Q. B. 599, it ls held that
the moment an actuAl sc"lce of the
daughter with another is terminated,
even though l& be wrongfully, and
she intends to return to her futher, he
has a right to her scrvic(•s, and may
maintain the action. l.il.'c Ellington
"· Ellington, 47 Miss. 3:!U; Van Horn
•· Jt'rccwan, 6 N . J. 82:.!. In Blanchard e. llt~ley, 120 Mus..<~. 487. B. C. 21
Am. Rep. 5;J5, the woman who Wl\11
seduced r<'8ided at the time ln U1e
family of a marrh:d sh>tcr, without
paying for her board, but with no
agreement with her father or herself
for any payment for sc"ices: Heltl,
that the sister's husbnnd could not
sue, as master, for her aK.-duct.ion.

I
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conditions which support it did not then exist.‘ In such a case

232
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the person in whose employ she was for the time being might

maintain the suit, unless he himself were the wrong-doer, in

which case it could not be brought at all.‘ To this last state-

ment this exception is to be made: that it’ the defendant pro-

cured the woman to enter his service fraudulently and for the

purpose of withdrawing her from her family and seducing her,

this is a wrong which precludes his claiming any rights or pro-

tection as master, and the parent may support an action as if the

hiring had never taken place.‘

This statement of the law is suﬁicient to show some of its

absurdities, and to justify some recent statutory changes.

The time when the cause of action is deemed to have accrued

may depend upon the form of action. This may he either in

trespass or case. If the wrong-doer comes upon the premisesof

the plaintiff and accomplishes the seduction there, the wrongful

act characterises his entry upon the land, and the seduction is to

be regarded as an aggravation of the trespass.‘ Trespass, there-

fore, ean only be brought by the parent when the daughter

resided with him at the time of the seduction. But if the

daughter, after seduction abroad, returns to the home of her

parents, where expenses are incurred and loss, actually or by pre-
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sumption of law, suffered in consequence of the seduction, the

right of action is deemed to arise from this expense or loss, but

the action must be in case for the consequential injury. It is,

therefore, snﬂicient that the actual or supposed relation of master

and servant exist, either at the time of the seduction or at the

time of the resulting damage; the form of the remedy being

varied to meet the facts, but the substantial recovery being the

' Dean v. Peel. 5 East, 49; South u. nett o. Allcott, 2 T. R. 166; Harper 0.

Denniston, 2 Watts, 474; Nickleson

0. Stryker, 10 Johns. 115; Dain 0.

Wycoﬁ‘, 7 N. Y. 191. The action

being grounded on loss of service, the

fact that the daughter is of full age

is immaterial. Keller o. Donnclly, 5

Md. 211; Greenwood 0. Greenwood,

28 Md. 370; Vossel v. Cole. 10 Mo.

634; Sutton v. Hulfman, 32 N. J.

58; Wert 0. Stronse, 38 N. J. 184;

Stevenson 0. Belknap, 6 Iowa, 97;

Lipe o. Eisenlerd, 32 N. Y. 229; Ben-

conditions which support it did not tl1on exist.• In such a case
the person in whose employ she was for the time being might
maintain the suit, unless he himself were the wrong-doer, in
which case it could not be brought at all.' To this last state~
meut this exception is to be made: that if the defendant pro~
cured the woman to enter his service fraudulently and for the
purpose of withdrawing her ft·om her family and sedudng her,
this is a wrong which precludes his claiming any rights or protection as master, anrl the parent may support an action as if the
hiring had never taken place.•
This statement of the law is sufficient to show some of its
absLll'dities, and to jnstity some recent statutory changes.
The time when the canE~e of action is deemed to have accrued
may depend upon the form of action. This mny he either in
trespass or case. If the wrong-doer comes upon the premises'of
the plaintiff and accomplishes the seduction there, the wrongful
act characterises his entry upon the land, and the seduction is to
be regarded as an aggravation of the trespass.• Trespass, theretore, can only be bronght by the parent when the danghter
resided with him at the time of the seduction. But if the
daughter, after seduction aoroad, returns to the home of her
parents, where expenses are incurred and loss, actually or by presumption of law, suffered in consequence of the ~;:ednction, the
right of action is deemed to arise from this expense or loss, but
tho action must be in case for the consequential injury. It is,
therefore, sufficient that the actual or supposed relation of master
and servant exist~ either at the time of the seduction or at the
time of the resulting damage; the form of the remedy being
varied to meet the facts, but the substantial recovery being the

____ ._ 7 -— i is 7% —

Lulfkin, 7 B. & 0.387. In this last

case the daughter was married, but

was living apart from her husband

with her father.

‘ See Etlmondsoll c. Maehell, 2 T. R.

4; Bennettv.A1lcott, 2T. R. 166; Man-

vell 0. Thomson, 2 C. & P. 303.

‘ Spcight 0. Oliviera, 2 Stark. 435;

Dain 0. Wyckoff, 18 N. Y. 45.

‘ Hubbcll 0. Wheeler, 2 Aik. 359;

Parker v. Meek, 3 Snced, 20; Logan

0. Murray, 6 Serg. & R 175.

Dean"· Peel,IS East, 49; South "·
2 Watts, 474; Nickleson
"· Stryker, 10 Johns. 115; Dain 11.
Wycuft', 7 N. Y. 191. The action
being grounded on loss of service, the
fact that the daughter is of full age
is immaterial. Keller"· Dounelly, 5
Md. 211; Greenwood "· Greenwood,
28 Md. 370; Vossel "· Colo, 10 It!o.
634; Sutton "· Huffman, 32 N. J.
tiS; Wert "· Strouse, 38 N. J. 184;
Stevenson "· Belknap, 0 Iowa, 97;
Lipe 11. Eiscnlerd, 32 N.Y. 229; Ben1

Deonit~ton,

nett"· Allcott, 2 T. R. 166; Harper e.
Luffkin, 7 B. & U. 387. In this last
case the daughter was married, but
was Jiving apart from her husband
with her father.
1 Sec Ellmondson r.l\fnchcll, 2 T. R.
4; Bennett tl. All colt, 2 T. H.l66; Manveil 11. Thomson, 2 C. & P. 303.
• Speight tl. Olivicra, 2 Stark. 435;
Dain 11. Wyckoff, 18 N.Y. 4;).
• Iluubcll "· Wheeler, 2 Aik. 359;
Parkcr11. Meek, 8 Sul'ed, 29; Logu
"·Murray, 6 Berg. & R. 175.
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same in each case.‘ In New York, however, this distinction is
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denied, and it is held that whether the form of action be trespass

or case, the actual or supposed relation which supports the action

must have existed at the time of the seduction." That would

certainly be true were the action brought by one who sustains

only the conventional relation of master to the woman seduced:

he cannot hire a disabled servant, and then claim the wrong

which disabled her as an injury to himself; but where the parent

sues, the real relation has existed from the iirst—the right of

control being only suspended while the daughter was in the ser-

vice of another—and the law imposes upon the parent certain

obligations in the support of his children from which he is not

released by their misconduct. There is, consequently, a very

obvious difference between a master hiring a disabled servant and

a parent receiving back to his homo a disabled child. In the

former case the master assumes no consequences except as, in

view of his own interest, he bargains to do so; but in the latter,

the child must be taken as she is, and the cause of action may

well be held to relate back to the time when the wrongful act

was committed from which injurious consequences subsequently

ﬂow.’

It is not essential to the maintenance of the suit that preg-
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nancy should have resulted; ‘ it is suﬂicicnt if the ability to per-

form services was in any degree impaired as a direct consequence

of the det'endaut’s conduct.‘

If the father is deceased, the mother may bring the action for

this injury.’

' Parker e. Meek, 3 Sneed, 29; El-

lington 0. Ellington, 47 Miss. 329;

Sargent '0. , 5 Cow. 106.

' Bartley o. Richtmyer. 4 N. Y. 38.

‘In Coon o. 1\Ioﬁ11t,3 N. J. 583, a

mother was held entitled to suc for

the seduction of her daughter. the se-

duction taking place before the fath-

er's death, and the couﬂncmcnt alter-

ward. The subject is carefully ex-

amined by PENNlNGTON,J., in this

case, who suggests that a master,

same in each ca.se.1 In Ne\V York, however, this distinction is
denied, and it is held that whether the form of action be trespass
or case, the actual or supposed relation which supports the action
must have exis,tcd at the time of the seduction."' That would
certainly he true were the action brought by one who sustains
only the conventional relation of master to the woman scdnced :
l1e cannot hire a disabled servant, and theu claim the wrong
which disabled her as an injury to himself; but where the parent
anes, the real relation has existed from the first- the right of
control being only snspended while the daughter was in the service of another-and the law imposes upun the parent cet·tain
obligations in the support of his children from which he is not
released by their misconduct. There is, consequently, a very
obviuns difference between a master hiring a disabled servant and
a parent receiving back to his homo a disabled child. In the
former case the master assumes no consequences except as, in
view of his own interest, he bar~ains to do so; but in the latter,
the child must be taken as she is, and the cause of action may
well bo held to relate back to the time when the wrongful act
was committed from which injurious consequences subsequently
flow.•
It is not essential to tho maintenance of the snit that pregnancy should have resulted; • it is sufficient if the ability to perform services was in any degree impaired as a direct consequence
of the defendant's conduct.•
If the father is deceased, the mother may bring the action for
this injnry.•

where the service began after the se-

duction. mizht also recover for loss

of service in conﬁnement if his con-

tract for the service antedated the se-

duction.

‘Abrahams 0. Kidney, 101 Mass.

222; White 0. Ncllis, 31 Barb. 279.

‘See Knight o. Wilcox, 14 N. Y.

413; Boyle e. Brandon, 13 M. 6: W.

738. Compare Eager v. Grimwood,

1 Exch. 61.

‘ Coon 0. Motlitt, 3 N. .1583; Ser-

geut e. , 6 Cow. 106; Furman

0. Van Sise, 56 N. Y. 435; Gray c.Dur.

land, 51 N. Y. 424; Fclkner o. Scar-

let, 29 Ind. 154. Of course, if the

daughter is above the age of 21. she

must be actually a member of the

' Parker e. Meek, S Sneed, 29; Ellington e. Ellington, 47 Miss. 329;
Sargent e. - . IS Cow. 106.
' Hartley e. Richtmyer, 4 N. Y. 88.
• In Coon e. 1\loffitt, S N. J. 583, a
mother was held entitled to sue for
the seduction of her dnughter, the seduction takin.~ plnl~e before the fath~r·s death, anti the confinement after.
ward. The ,;uhjcct is cnrcfully ex.
1\Dlined by PKNNINGTON, J., in this
case, who suggrsts that a master,
where the service begRn after the seduction. mizht al!!o recover for Joss
of service in confinement if his con-

tract for the aerrlce antedated the ~
ductioo.
• AbrRbams e. Kidney, lOt Mau.
222; White e. Nellis, 31 B:1rb. 279.
• See Knight e. Wilcox, 14 N. Y .
418; Boyle e. Brnndon, 13 }(. & W.
738. Compare Eager "· Grimwood,
1 Exch. 61.
1 Coon e. Muffitt, 3 N.J. :i~; Sergent e.--, IS Cow. 106; Furman
e. Van Slse, :;oN. Y. 435; Gray t. Durland, 1St N. Y. 4~4; Felkner e. ScarJrt, 29 Ind. 1M. Of course, if the
daughter is abovo the ngc of 21, abe
must be actually a member of the
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It has been said above that the damages in these cases are by
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no means measured by the loss of service and the incidental care

and expenses. It has been well said in Pennsylvania that “ proof

of the relation of master and servant, and of the loss of service,

by means of the wrongful act of the defendant, has relation only

to the form of the remedy, and that the action being sustained

in point of form by the introduction of these technical elements,

the damages may be given as a compensation to the plaintiff, not

only for the loss of service, but also ' for all that the plaintiff can

feel from the nature of the injury.’ ” ' Similar expressions are to

be met with in the decisions of other courts.’ VVheu thus the

substantial ground of recovery is found not to be the ground on

which the action is nominally planted, we cannot refrain from

uniting with the Supreme Court of Mississippi in expressions

of regret that the law should be chargeable with such manifest

absurdities, and in agreeing that “that system of jurisprudence

which punishes in damages the slightest aggression upon property,

but denies redress to the father, and if he be dead, to the mother,

for the deﬁlcment of an infant daughter, except upon the predicate

of a loss of services, is at variance with the sentiments and eon-

family, or neither parent can bring

the suit. Clark v. Fitch, 2 \Vend. 439;
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McDaniel 0. Edwards, '7 Ired. 408;

Lee 0. Hodges, 13 Gratt. 726; Patter-

son v. Thompson, 24 Ark. 55; Ken-

drick 0. McCrary, 11 Geo. 603; Stilton

1:. Hoffman, 32 N. J. 58; Wert 0.

Strouse, 38 N. J. 184.

Under the statutes of New York a

wife who has been abandoned by her

It has been said above that the damages in these cases are by
no means measured by the loss of service and the incidental care
and expenses. It has been well said in Penn!!ylvania that" proof
of the relation of master and servant, and of the loss of service,
by means of the wrongful act of the defendant, has relation only
to tho form of the remedy, and that the action being sustained
in point of form by the introduction of these technical elements,
the damages may be given as a compensation to the plaintiff, not
only for the loss of service, but abo ·for all that the plaintiff can
feel from the nature of the injury.'" ' Similar expressions are to
be met with in the decisions of other courts." When thus the
substantial ground of recovery is found not to be the ground on
which the action is nominally planted, we cannot refrain from
uniting with the Supreme Court of Mississippi in expression~
of regret that the law should be charp;eable with such manifest
absurdities, and in ag1·eeing that "that system of jurisprudence
\Vhich punishes in damages the slightest aggrct>sion upou property,
but denies redress to the father, and if he be dead, to the mother,
for the defilement of an infant daughter, except upon the predicate
of a loss of services, is at variance with the sentiments and con-

husband, and keeps a boardin|_z-house

on her own account, may sue in her

own name for the seduction of her

daughter, over 21 years of age, who

lives with her and performs services

for her. Bndgley 0. Decker, 44 Barb.

5'77.

‘Lewis, J., in Phelin 0. Kender-

dine, 20 Penn. St. 354, 361, quoting 2

Greenl. Ev., § 579.

‘See, particularly, Lips 0. Eisen-

lerd, 82 N. Y. 229, 236, per Dunno,

Ch. J.; Clark o. Fitch, 2 Wend. 459;

Stiles o. Tilford, 10 Wend. 338; Pruitt

0. Cox, 21 Ind. 15; Felkner o. Scarlet,

29 Ind. 154; Phillips u. Hoyle, 4 Gray,

568; Gruble v. Murgruve, 4 Ill. 312;

White v. Murtlantl, 71 lll. 250; Ken-

drick 1:. McCrary,11 Geo. (303; Elling-

ton 0. Ellington, 47 Miss. 329. So in

an action tbr enticing away a child,

the parent may recover for his mental

sutlbring. Stowe v. Heywood, 7 Al-

len, 118; Magee 1:. Ilollund, 27 N. J.

86. In the case ot‘ injuries to the

child, for which he would have an

action in his own behalf, the recovery

of the parent must be restricted to

the actual pecuniary loss. Cowden 1:.

Wright, 24 Wend. 4.29; Wltitney 0.

Hitchcock, 4 Denio, 461; Kurt‘ 0.

Parks, 44 Cal. 46; Sykes 0. Lawlor,

49 Cal.236; Boyd v. Blaisdell,15 Ind.

73; Douahoe o. Richards, 88 Me. 376.

The New York cases are dissented

from by the Supreme Court of Mis-

souri in Klingman v. Holmes, 54 Mo.

304.

_

family, or neither parent can bring
the suit. Clark t~. Fitch, 2 Wend. 4 i9;
McDaniel "· Ed wards, 7 Iret.l. 408;
Lee t~. Hodges, 13 Hratt. 726; Patter.
son "· Thompson, 24 Ark. 55; Kendrick " 1\lcCrary, 11 Geo. 603; Sutton
t~. Hoffman, 32 N. J. 58; Wert "·
Strouse, 38 N.J. 184.
Under the statutes of New York a
wlfe who has been abandoned by her
husband, and keeps Q bo11rdin~-house
on her own account, may sue in her
own name for the seduction of her
daughter, over 21 yea1·s of age, who
Jives with lwr and performs ~ervices
for her. Badgley "· Decker, 44 Bnrb.
577.
• LEwrs, J., In Phelin tt. Kender.
dine, 20 Penn. St. 354, 361, quoting 2
Green!. E''·• ~ 579.
1 Bee, particularly, Llpe fl. Eisenlerd, 82 N. Y. 229, 236, p~r DENIO,
Ch. J.; Clark"· Fitch, 2 Wend. 459;
Stlleu. Tilford, 10 Wend. 838; Pruitt

"· Cox, 21 Ind. 15; Felkner "·Scarlet.
29 Ind. 154; Phillips"· Hoyle, 4 Gr11y,
568; Grable v. 1\lnrgruve, 4 Ill. 8 ;2;
White 11. 1\lurtland, 71 Ill. 210; Ken.
drick 11. McCrary, 11 Geo. 003; Elling.
ton "· Ellington, 47 ::\lis~. 329. So in
an action fnr enticing away a clllld,
the parent m11y recover for his mental
sufl'ering. Stowe 1). Heywood, 7 Allen, 118; Magee t~. Holland, 27 N.J.
86. In the case of injuries to the
cltlld, for wllieh he would have an
action in his own behnlf, the recovery
of the parent must be restricted to
the actual pecuniary loss. Cowden "·
Wri~ht, 2! Wend. 429; Whitney "·
Hitchcock, 4 Denio, 461; Karr tt.
Parks, 44 Cal. 46; Sykes t~. Lawlor,
49 Cal. 230; Boyd t~. Blaisdell, 15 Ind.
73; Donahoe t~. Richards, 38 lit>. 376.
The New York cases 1uo dissented
from by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Klingman "· Holmes, 54 Mo.
304.
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science of this age.” ‘ But the evil is not one to be corrected by

judicial action; to uproot it would be to create new law, and this

is the province of legislation. Many States now have statutes

which allow suits for seduction to be brought for the beneﬁt of

the woman herself, some near relative, or a guardian being suffered

to bring it, and all allegations of loss of service being dispensed

with.’

\Vherever this action is permitted at the common law, it is

assumed that the plaintiff is not in fault. If he was asscnting

to the seduction, or eonnived at it, or without objection permitted

such improper action on the part of the defendant as might

naturally, and in fact did, lead to it, these facts may be pleaded

in bar of a recovery.‘

Adopted Children. A conspicuous feature of some of the

systems of law is the facility with which they permit the forma-

tion of family relations with which ties of blood have no neces-

sary connection. This is accompanied by some formal act of

adoption, and the child adopted comes into the family with all the

science of this age." 1 But the evil is not one to be corrected by
judicial action; to uproot it would be to create new law, and this
is the province of legislation. Many States now have statutes
which allow suits for seduction to be brought for the benefit of
the woman herself, some near relati ,·e, or a gnat·dian bci ng suffered
to bring it, and all allegations of loss of service being dispensed
with.'
'Vherever this action is permitted at the common law, it is
assumed that the plaintiff is not in tanlt. If he was assenting
to the seduction, or connived at it, or withon~objcction permitted
such improper action on the part of the c.letcndaut as might
naturally, and in fact did, lead to it, these facts may be pleaded
in bar of a recovery.'

rights of a child by birth, and subject to all the same duties and
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obligations. It has been said on a preceding page ‘ that the com-

mon law knows nothing of an adoption with such consequences.

Nevertheless, if one is received into the family by adoption, the

remedies in respect to third persons will be the same, while the

relation exists, that they would be in the ease of a child by

nature.

Wrongs to a Chi1d._ For an injury suffered by the child in

that relation no action will lie at the common law. The obliga-

tion of the parent to support him is only enforced by proceed-

ings on behalf of the public, and not by suit in the name of or

on behalf of the child. And no action will lie against a third

‘Ellington 0. Ellington, 4'7 Miss.

329, 351.

' See Updegraif e. Bennett, 8 Iowa,

72; Felkner 0. Scarlet, 29 Ind. 154.

As to the elfect of giving a statutory

Adopted Children. A conspicuous feature of some of the
systems of law is the facility with which they permit the formation of family relations with which ties of blood have no necessary connection. This is accompanied by some t0rmal act of
adoption, and the child adopted comes into the tA.mily with all the
rights of a child by birth, and subject to all the same duties and
obligations. It has been said on a prec~ding page' that the com.
mon law knows nothing of an adoption with such consequences.
Nevertheless, if one is recei,·ed into the family hy adoption, the
remedies in respect to third persons will be the same, while the
relation exists, that they w.ould be in the caso of a child by
nature.

remedy upon the common law right,

see Cross 0. Goodman, 20 Up. Cam. Q.

B. 242.

' Reddie 0. Seoolt, 1 Peake, 316;

Scngar e. Sligerland. 2 Caines, 219;

Smith o. Mastin. 15 Wend. 2'70; Ves-

sell 0. Cole, 10 Mo. 634. But where

a statutory action is allowed to be

Wrongs to a Chlld.. li'or an injury suffered by tl1e child in
that relation no action will lie at the common law. The obligation of the parent to support him is only enforced by Jlroceedings on behalf of the public, and not by suit in the name of or
on behalf of the child. And no action will lie against a third

brought for the woman’s beneﬁt, the

conduct of the nominal plaintiff, it

would seem, should not prejudice her

recovery.

‘ Ante, p. 42.

1 Ellington e. Elllngton, -'7 Miss.
829, Ml.
1 See Updegraff e. Bennett, 8 Iowa,
72; Felkner "· Scarlet, 20 Ind. 154.
Aa to the effect of giving a statutory
remedy upon the common law right,
8ee Croas e. Goodman, 20 Up. Can., Q.

B. 242.
1

Reddle e. Scoolt, 1 Penke, 316;

Be agar e. Sli~rJnnd, 2 Caines, 219;
Smith e. }[astin. 15 Wrnd. 270; VoRsell "· Cole, 10 llo. 634. But where
a stl\lulory action is Bllowml to be
brought for the woman's benefit, the
conduct of the nmninal plaintiff. lt
would sr<·m, should not prejudice her
recovery.
• Ante, p. 42.
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person for depriving a child of his source of support by means
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of an injury to the parent. By statute, however, a remedy is

given in a few cases which will be considered further on. Where

the child is injured in his own property or person, redress has

no necessary connection with the family relation.

Actions by Guardians. The guardian is either of the ward’s

person, or of his estate, or of both. The guardian of the estate

may maintain all proper suits for its protection. The guardian

of the ward’s person may, in general, maintain suits for personal

person tor depriving a child of his source of support h.Y means
.of an injury to the parent. By statute, however, a remedy is
given in a few caset~ which will be considered further on. Where
the child is injured in his own property or person, redress has
no necessary connection with the family relation.

injuries to the ward when, under corresponding circumstances,

the parent might maintain them. It has been held that he may

bring suit for the seduction of his female ward, the right being

grounded on the legal control he has over the minor’s services.‘

But the contrary has been held in Massachusetts, where he has

no such control.’

Action for loss of Marriage. The ﬁrst of family rights is that

of forming the relation of marriage, observing for the purpose

such rules as have been prescribed by statute as pre-requisites.

The ﬁrst of these, and in nearly all the States the only indispens-

able one, is that of competent consent. If, after consent once

given, one of the parties refuses performance, this, in law, is a

mere breach of contract, except where, by means of the contract

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of marriage. the man has been enabled to accomplish the won1an’s

seduction. The case then becomes'a gross fraud, and may be

Actions by Guardians.

The gunrdian is either of the ward's
person, or of his estate, or of both. The guardian of the estate
may maintain all proper snits for its protection. The guardian
-of the ward's person may, in general, maintain suits for personal
injuries to the ward when, under corresponding circumstances,
the parent might maintain them. It has been held that he may
bring snit for the seduction of his female ward, the right being
grounded on the legal control be has over the minor's services.'
But the contrary has been held in Massachusetts, where he has
no such controL•

prosecuted as a tort.’ There is something in it more than a failure

to keep an agreement: there is failure to atone for a great wrong

accomplished by means of a conﬁdential relation.

The prevention of a marriage by the interference of a third

person cannot, in general, in itself, be a legal wrong. Thus if

one, by solicitations, or by the arts of ridicule or otherwise, shall

induce one to break off an existing contract of marriage, no

action will lie for it, however eontemptible and blamable may be

the conduct. But a loss of marriage may be such a special

injury as will support an action of slander or libel, where the

party was induced to break oil‘ the engagement by false and dam-

‘ Fernsler o. Meyer, 3 W. & S. 416. ' See the subject referred to in the

' Blanchard 11. Ilsley, 120 Mass. 487; chapter on Frauds in Conﬁdential

S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 487. Relations.

,1 _ I_ _

Action for loss of Marriage. The first of family .rights is that
.of forming the relation of marriage, observing for the purpose
such rules as have been prescribed by statute as pre-requisites.
The first of these, and in nearly all the States the only indispensable one, is that of competent consent. If, after consent once
given, one of the parties refuses performance, this, in law, is a
mere breach of contract, except where, by means of the contract
-of marriage, the man has been enabled to accomplish the woman's
seduction. The case then becomes · a gross fraud, and may be
prosecuted as a tort.• There is something in it more than a failnre
to keep an agreement: there is failure to atone for a great wrong
accomplished by means of a confirlential relation.
The prevention of a marriage by the interference of a third
person cannot, in genm·al, in itself, be a legal wrong. Thus if
one, by solicitations, or by the arts of ridicule or otherwise, shall
induce one to break off an exitlting contract of marriage, no
action will lie for it, however contemptible and blamable may be
th~ conduct. But a loss of marriage may be such a special
injury as will snpport an action of slander or libel, where the
party was induced to break off the enbragement by false and damFcrnsler "· :Pt[oyer, 3 W. & B. 416.
Blanchard 11. Ilslcy, 120 Mass. 487;
:S. 21 Am. Rep. 487.
1

1

c.

1 Bee the subject referred to in the
chapter on Frauds in Confidential
Relationa.
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aging charges not actionable -per se.‘ Here the action, it is per-

INJURIES TO F AlllLY BIGHTS.

231

ceived, is for the defamation, and the loss of the marriage only

the damage ﬂowing from the injury. A contemplated marriage

might be prevented by the forcible separation of the parties, or

by the imprisonment of one of them; but the wrong, in contem-

plation of law, would consist in the assault, or in the false impris-

onment, and not in the loss of marriage. The suit might, there-

fore, lie in favor of one party, and not in favor of the other, if

only one was subjected to the illegal force.

It has been held, however, that if one, by the false and mali-

cious assertion to the intended husband that the woman is already

his own wife, succeeds in breaking up an intended marriage, the

\voman may have an action against him for this fraud.’

As the age of consent to marriage is usually below the age of

full legal capacity to act on the child's own behalf, there may in

some cases be an apparent conﬂict of rights in respect to forming

the relation of marriage. Previous to the child’s legal emanci-

pation, the parent is entitled to control his actions, and may right-

fully withhold consent from a contemplated marriage, and break

it up. But on the other hand, the child, if over the age of con-

sent, may enter into the relation of marriage if he can succeed

in doing so, and the relation will be perfectly legal and valid.
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Here is an apparent conﬂict of rights; buta real conﬂict of rights

can never exist; for what one has a lawful right to do, another

cannot have a lawful right to prevent. The solution of the appa-

rent diﬂiculty is to be found in this: The minor child has not, in

strictness of law, when he reaches the age of consent, a rig/it to

form the relation of marriage, but only the ca;/acz't_y to do so.

The age of consent is merely the age ﬁxed by the law, below

which a marriage is voidable. The marriage of a minor above

that age, though in strictncss of law it should not be formed with-

out parental consent, is nevertheless sustained on grounds of

public policy; and parental rights are made to yield to it. The

parent may prevent the marriage if he can. but tailing in this,

his rights are incidentally abridged by the marriage, as they

' Davis v. Gardiner, 4 Coke, 16; old o. Daunston, Cro. Car. 269; Moody

Parkins 0. Scott, 1 H. & C. Cat. 153; 0. Baker, 5 Cow. 351.

Nelson a. Stall, Uro. J ac. 422; South- * Sheperd 0. Waketnan, 1 Sid. '79.

aging cl1arges not actionable ·pm" ~~.· Here the action, it is perceived, is tor the defamation, and the loss of the marriage only
the damage flowing from the injury. A contemplated marriage
might be prevented by the forcible separation of the parties, or
by the impl'isoument of one of them; but the wrong, in contemplation of Jaw, would consist in tho assault, or in the falt;e imprisonment, and not in the loss of marriage. The suit might, therefore, lie in favor of one party, and not in favor of the other, if
only one wns subjected to the illegal force.
It has been held, however, that if one, by the false and malicious assertion to the intended husband that the woman is already
his own witc, succeeds in breaking up an intended marriage, the
woman may have au action at,rainst him for this fraud.'
As the age of <:onsent to marriage is usually below the age of
fuH legal capacity to act on the child's own behalf, there may in·
some cases be an apparent conflict of rights in respect to forming
the relation of marriage. Pre ..·ions to the child's legal emancipation, the parent is entitled to control his actions, and may rightfully withhold consent from a contemplated marriage, and break
it up. But on the other ha.ud, the child, if over the ag~ of consent, may enter into the relation of marriage if he can succeed
in doiug so, and the relation will be perfectly legal and valid.
Here is an app:lrent conflict of rights; but a real conflict of rights
can never exist; for what one has a lawful right to do, another
cannot have a lawful right to prevent. The solution of the apparent difficulty is to be found in this: The minor child has not, in
strictness of law, when he reaches the age of consent, a right to
form the relation of marriage, but only tho capacity to do so.
The age of consent is merely the age tixed by the law, belO\v
which a marri~ae is voidable. The marriage of a minor above
that age, though in strictness of law it should not be formed without parental consent, is neYerthclcss sustained on grounds of
public policy; and parental rights are made to yi·eiU to it. The
parent may prevent the marriage if he can. but tailing in this,
his rights are incidentally auridgcd by the marriage, as they
1 Davis "· Gardiner, 4. Coke, 16;
Parkins "· Scott, 1 H. & a. Cas. 153;
Nelaon "·Staff, Cro. Jac. 422; South-

old"· Daunston, Cro. Car. 269; Moody
.,. Baker, G Cow. Bal.
• Sheperd"· Wakeman, 1 Sid. '79.
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would be if consent were given. The marriage displaces parental
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rights instead of creating a conﬂict.‘

Fraudulent Marriage. A very serious wrong may be accom-

plished by inducing one, through misrepresentation and fraud,

would be if consent were given. The marriage displaces parental
rights instead of creating a conflict.'

to enter into an illegal marriage. It was decided in an early

case, that where a married man, by falsely assuming to be single,

succeeded in inducing a woman to marry him, she might, on dis-

covering the dcception, maintain an action against him for the

injury.‘ This doctrine has been applied in New York to the case

of one from whom his wife had procured a decree of divorce,

leaving him incapacitated to marry again during her life time.’

The tort in such a case consists in the fraud accomplished, to the

woman’s serious, and perhaps permanent, injury. Nor can it be

essential that any false aﬁirmations should have been made in

words. The woman to whom marriage is offered by one she does

not know to be married is not bound, at her peril, to suspect him

of intended crime, and to question him accordingly; but she

may rightfully assume, as she commonly will, that he has lawful

authority to do what he proposes, and his conduct in proposing

is of itself a false aﬂirmation if he has not.

Known impotency on the part of the man, it would seem,

must be a fraud on the marriage; and being with child by
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another man at the time of the marriage, and not disclosing the

fact, would be like a fraud in the woman. For these the mar-

riage might be annulled by a competent court,‘ but they afford

no ground for an action at the common law.

A marriage may be void because made in reliance upon a fraud-

'See Hervey 0. Moseley, 7 Gray,

-1'79.

' Anonymous, Skinner, 119.

‘ Blossom o. Barrett, 37 N. Y. 434.

A similar action was brought in

Maine, after the man's death, against

his personal representative, and sus-

tained. Withee o. Brooks, 65 Me. 14.

In Pennsylvania. however, it washeld

the right of action did not survive.

Grim '0. Car1"s A(hnr., 31 Penn. St. 533.

In Higgins v. Brcen, 9 M0. 497, a

woman who had been united in a

Fraudulent Marriage. A very serious wrong may be accomplished by inducing one, through misrepresentation and fraud,
to enter into an illegal marriage. It was decided in an early
case, that where a married man, by falsely assuming to be single,
succeeded in inducing a woman to marry him, she might, on discovering the deception, maintain 11n action ag:dnst him for the
injnry.• This doctrine has been applied in New York to the case
of one from whom his wifo had procured a decree of divorc..ae,
leaving him incapacitated to marry again during her lite time.•
The tort in snch a case consists in the fraud aC'.complished, to the
woman's serious, and perhaps permanent, injury. Nor ean it be
essential that any false affirmations should have been made in
·words. The woman to whom marriage is offered by one she does
not know to be married is not bound, at her peril, to suspect him
of intended crime, and to question him accordingly; but she
may rightfully assume, as she commonly will, that he has lawful
authority to do what he proposes, and his conduct in proposing
is of itself a false affirmation if he has not.
Known impotency on the part of the man, it would _seem,
must be a fraud on the marriage; and being with child by
another man at the time of the marriage, and not disclosing the
tact, would be like a fraud in the woman. For these the marriage might be annulled by a competent court: but they afford
no ground for an action at the common law.
A marriage may be void because made in reliance upon a fraud-

void marriage with a married man,

A --— — -L ji __- _

1

whom she believed to be single, was

held entitled, after his dcath,to re-

cover against his cstatc the value of

her services.

‘Scott v. Shufcldt, 5 Paige, 48;

Reynolds 0. Reynolds, 3 Allen, 605;

Donovan 0. Donovan, 9 Allen, 140;

Morris 0. Morris, Wright, (0.) ('30;

Ritter o. Ritter, 5 Blackf. 81, Anti-

nuptial incontinence in the woman

is no ground whatever for annulling

a marriage. Lcavitt 0. Leavitt, 13

Mich. 452.

See Hervey tr. Moseley, 7 Gray,

479.

Anonymous, Skinner, 119.
Blossom "· BatTett, 37 N.Y. 484.
A similar action wns brought in
Maine, after the man's death, n.!!:linst
his personal representative, and sustained. Withee"· Brooks, 05 lie. 14.
In Pennsylvania. however, it was held
the right of action did nnt survive.
Grim 1l. Can-'s Admr., 31 Penn. St. 533.
In Hig-gins "· Breen, 9 Mo. 497, &
woman who bad been united in &
void marriage with & married mn.n,
1
1

whom she believed to be single, was
held entitled, after his death, to recover a~ainst his estate the value of
her service~.
• Scott tr. Shufeldt, 5 Paige, 43;
Reynolds tr. Reynolds, 8 Allen, 605;
Dconovan "· Donovan, 9 Allen, 140;
Morris "· Morris, Wright, (0.) C3~;
Ritter tr. Ritter, 5 Blnckf. 81, Anti.
nuptial incontinence in the woman
is no ground whatever for annulling
a marringe. Leavitt tl. Leavitt, 13
Mich. ~2.
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unlawful interference with the buried dead of the family might

probably be restrained by injunction on theirjoint application,‘ and

‘See Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Penn.

St. 411, where burial rights are consid-

cred, and cases referred to. It is de-

cided in this case that the grant of a
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ulent divorce. Traudulent di orces are sometimes procured by .I
~
going into foreign jurisdictions for the purpose, where nei ther~~~
courts nor legislature can have au thority to grant them, becanse of
•
~
the absence of the jurisdictional fact of residenrP. Where a mar~
riage is en tered into, in reliance upon such a di vorce, with one~~w
'
not aware of the facts, the wrongs committed are precisely th~~~~
same as if no such divorce bad ever been obtained. Th ey do
~~~
not, therefore, r equire further notice here. The first manin.ge,'\_
"". -)"
under such circnmstances, of course remain s unaffected by tl~~s ,
second, except as the latter constitutes a wrong which may j nstiT~
_.,~
a divorce. It does not discharge the ?;Hil ty party from any of ~~
the d:t ties or obligations imposed upon him by the first and lega~
. ~
marr1age.
~

any-{~~

where, shall we ﬁnd in the common law a recognition of legal

ease, however, the recognition is very faint and uncertain. An

s.

JM

o-f I _ .

Burial Rights./I In respect to the burial of the dead, if any-

rights in the family as an aggregate of persons. Even in that

.J.

Burial Rights . ....tin respect to the burial of the dead, if
where, shall we find in th e common law a recog ni tion of legal..r~~ ·
rights in the family as an aggregate of persons. E ven in th at ~~ / .
case, however, the recognition is very faint and uncertain. An 't~
~
unl~wful interfe rence with the buried dead of the family might
\
probably be restrained by injunction on their joint application,• and
~

burial lot in a cemetery, though pur-

porting to he in fee, is only for so long

as the ground is used t'or cemetery

purposes, and that, under competent

legislation, the cemetery may be va-

cated, and the bodies removed to other

grounds without the consent of the

family. Citing Windt o. German Re-

formed Church, 4 Sandt‘. Ch. 471;

Richards o. N.W. Prot. Dutch Church,

32 Barb. 42; Price v. Meth. Ep.

Church, 4 Ohio, 515; Brick Presb.

Church v. New York, 5 Cow. 538;

Coates ~v. New York, 7 Cow. 585; City

Council 0. Wentworth Baptist (Jhurch.

4 Strob. 306. Approving the Penn-

sylvania case, see Partridge 0. First

Independent Church, 39 Md. 631.

Where the use of cemetery grounds

for that purpose is discontinued, the

lot owner has a right to remove monu-

ments as pcrsonalty. lhid. The right

of the owner of a cemetery lot much

resembles that of the owner of a pew

in a church. This lust right is gone

if the church is destroyed by ﬁre or

by time. Frcleigh v. Platt, 5 Cow.

494; Gay 0. Baker, 1'7 Muss. 435;

Howard o. First Parish, etc., 7 Pick.

137. And the owner has no right to

compensation from the parish if use

of the church is abandoned. Fnssett

0. First Parish, etc., 1!) Pick. 361.

Neither has he if it is torn down be-

cause it has become unﬁt for use.

Gorton o. Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508. See

Van Houten c.‘ Reformed Dutch

Church, 17 N. J. Eq.126. But if it

is destroyed maliciously, or merely

1
Sec Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Penn.
St. 411, where burial r iJ,{hts nrc considerect, nnd cnses referred to. It is dec idcd in this case that the grant of a
burial lot in a cemetery, though purporting to be in fee, is only for so long
as the ground is used for cemetery
pur poses, and that, u nder compett·nt
leg islation, the cemetery way be vacated, and the bodies removed to other
grounds wi thout the consent of the
f:nu ily. Citing W indt v . Germ an Reformed Church, 4 Sun cl f. Ch. 471;
Ricbards v. N .W . P rot. D utch Ch urch,
32 Bur b. 42 ; P rice ». :Met h. Ep.
Ch urch, 4 Ohio, 515 ; B rir k P rcsb.
Cl!Urch v. N ew Y or k, 5 Cow. 538 ;
Coates "ll. New York, 7 Cow. 5S.i ; City
Cou ncil "D. Wentworth Baptist Church.
4 Strob. 306. Approving the P enn.
sylvania case, sec P artridge v. F irst
I nd ependent Cllurch, 3!) Mel. 631.
Where ibc use of cemetery grounds
for that pW'pose is discontinued, the

lot owner has a rig ht to r emove monum ents as person nlty. ! hid. T he right
of tlle owner of a cemetery lot much
resembles that of th e owner of a pew
in a chllrch. Thi last righ t is gone
if U1e church is cl r!'troyed by fire or
by time. Freleigh v. P lntt, 5 Cow.
494; Gay v. Baker, 17 :Mass. 435 ;
H oward , , Fi rst P ar ish, etc., 7 Pick .
137. And tho owner bas no r ight to
compr nsntiou from thr parish if use
of the church is ~t bamloucd . Fnssett
'll. First P nri;:h, etc., 111 Pick. 861.
N either has he if it is torn down because it h as become u nfit for use.
Gorton v. H ad~cll, I) Cush. 508. St·e
V :m H ou ten t:.' R •·formcll Dutch
Ch urch, 17 N . J . E q. 126. B ut if it
is destroyed maliciously, or merely
for the convenience of the p arbh , in
dcmo ity is due. Gay oo. Baktor, 17
) f nss. 435; Voorhees v. Presbytcr ifUl
Church, 8 Barb. 13.3 ; 8. C. 17 Burb.
103; Kellogg v. DickillSon, 18 Vt. 266;
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the owner of the lot in which the body was deposited might main-

240

THE LAW OF

TORT~.

tain trespass quare clausum for its disintermeut, and recover

substantial damages, in awarding which, the injury to the feel-

ings would be taken into consideration.‘ In Indiana it has been

said that “the bodies of the dead belong to the surviving rela-

tions, as property, and that they have a right to dispose of them

as such, within restrictions analogous to those by which the dis-

position of other property may be regulated.”' But the com-

mon law recognized no such property, though it did recognize a

property in the shroud or other apparel of the dead as belong-

ing to the person who was at the charge of the funera.1._'

Painful questions, which have never been passed upon by the

courts, might arise, if a dispute should spring up among the rel-

atives of the dead concerning the place where the body should

be deposited. It has been decided, in an opinion of much

research, that when the body has once been interred in a partic-

lar cemetery, without objection, the widow may be enjoined from

removing it on the application of the heir, and the reasoning of

the court would apply equally if the position of the parties were

reversed.‘ But in Pennsylvania it is held that the widow’s con-

trol of the body ceases with the burial, and that thereafter its dis-

position belongs to the next ot' kin.‘
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For an injury to the monument an action of trespass might

be brought by the owner of the burial lot; or, if there was no

private ownership in the lot, then by the party erecting it.’

Cooper v. Presbyterian Church, 32

Barb. 222; In re Presbyterian Church,

3 Edw. Ch. 155; Gorton '0. Hadsell, 9

Cush. 50s. ,

‘ Meagher o. Driscoll, 09 Mass. 281.

At the common law, the only remedy

for the wrongful removal of a body

buried in church grounds was by in-

dietment. Regina 0. Sharpe, Dears.

& B. 160; S. C. 40 Eng. L. & Eq. 581.

' B igert '0. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134,

the owner of the lot in which the body was deposited might maintain trespass ~rtJ claUBum for its disinterment, and recover
substantial dam~o-es, in awarding which, the injury to the feelings would be taken into consideration.' In Indiana it )las been
said that " the bodies of the dead belong to the snrvi ving relations, as property, and that they have a right to dispose of them
as such, within restrictions analogous to those by which the disposition of other property may be regulated." • But the common law recognized no such property, though it did recognize a
property in the shroud or other apparel of the dead as belonging to the person who was at the charge of the funeral~·
Painful questions, which have never been passed upon by the
courts, might arise, if a dispute should spring up among the relatives of thE' dead concerning tho place where the body should
be deposited. It has been decided, in an opinion of much
research, that when the body has once been interred in a partietar cemetery, without objection, the widow may be enjoined from
removing it on the application of the heir, and tho reasoning of
the court would apply equally if the position of the parties were
reversed.' Bnt in Pennsylvania it is held that the widow's control of the body ceases with the burial, and that thereafter its disposition belongs to the next of kin.'
For an injury to the monument an action of trespass might
be brought by the owner of the burial lot; or, if there was no
private ownership in the lot, then by the party ercctiug it.•

138, per Pnuxms, J.

'2 Bl. Com. 429; Matter of Brick

Presb. Church, 3 Edw. Ch. 155, 168;

Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281. 28!;

Pierce 0. Proprietors, etc., 10 R. I.

227, 242. .

‘ Pierce 1:. Proprietors, etc., 10 R. I.

227; S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 667. See

Guthrie v. Weaver, 1 Mo. Ap. Rep.

136. In this case it was decided that

the husband who had buried his wife

in her father's cemetery lot, and who

desired to remove it, and was pro-

hibited, could not maintain replevin

{or the coﬁlu and its contents against

the father, the body not being prop-

erty, and the eoﬂin ceasing to be mer-

chandise when buried.

' Wynkoop 0. Wynkoop,42 Penn.

St. 293, 302.

‘ Spooner 0. Brewster, 3 Bing. 136;

Partridge e. First Independent

Church, 39 Md. 631.

Cooper 11. Preshyt<>rian Church, 89
Barb. 222; Inr~ Presbyterian Church,
8 Edw. Ch. 155; Gorton e. Hadsell, 9
Cush.508.
.
a Meagher e. Driscoll, 00 Mass. 281.
At the common law, the only remedy
for the wrongful removal of a body
buried in church grounds was by indictment. Regina "· Sllarpe, Dears.
& B. 160; B. C. 40 Eng. L. & Eq. 581.
t B:1gert "·Indianapolis, 18 Ind. 134,
188, per PERK[NS, J.
• 2 Bl. Com. 420; Matter of Brick
Presb. Church, 8 Edw. Ch. 155, 168;
Meaghero. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 284;
Pierce o. Proprietors, etc.. 10 R. L

m, 242.

• Pierce 11. Proprietors, etc., 10 R. I.
227; B. C. 14 Am. Rep. 667. Bee
Guthrie "· Weaver, 1 llo. Ap. Rep.
136. In U1is case it was decided thal
the husband who had buried his wife
in her ft~.ther's cemetery lot, and who
desired to remove it, and was prohibited, could not maintain replevin
for the coffin and its contents against
the father, the b<>dy not being prop.
erty, and the coffin ceasing to be mer.
chandisc when buried.
' Wynkoop t~. Wynkoop,~ Penn.
St. 293, 802.

• Spooner e. Brewster, 8 Bing. 136;
Partridge e. Firs' lndependen'
Chnrcb, 80 Md. 631.
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lNJUHIEEt TO li'.AHILY RIGHTS.

Exemption Laws. One of the most distinct instances of

241

recognitions of the family, as such, for the purposes of legal

remedy, is to be found in the constitutional and statutory pro-

visions exempting property from levy and sale on legal process

for the satisfaction of debts. These exemptions are, for the most

part, made for the beneﬁt of the family, and to householders

only. The provisions are so different in different States that it

would be idle to attempt, in any such space as is at our com-

mand, to make an abridged statement of the law. In many

States the husband can only dispose of an interest in exempt

property with his wit'e’s consent, and if he fails to resort to the

proper legal remedies for the protection 0t' the exemption, the

wife may bring suits for the purpose.‘

The beneﬁt of the homestead is, in many of the States, con-

tinued to the family after the owner’s death, so long as they, as

a family, occupy it.‘

Master and Servant. The wrongs which the master may sus-

tain in that relation at the hands of others are substantially con-

ﬁned to being deprived of services. Connected with this, how-

ever, may be incidental damages, such as expenses in care and

attention for the servant, medicines, etc., when the loss. is occa-

sioned by some violence to the servant, or injury to his health,
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so that his care devolves upon the master, and perhaps other

incidental expenses in some cases. The principles which govern

Exemption Laws. One of the most distinct instances of
recognitions of the family, as such, for the purposes of legal
remedy, is to be found in the constitutional and statutory provisions exempting property from levy and sale on legal process
for the satisfaction of debts. These exemptions are, for the most
part, made for the benefit of the family, and to householders
only. The provisions are so different in different States that it
would be idle to attempt, in any such space as is at our command, to make an abridged statement of the law. In many
States the husband can only dispose of an interest in exempt
property with his wife's consent, and if he fails to resort to the
proper legal remedies for the protection ot' the exemption, the
wife may bring suits for the purpose!
The benefit of the homestead is, in many of the States, continued to the family after the owner's death, so long as they, as
a family, occupy it.'

the recovery have been suﬁiciently indicated in speaking of parent

and child.‘ The wrongs which a servant might suffer at the

hands of third persons would be redressed, independent of the

relation.

INJURIES BY TUE USE OF INTOXICATING IJQUORS.

Witliin the last few years statutes have been passed in a num-

ber of the States giving to husband, wife, parent, child, or

guardian, and sometimes to other parties, for injuries done by

intoxicated persons, the right to maintain actions against

the person or persons who may have sold or given the liquors

‘See cases collected in Smyth on 'Bmyth on H0I11€BlC:1(l5 and Ex-

Homcsteads and Exemptions, §§ 456, eruptions, Ch. XI. .

and 521. ' See Schouler Dom. Rel. 631, G32,

and cases cited.

16

Kaster and Servant. The wrongs which the master may sustain in that relation at the hands of others are substantially confined to being deprived of services. Connected with this, however, may be incidental damages, such as expenses in care and
attention for the servant, medicines, etc., when the loss. is occasioned by some violence to the servant, or injnry to his health,
so that his care devolves upon the master, and perhaps other
incidental expenses in some cases. The principles which govern
the recovery have been sufficiently indicated in speaking of parent
and child.' The wrongs which a servant might snft'er at the
hands of third persons would be redressed, independent of the
relation.
INJURIES BY THB USE OB' INTO.I.IOATING LIQUORS.

Within the last few years statutes have been passed in a number of the States giving to husband, wife, parent, child, or
guardian, and sometimes to other parties, for injuries done by
intoxicated persons, the right to maintain actions against
the person or persons who may have sold or given the liquors
1 Bee cases collected In Smyth on
Homestel&da and Exemptiona, § § 456,
and G21.

16

1 Smyth on Homesteads an<l Ex.
emptiona, Ch. XI.
• Bee Bchouler Dom. Rel. 681, 6a2,
and cases cited.
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which caused the intoxication. Also for injuries to means ot
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support; for the expense and trouble of caring for the intoxicated

person; and for other injuries and losses which are particularly

pointed out in the statutes, which are here copied. All these

provisions are for the beneﬁt and protection of the family, and

are therefore here presented; but it has been deemed better to

give them in detail, than to attempt to bring together their several

provisions under one head.‘

Arkansas. An act applying to Washington county noly pro-

vides that “every husband, wife, parent, guardian, or other per-

son, who shall be injured in person or property, or means of

support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the

intoxication of any person, habitual or otherwise, shall have a

which caused the intoxication. Also for injuries to means of
support; for the expense and trouble of caring for the intoxicated
person; and for other injuries and losses which are particularly
pointed out in the statutes, which are here copied. All these
provisions are for the benefit and protection of the family, and
are therefore here presented; but it has been deemed better to.
give them in detail, than to attempt to bring together their several
provisions under one head. 1

right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly,

against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving

intoxicating liquors, in said county of Washington, in whole or

in part, of such person or persons, and recover full damages,”

etc. The act is evidently defective, probably in consequence of

some accidental omission.’

Connecticut. “ \Vhoever shall sell intoxicating liquor to any

person, who thereby becomes intoxicated, and while so intoxicated

shall, in consequence thereof, injure the person or property of
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another, shall pay ust damages to the person injured, to be recov-

ered in an action under this statute; and if the person selling

such intoxicating liquor is licensed, the recovery of a udgment for

such damages shall be conclusive evidence of a breach of the bond.” ’

Illinois. “Every person who shall, by the sale of intoxicating

liquors, with or without a license, cause the intoxication of any

other person, shall be liable for and compelled to pay a reasonable

Arkansas. An act applying to Washington county noly provides that" every husband, wife, parent, guardian, or other person, who shall be inju1·ed in person or property, or means of
.support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of' the
intoxication of any person, habitual or otherwise, shall have a
right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly,
against any perROn or persons who shall, by selling or giving
intoxicating liquors, in said county of Washington, in whole or
in part, of such person or persons, and recover t\tll damages,"
etc. The act is evidently detective, probably in consequence of
some accidental omission.•

compensation to any person who may take charge of and provide

for such intoxicated person, and two dollars per day in addition

‘We have not thought it worth

while to give the provisions which

exist in some of the States authoriz-

ing the wife to sue for and recover the

moneys paid by the husband for

liquors illegally sold to him, or those

which invalidate the leases of build-

ings to be used for the sale of liquors

in violation of law, etc., except where

Connecticut. " Whoever shall sell intoxicating liquor to any
person, who thereby becomes intoxicated, and while so intoxicated
shall, in consequence thereof, injure the person or property of
another, shall pay just damages to the person injured, to be recovered in an action under this statute; and if the person selling
such intoxicating liquor is licensed, the recovery of a judgment for
such damages shall be conclusive evidence of a breach of' the bond." J

they give special actions of tort.

’ Laws of 1873 p. 385.

' General Statutes, Revision of 1875,

p. 269, § 9.

Dlinois. "Every person who shall, by the sale of intoxicating
liquors, with or without a license, cause the intoxication of any
other person, shall be liaqle for and compelled to pay a reasonable
compensation to any person who may take charge of and provide
for such intoxicated person, and two dollars per day in addition
We have not thought it worth
while to give the provisions which
exist in some of the States authoriz.
ing the wife to sue for and recover the
moneys paid by the husband for
liquors illegally sold to him, or those
which invalidate the lellSeS of build1

ings to be userl for the sale of liquors
in violation of law, etc., except where
they give special actions or tort.
• Laws of 1878 p. 8~.
1 General Statutes, Revision of 18'75,
p. 269, § 9.
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thereto for every day such intoxicated person shall be kept in

consequence of such intoxication, which sums may be recovered
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in an action of debt before any court having competent juris-

diction. - '

“Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or

other person, who shall be injured in person or property, or

means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence

of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall

have a right of action in his or her own name, severally or’

jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or

giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication, in

whole or in part, of such person or persons; and any person

owning, renting, leasing, or permitting the occupation of any

building or premises, and having knowledge that intoxicating

liquors are to be sold therein, or who having leased the same for

other purposes, shall knowingly permit therein the sale of any

intoxicating liquors that have caused, in whole or in part, the

intoxication of any person, shall be liable, severally or jointly,

with the person or persons selling or giving intoxicating liquors

aforesaid, for all damages sustained, and for exemplary damages;

and a married woman shall have the same right to bring suits

and to control the same and the amount recovered, as a femme
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sole,‘ and all damages recovered by a minor under this act, shall

be paid either to such minor, or to his or her parent, guardian,

or next friend, as the court shall direct; and the unlawful sale,

or giving away, of intoxicating liquors, shall work a forfeiture of

all rights of the lessee or tenant under any lease or contract of

rent upon the premises where such unlawful sale or giving away

shall take place; and all suits for damages under this act may be

by any appropriate action in any of the courts of this State

having competent jurisdiction.

“The giving away of intoxicating liquors, or other shift or

device to evade the provisions of this act, shall be held to be an

unlawful selling.” ‘

Statutes giving such action, it seems, are to be construed

strictly.’ The wife can maintain no action unless she can show

' Rev. Stats. 1874, p. 438. §§ 8,9 and del 0. Anthis, '11 Ill. 241; Kcllerman

13, re-enacting sections 4, 5 and '7 of e. Arnold, 70 Ill. 632; Fentz 0. Mead-

Laws of 1872, p. 553. ows, 72 Ill. 540.

’ Freese o. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; Mei-

therf'to for every day such intoxicated person shall be kept in
consequence of such intoxication, which sums may be recovered
in an action of debt before any court having oompetent jurisdiction.
"Every' husband, wife, cllild, parent, guardian, employer, or
other person, who shall be injured in person or property, or
means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence
of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall
have a right of action in his or her own name, severally or
jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or
giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication, in
whole or in part, of such person or persons; and any person
owning, renting, leasing, or permitting the occupation of any
building or premises, and having knowledge that intoxicating
liquors are to be sold therein, or who having leased the same for
other purposes, shall knowingly permit therein the sale of any
intoxicating liquors that have caused, in whole or in part, the
intoxication of any person, shall be liable, severally or jointly,
with the person or persons selling or giving intoxicating liquors
aforesaid, for all damages sustained, and for exemplary damages;
and a married woman shall have the same right to bring suits
and to control the same and the amount recovered, as a femme
sole," and all damages recovered by a minor under this act, shall
be paid either to such minor, or to his or her parent, guardian,
or next friend, as the court shall direct; and the unlawful sale,
or giving away, of intoxicating liquors, shall work a forfeiture of
all rights of the lessee or tenant under any lease or contract of
rent upon the premises where such unlawful sale or giving away
shall take place; and all suits for damages under this act may be
by any appropriate action in any of the courts of this State
havin~ competent jurisdiction.
''The giving away of intoxicating liquors, or other shift or
device to evade the provisions of this act, shall be held to be an
unlawful selling." 1
Statutes giving such action, it seems, are to be construed
strictly.' The wife can maintain no action unless she can show
1 Rev. Stats. 1874, p. 488, §§ 8, 9 and
18, re-enacting sections 4, 5 and 7 of
Laws of 1872, p. 563.
• Freese e. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; Mel.

del e. Anthis, 71 Ill. 241; Kellerman
e. Arnold, 70 Ill. 632; Fent3 t. Meadows, 72 Ill. MO.
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injury in person, property, or means of support. Anguish or
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pain of mind or the feelings suffered by her by reason of her hus-

band’s intoxication are not elements of damages.‘ Exemplary

damages cannot be awarded unless actual damages are proved,

and then they may be if aggravating circumstances are shown;’

and the defendant, when exemplary damages are claimed, may

show facts in mitigation, such as that he had forbidden his clerk,

by whom the sale was made, to sell to the defendant,‘ or that the

wife and husband drank liquors together.‘ Proof of injury to

means of support need not be direct, but is to be made out by

circumstances,’ and it is no excuse to the defendant that he could

not reasonably have foreseen the consequences.‘ Neither is it a

defense that others also sold liquors to the husband,’ but where

several are liable there can be but one recovery for the injury.‘

The damage sustained must be correctly described in the declara-

tion; if the wife complains only of loss of means of support,

evidence should not be received of an injury to the person of the

wife.‘ The widow may bring the action after the death of the

husband caused by intoxication." The section for the recovery

' Freese 1:. Tripp, '70 111.496; Meidel

0. Anthis, 71 Ill. 211; Fentz 0. Mead-

ows, 72 Ill. 540. The mere intoxica-
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cation of the husband, unaccompan-

ied with any injury to the person of

the wife, or to his or her means of

support, gives no right of action.

Confrey D. Stink, "13 111. 187. ‘

' Roth v. Eppy,,80 Ill. 283, explain-

ing Freese ta. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; Meidel

IDJnry in person, property, or means of support. Anguish or
pain of mind or the feelings suffered by her by reason of her husband's intoxication are not elements of damages: Exemplary
damages cannot be awarded nnless actual damages are proved,
and then they may be if aggravating circumstances are shown;~
and the defendant, when exemplary damages are claimed, may
show facts in mitigation, such as that he had forbidden his clerk,
by whom the sale was made, to sell to the defendant,' or that the
wife and husband drank liquors together.6 Proof of injury to
means of support need not be direct, but is to be made out by
circumstances,, and it is no excuse to the defendant that he could
not reasonably have foreseen the consequences.• Neither is it a
defense that others also sold liquors to the husband,7 but where
several are liable there can be but one recovery for the injury.'
The damage sustained must be correctly described in the declaration; if the wite complains only of loss of means of support,
evidence should not be received of an inj nry to the person of the
wife.' The widow may bring the action after the death of the
husband caused by intoxication." The section for the recovery

v. Anthis, 71 lll. 241; Kellerman 0. Ar-

nold, '7l Ill. 632; Keedy 0. Howe, 72

Ill. 133; Fentz. 0. Meadows, '12 Ill.

540;' Bates v. Davis, 76 Ill. 222; Al-

brecht 0. Walker, 73 Ill. 69; Branti-

gam v. While, 73 Ill. 561; Graham 0.

Fulford, 73 Ill. 596; Hackett v. Smels-

ley, 7'7 Ill. 109; McEvoy 0. Humphrey,

7'7 Ill. 388; Albrecht 0. Walker, 73

Ill. 69.

3 Freese 0. Tripp, '70 Ill. 496; Fentz

v. Meadows, '72 Ill. 540; Brantigam 0.

While, 73 lll. 561; Bates v. Davis, '76

Ill. 222. But the fact that the sales

were made by a clerk in violation of

instructions would be no defense to

the action. Keedy o. Howe, 72 Ill.

138.

‘ Roth 0. Eppy, 80 Ill. 288; Hackett

0. Smelsley, '77 Ill. 109. See Reget v.

Bell, '77 Ill. 593. The liability of the

defendant to indictment for the same

act is no bar to exemplary damages.

Brannon v. Silvernail, 81 Ill. 434.

‘ Horn o. Smith, 77 Ill. 381; Roth

o. Eppy, 80 Ill. 283. As to what con-

stitutes an injury to means of sup-

port, see Meidel 0. Anthis, '71 Ill. 241;

Haekett o. Smelsley, '77 Ill. 109; Mc-

Cann v. Roach, 81 Ill. 213.

° Roth 0. Eppy, 80 Ill. 283.

" Emory 1:. Addis, 71 Ill. 273; Hack-

ett v. Smelsley, 77 Ill. 109.

' Emory 0. Addls, 71 Ill. 273.

' Haekett 0. Smelsley, '77 Ill. 109.

'° Hackett 0. Smelsley, 77 Ill. 109.

A death resulting from an assault

committed upon the husband for

abusive language used by him while

intoxicated, is not to be referred to

1 Freese"· Tripp, 70 lll. 496; Meidel
e. Anthis, 71 Ill. 241; Feutz 11. Mead.
ows, 72 IU. 540. The mere intoxica.
cation of the husband, unaccompan.
ied with any injury to the person of
the wife, or to his or her means of
support, gives no right of action.
'
Confrey 11. Stark, 78 Ill. 187.
• Roth 11. Eppy,_80 Ill. 283, explaining Freese 1!. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; ?tleidel
D. Anthis, 71lll. 241; Kellerman 1!. Ar.
nold, 71 Ill. 632; Keedy e. Howe, 72
Ill. 133; Fentz. 1!. Meadows, 72 Ill.
540 ;. Bates 1!. Davis, 76 Ill. 222; Albrecht 1!. Walker, 78 Ill. 69; Brautigam 1!. While, 73 Ill. 561; Graham "·
Fulford, 73 III. 596; Hackett"· Smelsley, 77 Ill. 109; McEvoy"· Humphrey,
77 Ill. 888; Albrecht"· Walker, 78
Ill. 69.
• Freese o. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; Fentz
G. Meadows, 72 Ill. 540; Brautigam"·
While, 78 Ill. 561; Hates 11. Davis, 76
Ill. 222. But the fi\Ct that the sales
were made by a clerk in violation of

instructions would be no defense to
the action. Keedy G. Howe, 72 Ill.
183.
6 Roth 1!. Eppy, 80 Ill. 288; Hackett
"· Smelsley, 77 Ill. 109. See Reget 1!.
Bell, 77 Ill. 593. The llability of the
defendant to indictment for the same
act is no bar to exemplary damages.
BrtWnon Zl. Silvernail, 81 Ill. 434.
6 Horn 1!. Smith, 77 Ill. 381 ; Roth
fl. Eppy, 80 Ill. 288. As to what constitutes an injury to means of sup.
port, see Meidcl "· Anthis, 71 Ill. 241;
Hackett 11. Smelsley, 77 Ill. 109; McCann 1!. Roach, 81 Ill. 213.
• Roth 11. Eppy, 80 Ill. 283.
' Emory"· Addis, 71 Ill. 273; Hackett 1!. Smel!'iley, 77 Ill. 109.
• Emory"· Addis, 71 Ill. 278.
' Hackett "· Smelsley, 77 Ill. 109.
1o Hackett 1!. Smelsley, 77 Ill. 109.
A death resulting from an assault
committed upon the husband for
abusive language used by him while
intoxicated, is not to be referred to
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of two dollars per day for taking charge of and providing for the
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intoxicated person has no application to the case of intoxication

caused by liquors given to him.‘ The sum can only be recovered

in an action of debt as prescribed in the statute,’ and the sum

named in the statute is the limit of the recovery.‘ In making

out a case it is not required to make it out beyond a reasonable

doubt, but only by a preponderance of evidence.‘

Indiana. “Any person or persons who shall, by the sale of

intoxicating liquor, with or without permit, cause the intoxica-

tion, in whole or in part, of any other person, shall be liable for

and be compelled to pay a reasonable compensation to any person

who may take charge of and provide for such intoxicated person,

of two dollars per day for taking charge of and providing for tllC
intoxicated person has no application to the case of intoxication
caused by liquors given to him/ The sum can only be recovered
in an action of debt as prescribed in the statute; 1 and the sum
named in the statute is the limit of the recovery.• In making
out a case it is not required to make it out beyond a reasonable
doubt, but only hy a preponderance of evidence.'

for every day he or she is so cared for, which sum may be recov-

ered in an action of debt before any court having competent

jurisdiction.’

“In addition to the remedy and right of action provided for

in section eight of this act, every husband, wife, child, parent,

-guardian, employer, or other person who shall be injured in per-

son or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person,

or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of

any person. shall have a right of action in his or her name, sev-

erally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by
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selling, bartering, or giving away intoxicating liquors, have

caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person; and

any person or persons owning, renting, leasing, or permitting the

occupation of any building or premises, and having knowledge

that intoxicating liquor is to be sold therein, or having leased

the same for other purposes, shall knowingly permit therein the

sale of intoxicating liquor, or who having been informed that

intoxicating liquor is sold therein that has caused, in whole or in

part, the intoxication of any person, who shall not immediately,

after being so informed, take legal steps, in good faith, to dispos-

the sale of the liquor as the cause.

Shugart v. Egan, 83 Ill. 56.

' Brannan 0. Adams, 76 Ill. 331.

' Confrey v. Stark, '73 Ill. 187.

' Brannan 0. Adams, 76 Ill 331.

‘Robinson o. Randall, 82 Ill. 521.

In this case it is held that the more

{act that one has a prejudice against

persons engaged in the sale of intox-

icating liquors does not disqualify

him from sitting as a juror, but if he

will not give the same weight to the

testimony of one so engaged that he

would to persons engaged in other

business, he is disqualiﬁed.

Indiana. "Any person or persons who shall, by the sale of
intoxicating liquor, with or without permit, cause the intoxication, in whole or in part, of any other per~>on, shall be liable for
and be compelled to pay a reasonable compensation to any person
who may take charge of and provide for such intoxicated person,
for every day he or she is so cared for, which sum may be reooverod in an action of debt before any court having competent
jurisdiction.•
"In addition to the remedy and right of action provided for
in section eight of this act, every husband, wife, child, parent,
.gnardian, employer, or otherperson who shall be injured in per·
son or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person,
or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of
any person, shall have a right of action in his or her name, severally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by
selling, bartering, or giving away intoxicating liquors, have
caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such pe11ion; and
any person or persons owning, renting, leasing, or permitting the
occupation of any building or premises, and having knowledge
that intoxicating liquor is to be sold therein, or having leased
the same for other purposes, shall knowingly pern:~it therein the
sale of intoxicating liquor, or who having been informed that
intoxicating liquor is sold therein that has caused, in whole or in
part, the intoxication of any person, who shall not immediately,
after being so informed, take legal steps, in good faith, to dispos-

' General Laws, 1878, p. 154, § 8.

the sale of the liqoor as the cause.
Shugart e. Egan, 8S Ill. 56.
1 Brannan "· Adams, 76 Ill. 881.
• Confrey "· Stark, 78 Ill. 187.
• Brannan D. Adams, 76 Ill 881.
• Robinson "· Randall, 82 Ill. 521.
In this case it is held that the mere
!act \hat one bas a prejudice against

persons engaged In the sale of intox.
icating liquors does not disqualify
him from sitting 1\8 a juror, but if be
will not give the same weight to the
testimony of one so engaged that be
would to persons engaged In other
'business, be is disqualified.
1 General Laws, 1878, p. 1ti4, § 8.
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sess said tenant or lessee, shall be liable jointly with the person
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selling, bartering, or giving away intoxicating liquor as aforesaid,

to any person or persons injured, for all damages, and for exemp-

lary damages: 1’ro'vided, however, that execution on any such

judgment shall ﬁrst be levied on the property of the person

selling, bartering or giving away such liquor; and in the event of

a failure or insuﬁiciency of such property to satisfy the judgment,

then on the property of the other defendants. ‘A married woman

shall have the same rights to bring suit and to control the same,

and the amount received as a femme sole, and all damages

received by a minor under this act, shall be paid either to such

minor or to his or her parent, guardian, or next friend, as the

court shall direct. The unlawful sale or giving away of intoxi-

cating liquors shall work a forfeiture of all rights of the lessee

or tenant under any lease or contract of rent, upon the premises

where such unlawful sale, bartering, or giving away shall take

place. All suits for damages under this act may be by any

appropriate action in any of the courts of this State having com-

petent jurisdiction. All judgments recovered under the pro-'

visions of this act may be enforced without any relief or beneﬁt

from the valuation or appraisement laws.” ‘

Under this provision a wife bringing suit must establish the
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following facts: 1. The intoxication of the husband, habitual or

otherwise. 2. That she has been injured in person or property,

or means of support, in consequence of such intoxication. 3.

That the intoxication from which the injury resulted was caused,

in whole or in part, by the selling, bartering, or giving of intox-

icating liquors to her husband by the defendant.‘ Each person

who, by selling, bartering, or giving intoxicating liquors, con-

‘ General Laws, 1873, p. 155, § 12.

This act was repealed in 1875, and a

new act substituted which required a

bond of all dealers in liquors, to be

given to the State and ﬁled with the

county auditor, and contained the fol-

lowing provision: "Every person

who shall sell, barter, or give away

any intoxicating liquors in violation

of any of the provisions of this act,

shall be personally liable, and also

liable on his bond ﬁled in the audi-

tor's oﬂiee, as required by section four

seas said tenant or lessee, shall be liable jointly with the person
selling, bartering, or giving away intoxicating liquor a.s aforesaid,
to any person or persons injured, for all damages, and for exemplary damages: Pro·vided, however, that execution on any such
judgment shall first be levied on the property of the person
selling, bartering or giving away such liquor; and in the event of
a failure or insufficiency of such property to satisfy the judgment,
then on the property of the other det€mdants. ·A married woman
shall have the same rights to bring suit and to control the samo,
and the amount received as a. femme sole, and all damages
received by a minor under this act, shall be paid either to such
minor or to his or her parent, guardian, or next friend, as the
court shall direct. The unlawful sale or giving away of intoxicating liquors shall work a forfeiture of all rights of the lessee
or tenant under any lease or contract of rent, upon the premises
where such unlawful sale, bartering, or giving away shall take
place. All snits for damages under this act may be by any
appropriate action in any of the courts of this State having competent jurisdiction. All judgments recovered under the pro-•
visions of this act may be enforced without any relief or benefit
from the valuation or appraisement laws." 1
Under this provision a wife bringing suit must establish the
following facts: 1. The intoxication of the husband, habitual or
otherwise. 2. That she has been injured in person or property,
or means of support, in consequence of such intoxication. 3.
That the intoxication from which the injury resulted was caused,
in whole or i~ part, by the selling, bartering, or giving of intoxicating liquors to her husband by the det(mdant.w Each person
who, by selling, bartering, or giving intoxicating liquors, con-

of this act, to any person who shall

sustain any injury or damage to their

person or property, or means of sup-

port, on account of the use of such

intoxicating liquors so sold as afore-

said, to be enforced by appropriate

action in any court of competent ju-

risdiction.” General Laws, Special

Session, 1875, p. 59, § 20. No decis-

ions are reported under this provision.

' Fountain 0. Draper, 49 Ind. 441.

t General Laws, 1878, p. 151i, § 12.
This act was repealed in 1875, and a
new act suiJstituted which required a
bond of all dealers in liquors, to be
given to the State and filed with the
county auditor, and contained the following provision : " Every pcr:!on
who shall sell, barter, or give away
any intoxicating liquors in violt~tion
of any of the provisions of this act,
shall be personally liable, and also
liable on his bond filed in the audi.

tor's oftlcc, as required by section four
of this act, to any person who shall
sustain any injury or damage to their
person or property, or means of support, on account of the use of suclt
intoxicating liquors so sold as aforesaid, to be enforced by appropriate
action in any court of competl·nt jurisdiction." General Laws, Special
Session, 1875, p. 59,~ 20. No decisions are reported under this provision.
1 Fountain tl. Draper, 49 Ind. 441.
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tributed in part to the intoxication causing the injury complained

247

of, is liable to the full extent of the injury, and all such persons

may be joined, or one may be sued.‘ And a clerk or salesman

who sells liquor is a joint wrong-doer with his principal, and may

be joined in an action with him.’ A wife sufficiently avers her

injury by alleging that her husband was intoxicated by liquor

purchased of the defendant, and thereby neglected his work and

squandered his money, and damaged the plaintiff in her means

of support.‘ One who was prevented from following his usual

occupation by being struck, beaten, and wounded by an intoxi-

cated person, was held entitled to a remedy against the liquor-seller

under this statute, and was not required to join the intoxicated

person as co-defendant.‘ But where an intoxicated person, while

in that condition, received an injury which he would not have

received if sober, and which resulted in his death, the intoxication,

it was held, was only the remote cause of the death, and therefore

an action could not be sustained by his widow under this statute.‘

Under section eight, above quoted, the plaintiff was entitled to

fecover for taking care of the intoxicated person only for the

time he remained intoxicated.‘

When the wife sues, her anxiety of mind, mortiﬁcation, sorrow

and loss of her husband’s society cannot enter into the measure
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of damages she may recover; and if the sale of liquor to the

husband was an illegal act, exemplary damages cannot be

awarded, as that would be in effect to expose the seller to double

punishment.’

This legislation is constitutional,‘ and it applies to those

licensed to sell intoxicating liquors as well as to others." It is

not necessary, when the wife sues for an injury in her person and

means of support, that she should unite her husband with her as

plaintiﬁ'.‘°

‘ Fountain 0. Draper, 49 Ind. 441.

‘Barnaby v. Wood, 50 Ind. 405;

English v. Beard, 51 Ind. 489.

' Barnaby v. \Vood, 50 Ind. 405.

See Sr-hlosscr v. State, 55 Ind. 82.

' English 0. Beard, 51 Ind. 489.

'Krnch o. Hcilman,58 Ind. 517;

Collier 0. Early, 54 lnd. 559; Backes

0. Dant, 55 Ind. 181.

' Krach o. Heilman, 53 Ind. 517.

Proof that beer was sold, without

showing what kind of beer, or that it

was intoxicating, docs not show an

unlawful sale. Schlosscr o. Stale, 55

tribnted in part to the intoxication causing the injury complained
of, is liable to the full extent of the injury, and all such persons
may be joined, or one may be sued. • And a clerk or salesman
who sells liquor is a joint wrong-doer with his principal, and may
be joined in an action with him.' A wife sufficiently avers her
injury by alleging that her husband was intoxicated by liquor
purchased of the defendant, and thereby neglected his work and
squandered his money, and damaged the plaintiff in her means
of support. • One who was prevented from following his usual
occupation by being struck, beaten, and wounded by an intoxicated person, was held entitled to a remedy against the liquor-seller
under this statute, and was not required to join the intoxicated
person u.s co-defendant.• But where an intoxicated person, while
in that condition, received an injury which he would not have
received if sober, and which resulted in his death, the intoxication,
it was held, was only the remote cause of the death, and therefor-e
an action could not be sustained by his widow under this statute. •
Under section eight, above quoted, the plaintiff was entitled to
tecover for taking care of the intoxicated
person only for the
\
time he remained intoxicated.'
When the wife sues, her anxiety ot' mind, mortification, sorrow
and loss of her husband's society cannot enter into the measure
of dam~~ she may recover; and if the sale of liquor to the
husband was an illegal act, exemplary damages cannot be
awarded, as that would be in effect to expose the seller to double
punishment. •
This legislation is constitutional,' and it applies to those
licensed to sell intoxicating liquors as well as to others.• It is
not necessary, when the wife sues for an injury in her person and
means of support, that she should unite her husband with her as
plaintiff.••

Ind. 82.

' Kmrner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284.

' Wilkerson 0. Rust, 57 Ind. 172, cit-

ing the preceding cases.

' Wilkerson 0. Rust, 57 Ind. 172.

1° Mitchell 0. Rams, 57 Ind. 259.

}'ountain o. DrRper, 49 Ind. 441.
Barnaby o. Wood, 50 Ind. 405;
· English v. Beard, 51 Ind. 489.
• Barnaby 11. Wood, 50 Ind. 405.
Sec Sl'hlosser o. St~te, 55 Ind. 82.
• English o. Bl'ard. 51 Ind. 489.
• Krach o. Heilman, 53 Ind. 517;
Collier o. Early, 54 Ind. 559; Hackes
o. Dant, 55 Ind. 181.
• Krach o. Heilman, 53 Ind. rH7.
1

1

Proof that beer was sold, without
showing what kind of beer, or that it
was intoxicating, docs not show an
unlawful sale. Schlosser o. State, 55
Iud. 82.
, Krerner "· Oberly, 56 Ind. 21:14.
• Wilkerson o. Rust, 57 Ind. 172, citing the preceding cases.
1 Wilkerson o. Rust, 57 Ind. 172.
10 .Mitchell o. Hutts, 57 Ind. 2:>9.
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Iowa. “ Any person who shall, by the manufacture or sale
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of intoxicating liquors, contrary to the provisions of this chap-

ter, cause the intoxication of any other person, shall be liable for

and compelled to pay a reasonable compensation to any person

who may take charge of and provide for such intoxicated person,

and one dollar per day in addition thereto for every day such

intoxicated person shall be kept in consequence of such intoxi-

cation, which sums may be recovered in a civil action before any

court having jurisdiction thereof.” ’

“Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other per-

son, who shall be injured in person or property or means of sup-

port, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of intoxica-

tion, habitual or otherwise, of any person‘, shall have a right of

action, in his or her own name, against any person who shall, by

selling intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication of such per-

son, for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary

damages; and a married woman shall have the same right to

bring suit, prosecute and control the same, and the amount recov-

ered, as if a single woman; and all damages recovered by a minor

under this section shall be paid either to such minor or his parent,

guardian, or next friend, as the court shall direct, and all suits

for damages under this section shall be by civil action in any
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court having urisdiction thereof.” '

The words “any person who shall, by selling,” etc., in a pre-

vious statute, giving a similar right, were held to embrace any

person making the sale, whether the owner or the son, clerk or

servant of the owner.’ A joint action will not lie against sev-

eral persons whose places of business are distinct, who make

separate sales of liquor to the same person, at least where it does

not appear that such sales caused a single act of intoxication.‘ It

is not enough that their sales contributed to a general besotted

condition.‘ The wife suing cannot recover, unless she shows an

actual injury.‘ And where she sues for an injury to her means

of support by the sale of intoxicating liquors to her husband,

the question what circumstances will warrant exemplary damages

' Code of 1873, p. 288, § 1556. The Worlcy v. Spurgcon, 38 Iowa, 465.

chapter is the Prohibitory Liquor ‘ La France 1:. Krnyer, 42 Iowa, 143.

Law, so called. ' Hitchner v. Ehlcrs, 44 Iowa, 40.

' Ibid. § 1557. ' Galloway 0. Layton, Sup. Ct. Iowa,

“ State 12. Stricker, 33 Iowa, 395; Dec. 1877.

Iowa. "Any person who shall, by the manufacture or sale
of intoxicating liquors, contrary to the provisions of this chapter, cause the intoxication of any other person, shall be liable for
and compelled to pay a reasonable compensation to any person
who may take charge of and provide for sneh intoxicated person,
and one dollar per day in addition thereto for every day such
intoxicated person shall be kept in consequence of such intoxication, which smns may be recovered in a civil action before any
court having jurisdiction thereof." 1
"Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person, who shall be injured in person or property or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person·, shall ha,·e a right of
action, in his or her own name, against any person who shall, by
selling intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary
damages; and a married woman -shall have the same right to
bring suit, prosecute and control the same, and the amount recovered, as if a single woman; and all dama~s recovered by a minor
under this section shall be paid either to such minor or his parent,
guardian, or next friend, as the court shall direct, and all suits
for damages under this section shall be by civil action in any
court having jurisdiction thereof." •
The words "any person who shall, by selling," etc., in a previous statute, giving a similar right, were held to embrace any
person making the sale, whether the owner or the son, clerk or
servant of the owner.• A joint action will not lie against several persons whose places of business are distinct, who make
separate sales of liquor to the same person, at least where it does
not appear that such sales caused a single act of intoxication.' It
is not enough that their sales contributed to a general besotted
condition.• The wife suing cannot recover, unless she shows an
actual injury.' And where she sues for an injury to her means
of support by the sale of intoxicating liqnors to her husband,
the question what circumstances will warrant exemplary damages
1 Code of 1873, p. 288, ~ 1556.
The
chapter is the Prollibitory Liquor
Law, so called.
t Ibid. § 1557.
• State "· Stricker, 83 Iowa, 895 ;

Worley "· Spurgeon, 88 Iowa, 466.
• La France"· Krayer, ~Iowa, 148.
1 Hitchner"· Ehlers, 44 Iowa, 40.
1 Calloway"· Layton, Sup. CL Iowa,
Dec. 1877.
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is for the jury, and the court should not instruct the jury that

24fl

certain facts should or should not aggravate the damages.‘

Kansas. “Every person who shall, by the sale, barter or gift

of intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication of any other per-

son, such person or persons shall be liable for and compelled to

is for the jury, and the court should not instruct the jury that
certain facts should or should not aggravate the damages}

pay a reasonable compensation to any person who may take charge

of and provide for such intoxicated person, and ﬁve dollars per

day in addition thereto for every day such intoxicated person shall

be kept in consequence of such intoxication; which sum may be

recovered by a civil action before any court having jurisdiction.

“Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other per-

son, who shall be injured in person or property or means of sup-

port, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of intoxication,

habitual or otherwise, of any person, such wife, child, parent,

guardian, employer or other person shall have a right of action

in his or her own name against any person who shall, by selling,

bartering or giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxi-

cation of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well

as exemplary damages; and a married woman shall have the right

to bring suits, prosecute and control the same and the amount

recovered, the same as if unmarried; and all damages recovered

by a minor under this act shall be paid either to such minor or
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to his or her parents, guardian or next friend, as the court shall

direct; and all suits for damages, under this act, shall be by civil

action in any of the courts of this State having jurisdiction

thereof.

“The giving away of intoxicating liquors, or other shifts or

device to evade the provisions of this act, shall be deemed and

held to be an unlawful selling within the provisions of this

act.” ’

Maine. The Prohibitory Liquor Law, so called, provides that

if any person not authorized as thereby provided “shall sell any

' Goodenough 0. McGrew, 44 Iowa,

670. Under another statute provid-

ing a forfeiture to the school fund by

any person who should give or sell

intoxicating liquors to an intoxicated

person, it was held not necessary to

prove that defendant knew the per-

son was intoxicated. Church 0. Hig-

ham, 44 Iowa, 482. Wine is “intoxi-

cating liquor." Worley o. Spnrgeon,

88 Iowa, 465.

' General Statutes, 1868, p. 399, §§ 9,

Kansas. " Every person who F~hall, by the sale, barter or gift
of intoxicating liqnors, cause the intoxication of any other person, such person or persons shall be liable for and compelled to
pay a reasonable compensation to any person who may take charge
of and provide for such intoxie.atcd person~ and fhe dollars per
da.v in addition thereto for every day snch intoxicated person shall
be kept in consequence of snch intoxication; which sum ma.v be
rceO\'ered by a civil action before any court having jurisdiction.
"E\·ery wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person, who shall be injured in person or property or mcuna of tmpport, by any intoxicated person, or in comcquene.e of intoxication,
l1abitnal or otherwise, of any person, such wife, child, parent,
guardian, employer or other person shall have a right of action
in his or her own name against any person who shall, by selling,
bartering or giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well
as exemplary damages; and a marrioo woman shall have the right
to bring suits, prosecute and COI_Jtrol the same and the amount
rcco\·ered, the same as if unmarried; and all damages recovered
by a minor under this act shall be paid either to such minor or
to his or her parents, guardian or next friend, as the court shall
direct; and all snits for damages, under this act, shall be by civil
a<:tion in any of the courts of this State having jurisdiction
thereof.
"The giving away of intoxicating liquorlll, or other shifts or
device to evade the provision.; of this act, shall be deemed and
held to be an unlawful selling within the provisions of this
act." •

10, and 11.

Jrlaine. The Prohibitory Liquor Law, so called, provides that
if any person not authorized aa thereby provided "shall sell any
Goodenough "· McGrew, 44 Iowa,
670. tinder another statute provid.
ing a forfeiture to the school fund by
any person who should give or sell
intoxicating liquors to an intoxicated
person, it was held not necessary to
prove that defendan~ knew the per1

son was intoxicated. Church "· Hig.
bam, 44 Iowa, 482. Wine is "intoxicating liquor." Worley "· Spurgeon,
88 Iowa,4M.
' General Statutes, 1868, p. 399, §~ 9,
10, and 11.

LO

250

Q!

THE LAW OF TORTS.

G

TIIE LA\V OF TORTS.

intoxicating liquors to any person, he shall be liable for all the

injuries which such person may commit While in a state of intox-

ication resulting therefrom, in an action on the case in favor of

the person injured.” ‘

intoxicating liquors to any person, he shall be liable for all the
injuries which such person may commit while in a state of intox.
ication resulting therefrom, in an action on the case in favor of
the person injured." 1

Massachusetts. “ If a person in a state of intoxication,

commits an assault and battery, or injures property, whoever fur-

nished him with any part of the liquor which occasioned his

intoxication, if the same was furnished in violation of this act,

shall be liable to the same action by the party injured as the per-

son intr xi.-ated would be liable to; and the party injured, or his

or her legal representative, may bring either a joint action against

the pe's ui intoxicated and the person who furnished the liquor,

or a s< pirate action against either.

“Whoever, by himself or his agent or servant, shall sell or

give intoxicating liquor to any minor, or allows a. minor to loiter

upon the premises where such sales are made, shall forfeit one

hundred dollars for each offense, to be recovered by the parent or

guardian of such minor in an action of tort.

“The husband, wife, parent, child, guardian or employer of
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any person who has or may hereafter have the habit of drinking

spirituous or intoxicating liquor to excess, may give notice in

writing, signed by him or her, to any person requesting him not

to sell or deliver spirituous or intoxicating liquor to the person

having such habit. If the person so notiﬁed at any time, Within

twelve months thereafter, sells or delivers any such liquor to the

person having such habit, or permits such person to loiter on

his premises, the person giving the notice may, in an action of

tort, recover of the person notiﬁed such sum not less than one

hundred nor more than ﬁve hundred dollars, as may be assessed

as damages: Provided, the employer giving said notice, shall be

injured in his person or property. A married woman may bring

such action in her own name, and all damages recovered by her

shall inure to her separate use. In case of the death of either

party, the action and right of action shall survive to or against

his executor or administrator.” '

_' Rev. Stat. 1871, p. B04, § 32. liquor, or liquors, in this act shall be

‘Statutes 1875, p. 668, §§ 14, 15, construedtoinclude ale, porter, strong

and 16. A subsequent section pro- beer, lager beer, cider, and all wines,

vides that “the terms intoxicating as well asclistilled spirits." § 18.

—* ' *—*iiu:l

Massachusetts. "If a person in a state of intoxication,
commits an assault and battery, or injures property, whoever fur.
nished him with any part of the liquor which occasioned his
intoxication, if the same was furnished in violation of this act,
shall be liable to the same action by the party injured as the person intr xL·ated would be liable to; and the party injured, or his
or her ~e;al representative, may bring either a joint action agains.t
the pe· s •n intoxicated and the person who furnished the liquor,
or as( p 1rate action against either.
"Whoever, by himself or his agent or servant, shall sell or
give intoxicating liqnor to any minor, or allows a minor to loiter
upon the premises where such sales are made, shall forfeit one
hundred dollars for each offense, to be recovered by the parent or
guardian of such minor in au action of tort.
"The husband, wife, parent, child, guardian or employer of
any person who has or may hereafter have the habit of drinking
spirituous or intoxicating liquor to excess, may give notice in
writing, signed by him or her, to any person reqne~ting him not
to sell or deliver spirituous or intoxicating liquor to the person
having such habit. If the person so notified at any time, within
twelve months thereafter, sells or delivers any such liquor to the
person having such habit, or permits such person to loiter on
his premises, the person giving the notice may, in an action of
tort, recover of the person notified such sum not less than one
hundred nor more than five hundred dollars, as may be assessed
as damages: Provided, the employer giving said notice, shall be
injured in his person or property. A married woman may bring
such action in her own name, and all damages recovered by her
shall inure to her separate use. In case of the death of eith~r
party, the action and right of action shall survive to or against
his executor or administr·ator." •
1 Rev. Stat. 1871, p. 804, § 82.
·• Statutes 1875, p. 668, §§ 14, 15,
and 16. A subsequent section pro.
vides thnt •• the terms intoxicnting

liquor, or liquors, in this act shall be
construed to include ale, porter, strong
beer, lager beer, cider, and all wines,
88 well 88 distilled spirits." § 18.
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Michigan. “Every wife, child, parent, guardian, husband, or
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other person who shall be injured in person or property or means

of support by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intox-

ication of any person, or by the reason of the selling, giving, or

furnishing any spirituous, intoxicating, fermented or malt liquors

to any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own

name against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giv-

ing any intoxicating or malt liquor, have caused or contributed

to the intoxication of such person or persons, or who have caused

or contributed to such injury; and the principal and sureties to

the bond hereinafter mentioned, shall be liable, severally and

jointly, with the person or persons so selling, giving, or furnish-

ing any spirituous, intoxicating, or malt liquors as aforesaid; and

in any such action provided for in this section the plaintiff shall

have a right to recover actual and exemplary damages. And in

every action by any wife, husband, parent, or child, general repu-

tation of the relation of husband and wife, parent and child, shall

be ;m71n.a facie evidence of such relation; and the amount recovered

by every wife or child shall be his or her sole and separate prop-

erty.”‘ The previous statute, repealed in 1875, was somewhat

less comprehensive. It provided “ that every wife, child, parent,

guardian, husband, or other person, who shall be injured in
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property, means of support, or otherwise, by any intoxicated

person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, shall have

a right of action in his or her own name against any person or

persons who shall, by selling or giving any intoxicating liquor

or otherwise, have caused or contributed to the intoxication of

such person or persons; and in any such action the plaintiff shall

have a right to recover actual and exemplary damages.” '

' General Laws, 1875, p. 284, § 3. as

amended; General Laws, 1877, p. 218.

The bond mentioned is one which

every liquor dealer is required to give,

the condition of which is not to sell

or deliver liquors to any minor, habit-

ual drunkard, or person in the habit

of becoming intoxicated, or to any

person whose husband, wife, parent,

child, guardian, or employerlshall

notify him that he is in the habit of

drinking to excess, etc. Still more

stringent provisions are made for the

Jliohigan. "Every wife, child, parent, guardian, husband, or
other person who shall be injured in person or property or means
of support by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, or by the reason of the selling, giving, or
furnishing any spirituous, intoxicating, fermented or malt liquors
to any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own
name against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving any iLtoxicating or malt liquor, have caused or contributed
to the intoxication of such person or peri!ons, or who have <.'&used
or contributed to such injury; and the principal and sureties to
the bond hereinafter mentioned, shall be liable, severally and
jointly, with the person or persons so selling, giving, or furnishing any spirituous, intoxicating, or malt liquors as aforesaid; and
in any such action provided tor in this section the plaintiff shall
have a right to recover actual and exemplary damages. And in
every action by any wife, husband, parent, or child, general reputation of the relation of husband and wife, parent and child, shall
be pimafacie evidence of such relation; and the amount recovered
by every wife or child shall be his or her sole and separate property." 1 The previous statute, repealed in 1875, was somewhat
less comprehensive. It provided "that e\"ery wife, child, parent,
guardian, husband, or other person, who shall be injured in
property, means of support, or otherwise, by any intoxicated
person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, shall have
a right of action in his or ber own name against any person or
persons who shall, by selling or giving any intoxicating liquor
or otherwise, have caused or contributed to the intoxication of
soch person or persons; and in any such action the plaintiff shall
have a right to recover actual and exempll\ry damages." 1

cases of sales or gitts to minors under

the age of eighteen, and the suit is

permitted to be brought by the father,

mother, guardian, or master, or other

person standing in place of parent to

the minor, for the recovery of actual

and exemplary damages, but not l(f.~.'!

than ﬁfty dollars in each case. Either

father or mother may sue alone, but

a recovery by one is a bar to suit by

the other. General Laws, 1877, p. 72.

' General Laws of 1871, p. B63.

This was an amendment to the Pro-

General Laws, 187~. p. 284, ~ 8, as
amended; General Laws, 1877, p. 218.
The bond mentioned is one which
every liquor dealer is required to give,
the condition of which is not to sell
or dt>llver liquors to any minor, habitual druokiU'd, or person in the habit
of becoming Intoxicated, ur to any
person whose husband, wife, parent,
child, guardian, or employer' shall
notify him that he is in the habit of
drinking to excess, etc. Still more
stringent provisions are made for the
1

caaea of sales or gitla to minora under
the age of eighteen, and the suit ia
permitted to be brought by the father,
mother, guardian, or master, or other
person standing in place of parent to
the minor, for the recovery of actual
and exemplary damages, but not le,.)\
tbnn fifty dollars in each case. Either
father or mother may sue alone, but
a recovery by one is a bar to suit by
the other. Generul Laws, 1877, p. 72.
1 General Laws of 1871, p. 863.
This wus an amendment to the Pro-
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Under the repealed statute it was held that one was not liable

for the consequences of an unauthorized appropriation of his

liquors by another without his knowledge. Nor should he be

charged with exemplary damages, unless his conduct was willful,

wanton, reckless, or otherwise deserving of punishment beyond

what the requirement of mere compensation would impose. But

it is no excuse for him that the sale or gift was by his servants

employed in his business. and in disobedience of his orders.‘ The

statute contemplates the recovery of damages to the extent of

the injury in every case, and of exemplary damages where they

are appropriate; but there can be no recovery unless there be

some injury. The right of action does not spring from the rela-

tionship alone, and in the absence of actual damage to the com-

plaining party. If liquors are sold to one previously intemperate,

and not supporting his wife, the wife suing is not entitled to

recover as for the loss of the sober intelligent society of the

husband and of means of support; the liability must be measured

by the effects produced upon the husband and wife as they were,

and not as they might have been.’
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Missouri. The statutes require of every dram-shop keeper a

bond, and provides that if he shall “sell, give away, or otherwise

dispose of, or suffer the same to be done about his premises, any

intoxicating liquors, in any quantity, to any minor, without the

permission of the parent, master or guardian of such minor ﬁrst

had and obtained,” he shall forfeit and pay to such parent,

Under the repealed statute it was held that one was not liable
for the consequences of an unauthorized appropriation of his
liquors by another without his knowledge. Nor should he be
charged with exemplary damages, unless his conduct was willful,
wanton, reckless, or otherwise deserving of punishment beyond
what the requirement of mere compensation would impose. But
it is no excuse for him that the sale or gift was by his servants
employed in his business. and in disobedience of his orders.1 The
statute contemplates the recovery of damages to the extent of
the injury in every case, and of exemplary damages where they
are appropriate; but there cau be no recovery unless there be
some injury. The right of action does not spring from the relationship alone, and in the absence of actual damage to the complaining party. If liquors are sold to one previously intemperate,
aud not supporting his wife, the wife suing is not entitled to
recover as for the loss of the sober intelligent society of the
husband and of means of support; the liability must be measured
by the effects produced upon the husband and wife as they were,
and not as they might have been.'

master, or guardian, for every such offense, ﬁfty dollars, to be

recovered by civil action, or in the name of the county on the

bond.‘

Nebraska. “The person so licensed [to sell intoxicating

liquors] shall pay all damages that the community or individuals

hibitory Liquor Law, so called. Comp.

L. Ch. 79. The same section declared

all payments for liquors sold in vio-

lation of law should be “considered

as having been received without con-

sideration, and against law and equity,

and any money or other property paid

therefor may be recovered back by the

:Missouri. The statutes require of every dram-shop keeper a
bond, and provides that if he shall" sell, give away, or otherwise
dispose of, or suffer the same to be done about his premises, any
intoxicating liquors, in any quantity, to any minor, without the
permission of the parent, master or guardian of such minor first
had and obtained," he shall forfeit and pay to such parent,
master, or guardian, for every such offense, fifty dollars, to be
recovered by civil action, or in tho name of the county on the
bond.'

person paying the same, his wife, or

'—’ —' ' “inn

any of his children, or his parent,

guardian, husband, or employer."

Nebraska. "The person so licensed [to sell intoxicating
liquors] Bhall pay all damages that the community or individuals

See Hemmens 0. Bentley, 32 Mich.

89.

‘ Kreiler 0. Nichols, 28 Mich. 496.

See Smith o. Reynolds, 8 Hun, 128.

' Ganssly 0. Perkins, 80 Mich 492.

' General Statutes, 1865, p. 421, § 20.

hibitory Liquor Law, so called. Comp.
L . Ch. 79. The same section declared
all payments for liquors sold in vio.
lution of law should be "considered
as having been received without considt>ration, and against law and equity,
and any money or other property paid
therefor may be recovered back by the
person paying the same, his wife, or

any of his children, or his parent,
guardian, husband, or employer."
See Hemmens tl. Bentley, 82 Mich.

89.
' Kreiter "· Nichols, 28 Mich. 496.
Bee Smith "· Reynolds, 8 Hun, 128.
1 Ganssly "· Perkins, SO Mich 492.
• General Statutes, 1865, p. 421, § iO.
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may sustain in consequence of such traffic; he shall support all

253

paupers, widows, and orphans, and the expenses of all civil and

criminal prosecutions growing out of or justly attributable to his

retail traﬂic in intoxicating drinks; said damages and expenses

to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction by any

civil action on the bond named and required in section ﬁve hun-

dred and seventy-two, a copy of which, properly authenticated,

shall be taken in evidence in any court of justice in this State;

and it shall be the duty'of the county clerk to deliver, on demand,

such copy to any person who may claim to be injured by such

traﬁic.

“ It shall be lawful for any married woman, or other person at

her request, to institute and maintain, in her own name, a suit

on any such bond for all damages sustained by herself and chil-

dren on account of such traﬂic, and the money when collected

shall be paid over for the use of herself and children.

“On the trial of any suit under the provisions hereof the

cause or foundation of which shall be the acts done or injuries

inﬂicted by a person under the inﬂuence of liquor, it shall only

be necessary to sustain the action, to prove that the defendant

or defendants sold or gave liquor to the person so intoxicated, or

under the inﬂuence of liquor, whose acts or injuries are com-
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plained of, on that day or about that time when said acts were

committed or said injuries received; and in an action for damages

brought by a married woman, or other person whose support

legally devolves upon a person disqualiﬁed by intemperance from

earning the same, it shall only be necessary to prove that the

defendant has given or sold intoxicating drinks to such person in

quantities sufficient to produce intoxication, or when under the

inﬂuence of liquor.” '

New Hampshire. “ If the husband, wife, parent, child,

brother, sister, or other near relative, guardian, or employer of

any person who has the habit of drinking spirituous liquors to

excess, shall give notice in writing, by him or her signed, to any

person not to furnish any spirituous liquor ti) the person who has

such habit; if the person so notiﬁed shall furnish any spirituous

liquor, for a consideration or otherwise, to the person who has

such habit, at any time within one year after such notice given,

' General Laws, 1873, p. 853, §§ 576, 577, 579.

may sustain in consequence of such traffic; he shall support all
paupers, widows, and orphans, and the expenses of all civil and
criminal prosecutions growing out of or justly attributable to hie
retail traffic in intoxicating drinks; said damages and expensecJ
to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction by any
civil action on the bond named and required in section five hundred and seYenty-two, a copy of which, properly authenticated,
shall be taken in evidence in any court of justice in this State;
and it shall be the duty'of the<.'Onnty clerk to deliver, on demand,
such copy to any person who may claim to be injured by such
traffic.
" It shall be lawful for any married woman, or other person at
her request, to institute and maintain, in her own name, a suit
on any such bond for all damages sustained by herself and children on account of such traffic, and the money when collected
shall be paid over for the use of herself and children.
''On the trial of any snit under the provisions hereof the
cause or foundation of which shall be the acts done or injuries
iofticted by a person under the influence of liquor, it shall only
be necessary to sustain the action, to prove that the defendant
or defendants sold or gave liquor to the person so intoxicated, or
under the influence of liquor, whose acts or injuries are complained of, on that day or about that time when said acts w£'re
committed or said injuries received; and in an action for dnmagcs
brought by a married woman, or other person whose support
legally devolves upon a person disqualified by intemperance from
earning the same, it shall only be necessary to prove that the
defendant has given or sold intoxicating drinks to such person in
quantities sufficient to produce intoxication, or when under the
infiuence of liquor.'' a
New Hampshire.

"If the husband, wife, parent, child,
brother, sister, or other near relative, guardian, or employer of
any person who has the habit of drinkiug spirituous liquors to
excess, shall give notice in writing, by him or her signed, to any
person not to furnish any spirituous liquor th the person who has
such habit; if the person so notified shall furnish any spirituous
liquor, for a consideration or otherwise, to the person who has
such habit, at any time within one year after such notice given,
1

General Laws, 1873, p. 858,

~§

676, 577, 679.
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the person giving such notice may, in an action of tort brought

by him or her, recover of the person so notiﬁed any sum not less

than ﬁfty dollars nor more than ﬁve hundred dollars, which may

be assessed by the jury as damages; and any married woman

may bring such action in her own name, and recover such dam-

ages to her own use.‘

“Whenever any person in a state of intoxication shall commit

any injury upon the person or property of any other individual, any

person, who by himself, his clerk or servant, shall have unlaw-

fully sold or furnished any part of the liquor causing such intox-

ication, shall be liable to the party injured for all damage

occasioned by the injury so done, to be recovered in the same

form'0f action as such intoxicated person would be liable to, and

both such parties may be joined in the same action; and in case

of the death or disability of any person, either from the injury

received as herein speciﬁed, or in consequence of intoxication

from the use of liquor unlawfully furnished as aforesaid, any

person who shall be in any manner dependent on such injured

person for means of support, or any party on whom such injured
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person may be dependent, may recover from the person unlaw-

fully selling or furnishing any such liquor as aforesaid, all

damage or loss sustained in consequence of such injury, to be

recovered in an action on the case; and any married woman may

bring such action in her own name, and recover such damages to

her own use.” “

Under the act of 1870, above given, trespass for assault and

battery was maintained against four persons jointly, who sepa-

rately sold liquors in violation of law to the party committing

the assault.’ The act does not give to one upon whom a person

becomes dependent in consequence of intoxication produced by

liquor unlawfully furnished, and who was not previously de-

pendent on such party, a right of action against the person so

unlawfully furnishing the liquor for the damages resulting from

such intoxication.‘ That portion of the act which gives a remedy

where death resulted is constitutional, and for the death of the

husband his widow, who was dependent upon him for her sup-

port, may bring suit.‘

' Rev. Stat, 1867, p. 210, § 22. ‘ Hollis 0. Davis, 56 N. H. 74.

’ Laws of 1870, p. 403. ' Bedore 0. Newton, 5-L N. H. 117.

' Bodge -0. Hughes, 53 N. II. 614.

the person giving such notice may, in an action of tort brought
by him or her, recover of the person so notified any sum not less
than fifty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, which may
be assessed by the jury as damages; and any married woman
may bring such action in her own name, and recover such damages to her own use. 1
"Whenever any person in a state of intoxication shall commit
any injury npon the person or property of any otherindividual,any
person, who by himself, his clerk or ~rvant, shall have unlawfully sold or furnished any part of the liquor causing such intoxication, shall be liable to the party injured for all damage
occasioned by the injury so done, to be recovered in the same
form· of action as such intoxicated person would be liable to, and
both such parties may be joined in the same action; and in case
of the death or disability of any person, either from the injury
received as herein specified, or in consequence of intoxication
from the use of liquor unlawfully furnished as aforesaid, any
person who shall be in any manner dependent on such injured
person for means of support, or any party on whom such injured
person may be dependent, may recover from the person unlawfully selling or furnishing any such liquor as aforesaid, all
dam9.o~ or loss sustained in consequence of such injury, to be
recovered in an action on the case; and any married woman may
bring such action in her own name, and recover such damages to
her own use."~
Under the act of 1870, above given, trespass for assault and
battery was maintained against four persons jointly, who separately sold liquors in violation of law to the party committing
the assault.' The act does not give to one upon whom a person
becomes dependent in consequence of intoxication produced by
liquor unlawfully furnished, and who was not previously dependent on such party, a right of action against the person so
unlawfully furnishing the liquor for the damages resulting from
such intoxication.' That portion of the act which gives a remedy
where death resnlte<\ is constitutional, and for the death of the
husband his widow, who was dependent upon him for her support, may bring suit. •
Rev. Stat., 1867, p. 210, § ~2.
Laws of 1870, p. 403.
1 Bodge "· Hughes, 53 N. H. 614.
1

1

• Hollis "· Davis, ti6 N. H. 74.
• Bedore"· Newton, 54 N. H. 11'7.
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New York. “Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian,

employer or other person who shall be injured in person, or

property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in

consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any

person, shall have a right of action in his or her name, against

any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving away intox-

icating liquors, cause the intoxication, in whole or in part, of

such person or persons, and any person or persons owning or

renting or permitting the occupation of any building or prem-

ises, and having knowledge that intoxicating liquors are to be

sold therein, shall be liable, severally or jointly -with the person

or persons selling or giving intoxicating liquors aforesaid, for

all damages sustained and for exemplary damages; and all dam-

ages recovered by a minor under this act shall be paid either to

such minor or to his or her parent, guardian or next friend, as the

court shall direct; and the unlawful sale or giving away of intoxi-

cating liquors shall work a forfeiture of all rights of the lessee or

tenant under any lease or contract of rent upon the premises.”'

This act is constitutional, and applies as well to those who sell
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with license as those who sell without it.’ As to what makes

out a cause of action under it, see cases cited in the margin.‘ It

is no defense that the liquor was sold by defendant’s bar-tender

without his knowledge and against his instructions.‘ ‘When the

owner of the building is sued, there must be clear and satisfac-

tory proof establishing the permission to occupy with knowledge

that liquors were to be sold therein.‘ Whether an action can be

sustained under it for the death of the intoxicated person, the

cases are not agreed.‘ A joint action will not lie against two or

more persons who separately, at different times and places, have

sold liquor to the same person, though the several sales contrib-

uted to the intoxication which produced the injury.’

' Laws, 1878, Ch. 646, § 1. ‘ Smith o. Reynolds, 8 Hun, 128.

' Baker 0. Pope, 2 Hun, 556; Quain

0. Russell, 12 Hun, 376. In its appli-

cation to owners of premises it is

constitutional. Bertholf 0. O‘Rcilley,

8 Hun, 16; Franklin 0. Schcrmerhorn,

8 Hun, 112.

‘ Quain v. Russell, 8 Hun, 319; S.

C. 12 Hun, 376; Bertholf 0. O‘Reilley,

8 Hun, 16.

See Krcitcr o. Nichols, 28 Mich. 496.

lfew York. "Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian,
employer or other person who shall be injured in person, or
property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in
consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any
person, shall have a right of action in his or l1er name, against
any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving away intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication, in whole or in part, of
such person or persons, and any person or persons owning or
renting or permitting the occupation of any building or premises, and having knowledge that intoxicating liquors aro to be
sold therein, shall be liable, severally or jointly "vith the person
or persons selling or giving intoxicating liquors aforesaid, for
all damages sustained and for exemplary damages; and all damages recovered by a minor under this act shaH be paid either to
such minor or to his or her parent, guardian or next friend, as the
court shall direct; and the unlawful saJe or giving away of intoxicating liquors shall work a forfeiture of all rights of the lessee or
tenant under any lease or contract of rent upon the premises." •
This act is constitutional, and applies as well to those who sell
with license as those who sell without it.' As to what makes
out a cause of action under it, see cases cited in the margin.• It
is no defense that the liquor was sold by defendant's bar-tender
without his knowledge and against his instructions.' When the
owner of the building is sued, there must be clear and satisfactory proof establishing the permission to occupy with knowledge
that liquors were to be sold therein. • Whether an action can be
sustained under it for the death of the intoxicated person, the
cases are not agreed.' A joint action will not lie against two or
more persons who separately, at different times and places, have
sold liquor to the same person, though the several sales contributed to the intoxication which pr<?<~nced the injury.'

° Mead 0. Stratton, 8 Hun, 148. The

owner and the tenant may be joined in

the suit. Bertholfv. O‘Rcilley, 8 Hun,

16; Jackson 0. Brookins, 5 Hun, 530.

° That it may, sec Jackson o. Brook-

ins, 5 IIun, 530: that it may not, Hayes

0. Pheian, 4 Hun, 733.

Jackson 0. Brookins, 6 Hun, 530.

Laws, 1878, Ch. 646, § 1.
Baker e. Pope, 2 Hun, 5iifl; Quain
.,. Russell, 12 Hun, 376. In its application to owners of premises it is
constitutional. Bertholf o. O'Reilley,
8 Hun, 16; F~anklin "·Schermerhorn,
8 Hun, 112.
• Quain "· Russell, 8 Hun, 819; B.
C. 12 Hun, 876; Bertholf e. O'Reilley,
8 Hun, 16.
1

1

'Smith "· Reynolds, 8 Hun, Hl8.

Bee Kreiter "· Nichols, 28 Mich. 496.
• Mead.,. Stratton, 8 Hun, 148. The
owner anu the tenant may be joined ln
the suit. Bertholf"· O'Rcilley, 8 Hun,
16; Jackson"· Brookins, 3 Hun, ~SO.
• That it may, sec Jackson"· Brook.
ins, 5 Hun, 3:ID: that it may not, Hayes
e. Phelan, 4 Hun, 738.
J ackdon 11. Brookins, 5 Hun, 580.

KO

256

U1

THE LAW OF TORTS.

O;

THE LAW OF TORTS.

North Carolina. “The father, or if he be dead, the mother,

guardian or employer of any minor to whom sale or gifts shall be

made in violation of this act, shall have a right of action in acivil

suit against the person or persons so offending by such sales or

gifts; and upon proof of any such illicit sales or gifts, shall

recover from such party or parties so offending such exemplary

damages as a jury may assess: Provided, such assessment shall

be not less than twenty-ﬁve dollars.” '

Ohio. “That every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian,

employer, or other person who shall be injured in person or

North Carolina. "The father, or if he be dead, the mother,
guardian or employer of any minor to whom sale or gifts shall be
made in violation of this act, shall have a right of action in a ci vii
snit against the person or persons so offending by such sales or
gifts; and upon proof of any such illicit sales or gifts, shall
recover from such party or parties so offending such exemplary
dam~O'e& as a jury may assess: Provided, such assessment shall
be not less than twenty-five dollars." •

property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in

consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any

person, such wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other

person shall have a right of action in his or her own name, sev-

erally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by

selling or giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxica-

tion, in whole or in part, of such person or persons; and the

owner of, lessee or person or persons renting or leasing any

building or premises, having knowledge that intoxicating liquors
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are to be sold therein in violation of law, or having leased the

same for other purposes, shall knowingly permit intoxicating

liquors to be sold in such building or premises that have caused

the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person or persons,

shall be liable severally or jointly, with the person or persons

selling or giving intoxicating liquors as aforesaid, for all damages

sustained, as well as exemplary damages; and a married woman

shall have the same right to bring suits and control the same, and

the amount recovered, as a femme sole ,' and all damages recov-

ered by a minor under this act shall be paid either to such minor,

or to his or her parent, guardian or next friend, as the court

shall direct; and the unlawful sale or giving away of intoxicating

In Hayes 0. Phelan, 4 Hun, 773, it is

said that the statute should receive a

strict construction, and that a right

of action only exists against the ven-

dors, etc., of the liquor when it also

lies against the intoxicated person.

But this is denied in Quain 0. Russell,

8 Hun, 819. Whether a knowledge

of the habits of the husband would

warrant the giving of exemplary

damages, quere. Dubois 0. Miller. 5

Hun, 332. In Franklin 0. Schermer-

Ohio. "That every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian,
employer, or other person who shall be injured in person or
property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in
consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any
person, such wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other
person shall have a right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by
selling or giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person or persons; and the
owner of, Jessee or person or persons renting or leasing any
building or premises, having knowledge that intoxicating liquors '
are to be sold therein in violation of law, or having leased the
same for other purposes, shall knowingly permit intoxicating
liquors to be sold in such building or premises that have caused
the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person or persons,
shall be liable severally or jointly, with the person or persons
selling or giving intoxicating liquors as aforesaid, for all damages
sustained, as well as exemplary damages; and a married woman
shall have the same right to bring snits and control the same, and
the amount recovered, as a femme sow/ and all damages recovered by a minor under this act shall be paid either to such minor,
or to his or her parent, guardian or next friend, as the court
shall direct; and the unlawful sale or giving away of intoxicating

horn,8 Hun, 112, it is held that as

each member of the family may sue,

one who sues alone can only recover

his proportion of the injury.

' Laws of 1873-'74, p. 94, § 2.

In Hayes"· Phelan, 4 Hun, 773, it is
said that the statute should receive a
strict construction, and that a right
of action only exists against the vendors, etc., of the liquor when U also
lies against the intoxicated person.
But this is denied in Quain "·Russell,
8 Hun, 819. Whether a knowledge
of the hRbita of the huaband would

warrant the giving of exemplary
damages, quer~ Dubois"· }[iller, 5
Hun, 332. In Franklin "·Schermerhorn, 8 Hun, 112, it is held that as
each member of the family may sue,
one who sues alone can only recover
his proportion of the injury.
1 Laws of 1878-74, p. 94, § 2.
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under any lease or contract of rent upon premises where such

unlawful sale or giving away shall take place; and all suits for

damages under this act shall be by a civil action in any of the

courts of this State having jurisdiction thereof: P7'0Uid¢'r1, that

such husband, wife, child, parent, guardian or other interested

person liable to be so injured by any sale of intoxicating liquors

to any person or persons aforesaid, shall desire to prevent the

sale of intoxicating liquors to the same, shall give notice either

in writing or verbally. before a witness or witnesses, to the per-

son or persons so selling or giving the intoxicating liquors, or to

the owner or lessor of the premises wherein such intoxicating

liquors are given or sold, or shall ﬁle with the township or cor-

poration clerk in the township, village or city wherein such

intoxicating liquor may be sold, notice to all liquor-dealers not

to sell to such person or persons any intoxicating liquors from

and after ten days from the date of so ﬁling such notice; and

such notice or notices ﬁled with such clerk shall he entered by

the clerk, of such township, city, or village in a book to be kept

for such purpose, which said book shall be open for the inspec-

tion of all persons interested; any notice entered in such book

shall be erased and so obliterated as not to be legible by the
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oﬂicer having charge of the same, upon the demand of the person

or persons by whom such notice was ﬁled, and thereafter such

notice shall cease and end; otherwise, the aforesaid injured per-

son or persons shall not be entitled to real or exemplary damages

for the alleged injuries which they may have sustained by the

intoxication of any of the aforesaid persons, viz.: husband, wife,

child, parent, guardian, employer, or any other person or persons

whomsoever: Providerl, that such notice, whether served per-

sonally or ﬁled with the clerk, as aforesaid, shall during its exist-

ence inure to the beneﬁt of all persons interested, the same as if

a notice had been served by each.” ’

The cause of action under this statute is in the nature of a

' Laws of 1875, p. 35. This is an

amendment of Laws of 185-1, p. 1-'14,

§ 7, which was once before amended,

Laws of 1870, p. 102. The section as

here given is very blind in some

parts, and pains have been taken to

give the exact punctuation as oﬂl.

cially printed. The decisions here

referred to were made under the law

as it stood before the amendment, but

in the particulars touched upon the

change is not material.

.17

liqnon shall work a forfeiture of all rights of the lessee or tenant
under any lease or contract of rent upon premises where such
unlawful sale or giving away shall take place; and all snits for
damages nnrler this act shall bo by a civil action in any of the
courts of this State having jurisdiction thereof: P.rovid~:d, that
such husband, wife, child, parent, gnardian or other interested
person liable to be so injured by any sale of intoxicatiQg liquors
to any person or persons aforesaid, shall desire to prevent the
sale of intoxicating liquors to the same, shall give notice either
in writing or verbally. before a witness or witnesi;e~, to the person or persons so selling or giving the intoxicating liquors, or to
tho owner or le:-o:>or of the premises wherein such intoxicating
liquors are given or sold, or shall file \\ith the township or corporation clerk in the township, village or city wherein such
intoxicating liquor may be sold, notice to all liquor-dealers not
to sell to such person or persons any intoxicating liquors from
and after ten days from the date of so filing such notice; and
such notice or notices filed with such clerk shall be entered by
the clerk, of such township, city, or village in a book to be kept
for such purpose, whid1 said book shall be open for the inspection of all persons interested; any notice entered in such book
shall be erased and so obliterated as not to be legible by the
officet· having charge of the same, upon the demand of the person
or persons by whom such notice was filed, and thereafter· such
notice shall cease ami end; otherwise, the aforeFaid injured person or persons shall not he entitled to real or exemplary damages
for the alleged injuries which they may have sustained by the
intoxication of any of the aforesaid persons, viz.: husband, wife,
child, parent, guardian, employer, or any other person or persons
whomsoever: Provided, that such notice, whether serve<l personally or filed with the clerk, as aforesaid, shall during its existence innrc to the benefit of all persons interested, the same as if
a notice had been served by each." '
The cause of action under this statute is in the nature of a
J Laws of 187~, p. 85.
This Is an
amendment of Laws of 1854, p. 154,
§ 7, which 'fa& once before amended,
Laws of 1870, p. 102. The section a1
here given Is very blind in some
par18, and pains have been taken to

. 17

give the exact punctuation aa olftcilllly printed. The decisions hero
referred to were made nndcr the law
as it stood before the amendment, bnt
In the particulars touched upon the
change Ia not materia\.
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have intended it, and is liable for the damages resulting, though

others may by their illegal sales have contributed thereto, without

his knowledge and without preconcert with him.’ The wife may

bring the action after the decease of the husband,’ and may

recover exemplary damages where the right to recover actual

damages is established, and without proof of malice or other

circumstances of special aggravation.‘ A sale of the wife’s

property by her husband is an injury to her property.‘

It has been recently decided, on full deliberation, that the

statute only applies where the sales which caused the injury were

illegal and forbidden.‘ -

Pennsylvania. “The husband, wife, parent, child or guardian

of any person who has or may hereafter have the habit of

drinking intoxicating liquor to excess, may give notice in

writing, signed by him or her, to any person, not to sell or

deliver intoxicating liquor to the person having such habit; if

the person so notiﬁed, at any time within twelve months after

such notice, sells or delivers any such liquor to the person having

tort. 1 One who contributes to the intoxication is presumed to
have intended it, and is liable for the damages resulting, though
others may by their illegal sales have contributed thereto, without
his knowledge and without preconcert with him.' The wife may
bring the action after the decease of the husband,' and may
recover exemplary damages where the right to rec.·o,·er actual
damages is established, and without proof of malice or other
circumstances of special aggravation.• A sale of the wife's
property by her husband is an injury to her property.•
It has been recently decided, on full deliberation, that the
statute only applies where the sales which caused the injury were
· illegal and forbidden. •

such habit, the person giving the notice may, in an action of

tort, recover of the person notiﬁed any sum not less than ﬁfty nor

more than ﬁve hundred dollars, as may be assessed by the court
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or judge as damages. A married woman may bring such action

in her own name, notwithstanding her coverture, and all damages

recovered by her shall go to her separate use. In case of the

death of either party, the action and right of action given by

' Reugler o. Lilly, 26 Ohio, (N. s.) 48.

* Boyd 0. Watt, 27 Ohio, (N. s.) 259.

For cases in which proceedings were

taken to divest a tenant of possession

of leased premises, for" violation of

this act by selling liquor thereon, see

McGarvey v. Puckett, 2'7 Ohio, (n. s.)

669; Justice 0. Lowe, 26 Ohio, (N. s.)

8'72.

“ Schneider 0. Hosier, 21 Ohio, (N.

s.) 98.

‘ Schneider 1:. Hosier, 21 Ohio, (N.

B.) 98. As to what constitutes an

injury to means of support, see this

Pennsylvania. "The husband, wife, parent, child or guardian
of any person who has or may hereafter have the habit of
drinking intoxicating liquor to excess, may give notice in
writing, signed by him or her, to any person, not to sell or
deliver intoxicating liquor to the person having such habit; if
the person so notified, at any time within twelve months after
such notice, sells or delivers any such liquor to the person having
such habit, the person giving the notice may, in an action of
tort, recover of the person notified any sum not less than fifty nor
more than five hundred dollars, as may be assessed by the court
or judge as damages. A married woman may bring such action
in her own name, notwithstanding her coverture, and all damages
recovered by her shall go to her separate u~. In case of tho
death of either party, the action and right of action given by

case, and also Mulford o. Olewcll, 21

Ohio, (K. s.) 191. As to what consti-

tutes an injury to the person, see also

this last case.

' Mulford o. Clewell, 21 Ohio, (N. s.)

191.

' Baker o. Beckwith, 29 Ohio, (N. s.)

B14. The decision merely construes

the statute; and it could afford little

or no light for the construction of the

statutes of other States. Some of the

other statutes certainly give this re-

Reugler "· Lilly, 26 Ohio, (N. 8.) 48.
• Boyd "· Watt, 27 Ohio, (N. 8.) 259.
For cases in wllich proceedings were
taken to divest a tenant of possession
of lensed premise8, for· violation of
this act by selling liquor ti.Jereon, see
:McGarvey "· Puckett, 27 Ohio, (N. s.)
660; Justice"· Lowe, 26 Ohio, {N. s.)
872.
a Schneider "· Hosier, 21 Ohio, (N.
1

dress where the sales themselves are

not forbidden.

I

8.) 98.

• Schneider "· Hosier, 21 Ohio, (N.
As to what constitutes an
injury to means of support, see this

8.) 08.

case, and also Mulford "· Clewell, 21
Ohio, (N. 8.) 191. M to what constitutes an injury to the person, sec also
this lnst case.
1 Mulford "· Clewell, 21 Ohio, (N. s.)
191.
1 Baker"· Beckwith, 29 Ohio, (N. s.)
814. The decision merely construes
the statute; and it could afford little
or no light for the construction of the
statutes of other States. Some of the
other statutes certainly give this re.
dress where the sales themselves are
not forbidden.

INJURIES TO FAMILY RIGHTS.

KO

INJURIES TO l<'AlliLY RIGHTS.

259

Q)!

19

this section, shall survive to or against his executor or adminis-

trator without limit as to damages.”

this sectipn, shall survive to or against his executor or administrator without limit as to damages."'

Rhoda Island. “If any person in a state of intoxication

commits any injury to the person or property of another. the

person who furnished him with any part of the liquor which

occasioned his intoxication, if the same was furnished in violation

of this act, shall be liable to the same action by the party injured

as the person intoxicated would be liable to; and the party

injured or his or her legal representatives, may bring either a

joint action against the person intoxicated and the person who

furnished the liquor, or a separate action against either.”

“ The husband, wife, parent, child, guardian or employer of any

person who has or may hereafter have the habit of drinking

intoxicating liquor to excess, may give notice in writing, signed

by him or her, to any person requesting him not to sell or

deliver spirituous or intoxicating liquor to the person having

such habit. If the person so notiﬁed at any time within twelve

months thereafter, sells or delivers any such liquor to the person

having such habit, or permits such person to loiter on his
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premises, the person giving the notic~ may in an action of

trespass on the case, recover of the person notiﬁed, such sum as

may be assessed as damages: Provided, the employer giving

said notice shall be injured in his person, business or property.

A married woman may bring such action in her own name, and

all damages recovered by her, shall inure to her separate use. In

case of the death of either party, the action and right of action

shall survive to or against his executor or administrator.”'

Vermont. “Wl1enever any person, by reason of intoxication,

shall commit or cause any injury upon the person or property ot

any other individual, any person who by himself, his clerk, or

servant, shall have unlawfully sold or furnished any part of the

liquor causing such intoxication, shall be liable to the party

injured for all damage occasioned by the injury so done, to be

recovered in the same form of action as such intoxicated person

would be liable to; and both such parties may be joined in the

same action, and in ease of the death or disability of any

person, either from the injury received as herein speciﬁed, or in

"If any person in a state of intoxication
commits any injury to the pm·son or property of another. the
person who furnished him with any part of the liquor which
occasioned his intoxication, if the same was furnished in violation
of this act, shall be liable to the same action by the party injured
as the person intoxicated would be liable to; and the party
injured or his or her legal representatives, may bring either a
joint action against the person intoxicated and the person who
furnished the liquor, or a separaw action ~0'8.inst either."
"The husband, wife, parent, child, guardian or employer of any
person who has or may hereafter have the habit of drinking
intoxicating liquor to excess, may give notice in writing, signed
by him or her, to any person requesting him not to sell or
deliver spirituous or intoxicating liquor to the person having
snch habit. If the person so notified at any time within twelve
months thereafter, se1ls or delivers any such liquor to the person
having such habit, or permits such person to loiter on his
premises, the person giving the notic • may in an action of
trespwss on the case, recover of the person notified, such sum as
may be assessed as damages: Provided, the employer giving
said notice shall be injured in his person, business or property.
A married woman may bring such action in her own name, and
all damages recovered by her, shall inure to her separate use. In
case of the death of either party, the action and right of action
shall survive to or ~nst his executor or administrator.',.
Rhode Island.

' Laws of 1875, p. 41, § 7. ' Laws of 1875, p. 24, §§ 32 and 34.

"Whenever any person, by reason of intoxication,
shall commit or cause any injury upon the JWrson or property of
any other individual, any person who by himself, his clerk, or
servant., shall have unlawfully sold or furnished any part of the
liquor causing such intoxication, shall be liable to the party
injured for all damage occasioned by the injury so done, to be
recov~red in the same form of action as such intoxicated person
would be liable to; and both such parties may be joined in the
same action, and in case of the death or disability of any
person, either from the injury received as herein specified, or in
Vermont.

1

l4w:a of 1876, p. 41, § 7.

1

Luws of 1875, p. 24, §§ 32 and 84.
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furnished as aforesaid, any person who shall be in any manner

dependent on such injured person for means of support, or any

party on whom such injured person may be dependent, may

recover from the person unlawfully selling or furnishing any

such liquor as aforesaid, all damage or loss sustained in conse-

quence of such injury, in any court having jurisdiction in such

cases; and coverture or infancy shall be no bar to proceedings

for recovery in any case arising under this act, and no person

shall be disqualiﬁed as a witness, by reason of the marriage

relation in any proceeding under this act.” '

West Virginia. “Any husband, wife, child, parent or guardian

may serve upon any person engaged in the sale of intoxicating

liquors a written notice not to sell or furnish such liquors to the

wife, husband, child, parent or ward of the person giving such

notice; and thereafter, if the person so served with such notice

shall, by himself or another, sell or furnish such liquors to the

consequence of intoxication from the use of liquors nnlawfnll1
fnrnisl_1ed as aforesaid, any person who shall be in any manner
dependent on such injured person tor means of support, or any
party on whom such injured person may be dependent, may
recover from the person unlawfully selling or furnishing any
such liquor as aforesaid, all damage or loss sustained in consequence of such injury, in any court having jurisdiction in such
cases; and coYerture or infancy shall be no bar to !'roceedings
for recovery in any case arising under this act, and no per,.on
shall be disqualified as a witness, by reason of the marriage
relation in any proceeding under this act." •

person named in said notice, and by reason thereof the person to

whom such liquor is sold or furnished shall become intoxicated,

and, while in that condition, do damage to another, or shall, by

reason of such intoxication, injure any person in his or her means

of support who may have the legal right to look to him therefor,
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upon due proof that such liquors were sold or furnished as afore-

said, and that the person mentioned in said notice was, at the

time of service thereof, in the habit of drinking to intoxication,

an action may be maintained by the husband, wife, child, parent

or guardian of the person mentioned in said notice, or other

person injured by him as aforesaid, against the person selling or

furnishing him such liquors, as well as for all such damages as

the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the selling or giving of

such liquors, as for exemplary damages, and if the person so

proceeded against has given the bond and security hereinafter

provided for, such suit may be brought and prosecuted upon such

bond, against him and his sureties therein. Such suit may he

brought and prosecuted by a married woman in any case where

the person mentioned in such notice is her husband or infant

child, and the damages recovered therein shall be her sole and

separate property, and governed by the provisions of the code of

l Act of 1869, as amended in 1874; Laws 1874, p. 53.

West Virginia. "Any husband, wife, child, parent or guardian
may serve upon any person engaged in the sale of intoxicating
liquors a written notice not to sell or furnish such liquors to the
wife, husband, child, parent or ward of the person giving such
notice; and thereafter, if the person so served with such notice
shall, by himself or another, sell or furnish such liquors to the
person named in said notice, and by reason thereof the person to
whom such liquor is sold or furnished shall become intoxicated,
and, while in that condition, do damage to another, or shall, by
reason of such intoxication, injure any person in his or her means
of support who may have the legal right to look to him therefor,
upon due proof that such liquors wet·e sold or furnished as aforesaid, and that the person mentioned in said notice was, at the
time of service thereof, in the habit of drinking to intoxication,
an action may be maintained by the husband, wife, child, parent
or guardian of the person mentioned in said notice, or other
person injured by him as aforesaid, against the person se1ling or
fut·nishing him such liquors, as well as for all such damages as
the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the selling or giving of
such liquors, as for exemplary damages, and if the person so
proceeded against has given the bond and security hereinafter
provided for, such suit may be brought and prosecuted upon ~·1ch
bond, against him and his sm·eties therein. Such snit may lJc
brought and prosecuted by a married woman in any case where
the person mentioned in such notice is her lmsband or infant
child, and the damages recovered therein shall be her sole and
separate property, and governed by the provisions of the code of
• Act of 1859, as amended in 1874; Laws 1874. p.ISS.
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West Virginia in relation to the separate property of married

261

women. Where such suit is brought by a guardian, the damages

recovered therein shall be the property ot' his ward.”‘

Wisconsin. “Anyperson or persons, who shall be injured in

person, property or means of support by or in consequence of

the intoxication of any minor or habitual drunkard, shall have a

West Virginia in relation to the separate property of married
women. Where such snit is brought by a guardian, the damages
recovered therein shall be the property of his ward." 1

right of action severally or jointly in his, her or their name

against any person or persons who have been notiﬁed or requested

in writing by the authorities designated in section 10 of this act,

the husband, wife, parents, relatives, guardians or persons having

the care or custody of such minor or habitual drunkard, not to

part with liquor or other intoxicating drinks to them, and who,

notwithstanding such notice and request, or shall knowingly sell

or give away intoxicating liquors, thereby causing the intoxica-

tion of such minor or drunkard, and shall be liable for all

damages resulting therefrom. A married women shall have the

same right to bring suit and to control the same as afemme sols,

and all damages recovered by a minor under this act shall be

paid either to such minor or to his or her parents, guardian or

next friend, as the court shall direct, and all suits for dmnages

may be by any appropriate action in any of the courts of this

State, having competent jurisdiction.”
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“The giving away of intoxicating liquors, or other shift or

device to evade the provisions of this act, shall be deemed and

held to be an unlawful selling within the provisions of this act.”'

This legislation is constitutional.‘ The wife who takes care

of an intoxicated person may recover compensation therefor

under the statute;‘ and if she is injured in her health in so

doing, and put to the expense of a physician and attendant for

him, and of a physician for herself, and is obliged to employ

assistance in her own business in consequence of her attendance

upon her husband, these constitute elements of damage under

the act.‘ Driving the wife from the house by threats and

‘ Laws of 1877, p. 144, § 16.

' Laws of 1874, p. 303. § 16 and 20.

‘State 0. Ludington, 33 Wis. 107;

Wightman 9. Devere, 33 Wis. 570.

These were decisions under a previous

statute, but are applicable to this.

‘ Wightman 0. Devere, 33 Wis. 570.

‘ Wightnrin 0. Dcvere, 33 Wis. 570.

What should constitute exemplary

damages was somewhat discussed in

this case, and also whether the wife

could recover for loss of means of

support if the husband did not sup-

port her before.

Wisconsin.

•• Any -person or persons, who shall be injured in

person, property or means of support by or in consequence of
the intoxication of any minor or habitual drunkard, shall have a
right of action SC\'erally or joiutly in his, her or their name
against any person or persons who have been notified or requested
in writing by the authorities designated in section 10 of this net,
the husband, wife, parents, relatives, guardians or persons having
the care or custody of such minor or habitual .drunkard, not to
part with liquor or other intoxicating da·inks to them, and who,
notwithstanding such notice and request, or shall knowingly sell
or give away intoxicating liquors, thereby causing the intoxication of such minor or drunkard, and shall be liable for all
damages resulting thea·efrom. A married women shall have the
same right to bring snit and to co11trol the same as a femme sols,
and all damages recovered by a minor umlcr this act shall be
paid either to such minor or to his or her parents, guardian or
next friend, as the court shall dil'ect, and all suits for damages
may be by any appropriate action in any of the courts of this
State, having competent jurisdiction."
''The giving away of intoxicating liquors, or otl1er shift or
device to evade the pro,·isions of this act, shall be dcemcJ and
laeld to be an unlawful selling within the provisions of this ad."•
This legislation is constitutional.' The wife who take::> care
of au intoxicated person may recover compensation thl•refor
under the statute; • and if she is injured in her health in so
doing, and put to the expense of a physician and attendant tor
him, and of a physician for herselt~ and is obliged to employ
assistance in her own business in consequence of her attendance
upon her husband, the~e constitute clements of damngP u11Jcr
the act.' Driving the wife from the house by threats and
• Lnws of 1877, p. 144, ~ 10.
• LRws ('If 1874, p. aoa. § 16 an(l 20.
• ~tnte "· Ludin~ton, 33 Wis. 107;
W!~htman "· Devere, 33 Wis. 670.
Thea!e were decisions under a previous
ltatute, but are applicable to this.
• Wightman •· Devere, 33 Wis. 570.

• Wightm:m "· Devere, 33 Wis. 570.
What should constitute exemplary
damag-(•s was somewhat discu!lscd ill
this case, and nlso whether the wife
could recover for loBS of means of
support if the husband did not lOPport her before.
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as she may recover for, and damages may be added for the injury

to her feelings and the indignity suffered by her.‘ Means of

support will include what the husband might have earned by his

labor and attention to business, and contributed to the support

of the family.‘ It is immaterial whether the sale was made by

the defendant in person or by a servant.‘

AUITONB FOR OAUSING DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, ETC.

It has heretofore been stated, that at the common law, no civil

action would lie for causing the death of a human being.‘ By

this was not meant that the act which caused the death might

not, under some circumstances, give a right of action, but that

intimidation, but without actual violence, is snch physical injury
as she may recover for, and damages may be added for the injury
to her feelings and the indignity suffered by her.' Means of
support will include what the hu:suand might have earned by his
labor and attention to business, and contributed to the supp•>rt
of the family.' It is immaterial whether the sale was made Ly
the defendant in per::;on or by a servant.'

it must be a right not springing from the death itself. Thus it

has been shown that the master of a servant, or any one who is

ACTIONS FOR OAUSING DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, ETO.

lawfully entitled to command the services of another, may bring

action against a wrong-doer who deprives him of those services.

Now, the same act which deprives a master of the services of

his laborer, or a father of those of his child, may result in the

death of the servant or child. In these eases the common law

gave a remedy for the loss, but only for the time intermediate

the injury and the death. The master, parent, etc., suing might,

however, recover any incidental damages he might have suﬁiered,
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such as expenses for medical attendance, care and nursing up to

that time; but the estimate must be conﬁned to the pecuniary

loss, and not cover mental suffering.‘ And it has been held, in

England, that where a passenger is being carried by a railway

company, and is killed through a breach of the implied obliga-

tion of the company to convey earethlly, his personal representa-

tive may maintain an action for the damage to his personal

estate arising in his life time from medical expenses and loss

occasioned by his inability to attend to business.‘ But such

redress is exceedingly inadequate in any case, and where the

' Peterson o. Knoble, 35 Wis. 80.

' Wightman 1:. Devere, 33 Wis. 570.

' Peterson v. Knoble, 35 Wis. 80.

For questions arising out of the repeal

of the statute under which the fore-

going decisions were made, see Dillon

e. Linder, 86 Wis. 344.

‘ Ante, p. 15. ,

‘Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Ext-h.

88; Hyatt 0. Adams, 16 Mich. 1-"30;

Covington. etc., R. R. Co. 1:. Packer,

9 Bush, 455.

° Bradshaw v. Laneashire, etc., K

00., L. R. 10 <1. P. 1s9,(1s1s.)

It has heretofore been stated, that at the common law, no civil
action would lie for causing the death of a human being.• By
this was not meant that the act which caused the death might
not, under some circumstances, give a right of action, but that
it must be a right not springing from the death itself. Thus it
has been shown that the master of a servant, or any one who is
lawfully entitled to command the services of another, may bring
action against a wrong-doer who deprives him of those services.
Now, the same act which deprives a master of the services of
his laborer, or a fhther of those of his child, may result in the
death of the servant or child. In these cases the common law
gave a remedy for the loss, but only for the time intermediate
the injury and the death. The master, parent, etc., suing might,
however, recover any incidental damages he might have sufferetl,
such as expenses for medical attendance, care nnd nursing up to
that time; but the estimate must be confined to the pecuniary
loss, and not co,·er mental suffering. • And it has been held, in
England, that where a passenger is being carried by a railway
company, and is killed through a breach of the implied ouli~u.
tion of the company to convey carefully, his personal represcutative may maintain an action for the damage to his personal
estate arising in his life time from medical expenses and loss
occasioned by his inability to attend to bnsine~s.• But such
redress is exceotlingly inadcq nate in any case, and where the
J Peterson "· Knoble, 85 Wis. 80.
• Wightman"· Devere, 33 Wis. 570.
• Peterson "· Knoble, 35 Wis. 80.
For questions arising out of the repeal
of the statute under which the fore.
going decisions were made, sec Dillon
tt. Linder, 86 Wis. 344.

'Ante, p. 15.
'O:>born "· G illctt, L. R. 8 Ex<' h.
88; Hyatt "· Adams, 16 l\lich. 1~0;
Covington, etc., R R. Co. "· Packer,
9 Bush, 455.
s Bratlshnw 11. Lancnshire, etc., R.
Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 189, (1875.)
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death is instantaneous, as well as in very many other cases, the

INJURIES TO I<'.AMILY RIGHTS.

2133

principles which have supported recovery in the cases above

mentioned can have no application, and no redress at all was pos-

sible at common law. This was a great and an admitted defect,

and the British Parliament undertook to remedy it in the year

1846 by an act which is familiarly known as Lord Campbell’s

Act, and which has formed the model for much of the legislation

in this country on the same subject.

It was provided by this important statute “That whensoevor

the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,

or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would iit'

death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to main-

tain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then,

and in every such case, the person who would have been liahle

if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,

notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although

the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as

amount in law to felony.

“ That every such action shall be for the beneﬁt of the wife,

husband, parent and child of the person whose death shall have

been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the

executor or administrator of the person deceased; and in every
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such action the jury may give such damages as they may think

proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the par-

ties respectively for whom and for whose beneﬁt such action shall

be brought; and the amount so recovered, after deducting the

costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst

the before mentioned parties in such shares as the jury, by their

verdict, shall direct.” '

It is seen, on a perusal of this statute, that it gives an action

‘ Stat. 9 and 10 Vic. c. 93, §§ 1 and

2. The third section provided that

only one action should lie for and in

respect of the same subject mailer of

complaint; and it limited the time for

bringing this to twelve calendar

months from the death. The ﬁlth

provided that the word "person"

should apply to bodies politic and

corporate, that the word “parent”

should include father and mother,

grandfather and grandmother, and

stepfather and stepmother; and the

death is instantaneous, as well as in very many other eases, the
principles which have supp<)rted recovery in the cases abo,·e
mentioned can have no application, and no redress at all was possible at common law. This was a great and an admitted detect,
and the Britit>h Parliament undertook to remedy it in the year
1846 by an act which is familiarly known as Lord Campbell's
Act, and which has formed the model for much of the legislation
in this country on the same subject.
It was provided by this important statute "That whensoen•r
the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would 1if
death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then,
and in every such case, the person who would have been liable
if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damagl•s,
notwithstandiug the death of the person injured, and although
the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount in law to felony.
"That every such action shall be for the benefit of the wifl',
husband, parent and child of the person whose death shall have
been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the
executor or administrator of the person deceased; and in every
such action the jury may give such damages as they may think
proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall
be brought; and the amount so re<.'Overcd, after deducting the
costs not recovered from the detEmdant, shall be divided amongst
the before mentioned parties in such shares as the jury, by their
verdict, shall direct.'' 1
It is seen, on a perusal of this statute, that it gives an action

word “ child ” should include sun

and daughter, grandson and grand-

daughter, and stepson and slep-

duughter. By Stat. 27 and 28 Vic. c.

95, if there is no executor or admin-

istrator, the action may be brought by

any of the persons for whom an ex-

ecutor or administrator might have

brought it.

1 Stat. 9 and 10 Vic. c. 98, §§ 1 ana
2. The third !lt'Ction provided that
only one action should lie for and in
respect of the same subjet·t matt~r of
complaint; and it limited the lime for
bringing this to twelve calendar
montba from tho death. The tlflh
provided that the word " person "
should apply to bodi~s politic and
corporate, that the word "parent"
ahould include father and mother,

grandfather and grandmother, and
stepfather and stepmother; and the
word "child" should include sun
and daughter, grandson and grand.
daughter, and stepson and step.
daughter. By Stat. 21 and 28 Vic. c.
~.if tht>rc is no executor or udminlstrator, the action may be brought by
any of the persons for whom an ex.
ecutor or administrator might havu
brought it.
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in his death, might have maintained one. In other words, it

continues for the beneﬁt of the wife, husband, etc., a right of

action which, at the common law, would have terminated at the

death, and enlarges its scope to embrace the injury resulting from

the death.‘ If, therefore, the party injured had compromised for

the injury, andaceepted satisfaction previous to the death, there

could have been no furth_er right of action, and consequently no

suit under the statute.’ It is a logical conclusion, also, that if

the negligence of the person killed contributed proximately to the

fatal injury, no action can be maintained on the statute, because he

himself could have brought none had the injury not proved fatal.‘

So if the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant,

no action will lie under the statute against the master, unless the

statute, by construction, appears to give it in such case.‘ A

question has also been made in some States whether suit could

be maintained where the death was instantaneous; and in Mas-

sachusetts, under a somewhat nice and technical construction of

‘Read o. Great Eastern B. Co., L.

R. 8 Q. B. 555; Senior 0. VVurd, 1 El.

& El. 385; l\[cCubbin v. Hastings, 27

Ln. Ann. 713; Conner’s Admr. v. Paul,
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12 Bush, 144.

’ Read o. Great Eastern R. Co., L. R.

8 Q. B. 555. See, also, Carey 1:. Berk-

shire R. R.Co., 1 Cush. 479; Kearney '0.

Boston, etc., R. R. Co.,9 Cush. 108;

only when the deceased himself, if the injury had not resulted
in his death, might have maintained one. In other words, it
continues for the benefit of the wife, husband, etc., a right of
action which, at the common law, would have terminated at the
death, and enlarges its scope to embrace the injury resulting from
the death.' If, therefore, the party injured had <'.Ompromised for
the injury, and-accepted satisfaction previous to the death, there
could have been no furth~r right of action, and consequently no
snit under the statnte.1 It is a logical conclusion, also, that if
the negligence of' the person killed contributed proximately to the
fatal injury, no action can be maintained on the statute, because he
himself could have brought nono had the injnry not proved fatal.'
So if the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant,
no action will lie under tho statute against the master, unless the
statute, by construction, appears to give it in such case. • A
question has also been made in some States whether snit could
be maintained where the death was instantaneous; and in Massachusetts, under a somewhat nice and technical construction of

Bancroft -v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 11

Allen, 34; Commonwealth v.Vermont,

etc., R. R.Co., 108 Mass. '7; Whitford v.

Panama R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 465; Soule

0. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 24 Conn.

575; Murphy 1:. New York, etc., R. B.

Co., 29 Conn. 496; Goodscll '0. Hart-

ford, etc. R. R. Co., 33 Conn. 51. In

Ohio it is said the administrator can

bring an action for the injury under

the same restrictions and on the same

grounds that the party injured, if

death had not ensued, might have

done. Meara's Admr. '0. Holbrook, 20

Ohio, (N. s.) 137. But if the party in-

jured, having a right of action, brings

suit upon it, and dies pending the

suit, as the suit thereby nbales, it is no

impediment to a suit by the admin-

istrator. Indiannpolis,etc.. R. R. Co.

0. Stout, 53 Ind. 143. It is held in

Kentucky, that where the death is

not instantaneous, there are two

causes of action, one for mental and

bodily suffering before death, and

the other for the loss of life; but that

only one can be maintained, and that

the party entitled to sue must elect

between them, and that the pendency

of one action would abnle the other.

Conner's Admr. 0 Paul, 12 Bush, 144.

' Senior v Ward, 1 El. & El. 385,

following Barton's Hill Coal Co. 0.

Reid,3 Macq. II. L. Gus. 266, and gen-

erally followed in this country. Un-

der SOlllC statutes contributory negli-

gence is no defense, though it may go

in mitigation of damages. See Nash-

ville, ete., R. R. Como. Smith. 6 Heisk.

1'74.

‘ The Iowa statute is held to require

that construction. Philo 0. Ill. (lent.

t Read e. Great Enstern R. Co., L.
R 8 Q. B. lS55; Senior e. Ward, 1 El.
& El. 885; llcCubl>ln •· Hustings, 27
La. Ann. 718; Conner's Admr. •· Paul,
19 Bush, 144.
t Read •· Great Eastern R. Co., L. R
8 Q. B. 555. See, also, Carey •· Berk.
shire R. R.Co., 1 Cush.479; Kearney e.
Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Cusb. lOS;
Bancroft •· Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 11
Allen, 84; Commonwealth fJ.Vcrmont,
etc., R. R.Co., 10~ ~lass. 7; Whitford e.
eanama R. R. Co., 23 N.Y. 465; Soule
e. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 24 Conn.
675; Murphy•. New York, etc., R. R.
Co., 20 Conn. 406; Goodsell e. Hart.
ford, ttc. R. R. Co., 88 Conn. 51. In
Ohio it is said the administrator can
bring an action for the injury onder
the same restrictions and on the same
grounds that the party injured, if
death bad not ensued, might have
done. Me11ra's Admr. e. Holbrook, 20
Ohio, (N. s.) 187. But if the party in.
jured, having a right of action, brings
suit upon it, and <lies pending the

suit, as the suit thereby abates, it is no
impediment to a suit by the administrator. Indianapolis, etc., R. R Co.
"· Stout, 53 Ind. 143. It Is held ln
Kentucky, that where the death ia
not instantaneous, there arc two
causes of action, one for mental and
bodily suffering before death, and
the other for the loss of life; but \hat
only one can be maintained, and that
the party entitled to sue must elect
between them, and that the pendency
of one action would abate the other.
Conner's Admr. • Paul, 12 Bush, 144.
• Senior 11 Wnrd, 1 El. & El. 881),
following Barton's Hill Coal Co. • ·
Reid,8 !lacq. II. L . Cas. 266, and generally followed in this country. Uo.
der some statutes contributory negll.
gence is no defense, though it may go
in mitigation of damages. See Nashville, etc., R. R. Co."· Smith. 6 Heiak.
174.
• The lol\·a statute is held to rcquiro
that construction. Philo "· Ill. Ocnt.
H. R Co., 33 Iowa, 47.
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the statute, it was decided that the action would not lie in such
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a case.‘ But probably under no existing statute would it be so

held now.

But there is another class of statutes in the United States quite

distinct from Lord Camp_bell’s Act, and which give rights of

action irrespective of any that the deceased himself might have

had.’ By this we mean that they give to some designated bene-

ﬁeiary or beneﬁciaries a right that only comes into existence after

the death, and is not the survival, continuation, or enlargement

of any pre-existing right. Thus, a Georgia statute provides that

“ A widow, or, if no widow, a child or children may recover for

the homicide of the husband or parent; and if suit be brought

by the widow or children, and the former or one of the latter dies

pending the action, the same shall survive in the ﬁrst ease to the

children, and in the latter case to the surviving child or chil-

dren.” ' In the main, however, such an action must he supported

on the same principles as those which govern the action under

Lord Oatnpbell’s Act

' The decision was under the stat,

ute ot'1842, which provided that " the

action of trespass on the case for dam-

age to the person shall hcreaﬂcr sur-
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vive, so that, in the event of the death

of any person entitled to bring such

action, or liable thereto, the same may

be prosecuted or defended by or

against his executor or administrator,

the statute, it was decided that the action would not lie in such
a case.' But probably under no existing statute wot~ld it be so
held now.
Bot there is another class of statutes in the United States qnite
distinct from Lord Camp~ll's Act, and which give rights of
action irrespective of any that the deceased himself might have
had.' By this we mean that they give to some designated beneficiary or beneficiaries a right that only comes into existence after
the death, and is not the survival, continuation, or enlar~"Cment
of any pre-existing right. Thus, a Georgia statute provides that
" A widow, or, if no widow, a child or children may recover ior
the homicide of the husband or parent; and if suit be bt·ought
by the widow or children, and the former or one of the latter dies
pending the action, the same shall survive in the firdt case to the
children, and in the latter case to the surviving child or children." • In the main, however, such an action· must be supported
on the same principles as those which go\·ern the action under
Lord Campbell's Act

in the same manner us it‘ he were liv-

ing." Kearney e. Boston, etc., R.

Corp. 9 Cush. 108. Compare Ban-

croft 0. Boston, etc., R. Corp. ll Al-

len, 34. Under the Tennessee statute

a similar ruling was made. Louis-

ville, etc., R. R. Co.o. Burke, 6 Coldw.

45; but this was overruled in Nash-

ville, etc., it. R. Co. v Prince, 2 Heisk.

580. And, see, Fowlkcs 0. Nashville,

etc., R. R..(.‘o., 9 ileisk. 829. In Connec-

ticut the court distinguish their stat-

ute from that of Massachusetts, and

hold the suit maintainable in case of

instantaneous death. Murphy o. New

York, etc., R. R. Co., 80 Conn. 184.

In New York the conclusion is the

same. Brown v. Butlitlo, etc., R. R.

Co., 22 N. Y. 101.

* These, however, may provide that

the action shall be brought by the ex-

ecutor or administrator, or, which is

the same thing, by the personal rep-

resentative. 'Sce Hagen 0. Kean, 8

Dill. 124. A widow cannot sue under

this designation. Ibid. For a some-

what peculiar statute, sec James 0.

Christy, 18 Mo. 162.

‘ Code of 1873. p. 511, § 2971. The

husband can bring no action under

this statute for the homicide of his

wife. Georgia, etc., Co. v. Wynn, 42

Geo. 331. In some of the Slates the

proceeding against railroad compa-

nies causing dcath by negligence is

by indictment, and a ﬁne is imposed

on conviction; but it is for the bene-

ﬁt of the widow, children, or heirs,

and the principles applicable in civil

cases apply. State 0. Railroad, 52 N.

H. 528.

• The decision was under the stat..
ate of 1S42, which provided that "the
action of trespass on the case for dllmage to the person shall hereafter sur.
vive, so that, in the event of the death
of any person entitled to bring such
action, or linble thereto, the same may
be prosecuted or defended by or
ag-ninst his executor or administrator,
in the sRme mRDner as if he were living." Kearney "· Boston, etc., R.
Corp. 9 Cush. 108. Compare Bancroft. "· Boston, etc., R. Corp. 11 Allen, 84. Und"r the Tenm·s>~ee statute
a similar ruling was made. LouisTille, etc., H. R. Co.t:t. Burke. 6 Coldw.
45; but this WM overruled in Nashville, etc., H. R. Co. t:1 Prince. 2 llcisk.
580. And, Bel', Fowlk<•• t:t. Nashville,
t'tc., R. R.Co., 9 Ileisk. 829. In Connecticut the court distinguish their sta~
ute from that of llassachusetts, and
hold the suit maintainable in case of
inst1ntaneous dent h. ll urphy t:t. New
York, e\c., R. R. Co., 8U Conn. 184.

In New York the conclusion 1a the
same. Brown e. BuO"alo, etc., R. R.
Co., 22 N. Y. 191.
1 These, however, may provide that
the action shall be brought by the executor or administrator, or, wliicb Ia
the same tuing, by the personal rep.
r<'sentutive. 1 See Hagen e. Kcan, 8
Dill. 124. A widow cannot sue under
this designation. Ibid. For a l-Ome.
what pe<'UliRr statute, see James •·
Christy, 18 llo. 162.
1 Vode of 1873. p. 511, t$ 2971. Th•
husband Cftn bring no action under
&his statute for the homicide of hia
wife. Georgia, etc., Co. t:t. Wynn, 49
Geo. 331. In some of the Stal<'s the
proceeding against rRilrond compa..
nics causing death by negligl•nce ia
by indictment, and a fine is imposed
on conviction: but it is for the bene.
fit of &he widow, chihlren, or heira,
and the principles applicable in ch'll
cases apply. State •· Railroad, 62 N.
H. 528.
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266 THE LAW OF TORTS.

Remedy Local.e:Where suit was brought in Georgia for the

killing of the plaintiff ’s husband in Alabama, it was decided that

the suit could not be maintained, because, by the statute of Ala-

bama, the right of action is given to the personal representative.

The inference from the opinion is, that had the suit been brought

by an administrator appointed in Georgia, it would have been

sustained.‘ In New York it is held that the remedy is purely

local, and can only be brought in the State whose statutes give it,

and where the killing took place.’

In Massachusetts the same conclusion has been reached, the

court regarding the recovery which the statute authorizes as in

the nature of the statute penalty, which, though sued for by the

administrator, is to be distributed not as a part of the estate gen-

erally, but according to a special statutory rule.‘ In several of

the other States it is also held that the right and the remedy are

purely local.‘ In Illinois it is held that a foreign administrator
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cannot sue under the statute,‘ but in Indiana the general statute

appears to permit it.‘ In Alabama, under a statute giving an

action against the county, where one was killed by lynching, etc.,

it has been held that aliens, though resident abroad, may sue,’

and it probably would be so held under any of the statutes

referred to.

Who Liable, Wliere the action is given without any restric-

tion as to the parties who shall be liable, it may he brought

against not only natural persons, but corporations, public as well

as private.‘ By some statutes, however, the remedy, or perhaps

1%

' Selma R. R. Co. u. Lacey, 40 Geo.

106.

~ ’ Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co., 23

N. Y..46-3. It makes no diﬂerence, as

was decided in this case, that the de-

4.~

~?.
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THE LAW OF TORTS.

Remedy Local.~here suit was brought in Georgia for the
killing of ~1e plaintiff's husband in Alabama, it was decided that
the suit could not be maintained, because, by the statute of Alabama, the right of action is given to the personal representative.
The inference from the opinion is, that had the suit been brought
by an administrator appointed in Georgia, it would have been
sustained. 1 In New York it is held that the remedy is purely
local, and can only be brought in the State whose statutes give it,
and where the killing took place.•
In Massachusetts the same conclusion has been reached, the
court regarding the recovery which the statute authorizes as in
the nature of the statute penalty, which, though sued for by the
administrator, is to be distributed not as a part of the estate generally, but according to a special statutory role.' In several of
the other States it is also held that the right and the r:emedy are
purely local.' In Illinois it is held that a foreign administrator
cannot sue under the statute·, ' but in Indiana the general statute
appears to permit it.' In Alabama, under a statute giving an
action against the county, where one was killed by lynching, etc.,
it has been held that aliens, though resident abroad, may sue,'
and it probably would be so held under any of the statutes
referred to.
Who Liable, Where the action is given without any restriction as to the parties who shall be liable, it may be brought
against not only natural persons, but corporations, public as well
as private.' By some statutes, however, the remedy, or perhaps

fendant is a New York corporation.

Bee Mahler v. Transportation Co., 35

1

Selma R R Co. 1'. Lacey, 49 Geo.

N. Y. 352; Campbell n. Rogers, 2

106.

Handy, (0hio,) 110.

• • Whitford o. Panama R. R Co., 23
N. Y~465. It makes no difference, as

' Richardson 0. New York Cent. R.

R. Co., 98 Mass. 85. So far as this

case treats the statute as in its nature

penal, it is opposed to Bencho. Bay

State Co., 30 Barb. 433, and Lnmphear

0. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 237.

"Woodard 0. Michignn, etc., R. R.

Co., 10 Ohio, (N. s.) 121; Ni-edham 0.

Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 88 Vt. 294;

State o. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 45

Md. 41.

" Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. 0. Cragin, 71

Ill. 177. -

° Jclfersonville, etc., R R. Co. 0.

Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228; S. C. 41 Ind.

49.

" Luke 0. Calhoun Co., 52 Ala. 115.

' Chicago v. iliajor, 18 Ill.8-19; Chi-

cago v. Starr, 42 Ill. 174; Southwest-

ern R. R. Co. o. Paulk, 24 Geo. 356.

Corporations are of course responsi-

ble for the acts oi‘ their servants in

these as in other cases. McAunich v.

— I I mt]

was decided In this case, that the de.
fendant is a New York corporation.
Bee Mahler 1'. Transportation Co., SIS
N. Y. 852; Campbell e. Rogers, a
Handy, (Ohio,) 110.
• Richardson e. New York Cent. R
R. Co., 98 Mass. &'i. So far as this
case treats the statute as in its nature
penal, it Is opposed to Bench e. Bay
State Co., 80 Barb. 483, and Lnmphear
e. Buckingham, 83 Conn. 287.
• Woodard e. )lichigan, etc., R. R

·-~

__:...,.£ ~- ~

Co., 10 Ohio, (11. s.) 121 ; N t•edham •·
Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 88 Vt. 294;
State "· Pittsburgh, etc., R R Co., 45
){d. 41.
• Ill. Cent. R R. Co. •· Cragin, 71
Ill. 177.
1 Jeffersonville, etc., R ll Co. •·
Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228; B. C. 41 Ind.
49.

' Luke"· Calhoun Co., 52 Ala. lllt
• Chicago e. Mt~jor, 18 Ill. 849; Chicago"· Starr, 42 Ill. 174; Southwestern R. R. Co. •· Paulk, 24: Geo. 836.
Corporations are of course responsl.
ble for the acts of their sPrva.nts in
the.;c as in other cases. llcAunich o.

··~

'..

..
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a special remedy, is given against railroad companies only, and

of course the statute cannot be extended by construction. In

Minnesota, and perhaps some other States, it may be brought

against a steamboat by name to establish a liability against it.‘

On a construction of the statutes of Maine it is held that where

one is killed by the negligent operation of a railroad in the hands

of a lessee, neither the railroad company nor the lessee is liable; ’

but this seems notconsistent with some decisions elsewhere.’

The Plaintiﬁ‘. Most commonly the action is given to the

executor or administrator of the person killed; and an adminis-

trator may be appointed for the purpose of bringing it, though

a special remedy, is given a6J"&inst railroad companies only, and
of course the statute cannot be extended by construction. In
Minnesota, and perhaps some other States, it may be brought
against a steamboat by name to establish a liability ag1~inst it.'
On a construction of the statutes of Maine it is held that where
one is killed by the negligent operation of a railroad in the hands
of a lessee, neither the railroad company nor the lessee is liable; 3
but this seems not consistent with some decisions elsewhere.•

there is no estate.‘ Under many of the statutes, however, some

one or more of the parties to be beneﬁted by the recovery may

sue. Thus, in Alabama, the father, or if he be dead the mother,

may bring suit where the person killed was a minor child.‘ Sev-

eral States have similar statutes. In Iowa, it seems by construe-

tion, in endeavoring to accommodate the statute to the common

law, it is held that where the parents are authorized to sue for

the killing of a minor child, there may be two actions: one by a

parent, to recover damages for the loss during what would have
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been the ehild’s minority, and one by an administrator for subse-

quent damages.‘ In Georgia the statute provides that “ a wido\v,

Mississippi, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Iowa.

338; Sherman o. Western Stage Co.,

24 Iowa, 515.

‘ Bouliller 0. The Milwaukee, 8

Minn. 97.

’ State v. Consolidated, etc., Co., 67

Me. 4'79.

' In Railroad C0. 0. Barron, 5 Wall.

90, where one was killed by the neg-

Most commonly the action is given to the
executor or administratot· of the per:;on killed; nnd an adrnini:;trator may be appointed for the purpose of bringing it, though
there is no estate.• Under many of the statutes, however, some
one or more of the parties to be benefited by the recovery may
sue. Thus, in Alabama, the father, or if he be dead the mother,
may bring suit whm·e the person killed was a minor child.' Several States have similar statutes. In Iowa, it seems by construction, in endeavoring tO accommodate the statute to the common
law, it is held that where the parents are authorized to sue for
the killing of a minor child, there may be two actions: one by a
parent, to recover damages for the loss during what would have
been the child's minority, and one by an administrator for suhl'e·
quent damages.' In Georgia the statute provides that" a widow,
The Plaintiff.

ligent use by one company of the rail-

road track of another, the latter com-

pany was held responsible. Citing

Ohio, etc., R R. Co. 0. Dunbar, M) Ill.

623, and Nelson o. Vermont, etc., R.

R. Co., 26 Vt. 717, which were cases

where railroad companies were held

liable for injury to stock under cor-

responding circumstances. In Illi-

nois, where a road is leased, lessor

and lessee are both liable for the loss

of cattle consequent on failure to

fence the road. Ill. Cent. R R. Co. o.

Kanousc, 39 Ill. 272; Toledo, etc., R.

R. Co. 0. Rumbold, 40 Ill. 143. A

trustee operating the road for the hen-

eﬁt of creditors is held liable in Con-

necticut. Lamphear 0. Buckingham,

33 Conn. 237. .

4 Hartford, etc., R. R. C0. 0. An-

drews, 36 Conn. 213. The deceased

was resident in Maine, but killed in

Connecticut, having no property in

the last named State, but administra-

tion was permitted to be taken there.

' Code, 1876, § 2899. In Louisiana,

also. the father may suo for the loss

of his minor child by wrongful act

or default. Frank o. New Orleans,

etc., R. R. Co., 20 La. Ann. 25.

' Walters 0. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.,

Mississippi, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Iowa,
388; Sherman 11. Western 8tago Co.,
24. lows, 515.
1 Boutilier "· The Milwaukee, 8
Minn. 97.
1 State "· Consolidated, etc., Co., 67
Me. 479.
• In !{ail road Co. "· Barron, 5 Wall.
90, where one was killed by the neg.
ligent use by one company of the rail.
road track of another, the latter com.
pany was held respnnsible. Citing
Ohio, etc., R R. Co. "· Dunbar, 20 Ill.
623, and Nelson "· Vermont, etc., R.
R. Co., 26 Vt. 717, which were cases
where railroad companies were held
liable for injury to stock under correaponding circumRtances. In Illinois, where a road is leased, lessor
and lessee are both liable for the loss

of cattle consequent on failure to
fence the road. Ill. Cent. R R. Co. "·
Kanouse, 39 Ill. 272; Toledo, etc., R
R. co. "· Rumbold, 40 111. 143. A
trustee opcrKting the roud for the hen.
efit of creditors is held liable in Con.
necticut. Lamphear "· Buckingham,
83 Conn. 237.
•IIartford, etc., R R Co. 11. An.
drews, 86 Conn. 213. The decease1l
was resident in )[ainc, but killed in
Connecticut, havin.~ no property In
the last named St11te, but administnttion was permitted to be taken therE'.
• Code, 1876, § 2899. In Louisiana,
also, the father may suo for the loss
of his minor child by wrongful act
or defuult. Frank "· New Orleuns,
etc., R. H. Co., 20 La. Ann. 25.
• WaltE'rs "·Chicago, etc., R R. Cn .•
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and if no widow, a child or children, may recover for the homi-
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cide of the husband or parent; ” and it is held that if the widow

sues and marries pending the suit, she may proceed to judgment

notwithstanding the marriage.‘ If she dies pending the suit.

the action and the right of action survive to the children, whose

damages will be measured by the injury to themselves.‘ In Cal-

ifornia the rule is the same, and in the suit continued for the use

of the children, any discussion of what would be proper compen-

sation to the widow is wholl y irrelevant and should be excluded.‘

But in Georgia where the widow brings suit and carries it to

judgment in her own name, the damages which can be consid-

ered are only her <wn damages, and not those suffered by the

children also.‘ U1 e of the troublesome things connected with

this action where others than the personal representative sue, is

that it is diﬁieult to provide for the distribution of the moneys

recovered among the persons whom the statute intends to

beneﬁt; and in general no attempt is made to do it. If the

widow sues, she recovers for her own beneﬁt, where if an admin-

istrator had sued, the recovery must have been divided with

children. And where statutes permit actions to be brought by

one of several who would be entitled to sue, and make no pro-

vision for distributing the recovery, it would seem that there
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might be question of the right to maintain two or more actions

by the intended beneﬁciaries severally.

The Beneﬁciaries. Where the personal representative brings‘

the suit, his position in respect to it and to the moneys recovered

is peculiar. The cause of action is not given in favor of the estate

proper.“ If it was, the moneys would be accounted for with

36 Iowa. 458. See Needham 1:. Grand

Trunk R. Co., 38 Vt. 294; Barley

0. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Biss. 430.

' Georgia, etc., Co. o. Garr, 5'7 Geo.

2'77.

’ David v. Southwestern R. R. Co,

41 Geo. 223; Macon, etc., R. R. Co. 1:.

and if no widow, a child or children, may recover for the homicide of the husband or parent;" and it is held that if the widow
sues and marries pending the suit, she may proceed to judgment
notwithstanding the marriage/ If she dies pending the suit,
the action and the right of action survive to the children, whose
damages will be measm·ed by the injury to themselves.' In California the rule is the same, and in the snit continued for the use
of the childt·en, any discussion of what would be proper compensation to the widow is wholly irrelevant and should be excluded.'
But in Georgia where the widow brin~ suit and carries it to
. judgment in her own name, the damages which can be considered are only her < wn damages, and not those suffered by the
childt·en also.' U1 e of tho troublesome things connected with
this action where others than the personal representative sue, is
that it is diffi~ult to provide for the distribution of the moneys
reco\"ered among the persons whom the statute intends to
benefit; and in general no attempt is made to do it. If the
widow sues, she recovers for her own benefit, where if' an administrator had sned, the recovery mnst have been divided with
children. And where statutes permit actions to be brought by
one of several who would be entitled to sue, and make no provision for distributing the recovery, it would seem that there
mi~ht be question of the right to maintain two or more actiona
by the intended beneficiaries severally.

Johnson, 38 Geo. 409,435. It seems

to be required by statute in this Slate

that the widow suing for the killing of

her husband should allege a criminal

prosecution therefor, or show some

excuse for the failure to institute one.

Allen 0. Atlanta St. R. R Co., 54 Geo.

Where the personal representative brings·
the suit, his position in respect to it and to the moneys recovered
is peculiar. The cause of action is not given in favor of the estate
proper.' If it was, the moneys would be accounted for with
The Beneficiaries.

503; Weckes o. Cottingham, 58 Geo.

659. In Alabama it is held that the

common law doctrine of the merger

of the civil action in the felony has

no application to this statutory action.

Lankl'0rd's Admr. 0. Barrett, 29 Ala.

700.

3 Taylor o. W. P. R. R. Co., 45 Cal.

823.

4 Macon, etc., R. R. Co. o. Johnson,

88 Geo. 409.

‘ See Wliitford 0. Panama R. R.

36 Iowa. 458. Sec Needham"· Hrand
Trunk H. Co., 38 Vt. 2!J4; Barley
&. Chicago, etc .. R R. Co., 4 Biss. 430.
J Georgia, etc., Co. "· Garr, 57 Geo.
277.
11 David "· Southwestern R. R. Co,
41 Geo. 223; Macon, etc., R. R. Co. "'·
Johnson, 88 Gco. 409, 435. It seems
to be required by statute in this State
tbnt the widow suing for the killing of
her husband should allege a criminal
prosecution therefor, or show some
excuse for the failure to institute one.

Allen"· Atlanta St. R. R Co., 54 Geo.
503; Weekes"· Collingham, 58 Geo.
559. In Alabama it is hrld that the
common law doctrine r,f the merger
of the civil action in the felony baa
no application to this statutory action.
Lankford's Admr. "· Barrett, 29 Ala.
700.
1 Taylor "· W. P. R. R. C:>., 45 Cal.

823.
4 Macon, etc., R. R. Co."· Johnson.
88 Geo. 409.
• See Whitford "· Panama R. R.
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other assets, and, in case of an estate otherwise insolvent, would
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be appropriated by creditors. But the purpose of these statutes

is to make provision for members of the family of the deceased

who might naturally have calculated on receiving support or

assistance from the deceased had he survived. Thus, under the

English statute the action is to be for the beneﬁt of the wife,

husband, parent, or child: it is clear that creditors can have no

share in this, but the recovery must be a special fund, to be paid

over by the personal representative to the person or persons for

whom the statute intends it.‘ It is also obvious that there might

be cases in which no action could be brought by an executor or

administrator, because of there being no person in existence who

would be entitled to the moneys. Thus, if the action be given

for the beneﬁt of the widow and children only, and there be

neither, there can be no action;' and it seems to be necessary in

some States to name in the declaration the person for whose

beneﬁt the suit is brought, and to show the relationship.’ But

where the recovery is to be distributed as the personal estate of

an intestate would be, it must be assumed that kindred exist, and

it need not be averred.‘ A

Co., 28 N. Y. 465: Chicago v. Major,

18 Ill. 849; Waldo 0. Goodsell, 83
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Conn. 432; Haggerty 0. Central R. R.

Co., 31 N. J. 34:».

‘ Chicago 0. Major, 18 Ill. 349:

Lyon's Admr. o. Cleveland, etc., R. R.

Co., 7 Ohio, (rt. s.) 836; Andrews u.

Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Conn. 57.

’ It seems that in Ohio, where the

action is given for the beneﬁt of the

other 888ets, and, in case of an estate otherwise insolvent, would
be appropriated by creditors. Bot the purpose of these statutes
is to mako provision for members of the family of the deceased
who might naturally have calculated on receiving support or
assistance from the deceased had he snr\"ived. Thus, under the
English statute the action is to be for the benefit of tho wife,
husband, parent, or child: it is clear that creditors can have no
share in this, but the recovery must be a special fnnd, to be paid
over by the personal representative to the person or persons for
whom the statute intends it. 1 It is also obvious that there mi~ht
bo cases in which no action could bo brought hy an executor or
administrator, because of there being no person in existence who
would be entitled to the moneys. Thus, if the action be gi\'cn
for the benefit of the widow and children onlJ·, and there be
neither, there can be no action; s and it seems to be necessary in
some States to name in the declaration the person for whose
benefit the sni.t is brought, and to sho\V the relationship. 1 Bot
\Vhere the reco\"ery is to be distributed as the pm·sona.l estate of
an intestate would be, it must be assumed that kindred exist, and
it need not be averred.•

widow and next of kin, if the action

is brought for the killing of the wife,

the husband is entitled as next of kin

to such share as he would take in her

estate under the statute of distribu-

tions; the words “ next of kin " being

used in the statute in this peculiar

sense. Steel 0. Kurtz, 28 Ohio, (N. s.)

191. Compare Lucas 0. N. Y. Cent.

R. R. Co., 21 Barb. 245.

‘Where the declaration mentions

the father only, the recovery must be

limited to his loss, and cannot he ex-

tended by showing on the trial that

there are also a mother and brothers

and sisters. Quincy Coal Co. 0. Hood,

77 ll]. 68. See Chicago, etc., R R.

Co. 0. Morris, 26 Ill. 400. In Indiana

it is sutiicient to aver that there are

persons who would be entitled, hut

they need not be named. Jefferson-

villc, etc., R R. Co. 0. Hendricks, 41

Ind. 40. And. see Woodward 0. Chi-

cago, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Wis. 401); Lu-

cas 0. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 21 Barb.

245.

Where children are made the bene-

ﬁciaries, illegitimate children are not

included. Dickinson 0. N. E. Rail-

way Co., 2 H. & C. 735. But they

may be entitled as next of kin of their

mother when she is the person killed.

Muhl 0. Southern, etc., R. R. Co., 10

Ohio, (N. s.) 272.

‘ Alabama, etc., R. R. Co. o.Wallcr,

48 Ala. 459.

Where the stutute makes the widow

and next of kin the beneﬁciaries, the

Co., 23 N.Y. 4Jl5: Chicago D. Major,
18 Ill. 849; Waldo 11. Goodsell, 83
Conn. 432; Ha~erty 11. Central R. R.
Co., 81 N.J. 3-lU.
s Chicago "· :Major, 18 Ill. 849:
Lyon's Admr. 11. Cleveland, etc., R. R.
Co., 7 Ohio, (N. 8.) 83G; Andrews "·
Hartford, etc., H. R. Co., 8! Conn. 57.
1 It seems that in Ohio, where tho
action is given for the benefit of the
widow and next of kin, if the action
Is brought for the killing of the wife,
the husband Is entitled as next of kin
to such share as he would take in her
estate under the statute of distributions; the words" next of kin" being
used in the statute in this peculiar
aense. Steel 11. Kurtz, 2B Ohio, (N. a.)
191. Compare Lucas "· N. Y. Cent.
R R. Co., 21 Barb. 24.'S.
' Where the declaration mentions
the father only, the recovery must be
limited to bia 1088, IUld cannot he ex.
tended by ahowlng on the trial t.hat

there are also a mother and brothers
and sistrrs. Quincy Coal Co. "· Hood,
77 Ill. 68. Bee Chicago, etc., R R.
Co. "· Morris, 26 Ill. 400. In Indiana
it is sufficient to aver that there ure
persons who would be entitled, hut
they need not be named. J cffcrson.
ville, rtc., R. R. Co. c. Hendricks, 41
Ind. 40. And. see Woodward "· Chicago, etc., R. H. Co , 2:3 Wis. 401l; Lu.
cas c. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 21 Barb.
245.
Where children are made the bene.
flciaries, illegitimate children sre not
included. Dickinson c. N. E. Rail.
way Co., 2 H. & C. 735. But they
may be entitled as next of kin of their
mother when she is tllc person killed.
Muhl "· Southern, etc., R. R. Co., 10
Ohio, (N. 8.) 272.
• Alabama, etc., R. R. Co. 11. Waller,
48 AIL 459.
Where the statute makes the widow
and next of kin the beneficiaries, the
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the question of the right to recover is merely a question of neg-

ligence, and is to be governed by the same principles and consid-

erations as questions of negligence where the results were less

serious. The reader is therefore referred to the chapter on neg-

ligent injuries for their discussion. Where the act was one o1

intentional violence, the question that would arise if the right 01

recovery were disputed must be one of justiﬁcation or excuse,

and would be the same as in cases of trespass to the person.‘

This also, therefore, requires no special discussion here.

Proximate Cause. The wrongful act, neglect, or default must

have been the proximate cause of death. But it is the proxi-

mate cause if it inﬂicts a fatal injury, though the death that

would have resulted is anticipated by an unskillful surgical

operation.’

What Damages Recoverable. It seems to have been made a

What is Wrongful Aot, Neglect, or Default. In most cases
the question of the right to recover is merely a question of negligence, and is to be governed by the same principles and con~id
erations as questions of negligence where the results were less
serious. The reader is therefore referred to the chapter on negligent injuries for their discussion. Where the act was one of
intentional violence, the question that would arise if the right ot
recovery were disputed must be one of justification or excuse,
and would be the same as in cases of trespass to the person.'
This also, therefore, requires no special discussion here.

question, both in England and this country, whether, if the

plaintiff showed the wrong, resulting in death, but failed to

prove actual damages, he was entitled to recover even the nom-

inal damages which are supposed to ﬂow from any technical legal

wrong. In England the rule is settled that the action will not

be supported for the recovery of merely nominal damages.’ The
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ground seems to be that no one shows himself entitled as bene-

ﬁciary until he shows that personally he has suffered ; in other

Proximate Cause. The wrongful act, neglect, or default must
have been the proximate cause of death. But it is the proximate cause if it inflicts a fatal injury, though the death that
would· have resulted is anticipated by an unskillful surgical
operation.'

words, that, as in some cases of slander, it is necessary to prove

special damage in order to convert what may be a moral wrong

into a legal wrong, so here the wrongful act or default is not shown

to be a tort to the person complaining of it until he traces percep-

action may be maintained where there

is a widow and no kindred, or where

there is next of kin and no widow.

Oldﬁeld v. New York, etc., R. R. 00.,

14 N. Y. 310; Haggerty 0. Central R.

R. Co., 31 N. J. 349; Lyons *0. Cleve-

land, etc., R. R. Co., '7 Ohio, (N. s.)

336.

‘ Wliite o. Maxcy, 64 Mo. 552. Un-

der the Kentucky statute, which only

gives an action where the death was

caused by the “willful neglect " of

another, no action will lie if the kill-

ing was intentional. Spring‘s Admr.

0. Glenn, 12 Bush, 172.

What Damages Recoverable. It seems to have been made a
question, both in England and this country, whether, if the
plaintiff showed the wrong, resulting in death, but failed to
prove actual damages, he was entitled to recover even the nominal damages which are supposed to flow from any technical legal
wrong. In England the rule is settled that the action will not
be supported for the recovery of merely nominal damages. 1 The
ground seems to be that no one shows himself entitled as beneficiary until he shows that personally he has suffered ; in other
words, that, as in some cases of slander, it is necessary to prove
special damage in order to convert what may be a moral wrong
into a legal wrong, so here the wrongful act or default is not shown
to be a tort to the person complaining of it until he traces percep-

’ Saute: 0. N. Y. Cent. etc. R. R. Co.,

66 N. Y. 50.

' Duckworth o. Johnson, 4 H. & N.

653; Boulter v. Webster, 13 W. R. 289;

11 L. T., (N. s.) 698. Compare Lyons

1:. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., '7 Ohio,

(N. s.) 336; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v.

Ogier, 35 Penn. St. 60; Quin v. Moore,

15 N. Y. 432.

i —_ -m‘

action may be maintained where there
is u widow and no kindred, or where
there is next of kin and no widow.
Oldfield "·New York, etc., n. R. Uo.,
14 N. Y. 310; Haggerty"· Central R.
R Co., 31 N.J. 349; Lyons "· Cleveland, etc., R. R Co., 7 Ohio, (N. s.)
336.
1 Wllite "·Maxcy, 64 Mo. 552.
Un.
der the Kentucky statute, which only
gives an action where the dea'h was
caused by the "willful neglect" of

-

another, no action will lie if the killing was intentional. Spring's Admr.
"·Glenn, 12 Bush, 172.
' Sauter"· N.Y. Cent. etc. R. R. Co.,
66 N.Y. 50.
1 Duckworth t~. Johnson, 4 H. & N.
653; Boulter"· Webster, 13W.lt 289;
11 L. T., (N. s.) 598. Compare Lyons
"· Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 7 Ohio,
(N. s.) 336; Pennsylvania R. R. Co."·
0 gier, 35 Penn. St. 60; Quin "· Moore,
15 N.Y. 432.
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tible injurious consequences to himself. But where the statute
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ﬁxesa minimum of recovery, as some of those in this country

do, there would seem to be no doubt of the right of one who

establishes a technical ground of action to recover this minimum

sum without any speciﬁc showing of loss.‘ But in this country

as well as in England, the ground of recovery must be something

besides an injury to the feelings and affections, or a loss of the

pleasure and comfort of the society of the person killed ; there

must be a loss to the claimant that is capable of being measured

by a pecuniary standard.’ Exemplary damages are therefore not

to be recovered, unless the statute expressly, or by implication.

allows them, as in some instances it does.‘ But in estimating

' Lamphear 0. Buckingham, 33

Conn. 237. The minimum sum ﬁxed

by statute was one thousand dollars,

and the court awarded it on over-

ruling demurrer to the declaration.

" Franklin 0. Southeastern R. Co.,

8 H. & N. 211; Blake o. Midland R.

tible injurious consequences to himself. But where the statute
fixes a minimum of recovery, as some of those in this country
do, there would seem to be no doubt of the right of one who
establishes a technical ground of action to recover this minimum
sum without any specific showing of loss.' But in this country
as well as in England, the ground of recovery must be something
besides an injury to the feelings and affections, or a loss of the
pleasure and comfort of the society of the person killed ; there
must be a loss to the claimant that is capable of being measured
by a pecuniary standard.' Exemplary damages are therefore not
to be recovered, unless the statute expressly, or by implication,
allows them, as in some instances it does.j But in estimating

Co., 18 Q. 13.93; Pym 0. Great Nor.

R Co., 4 Best & S. 3'10; Mitchell

e. N. Y. Cent. etc., R R Co., 2 Hun,
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535; S C. 5 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (T. & C.)

122; Chicago e. Major, 18 Ill. 849;

Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. e. Harwood,

80 Ill. 88 ; Rockford, etc., R. R. C0.

c. Delaney, 82 Ill. 198; Brady 0. Chi-

cago, 4 Bias. 4-48; Needham 0. Grand

Trunk R. Co., 88 Vt. 294; Louis-

ville, etc., R. R. Co. e. Case's Admr.,

9 Bush, 728; Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Tindall,13 Ind., 366; Ewen 0. Chi-

cago, etc., R. R. Co., 38 Wis. 614;

Pennsylvania R. R. C0. 0. Zebe, 83

Pt-nn. St. B18; Pennsylvania R. R. Co.

o. Henderson, 51 Penn. St. 815; Telfer

n. Northern R. R. Co., 30 N. J. 188;

Donaldson 0. Mississippi, etc., R. R.

(‘0.. 18 Iowa, 280. The pain and suf-

fering by the deceased are not ele-

ments of damage to be recovered by

survivors. Barron 1:. Illinois, etc., R.

R. Co., 1 Biss. 4l2. In Scotland the

jury are permitted to award a sola-

tium for injured feelings. Putters-on

o. Wallace, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 748.

‘ See Myers e. San Francisco, 42

Cal. 215, in which a judgment of ﬂve

thousand dollars for the killing of a

child seven years of age by the run-

ning of a ﬂre-engine over it, was sus-

tained as not excessive. In Kentucky

punitory damages are allowed by the

statute when the fatal neglect is will-

ful. Jacobs 0. Louisville, etc., R. R.

Co., 10 Bush. 263. See Chiles o. Drake,

2 Met. (Ky.) 146. As to what willful

neglect is, see Lexington v. Lewis's

Admr., 10 Bush, 677. Lord Cam'-

nau. thought that in getting at actual

damages the amount of an insurance

policy that became payable at the

death should be deducted. Bee note

to 4 Best & S. 403. But the contrary

was held in Sherlock o. Ailing, 44

Ind. 184. The ground of recovery in

Tennessee seems to be much broader

than in most States, and is fully ex-

plained in Collins v. East Tennessee,

1 Lamphear
e. Buckingham, 88
Conn. 287. The minimum sum ftxed
by statute was one thousand dollars,
and the court awarded it on over.
ruling demurrer to the declaration.
• Franklin e. Southeastern R. Co.,
8 H. & N. 211; Blake e. }lid land R.
Co.,18 Q. B. 98; Pym e. Great Nor.
R. Co., 4 Best & S. 8~16; Mitchell
e. N.Y. Cent.. etc., R. R Co., 2 Hun,
535; S C.l5 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (T. & C.)
122; Chicago tJ. Major, 18 Ill, 849;
Chicago, etc., R. H. Co. e. Harwood,
80 Jll. 88 ; Rockford, etc., R. R. Co.
e. Delaney, 82 Ill. 198; Brady e. Chi.
e&bro, 4 Bi88. 448; Needham e. Grand
Trunk R. Co., 8~ Vt. 294; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. "· Case's Admr.,
9 Bush, 728; Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. "·
Tindall, 18 Ind., 866; Ewen 11. Chi.
cago, etc., R. R. Co., 88 Wis. 614;
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. • · Zebc, 83
Pl·nn. St. 818; Pennsylvania R. R. Co.
"· Henderson, 51 Penn. St. 815; Telfer
"·Northern R. R Co., 80 N.J. 188;
Donaldson e. Mis!lissippi, etc., R. R
Co.. 1M Iowa, 280. The p:lin and suf.
fering hy the deceased arc not ele..
menta of damage to be recovered by
survivors. Barron e. Illinois, etc., R.
R. Co., 1 Biss. 412. In Scotland the
jury arc permitted to award a sola.
tium for injured feelings. Pnttrr~<lD
t1. Wallace, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 748.

• See Myers tl. Sao Francisco, 42
Cal. 215, in which a Judgment of ftve
thousand dollars for the killing or a
child seven years of age by the running of a fire-engine over it, was sustained as not CXCC88ive. In Kentucky
punitory damages are allowed by the
statute when the fatal neglect is wlllful. Jacobs e. Louisville, etc., R. R.
Co., 10 Bush. 268. Sec Chiles"· Drake,
9 Met. (Ky.) 146. As to what willful
neglect is, see Lexington "· Lewis'a
Admr., 10 Bush, 677. Lord CAKP·
BELl. thought that in getting at actual
damages the amount of an insurance
policy that became payable at the
death should be deducted. See note
to 4 Bt.'St & B. 403. But the contrary
was held in Sherlock tJ. Alling, 44
Ind. 1St The ground of recovery in
Tennessee seems to be much broader
than in most States, and is fully ex.
plained in Collinto "· East Tennessee,
etc., R. R Co, 9 Hci~k. 8·tt. Sec, also,
N nsln·ille, etc., R. R. Co. "· Prince, 2
Hci'ik. 5~0; Nashville, l'IC'., R. R. Co.
~. Smith, G llcisk. 174. In Connectt.
cnt, under an act pas~C'd in 1R18, the
recovery was for the damngt•s for tho
personal injury and suffering of the
pnrty hlmsC'lf if he survived, but for
the :;ame damages if he did not sur.
vive. Se,!!cr tl. Barkhamsted, 22 Conn.
290; Masters •· Warren, 27 Conn.
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actual damages, some departure from the standards applied in
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other cases is essential, as otherwise, in some cases, no recovery

could be had at all, though the statute plainly gives the action.

If a parent sues for the killing of a minor child, who is yet too

young to render services, it is manifest that for the time being

there could be no pecuniary losswhatever; and whether the child,

if living, would ever become serviceable, must be matter for

speculation only. Yet, as the statutes plainly give the right of

action for the beneﬁt of the parent, without restriction to cir-

cumstances, but manifestly assume that there is some injury in

every case, the right to recover in these eases must be deemed

unquestionable.‘ So the parent may -recover for causing the

death of a child who was of full age and not residing with the

parent, and upon whom the parent would have no legal claim to

any assistance whatever. Here the accustomed donations of the

child constitute an element of damage, and the parent may give

evidence of his own pecuniary circumstances and dependent con-

dition, as tending to show that his loss was probably greater than

it would have been had he been independent in respect to pecu-

niary means.“ The true basis of recovery seems to be stated by

POLLOCK, C. B: “It has been held,” he says, “that these dain-

ages are not to be given as a solatium. That was so decided for
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the ﬁrst time in bane, in Blake v. Midland Railway Company.‘

That case was tried before PARKE, B., who told the jury that the

Lord Chief Baron had frequently ruled at nisi prim. and without

objection, that the claim for damage must be founded on pecu-

293. The act was amended in 1853

so as to ﬁx a minimum of one thous-

and dollars and a maximum of ﬁve

thousand dollars to the amount of the

recovery, but without changing the

basis of recovery. Soule v. New

York, etc., R. R. Co., 24 Conn. 575;

Goodscll 0. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co.,

33 Conn. 51.

‘ It was denied, however, in Geor-

gia. See Allen v. Atlanta, etc., Street

Railway Co., 54 Geo. 503. In Chicago

actual damages, some departure from the standards applied in
other cases is essential, as otherwise, in some cases, no recovery
could be had at all, though the statute plainly gives the action•
.If a parent sues for the killing of a minor child, who is yet too
young to render services, it is manifest that for the time being
there could be no pecuniary loss _whatever; and whether the child,
if living, would ever become serviceable, must be matter foc
speculation only. Yet, as the statutes plainly give the right of
action for the benefit of the parent, without restriction to circumstances, but manifestly assume that there is some injury in
every case, the right to recover in these cases must be deemed
unquestionable.' So the parent may ·recover for causing the
death of a child who was of full age and not residing with the
parent, and upon whom the parent would have no legal claim to
any assistance whatever. Here the accustomed donations of the
child constitute an element of damage, and the parent may give
evidence of his own pecuniary circumstances and dependent condition, as tending to show that his loss was probably greater than
it would have been had he been independent in respect to pecuniary means.' Tho true basis of recovery seems to be stated by
PoLLocx, C. B: "It has been held," he says, "that these damages are not to be given as a solatium,. That was so decided for
the first time in bane, in Blake v. Midland Railway Company.'
That case was tried before PARKE, B., who told the jury that the
Lord Chief Baron had frequently ruled at nisi prius, and without
objection, that the claim for damage must be founded on peen-

v. Major. 18 Ill. 349, a recovery of

eight hundred dollars for causing the

death of a child four years old was

supported. A still larger judgment

for the killing of a young child was

supported in Louisville, etc., R. R. Co.

0. Connor, 9 Heisk. 19. And see Chi-

cago 0. Scholtcn, 75 Ill. 468; Phila-

delphia, etc., R. R. Co. -v. Long, 75

Penn. St. 257; Quin v. Moore, 15 N.

Y. 432; Ihl v. Forty-Second Street, etc.,

R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317.

‘ Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169. See

Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Shannon,

43 Ill. 338; Potter '0. Chicago, etc., R.

R. Co., 22 Wis. 615; Ewen 0. Chicago,

etc., R. R. Co., 88 Wis. 618; Barley e.

Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Biss. 4.30.

' 18 Q. B. 93.

298. Tho act was amended in 1858
so as to fix a minimum of one thousand doliars and a maximum of five
thousand dollars to the amount of the
recovery, but without changing the
basis of recovery. Soule 11. New
York, etc., R R. Co., 24 Conn. 57:5;
Goodsell 11. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co.,
83 Conn. 51.
1 It was denied, however, in Georgia. See Allen "'· Atlanta, etc., Street
Railway Co., 54 Gco. 503. In Chicago
"· Major. 18 Ill. 849, a recovery of
eight hundred dollars for causing the
death of a child four years old was
supported. A still larger judgment

for the killing of a young child wl\8
supported in Louisville, etc., R. R. Co.
"· Connor, 9 Heisk. 19. And see Chicago 11. Scholten, 7:5 Ill. 468; Phil a.
delphia, etc., R R Co. 11. Long, 75
Penn. St. 2;>7; Qnin 11. Moore, 15 N.
Y. 482; lhl11. Forty-Second Street, etc.,
R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 817.
1 Chicago 11. Powers, 42 Ill. 169. See
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 11. Shannon,
48 Ill. 838; Potter 11. Chicago, etc., R.
R. Co., 22 Wis. 615; Ewen 11. Chicago,
etc., R. R. Co., 88 Wis. 618; BRrley •·
Chicago, etc., R R Co., 4 Bias. 480.
118 Q. B. 98.
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niary loss, actual or expected, and that mere injury to feelings
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could not be considered. It is also clear that the damages are

273

not to be given merely in reference to the loss of a legal right,

for they are to be distributed among relations only, and not to

all individuals sustaining such a loss; and accordingly the prac-

tice has not been to ascertain what beneﬁt could have been

enforced by the claimants, had the deceased lived, and give dam-

ages limited thereby. If, then, the damages are not to be calcu-

lated on either of these principles, nothing remains except that

they should be calculated in reference to a reasonable expectation

of pecuniary beneﬁt, as of right or otherwise, from the continu-

ance of the life.”‘ In some cases the reasonable expectation is

fairly measured by the legal right; as where the widow sues for

the loss of her husband, who was legally bound to furnish her a

reasonable support during her life time according to his condi-

tion in life; and the loss of thisreasonable support is the measure

of her recovery.’ Under the Georgia statute it seems to be held

that when action is brought in the interest of children for the

loss of their father, the damages should be the present worth of

a reasonable support for them during minority, according to the

expectiou of the father’s life, and in view of his condition in

life, prospects, habits, etc.‘ In Pennsylvania the rule adopted
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is thus stated: “ The loss is what the deceased would have

probably earned by his intellectual or bodily labor in his busi-

ness or profession during the residue of his life time, and which

would have gone for the beneﬁt of his children, taking into

consideration ability and disposition to labor, and his habits of

\

' Franklin v. South Eastern R. Co.,

8 H. & N. 211. See Dalton v. South

Eastern R. Co., 4 C. B., (11. s) 296;

Pym v. Great Nor. R. Co., 2 Best & S.

759; 4 Best & S. 396; Grotenkemper

0. Harris, 25 Ohio, (N. s.) 510; Kessler

0. Smith, 66 N. C. 154; Railroad Co.

o. Barron, 5 Wall. 90; Ewen 0. Chi-

cago, etc , R. R. Co., 38 Wis. 613; Steel

0. Kurtz, 28 Ohio, (N. s.) 191; Hunt-

ingdon, etc., R. R. Co. v. Decker, 84

Penn. St. 419.

nia.ry loss, actual or expected, and that mere injury to feelings
could not be considered. It is also clear that the damages are
not to be given merely in reference to the loss of a legal right,
for they are to be distributed among relations only, and not to
alJ individuals sustaining such a loss; and accordingly the practice has not been to ascertain what benefit could have been
enforced by tho claimants, had the deceaseJ lived, and give damages limited thereby. If, then, the damages are not to be calculated on either of these principles, nothing remains except that
they 8honld be calculated in reference to a reasonable expectation
of pecuniary benefit, as of right or otherwise, from the continuance of the life." ' In some cases the reasonable expectation is
fairly measured by the legal right; as where the wiJow sues for
the loss of her husband, who was legally bound to furnish her a
reasonable support during her life time according to his condition in life; and the loss of thi~reasonable suppor~ is the measure
of her recovery.' Under the Georgia stntute it seems to be held
that when action is brought in the interest of children tor the
loss of their father, the damages should be the present worth of
a reasonable support for them during minority, a<."Cording to the
expect.ion of the father's life, and in view of his condition in
life, prospects, habits, etc.• In Penusyh·ania the rule adopted
is thus stated: "The loss is what the deceased would have
probably earned by his intellectual or booily labor in his bnsine:::;s or profession during the residue of his life time, and which
would have gone for the benefit of his children, taking into
consideration ability and disposition to labor, and his habits of

' Macon, etc., R. R. Co. o. Johnson,

38 Geo. 409. Approved in Atlanta,

etc., R. R. Co. v. Ayres, 53 Geo. 12.

Compare Catawissa R. R. Co. v. Arm-

strong, 52 Penn. St 282. Nursing,

medical attendance, and funeral ex-

penses may propably be added. Penn-

sylvania R. R. Co. v. Bantom, 54 Penn.

St. 495; Cleveland, etc, R. R Co. 0.

Rowan, 66 Penn. St. 893. The proba-

bility of the widow’s subsequent mar-

riage should not be taken into ae-

count. Baltimore 8: Ohio R. R. Cu.

0. State, 33 Md. 542.

' David 0. South Western R. 00..

41 Geo. 223. See, also, Baltimore &

Ohio R. R. Co. 0. State, 83 Md. 542.

18

• Franklin "· South EastPrn R Co.,
3 H. & N. 211. See Dalton "· South
Eastern R. Co., • C. B., (N. e) 296;
Pym 11. Great Nor. R. Co., 2 Best & B.
75fl; 4 Best & S. 806; Grotenkemper
"·Harris, 23 Ohio, (N. s.) 510; Kessler
"·Smith, 66 N.C. 154; Railroad Co.
"· Barron, 5 Wall. 90; Ewen "· Chicago, etc, R. R. Co., 38 Wis. 613; Steel
"· Kurtz, 28 Ohio, (R. s.) 101; Hunt.
ir1gdon, etc., R. R. Co. D. Decker, 84
Penn. St. 419.
'llacon, etc., R. R Co."· Johnson,
88 Geo. 409. Approved in Atlanta,
ek:., R. R. Co. "· Ayres, 53 Geo. 12.

18

Compare CatBwissa R. R. Co."· Armstrong, 52 Penn. St 282. Nursing,
medical attendance, and funeral ex.
penses may propably be added. Pennsylvania R. H. Co."· Ban tom, 54 Penn.
St. 495; Cleveland, etc , R. R. Co. D.
Rowan, 116 Penn. St. 893. The probe..
bility of the widow's subsequent mar.
riage should not be tuken into account. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co.
11. State, 33 Md. lH2.
• David 11. South Western R. Co.,
41 Geo. 228. Bee, also, Baltimore &
Ohio R. R. Co. "· State, 3S Md. Mi.
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living and expenditnre.”‘ In some other States the probable
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value of the nurture, instruction, and physical, moral and intel-

lectual training which the parent for whose loss the suit is

brought might have given to the children, are considered proper

elements of damages.’

In some cases the circumstances may be said to reasonably ﬁx

a maximum of recovery, because they set a limit to the probable

ability to give assistance. Thus, if the deceased is a common

laboring man, and it is not shown that he could bring to the

assistance of the family other resources than his daily earnings,

an award of ﬁve thousand dollars is clearly excessive.’ So when

the suit is brought for the beneﬁt of the mother, an award so

large that the interest upon it would exceed all his probable

earnings is manifestly greater than the pecuniary loss could pos-

sibly be, where it appears that the deceased was without property

or other expectations.‘

In England an award in favor of the father of seventy-ﬁve pounds

was set aside in one case, where it appeared that he was old and

inﬁrm, and the deceased only assisted him in some work, from

which he received three shillings and sixpence per week.‘ This

seems a very strict application of the law. An American court

would probably not disturb a verdict, unless the excess appeared
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more manifest.‘

Many of the statutes ﬁx a maximum of recovery, ﬁve thou-

sand dollars being a common limitation.

The action by the father for the negligent killing of his mi11or

child cannot be joined with an action at the common law for a

personal injury to himself caused by the same negligent act.’

‘ SHAIISWUOD, J., in Pennsylvania

R. R. (Jo. v. Butler, 57 Penn. St. 335.

Sec Pennsylvania R. R. Co. o. Brooks,

57 Penn.'St. 339; Cleveland, etc., R.

R. Co. '0. Rowan, 66 Penn. St. 393;

Huntingdon, ctc. R. R. C0. 0. Decker,

R4 Penn. St. 419.

’ Tilley /o. Hudson River R. R. Co.,

29 N. Y. 252; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v.

Weldon, 52 Ill. 290; Castcllo v. Land-

Wehr, 28 \Vis. 522.

‘ Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. e. Weldon, 52

Ill. 290.

living and ex1>enditure." 1 In some other States the probable
value of the nurture, instruction, and physical, moral and intellectual training which the parent for whose loss the snit is
brought might have gi'·en to the children, are considered proper
elements of damages.'
In some cases the circumstances may be said to reasonably fix
a maximum of recovery, because they set a limit to the probable
ability to give assistance. Thus, if the deceased is a common
laboring man, and it is not shown that he could bring to the
ru-:-istance of the family other resources than his daily earnings,
an award of five thousand dollars is clearly excessive.' So when
the suit is brought for the benefit of the mother, an award so
large that the interest upon it would exceed all his probable
earnings is manifestly greater than the pecuniary loss could possibly be, where it appears that the deceased was without property
or other expectl}tions.•
In England an award in favor of the father of seventy-five ponnds
wus set aside in one case, where it appeared that he was old and
infirm, and the deceased only assisted him in some work, from
which he received thrt>e shillings and sixpence per week.• This
!:ieems a very strict application of the law. An American court
would probably not disturb a verdict, unless the excess appeared
more manife8t.'
Many of the statutes fix a maximum of recovery, five thousand dollars being a common limitation.
The action by the father for the negligent killing of his minor
child cannot be joined with an action at the common law for a
personal injury to himself caused by the same negligent act.'

‘ Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bay-

ﬂeld, 37 Mich. 205. See Hutton 1».

Windsor, 34 Up. Can. Q. B. 487; Rose

0. Des Molnes R. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 246.

‘ Franklin o. South Eastern R. Co.,

3 H. & N. 211.

° As to proper latitude to be allowed

in estimating damages, sec Railroad

C0. 0. Barron, 5 VVn1l. 90, 105.

" Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Ches-

ter, 57 ' Ind. 297.

~i

1 SHAnswuoD, J., in Pennsylvania
R. R. Uo. ,, Butler, 57 Penn. St. 835.
Sec Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,. Brooks,
57 Penn. 'St. 339; Cleveland, etc., R.
R. Co. ,. Rowan, 66 l~enn. St. 393;
Huntingdon, etc. R. R. Co.,, Decker,
M Penn. St. 419.
1 Tilley"· Hudson River R H. Co.,
29 N.Y. 252; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co.,.
Weldon, 52 Ill. 290; Castello". Land.
wehr, 28 Wi.s. 522.
1 Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. •· Weldon, 52
Ill. 290.

• Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. ,, Bay.
field, 37 Mich. 205. Bee Hutton "·
Windsor, 84 Up. Can. Q. B. 487; Rose
e. Des Moines R. R. Uo., 39 Iowa, 246.
1 Franklin ,. South Eastern R. Co.,
8 H. & N. 211.
• As to proper latitude to be allowed
in estimating damages, see Railroad
Co. ,. Barron, 5 Wall. 90, 100.
' Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. "· Cheater, 57' Ind. 297.
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OIVIL AND POLITWAL RIGUTS.
G H A PT E R I X.

~75

wnoxss IN RESPECT T0 CIVIL AND POLITICAL atoms.

The Term Civil Rights. If we employ the term civil rights

in the comprehensive sense in which it has already been made

use of.‘ we lniglit with propriety discuss under that title all

classes of rights not strictly political. It has been found more

convenient, however, to follow the common method. and to speak

of some classes of rights separately: such, for instance, as rights

in real and personal property, incorporeal rights, etc. In this

regnril we follow the practice of writers on general jurisprudence

CHAPTER IX.

and constitutional law, who, in discussing sovereign powers.

speak of the power to tax, the police power, etc., as it’ these stood

apart from the general powers of government, when in fact in

WRONGS IN RESPECT TO CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS.

their exercise they are only particular manifestations of the gen-

eral sovereignty. The method is well enough, because it is con-

venient; at the same time it is desirable not to be misled by the

use of so comprehensive a term in a sense comparatively narrow.

The use of the term civil rights in this latter sense has been

brought about within a few years in connection with legislation

to preclude discrimination against colored people; and in the

public mind it has not embraced some rights which are quite
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fundamental—such, for example, as the right to acquire prop-

erty—becausc, as to these, there was no controversy and no

occasion to legislate._

Civil liberty has also been spoken of, and an attempt made to

show in what it consistes.’ At the same time the power of the

legislature to regulate civil rights and the necessity for its em-

ployment was recognized. In now directing attention to the

wrongs which may be suﬂ'ei-ed in respect to civil rights, particular

rights will be mentioned, and the limits the overstepping of

which will constitute a violation of right, either by the State or

' Ante, p. 33. ‘ ' Ante, pp. 8-10.

The Term Civil Rights. If we employ the tenn civil rights
in the comprehensive t:ense in which it has already been made
nse of,' we might with propriPtJ discms under that title all
classe~ of rights not strictly political. It has been found more
convenient, however, to follow the common method. and to speak
of some classes of rights separately; such, for instance, as rig-htH
in real and perf.onal property, incorpor£>al rights, etc. In this
re.!..''Hr(l we tollow the practice of writers on ~eneral jurisprudence
and constitutional law, who, in discn!lsing sovereign powers,
speak of the power to tax, the poliee power, etc., as if these stood
»part from the general powers of government, when in tact in
their exercise they are only particular maniff>stations of the general sovereignty. The method is well enou~h, because it is conwnient; at the same time it is desirable not to be mi£ll£'d by the
use of so comprehensive a term in a senAe comparati,·ely uarrO\V.
The use of the term civil rights in this latter sense has been
hronght ahont within a few years in connection with lPgislation
to prP('ln<le dis<'rimination against colored p<>ople; and in the
public mind it has not embraced some rights which are quite
fundamental- such, for example, as the right to acquire property- because, as to tlu:Jse, there was no coutro\·cr·sy and no
occasion to legislate.
Civil liberty has al~ been spoken of, and an attempt made to
show in what it consistes.• At the same time the power of the
lcgislattue to regulate civil ri~hts and the necessity for its employment was recognizcu. In now directing attention to the
wrongs which may be suflcred in rcsl•eet to ci,·il rights, particular
rights will be mentioned, and the limits the ove1·stepping of
which will constitute a violation of right, either by the State or
• Ante, p. 83.

• Ante, pp. 8-10•
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by individuals, will be indicated. A wrong is not the less a.
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wrong because of being committed by the State through its legis-

lation; and when thus committed some individual actor is gen-

erally in_position to be held responsible. Even when that is not

the case, however, a discussion of the law of wrongs could not

well omit the wrongs by government.

Bight to Labor and to Employ Labor. Every person mi

has a right to make use of his labor in any lawful employment

on his own behalf, or to hire it out in the service of others. This

is one of the ﬁrst and highest of civil rights.

by individuals, will be indicated. A wrong is not the less a
wrong because of being committed by the State through its legislation; and when thus committed some individual actor is generally in. position to be held responsible. ·Even when that is not
the case, however, a discussion of the law of wrongs could not
well omit the wrongs by government.

State Regulation of Employments. Within certain limits

which cannot with accuracy be conclusively deﬁned, the State

must always be at liberty to determine what are lawful employ-

ments, and to make others unlawful by forbidding them. This

liberty is exercised by making games of chance unlawful, and in

some States by forbidding the traﬁic in intoxicating drinks. The

assumption supporting such prohibitions is, that the employ-

Right to Labor and to Employ Labor. Every person BUi juriB
has a right to make use of his labor in any lawful employment
on his own behalf, or to hire it ont in the service of others. This
is one of the first and highest of civil rights.

ments forbidden are hurtful and demoralizing; and they are pro-

hibited in the exercise of a legislative discretion which is subject

to no extraneous control. ‘ Passing from the cases of prohibition,

we ﬁnd that the authority to regulate business embraces every

class and variety of occupation, and that it may be exercised
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either in respect to the persons who may follow or be employed

in the business, or as to the methods in which the business may

be conducted. or both.

The general principle of constitutional liberty is, that there

must be no exclusions from lawful employments. Nevertheless,

the law may make exceptions in some cases where the reasons

therefor are suﬁicient on grounds of public policy. Without

doubt persons may be excluded -because their immaturity qr imbe-

cility would render the employment hurtful to themselves or

dangerous to others, or for any other reason special and peculiar

to their cases, and which presents a fair case for the exercise of

the legislative judgment. The case of the employment of small

children in mines or manufactories is an apt illustration. For-

bidding this is sometimes a matter of humanity, and the right to

do so is plain.‘ The exclusion of females might perhaps be jus-

_ ' Commonwealth 0. Hamilton Manuf. Co., 120 Mass. 383.

H

State Regulation of Employments. Within certain limits
which cannot with accuracy be conclusively defined, the State
must always be at liberty to determine what are lawful employments, and to make others unlawful by forbidding them. This
liberty is exercised by making games of chance unlawful, and in
some States by forbidding the traffic in intoxicating drinks. The
assumption supporting such prohibitions is, that the employments forbidden are hurtful and demoralizing; and they are prohibited in the exercise of a legislative discretion which is subject
to no extraneous control.' Passing from the cases of prohibition,
we find that the authority to regulate business embraces every
class and variety of occupation, and that it may be exercised
either in respect to the persons who may follow or be employed
in the business, or as to the methods in which the business may
be conducted. or both.
The general principle of constitutional liberty is, that there
must be no exclusions from lawful employments. Nevertheless,
the law may make exceptions in some cases where the reasons
therefor are sufficient on grounds of public policy. Without
doubt persons may be excluded .because their immaturity Qr imbecility would render the employment hurtfnl to themselves or
dangerous to others, or for any other reason special and peculiar
to their cases, and which presents a fair case for the exercise of
the legislative judgment. The case of the employment of small
children in mines or manufactories is an apt illustration. :Forbidding this is sometimes a matter of humanity, and the right to
do so is plain/ The exclusion of females might perhaps be jus, 1

Commonwealth "· Hamilton llanuf. Co., 128 Ml\88. 383.
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tiﬁed on physical grounds of equal validity in the case of some

employments.' And where an occupation is peculiarly suscep-

tible of abuse, it may be proper for the State to surround it with

special restrictions, and to require those who propose to enter

upon it to take out a special licence and give security for good

behavior, and to refuse altogether to issue licenses to persons of

known bad character. Such regulations are usually made for the

cases of hackmen, saloon-keepers, proprietors of billiard halls, of

theaters, shows, etc.

The ﬁnal test of what is a reasonable regulation must be found

in the legislative judgment, unless the constitution has provisions

on the subject. \Vhat the legislature ordains and the constitu-

tion does not prohibit must be lawful.‘ But if the constitution

does no more than to provide that no person shall be deprived of

life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law, it makes

an important provision on this subject, because it is an important

part of civil liberty to have the right to follow all lawful employ-

ments. Regulations invidiously framed to exclude persons or

classes must be held forbidden by the constitutional provision

referred to. The grant by the State of monopolies in trade must

also be held forbidden by it. These were long since decided to

be illegal in England,’ and they are equally illegal in this coun-
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tr_v.‘ Still, the legislature, when it grants special privileges or

franchises, may undoubtedly make them exclusive. The dis-

tinction seems to be this: The following of the ordinary and

necessary employrnents of life is a matter of right, and cannot

be made to depend upon the State‘s permission or license, except

* Granting licenses for the sale of ' Danville R R Co. 0. Common-

intoxicating drinks to males only,

does not violate the constitutional

provision which forbids the grant of

special privileges or immunities.

B-air 0. Kilputrick, 40 Ind. 312. A

regulation which should forbid the

employment of females in any place

where intoxicating liquors are sold

might be supported by very strong

reasons growing out of the peculiar

temptations to vice and crime where

tified on physical grounds of equal validity in the case of some
employments.' And where an occupation is peculiarly susceptible of abuse, it may be proper for the State to surround it with
special restrictions, and to require those who propose. to enter
upon it to take out a special licence and give security for good
behavior, and to refuse altogether to issue licenses to persons of
known bad character. Such regulations are usually made for the
cases of hackmen, saloon-keepers, proprietors of billiard halls, of
theaters, shows, etc.
The final test of what is a reasonable regulation must be found
in the legislative jud~ment, unless the con8titution has pr(}visions
on the subject. 'Vhat the legislature ordains and the constitution does not prohibit must be lawful.' But if the constitution
does no more than to pro\· ide that no pcrsou shall be depri \"ed of
lite, liberty, or property, except by due process of law, it makes
an important provision on this subject, because it is an important
part of civil liberty to have the right to follow all lawful employments. Regulations invidiously framed to exclnde per~ons or
clnsses must be held forbidden by the constitutional provision
reterred to. Tho grant by the State of monopolies in trade must
al~;o be held forbidden by it. These were long since decided to
be illegal in England,' and they are equally illegal in this countJ·~· .• Still, the legislature, when it grants special prh·ilcges or
f1·anchises, may undoubtedly make them exclusive. The distinction seems to be this: The following of the ordinary and
nt'CCSsary employments of lite is a matter of right, and cannot
be made to depeud upon the State's permic:;sion or license, ex<:ept

the sexes are brought together in the

'

habitual indulgence of alcoholic

stimulants.

wealth, 73 Penn. St. 20,38; Randlc 0.

Put-itic R. R. Co., 65 M0. 825.

‘ Darcy v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84.

‘ lt has nevertheless been decided

that the Stale may grant to a corpo-

ration the exclusive control of the

business of slaughtering cattle for its

principal city, and that this is no in-

vasion of civil rights. Slaughter-

house Cases, 16 Wall. 86. The sub-

ject is discussed by the author at

length in the Princeton Review for

March-April. 1878.

Granting licenaea for tho sale of
intoxicating drinks to males only,
does not violate the constitutional
provision wll.ich forl>ids the grant of
sp<>cial privile~es or immunities.
B.sir "· Kilputrick, 40 Ind. 312. A
regulation which should forbid the
employmeat of females in any place
wht!re intoxicating liquors are sold
might be supported by very strong
rensona growing out or the peculiar
temptationtl to vice and crime where
the aes:ea are brought together in the
habitual indulgence of alcoholic
IWnUlanta.
1

Danville R. R Co. "· Commonwealth. 73 Penn. St. 20, 38; Randle e.
Pucitlc R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 82:>.
'Darcy"· Allain, 11 Rep. 84.
• lt bas nevertheless been decided
that the Stale may grant to a corporation the exclusive control of tho
business of slaughtering cnttlc fm· its
principal city, and that this is no invasion of civil rights. Slaughter.
bouse Cases, 16 Wall. 86. The t;UbJect is discussed by the author u
length in the PrinutOA &DiN for
March-April, 1878.
1

•
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to this extent: that if the business offers temptations to excep-
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tional abuses, it may be subjected to special and exceptional reg-

to this extent: that if the business offers temptations to exceptional abuses, it may be subjected to special and exceptional regulations, and among these may be the requirement of a license.
Bot when the State gives permission to do something not otherwise lawful, it may in its discretion make the gift exclusive.
Thns, it may grant an exclusive ferry, or an exclusive right to
erect a toll-bridge, or to set np a lottery, and no one is wronged.
because no one had snch a liberty before, and therefore no one
is deprived of any thing by the grant.

ulations, and among these may be the requirement of a license.

But when the State gives permission to do something not other-

wise lawful, it may in its discretion make the gift exclusive.

Thus, it may grant an exclusive ferry, or an exclusive right to

erect a toll-bridge, or to set up a lottery, and no one is wronged.

because no one had such a liberty before, and therefore no one

is deprived of any thing by the grant.

Right to form Business Relations. It is a part of every man’s

civil rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations

with any person whomsoever. whether the refusal rests upon

reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice.

With his reasons neither the public nor third persons have any

legal concern. It is also his right to have business relations

with any one with whom he can make contracts, and if he is

Bight to form Business Belationa. It is a part of every man's
civil rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations

wrongfully deprived of this right by others, he is entitled to

redress. Thus, if one is prevented by the wrongful act of a

third party from securing some employment he has sought, he

with any person whomsoever. whether the ret'nsal rests upon
reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice.
With his reasons neither the public nor third persons have any
legal concern. It is also his right to have business relations
with any one with whom he can make contracts, and if he is
wrongfully deprived of this right by others, he is entitled to
redress. Thus, if one is prevented by the wrongful act of a
third party from securing some employment he has sought, he
suffers a legal wrong, provided he can show that the failure to
employ him was tho direct and natural consequence of the
wrongful act. The difficulty here is, that this will in general be
a consequence of some other legal wrong, and will constitute an
aggravation of damages rather than a distinct cause of action.
Thus, the libel of a serving-man may induce one needing his
services to refuse him employment; • but here the libel is the
cause of action, and the loss of employment is the proof that
special damage has flowed from it. It probably cannot he safely
affirmed that inducing one by any means whatsoever not in themselves unlawful to refuse a person employment will give a cause
of action. A wrong of that sort would be accomplished either,
firet, by the presentation of reasons, or, seeond, by means of a
conspiracy: in the former case there would be no legal wrong if

suffers a legal wrong, provided he can show that the failure to

employ him was the direct and natural consequence of the

wrongful act. The difﬁculty here is, that this will in general be
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a consequence of some other legal wrong, and will constitute an

aggravation of damages rather than a distinct cause of action.

Thus, the libel of a serving-man may induce one needing his

services to refuse him employment;‘ but here the libel is the

cause of action, and the loss of employinent is the proof that

special damage has ﬂowed from it. It probably cannot be safely

aﬂirmed that inducing one by any means whatsoever not in them-

selves unlawful to refuse a person employment. will give a cause

of action. A wrong of that sort would be accomplished either,

ﬁrst, by the presentation of reasons, or, second, by means of a

conspiracy: in the former case there would be no legal wrong if

' In Ashley o. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48,

where a manager sued for a libel on

an actor in his employ, alleging as

special damage that the actor was

thereby made sick and disabled from

acting, Lord Kmzxorr ruled that the

O

" * or ‘<naw

damages were too remote; and in

Vicars '0. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1. it was

held, that being discharged from scr-

vicc because of a slander not other-

wise actionable would not make it so.

•

1 In Ashley "· HIUTison, 1 Esp. 48,
where a manager sued for a libel on
an actor in his employ, alleging as
special damage that the actor was
thereby made sick and disabled from
acting, Lord KEli"YON ruled that the

......

damages were too remote; and in
Vicar" "· Wilcocks, 8 East, 1. it was
held, that being discharged from service because of a slander not otherwise actionable would not mllke it so.
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there were no such false assertions as would support an action;

in the latter, if the conspiracy were made.eﬂ'ectual by means of

unlawful acts, the wrong would be manifest; but what shall be

deemed unlawful acts in the case of a conspiracy it is not very

easy to determine.

Conspiracy to Prevent Employment. By conspiracy is here

there were no such false assertions as would s11pport an action;
in the latter, if the conspiracy were made.effectual by means of
unlawful acts, the wrong would be manifest; but what shall be
deemed unlawful acts in the case of a conspiracy it is not Yery
easy to determine.

intended, a combination of two or more persons to accomplish,

by some concerted action, an unlawful end to the injury of

another. It was shown in a preceding chapter that the eon-

spiracy was not in itselfa legal wrong; it is a thing amiss, when

it has an unlawful purpose in view, but it does not become a legal

wrong until the unlawful purpose is accomplished, or until some

act, distinctly illegal, is done towards its accomplishment. Nor

is it perceived that the end itself can be unlawful if it can be

accomplished by perfectly lawful means.‘

There may be a difference in the law between breaking up a

service actually entered upon or contracted for, and inducing a

person by any species of inducements not unlawful in themselves

to refuse to contract for service. The latter may be wrong in
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morals, but not illegal: the former is an actionable wrong.

standing upon exactly the same footing as the wrong by which

the master loses his servant’s assistance through his being wrong-

fully disabled. This general subject was recently so fully con-

sidered by the Court of Queen’s Bench in an action brought for

maliciously procuring an actor to break his contract of service

with the plaintiff, that a reference to that case. and to the author-

ities upon which it was decided, seems to be all that is important

in this connection. It was held in that case by the majority of

the court that the action will lie whether the service had actually

been entered upon or not, provided a valid contract for it was in

existence.’ wﬁn the other hand it has been decided that a mere

‘ To conspire maliciously and vex-

atiously, and without reasonable or

probable cause, to commence and actu-

ally commencing a suit in the name

nt‘ -1 third party against the plaintiff,

is not actionable where no legal dam-

age is alleged. Cottercll v. Jones, 11

C. B. 713. See Wellington o. Small,

3 Cush. 145.

\§»&¢,ﬂ»Z¢v, ~0-

'Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 2lli_

Conspiracy to Prevent Employment. By conspiracy is hE>re
intended, a combination of two or more persons to accomplish,
by some concerted action, an unlawful end to the injnry of
another. It was shown in a preceding chapter that the conllpiracy was not in i~lf a legal wrong; it is a thing amiss, when
it has an unlawful purpose in view, but it does not become a le~al
wrong until the unlawful purpose is acf'ompli.,hed, or until some
act, distiuctly illegal, is done towards its accomplillhment. Xor
it> it perceived that the end itself can be unlawful if it can be
accomplished by perfectly lawful means.•
There may be a difference in the law between breaking up a
Rervice actually entered upon or contracted for, and inducing a
person by any species of inducements not unlawful in themSE'lve~
to refuse to contraet for ser,·ice. The latter may be wrong in
moral~', but not illE'gal: the former is an actionable wrong,
standing upon exnctly the same footing as the wrong by which
the mnt'ter loses his sen·ant's assillbmce through his being wrongfully disabled. This general subject was recently so fully conRidered hy the Court of Queen's Benrh in an action broJl~ht for
maliciously procuring an actor to break hill contract of servi<·E'
with the plaintiff, that a reference to that case, and to the authorities upon whid1 it waH deeirled, sE'ems to be all tlll\t is ~mportant
in this connection. It was held in that case by the majority of
the court that the action will lie wlwther the f'en·ice had actually
been entered upou or not, provided a valid contract for it was in
existence.' ~n the other hand it has been decided that a mere

citing the cases for enticing away or

harboring servants, Adams v. Bafeuld,

1 Leon. '2-10; Blake 1:. Lanyon, Ii T. R.

221; Pilkington r. Scott, 15 M. 6: W.

657 ; Hartley o. Cummings, 5 C. li.

247; Sykes 0. Dixon, 9 Ad. & El.

G?

5‘

31';

1 To conspire maliciously and ,-cxatiously, and without rc&llonable or
probable cause, to commence and nctually commencing a suit In the name
nr 'l thirtl party against the plaintiff,
is not actionaule whem no legal damage is allcgetl. Cotterell 1:1. Jones, 11
C. B. 71:1. See Wellington o. Small,
3 Cu11b. 14.j.

~ k,a.~4."1 /

'Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & lll. 2W.
citing the cases for enticing :1wny or
harboring scn·ants, Adams o. Bafcnhl.
1 Leon. 240; Blake t'. Lanyon, li T. R.
221; Pilkington t:. Scott, 15 M. & W.
6.)7 ; Htutley o. Cummings, 5 C. B.
247; Sykes e. Dixon, 9 Ad. & El. 6!m.

1
280 THE LAW or TORTS.

conspiracy to break a contract for the delivery of property can-
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not constitute a tort, _even though the contract be broken in pur-

suance of it; the ground of it being that the party to the contract

might of his own volition have broken his promise without being

liable as for a wrong, and “that an act which, if done by one

alone, constitutes no ground of an action on the case, cannot be

made the ground of such action by alleging it to have been done

by and through a conspiracy of several. The quality of the act,

and the nature of the injury inﬂicted by it, must determine the

question whether the action will lie.” ‘ It is diflicult to under-

stand, however. why a conspiracy to deprive one of labor con-

tracted for can be any different in nature or damaging quality

from a conspiracy to deprive him of property bargained for;

or of anything else of value. There is no peculiar sacredness to

the right to service over any other right, and no good reason

can be suggested for protecting it diﬁ'erently.'

But the acts done in pursuance of a conspiracy may be unlawful

in themselves if they include deception, threats,‘ intimidation, or

auy species of duress whatsoever, whether employed upon the

laborer or upon the employer. Any one has an undoubted right

to refuse to be employed by another, but he has no right what-

ever to resort to compulsion of any sort to keep others from the
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employment. A society of men may lawfully unite in agreeing

that they will not perform services for those who employ laborers

not associated with them, but they become wrong-doers the I110-

meut they interfere with the liberty of action of others. Upon

this point the recent case of Carew v. Rutbmford is instructive.

In that case, for some disregard of their regulations, a con-

tractor, who had not agreed to be bound by them, was ﬁned by a

labor organization, and was threatened that, unless he paid the

' Kimball 0. Harman, 84 Md. 507;

S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 340, citing Hutchins

0. Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104; Wellington

0. Small,8 Cush.14-3; Adler ‘D. Fenton,

24 How. 407; Cottcrell v. Jones, 11

C. B. 713. A conspiracy between a

debtor and a third person to defraud

a creditor by the debtor delivering

property over to the third party and

then taking the beneﬁt of the insol-

vent law, was held actionable in Per

rod 0. Morrison, 2 Pen. & Watts, 126,

criticised in Wellington 1;. Small, 3

conspiracy to break a contract for the delivery of property eannot constitute a tort, ~ven though the contract be broken in pursuance of it; the ground of it being that the party to the contract
might of his own volition have broken his promise without being
liable as for a wrong, and " that an act which, if done by one
alone, constitutes no ground of au action on the case, cannot be
made the ground of such action by alleging it to have been done
by and throngh a conspiracy of several. The quality of the act,
and the nature of the injnry inflicted by it, must determine the
question whether the action will lie." 1 It is difficult to understand, howen!r. why a cow~piracy to deprive one of labor contracted for can be any different in nature or damaging quality
from a conspirncy ~ deprive him of property bargained for;
or of anything else of value. There is no peculiar sacredness to
the right to service over any other right, and no good reason
can be suggested for protecting it differently.•
But the acts done in pursuance of a con~piracy may be unlawful
in themselves if the: include deception, threats: intimidation, or
any species of duress whatsoever, whether employed upon the
laborer or upon the employer. Any oue has an undoubted right .
to refuse to be employed by another, but he has no right whatever to ree;ort to compulsion of any sort to keep others from the
employment. A society of men may lawfully unite in agreeing
that they will not perform serdces for those who employ laborers
not associated with them, but they become wrong-doers the mo- ·
ment they interfere with the liberty of action of others. Upon
this point the recent case of Oarew v. Rutherford is instructive.
In that case, for some disregard of their regulations, a contractor, who had not agreed to be bound by them, was fined by a
labor organization, and was threatened that, unless he paid the

Cush. 145.

' An action may perhaps be main-

tained for inducing a man to break a

contract of marriage. Sheperd o.

Wakcnian, 1 Sid. 79. ‘

' See Green v. Button, 2 C.

707; Rice v. Manley, 66 N.Y.

23 Am. Rep. 30..

_-‘fé’?

9°?’

S1?’

1 Kimball "· Harman, 84 Md. 007;
S. 0. 6 Am. Rt>p. 840, citing Hutchins
e. Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104; Wellington
e. Small, 8 Cush. 14.); Adler"· Fenton,
24 How. 407; Cotterell "· Jones, 11
0 . B. i13. A conspiracy between a
debtor and a third person to defraud
a creditor by the debtor delivering
property over to the third party and
then taking the ben<"fit of the insolV<"nt law, was held actionRble in Per

rod 11. Morri!lon, 2 Pen. & Watts, 126,
criticised in Wellington fl. Small, 8
Cosh. 145.
' An action may perhaps btl main.
taine<l for inducing a man to break &
contract of marriage. Sheperd e.
Wllkeman, 1Sid. 79.
• See Green "· Button, 2 C. M:. &. R.
707; Rice 11. Manley,66 N.Y.82; S.C.
23 Am. Rt'p. 80.,

•
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ﬁne, his workmen should leave his employ, and that the power

281

of the association should be used to prevent others engaging in

his service. Says Cnsrmau, Ch. J .: “We have no doubt that a

conspiracy against a mechanic who is under the necessity of

employing workmen in order to carry on his business, to obtain

a sum of money from him which he is under no legal liability to

pay, by inducing his workmen to leave him, and by deterring

others from entering into his employment, or by threatening to

do this, so that he is induced to pay the money demanded, under

a reasonable apprehensioh that he cannot carry on his business

without yielding to the illegal demand, is an illegal, if not a

criminal, conspiracy; that the acts done under it are illegal; and

that the moneys thus obtained may be recovered back, and if the

parties succeed in injuring his business, they are liable to pay all

the damage thus done to him. It is a species of annoyance and

extortion which the common law has never tolerated. This prin-

ciple does not interfere with the freedom of business, but pro-

tects it. Every man has a right to determine what branch of

business he will pursue, and to make his own contracts with

whom he pleases, and on the best terms he can. He may change

from one occupation to another, and pursue as many diﬁ"erent

occupations as he pleases, and competition in business is lawful.
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He may refuse to deal with any man or class of men; and it is

no crime for any number of persons, without an unlawful object

in view, to associate themselves together and agree that they will

not work for or deal with certain men or classes of men, or work

under a certain price or without certain conditions.‘ * * *

Freedom is the policy of this country. * * * The acts alleged

and proved in this case are peculiarly oﬂensive to the free prin-

ciples which prevail in this country, and if such practices could

enjoy impunity, they would tend to establish a tyranny of irre-

sponsible persons overlabor and mechanical business which would

be extremely injurious to both.”“ The same general principle

has also been declared in England, where the court went so far

as to enjoin a labor association which, by means of placards,

advertisements, etc., was endeavoring to prevent laborers from

' Citing Commonwealth 0. Hunt, 4 * Carew -v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1,

Met. 111; Boston Glass Manufactory 13. See Hilton e. Eekersley, 6 El.&

r. Binncy, 4 Pick. 425; Bowen 0. BL47.

Matheson, 14 Allen, 499.

..

:fine, hie workmen should leave his employ, and that the power
of the association should be use<l to prevent others en~ging in
his service. Says CHAPMAN, Ch. J.: "We have no doubt that a
eonspiracy against a mechanic who is onder the necessity of
employing workmen in order to carry on his business, to obtain
a sum of money from him which he is under no legal liability to
pay, by inducing his workmen to leave him, and by detening
others from entering into his employment, or by threatening to
do this, eo that he is induced to pay the money demanded, under
a reasonable apprehensioft that he cannot carry on his business
without yielding to the illegal demand, is an illegal, if not a
criminal, conspiracy; that the acts done under it are illegal; and
that the moneys thus ohtained may be recovered back, and if the
parties succeed in injuring his business, they are liable to pay all
the damage thus done to him. It is a species of annoyance and
extortion which the common law has ne\·er tolerated. This principle does not interfere with the freedom of but~iness, but protects it. Every man has a right to determine what branch of
business he \Vill pursne, and to make his own contracts with
• whom he pleases, and on the b<>st terms he can. He may chnnge
from one occupation to another, and 1mrsne as many different
occupations as he pleases, and competition in business is lawful.
He may refuse to deal with any man or class of men; and it is
no crime for any number of persons, without an unlawful object
in view, to associate themselves to~ther and agree that they will
not work for or deal with certain mtln or classes of men, or work
nnder a certain price or without certain conditions.' * * *
Freedom is the policy of this conn try. * * * The actA alleged
and proved in this case are pec.-uliarly otf'ensi ve to the free principles which prevail in thiti country, and it' such practices could
eujoy impunity, they would tend to establish a tyranny of irrespon8ihle persons over Jabor aud mechanical busin('ss which would
be extremely injurious to both."' Tho same general principle
has also been declared in England, where the court went so far
as to enjoin a labor association which, by means of placards,
advertisements, etc., was endeavoring to prevent laborers from

.

.

1 Citing Commonwealth e. Hunt, ~
MeL 111; Boston Gla.'IB Manufactory
"· Binney, 4 Pick. 42;1; Bowen e.
)fatheson, 14 Allen, 499.

1 Carew •· Rutherford, 106 Mau. 1,
18. Bee Hilton •· Eckersley, 6 El. &

Bl. 47.
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entering the plaintiﬁ"s employment. The justiﬁcation for this

action was found in the fact that the organization was proceeding

to destroy the value of the plaintiff ’s property; by their threats

and intimidation rendering it impossible for the plaintiffs to

obtain workmen, without whose assistance the property would

become utterly valueless for the purposes of their trade.‘ The

same doctrine would undoubtedly be applied to the case of em-

ployers, who, by combination and unlawful means, should pre-

vent or seek to prevent the employment of any special class of

laborers. Every man has the liberty of employing and being

employed, andevery man must respect the like liberty in others.

Unlawful Combinations. A combination formed by agree-

ment between a number of employers in the same line of busi-

ness, to suspend or carry on business,as the majority shall agree,

entering the plaintiff's employment. The justification for this
action was found in the fact that the organization was proceeding
to destroy the value of the plaintiff's property; by their threats
and intimidation rendering it impossible for the plaintiffs to
obtain workmen, without whose aseistanee the property would
become utterly valueless for the purposes of their trade.' The
same doctrine would undoubtedly be applied to the case of employers, who, by combination and unlawful means, should prevent or seek to prevent the employment of any special class of
laborers. Every man has the liberty of employing and being
employed, and-every man must rel'pect the like liberty in otherto.

is void, because in restraint of trade.’ So is an agreement

between laborers, by which they undertake that they will not

seek work at a shop where disputes connected with the trade have

arisen, and will not encourage or assist a laborer contrary to cer-

tain rules agreed upon, or seek to procure employment for those
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not associated with them.‘ These are plain cases.

Right to be Carried by Common Carriers. The business ot

common carriers is a quasi public business; a term which we

employ, because it is often made use of. and because it indicates

that the public have some rights in respect to the business which

do not exist in the case of business of a purely private character.

N o man becomes a common carrier except with his own consent;

but when he docs so, he must conform to those principles of the

Unlawfal Combinations. A combination formed by agreement between a number of employers in the same line of business, to suspend or carry on business, as the majority shall agree.
is void, because in restraint of trade.• So is an agreement
between laborers, by which they undertake that they will not
seek work at a shop where dia;putes connected with the tradeha\'e
arisen, and will not encourage or assist a laborer contrary to certain rules agreed upon, or seek to procure employment for those
not associated with them.' These are plain cases.

common law under which the business has grown up, and which

have always required of the common carrier impartiality in his

business as between individuals; he must carry for all, and he

must carry under impartial regulations.‘ But the common law

‘ Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, thirteenth amendment to the Consti-

Law R. 6 Eq. Cas. 551.

’ Hilton 0. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl.

47, 66.

’ Hornby v. Close, L. R. 2 Q. B. 153.

And see Farrer v. Close, L. R. 4 Q. B.

602; Commonwealth 1;. Hunt, 4 Met.

111; People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9.

The right of a slave, freed by the

tulion, to be paid for his services.

where he continued in the former

master’s service, began immediately,

Right to be Carried by Common Carriers.

The business ot
common carriers is a qua8i public business; a term which we
employ, because it is often made use ot: and becnua;e it indicates
that the public have some rights in respect to the business which
do not exist in the ~se of business of a purely prh·ate character.
No man becomes a common carrier except with his own con~ent;
but when he does so, he must conform to those principles of the
<~ommon law under which the business has grown up, and which
have always required ot' the common carrier impartiality in his
business as between individuals; he must <>arry for all, and he
must carry under impartial reglllations.c But the common law

without any special contract. Huhdy

1:. Clark, 4 Houston, 16.

‘ 2 Kent. Com. 451; Redf. on Railw.

Vol. 2, lntrod. Aug. on Carriers.

' Springhead Spinning Co. t~. Riley,
Law R. 6 Eq. Cas. m>t.
t Hilton t~. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl.

47, 66.
• Hornby t~. Close, L. R. 2 Q. B. 11S3.
And see Farrer ~. Close, L. R. 4 Q. B.
602; Commonwealth "· Hunt, 4 Met.
111; People t~. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9.
The right of a slave, fr<'cd by the

thirteenth amendment to the Consti.
tulion, to be paid for his services.
where he continued in tho form('r
master's service, began immediately,
without any special contract Handy
"· Clark, 4 Houston, 16.
• 2 Kent. Com. 451; Redf. on Railw.
Vol. 2, Introd. Ang. on Carriers.

CIVIL axn POLITICAL RIGHTS. 283$

does not determine what shall be the scope of his business; he
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may carry certain kinds of property only, or all kinds of property;

or, if he be a carrier of persons, he may, perhaps, limit the busi-

ness to the carriage of certain classes of persons only; the dis-

crimination being based on distinctions which are’ not objectionable

as being arbitrary, but having some principle to support them.

It is not perceived, for example, that any principle of the com-

mon law should preclude a person from undertaking to carry from

point to point, as a permanent business. persons of one sex only,

making special arrangements for their accommodation, while

another, perhaps, makes other arrangements for the other sex.

But where no such discrimination was made, certain liberty of

action in receiving and rejecting persons was always admissible,

because it could always be justiﬁed on grounds of impartiality

and reason. To take a plain case: A railroad company could

never be compelled to receive and carry in one of its ordinary

passenger coaches a man whose appearance was shocking to the

sense of decency of others, or a man in a state of beastly intoxi-

cation, or a man aﬂiicted with contagious disease.‘ The compul-

sion of impartial carriage is established on public grounds, and

for the public beneﬁt, and it is manifest that the public good does

not require that persons should be received for carriage under
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such circumstances. But since it is impossible to anticipate all

the cases which may arise to render discriminations proper, the

law allows to carriers the liberty of making rules and regulations

for the control and management of their business, subject to this

restriction only, that the rules and regulations must not be unrea-

sonable,‘ and that they must not conﬂict with any which may

lawfully be prescribed by competent legislative authority. Com-

petent authority would be that of the State, in the case of com-

merce entirely within the State. and that of the United States, in

the case of foreign and inter-State traﬁic.

Among the regulations often established by carriers of passen-

gers is one setting aside certain carriages for the exclusive use of

women and their escorts. Such a regulation violates the right of

no one who is excluded, and for whom accommodations are else-

‘See Jencks 0. Coleman. 2 Bum. chcster, etc., R. R. Co. o. Miles, 55

221; Markham v. Brown. 8 N. H. 523. Penn. St. 209; State 0. Overton, 24 N.

' Day 0. Owen, 5 Mich. 620; West» J. 435.

doee not determine what shall be the scope of his busineu; he
may f!ARY certain kinds of property only, or all kinds of property;
or, if he be a carrier of persons, he may, perhaps, limit the business to the carriage of certain classes of persons only; the discrimination being based on distinctions which anr not objectionable
as being arbitrary, but having some principle to sn1•port them.
It is not perceived, for example, that any principle of the common law should preclude a person frQm undertaking to carry from
point to point, as a permanent business. persons of one sex only,
making special arrangements for their accommodation, while
another, perhapa, makes ot.her &rr&nf,~ments for the other sex.
But where no such discrimination was made, certain liberty of
action in receiving and rejecting persons was always admissible,
because it could always be justified on grounds of impartiality
and re&.'ion. To take a plain case: A railroad company could
never be compelled to re<.-eive and carry in one of its ordinary
passenger coaches a man whose appearance was shocking to the
bense of decency of others, or a man in a state of beastly intoxication, or a man afHicted with contagious di~case.• The compulsion of impartial carriage is established on public grounds, and
tor the public benefit, and it is manifest that the public good does
not require that per~ons should be received for carriage under
such circumRtances. But since it is impossible to anticipate all
the cases which may arise to render discriminations proper, the
law allows to carriers the liberty of making rules and regulations
tor the control and management of their business, subject to this
restriction only, that the rules and regulations must not be unreasonable,' and that they must not conflict with any which may
lawfully be prescribed by competent legislative authority. Competent authority would be that of the t;tate, in the case of OOIUmerce entirely within the State. and that of the United States, in
the case of foreign and inter-State traffic.
Among the regulations often established by carriers of passenger~t is one detting aside certain carriages for the exclusive use of
women and their es<:orts. Such a regulation violates the right ot'
no one who is excluded, and for whom accommodations are else1 See Jenekl e. Coleman. I Bam.
1181; :Markham e. Brown, 8 N. H. 523.
• Day •· Owen, G llieh. G20; West-

cbl:'ster, etc., R. R. Oo. "· MiJf'A, M
Penn. St. 200; State e. Overton,24 N.

J. 433.

•
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where provided.‘ Another, not so plainly justiﬁable, is a rule
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setting aside certain carriages within which alone will persons

of color be received and carried. Such a regulation has been

sustained where the accommodations furnished were equal to

those supplied for other passengers,’ but has been held invalid

where no such impartial accommodations had been provided.‘

Since the changes recently effected by the new amendments to

the federal Constitution, and which have been brought about in

the social condition of the country, it has been the policy alike

of the nation and of the several States to legislate against certain

discriminations which before were customary, and were seldom

disputed. A recent act of Congress is sufficiently important in

this connection to be specially noticed. Its avowed purpose was

to insure to all persons the beneﬁts of the fourteenth amendment

to the Constitution of the United States, which provides, among

other things, that “ N o State shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

The regulations referred to are, “ That all persons within the

jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and
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equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities

and privileges of inns, public conveyances, on land and water,

theatres and other places of public amusement, subject only to

the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable

alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any pre-

vious condition of servitude.” ‘ In the absence of any such

regulation, it is not very clear that inn-keepers and carriers of

persons, by land or by water, would be warranted, in law, in dis-

criminating on the ground solely of a difference in race or color,

or because of any previous condition. The common law required

impartiality in their accommodations, and personal discrimina-

tions must be unlawful, unless the presence of the excluded per-

son would be dangerous to others, or would be justly offensive to

their sense of decency or propriety, or for other reason would

‘Chicago, etc., R R. Co. o. Wil- ‘Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. o. Wil-

liams, -'35 Ill. 185; S. C.8Am. Rep. 641. liams, 55 Ill. 185; S. C. 8 Am. Rep.

’Westchesler, etc., R. R. Co. 0. 641.

Miles, 55 Penn. St. 209. ‘ Laws 1875, Ch. 114.

~ "-Lit!

where provided! Another, not so plainly justifiable, is a role
setting asid~ certain carriagce within which alone will persons
of color be received and carried. Such a regulation has been
sustained where the accommodations furnished were equal to
those supplied for other passengers,s but has been held invalid
where no such impartial accommodations had been provided.'
Since the changes recently effected by the new amendments to
the federal Constitution, and which have been brought about in
the social condition of the country, it has been the policy alike
of t.he nation and of the several States to legit"late against certain
diRcriminations which before were customary, and were sclJom
di8puted. A recent act of Congress is sufficiently important in
this connection to be specially noticed. Its avowed I•nrpose was
to insure to all persons the benefits of the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, which prod des, among
other things, that " No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The regulations referred to are, "That all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities
and privilc~es of inns, public conveyances, on land and water,
theatres and other places of public amusement, subject only to
the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable
alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude." • In the absence of any snch
regulation, it is not very clear that iAn-keepers and carriers of
persons, by land or by water, would be warranted, in law, in discri minatiug on the ground solely of a difference in race or color,
or because of any previous condition. The common law required
impartiality in their accommodations, and personal discriminations must be unlawful, unless the presence of the excluded pereon would be dangerous to others, or would be justly offensive to
their seuse of decency or propriety, or for other reason would
1

Cllicngo, etc., R R. Co. "· Wil-

liams, 55 111. 185; S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 641.
• W estcbcstcr, etc., R R. Uo. 11.
llilc~,

55 I>cnn. St. 209.

• Chicago, etc., H. R. Co. "· WU.
Iiams, 55 Ill. 185; 8. C. 8 Am. Rep.
641.
• Lnws 1875, Ch. 114.
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interfere with the proper enjoyment by others of the accommo-
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dations which the innkeeper or common carrier affords.

As is said by Mr. Justice Soorr, “A railroad company cannot

capricionsly discriminate between passengers on account of their

nativity, color, race, social position, or their political or reli-

gious beliefs. Whatever discriminations are made m'ust be on

some principle, ‘or for some reason, that the law recognizes as

just and equitable, and founded in good public policy.”‘ But

the right of Congress to legislate on all these subjects must be

more than doubtful. If it possesses the authority, it must come

either from its control over commerce, or from the fourteenth

amendment to the Constitution, which in express terms confers

power to legislate for the enforcement of its provisions. Its

power over commerce extends to foreign commerce, and com-

merce between the States and with the Indian tribes; but it does

not go further, and it does not extend to the regulation of com-

merce entirely within a State. Neither does it embrace the

regulation of inns nor of places of amusement.’ If the privi-

lege to visit these, and immunity against discrimination in doing

so is one of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United

States, then Congress may legislate for its protection; otherwise,

not. But it seems scarcely necessary to point out, that if it be
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a privilege at all, the right to it is derived, not from the federal,

but from the State government, and it must therefore, as a priv-

ilege, pertain to State citizenship, and not to citizenship under

the United States.

Theaters and other places of public amusement exist wholly

under the authority and protection of State laws; their managers

are commonly licensed by the State, and in conferring the license

it is no doubt competent. for the State to impose the condition

that the proprietors shall admit and accommodate all persons

impartially. Therefore State regulations corresponding to those

established by Congress must be clearly within the competency

of the legislature, and might be established as suitable regula-

tion of police.‘ And the power of the State to regulate the busi-

' Chicago, etc, R. R. Co. o. Wil- 1873, the intent of which was, “that

liams, 55111. 185,188. all persons may have equal accom-

‘ See Cully 1:. Baltimore, etc., R. R. modations in the vehicles of common

(‘o., 1 Hughes, 536. carriers, at the inns, hotels, theatres,

‘The Mississippi legislation of and other public places of amuse-

interfere with the proper enjoyment by others of the accommodations which the innkeeper or common carrier aft'ords.
As is said by Mr. Justice Soon, "A railroad company cannot
capriciously discriminate between passengers on account of their
nativity, color, race, social position, or their political or religious beliefs. Whatever discriminations are made mttst be on
some principle, "or for some reason, that the law recognizes as
just and equitable, and founded in good pnhlic policy." 1 But
the right of Congress to legislate on all these subjects must be
more than doubtful. If it possesses the authority, it must come
either fmm its control over commerce, or from the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution_, which in express terms confers
power to legislate for the enforcement of its pro•;isions. Its
power over commerce extends to foreign commerce,. and commerce between the States and with the Indian tribes; but it docs
not go further, and it does not extend to the regulation of commerce entirely within a State. Neither does it embrace the
regulation of inns nor of places of amusement.• If the privilege to visit these, and immunity against discrimination in doing
so is one of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, then Congress may legislate t'or its protection; otherwise,
not. But it seems scarcely necessary to point out, that if it be
a privilege at all, the right to it is derived, not from the federal,
but from the State government, and it must therefore, as a privilege, pertain to State citizenship, and not to citizenship under
the United States.
Theaters and other places of public amnsC"ment exist wholly
under the authority and protection of State laws; their managers
are commonly licensed by the State, and in conferring the license
it is no doubt competent. for the State to impose the condition
that the proprietors shall admit and accommodate all persons
impartially. Therefore State regulations corresponding to those
established by Congress must be clearly within the competency
of the legislature, and might be established as suitable regulation of police. • And the power of the State to regula to the bnsiI Chicago, etc, R. R
Co. "· wn.
Hams, 5S Ill. 185, 188.
1 See Cully e. Baltimore, etc., R. R.
Co., 1 Hughes, 536.
• The :Mississippi 1egislation of

1878, the intent of which was, " that

persons may have equal accommodations in the vehicles of common
carrit!rs, at the inns, hotels, theatres,
and other public places of amu~
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ness of innkeepers and common carriers would be at least equally
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plain. But Congress has no corresponding police power to be

exercised within the States.‘ And on the other hand, State reg-

ulations of the sort, so far as they assume to cover the trans-

portation of passengers from State to State, are void as invasions

of the constitutional power of Congress over commerce between

the States.’

Right to Control one’s Property and Actions. Every man

controls his own property as he pleases, puts it to such use as he

pleases, improves it or not, as he may choose, subject only to the

obligation to perform, in respect to it, the duties he owes to the

State and to his fellows. The State cannot substitute its judg-

ness4>f innkeepel'S and common carriere would be at least equally
plain. But Congress has no corresponding police power to be
exercised within the States.' And on the other hand, State regulations of the sort, so far ae they assume to cover the transportation of passengers from State to State, are void as invasions
of the constitutional power of Congress over commerce between
the States.•

ment for his as to the use he should make of it for his own advan-

tage.“ Neither can the State regulate his dress or his table,

except so far as may be needful for the protection of morality

and decency. State laws prohibiting the sale of liquors to be

drank on the dealer’s premises have the public interest in view,

and are jnstiﬁed on that ground. And laws prohibiting women

to appear in public in the customary garb of men would be sup-

ported, not as regulations of fashion, but as regulations to pre-

vent a practice likely to lead to serious abuses, and to be resorted

to for the worst purposes.
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The right to an Education. It is a part of every person’s

civil liberty to provide for his own education as he may have the

means. Among the duties of imperfect obligation imposed upon

nient, upon the terms of paying the

usual prices therefor,” was fully sus-

tained, against all the objections that

could he suggested, in Donnell 1:. State

4“ Miss. 661.

'Slnll_{_-‘liter House Cases, 16 Wall.

36; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. Rep.

542.

Right to Control one's Property and A.otioD.II. Every man
controls his own property as he pleases, puts it to such use as he
pleases, improves it or not, as he may choose, subject only to the
obligation to perform, in respect to it, the duties he owes to the
State and to his fellows. The Sfate cannot substitute its judgment for his as to the use he should make of it for his own advautage.' Xeither can the State regulate his dress or his table,
except so far as may be needful for the protection of morality
and decency. State laws prohibiting the sale of liquors to be
d1·ank on the dealer's premises have the public interest in view,
and are justified on that ground. And laws prohibiting women
to appear in public in the customary garb ot' men would be supported, not as regulations of fashion, but as regulations to prevent a practice likely to lead to serious abuses, and to be resorted
to for the worst purposes.

'1 Hall c. De Cuir, 95 U. S. Rep. 485.

'l‘lie statute had been previously sus-

tained in the State courts. De Cuir

1:. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1. The suit

was brought for refusal to permit the

plaintilf, a colored woman, to enter

The right to an Education. It is a part of every person's
civil liberty to provide for his own education as he may have the
means. Among the duties of imperfect obligation imposed upon

the ladies’ cabin of defendant's steam-

s»--- ——-anal

boat, and compelling her to go into

the “colored bureau," so called, and

take her meals there. The ease set-

tles the point of State law, that no

such discrimination is lawful within

the Statejurisdiction. And see Cogcr

e. N orlh West Union Packet ('0., 37

Iowa, 145, where the Congressional

Civil Rights Act of 1866, forbidding

similar discriminations, was sus-

tained ancl enforced as against a com-

pany of common carriers navigating

the Mississippi.

3 Gaines o. Buford, 1 Dana, 479, 499;

Violett o. Violett, 2 Dana, 323.

ment, upon the terms of paying the
u::~unl prices therefor," was fully sus.
tained, against all the objections that
could be suggested, in Donnell"· State
4~ ::\liss. 661.
' Blanghter House Cases, 16 Wall.
36; U. S. 11. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. Rep.
542.
2 Hall "· De Cuir, 95 U. B. Rep. 485.
The statute had been previously sus.
tained in the State courts. De Cuir
11. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1. The suit
was brought fur refusal to permit the
plaintiff, a colored woman, to enter
the ladies' cabin of defendant's steam.

boat, and compelling her to go into
the "colored uurl!au," so called, and
take her meals there. The case settles the point of State law, that no
such discrimination is lawful within
the State jurisdiction. And see Coger
"·North West Union Packet Co., :J7
Iowa, 145, where the Congressional
Civil Rights Act of 1866, forbidding
similar discriminations, was sus.
tained and enforced as against a company of common carriers navigating
the Mississippi.
s Gaines c. Buford, 1 Dana, 479, 499;
Violett 11. Violett, 2 Dana, 823.
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parents is that of providing suitable education for their children.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL

RIGHT~.

2~7

This duty is usually assumed by the State to this extent: That it

places or intends to place the means of education within the

reach of all, providing schools which all can attend, and in some

cases making instruction in these schools perfectly free to all.

But the right to an education at the expense of the public is not,

as against the State, a legal right at all, unless made so by the

Constitution. To furnish to its citizens the means of an educa-

tion is a duty which the State, at its option, will assume or decline;

and when the duty is assumed, the State, in the provision it

makes, will go so far as its -law makers shall think proper, and

no further. The provision made to-day may, perhaps, be repealed

to-morrow; and though the repeal may seem in the highest

degree impolitic, those who may suffer from it cannot deny to it

competent force. But any provisions for education which are

made by the Constitution, the people, as a matter of right, may

claim the beneﬁt of, unless legislation is necessary to give

them eﬁ'ect. Some constitutional provisions are self-executing,

and if these measure out the State’s bounty for education, the

legislature cannot restrict it; others cannot have effect without

legislation; and where that is the case, the bounty intended may

possibly be withheld.‘
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It may possibly be found, also, when the State has made pro-

vision for education, that it has done so with unlawful discrimi-

nations. So long as slavery existed, it was customary, in estab-

lishing and providing for the support of schools, to discriminate

in the advantages given, throwing open some schools to children

generally, but denying admission to colored children. The right

to do this was aﬁirmed in Massachusetts, upon the broad ground

that the State had undoubted right to select the objects of its

bounty,’ and was generally conceded elsewhere. Since then the

fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution has been

adopted, and it is now held that when the provision is made for

education, it must be impartial. The provision gives to the

whole people certain rights, and to single out a certain portion

by the arbitrary standard of color, and say that these shall not

have rights which are possessed by others is said to deny to them

' Respecting self-executing consti- ' Roberts o. Boston, 5 Cush. 198.

tutional provisions, see Cooley, Const. See Van Camp v. Board of Education,

Lim. 99-102. 9 Ohio, (11. a.) 406.

parents is that of providing suitable edncation for their children.
This duty is usually assumed by the State to this extent: That it
places or intends to place the means of education within the
reach of all, J>roviding schools which all can attend, and in some
cases making instruction in these schools perfectly free to all.
Bot the right to an education at the expense of the public is not,
as against the State, a legal right at all, unless made so by the
Constitution. To furnish to its citizens the means of an education is a duty which the State, at its O})tion, will assume or decline;
and when the duty is M&omcd, the State, in the provision it
makes, will go so far as its law makers shall think proper, and
no further. The provision made to-day may, perhaps, be repealed
to-morrow; and though the repeal may seem in the highest
dc~ree impolitic, those who may suffer from it cannot deny to it
competent force. But any provisions tor education which are
made by the Constitution, the peo]lle, as a matter of right~ may
claim the benefit of, unless legislation is necessary to give
them effect. Sume constitutional provisions are self-executing,
and it" these measure out the State's bounty for education, the
legislature cannot restrict it; others cannot have effect without
legislation; and where that is the case, the bounty intended may
possibly be withheld. 1
It may possibly be found, also, when the State has made provision for education, that it has done so with unlawful discriminations. So long as slavery existed, it was customary, in eetablit~hing and providing for the support of schools, to discriminate
in the advanta~es ~riven, throwing open some schools to children
generally, but denying admh;t'ion to colored children. The right
to do this was affirmed in Massaclm~etts, npon the broad ground
that the State had nndonhted right to select the objects of ita
bounty,' and was genera1Jy conceded elsewhere. Since then the
tonrtt->enth amendment to the te<leral Constitution has been
adopted, and it is now held tltat when the provision is made for
~duration, it mu~;t be impartial. The provision gi'f'cs to the
whole peop1c certain right.d, and to single out a certain 1>ortion
by the arbitrary standard of color, and say that these shall not
have rigbtt:S which are possessed by others is said to deny to them
' Rl'specting SE'lf.cxecuting constitutional provislou, aee Cooley, Const.
Lim. 89-lOl.

1

Roberts

~.

Boston, 5 Cusb. 198.

Bet> Van Camp"· Board of Education.
0 Ohio, (:R. 1.) 4.06.
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“ theequal protection of the laws” and is consequently forbid-
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den.‘ But no right is violated when colored pupils are merely

placed in different schools. provided the schools are equal, and

the same measure of privilege and justice is given in each.’

A teacher may violate the right to instruction in the public

schools by refusing to instruct those who lawfully come.

Whether an action would lie against the teacher for such refusal,

or whether the remedy would not be conﬁned to an appeal to

the governing board, is left in doubt on the authorities. It

would seem, however, that the refusal was a plain violation of an

individual right, and, as such, was actionable.‘ The teacher

might also violate the right to instruction by inﬂicting punish-

ment for something not within his urisdiction ; ‘ or by arbitrarily

subjecting the pupil to ridicule and disgrace; or by excluding

him from school without justiﬁcation. The teacher, as is said

elsewhere,‘ is vested with judicial discretion in the management

of his school, but he must not abuse this, or exceed his powers.

He is a judge with limited authority, not an autocrat.

School committees or trustees may also deprive individuals of

‘Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36. Bee

People ~v. Board of Education, 18

Mich. 400; Clark 0. Board of Direct-
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or;-1,24 lows, 266; Smith 0. Keokuk,

40 Iowa, 518; Dove 1:. School District,

41 Iowa, 689.

' Cory 0. Carter, 48 Ind. 327; State

v. McOann, 21 Ohio, (N. s.) 198; County

Court v. Robinson, 27 Ark. 116. See

"the~qnal

protection of the laws" and is consequently forbidden.' But no right is violated when colored pupils arc merely
placed in different schools, provided the schools are equal, and
the same measure of privilege and justice is given in each.•
A teacher may violate the right to instruction in the public
schools by refusing to instruct those who lawfully come.
Whether an action would lie against the teacher for such refusal,
or whether the remedy would not be confined to an appeal to
the governing board, is left in doubt on the authorities. It
would seem, however, that the refusal was a plain violation of an
individual right, and, as such, was actionable.• The teacher
might also violate the right to instruction by inflicting punishment for something not within his jurisdiction; • or by arbitrarily
subjecting the pupil to ridicule and disgrace; or by excluding
him from school without justification. The teacher, as is said
elsewhere: is vested with judicial discretion in the management
of his school, but he must not abuse this, or exceed his powe1·s.
He is a judge with limited authority, not an autocrat.
School committees or trustees may also deprive individuals of

State 0. Duffy, '7 Nev. 842.

‘ In Spear 0. Cummings, 23 Pick.

224, it was decided that no action

would lie against a teacher by the pa-

rent whose child the formcr refused

to receive into the school and instruct.

His remedy, it was said, was to ap-

peal to the school committee. It is

intimated in the same case that no ac-

tion would lie against the committee

if the teacher were acting under their

orders, their powers being judicial.

To the same effect is Douahoe 0. Rich-

ards, 38 Me. 3'76. And see Learock

o. Putnam, 111 Mass. 499. In Roe 0.

Deming, 21 Ohio, (N. s.) 666, it is held

that such an action by the father will

lie; but in Stephenson o. Hall, 14

Barb. 222, it is said it should be

brought by the child himself.

‘ In Morrow 0. Wood, 35 Wis. 59,

S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 4'71, the Supreme

Court of Wisconsin declare that where

a child attends school directed by his

father to pursue certain studies only

which are taught in the school, and

the teacher punishes him because he

will not take up others also, this is a

a criminal assault; and that the duty

of the child under the circumstances

is to obey his father. This is good

sense. Sec Sewell 0. Board of Educa-

tion, 29 Ohio, (N. s.) 89, in which it was

decided that instruction in elocution

might be made compulsory in schools,

and a pupil expelled for failing to be

prepared with a rhetorical exercise at

a time designated.

" See ante, p. 1'72. Also, Anderson ti.

State, 3 Head, 455; Lander 0. Beaver.

32 Vt. 114.

Ward e. Flood, 48 Cal. 86. See
People "· Board of Education, 18
:M1ch. 400; Clark"· Board of Direct.
ors, 24 Iowa, 266; Smith "· Keokuk,
40 Iowa, 518; Dove "· School District,
41 Iowa, 689.
• Cory"· Carter, 48 Ind. 827; State
"· McCann, 21 Ohio, (N. s.) 198; County
Court"· Robinson, 27 Ark. 116. Bee
State"· Duffy, 7 Nev. 842.
• In Spear "'· Cummings, 23 Pick.
224, it was decided that no action
would lie against a teacher l.Jy the pa.
rent whose child the former refused
to receive into the school and instruct.
His remedy, it was sail}, was to aPpeal to the school committee. It is
intimated in the same case that no action would lie against the committee
if the teacher were acting under their
orders, their powers being judicial.
To the same effect is Donahoe "· Richards, 38 Me. 376. And see Learock
"·Putnam, 111 Mass. 499. In Roe"·
Deming, 21 Ohio, (N. s.) 666, it is held
1

that such an action by the father will
lie; but in Stephenson "· Jlall, 1-i
Barb. 222, it is said it should be
brought by the child himself.
'In llorrow "· Wood, 35 Wis. 59,
S.C. 17 Am. Rep. 471, the Supreme
Court ofWisconsin declare that where
a child attends school directed by his
father to pursue certain studies only
which are taught in the school, and
the teacher punishes him because he
will not take up others also, this is a
a criminal assault; and that the duty
of the child under the circumstances
is to obey his father. This is good
sense. Bee Sewell t!. Board of Education, 20 Ohio, (N. s.) 89, in which it was
decided that instruction in elocution
might be made compulsory in schools,
and a pupil expelled for failing to be
prepared with a rhetorical exercise at
a time designated.
1 See ante, p.172. Also, Anderson !'.
State, 8 Head, 465; Lander "· Beaver,
82 Vt. 114.
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their rights in schools, through regulations which demand things
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in themselves unreasonable. Under the general authority usually

conferred upon these boards to prescribe the rules and laws for

their rights in schools, through regulations which demand tJ1ings
in themselves unreasonable. Under the general authority usually
conferred upon these boards to prescribe the rules and laws tor
the c.:ontrol ot• schools, their powers are no doubt very extensh·e,
but in the nature of things there are some limits. The general
principles of constitutional law undoubtedly govern their action,
as they do the action of higher authorities; and whatever would
violate those principles would be an excess of power on their
part. It has sometimes been claimed that the principle of
religious liberty was violated by regulations for the reading of
the common vergion of the Bible in the public schools ll.oO'l&inst
the objections of the parents or guardians of some of the pupils;
but regulations for that purpose have been sustained as not
beyond the proper powers of such boards.• On the other hand, it
is held equally competent for the governing board of a school to
exclude the reading of the Bible therefrom: all sects and denominations of worshipers being equal before the law, none of them
can demand as a right to ha\'e its sacred book read in the schools
supported by the State, ~~.oo-ainst the judgment of the governing
board to whose direction the State has entrusted them.' It is
unfortunate that it ever becomes necessary to make such decisions, or that the schools where those who are to govern their
country receive their training should be exposed in any degree
to sectarian controversy.'

the control of schools, their powers are no doubt very extensive,

but in the nature of things there are some limits. The general

principles of constitutional law undoubtedly govern their action,

as they do the action of higher authorities; and whatever would

violate those principles would be an excess of power on their

part. It has sometimes been claimed that the principle ot'

religious liberty was violated by regulations for the reading of

the common version of the Bible in the public schools against

the objections of the parents or guardians of some of the pupils;

but regulations for that purpose have been sustained as not

beyond the proper powers of such boards.‘ On the other hand, it

is held equally competent for the governing board of a school to

exclude the reading of the Bible therefrom: all sects and denom-

inations of worshipers being equal before the law, none of them

can demand as a right to have its sacred book read in the schools

supported by the State, against the judgment of the governing

board to whose direction the State has entrusted them.’ It is

unfortunate that it ever becomes necessary to make such decis-

ions, or that the schools where those who are to govern their
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country receive their training should be exposed in any degree

to sectarian controversy.’

Rights in the Learned Professions. N 0 one has any right to

practice law or medicine except under the regulations the State

may prescribe. To practice in the courts or to practice medicine

is not a privilege of citizenship, and is therefore neither given

nor protected by or under the Civil Rights act of Congress or the

new amendments to the Constitution.‘ The privilege may be

' Donahoe o. Richards, 38 Me. 376.

In this case pupils were required to

read portions of the Scripture against

the objection and protest of their pa-

rents. To like effect is Spiller 0. Wo-

burn, 12 Allen, 127.

’ Board of Education u. Minor, 23

Ohio, (11. a) 211.

' Whatever authority the governing

board of a school possess cannot be

delegated to others; for example, they

cannot empower a teacher to employ

his assistant when the law vests tho

power in the board. State 0. Wil-

liums, 29 Ohio, (R. s.) 161.

•

Rights in the Learned Professions. No one has any right to
practi<.-e law or medicine ex<.:ept under the regulations the State
may pres('ribe. To prnctioo in the courts or to practice medicine
is not a privilege of citizenship, and is therefore neither given
nor protected by or under the Civil Rights act of Congress or the
new amendments to the Constitution.• The privilege may be

‘ Sec Brudwcll 0. State, 55 Ill. 535;

S. C. 16 Wnll.130; Matter of Goodell,

39 Wis. 282; Ea parts Spinney, 10

1

D·•nahoe t1. Richards, 88 Me. 378.

In this cn11e pupils were required to

Nev. 828.

19

read portions of the Scripture against
the objection and protest of their pa.
rents. To like effect is Spiller"· Woburn, 12 Allen, 127.
1 Bo!U'd of Education •· Minor, 23
Ohio, (K. 8.) 211.
1 Whatever authority the governing
board of a school possess cannot be

19

delegated to others: for example, they
cannot empower a teacher to employ
his assismnt when tho law vests tho
power in the board. State fl. Williams, 29 Ohio, (N. s.) 161.
• Sec Bradwell "·State, 53 111. ~5;
B. C. 16 Wall. 130; Hatter of Goodell,
39 Wis. 232; B~ pGf"U Spinney, 10
Nev. 323.
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given to one sex and denied to the other, and other discrimina-
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tions equally arbitrary may doub,tless be established. But with

given to one sex and denied to the other, and other discriminations equally arbitrary may doub,tlcss be establh•hed. But with
the right to officiate as religious teacher the State has no concern
so long as the customary po1ice regulations of the State are
observed. It is a part of the religious liberty of the people that
their religious teachers shall be chosen in their own mode, without State intervention, and that any one who can obtain hearers
may teach in his own way. The members of none of the learned
professions have any special privileges the violation of which by
in~liVIduals can well constitute an actionable wrong.
The attorney has a certain privilege from arrest while attending court in
thr discharge of p1·ofessional duty, but a disregard of this privilege would be remedied, not by snit, but by an application to
the court for his discharge. The unnecessary execution of pro...
cess against a clergyman while he was in tho discharge of his
duties in the pulpit or in any religious gathering, would be
highly censurable, and possibly, in a g1·oss case, su~ject the officer
to an action, either at the suit of the clergyman or of the religious organization whose worship was needlessly disturbed.

the right to oﬂiciate as religious teacher the State has no concern

so long as the customary police regulations of the State are

observed. It is a part of the religious liberty of the people that

their religious teachers shall be chosen in their own mode, with-

out State intervention, and that any one who can obtain hearers

may teach in his own way. The members of none of the learned

professions have any special privileges the violation of which by

individuals can well constitute an actionable wrong. The attor-

ney has a certain privilege from arrest while attending court in

the discharge of professional duty, but a disregard of this priv-

ilege would be remedied, not by suit, but by an application to

the court for his discharge. The unnecessary execution of pro-

cess against a clergyman while he was in the discharge of his

duties in the pulpit or in any religious gathering, would be

highly censurable, and possibly, in a gross case, subject the otﬁcer

to an action, either at the suit of the clergyman or of the relig-

ious organization whose worship was needlessly disturbed.

Religious Liberty. Having in a previous chapter deﬁned

religious liberty,‘ nothing more seems requisite to indicate what

would constitute invasions. Individual wrongs generally consist
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in disturbance of religious meetings, or in some other act which

would be a wrong independent of any question of the liberty of

conscience or of worship. If a clergyman is assaulted in the

pulpit, this is but an assault, though the time and the place may

aggravate the Wrong; if a religious meeting is disturbed, the

right of citizens to assemble for any lawful purpose is violated,

and any civil redress would be the same with that which would

be sought had the meeting been for political, business, or social

Religious Liberty. Having in a previous chapter defined
religious liberty: nothing moro l'leems requisite to indicate what
would constitute invasions. Individual wrongs generally consist
in disturbance of religions m£'etings, or in some other net which
wonld be a wrong independent of any question of the liberty of
conscience or of worship. If a clergyman is assaulted in the
pulpit, this is but an assault, though the time and the plll.Ce may
aggra'\'ate the wrong; if a religious meeting is disturbed, the
right of citizens to assemble for any lawful purpose is violated,
and any civil redress would be the same with that which would
be sought had the meeting been for political, business, or social
pnrposes. Voluntary religious organizations are formed at the
will of the associates undisturbed by the State; incorporated
societies can only be formed at the will of the State and under
its laws.' But when formed they must be left to manage their

purposes. Voluntary religious organizations are formed at the

will of the associates undisturbed by the State; incorporated

societies can only be formed at the will of the State and under

its laws.’ But when formed they must be left to manage their

' Ante, p. 33. Hale 0. Everett, 53 N. H. 9; S. G. 18

’Sils-by '0. Barlow, 16 Gray, 329; Am. Rep. 82; Robertson 11. Bullions,

Anderson 0. Brock, 3 Me. 2413; Meth. 11 N. Y. 243; Atwater v VVoodbridge,

Ep. Church 0. Sherman, 36 Wis. 404; 6 Conn. 223; Worrell 0. First Presb.

Ferraria o. Vasconcelles, 23 Ill. 456; Ch. 23 N. J. Eq. 96.

l

1

l

•

1 Ante, p. 83.
' Silsby v. Barlow, 16 Gray, 329;
Anderson t'l. Brock, 3 :Me. 24:l; ~[eth.
Ep. Church D. Sherman, 36 Wis. 404;
Ferraria c. Vasconcelles, 23 111. 456;

Hale t'l. Everett, 53 N. H. 9; 8. C. 16
Am. Hep. 82; Robertson t'l. B•Jllions,
11 N.Y. 243; Atwater t'l. Woodbridge,
6 (;onn. 223; Worrell "·First Presb.
Ch. 23 N.J. Eq. 96.
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own affairs in their own way, without the interference of the
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State to control them. The point at which the State may law-

fully interfere is where these organizations disregard property

rights of their members, or the rights acquired by contract; and

when this occurs they becomo amenable, like all other organiza-

tions and individuals, to the ordinary State jurisdiction.‘ And

there is a disregard of rights when lawful members are expelled

or refused participation in the privileges of the organization, for

reasons which the rules or usages to which they have expressly

or by implication given assent would not recognize, or in disre-

gard of forms which the rules or usages have made necessary, or

when the purpose of the organization is perverted by radical

changes without general consent.’

Equality of Right. Every person is entitled to have his rights

tested by the same general laws which govern the rest of the

political society. The liberty of a pauper or supposed pauper

cannot be entrusted to the discretion of an overseer of the poor

or other ministerial or administrative oﬁicer;' the apprenticing

of whites and blacks must be under the same general regula-

tions;‘ and the supposed insane must have the same right to a

uwn afl'n.irs in their own way, without the interference of the
State to control them. The point at which the State may lawfully interfere is where these organizations di:;regard Pf"Opcrty
rights of their members, or the rights acquired by contrnct; and
when thi;3 occurs they become amenable, like all other organizations and individuals, to the ordinary State jurisdiction.' And
there is a disregard of rignts when lawful members are expelled
or refnoed participation in the privileges of the organization, for
reasou~ which the rules or usages to which they have expressly
or by implication given assent would not recognize, or in disregard of tonus which the rnles or usa~es have made necessary, or
when the purpo$e of the organization is perverted by radical
changes without general consent.•

judicial hearing with all others.‘ And no doubt any legislation

which undertakes to regulate or abolish the evil of persons
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roaming about the country under a false pretence of seeking

employment, must give them the same opportunity for trial as

other persons accused of vagrancy are entitled to.

‘See Harmon 0. Dreher, 1 Spcers

Eq. 87; Dietfcndorf u. Ref. Cal. Ch.

Island Church, 2 Bich. Eq. 192; Den

0. Bolton, 12 N. J. 206; German Re-

20 Johns. 12; Connitt o. R. P. D.

Church, 54 N. Y. 551; Chase o. Che-

ney, 58 lll. 509; Lawson 0. Kolbcn-

son. 61 lll. 405; Smith v. Nelson, 18

Vt. 511: Harrison 0. Hoyle. ‘24 Ohio,

(K. s.) 254; Sohier o. Trinity Church,

109 Mass. 1: Fitzgerald 0. Robinson,

112 Mass. 371; Gartin 0. Penick, 5

Bush, 110; Kinkead 0. McKee, 9

Equality of Bight.

E\·ery person is entitled to have his rights
tested by the same general laws which go\·ern the rest of the
political society. The liberty of a pauper or supposed pauper
cannot be entrusted to the discretion of an overseer of the poor
or other ministerial or administrative ofiiccr; • the apprenticing
of whites and blacks must be under the same general regulations; • and the supposed insane must have the same right to a
judicial hearing with all others. • And no doubt any legislation
which undertakes to regulate or abolish the evil of persons
roaming about the (."Ountry under a false pretence of seeking
employment, must give them the same opportunity for trial as
other persons accused of vagl'aocy are entitled to.

Bush, 535; G115!’ Appeal,'73 Penn. St.

89; Hale o. Everett, 53 N. H. 9; Wat-

son 0. Jones, 13 Wall. 6'79. _

‘Watson 0. JIIlll‘.~‘, 13 W-ill. 679;

Hale o. Everett, 53 N. ll. 9; Harmon

0. Drelicr,1 Spears Eq. 87; John's

formed Church o. Seibert. 3 P1-nn. St.

282; McGinnis o. Watson, 41 Penn.

St. 9; Gartin v. Penick, 5 Bush. 110;

Lucas v. Case, 9 Bush. 297; Grosvcnor

0. United Sociely, 118 Mass. '78; Peo-

ple o. German, etc., Church. 58 N. Y.

103; Fitzgerald 0. Robinson, 112

Mass. 371.

“Porilaml 0. Bangor, 65 Me. 120;

S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 681. Bee, for same

principle, Durst v. People, 51 111.286;

B. C. 2 Am. Rep. 301.

‘ Matter of Turner, 1 Abb. U. S. 84.

' Ante, p. 171, 172.

Bee Harmon e. Dreher, 1 Speers
Eq. 87; Dielfendorf e. He f. Ual. Ch ,
20 Johns. 12; Connitt v. R P. D.
Church, M N. Y. 551: Chase "· Cheney, 58 Ill. 50!); Lawson v. Kolbcnson, 61 lll. 405: Smith tt. NPison, 18
Vt. 511; Harrison v. Hoyle, 24 Ohio,
(1'1'. e.) 254; Bobier"· 1'rinity Uhurch,
lOU Mass. 1: Fitzgerald fl. Huuinson,
112 }lass. 371; Gartin e. Penick, 5
Bush, 110; Kinkead "· )lcKee, 9
Bu~h. 1i!l5: Gass' Appeal, 73 Penn. St.
811; Halle e. Everett, 53 N.H. 9; Wat.
wn "·Jones, 13 W11ll. 679.
1 Watson fl. Jn1w,o, 13 W.Lll. 679;
Hale "· E\·erctt, 53 N. II. D; Harmon
e. Dreher, 1 Speers Eq. 87; John's
1

Island Church, 2 Jlich. Eq. 192; Den
e. Bolton, 12 N. J. 206; German Reformed Church "· Seibert. a P1•nn. St.
282; ~lcGinnis e. Wutson, 41 Penn.
St. 9; Gurtin 11. Penick, 5 B:1sh. 110;
Lucas fl. Case, 9 Bush. 2!J7; Gros\·cnor
"· Uni!cd Society, 118 Ma<:i. 78; People"· Gl'rmnn, etc., Church, 53 N.Y.
103; Fitzgerald e.. Robinson, 112
Jdngs. 3i1.
3 Pnrtlnnd v. Bangor, M Me. 120;
B. C. 20 Am. R<"p. 681. !:See, for same
principle, DuMlt tt. People, 51 Ill. 286;
B. C. 2 Am. Rep. 301.
• Matter of Turner, 1 .Abb. U. B. 84.
• Ante, p. 171, 172.
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Exceptional Burdens. One of the most important of civil
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rights is the right to require that public burdens shall be impar-

Exceptional Burdens. One of the most important of civil
rights is the right to require that public burdens shall be impartially distributed, and the right to resist those which touch the
individual unequally and unfairly. Of unequal burdens, those
of unequal taxation and unequal requirement of military service
may furni~h suitable illustrations. But on these subjects all
that can be required is, that the laws be impartial and be fairly
administered; inequality in their operation being unavoidable.
An impartial law for military ser,·ice will be likely to provide
that all able-bodied male persons between certain ages shall be
liable to be summoned tor actual duty, and that from a list of
these the number required shall be drawn by lot. Under such a
law no one·is wronged who has the fortune to be drawn while
his neighbor escapes. In Great Britain, nntil recently, when
recruits for the navy were needed, it was allowed by immemorial
custom to send out a press-gang with authority to seize upon
sailors wherever found, and by force to place them npon ships of
war, where they would be compelled to perfot·m military service.
Such an authority is invidious and arbitrary, and wholly inadmissible in this country.'
The right to be exempt from unequal taxation is, as between
the States, one of the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the several States.• It is incompetent, therefore, to assess and
tax the property of a non-resident higher than that of residents.
It is equally incompetent to discriminate between residents, either
by overvaluing the property of the one or by undervaluing the
property of the other, or by omitting the one or his property
altogether from the roll, or by any other act of omission or commission which produ<.:es inequality. The principle in these
cases is plain, but the application is sometimes difficult. Where
taxation is based upon an assessment of property, the assessors
have judicial functions to perform, and it is always presumed
that they have performed them honestly and to the hest of their
judgment. It is therefore generally held that they are not liable
to a private action at the suit of an ag-grieved party who complains that he is overtaxed in consequence of their unequal

tially distributed, and the right to resist those which touch the

individual unequally and unfairly. Of unequal burdens, those

of unequal taxation and unequal requirement of military service

may furnish suitable illustrations. But on these subjects all

that can be required is, that the laws be impartial and be fairly

administered; inequality in their operation being unavoidable.

An impartial law for military service will be likely to provide

that all able-bodied male persons between certain ages shall be

liable to be summoned for actual duty, and that from a list of

these the number required shall be drawn by lot. Under such a

law no one is wronged who has the fortune to be drawn while

his neighbor escapes. In Great Britain, until recently, when

recruits for the navy were needed, it was allowed by immemorial

custom to send out a press-gang with authority to seize upon

sailors wherever found, and by force to place them upon ships of

war, where they would be compelled to perform military service.

Such an authority is invidious and arbitrary, and wholly inad-

missible in this country.‘

The right to be exempt from unequal taxation is, as between

the States, one of the privileges and immunities of citizens of
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the several States.” It is incompetent, therefore, to assess and

tax the property of a non-resident higher than that of residents.

It is equally incompetent to discriminate between residents, either

by overvaluing the property of the one or by undervaluing the

property of the other, or by omitting the one or his property

altogether from the roll, or by any other act of omission or coin-

mission which produces inequality. The principle in these

cases is plain, but the application is sometimes ditiicult. Where

taxation is based upon an assessment of property, the assessors

have judicial functions to perform, and it is always presumed

that they have performed them honestly and to the hest of their

judgment. It is therefore generally held that they are not liable

to a private action at the suit of an a;:_q|'ic\'ed party who com-

plains that he is overtaxed in consequence of their unequal

‘Cooley, Const. Liu1.299. 627; Scott o. Watkins, 22 Ark. 556;

' Corﬁeld 11. Corycll. 4 Wash. C. C. Oliver 0. Washington Mills, 11 Allen,

8'71, 380; Wiley 0. Partner, 14 Ala. 268.

— —— - __ 7 _.___ _ _

..

1 Cooley, Consl Lim. 299.
• Corfteld t~. Coryell. 4 Wash. C. C.
871, 880; Wiley t~. Parmer, 14 Ala.

627; Scott t~. Watkins, 22 Ark. 556;
Oliver tl. Washington Mills, 11 Alll.'o,
268•
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assessment.‘ A remedy for the injustice in such a case must be
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sought in a suit to set aside the tax, or to reduce it to its proper

proportions; and this may be done if it be made to appear that

the assessors have been governed by improper motives, and not

by their judgment, in making their valuations.’ The tax-payer

may hold the assessors liable only when they have acted without

jurisdiction, or perhaps where, through neglect of duty, they

have deprived the tax-payer of some important privilege; such,

for instance, as the right to be heard on a review of the assess-

ment.‘ They act without jurisdiction if they assess persons or

property not within the territorial limits for which they can act,

or if they spread upon the roll a larger sum than has been law-

fully voted or ordered.‘ In these cases the tax-payer may either

proceed against the officers responsible for the excess of nrisdic-

tion, or, he may pay the tax under compulsion or protest, and then

recover it back of the town, county, etc., to which it is subse-

quently paid over.‘ He may also resist the collection of the tax,

and hold the collector responsible as a trespasser if the want of

authority appears in the list or warrant which constitutes the

collcctor’s authority, but not otherwise.

For any injustice which may be done to citizens through the

selection by law of the objects of taxation, there can be no
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remedy whatever, except the political remedy. to be worked out

through a repeal or modiﬁcation of the law. Every system of

taxation must be more or less arbitrary in its selection of methods,

and of the objects upon or in respect to which burdens shall be

laid, and the judiciary can give no relief from the incidental

injustice. Discriminations as between individuals, however,

must rest upon some principle, or they will be illegal. In illus-

tration, the case of a poll-tax upon adult male persons may be

taken. These are sometimes levied, and they may be considered

‘Weaver 0. Devendorf, 3 Dcnio,

117. The subject will be referred to

in another chapter.

' Letferts 0. Culumet. 21 Wis. 688;

Milwaukee Iron Co. 0. Hubbard, 29

Wis. 51; Merrill o. Humphrey, 24

Mich. 170; Republic Life Ins. Co. 0.

Pollak, 75 Ill. 292.

’ See Thames Munuf. C0. 0. Lathrop,

7 Conn. 550.

‘ Mygatto. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 818;

Libby o. Burnham, 15 Muss. I44;

Gruftou Bank 0. KimbalI,20 N. H.

107; Cooley on Taxation, 553, 554.

assessment.' A remedy for the injustice in such a ease must be
sought in a suit to set a:1ide the tax, or to reduce it to its proper
proportions; and this may be done if it be made to appear that
the assessors have been governed by improper motives, and not
by their judgment, in making their valuations.• The tax-payer
rna~ hold the assessors lia.bl~ only when they have acted without
jurisdiction, or perhaps where, through neglect of duty, they
have deprived the tax-payer of some important privilege; such,
for instance, as the right to be beard on a review of the assessment.• They act without jurisdiction if they assess persons or
property not within the territorial limits for which they can act,
or if they spread upon the roll a larger snm than has been lawfully voted or ordered.• In these cases the tax-payer may either
proceed against the officers responsible for the excess of jurisdiction, or, he may pay the tax under compulsion or protest, aud then
rl·cover it back of the town, county, etc., to which it it> subsequently paid over.• He may also resist the collection of the tax,
and hold the collector responsible as a trespasser if the want of
authority appears in the list or warrant which constitutes the
collector's authority~ but not otherwise.
For any injustice which may be done to citizens through the
St-lection by law of the objects of taxation, there can be no
rl•tnedy whatever, except the political remedy. to be worked ont
through a repeal or modification of the law. Every system of
taxation must be more or le~s arbitrary in its selection of methods,
and of the objects upon or in rPSpect to which burdens shall be
laid, and the judiciary can give no relief from the incidental
injustice. Discriminations as between individuals, however,
must rest upon some principle, or they will be illegal. In illustration, the ease of a poll. tax upon adult male persons may be
taken. These are sometimes levied, and they may be considered

° As to what is a compulsory pay.

mcnt of a tax, see Boston, etc., Glass

Co. 0. Boston, 4 Met. 181; Atwcll 0.

Zelull', 26 Mich. 118; Baker v. Cincin-

nati, 11 Ohio, (u. s.) 534; Taylor 0.

Board of Health, 81 Penn. St 78.

c

I

1 Weaver e. Devendorf, 8 Denio,
117. The subject will be referred &o
in another chapter.

' Letrerta •· C1Llumet, 21 Wis. 688;
ltilwankee Iron Co. e. Hubbard, 29
Wia. 51; Merrill e. Humphrey, 24
Mich. 170; Republic Life Ins. Co. e.
Pollak, 75 Ill. 292.
• BeeTbamea Hanuf. Co. •· Lathrop,

7 Conn. MO.

• Mygatte. Washbnm,15 N.Y. 816;
Libby tJ. Burnham, 15 )lass. 144;
Grafton Bank tJ. Kimball, 20 N. H.
107; Cooley on Taxation, 553, 5M.
• AB &o what is a compulsory payment of a tax, see Boston, etc., Gl1111
Co. tJ. Boston, 4 MeL. 181 ; Atwell ..
Zeluff, 26 llich. 118; Baker"· Cincln.
nati, 11 Ohio, (N. a.) 1>34; Tayler ..
Board of Health, 81 PellD. SL '73.
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exclusively. But a discrimination between the sexes in the tax-

ation of their property would be plainly inadmissible.

Unlawful Searches, etc. An important civil right is intended

to be secured by the provisions incorporated in the National and

State Constitutions, which, in substance, declare that unreason-

a cornpen~ntion for the privilege of suffrage which males posse88
exclusively. But a discrimination between the sexes in the taxation of their proper·ty would be plainly inadmissib:e.

able searches and seizures shall be unlawful, and that all persons

shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against

them. In their origin these provisions had in view the mischiefs

of such oppressive action by the governmtnt or its oﬁicers, as

the seizing of papers to obtain the evidence of intended crimes; ‘

but their protection goes much beyond such cases : it justly

assumes that a man may have secrets of business, of friendship,

or of more tender sentiments, to which his books, papers, or

letters may bear testimony, but with which the public have no

concern; that he may even have secrets of shame which are so

exclusively his own concern that others have no right to pry into

or to discuss them. An unlawful search and seizure is an aggra-

vated trespass, and should be visited with corresponding damages.

Many provisions of law are made to protect against it. Search

warrants are allowed to be issued only after a showing of legal

cause under oath to the satisfaction of a court or magistrate; " it
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is made a criminal offense for one person wrongfully to open

another’s letters; the postmaster who detains or pries into letters

is liable in damages for so doing; and the law might, with the

utmost propriety, surround correspondence by telegraph by like

securities. It has generally done so, to the extent of requiring

of the persons through whose hands such correspondence may

pass, the observance of secrecy; but it has been held that they

may be compelled to produce telegrams in evidence, and test-iiy

concerning them in courts and before legislative committees.’

‘ Such as seizing the papers of Al-

gernon Sidney in order to ﬁnd among

his political speculations something

which could be construed into trea-

son; or those of John Wilkes to get

possession of intended lihels.

'2 Hale, P. C. 113; Bishop, Cr.

\

Proc., Ch. XVIIL; 8 Wharton, Cr.

L., 2037-2946; 1 Archhold, Cr.

L. 143; Cooley, Const. L., 2!-9-308.

‘State d. Litchﬁeld, 58 Me. 267;

Hensler n. Freedman, 2 Pars. Sel. Cas.

274; National Bunk v. National Bank,

7 W. Va. 544.

Unlawful Searches, etc. An important civil right is intended,
to be secured by the provisions incorporated in the National and
State Constitutions, which, in substance, declare that unreasonable searches and seizures shall be unlawful, and that all persons
shall be secure in their persons, hou~:>e~, paper·s, and effects against
them. In their origin these provisions had in view the mischiefs
of such oppressive action by the govemttJLnt or its officers, as
the seizing of papers to obtain the evidl·uce of intended crimes; •
but their protection goes much beyond such cases: it justly
assumes that a man may have secrets of business, of friendship,
or of more tender sentiments, to which his books, papers, or
letters may bear teotimony, but with which the public have no
concern; that he may even have secrets of shame which are so
exclnsi\·ely his own concern that others have no right to pry into
or to discuss them. An unlawful search and seizure is an aggravated tre::;pass, and should be visited with corresponding damages.
Many provisions of law are made to protect against it. Search
warrants are allowed to be issued ouly after a showing of legal
cause under oath to the satisfaction of a court or ma~istrate; • it
is made a criminal offense for one per·son wrongfully to open
another's letters; the postmaster who detains or pries into letters
is liable in damages for so doing; and the law might, with the
utmost propriety, surround corrcsponden<...-e by telegraph by like
securities. It has generally done so, to the extent of requiring
of the persons through whose hands such corrc<>pondence may
pass, the obscrvan<...-e of' ~:oecrecy; but it has been held that they
may be compelleu to produce telegrams in evidence, and test1i(y
ooncerning them in courts and before legislative committees.•

_ Z -_ »-_-.,

1 Such as seizing the papers of Algernon Sidney in order to find among
his political speculations something
which could be construed into trea.
son; or those of John Wilkes to get
possession of ·intended Iihels.
• 2 Hale, P. C. ll:J; Bishop, Cr.

Proc., Ch. XVIII.; 8 Wharton, Cr.
L., 1:1~ 2937-2946; 1 Archhold, Cr.
L. 143; Cooley, Const. L., 2l,9-308.
a State fl. Litchfield, 58 Mo. 267;
Hensler~. Fr!'edman, 2 Pars. Sel. Cas.
274; National Bank"· National .Bank.
'l W.Va. 544.
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Search Warrants. The only lawful mode of making search

upon one’s premises is under the command of search warrants;

and these are allowed to discover stolen or smuggled goods, or

implements of gaming, and in a few other cases for which pro-

vision must be found in the statutes. The authority to issue

them is liable to great abuses, and the law is justly strict regarding

their requirements. They must be duly issued by a court or

oﬂioer of competent jurisdiction, and if it does not appear by the

warrant that a. proper showing was made before it was issued,

the warrant can alford no protection to the oﬁicer executing it.‘

The warrant must also describe particularly the place to be

searched, and leave nothing to the discretion of the oiﬁcer in

this rega1'd;’ and if property is to be searched for, it must

describe particularly the property.‘ The otiicer in executing the

warrant must not go beyond its authority to search other build-

ings,‘ or to seize other property;‘ but he is no trespasser in

seizing goods which answer the description, even though they

prove not to be the goods intended.‘ Neither is he a trespusser

in any case if the warrant is suﬁicient in its apparent requisites
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and he simply obeys its command.’

In respect to the disposition of property seized under a search

' Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40;

Commonwealth 0. Lottery Tickets, 5

Cush. 369; State 0. Staples, 37 Me.

228; State 0. Carter, 39 Me. 262; Jones

Fletcher, 41 Me. 254.

' Humcs e. Taber. 1 R. I. 464; Reed

0. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh, 44; Sandford

Search Warrants. The only lawful mode of making search
upon one's premises is under the c6mmnnd of Rearch warrants;
and these are allowed to discover stolen or smuggled goods, or
implements of gaming, and in a few other cases for which provision must be found in the statutes. The authority to issue
them is liable to great abuses, and the law is justly strict rc~arding
their requit·cments. They must be duly issued by a court or
officer of com pctent jurisdiction, and if it does not appear by the
warrant that a proper showing was made before it was issued,
the warrant can afford no protection to the officer executing it.'
The warrant must also describe particularly the place to he
searched, and leave nothing to the disct·etion of the officer in
this regard; • and if property is to be searched for, it m nst
describe particularly the property.• The officer in executing the
warrant must not go beyond its authority to search other buildings: or to seize other property; • but he is no trespasser in
seizing goods which answer the de~cription, even though they
prove not to be the goods intended.• Neither is he a trespasser
in any case if the warrant is sufficient in its apparent requisites
and he simply obeys its command.7
In respect to the disposition of property seized under a search

0. Nichols, 13 Muss. 286; People v.

Holcomb, 3 Park Cr. R. 656; State 0.

Robinson, 83 Me. 564; Ashley v. Pct-

erson, 25 Wis. 621. For instances in

which the description was held insuf-

ﬂcieut, see Meek e. Pierce, 19 Wis.

300; Commonwealth 1:. Dana, 2 Met.

329; Dwinncls 1:. Boynton, 3 Alien,

310; Commonwealth 0. Intoxieuting

Liquors, 6 Allen, 596.

1 State 0. Robinson, 36 Me. 564;

Commonwealth e. Intoxicating Liq-

uors, 13 Allen,52; Downing v. Porter,

8 Gray, 539. Sec, also, cases cited in

last note. The warrant will be good

if the description is suﬂlciently accu-

rate to enable the oﬂicer to identify

it. Downing 0. Porter, 8 Gray, 539.

If the description in the complaint is

sutllcient, and the warrant refers to

that, it will be suﬂicient. Dwinnels

0. Boynton, 3 Allen, 310.

‘ McGlinchy 0. Barrows, 41 Me. 74;

Jones o. Fletcher, 41 Me. 254; Down-

ing o. Porter, 8 Gray, 539.

’ Crozier 0. Cundey, 6 B. & C. 232;

Stone v. Dana, 5 Met. 98.

' Stone 0. Dana, 5 Met. 98.

' Humes e. Tuber, 1 R. 1. 464; Bell

0. Clup, 10 Johns 263; Dwinnels 0.

B--ynton, 8 Allen, 310; Sandford 0.

Nichols, 18 Muss. 286. But case will

lie against the complainant if he has

obtained the warrant without proba-

ble cause, and from malicious mo-

tives. Beuty 1:. Perkins, 6 Wend. 382;

Lnddington v. Peck, 2 Conn. 700;

Watson o. Watson, 9 Conn. 140.

1 Grumon "· Haymond, 1 Conn. 40;
Commonwealth "· Lot:ery Tickets, 6
Cush. 369; State "· Staples, 37 Me.
228; State o. Carter, 39 lie. 262; Jones
Fletcher, 41 :Me. 2<34.
' Humes fl. Tnhcr. 1 R. I. 464; Reed
•· Hicc, 2 J. J. Mnrsh, 44; Sandford
•· Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; People 11.
Holcomb, 3 Park Cr. R. 656; State o.
Hobinson, 33 ?tie. 5G4; Ashley tl. Pet.
erson, !?~ Wis. 621. For Instances In
which the description WRS held Insufficient, see lh·ck "· Pierce, 19 Wis.
300; Commonwealth ~. Dana, 2 Met.
329; Dwinn<:l::~ "· Boynton, 3 Alien,
310; (;ommonwt'alth "· Intoxkuting
Liquors, 6 Allen, 5!JU.
' Bt~ttc "· Hobinson, ~ Me. 564;
Commonwculth "· Intoxicating Liq.
uors, 13 Allen, 52; Downing- tt. Porter,
8 Gruy, 539. See, also, cases cited in
luL note. The warrant will be good
if &he de:;cription is suftlcicntly accu.

rate to enable the oftlcer to identify
it. Downing "· Porter, 8 Gray, 539.
If the ucscription in the complaint Ll
sufficient, ~tnd the warrant refers to
that, it will be suftleient. Dwinnels
e. Boynton, 3 Allen, 310.
• McGlinchy e. Barrows, 41 Me. 7-i;
Jones"· FletcllCr, 41 :Me. 254; Down.
ing "· Porter, 8 Gray, 639.
~ Crozier e. Cundcy, 6 B. & C. 232;
Stone 11. Dnna, 5 Met. !18.
1 Stone "· Dana, 5 )[ct. 98.
'Humes o. Tuber, 1 U. I. 464; Bell
11. Clnp, 10 Johns 2G3; Dwinncls "·
B. •ynton, 8 Allen, 810; SuDllf••rd 11.
Nidwls, 18 lluss. ::!SG. But ca~e will
lie ngainst the complainant if he hliS
obtained the warrant without proba.
blc cause, nod from malicious mo.
tivt>!l. Beaty"· Perkins, 6 Wend. 382;
Luddington "· Peck, 2 Conn. 700;
Watson o. Watson. 9 Conn. 140.
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warrant, no more than in respect to where he shall search or
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what he shall search for, can the ministerial officer be vested with

a judicial discretion. He cannot, therefore, be empowered to

destroy property kept for an illegal purpose, without any udicial

determination on that subject.‘

Invasions of Political Rights. The citizen might be deprived

of his right to meet and discuss public affairs, either by the action

of private individuals, or by that of the public authorities. In

the former case the means resorted to for the purpose of defeat-

warrant, no more than in respect to wLer~ he shall search or
what he shall search for, can the ministerial offieer be vested with
a judicial discretion. He cannot, therefore, be empowered to
destroy property kept tor an illegal purpose, without any judicial
determination on that subject.'

ing the right would determine the nature of the remedy. Thus,

persons might wrongfully and by force be removed from a place

of meeting. or they might, by threats or other means of intimida-

tion, be prevented from meeting; in the one case there would be

an aggravated trespass, and in the other a wrong perhaps equal

in degree, but which, being accomplished without force, must be

redressed in an action on the case. When a meeting for any

lawful purpose is actually called and held, one who goes there

with the purpose to disturb and break it up, and commits dis-

order to that end, is a trespasser upon the rights of those who

for the time have control of the place of meeting. If several

unite in the disorder, it may be a criminal riot. It is diilicult to

indicate the particular methods in which the right of petition

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

may be violated, and every case will be likely to present new

facts. Parties interested in and circulating petitions doubtless

have a qualiﬁed property in them while in their possession, the

disturbance of which may be redressed by suit. The disregard

of petitions or remonstrances by the persons or bodies to whom

they are addressed is of course only a political wrong.

Suffrage. The chief political right is that of suffrage. The

ways in which this may be invaded are numerous, and while all

of them are wrongs to the political society, and are or may be

made punishable under the penal laws, only a portion of them

can support a private right of action. The reasons for this will

l Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1;

Greene 0. Briggs, 1 Curt. 311; Hib-

bard 1;. People, 4 Mich. 125. In the

recent case of McCoy o. Zane. 65 Mo.

11, the court avoid this point, but they

hold that an officer is not protected

in seizing _and destroying, under a

search warrant, gaming implements

Invasions of Political Rights. The citizen might be deprived
of his right to meet and discuss public affairs, either by the action
of private individuals, or by that of the public authorities. In
the former case the m"eans resoa·ted to for the purpose of defeating the right would determine the nature of the remedy. Thus,
persons mi~ht wrongfully and by force be removed from a place
of meeting, or they might, by threats or other means of intimidation, be prevented from meeting; in the one case there would be
an agg-ravated trespass, and in the other a wrong perhaps equal
in degree, but which, being accomplished without force, must be
redre&sed in an action on the case. When a meeting for any
lawful purpose is actually called and held, one who goes there
with the purpose to disturb and break it up, and commits dis.
order to that end, is a trespasser upon the rights of those who
for the time have control of the place of meeting. If several
unite in the disorder, it may be a criminal riot. It is difficult to
indicate the particular methods in which the right of petition
may be violated, and every case will be likely to present new
facts. Parties interested in and circulating petitions doubtless
have a qualified property in them while in their possession, the
disturbance of which may be redressed by suit. The disregard
of petitions or remonstrances by the persons or bodies to whom
they are addressed is of course only a political wrong.

which were not in fact kept for gam-

ing purposcs; the law only authoriz-

ing the destruction of those so kept.

Buftioage. The chief political right is that of suffrage. The
ways in which this may be invaded are numerous, and while all
of them are wrongs to the political society, and are o1· may be
made punishable under the penal laws, only a portion of them
can support a private right of action. The reasons for this will
I Fisher o. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1;
Greene o. Briggs, 1 Curt. 811; Hi b.
bard o. People, 4 Mich. 125. In the
recent case of llcCoy "· Zane. 65 Mo.
11, the court avoid this point, but they
hold that an officer is not protected

in seizing ,and destroying, under a
search warrant, gaming implement.
which were not in fact kept for gam.
ing purposes; the law only authorizing the dest.ruction of those so kepL.
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be apparent when the cases are enumerated. The following may
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be instanced as cases in which an individual entitled to suffrage

is deprived of the right:

1. Where oﬁieers have wrongfully neglected or refused to

take the necessary preliminary action to enable an election to be

held.

2. Wliere, by forcible or riotous proceedings, the holding oi

an election has been prevented.

3. \Vhere illegal votes are received which control the result.

4. Where, by the illegal conduct of the oﬁicers, or of other

persons, the ballots are destroyed, or in some other manner it

becomes impossible to determine the result, whereby the election

is defeated.

In each of these cases it may be said the individual elector is

wronged, but he is wronged only in the same manner and to the

same degree with all others. There is a general injury to all,

but no special and particular injury to any one. Consequently

the injury is only to the public, and must be redressed in a crim-

inal prosecution» Moreover, in the third-case speciﬁed, the idea

of individual injury is excluded if the elector has actually exer-

cised his own right by depositing his ballot. All other interest

is then general. In a legal sense one citizen has exactly the
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same interest with any other in having effect given to the will of

the majority of the electors, as it has been expressed in legal

ballots, and it would be contradictory to the theory of our insti-

tutions to assume that only those voting for the candidate receiv-

ing the highest number of legal votes were interested in his

receiving the office for which he is thus designated. An elec-

tion is only a means of ascertaining, in a formal manner, what

the will of the electors is, and when that will has been legally

expressed, it is to be presumed that every citizen is desirous and

interested to give it effect. No legal principle which assumed

the contrary could for a moment be admitted.

In the following cases the injury might be more direct and

personal:

1. Where the elector, by force or threats, is kept away from

the poll.

2. \Vhere the oﬁicers, by wrongful decisions concerning his

qualiﬁcations to vote. deprive him of the right.

3. Where oﬂicers or others wrongfully invade his right to secrecy.

be apparent when the cases are enumerated. The following may
be instanced as cases in which an individual entitled to sutfl·age
is rleprived of the right:
1. Where officers have wrongfully neglected or refn~ed to
take the necessary preliminary action to enable an election to be
held.
2. Where, by forcible or riotous proceedings, the holding of
an election has been prevented.
3. \Vhere illegal votes are received which control the result.
4. Where, by the illegal conduct of the officers, or of other
}>t'rsons, the ballots are destroyed, or ii1 some other manner it
becomes impossible to determine the result, whereby the election
is defeated.
In each of these cases it may be said the individual elector is
wronged, but he is wronged only in the same manner and to the
same degree with all others. There is a general injnry to all,
but no special and particular injnry to any one. Consequently
the injury is only to the public, and must be redressed in a criminal prosecution .... Moreover, in the third·case specified, the idea·
of individual injury is excluded if the elector has actually exercised his own right by depositing his ballot. All other interest
is then general. In a legal sense one citizen has exactly the
same interest with any other in hRving effect given to the will of
the mRjot·ity of the electors, as it has been expressed in legal
ballots, and it would be coutradictory to the theory of our institutions to assume that only those voting for the candidate receiving the highest number of legal votes were interested in his
receiving the office for which he is thus designated. An eleetion is only a means of asc..-ertaining, in a formal manner, what
the will of the electors is, and when that will has been legally
expressed, it is to be presumed that every citizen is desirous and
interested to give it effect. No le:.,ral principle which assumed
the contrary could for a moment be admitted.
In the following cases the injury might be more direct and
personal:
1. Where the elector, by force or threats, is kept away from
the 11ol1.
2. \Vhere the officers, by wrongful decisions concerning his
qualifications to vote. deprive him of the right.
3. Where offic.:ers or others wrongfully invade his right to &eCI'eC1·
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In the second of these cases it will be shown, in a subsequent
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chapter, under what circumstances an individual remedy may be

had. In the ﬁrst, if force is employed, there is an aggravated

trespass, and if it was not employed, the right of action, we take

it, would be plain, if the terror excited by the threats were such

that a reasonable man would have been deterred from the exer-

cise of his right. In the third there would be more room for

controversy. '

An elector in this country has not only a right to vote, but he

has a right to exclude others from a knowledge of how he votes.

The purpose in establishing voting by ballot is to give him this

right, in order that, in his action, he may be perfectly free, unin-

tlucnced either by the fear of giving offense, or by the desire to

please. His right is therefore invaded when his secrecy is

uncovered.‘ But there are no cases in which it has judicially

been determined what facts make out such an invasion, or at

precisely what point the rude indulgence of one’s curiosity,

which is always an impertinence and an incivility, becomes also

an illegal act. To look over one’s shoulder while he is preparing

his ballot might be thought a. rudeness merely, as would be a like

act when one is writing a private letter. Besides, at this stage,

the act is incomplete; the elector may change his ballot entirely;
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and if one only discovers how the elector at one time has contem-

plated voting, his right to a secret ballot, afterward exercised, is

not invaded at all. But where judges of election, when the bal-

lot is received by them for deposit in the box, proceed ﬁrst to

open and inspect it, the violation of right is manifest, and the

same law which gives an action for a _mere nominal trespass on

lands would doubtless give one here.

Exclusion from Omce. One may be wronged in his right to

hold oﬁice, if he possesses the necessary qualiﬁcations, and has

been actually chosen to one. The qualiﬁcations must be pre-

scribed by law; there is no such thing as a natural right to hold

an otliee, any more than there is a natural right to vote.’ But

' People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45; Peo-

ple 0. Cicott, 16 Mich. 283; State 0.

Hilmantcl, 23 Wis. 422; Williams 0.

Stein, 38 Ind. 89; McCrary's Law of’

Elections. §§ 194, 195.

’ The qualiﬁcations prescribed must

of course be supported by some rea-

son; they cannot be purely arbitrary,

In the second of these cases it will be shown, in a subsequent
chapter, under what circumstances an individual remedy may be
bad. In the first, if furce is employed, there is an aggravated
trespass, and if it was not employed, the right of action, we take
it, would be plain, if the terror excited by the threats were such
that a reasonable man would have been deterred from the exercise of his right. In the third there would be more room tor
controversy.
An elt:ctor in this country has not only a right to vote, but he
has a right to exclude others from a knowledge of how he votes.
The purpose in establishing voting by ballot is to give him this
right, in order that, in his action, he may be perfectly free, uninfluenced eitlter by the tear of giving offense, or by the desire to
please. His right is theretore invaded when his secrecy is
uncovered.' But there arc no cases in which it has judicially
been determined what facts make out such an invasion, or at
precisely what point the rude indulgence of one's curiosity,
which is always an impertinence and an incivility, becomes also
an illegal act. To look over one's shoulder while he is preparing
his ballot might be thought a rudeness merely, as would be a liktt
act when one is writing a private letter. Besides, at this s~~t
the act is incomplete; tho elector may change his ballot entirely;
and if one only disc--Overs how the elector at one time has contemplated voti "~· his right to a secret ballot, afterward exercised, is
not invaded at all. But where judges of election, when the ballot is received by them for deposit in the box, proceed first to
open and inspect it, the violation of right is manifest, and the
same law which gives an action for a .mere nominal trespass on
lands would doubtless give one here.

like the exclusion of members of a

particular party. Baltimore v. State,

-|

Exclusion from OfBce. One may be wronged in his right to
hold office, if he possesses the necessary qualifications, and has
been actually chosen to one. The qualifications must be prescribed by law; there is no such thing as a natural right to hold
an office, any more than there is a natural right to vote.' But
1 People"· Pense, 27 N.Y. 45; People "· Cicott, HJ Mich. 283; State e.
Hilmantel, 23 Wis. 422; Williams e.
Stein, 88 Ind. t:!9; McCrary's Law of
Elections,§§ lll·t 195.

1 The qualifications prescribed must
of course be supported by some rcason; they cannot be purely arbitrary.
like the exclusion of members of a
particular party. Baltimore "· State,
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when a qualiﬁed person, chosen to an oﬁice, is excluded from it,

299

there is a wrong both to the State and to the individual; to the

former, because it is thus deprived of its chosen olﬁcer, and to

the latter, because he thus loses his oﬁice. If another has usurped

the oﬁice, the suitable remedy to oust him is found in the pro-

ceeding by qua warranto or some analogous statutory process.‘

Meantime, until he is ousted, if he has color of oﬂtice, and actually

performs the functions without hindrance, he is oﬂicer rle facto,

and his acts, which concern the public and third persons, are

upheld on grounds of public policy.’ But when the intruder is

dispossessed, the money value of the oﬁice is recognized, and the

party entitled is allowed to recover his damages.’

Military Subordination. An important exemption is to be

free from military control, except when it is exercised in strict

conformity to law. In times of pence the military remains in strict

subordination to the civil power, and in times of war also, except

on the theater of warlike operations.‘ An exception would be

made, in either peace or war, by the declaration of martial law.‘

Where, therefore, the civil law is not suspended, either by the

when a qualified person, chosen to an office, is excluded from it,
there is a wrong both to the State and to the individual; to the
former, because it is thus deprived of its chosen officer, and to
the latter, because he thus loses his office. If another has usurped
the office, the suitable remedy to oust him is found in the proceeding by quo warranto or some analogous statutory process.'
Meantime, until he is ousted, if ht~ hns color of office, and actually
performs the functions without hindrance, he is officer d6 facto,
and his acts, which concern the public and third persons, are
upheld on grounds of public policy.' But when the intruder is
dispossessed, the money value of the office is re<.'Ognized, and the
party entitled is allowed to recover his damages.•

actual presence of warlike operations, or by declaration of mar-

tial law, whatever would be a wrong, if done by any other citi-

15 Md. 876, 4'76. See People 0. Hurl-
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but, 24 Mich. 44»

‘ 3 Bl. Com. 362; High, Extraordi-

nary Remedies, § 628 at seq.

'Purker 0. Lett. Ld. Raym. 658;

Commonwealth o. McCombs, 56 Penn.

St. 436; Ray 0. Murdock, 86 Miss. 692;

State u. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; Ex

parla Strang, 21 Ohio, (N. s.) 610;

Bucknam 1;. Ruggles, 15 Mass. 180;

People 0. Kane, 23 Wend. 414; Burke

llilitary Subordination. An important exemption is to bo
free from military control, except when it is exerci~cd in strict
conformity to law. In times of peace the military remains in strict
subordination to the civil power, and in times of war also, except
on the theater ot' warlike operations.• An ex<.-eption would be
made, in either peace or war, by the ccclamtion of martial law.'
Where, therefore, the civil law is not suspended, either by the
actual presence of warlike operations, or by declaration of martial law, whatever would be a wrong, if done by any other citi-

o.Elliot.t,4 Ired. 355; Taylor 0. Skrine,

3 Brcv. 516; McGregor 0. Balch, 14

Vt. 428; Rice 0. Commonwealth. 8

Bush, 14; Pritchctt 0. People, 6 Ill.

525; Jones v. Gibson, 1 N. H. 266;

Cabot 0. Given, 45 Me. 144; Auditors

0. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176; Mc(‘ormick

0. Fitch, 14 Minn. 252; Leach v. Cus-

sidy, 23 Ind. 449; State 0. Tolnn, 33

N. J. 195.

' Lightly o. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 112;

Allen 1:. McKeen, 1 Sum. 276; United

Stntcs o. Addison, 6 Wall. 291; Glas-

coek o. Lyons, 20 Ind. 1; People 0.

Miller, 24 Mich. 458; Howcrtou 0.

Tate, 7d N. C. 161; Sign!‘ 0. Crcnshaw,

16 :Md. 876, 476. Bee People •· Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 441 8 Bl. Com. 362; High, Extraordl.
aary Rcmediet, § 623 ft 1eq.
' Pa!ker "· ~tt, lA. Raym. 6'i8;
Commonwealth"· )lcCombs, 66 Penn.
8L4:J6; Ray"· ){urdock, 86 Miss. 692;
State tJ, Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; E:c
f'tJrU Strang, 21 Ohio, (:R. a.) 610;
Bucknam "· Ruggles, 15 Mass. 180;
People"· Kane, 23 Wt:nd. 414; Burke
e. Elliott, 4 Ired. 3:">5; Taylor"· Skrine,
8 Brcv. 516; McGre,gor "· Balch, 14

10 La. Ann. 297; Petit 0. Rousseau,

15 La Ann. 239; Dorsey o. Smyth. 28

Cal. 21. It seems that the damages

should be the uinount of the emolu-

ments of the otﬂce. United Slates v.

Addison, 6 \V:ill. 291; Gluseock o.

Lyons, 20 Ind. 1; Douglass v. Stutc,

31 Ind. 429; People v. Miller, ‘J-t

Mich. 458.

‘E1: parts Milligan, 4 Wall. 2;

Milllgan 0. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13; Com-

monwealth 0. Small, 20 Penn. Bl.

81.

' Luther e. Borden, '7 How. 1.

Vt. 428; Rice "· Crlmmonwealth, 8
Bush, 14; Pritchett "· People, 6 Ill.
:i2.1; Jones D. ltib~on, 1 N. H. 266;
Cabot"· Given, 45 Me. 144; Auditors
e. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176; McCormick
e. Fitch, 14 Minn. 2.'52; Leach"· Cas.
aldy, 23 Ind. 449; State e. Tolan, 38

H.J.18G.

1 Lightly e. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 112;
Allen"· llcKcen, 1 Sum. 276; United
States e. Addison, 6 Wall. 291; Glas.
cock "· Lyons, 20 Ind. 1; People "·
Miller, 24 Mich. 4U8; Howerton e.
Tate, 70 N. C. 161; Siguu. Crenshaw,
10 La. .Ann. 297; Petit e. Rousseau,
15 La. Ann. 2.1!l; Dorsey "· Smyth, 28
Cal. 21. It seems that the damages
should be the amount of the emolu.
menta of the oftlce. United States "·
Addison, 6 Wall. 291; GlMcO<'k "·
Lyons, 20 Ind. 1 ; Douglass "· State,
81 Ind. 429; People "· Hiller, 24
Mich. 458.
• Ez paf'U Milligan, ' Wall. 2;
Milligan "· Hovey, 3 Bias. 18; Com.
monwealth •· Small, 26 Penn. SL

31.

• Luther e. Borden, 7 How. L
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zen, would be a wrong if done by a person in the military service,
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whether oilicer or private, and would be punished in the same

way. ‘

Military oﬁicers have no general authority to seize property

for the purposes of government, and their subordinates have no

protection in obeying their orders in doing so.‘ The seizures are

trespasses.' The necessities of the service are to be provided for

by the civil law, and unless impressment be expressly allowed by

law, what is taken must be paid for at the time, or its payment

provided for.’ There are exceptions to this rule, but they are of

those cases only in which the necessities of the public service are

urgent, and such as will not admit of delay; when the civil

authority would be too late in providing the means required for

the occasion.‘ If property was seized without such emergency

no title would pass, and the owner might reclaim it in whose

hands soever he might ﬁnd it.‘ Impressmcnt, in emergencies,

belongs to the commander of the army, or of the district or post.

The right cannot be exercised by oﬂicers of straggling squads of

men.‘

Courts martial, for the trial of military offenses, are strictly

courts of interior and limited jurisdiction, and to render their

proceedings valid, and a protection to those acting under them,
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it must appear that they have kept within their jurisdiction.‘ A

citizen not in the military service, or lawfully summoned into it,

is not amenable to court martial.‘ But where such a court has

proceeded within its jurisdiction, its action is as conclusive as the

action of any court exercising its legitimate powers.’

' Riggs 1:. State, 8 Cold. 85.

' Mitchell 0. Harmony, 13 How. 115,

135; 'l‘crrill v. Rankin, 2 Bush, 453;

Bryan'n.Walker,64 N. C. 141; Koonce

0. Davis, '72 N. C. 218; Merritt 0.

Nashville, 5 Cold. 95.

* Sellards 0. Zomes, 5 Bush, 90;

Wilson 0. Franklin, 63 N. C. 259;

Hogue 1:. Penn, 3 Bush. 663.

‘ Farmer v. Lewis, 1 Bush, 66; Sel-

lards '0. Zomes, 5 Bush, 90; Merritt 0.

Nashville, 5 Cold. 95.

zen. would be a wrong if done by a person in the military service,
whether officer or private, and would be punished in the same
way.
Military officers have no general authority to seize propert1
for the purposes of government, and their subordinates have no
protection in obeying their orders in doing so.' The seizures are
trespasses.' The necessities of the service are to be provided for
by the civil law, and unless impressment be expressly allowed by
law, what is taken must be paid for at the time, or its payment
provided for.' There are exceptions to this rule, but they are of
those cases only in which the necessities of the public service are
urgent, and such as will not admit of delay; when the civil
authority would be too late in providing the means required for
the occasion.• If property was seized without such emergency
no title would pass, and the owner might reclaim it in whose
hands soever he might find it. • Impressment, in emergencies,
belongs to the commander of the army, or of the district or post.
The right cannot be exercised by officers of straggling squads of
men.•
Courts martial, for the trial of military offenses, are strictlJ
courts of interior and limited jurisdiction, and to render their
proceedings valid, and a protection to those acting under them,
it must appear that they have kept within their jurisdiction.' A
citizen not in the military service, or lawfully summoned into it,
is not amenable to court martial.' But where such a court baa
proceeded within its jnrisdiction. its action is as conclusive as the
action of any court exercising its legitimate powers.'

' Reeves 0. Trigg. '7 Bush, 385.

' Lewis '0. McGuire, 8 Bush, 202;

Hogue 1;. Penn, 3 Bush, 663.

‘Duﬂicld 0. Smith, 3 Scrg. & R

590; Barrett o. Crane. 16 Vt. 246;

Brooks 0. Adams, 11 Pick. 440;

Brooks v. Davis, 17 Pick. 148; Com-

monwealth o. Small, 26 Penn. St. 31.

' Smith o. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257; Mer-

rimau 0. Bryant, 14 Conn. 200. See,

also, Mallory 0. Merritt, 17 Conn.

1'78.

‘Stale v. Stevens, 2 McCnrd, 32;

State '0. Wakely, 2 N. & M00. 410.

Sec State 0. Davis, 4 N. J. 311; Mower

0. Allen, 1 D. Chip. 381; Common-

wealth 0. Small, 26 Penn. St. 31.

‘#95

I Riggs "· State. 8 Cold. SIS.
'Mitchell e. Harmony, 18 How. 1111,
135; Terrill "· Rankin, 2 Bush, 45S;
Bryan11.Walker,64 N. C.141; Koonce
"· Davis, 72 N. C. 218; Merritt e.
Nashville, 5 Cold. 95.
a Sellards "· Zomes, IS Bush, 90;
Wilson "· Franklin, 68 N. 0. 259;
Hogue "· Penn, 8 Bush, 663.
~Farmer"· Lewis, 1 Hush, 66; Sel.
lards e. Zomes, 6 Bush, 90; Merritt e.
Nashville, II Cold. 95.
• Reeves "· Trigg. 7 Bush, 8Sr;.
• Lewis "· McGuire, S Bush, 202;
Hogue "· Penn, S Bush, 663.

' Dumeld "· Smith, 8 Scrg. & R.
590; Barrett "· Crane, 16 Vt. 246;
Brooks "· Adams, 11 Pick. «0;
Brooks "· Davis, 17 Pick. 148; Com.
monwealth "·Small, 26 Penn. St. 81.
• Smith"· Shaw, 12 Johns. 21S7; Mer.
riman e. Bryant, 14 Conn. 200. See,
also, Mallory e. Merritt, 17 Conn.
178.
'State e. Stevens, 2 McCord, St;
State e. Wakely, 2 N. & McC. (10.
See State e. Davis, 4 N.J. 811; Mower
"· Allen, 1 D. Chip. 881; CommODe
wealth e. Small, 26 Penn. St. 81.
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Military tribunals cannot be established for the trial of offenses

801

against the general laws, when the civil courts are in the undis-

turbed exercise ot' their powers.‘

Neither military nor civil law can take from the citizen the

right to bear arms for the common defense. This is an inherited

and traditionary right, guaranteed also by State and federal Con-

stitutions. But it extends no further than to keep and bear those

arms, which are suited and proper for the general defense of the

community against invasion and oppression, and it does not

include the carrying of such weapons as are specially suited for

deadly individual encounters.’ Therefore, the State laws which

forbid the carrying of such weapons concealed are no invasion

of the rights of citizenship.

' Exports Mllllgan, 4 Wall. 2. B. C. 8 Am. Rep. 8, and note; Carroll

' Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk. 165; 8. 0. State, 28 Ark. 99; S. C. 18 Am. Rep.

O. 1 Green, Cr. Rep. 466 and note; 538; Fife 0. State, 81 Ark. 455.

lli1itary tribunals cannot be established for the trial of offenses
against the general laws, when the civil courts are in the undisturbed exercise of their powers.'
.:Neither military nor civil law can take from the citizen the
right to bear arms for the common defense. This is an inherited
and traditionary right, guaranteed also by State and federal Constitutions. But it extends no further than to keep and bear those
arms, which arc suitetl and proper for tho general defense of the
community against invasion and oppression, and it does not
include the carrying of such weapons as are specially suited tor
deadly individual encounters.• Therefore, the State laws which
forbid the carrying of such weapons concealed are no invasion
of the rights of citizenship.
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1

BzpGf'U Milligan, oi Wall. B.

Andrews "·State. 3 Hclsk. 16.'''; S.
0. 1 Green, Cr. Rep. 4.66 aod note;
1

8. C. 8 Am. P.ep. 8, aod note; Carroll
e. State, 28 Ark. 99; S. C. 18 Am. Rep.
G88; Fifo e. State. 81 Ark. 4.515.
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INVASION or RIGHTS IN REAL PROPERTY.

The ownership of lands is complete or partial; it is of present

title or future title; it is several or joint. In this country most

persons own their estate by absolute or fee simple title, corre-

sponding to the old allodial titles, which were free from any

feudal tenure. The characteristics are, that the owner has com-

plete dominion, and may sell it as he would a chattel, and if he

docs not make a disposition of it to take effect in his life time,

he may do so by testamentary conveyance, or leave it to pass to

his heirs-at-law. His dominion is indeed subject to certain pow-

ers in the State, which pertain to sovereignty, and which consist

in a right to appropriate it to the public use whenever it shall

CHAPTER X.

be found needful, and a right to regulate its enjoyment, so as to

prevent needless or unreasonable interference with the rights of

others. It is also, or may be, subject to certain easements and

INVASION OF RIGHTS IN REA.L PROPERTY.

servitudes in favor of other parties, some of which are incident

to ownership, while others, when they exist, arise from contract,

express or implied.

In what follows, by real property is understood the thing

itself; the land, and what pertains to it, and the right for the

time being to possess and enjoy it. Particular estates in the land,
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some of which would be mere chattels real with the incidents of

personal property, it does not often become important, when

mere remedies are in question, to distinguish; the law looking to

the right to present possession only, and defending that with its

lawful incidents.

The chief characteristic of ownership is this right to com-

plete dominion. The line of a man’s private domain, like the

boundary line between nations, is not to be crossed without per-

mission. In law this permission is called a license.

*‘“*"'~IHai

The ownership of lands is complete or partial; it is of present
title or future title; it is several or joint. In this country most
persons own their estate by absolute or fee simple title, corresponding to the old allodial titles, which were free from any
feudal tenure. The characteristics are, that the owner has complete dominion, and may sell it as he would a chattel, and if he
docs not make a disposition of it to take effect in his life time,
he may do so by testamentary conveyance, or leave it to pass to
his heire-at-law. His dominion is indeed subject to certain powers in the State, which pertain to sovereignty, and which consist
in a right to appropriate it to the public use when~ver it shall
be found needful, and a right to regulate its enjoyment, so as to
prevent needless or unreasonable interference with the right.s of
others. It is also, or may be, subject to certain easements and
servitudes in favor of other parties, some of which are incident
to ownership, while others, when they exist, arise from contract,
express or implied.
In what follows, by real property is understood the thing
itself; the land, and what pertains to it, and the right for the
time being to possess and enjoy it. Particular e~tates in the land,
some of which would be mere chattels real with the incidents of
1wrsonal property, it does not often become important, when
mere remedies are in question, to distinguish; the law looking to
the right to present possession only, and defending that with its
lawful incidents.
The chief characteristic of ownership is this right to complete dominion. The line of a man's private domain, like the
boundary line between 11ations, is not to be crossed without permission. In law this permission is called a. license.
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Lawful license to enter one‘s premises may be given either,
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1. Impliedly by the owner; 2. Expressly by the owner; 3. By

the law.

Implied Licenses. Every retail dealer impliedly invites the

public to enter his shop for the examination of his goods, that

they may purchase them if they see ﬁt; the mechanic extends

Lawful license to enter one's premises may be given either,
1. Impliedly by the owner; 2. Expressly by the owner; 3. By
the law.

the like invitation to those who may have occasion to become his

customers; the physician and the lawyer invite them to their

respective oflices, and so on.‘ But the invitation is limited by

the purpose; it ,would be an abuse of the implied license, and a

trespass, if one, instead of visiting a dealer’s shop for the pur.

poses of the business carried on there, were to assemble his asso-

ciates there for some political or other purpose, for which the

shop had not been thrown open. No doubt one may visit

another’s place of business from no other motive than curiosity,

without incurring liability, unless he is warned away by placard

or otherwise. So every man, by implication, invites others to

come to his house as they may have proper occasion, either of

business,‘ of courtesy. for information, etc. Custom must deter-

mine in these cases what the limit is of the implied invitation.‘

In the case of young children and other persons not fully sui

7'm‘z's an implied license might sometimes arise when it would not
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in behalf of others. Thus, leaving a tempting thing for children

to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for

that purpose, may be equivalent toan invitation to them to make

use of it;‘ and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his

premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the

same implication should arise. So dogs may be impliedly invited

upon lauds by exposing meat which is apparently abandoned.‘

' Gowen u. Phila. Exchange Co., 5

Watts & S. 141, 148.

’ It is no trespass to enter upon a

man's premises to obtain settlement

of n debt, even though it be not yet

due. Lehman 0. Shacklcford, 50 Ala.

437. The servants of a wife who has

been divorced from her husband for

his fault may peaceably enter attor-

ward to remove her goods from the

husband's premises. Kallock c. Per-

ry, 61 Me. 273.

' Kay o. Pennsylvania R R. Co., 65

Penn. St. 27:5.

Implied Licenses.

Every retail dealer impliedly invites the
public to en~r his shop for the examination of his goods, that
they may purchase them if they see fit; the mechanic extends
the like invitation to those who may have occaRion to become his
customers; the physician and the lawyer invite them to their
respeetive offiecs, and so on.' But the invitation is limited by
the purpose; it ,would be an abuse of the implied license, and a
trespass, if one, instead of visiting a dealer's shop for the purposes of the business carried on there, were to assemble his associates there for some political or other purpose, for which the
shop had not been thrown open. No doubt one may visit
another's place of business from no other motive than curiosity,
without incurring liability, unless he is warned away by placard
or otherwise. So every man, by implication, invites others to
<:omo to his house as they may have proper occasion, either of
business,' of courtesy. for information, etc. Custom mnst determine in these cases what the limit is of the implied invitation.•
In the case of young children nnc.l other persons not fully sui
fu·ris an implied license might sometimes arise when it would not
in behalf of others. Thus, leaving a tempting thing for children
to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for
that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make
usc of it; 4 and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his
premises, near the common way, thin~rs tempting tv children, the
same implication should arise. So dogs may be impliedly invited
upon lands by exposing meat which is apparently abandoned.'

‘ Keefe v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co ,

21 Minn. 207. Compare Wood 0

School District, 44 lows, 27; Mangan

0. Atterton, L. R. 1 Exch. 2219.

‘ One who baits traps on his prem-

ises for dogs is liable to their owner

for their value if they are killed in

consequence. Townsend 0. Wathen,

9 East, 277.

1 Gowen a. Pbila. Exchange Co., li
Watts & S. 141, l43.
1 It is no trcspru;s to enter upon a
m:m's premist•s to obtain settlement
of n d<'bl, even though it be not yet
due. Lehman"· Shackleford, 50 Ala.
437. The scn·ants of a wife who has
bet>n divorced from her husband for
hia fault may peaceably enter afl.rr.
ward to remove her gcxxls from the
husband's premiaea. Kallock e. Per.
ry, 61 :Me. 278.

• Kay fl. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 6.5
Penn. tit. 273.
• Keefe fl. ?tiilwnuker, etc., R R. Co,
21 Minn. 207. C••mpare Wood e
School District, 44 low a, 27; !Iangan
fl, Atterton, L. U. 1 Exch. 2:)!).
1 One who baits traps on his premises for dogs is liable to their owner
for their value if they arc killed in
consrquence. Townsend e. Wathen,
9 Easl., 27'7.
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So one who has an easement in the lands of another is licensed
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to enter upon such lands whenever it becomes necessary to repair

or protect it.‘ And in a previous chapter many cases are enumer_

ated in which one, by implication of law, is licensed to enter

upon the land of another to remove property which he purchased

while it was there, or which was left there under express license,

or taken there wrongfully, and in some other cases.‘

Express License. Where one gives to another authority to

enter upon his lands to do a certain act or succession of acts,

without at the same timegranting to him any interest in the land

itself, this is a license, whether given by parol or in writing. It

So one who has an easement in the lands of another is licensed
to enter upon such lands whenever it becomes necessary to repair
or protect it.' And in a previous chapter many cases are enumerated in which one, by implication of law, is licensed to enter
upon the land of another to remove property which he purchased
while it was there, or which was left there under express license,
or taken there wrongfully, and in some other cases.•

may be given on condition, in which case it is inoperative, unless

the condition is performed.‘ It is personal as between the parties,

and cannot be assigned by the licensee,‘ and is revoked by a sale

of the land by the 1icensor.' If not acted upon within a reason-

able time it is presumptively recalled;' if it is acted upon, the

licensee assumes the obligation to observe due care, and to negli-

gently do nothing npon the land that shall be injurious.’ In

general, the licensor assumes toward the licensee no duty, but

to refrain from acts willfully injurious, except, perhaps, when he

‘Bee Prescott o. Williams, 5 Met.

429.
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’ See Ante, p. 51. If 0ne‘s beasts

escape from him upon the adjoining

premises. when he is driving along

the highway with due care, he may

lawfully enter to reclaim them. Good-

wyn 0. Cheveley,4 H. & N. 631. But

he must. take them out through the

proper openings. If he lets down the

Bxpreea License. Where one gives to another authority to
enter upon his lands to do a certain act or succession of acts,
without at the same timegranting to him any interest in the land
itselt~ this is a li<..oense, whether given by parol or in writing. It
may be given on condition, in which case it is inoperative, unless
the condition is performed.1 It is personal as between the parties,
and cannot be assigned by the licensee,' and is revoked by a sale
of the land by the licensor. 1 If not ncted upon within a. reasonable time it is presumptively recalled; • if it is acted upon, the
licensee assumes the obligation to observe due care, and to negligently do nothing upon the land that shall be injurious.' In
general: the licensor assumes toward the licensee no duty, but
to refrain from acts willfully injurious, except, perhaps, when he

fence for the purpose, when he might

take them through a gate, he may be

a trespasser. Gardner 0. Rowland, 2

lred. 247.

illlnmford o. Whitney, 15 Wend,

380; Freeman o. Hc:1dley,33 N. J. 523.

‘ Carleton v. Redington, 21 N. H.

291; Jackson 0. Babcock, 4 Johns.

418; Rugglcs 0. Lesure, 24 Pick. 187.

‘Drake v. Wells, 11 Allen, 141;

Houx u. Seat, 26 Mo. 178; Carter 1:.

Harlan, 6 Md. 20; Grocndykc 0.

Cramer, 2 Ind. 882; Mendenhall o.

_ -_- __ _ _ I

Klinck, 51 N. Y. 246; Estes 0. China,

56 Me. 407; Dark o. Johnson. 55 Penn.

St. 164; Prince 0. Case, 10 Conn. 382

Perhaps it would be equally correct

to say that the license had terminated

by the happening of a contingency

which, by implication of law, was in

the understanding of the parties at

tachcd to thelicense at its crtalion.

See Cook o. Stearns, 11 Mass. 538;

Bridges u. Purcell, 1 Dev. & Bat. 492;

Sampson u. Burnside, 13 N. H. 264;

Selden 1:. Delaware, etc., Canal Co.,

29 N. Y. 634; Wescott o. Delnno, 20

Wis. 514.

‘ Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83; Parsons

12. Camp. 11 Conn. 525. A license to

enter and cut and remove timber must,

so far, at least as the cutting goes, be

executed within a reasonable time, or

it will be lost. Hoit v. Stratton Mills.

54 N. H. 109; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 119.

" Eaton o. Winnie, 20 Mich. 156.

1

Bee Prescott e. Williams, IS Met.

.t29.
1 Bee Ante, p. IS1.
If one's beasts
t>SCape from him upon the adjoining
premises, when be is driving along
the highway with due care, be may
lawfully enter to reclaim them. Goodwyn e. Cheveley, .t H. & N. 6J1. But
he must take them out through the
proper openings. If he Jets down the
fence for the purpose, when be might
take them through a gate, he may be
a trespasser. Gardner e. Rowland, 2
Ired. 247.
a llnmford e. Whitney, 15 Wend,
:JSO; Freeman"· Headley,33 N.J. 523.
'Carleton "· Redington, 21 N. H.
291; Jackson "· Babcock, 4 Johns.
418; Ruggles 11. Lesure, 24 Pick. 187.
1 Drake "· Wells, 11 Allen, 141;
Houx 11. Seat, 26 Mo. 178; Carter e.
Harlan, 6 Md. 20; Groendyke e.
Cramer. 2 Ind. 882; Mendenhall o.

Klinck, li1 N. Y. 246; Estes e. China.
56 Me. 407; Dark"· Johnson, M Peon.
St. 164; Prince 11. Case, 10 Conn. 382
Perlu1.ps it would be equally correct
to say that the Jicensc had terminated
by the happening of a contingency
which, by impJicatlon of Jaw, was U1
the understanding of the parties attached to the license at its cr~:ation.
See Cook e. Stearne, 11 Mass. 538;
Bridges 11. Purcell, 1 Dev. & Bat. .t92:
Sampson 11. Burnside, 18 N.H. 264;
Selden e. Delaware, etc., Canal Co.,
29 N. Y. 634; Wescott "· Delano, 20
Wis. 514.
• Hill e. Lord, 48 Me. 83; Parsons
e. Camp. 11 Conn. 525. A Jicense to
enter and cut and remove timber must,
so far, at ]east as the cntting goes, be
executed within a reasonable time, o!'
It will be lost. Hoit "· Stratton Mills.
54 N. H. 100; B. U. 20 Am. Rep. 119.
' Eaton o. Winnie, 20 Mich. lli6.

WRONGS T0 REAL Paori-;n'rY. 305

had received a consideration for the license, or where his own
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business was such as to render the enjoyment of the license dan-

gerous, in which case the license would impose upon him the

obligation of additional care.‘ A license is not to be extended

by construction, and therefore a license for the erection of a

bridge will not extend to and license the rebuilding of the bridge

after the original structure has passed away.’ So a license is

always subject to revocation before it has been executed, but not

afterward. By this is meant that the license accompanies and justi-

ﬁes every act done under it, but is subject at any moment to be put

an end to as to any act contemplated by it but not yet performed.‘

The exceptions to this general right to revoke a license embrace

those cases where the licenses are coupled with an interest. By

this is meant, not the interest the licensee has in doing the act

permitted, but a legal interest conveyed to him in connection

with the lit-cnse, and to the enjoyment of which the license is

essential.‘ If, for example, one man sells to another cattle then

depasturing on his grounds, the right transferred in the cattle

' The owner of a lumber yard who

permits children to pass through it

does not assume toward them the ob-

ligation to see that the lumber is piled
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so as to be reasonably secure from

falling. Vandcrhcck 9. Hcndry, 34

N. J. 407, citing Hounscll v. Smyth,

7 C. B. (N. s.) 731; Binks 0. Sou.

York, etc., R. Co., 8 B 8: S. 244: Gau-

had rcreived a consideration for the lk-cuse, or where his owu
business was such as to render the enjoyment of the license dangerous, in which case the license would impose upon him the
obligation of additional ca.re. 1 A license is not to be extended
by construction, and therefore a license for the erection of a
bridge will not extend to and license the rebuilding of the bridge
after the original structnro has passed away.• So a license is
always snbject to re,·ocation before it has been oxecnted, but not
afterward. By this is meant that the license accompanies and justifies every act done onder it, but is subject a~ any moment to be put
an end to as to anya.ct contemplated by it but not yet performed.'
The exceptions to this general right to revoke a license embrace
those cases where the licenses are coupled with an interest. By
this is meant, not the interest the licensee has in doing the act
permitted, bot a legal interest conveyed to him in connection
with the lil'cnse, and to the enjoyment of which the license is
esscntiaJ.• If, for example, one man sells to another cattle then
depasturing on his grounds, the right transferred in the cattle

Lret 0. Edgcrton L. R., 2 C. B. 370;

Stone 0. Jackson, 16 C. B. 199 But

whore a. railroad company allow the

public q way across their premises,

they assume toward them, in the man-

agement of their road. an obligation

of additional care. Kay 0. Pcnnsyl.

vania R R. (‘o. 65 Penn. St. 269.

’ Hall o. Boyd, 14 Gco. 1; Gilmore

o. Wilbur. 12 Pick. 120: Amcri.<cog-

gin Bridge 0. Bragg, 11 N. H.102;

Gardner o. Rowland, 2 Ired. 247. The

same is true in the case ofdams erected

under license. See Cook 0. Slcurns,

11 Mass. 533.

‘ Houston 0. Latfce, 4

Dodge 0. LIcClintock, 4

-QC:

Z?
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Chynowcth 0. Tenney, 10 Wis. 807;

Kimball 0. Yates, 14 lll. 464; Allen

0. Fiskc, 42 Vt. 462; Woodward 0.

Beoly, 11 lll. 157; Drusc 0. \'Vl1et-let‘,

22 Mich. 439; S. C. 26 Mich. 18.); Ran-

dal v. Elder, 12 Kan. 257; Giles 11.

Simonds, 15 Gray. 441; Cook p.

Stcarns, 11 Mass. 533; Clute 0. Carr,

20 Wis. 531. It is a complete protec-

tion as to everything done under it

bcforc revocation. Wood n. Lcadbit-

ter, 18 M. & W. 838; Rawson v. Morse,

4 Pick. 127; Giles 0. Simonds. 15

Gray, 441; Marstou 0. Gale, 24 N. H.

177; Fuhr 0. Dean, 26 M0. 116;

Owens 0. Lewis, 46 Ind. 48!); Van

Dcuscn 0. Young, 29 N. Y. 9; Free-

man o. lleadlcy, 32 N. J. 223.

‘ See Wood 0. Manley, 11 Ad. & El.

84; Barnes 0. Barnes, 6 Vt. 388; Par-

sons e. Camp, 11 Conn. 625; Whit

J The owner or a lumber yard who
permits children to pass through i&
does not. nsqnmc toward them the obo
ligation to see that the lumber is pilcJ
10 u to be reasonably secure from
falling. Yanuerbeck !'. Hendry, 34
N. J. 467, citing Hounsell "· Smyth,
7 C. B. (R. s.) 731; Binks "· Sou.
York, etc., R. Co., 8 B & S. 244: Gau.
tre& "· EU~crton L. R., 9 C. B. 870;
Stone "· J1Lckson, 16 C. B. 199 Bu&
wbt>re a railroa<l company allow the
public " way across their premises,
they assume toward them, In \he mao.
agemcnt of their road, an obligation
or additional care. Kay 11. Pcnnsyl.
ftDia R. R. Co. 65 Penn. St. 269.
' Hall 11. Boyd, 14 Geo. 1; Gilmore
•· Wilbur. 12 Pick. 120: Ameriscog.
gin Bridge "· Bragg, 11 N. H. 102;
Gardner.. Rowland, 2lrcd. 247. The
aame is true in the case of dams erected
under license. See Cook "· Steurns,
11 ll 881. 633.
• Houston "· Lafl'ee, 46 N. H. 500;
Dodge •· KcCiin&ock, 4.7 N.H. 883;

20

Chynoweth o. Tenney, 10 Wis. 89'7;
Kimball "· Yates, lo4 Ill. 46t; Allen
e. Fiske, 42 Vt. 469; Woodward "·
&('ly, 11 Ill. 157; Druse "· Wbel·ler,
22llich. 439; S.C. 20 Micb.lBJ; Itan.
lial 11. Elder, 12 Kan. 2-'J-:'; Giles "·
Simonds, 15 Gray, 441; Cook p.
Stearns, 11 Mass. 533; Clute e. l'arr,
20 Wis. 631. It is a complete prntec.
tion as to everythin.~ done under 1&
before revocation. Wood "- Lt>11dbit.
ter,lS M. & W. 83::!; Rawson e. Mor~c,
4 Pick. 127; Gih•s e. Simonds, 15
Gray, 441; Marston "· Gale, 24 N. H.
177; Fuhr e. Dean, 26 llo. 116;
Owens e. Lewis, i6 Ind. 48!l; Vun
Deuscn 11. Young, 29 N. Y. 9; Freeman e. Ht>adley, 82 N .• 22.;.
• See Wood e. llanlcy, 11 Ad. & El.
84.; Barnes "· Barnes, 6 Vt. 38~; Par.
sons "· Camp, 11 Conn. 152-'J; Whit.
marsh e. Walker, 1 Met. 818; Giles"Simons, 13 Gray, 441; White e. Elwell,
48 Me. 860; Lcwia e. lieN aU, 63 N.

r.

0.63.
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supports the implied license to enter upon the grounds to take
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them away, and makes it irrevocable.‘ But it is to be observed

of this case that the license contemplates a temporary use of the

land only; not to have any permanent enjoyment of it; if it

contemplated anything further, it might be revoked, though no

revocation could take from the purchaser his interest in the cattle,

or preclude his right to remove them. So if one license another

to erect and occupy a building upon his laud, and he erects it

accordingly, the law recognizes the license so far as to protect his

right in the building; and though permission to occupy may be

rec illed, this will not preclude the licensee going upon the land

aftt"-rwards to take the building away.’ But a license cannot be

coupled with an interest in the lands, unless created by deed, or by

such other instrument as is suﬁicient to convey such an interest

under the Statute of Frauds. Therefore, rights of way, sales of

growing trees, permission to ﬂow lands permanently, or to carry

water over or pipes under the land of another, are mere licenses,

and revocable as such, unless created or made by deed.‘ And so

are the licenses which are given by the sale of tickets to theatres

and other places of public amusement.‘

In some cases where a license is revoked, it is of very little

importance whether the licensee is or is not protected against
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liability as a trespasser for what has been done under it, because

such a liability is insigniﬁcant as compared with the loss he must

ll One who has sold property by con-

ditional sale, and who, when the con-

dition is not complied with, enters

peaceably the house of the vendce,

with assistance, to take the property

away, is not a trespasser for so doing,

though the property is not found, it

being furniture for use there. Walsh

0. Taylor, 39 Md. 592.

’ Barnes o. Barnes. 6 Vt. 388; Smith

e. Benson, 1 Hill, 176; Dubois 0. Kel-

snpports the implied Jicense to enter upon the grounds to take
them away, and makes it irrevocable.1 llut it is to be observed
of this case that the license contemplates a temporary use of the
land only; not to have any permanent enjoyment of it; if it
contemplated anything further, it might be re,·oked, though no
re,·ocation could take from the purchaser his interest in the cattle,
or preclude his right to remove them. So if one liccme another
to erect and occupy a building upon his laud~ and he erects it
accordingly, the law recognizes the license so far as to protect his
right in the building; and though permission to occupy may be
rec llled, this will not preclude the licensee going upon the land
aft(·rwards to take the building away.• But a liceusc cannot be
coupled with an interest in the lands, unless created by deed, or by
such other instrument as is sufficient to convey such an interest
under the Statute of .Frauds. Therefore, rights of way, sales of
growing trees, permission to flow lands permanently, or to carry
water over or pipes under the land of another, are mere licenses,
and revocable as such, unless created or made by deed.' And so
'arc the licensea which are given by the sale of tickets to theatres
and other places of public amusement.'
In some cases where a license is revoked, it is of very little
importance whether the 1icensee is or is not protected against
liahi!ity as a trespasser for what has been done under it, OC"CRUBO
such a liability is insignificant as compared with the loss he must

ly, 10 Barb. 496.

' See Washb. Real Prop. B. 1, C. 12,

§ 2. A sule of growing trees may or

may not be a sale of an interest in

lands. If it is a sale of the trees, to be

taken as they stand by the vendee. it is

a sale of the realty; but if it is a sale

of the timber when the trees are cut,

it is a sale of personnlty, and may be

valid without deed. See cases col-

lected, Owens o. Lewis, 46 Ind. 489;

S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 295. A railway

company which, by consent of the

owner, is put. in possession of a way

over his land, with a covenant from

him for further assurance, has a license

coupled with an interest, and which

is not subject to revocation. New

Jersey. etc., R. Co. 0. Van Syckle, 37

N. J . 496.

‘Wood e. Leadliitter, 18 M. &. W.

838; Burton 0. Schcrpf,1 Allen, 138.

In this last case it was decided thata

ticket to a concert was a merelicense,

and might be revoked after the party

had taken his sent, and he be put out,

if he refused to go.

Tag!

j One who has sold property by coo.
ditional sale, and who, when the con.
dition is not complied with, enters
peaceably the house of tile vendee,
-with assistance, to tnke the property
awny, is not a trrspns!'!er for so doing,
though the propt•rty is not found, it
being furn iturc for usc there. Walsh
e. Taylor, 89 lid. 51>2.
1 Barnes"· B11rnes. 6 Vt. 388; Smith
"·Benson, 1 Hill, 176; Dubois e. Kel.
ly, 10 Barb. 41>6.
•sec Washb. Real Prop. B. 1, C. 12,
§ 2. A sale of growing trees mny or
may not be a sale of an inlerest in
hmds. If it is R sale of the trc<·s, to be
taken as they stand by the vendee. it is
a sale of the realty; but if it is a sale
of the timber when the trees are cut,

it Is a sale of peraonnlty, and mRy be
nlid without deed. See cases col.
lected, Owens "· Lewis, 46 Ind. 489;
8. C. 15 Am. Rep. 2!.15. A railway
c.ompany which, by consent of the
owner, is put in pn~sc~sion of a WRY
over his land, with a covenant from
him for further assurRnce, has a license
coupled with Rn int<'rl'st, and ·which
Is not subject to revocation. New
Jers!'y, etc., R. Co. "·Van Syckle, 87
N.J. 41>6.
• Wood e. I,cadhitter, 18 lf. &. W.
838; Burton "· Scherpf, 1 Allen, 188.
In this last c11se it was dcciderl tllat a
tiek<'t to n concert was a mere license,
and might be revoked after t11e party
bad taken his sent, and he be put out,
if he refused to go.
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suffer by the license being withdrawn as to the future. The case
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of license to erect mill dams, and thereby ﬂow the lands of pro-

prietors above, is a suitable illustration; and in what we shall

say further under this head we shall conﬁne our attention to

licenses of this sort. The hardship of permitting these to be

revoked is so great in some cases that it is of great interest to

know whether the licensee is not entitled to some protection

against it.

The practical consequence of the withdrawal of such a license

is this: that whereas the licensee in acting upon it has contem-

plated its permanent enjoyment, and has perhaps made large

expenditures in reliance upon it, yet he must now not only aban-

don such enjoyment, but he must also destroy whatever has been

erected under the license the continuance of which would require

the license for its protection. Wlien the license to ﬂow lands is

withdrawn, the dam which causes the ﬂow must be removed.

But the right of the licensor to revoke in these cases is recog-

nized very generally and very fully.‘ The statute of frauds does

not permit an interest in lands, except in a few cases-—of which

this is not one,— to pass without deed. But a right to ﬂow lauds

is, beyond any question, an important interest in the lands. and

directly within the contemplation of the statute.‘ Says Ssvsor-:,
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Ch. J.: “ If A. agree with B. that B. may build a dam upon the

land of A., if it is to be permanent, or anything more than a

mere temporary erection, such an agreement is not technically a

license. The object of A. is to grant and of B. to acquire an

interest which shall be permanent: a right not to occupy for a

short time, but as long as there shall be employment for the

water-power to be thus created. Can such an interest, such a

right, be created by parol? As Mr. SUGD]-IN says of the case of

Wood v. Luke, ‘ It appears to be in the very teeth of the statute,

' See Wallis 0. Harrison, 4 M. 8; W.

638; Cockcr 0. Cowper, 1 C. M. & R.

418; Mumford v.Whitu(-y, 15 Wend.

380; Houston v. Latlee, 46 N. II 505;

Selden v. D1-lawarc,etc., Co., 29 N. Y.

634; Foot 0 New Haven, etc., Co., 23

Conn. 214; Morse 0. Copeland, 2 Gray,

B02; Hull u. Cliutfee, 13 Vt. 150.

' Panama, Ch. J., in Cook v. Stearns,

11 Mass. 538. It is immaterial whether

a license, as rurh, is in writing or

oral: the protection is the same in

each ca~e, and the right to revoke the

same wht-re it is not coupled with an

suffer by the license being withdrawn as to the future. The case
of license to erect mill dams, ~nd thereby flow the lands of proprietors above, is a suitable illustration; and in what we shall
say further under this head we shall confine our attention to
licenses of this sort. The hardship of permitting these to be
revoked is so great in some cases that it is of great interest to
know whether the licensee is not entitled to some protection
against it.
The practical consequence of the withdrawal of such a hcense
is this: that whereas the licensee in acting upon it has contemplated its permanent enjoyment, and bas perhups made large
expenditures in reliance upon it, yet he must now not only abandon such enjoyment, but he mu~:~t also destroy whatever has been
erected under the license the continuance of which would require
the license for its pr Jtection. When the license to flow lands is
withdrawn, the dam which cau~es the flow must be removed.
But the right of the licensor to revoke in these cases is reeognized very generally and very fully! The statute of frands does
not permit an interest in lands, except in a few cases- of which
this is not one,- to pass without deed. But a right to flow lands
is, beyond any question~ an important interest in the lands~ and
directly within tho contemplation of the statute.• Says SAVAGE,
Ch. J.: " If A. agree with B. that B. may build a dam upon the
land of A., if it is to be permanent, or anything more than a
mere temporary erection, such an agreement is not technically a
license. The ohject of A. is to grant and of B. to acquire an
interest which shall be permanent: a right not to occupy tor a
short time, but as long as there shall be employment for the
water-power to be thus created. Can such an interest, such a
ri~ht, be created by parol1 As Mr. Suom:N says of the case of
·wood v. Ltl~, ' It appears to be in the very teeth of the statute,

interest. It may also he inferred from

circumstances. See Batchelder e. San-

born, 24 N. H. 474; Lakiu 0. Atnes,

10 Cush. 198; Harmon 0. Harmon, 01

Me. 222.

1 Bee Wallis"· Harrison, 4 1\f. & W.
688; Cocker tl. Cowper, 1 C. l\1. & R.
418; Mumford D. Whitnry, 1.-. Wend.
SSO; Houston t~. Latfcc, 46 N. II r,o;;;
8f'ltlen fl. Delaware, etc., Co., 29 N.Y.
634; Foot t1 New Haven, etc., Co., 23
Conn. 214; Morse,, Copeland, 2 Gray,
802; Hall tl. Chaffee, 13 VL 150.
• PARKER, Ch. J., In Cook 11. Stearns,
llllau. 538. It Ia immatcrilll whether

a license, o .urk, Is In writing or
oral : the protect ion is the same in
each ca-e, and the right to •evoke ~be
same whl•rc it is not coupled with an
intcrl'st. It may also he inferred from
circumstances. See Batchelder,, Sanborn, 24 N.H. 474; Lakin "· Ames,
10 Cu!lh. 108; Hu.l'mon ,, Hlll'mon, 61
Me. 222.
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which extends generally to all leases. estates or interests.’ To
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decide that a right to a permanent occupation of the plaintiﬁ"s

land may be acquired by parol, and by calling the agreement a

license, would be in eﬂ'ect to repeal the statute.” ‘

lVhat relief, then, if any, can be given to the licensee without

acting in the teeth of the Statute of Frauds, is the problem to

which the courts have directed much attention. If they abide by

the strict letter of the statute, the licensee will be remediless

when the permission is recalled; for it must be impossible to

give him protection without assuring him without deed an

interest in lands which the statute says shall pass by deed only.

But the statute has been adopted from forcible considerations of

public policy; and it lays down what was meant to be an inﬂex-

ible rule. It is scarcely too much to say that if parties are guilty

of the folly of disregarding its provisions it was the intent ot

the statute that they should be left without redress. Neverthe-

less it is matter of every-day observation that parties do and will

rely upon the word and honor of others in cases in which the

statute admonislies them that nothing short of a formal instru-

ment should be accepted; and that their conﬁdence is frequently

abused by those on whom they rely, who take advantage of the

statute to shield themselves against responsibility for frauds and
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other wrongs. And the la.w, in dctcstation of such conduct,

appears to have been quite ready in many eases to seize upon any

circumstances which could seem to form an excuse for treating

the case as taken out of the purview of the statute, so as to

permit the courts to give relief. And so many cases have thus

been treated as exceptional, and under such variety of circum-

stances, that the complaint sometimes made—tl|at the statute

has been repealed by judicial legislation — seems almost justiﬁed.

Some courts have been inclined to hold that, after the license

has been acted upon and considerable expenditures made, it

should not be- revoked without making compensation to the

licensee.’ Other cases go still further, and hold that where the

licensor has stood by and seen the licensee make large expendit-

‘ Mumford 0. Whitney, 15 Wend. Parshley.'7 N. H. 237; Ameriscng-gin

380 Bridge v. Bragg, 11 N. H. 103 ; Samp-

’ Sec Addison 1:. Hack, 2 Gill, 221; son v. Burnside, 13 N. H. 2611; Hall

Rhodes o. Otis, 33 Ala. 578; Snowden 0. Chaifee, 13 Vt. 150.

0. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10; Woodbury 1:.

_

which extends gcncra11y to all leases, estata ()'I' interests.' T<>
decide that a right to a. permanent occupation of the plaintiff's
land may be acquired by parol, and by calling the agreement &
license, would be in eftect to repeal the statute." •
'Vhat relief, then, if any, can be given to the licensee without
acting in the teeth of the Statute of Frands, is the problem ro
which the courts have directed much attention. If they abide by
the strict letter ot' the statute, the licen:;ee will be remediless
when the permission is recalled; for it must be impossible to
give him protection without assuring him without deed an
interest in lands which the statute says shall pass by deed only.
But the statute ha8 been adopted from forcible consideratioru; of
public policy; and it lays down what was meant to be an inflexible rule. It is scarcely too much to say that if parties are guilty
of the folly of disregarding its provisions it was the intent ot
the statute that they should be left without redress. Nevertheless it is matter of e\'ery-day observation that partiPs do and will
rely upon the word and honor of others in cases in which the
statute admonisLes them that nothing short of a formal instrument should be accepted; and that their confidence is frequently
abused by those on whom they rely, who take advantnge of the
statute to shield themselves aga.inst responsibility for frauds and
other wrongs. And the law, in detestation of snch C'.,onduct,
appears to have Lecn quite ready in many cnses to seize upon an.v
circumstances which could seem to form an excuse tor treating
the case as taken out of the purview of the statute, so as to
permit the courts to give relief. And so many cases have thus
been treated as exceptional, and under such val'iety of circumstances, that the complaint sometimes made- that the statute
has been repealed by judicial legislation- seems almost justified.
Some courts ha,·e been inclined to hold that, after the license
has Leen acted upon and considerable expenditures made, it
should not be revoked without making compensation to the
licensee.• Other cases go still fnrthm·, and hold that where the
licensor bas stood by and seen the licensee make large expendit1

Mumford

t~.

Whitney, 15 Wend.

880
1 Sec Addison "· Hock, 2 Gill, 221;
Rhodes 11. Otis, 33 Ala. 578; Snowden
e. Wilu, 19 Ind. 10; Woodbury v.

Parshley, 7 N. H. 237; Amerisco~)..:in
Bridge"· Bragg, 11 N. H. 10·~; S:uup.
son tl. Burnsitlc, 18 N. H. 264; Hall
t~. Chaffee, 13 Vt. 150.
·
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urea in reliance upon his license, and which will be wholly or in
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great part lost to him if the license should be recalled, these facts

are suﬂicient to create an estoppel in pais which will preclude

him from revoking. They liken the case to that of a man who

suffers his property to be sold as belonging to another without

interposing his claim, or who, under any other circumstances, by

keeping silence as to his own rights, induces another who is

ignorant thereof to take action which will be prejudicial if such

rights are afterwards asserted.‘

There is a class of cases \vhieh, at ﬁrst view, may appear to

resemble those under consideration, and to which the doctrine of

estoppel may with great propriety be applied; such, for instance,

as the erection of a partition-wall which parties are to enjoy in

common,’ or the altering the route of a water-course in which

both parties are interested;' but these, we think, are to he looked

upon as being not so much agreements which give interests in

lands as arrangements for the suitable and convenient apportion-

ment or improvement of separate rights which are so connected

or related that neither party can properly and fully enjoy his

own without some common understanding.

For all such cases the law prescribes for the conduct of the

parties some regulations; but there are no reasons to preclude
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their consulting their own interests or convenience in adding to

or modifying these; and if they shall do so, it may be supposed

it will generally be done without any understanding that interests

in lands are being given or required. Therefore, if their arrange-

ments are merely verbal the courts should not be over-nice in

technical classiﬁcation for the beneﬁt of a. party seeking to repu-

diate them. As has been well said, the acquiescence and consent

ot' the parties to such arrangements are in the nature of a con-

‘ See Swartz 0. Swartz, 4 Penn. St.

85 '; Rcrick 0. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267;

Lacy v.Arnelt, 33 Penn. St. 169; Cum-

berland R. R. Co. e. McLanahan, 59

Penn. St. 28; Huff 0. McCnnlcy, 53

P4-nu. St. 206; Sheﬂield v. Collier, 8

Kelly, 82; Cook v. Pridgen, 45 Geo.

831 ; Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10;

Lane 0. Miller, 27 Ind. 534; Wilson u.

(‘halfant., 15 Ohio, 248; Ricker 0.

Kelly, 1 Me. 117; Russell o. Hubbard,

59 I'll. 835.

' Wickersham o. Orr, 9 Iowa, 253;

Ra\\'s0n v. Bell, 46 Geo. 19; Russell

urea in reliance upon his license, and which will be wholly or in
great part 1ost to him if the li<.oense should be recalled, thet~e facta
arc sufficient to create an ~tuppel in paiiJ which will preclude
}tim from revoking. They liken the case to that of!" man who
auffen his property to be sold as belonging to another without
interposing his claim, or who. under any other circumstances, by
keeping silence as to his own rights, induces another who is
ignorant thereof to take action which will be prejudicial if such
rig-hts are afterwards RSt'erted.'
There is a class uf cases which, at first view, may appear to
re.-emble those under consideration, and to which the doctrine of
estoppel may with great propriety be applied; such, for in10tance,
as the erection of a partition-wall which parties are to enjoy in
oommon,' or the altering the route of a water-course in which
both parties are interested; • bot these, we think, arc to he looked
upon as being not so much agreements which give interct~-ts in
lands as arrangements for the sui table and convenient apportionment or improvement of separate rights which are so connected
or related that neither party can properly and fully enjoy his
own without some common understanding.
For all sn~h casell the law prescribes for tlte conduct of the
pArties some regulations; bot there are no reasons to precludo
their consulting their own interests or com·enience in adding to
or modifying these; and if they shall do so, it may be soppot~cd
it will generally be done without any understanding that interests
iu lands are being given or required. Therefore, if their arrangenwnta are merely verbal the conrta shonld not be over-nice in
technical classification for the benf•fit of a party seeking to repudiste them. As has been well said, the acquiescence and consent
of the parties to such arrangements are in the natnre of a con-

0. Hubbard, 59 Ill. 335; Wynn 0. Gar-

land, 19 Ark. 23.

' Le Fcvre 0. Le Fevrc, 4 S. 8: 11.241;

Rt-rick o. Kern, 14 B. & R. 267; Wil-

liams 0. Earl of Jcrscy,1 Cr. & Ph.92.

' See Swartz e. Swartz, 4: Penn. BL
85 ·; Rcrick e. Kern, 14 8. & R. 207;
lAK-y"· Arnett, 83 Penn. St. 169; Cum.
berland R. R. Co. e. McLanahan, ~9

Penn. BL S8; Hufr e. McCauley, 53
Pt•nn. Bl 908; Bheffteld "·Collier, 8
Kt-lly, 82; Oook e. Pridgen,~ Geo.
831 ; Snowden •· Wilaa, 19 Ind. 10 ;
Laoe •· Killer, 11'1 lnd.IS84; Wll~n •·
Chalfali&. liS Ohio, 248; Ricker e.

Kelly, l Me. 117; Rossell e. Rubbard,

nt

GD
833.
• Wickersham •· Orr, 9 Iowa, 253;
Rawson e. Bell, 46 Geo. 19; Rus.'lell
•· Hubbard, 59 Ill. 33.l; Wynn e. Gar.

land, 19 Ark. SS.
• Lo Fevre •· LeFevre, 4 S. & R. 241;
Rerlck •· Kern, 14 8. & R. 267; WUliama e. Earl of Jersey, 1 Cr. & Ph. &
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tract, which, when fulﬁlled by one party at his cost and charge,

must be obligatory upon both.’

If, however, the doctrine of estoppel can be so applied as to

make a parol license create an easement,’ or subject lands to a

servitude on the ground of expenditures madeon the faith of it,

it must be through some extension of that doctrine not as yet

fully accepted. Estoppel is applied to prevent fraud; the party

who has neglected to speak when duty or good faith required him

to do so, being denied the privilege of asserting his rights after-

wards, when to do so would work a surprise and a damage to the

party deceived and misled by his silence. But it is diﬁicnlt to

say that one is deceived who, with full knowledge of the facts,

has seen ﬁt to rely upon a promise which the law in advance

notiﬁes him is void. If one owning land were to say to another,

“This is my land, but if you will go on and occupy it I will

never assert title thereto,” it would be a. plain perversion of the

doctrine of estoppel to hold that he was afterwards precluded

from claiming the land. He has deceived no one regarding the

facts, and there is nothing to distinguish the case in its legal

bearings from any other in which a party refuses to hold himself

bound by a void promise. If, therefore, his pledge can be

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

enforced by estoppel, any other promise made void by the Statute

of Frauds, it would seem, might be enforced in the same manner.’

The doctrine of estoppel is a very salutary one, but it will not do

to apply it in cases where, though the party may not be acting

conscientiously, he is nevertheless only insisting upon the legal

safeguards prescribed by law for the common protection of all.

The rule is: “ If one is silent when he s/zoulcl speak, justice will

compel him to silence when he would speak.” ’ lt precludes the

facts from being shown because not shown in season; but there

is diﬂiculty in applying it to cases where the action has been had

with full knowledge.

There is also considerable support for the doctrine, that the

permission to ﬂow after it has been acted upon may be enforced

in equity on the same ground on which the courts of equity

enforce parol contracts for the sale of land after there has been

' Msnmcx, J., in Pratt 0. Lawson, ‘W000, J ., in Buckingham 0.

2Allen, 275. Smilh, 10 Ohio, 289, citing Wendell

' Sec Wright 0. DeGroﬁ', 14 Mich. 0. Van Renssclear, 1 Johns. Ch.

164; Hayeso Livingston,34 Mich. 384.

*‘*=-was l

tract, which, when fulfilled by one party at his cost and charge,
must be obligatory upon both. 1
If, however, the doctrine of estoppel can be so applied as to
make a parol license create an easement; or subject lands to a
servitude
the gl·ound of expenditures made·on the faith of it,
it must be throug-h some extension of that doctrine not. as yet
fully accepted. Estoppel is applied to prevent fraud; the party
who has neglected to speak when duty or good faith required him
to do so, being denied the privilege of asserting his rights afterwards, when to do so would work a surprise and a damage to the
party deceived and misled by his silence. But it is difficult to
say that one is deceived who, with full knowledge of the facts,
has seen fit to rely upon a promise which the law in advance
notifies him is void. If one owning land were to say to another,
"This is my land, but if yon will go on and occupy it I will
never assert title thereto," it would be a plain perversion of the
doctrine of estoppel to hold that he was afterwards precluded
from claiming the land. He has deceived no one regarding the
facts, and there is nothing to distinguish the case in its legal
bearings from any other in which a party refuses to hold himself
bound by a void promise. If, therefore~ his pledge can be
enforced by estoppel, any other promise made void by the Statute
of Frauds, it would seem, might be enforced in the same manner.•
The doctrine of estoppel is a very salutary one, but it will not do
to apply it in cases where, though the pa1·ty may not be acting
conscientiously, he is nevertheless only insisting upon the legal
safeguards prescribed by law tor the common protection of all.
The rule is: '"If one is silent when he should speak, justice will
compel him to silence when he would speak." • 1t precludes the
facts from being shown because not shown in season; but there
is difficulty in applying it to cases where the action has been had
with full knowledge.
There is also considerable support for the doct1·ine, that the
permission to flow after it has been acted upon may be enforced
in equity on the same ground on which the courts of equity
enforce parol contracts for the sale of land after there has been

on

1

MBRUICK,

J., in Pratt "·Lawson,

9 Allen, 275.
1 Bee Wright "· DeGroff, 14 l\licil.
164; Hayeu Livingston,34l\lich.884.

• Wooo, J., In Buckingham "·
Smi1il, 10 Ohio, 289, citing Wendell
11. VIUl Henssclear, 1 Johns. Cll. a53.
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partial performance, Says Judge Rsnrn-:i.n: “ If such a license

au

be given by parol, and expense incurred on the faith of it, so that

the parties cannot now be placed in statu qua, there would seem

to be the same reason why a court of equity should grant relief

as in any other case of part performance of a patrol contract for

the sale of land or any interest therein, i. e., to prevent fraud.” '

In Pennsylvania it has been explicitly held that “expending

money or labor in consequence of a license to divert a water-

course, or use a water-power in a particular way, has the effect

of turning such license into an agreement that will be enforced

in equity; ”’ and the decision, as appears by the context, and also

by subsequent cases, is not based upon any distinction between

licenses which are to extinguish and those which are to create an

easement or servitude, but is applicable to both.‘ The same doc-

trine is held in Indiana;‘ and in both these States it is held that,

inasmuch as they have no court with full equity powers, they

will give the licensee the necessary protection when he is pro-

ceeded against at law.‘

One serious diﬁiculty encountered in putting these cases on

the ground of speciﬁc performance, is that the right to the ease-

ment cannot be made complete without a grant, and the licensee

has not stipulated for a grant, or understood that one was to be
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given. When the court undertakes to decree speciﬁc perform-

ance, it seeks to carry out the contract of the parties as nearly

as may be possible; but to treat the license as a contract in these

cases, it would seem to be necessary to add a new stipulation and

then proceed to enforce it. \Vith this exception the case does

not diifer from those in which equity is in the daily practice ot

administering this relief. But it may well be said that in any

case of a parol contract relating to lands, it is the particular

right or privilege promised that the parties have in view rather

' Hull 0. Chaﬁee, 13 Vt. 157, note.

’ Rcrick o. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267.

' Compare Le Fcvrc v. L-1 Fevre, 4 S.

& R. 2-11; Strickler 0. Todd, 10 S. &

R. 63; M(:Kellip 0. Mcllhenny. 4

Watts, 817; Wlicatley 0. Chrisman, 24

Penn. St. 298; Campbell v. McCoy, 31

Penn. St. 263; Dark 17. Johnston, 83

Penn. St. 164; Lacy 0. Arnett, 83

Penn. St. 169.

‘ Snowden v. Wilas, 19 1'nd.10; Lane

0. Miller, 27 Ind. 534.

‘ Soc the cuscs above cited. Also,

Wetmorc o. White, 2 Caines‘ Cus. 87;

partial performance: Says Judge REDJ!'IELD: "If such a license
be given by parol, and expense incurred on the faith of it, so that
the parties cannot now be placed in statu quo, there would seem
to be the same reason why a court of equity should grant relief
as in any other case of part performance of a parol contract for
the sale of land or any interest therein, i. e., to prevent fraud." •
In Pennsylvania it has been explicitly held that "expending
money or labor in consequence of a license to divert a watercourse, or use a water-power in a particular way, has the effect
of turning such license into an agreement that will be enforced
in equity;"~ and the decision, as appears by the context, and al,;o
by subsequent cases, is not based upon any distinction between
licenses which are to extinguish and those which are to create an
easement or servitude, but is applicable to both.' The same doc'rine is held in Indiana; • and in both these States it is held that,
inasmuch as they have no court with full equity powers, they
will give the licensee the necessat·y protection when he is proceeded against at law.~
One serious difficulty encountered in putting these cases on
the ground of specific performance, is that the right to the easement cannot be made complete without a grant, and the li(.-ensee
has not stipulated for a grant, or understood that one was to be
given. When the court undertakes to decree specific pertormance, it seeks to carry ont the contract of the parties as nearly
as may be possible; but to treat the license as a contract in thebe
cases, it would seem to be necessary to add a new stipulation and
then proceed to enforce it. ·with this exception the case dues
not differ from those in which equity is in the daily practice of
administering this relief. But it may well be said that in any
case of a parol <.-ontract relating to lands, it is the particular
right or p1·ivilege promised tt1at the parties have in view rather

and the dictum of Gmnucv, J., in

Pierrcpont v. Barnard, 6 N. Y. 290,

804. Also, what is said by Aims, J.,

in Foster c. Browning. 4 R. l. 52;

Hall 0. Chatfee, 13 Vt. 150; Prince o.

Case, 10 Conn. 375.

Hall "· Chaffee, 18 Vt. 157, note.
Rcrick v. Kern, 14 S. & U. 267.
1 Cum pare Lc Fcvrc !). L·.· Ftlvre, • S.
& R. 241 ; Strickler v. Tolld, 10 S. &
R. 68; li<:Kdlip "· Mcilhenny, •
Watts, 817; Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24:
Penn. St. 298; Campbell v. McCoy, 81
Penn. SL 263; Dark "· Johnston, 83
Penn. BL 164; Lacy v. Arnett, 83
Peon. 8\. 169.
1

1

' Snowden fl. Wilaa, 19 Ind.10; Lane
v. Miller, 27 Ind. 534.
·
1 See the ca.~cs above cited.
Also,
Wetmore fl. White, 2 Caines' Cu.s. 87;
and the didutn of GRIDLKY, J., in
Pierrepont !). BRrnard, 6 N. Y. 290,
804. Also, what is said by AKa, J.,
in Foster t~. Browning, 4 R I. 52;
Ball"· ChKtfec, 18 Vt. 160; Prince "·
C11ac, 10 Conn. 876.
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than the means or instrument by which it is to be created or
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given, and the court will only be adapting the proper means to

the end at which the parties aimed, if it shall direct a legal

assurance to be executed.‘ If relief be given by awarding a

perpetual injunction against disturbing the enjoyment of the

license, the same cud would be reached and the licensor at the

same time would only be held to the exact terms of his promise.‘

.Assuming the case to stand on the same footing as a parol

contract for the purchase of lands, the permission to ﬂow must

obviously be regarded as something more than a mere license.

It could not properly be treated as a personal privilege merely,

but must be considered as pertaining to the mill property, so as

to pass with it on a. sale. And the death of the licensor or

licensee, or the sale of the servient tenement, or the decay of the

dam, would not revoke it. This is the view that has been taken

in Pennsylvania and Indiana.’ And the licensee, then, after

moneys expended, would have all the rights of a purchaser in

possession under a parol contract, among which would beithe

right to justify and defend his possession in the courts of law,

until his right was terminated by such steps as would be neces-

sary in the case of the occupation of lands under such parol

contracts.
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All that is above said is as applicable to a license for any other

purpose as to a license for ﬂowing lands.‘

‘See Stephens 0. Benson, 19 Ind. 367;

Huﬂ' v. McCauley, 53 Penn. St. 206;

634; Foster 0. Browning, 4 R I. 47;

Houston v. Laffee, 46 Vt. 505; Curie

Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375. In

Houston 0. Latfec, 46 N. H. 505, which

overrules the early New Hampshire

cases—which held a license on which

large expenditures had been made

was not revocable—it seems to be

plainly intimated that the licensee

than the means or instrument by which it is to be created or
given, and the court will only be adapting the proper means to
the end at which the parties aimed, if it shall direct a lt;,o-al
assurance to be executed.' If relief be given by awarding a
perpetual injunction against disturbing the enjoyment of the
license, the same end would be reached and the licensor at the
same time would only be held to the exact terms of his promise.'
. As:nnning the case to stand on the same footing as a parol
contruct for the purchase of lands, tlJC permission to .flow must
obviously be r('gardcd 88 something more than a mere license.
It could not properly be treated as a personal pri\·ilege merely,
but must be com;illered as pertaining to the mill property, so as
to pass with it on a sale. And the death of the licensor or
licensee, or the t;alc of the servient tenement, or the decay of the
dam, would not re,·oke it. This is the view that lms been taken
in Pennsylvania and Indiana.• And the licensee, then, after
moneys expended, would have all the rights of a purchaser in
possession uudcr a parol contmct, among which would be· the
right to justity and detend his possession in the courts of law,
until his right was terminated by such steps as would be necessary in the ca:se of the occupation of lands under such parol
cou tracts.
All that is above said is as applicable to a license for any other
purpose 88 to a license for flowing lauds. •

would be entitled to some equitable

redress.

' The right at law to revoke a li-

cense acted upon with expenditure

of moneys is fully recognized in

Owen v. Field, 12 Allen, 457; Clutc 0.

Carr, 20 Wis. 559; Helﬁeld 0. Cent.

R. R. Co., 29 N. J. 571; Druse 0.

Wheeler, 22 Mich. 439; Sclden 0.

Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 29 N. Y.

— - g‘ lq ‘mtg;

ton v. Redington, 21 N. H 291;

Ksmphonsc 0. Guffner, 73 Ill. 453;

Miller v. Tobie, 41 N. £1.84; Marston

0. Gale, 21 N. H. 176; Buggies 0.

Le<ure, 24 Pick. 187. See Cobb 0.

Fisher, 121 Mass. 169.

’ Lacy r. Arnelt, 33 Penn. St. 169;

Rcrick 0. Kerr, 14 S. & R. 267; Thomp-

son v. McEIurney, 82 Penn. St. 174;

Snowtlen 1:. Wilas. 10 Ind. 10. And

sec Mumford 0. Whitney‘, 15 Wend.

380.

‘ See Kamphouse v. Gatfuer, 73 Ill.

4-33, license for mining. If a building

has been erected under a license, the

licensee may lawfully remove it when

the license is revoked. See Rickor 0.

1 See Stephenst~. Benson,19 Ind. 3117;
Huff v. McCauley, 53 Penn. St. 206;
Prince "· Case, 10 Conn. 375. In
Houston"· Lnffee, 46 N. H. 503, which
overrules the early New Hampshire
cases-which held a license on which
large expenditures had been made
was not revocable-it seems to be
plainly intimated that the licensee
would be entitled to some equitable
redress.
'The right at law to revoke a u.
cense acted upon with expenditure
of moneys is fully reroguize,l in
Owen "· Field, 12 Allen, 437; Clnl.c "·
Carr, 20 Wis. 559; Hetfidd "· Cent.
R. R. Co., 29 N. J. 571 ; Druse "·
Wheeler, 22 ~lich. 4:J!); Selden "·
Delaware, etc., Canl\l Co., 29 N. Y.

634; Foster "· Bro\l-nmg, 4 R. I. 47;
Houston "· La !fee, 4U Vt. 505; Carlo.
ton "· Redington, 21 N. H. 291;
K11mphouso "· GntTncr, 78 Ill. 453;
?rlillcr v. Tobie. 41 N. II. 84; Marston
e. Gale, 21 N. II. 176; Ruggles •·
Lc•ure, 24 Pick. 187. See Cobb •·
Fisher, 121 1\lass. 169.
• Lacy r. Arne It, 33 Penn. St. 169;
lkrick "·Kerr, 14 8. & R. 211'7; Thompson "· .1\lcEinrney, 82 Penn. St. 174;
Snowden "· Wilas. 10 Ind. 10. And
sec Mumford •· Whitney, 15 Wend.
380.
4 Sec Kampbonsc "· Gaffucr, 73 Ill.
4;j3, license for mining. If a building
ha.s been ercctcllunder a license, the
licPnsee may lawfully remove it when
the license is revoked. See Rickor •·
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the law gives permission to enter a man’s premises. This per-

mission has no necessary connection with the owner‘s interest,

and is always given on public grounds. An instance is where a

ﬁre breaks out in a city. Here the public authorities, and even

private individuals, may enter upon adjacent premises as they

may ﬁnd it necessary or convenient in their eﬁ"orts to extinguish

or to arrest the spread of the ﬂames. The law of overruling

necessity licenses this, and will not suifer the owner of a lot to

stand at its borders and exclude those who would use his prem-

ises as vantage ground in staying the conﬂagration. Indeed, it

sometimes become necessary to destroy whole blocks of bllllflltlgs

to stop the spread of a ﬁre, and the sufferer, instead of looking

to the oiﬁcials who command it or the parties who execute their

commands, must seek redress at the hands of the State itself and

accept what the State awards.‘ So, if a highway is out of repair

or obstructed, a traveler having occasion to make use of it may

lawfully pass upon the adjoining premises, carefully avoiding

any unnecessary injury.‘ So the statutes which permit lands to

be taken for public purposes may provide for preliminary sur-

veys, in order to determine the necessity for any particular

Kelly, 1 Me. 117: Barnes 1:. Barnes. 6 ish Cast Plate C01. Meredith, 4 T. R.
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Vt. 383. But where one, without per-

mission, has put up buildings on the

land of another, whereby they be-

come the property of the landowner,

and he then obtains the lanciowuer‘s

parol consent to their removal, this

cons"nl is a mere license, and may be

revoked before it has been carried

out. Foster oi Mabe, 4 Ala. 402;

8. The third class of licenses comprehends those C88ell in· which
the law gives permission to enter R man's premises. This permisaion has no necessary connection with the owner's interest,
and is always given on public grounds. An instance is where a
fire breaks out in a city. Here the public authorities, and even
private individnals, may enter upon adjacent premises as they
may find it nccessaJ'Y or con\'cnient in their efforts to extinguish
or to arrest the spread of the fiames. The law of overruling
ne<~ssity licenses this, and will not suffer the owner of a lot to
etand at its bo1-ders and exclude those who wonld use his premises as vantage ground in staying the conilagration. Indeed, it
eometimcs become necessary to destroy whole blocks of building~
to stop the spread of a fire, and the sufferer, instead of looking
to the officials who command it or the parti<'s who execute th~ir
commands, must seek redress at the hands of the State itself and
at.'CCpt what the State awards.• So, if a highway is out of repah·
or obstructed, a traveler having occasion to make use of it may
lawtully pass upon the adjoining premises, carefully avoiding
any unnecessary injnry.' So the statutes which permit lands to
be taken for public purposes may provide for preliminary surveys, in order to determine the necessity for any particular

Gibbs o. Estey, 15 Gray, 587; Madr-

gan 0. McCarthy, 108 Muss. 376; Shell

0. Iiaywooil, 16 Penn. St. 523.

‘ Darlington v. New York, 31 N. Y.

104; New York 0. Lord, 18 Wend.

126; Stone r. New York, 25 Wend.

157; Sirocco v. Gcury, 8 Cal. 69;

American Print Works v. Lawrence,

21 N. J. 257; S. C. 23 N. J. 9. 690;

McDonald 1:. Red Wing, 13 Minn. 88.

As to the right to enter to make dc

fense against public enemies, see Brit

797. Per Bunnnn, J.; Boulton v. Crow-

thcr, 2 B. & C. 703.

’ Abs-ir v. French, 2 Show. 28; Tay-

lor v. Whitehead, Doug. 749; Bullurd

0. Harrison, 4 M. & S. 387; Campbell

0. Rare, 7 Cush. 408; Williams 0.

Saﬂ'ord, 7 Barb 309; Hedgepeth 0.

Robertson, 18 Tex. 858. The rule is

not the same in the case of a private

way, though it would seem that if the

private way is obstructed by the

owner of the adjoining land, it would

be justitiuble to pass over his land to

avoid the obstruction. Kent v.Jud-

kins,-51 Me. 160; Leonard o. Leonard,

2 Allen. 543; Furnum v. Platt, 8 Pick.

339. Compare Taylor v. Whitehead,

Doug. 749; Williams o. Saiford, '1

Barb. 309; Boyce v. Brown, 7 Barb.

80; Holmes 0. Seeley, 19 Wend. 506.

Kelly, 1 He. 117: Barnt"ll "·Barnes, 6
VL sag. But where one, without permis!clion, has put up buildings on the
Jand of another, whereby they become the property of the landowner,
and he then obtains the lanouwner'a
parol consent to their remnval, thia
('ODS"nt is a mere license, and may be
revoked before it has been carried
aut. Foster ~ lbbe, 4 Ala. 402;
Gibbe "· Estey, lli Gray, 687; Madrgan "·"McCarthy, 108 MtlliB. 376; SheJl
e. llaywoOll, 16 Pt•nn. St. 523.
1 Darlington 11. New York, 81 N.Y.
164; New York fl, LorJ, 18 Wend.
126; 8tone "· New York, ~ Wend.
137; E\t rocco e. Genry, 8 (.,'al. 68;
American Print Works "·Lawrence,
21 N. J. 257; S. C. 23 N.J. 9, ~;
McDonald "· Red Wing, 18 Minn. 88.
Aa &o the right to onter to make detense against public enemies, see Bri&.

ish Cast Pla&e Co. "· Meredith, 4 T. B .
797, per BULLER, J.; Boulton •· Crowther, 2 B. & C. 703.
' Abs·u •· French, 2 Show. 28; Taylor"· Whitehead, Doug. 749; Bullard
e. Harrison, 4 M. & S. 887; Campbell
tl. lla<-e, 'l Cush. 408; Williams e.
Safford, 7 Barb 809; Hedgepeth e.
Rol>ertson, 18 Tex. 858. The rule ts
not tho same in the case of a private
way, though it would seem that if the
private way is obstructed by the
owner of the Mljoining land, it would
be justifiable to pass over his land to
avoid the obstruction. Kent tl. J udkins, In Me. 180; Leonard"· Leonard,
9 Allen. M3; Farnum"· Platt, 8 Pick.
839. Compare Taylor "·Whitehead,
Doug. 749; Williams e. Saft'urd, 'f
Barb. 809; B11yC6 "· Brown, 7 Barb.
80; Holmes"· Seeley, 19 Wend. GOO.
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appropriation, and in thus providing, they license an entry upon
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the lands for the purpose.‘ So administrative otlicers are licensed

by the law to enter upon private premises when necessary in the

discharge of their duties.

A more common instance of a license given by the law is

where an oﬂicer has process, in the service of which it becomes

necessary to enter upon private grounds or into private build-

ings. In general an oﬁicer may go wherever a man is, in order to

make service of process upon him. The limitation of the right

is expressed in that familiar maxim of the law which recognizes

every man’s house as his castle. The meaning is, that every

man’s dwelling is sacred against any unlicensed intrusion, and

he may close and defend it not against private persons merely,

but against the ministers of the law also. The privilege of the

castle, however, is in the outer walls only; if the outer door is

found open, the oﬁicer may enter for any lawful purpose, and

having entered, he may, if need be, break open inner doors to

make or complete a. service. Even the outer doors may be forced

for the purposes of an arrest for treason, felony, or breach of the

peace, or to serve a search warrant which particularly speciﬁes

the building entered as the one to be searched, or to dispossess

the occupant when another, by the judgment of a competent
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court, has been awarded the possession.’ In these cases the

privilege must yield to the demands of public justice.

The privilege does not in any degree depend upon the char-

acter of the building except in this, that it must be the man’s

habitation. It may even be the part of a house only, as where

one building was occupied by many persons who had their sep-

arate apartments opening into a common hall, those of the

plaintiff communicating with the hall by several_doors. Says

Mnamck, J.: “The apartments occupied by the plaintiﬂ’ con-

stituted, in and of themselves, a complete habitation for himself

and for his family. He had the sole and exclusive use and pos-

session of them as completely as if they stood separate and apart

from everything else, and were in any other distinct structure.

The privilege which the law allows to a man’s habitation clearly

‘Walther 0. Warner, 25 Mo. 277; Co., 14 Wend. 51; S. C. 18 Wend. 9.

Merccre. McWilliams, Wright (Ohio), ’ Semayne‘s Case, 5 Co. 91; Yelv_

132; Fox o. W. P. R R. Co., 31 Cal. 29; S. C. Smith Lead. Cas. 213.

538; Bloodgood 0. Mohawk, etc., R. R.
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appropriation, and in thus providing, they license an entry upon
the lauds for the purpose.' So administrative officers are licensed
by the law to enter upon private premises when necessary in the
discharge qf their duties.
A more common instance of a license given by the law is
where an officer has process, in the service of which it becomes
necessary to enter upon private grounds or into private buildings. In general an officer may go where\·er a man is, in order to
make service of process upon him. The limitation of the right
is expressed in that familiar maxim of the law which recognizes
every man's honse as his castle. The meaning is, that every
man's dwelling is sacred against any unlicensed intrusion, and
he may close and defend it not against private pet·sous merely,
but against the ministers of the law also. The privilege of the
ca8tle, however, is in the outer walls only; if the outer door is
found open, the officer may enter for any lawful purpose, and
having entered, he may, if need be, break open inner doors to
make or complete a service. Even the outer doors may be forced
for the purposes of an arrest for treason, felony, or breach of the
peace, or to serve a search warrant which particularly specifies
the building entered as the one to be searched, or to dispossess
the oc'Cnpant when another, by the judgment of a competent
court, has been awarded the possession.s In these cases the
privilege must yield to the demands of public justice.
The pt·ivilege does not in any degree depend upon the cllaracter of the building except in this, that it must be the man's
habitation. It may even be the part of a house only, us where
one building was occnpied by many persons who had thei1· separate apartments opening into a common hall, those of the
plaintiff communicating with the hall by several. doors. Says
MERRICK, J.: "The apartments occupied by the plaintiff constituted, in and of themselves, a complete habitation tor himself
and for his family. He had the sole and exclusive use and possession of them as completely as if they stood separate and apart
from everything else, and were in any other distinct structure.
The privilege which the law allows to a man's habitation clearly
1 Walther ~. Warner, 25 Mo. 277;
Herccu. McWilliams, Wright(Ohio),
182; Fox tJ. W. P. R R. Co., 81 Cal.
ISSS; Bloodgood"· Mnhawk, etc., R. R.

Co., 14 Wend. 51; B. C. 18 Wend. t.
• Semayne's Case, 5 Co. 91; Yclv.
29; B. C. Smith Lead. Cas. 218.
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ought to attach to apartments so situated. It arises from the
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great regard which the law has for every man’s safety and quiet,

and, therefore. it protects him from those inconveniences which

must necessarily attend an unlimited power in the sheriff and

his oﬂicers in this respect. And this reason shows that the

principle of law which gives protection to dwelling houses has

no reference whatever to their quality, construction, or magnitude,

but is solely for the purpose of insuring the quiet, convenience

and security of those who inhabit and dwell in them. Domestic

security and peace would be equally disturbed by violence in

breaking the doors and forcing an entrance into a dwelling,

whether it should consist of the entire portions of the building

or of separate and distinct apartments within it.

“ Nor can the fact that there were several doors leading from

the common passage-way into the diﬂerent apartments occupied

by the plaintiff lead to a different conclusion. For, although it

was said by Lord Mansﬁeld, in Lee v. Gansel} that the having

of four outer doors would lead to the grossest absurdity, since

the greatest house in London has but one, that is not the manner

in which, according to our prevailing habits and modes of living,

our dwelling houses are here constructed. Many might, undoubt-

edly, be found here having four, and it would perhaps be diﬂicult
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to ﬁnd a house of any moderate degree of preteusion which has

less than two outer doors. While all the doors leading into any

of the apartments occupied by the plaintiff are closed, each of

them may be considered and must be treated as an outer door.

They are all necessary to protect the habitation from the intru-

sion of those who have no license to enter it. Whether an

ofﬁcer who had lawfully passed through one of them might

afterward, for the purpose of completing the service of his pro-

cess, treat the others as inner doors, need not now be considered,

because no such question arises upon the facts reported. The

complaint against the defendant is conﬁned to the breaking open

of one of the doors before he had obtained an entrance to any

of that portion of the building which was in the exclusive occu-

patiou of the plaintiff.

“The defendant contends that the door constructed and used

for closing the entrance from the street or public highway into

' Cowp. p. 1.

eught to attach to apartments so situated. It arises from the
great regard which the law has for e\·ery man's safety and quiet,
and, therefore! it protects him from those inconveniences which
must necessarily attend an unlimited power in the sheriff and
his officers in this respect. And this reason shows that the
principle of law which gives protection to dwelling houses has
no reference whatever to their qnality, construction, or magnitude,
but is solely for the purpose of insuring the quiet, convenience
and security of those who inhabit and dwell in them. Domestic
security and pea<..-e would be equally disturbed by violence in
breaking the doors and forcing an entram.-e into a dwelling,
whether it should consist of the entire portions of the building
or of separate and distinct apartments within it.
" Nor can the fact that there were several doors leading from
the common pa~;sage-way into the dift'erent apartments occupied
by the plaintiff lead to a different conclusion. For, although it
was said by Lord Mansfield, in Lee v. GanBel,t that the having
of four outer doors would lead to the grossest absurdity, siuce
the greatest house in London has but one, that is not the manner
in which, according to onr prevailing habits and modes of living,
our dwelling houses are here constructed. Many might, undoubtedly, be found here having four, and it would perhaps be difficult
·to find a house of any moderate degree of' pretension which has
less than two outer doors. While all the doors leading into any
of the apartments occupied by the plaintiff are closed, each of
them may be considered and must be tre.1ted as an outer door.
They are all necessary to protect the habi~tion from the intrnaion of those who have no license to enter it. Whether an
officer who had lawfully passed through one of them might
afterward, for the purpose of completing the service of his proeess, treat the others as inner doors, need not now be consider«>d,
because no such question arises npon the facts reported. The
complaint against the defendlUlt is confined to the breaking open
of' one of the doors before he had obtained an entrance to any
of that portion of the building which was in the exclntsive occupation of the plaintiff.
"The defendant contends that the door constrncted and used
for closing the entrance from the street or public highway into
I

Cowp. p.l.

316 THE LAW or TOBT8.

the common hall or entry of the building, is to be considered
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the only outer door of the plaintiﬁ"s dwelling house; that is to

say, that his house consisted of the apartments occupied by him,

and of the hall and entry used by him as a passage way in com-

mon with the tenants of all the other parts of the building. But

this latter tact is by no means shown. On the contrary, these

appear to have constituted no part of his tenement. He had an

easement in them only in common with others, who all equally

enjoyed the like privilege for the purpose of gaining access to

their respective tenements.” ‘

Another case of a license granted by the law is that to enter

and abate a nuisance. We have spoken of these licenses else-

where, and need not repeat what was there said. It has been

seen that the party licensed must keep strictly within the privi-

lege; he becomes a trespasser if unnecessary injury is done.‘

Abuse of License. A license, whether given by the owner

himself, or by the law, may be lost by abusing it. Thus, one

licensed to build an arch over a way abuses his authority if he

obstructs the way in building it.‘ But, as respects the conse-

quences of the abuse, a distinction which is of high importance

is to be taken between the two classes of cases. The distinc-

tion is this: That if the authority was conferred by the law, an

the common hall or entry of the building, is to be considered
the only outer door of the plaintiff's dwelling house; that is to
say, that his house consisted of the apartments occupied by him,
and of the hall and entry used by him as a passage way in common with the tenants of all the other parts of the building. But
this latter fact is by no means shown. On the contrary, these
appear to have constituted no part of his tenement. He had an
easement in them only in common with others, who all equally
enjoyed the Jike privilege for the purpose of gaining acceea to
their respective tenements." 1
Another case of a license granted by the law is that to enter
and abate a nuisance. We hal"e spoken of these licenses el~
where, and need not repeat what was there said. It has been
een that the party licensed must kel'p strictly within the privilege; he becomes a trespasser if unnecessary injury is done.•
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abuse not only terminates it, but revokes it; and it is presumed,

from the misbehavior of the licensee, that he entered originally

with the intent to do the wrong he has actually committed. and

not in good faith under his license. The wrong-doer is there-

upon held responsible as a trespasser ab initio; a trespasser in

the entry itself, as in everything (lone afterward. Thus, if par-

ties enter a public inn and demand entertainment there— the land-

lord being obliged by law to receive them—and it, after having

entered, they abuse the license by riotous conduct, they not only

‘Swain 0. Mizner, 8 Gray, 182,

184, following llsley 0. Nichols, 12

Pick. 270, in which, in an able opinion

delivered by Chief Justice SHAW,

a levy on chattels, which an otﬂccr

broke into adwclling house to make,

was held to be void. Tue same doc-

trine is laid down in People '0. Hub-

bard, 24 Wend. 869, and Bailey 0.

Wright, 38 Mich. See, also, Attack

0. Brumwcll, 3 Best& S. 520; Oystca/d

0. Shed, 13 Muss. 520; Snydackcr 0.

Bi-ossc, 51 Ill. 357.

' Ante, p. 49.

' Cashing 0. Adams, 18 Pick. 110.

- <--mi

Abuse of Li~enae.

A license, whether given by the owner
himself, or by the law, may be lost by abusing it. Thus, one
licensed to build an arch over a way abuses his authority if he
obstructs the way in building it! But, as respects the consequences of the abuse, a distinction which is of high importance
is to be taken between the two class~s of cases. The distinction is this: That if the authority was conferred by the law, an
abnse not only terminates it, hut revokes it; and it is presumed.
from the misbehavior of the licensee, that he entered original11
with the inknt to do the wrong he has actually committed. and
not in good faith under his license. The wrong-doer is thereupon held responsible as a trespasser ab initio/ a trespasser in
the entry itself, as in everything done afterward. Thus, if parties enter a public inn and demand entertainment there- the landlord being obliged by law to receive them- and it~ after having
-entered, they abuse the license by riotous conduct, they not onl1
1 Swain "· Mizner, 8 Gray, 182,
184. following llsley "· Nichola, 12
Pick.270, in which, in an able opinion
delivered by Chief Justice SuAw,
a levy on chattels, which an officer
broke into ad welling house to mRke,
was held to be void. Tne same doctrine Ia laid down in People"· Hub-

bard, 24 Wend. 868, and Bailey •·
Wright, 38 Mich. Sec, also, Auact
e. Br~&mwcll, 8 Best & S. 520; Oyatead
•· Shed, 13 Mass. 520; Snydacker •·
Brossc, 51111. 837.
'Ante, p. ~.
• Cushing "· Adama, 18 Plct. 110.
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become trespassers, but their trespass dates from their entry.‘
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So the oﬁicer who distrains property for taxes is a trespasscr ab

initio, if, instead of proceeding to dispose of it as required by

law, he lnisuses or misappropriates it.’ In these cases the law

has given an authority which the owner cannot resist, and as no

choice is allowel him in respect to the person who is to exercise

it, it is but reasonable that the law which confers the authority

should withdraw it wholly when it is abused. But when the

party himself grants a license, which he might, at his option,

have withheld, there is no reason why the remedy for an abuse

should be broader than the abuse itself. The licensee is there-

fore not a trespasser in his entry, but he is liable on the special

case for exceeding his license, or for any misconduct after entry.’

Boundaries. Where one’s land is bounded on a public high-

way, it presumptively extends, not to the outer line, but to the

middle of the road, and his supreme dominion embraces the

whole, qualiﬁed only by the public easement.‘ Says Pansons,

‘Six Carpenters’ Case, 8 Co. 290;

S. C. 1 Smith L. C. 216.

' The cases respecting trespass ab

become trespasaers, bnt their trespass dates from their entry.'
So the officer who distrnins property for taxes is a trespasser a&
initio. if. instead of proeceding to dispose of it as required by
law, he misuses or misappropriates it.' In these case.s the Jaw
has given an authority which the owner cannot resist, and as no
choice is al1owe l him in respect to the per.,on who is to exercise
it, it is hut reasonable that the law which confers the authority
should withdraw it wholly when it is abused. But when the
party himself grants a license, which he might, at his option,
have withheld, there is no reason why the remedy t'or an ahnse
should be broader than the abuse itself. The li<..-e11see is ther·efore not a tre~passer in his entry, but be is liable on the special
case tor exceeding his license, or for any misconduct after entry.•

initio will be referred to hereafter,

when protection by process is con-
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sidered.

‘Ede-lman v. Yeakel, 2'7 Penn. St.

26; Cushing 0. Adams, 18 Pick. 110;

Faulkner 1:. Altlerson, Gilm. (Va.) 221;

Jewell o. llluhood. 44 N. H. 474; Bal-

Boundaries. Where one's land is bonndt'd on a puhlic highway, it presnmpth•ely extends, not to the outer Hue, but to the
middle of the rum]~ anti ltis suprl.!mu dominion embraces the
whole, qualified only by the public easement! Snys PARSONS,

lard e. Noaks, 2 Ark. 45; Dnmont 0.

Smith, 4 Denio, 319; Van Brunt 0.

Bchenck. 13 Johns. 414; Stone 0.

Knapp, 20 Vt. 501 ; Ferrin u. Symonds,

ll N. ll. 363.

‘ Lade e. Sheperd, 2 Str. 1004; Good-

title o. Alkcr, 1 Burr. 133; Grose v.

West, '7 Tnunt. 89; Doe o. Pcarscy, '7

B. & C. 304; U. S. 0. Harris, 1 Sum-

ner, 21; Harris 0. Elliott, 10 Pct. 25;

Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet.

498; Cole v. Drew.44 Vt. 49; Webhcr

0. California, etc., R. R. Co., 51 (Jul.

425; Chatlmm o. Brainerd,11 Conn.

60; Jackson o. Hathaway, 15 Johns.

447. Lands described in a deed as

bounded by a public highway or

street will be considered as bounded

by the center, unless it clearly appears

that it was intended to make the side

line of the street a boundary instead

of the center. Moody 0. Palmer, 50

Cal. 31. If the land is hounded on

“the side " of the highway, these

words are presumed to exclude the

highway. Hughes v. Providence, etc.,

R. R. Co.. 2 R. I. 493; Hobokcn Land

Co. o. Kerrigan, 31 N. J. 13; An-

derson o. Jumes, 4 Robt. 35; Grand

Rapids, etc... R. R. Co e. Heisel, 37

Mich. ; Scvery o. Cent. Pac. R.

R. Co., 51 Cal. 194. B0 a boundary

described as extending “ to the mar.

gin of the cove, thence westerly along

the margin of the cove," etc., extends

only to the margin, and does not im

elude the ﬂats. Nickerson 0. Craw-

ford, 16 Me. 2-15. Sec, also, Rockwell

0. Baldwin, 53 Ill. 19. The ques'ion

whether the boundary is on the line

of the street or along the center is al-

ways one of intent. Mott v. Mott, 68

'Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Co. 290;
8. C. 1 Smith L. C. 216.
' The cases respecting trespass ab
in.itio will be referrrd to hereafter,
when protection by process is considered.
• Edelman "· Yeakel, 27 Penn. Sl
2-6; Cushing"· Adums, 18 Pick. 110;
Faulkner,;. Alderson, Gilm. (Va.) 221;
Jewell"· .Mahood. 44 N.H. 474; Ballard "· Nuuks. 2 Ark. 45; Dumont"·
Smith, 4 Denio, 319; Van Brunt "·
Schenck. 13 Johns. 414; Stone "·
Knapp, 29 Vt. 501; Ferrin"· Symonds,
11 N.H. SG:l.
• Lade c. Sheperd, 2 Str. 1004; Goodtitle "· AI ker, 1 Burr. 133; Grose "·
West, 7 Taunt. 39; Doe "· Pcnrsey, '1
B. & C. 304; U. S. t1. 1Iarris, 1 Sumner, 21; Harris "· Elliott, 10 Pet. 23;
Uarclny "· Howell's Lessec, 6 Pet.
498; Cole -c. Drew, 44 Vt. 49; Webhcr
"· ()a)ifornla, etc., R. R. Co., 51 Cnl.
42:S; Chutham "· Brainerd, 11 Conn.
60; Jack~on "· Hathaway, 1:S Johns.
447. LnOlls dt•scribed In a deed as
bounded by a public highway or

street will be considered as bounded
by the center, nnl<'S8lt cltarly appears
that It was intended to mnke the side
line of the street a boundary instc>nd
of the center. Moody "· P11lmer, 00
Cal. St. If the lnnd Is bounded on
"lhe side" of the highway, these
wor·ds are presumed to exclude the
highway. Hughes,, Providence, etc.,
R R. Co., 2 R. I. 49!-l; Hoboken Land
Co. "· Kenigl\n, 31 N. J. Ja; An.
derson "· Janws, 4 Roht. 3:'i; Grand
Rapids, etc., R R. Co "· Heisel, 37
Mich.
; SeYery "· Cent. Pac. R.
R. Co., 51 Cal. 19-l So a bound11ry
described as extending "to the margin of the cov~. thence wrsterly along
the margin of the cove," etc., cxtc>nd:~
only to the margin, and does nnt itrclude the flats. Nickerson ,, Craw.
ford, 16 :Me. 245. Sec, ulso, Rockwt•ll
,, Baldwin, l'i3 Ill. 19. The qucs'ioo
whl'lher the boundary is on the line
of the street or along th~ center is al.
ways one of intent. Molt "· Mott, 68
N. Y. 246. Sc•e Snlter fl. Jonu, &9 N.
J. 4.69; S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 229.
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proﬁts which may be derived from it consistently with the contin-

uance of the easement, the owner can lawfully claim.” ' The herb-

age in the highway is therefore his, and he may maintain trespass

against one whose cattle graze upon it, unless by law the cattle

are permitted to roam at large.‘ The growing trees in the high-

way also belong to the adjoining owner, except as they may be

needed for the purpose of making the way, or of repairing it; '

and if the highway olﬁcers sell trees thus standing in the road,

and they are cut without necessity, they are liable in tresspass

for so doing.‘ So it is a trespass on the adjoining owncr for a

person to deposit in the highway anything not in any manner

connected with the enjoyment of the easement,‘ or to extend a

structure on other lands out over it,‘ or to take a stand in the

highway for the purpose of blackguardism and abuse.’

It is competent, however, in appropriating lands for a public

way, to provide for taking, not an easement merely, but the fee

simple title, and where that is done, doubtless the rights of the

adjoining owner are considerably restricted. It has been decided

in Iowa that under such an appropriation the complete owner-

ship and dominion passed to the municipal corporation by which

the appropriation was made, and that if a deposit of mineral
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‘Parley 0. Chandler, 6 Mass. 454,

456. See Lam u. Kennedy, 13 Ohio,

(N. s.) 42; Pliifcr 0. Cox, 21 Ohio, tn.

s) %; Higgins 0. Reynolds, 31 N.

Y. 151; Holden '0. Shaltuck, 34 Vt.

336; Cole v. Drcw,4~1Vt.49; Graves

u. Shattuck, 35 N. H. 257; Chamber-

lain 0:. Enﬁcld, 43 N. H. 356; Wood-

ring v Forks Township, 28 Penn. St.

355, 361. ‘

Ch. J.: ''Every use 1lo which the land may be applied, and all the
profits which may be derived from it consistently with the continuance of the easement, the owner can !awfully claim." 1 The herb.
age in the highway is therefore his, and he may maintain trespaSB
against one whose cattle graze upon it, unless by law the cattle
are permitted to roam at large.• The growing trees in the highway also belong to the adjoining owner, except as they may be
needed for the purpose of making the way, or of repairing it; •
and if the highway officers sell trees thus standing in the road,
and they are cut without necessity, they are liable in tresspass
for so doing.• So it is a trespass on the adjoining owner for a
person to deposit in tho highway anything not in any manner
connected with the enjoyment of the easement,• or to extend a
structure on other lands out over it,• or to take a stand in the
highway fo1· the purpose of' blackguardism and abuse.'
It is competent, how·ever, in appropriating lands for a public
way, to provide for taking, not an easement merely, but the fee
simple title, and where that is done, doubtless the rights of the
adjoining owner are considerably restricted. It has been decided
in Iowa that under such an appropriation the complete ownership and dominion passed to the municipal corporation by which
the appropriation was made, and that if a deposit of mineral

* Stackpole 0. Healy, 16 Mass. 33;

Cool v. Crommct. 13 Me 250; Avery

0; Maxwell,4 N. H. 36; Woodruﬁ‘ 0.

Ncal, 28 Conn. 165. S0 he may main-

tain cjectment against one who ap-

propriates any part of his land within

the highway limits. Goodtitle 0. Al-

kcr, 1 Burr. 133.

‘Adams o. Emerson, 6 Pick. 56;

Sanderson 0. Haverstick, 8 Penn. St.

294; Ovcrman 0. May. 35 Iowa. 89;

Commissioners. etc., u. Bcckwith, 10

Kan. 603.

‘ Clark o. Dnsso, 34 Mich. 86; Ba-

ker c. Shephard, 24 N. H. 208. See,

further, Jackson 0. Hathaway, 15

Johns. 447; Babcock v. Lamb, 1 Cow.

238; Williams 0. N. Y. Cent. R. R.

Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Dnbnque 1|. Ma-

lony, 9 Iowa, 450; Dubuque 0. Ben-

son. 23 Iowa, 248; Wliite 0. Godfrey,

97 Mass. 4'72; Bliss 0. Ball, 99 Mass.

597; Makcpcace v. Worden, 1 N. H.

16; Sanderson o. llavcrstitck, 8 Penn.

St. 294; Vlfoodring v. Forks Town, 28

Penn. St. 355; R1-ad v. Lceds,19 Conn.

183; Kellogg 0. Malin, 50 M0. 496;

W(*st Covington '0. Freking, 8 Bush,

121.

‘ Lewis o. Jones, 1 Penn. St. 336.

' Codman v. Evans. 5 Allen, 308.

' Adams 0. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390.

_ _j_i — ‘~

I Prrley fl. Chandler, 6 Mass. 4.'i4,
456. See Lar~ "· KPnnedy, 13 Ohio,
(N. s.) 42; Phifer"· Vox, 21 Ohio, (N.
s) 248; Higgins "· Reynolds, IH N.
Y. 151; Holden "'· Shattuck, :l-! Vt.
336; Cole u. Drew, 4-1 Vt. 49; Graves
"· Shattuck, 35 N. H. 257; Chamber.
lain "· Enfield, 43 N. H. 856; Wood.
ring " Forks Township, 28 Penn. St.
855, 361.
•
Y Stackpole fl. Healy, 16 MI\Ss. 33;
Cool "· Crommet. 13 l\le 2.10; Avery
tr. 1\laxwell, 4 N. H. 36; Woodruff' 11.
N cal, 28 Conn. 165. So he may main.
tain ejectment against one who ap.
propriates any part of his land within
the l1ighway limits. Goodtitle "· AJ.
ker, 1 Burr. la3.
1 Adams "· Emerson, 6 Pick. 56;
Sander~on "· Haverstick, 8 Penn. St.
29!; Overman fl. !lay. 35 Iowa. 89;

Commissioners, etc., "· Beckwith, 10
Kan. 008.
• Clark "· Dnsso, 34 Mich. 86; Ba.
ker "·Shephard, 24 N.H. 208. See,
further, Jack8oD "· Hathaway, lli
Johne. 447; Babcock fi.Lnmb,l Cow.
238; Williams "· N.Y. Cent. R. R.
Uo., 16 N. Y. 97; Dubuque r. Malony, 9 Iowa, 450; Dubuque "·Benson. 23 Iowa. 248; White fl. Godfrey,
97 Mass. 472; Bliss fl. Ball, 99 ~lass.
Ci97; Makepeace "· Worden, 1 N.H.
16; Bnnd!'rson fl. llaverstitck, 8 Penn.
St. 294; Woodring"· Forks Town, 28
Penn. St. 855; Rl·nd "· Leells, 19 Conn.
H:l3; Kellogg "· Jrlul in, 50 Mo. 496;
W(•st Covington "· Freking, 8 Bush,
121.
• Lewis"· Jones, 1 Penn. St. 336.
• Cod man "· Evans, 5 Allen, 308.
'Adams"· Rivers, 11 Barb. 890.
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should exist beneath the surface, and be worked by the adjoining

819

proprietor, the corporation might recover from him the value of

the mineral taken out.‘ In Michigan a different view is taken;

the appropriation of the fee being held to be only for the pur-

poses of the easement, and for the other public purposes for which

it is customary or proper to make use of land thus appropriated.

Therefore, the earth in a city street, not needed for making or

repairing it, belongs to the adjacent owner, and cannot be sold

by the city.’

So prima the land bounded on a stream of water is

bounded by the center of the stream.‘ This rule has been applied

to such large rivers as the Connecticut,‘ the Delaware,‘ the Mis-

sissippi,‘ the Detroit,’ the Sandusky,' the M ilwaukee,' the Sault

’ Des Molnes u. Hall. 24 Iowa, 234.

See, also. Milburn 0. Cedur Rapids,

etc., R. R. Co., 12 Iowa, 246. Compare

Moses 0. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 21

Ill. 522: West 0. Bancroft, 82 Vt. 867;

Ohio, etc., R. R. C0. v. Applcgate, 8

Dana, 289; Hinchman o. Paterson,

ahonld exist beneath the surface, and be worked hy the adjoiuing
:proprietor, the corporation might recover from him the value of
the mineral taken ont.' In Michigan a different view is taken;
the appropriation of the fee being held to be only for the purposes of the easement, and for the other public purposes tor which
it is customary or proper to make nse of land thus appropriated.
Therefore, the earth in a city street, not needed for making or
repairing it, belongs to the adjacent owner, and cannot be sold
by the city.'
So pr-ima f~UM the land bounded on a stream of water is
bounded by the center of the stream.• This rule has been applied
to such large rivers as the Connecticnt: the Delaware,• the Mississippi,' the Detroit,' the Sandusky,' the .Milwaukee,' the Sault

etc., R. Co., 2 C. E. Green, 75; State v.

Laverack, 84 N. J. 201; Jackson 0.
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Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447, 453. It

would be otherwise, it seems, if the

land were detlicired for street purposes

only. Duhuque c. Benson,23 Iow:\,2-18.

’ Cumming e. Prang, 24 Mich. 514;

Bissell o. Collins. 28 Mich. 277; Gris-

wold v. Bay City, 35 Mich. 452. Com-

pare Delphi 0. Evans, 86 Ind. 90; West

Covington 0. Frcking, 8 Bush, 121.

1 Bickctt 0. Morris, L. R. 1 ll. L.

Sc. Ap. 47; Cate's Exrs. 0. Wadling-

t0n,1 McCord, 581; Hayes 0. Bow-

man, 1 Rand. 417; Jackson 0. Hal-

stead. 5 Cow. 216; Walker 0. Board

of Public Works. 16 Ohio, 540; State

1:. Gilmnnton, 9 N. H. 461; Nickerson

0. Crawford, 16 Me. 245; Browne 0.

Kennedy, 5 H. & J.195; Ross o. Faust,

54 Ind. 471; S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 655;

Arnold 0. Elmore, lli Wis. 536. The

rnle is the some in the case of bound-

ary on a canal. A_:t1Wt\n\ (‘anal C0.

0. Edwards, 36 Conn. 476, 501.

‘ Adams 0. Pease, 2 Conn, 481. In

this case, Rosana, J.,spe:tkin_2‘ of the

common law rule, which gives the

owner of the bank the title adﬁlum

medium aqua. and of the argument

ab inwnrcnienti, as it applied to such

large streams, says: "The argument

from inconvenience must be very

powerful to cast a shade on a long ee-

tnblished principle. Here I discern no

inconvenience. On the other hand, the

doctrine of the common law * *

promotes the grand ends of civil so-

ciety by pursuing that wise and or-

derly maxim of assigning to every-

thing capable of ownership a legal

and determinate owner." Approved

by Srrzxcsn, Ch. J., in llooker o.

Cummings, 20 Johns. 90, 101.

‘Rumlle 0. Delaware. etc., Canal

Co., 1 \\"ull. Jr., 275, 294, Gama, J.;

Hart v. Hill, 1 Whurt..124.

' Morgan 1:. Reading. 3 Sine. & Mar.

366; S. B. .\In-:noIin e. ltlurshull, 39

Des llmoea o. Hall. 24: Iowa. 2M.
See, also. :Milburn o. Ccdur R11pids,
etc., R. H. Co., 121owa, 246. Compare
Moses e. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. C'o., 21
Ill. 522: West e. Bancroft, 82 Vl8G7;
Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. e. Applegate, 8
Dana, 289; Hinchman e. Paterson,
etc., R. Co., 2 C. E. Green, 75; State e.
Laverack, 84 N. J. 201; Jackson e.
ll11tbaway, 15 Johns. 447, 453. It
would be otherwise, it seems, if the
land werededirtL'ed for street purposea
<mlg. Dubuque t:. Benson, 23 I own, 248.
1 Cumllling e. Prang, 24 Mich.IH4;
Bissell v. Collins, 28 :Mich. 277; Oris.
wold D. Bay CiLy, 35 Mic'ti. 452. Com.
pare DclphiD.EviUls,86 Ind. 90; Wea&
Covington D. Freking, 8 Hush, 121.
, Bickett e. Morris, L. R. 1 H. L.
Sc. Ap. 47; Cate's Exrs. '· Wudling.
ton, 1 McCord, 581; Hayes o. Bow.
mnn, 1 Rand. 41'7; Jackson e. Hal.
stead, 5 Cow. 216; Walker D. Board
of Public Works. 16 Ohio, 540; StJL!e
c. Gilmanton, 9 N.H. 461; Nickt·rson
D. Crawl'ol'd, 16 1tlc. 24.'>; Browne e.
Kt·nnedy,5 B. & J. 195: Ro~s e. Faust,
ti4 Ind. 471: 8. C. 23 Am. Rep. 6.15;
Arnold e. Elmore, 16 Wis. 536. The
rule is the same in the case of bound.
ary on a canal. A~awam f'anal Co.
e. Edwards, 86 Coon. 476, 501.
1

'Adams e. Pease, 2 Conn, 481. In
this case, Ilosx F.R, J ., speaking of Lhe
common law rule, which gives the
owner of the bank the title ad .ftlum
m«iium aiJIUil, and of the argument
ob incon.unimti, aa it applied to such
large strPams, says: •· The argument
from inconvenience must be very
pow('rful to cnst a shade on a Jon~ es.
tablished principle. Here I discern no
inconvenience. On the other halnd, the
doctrine or the common law • •
promotes the grand entls of civil so.
ciety by pursuing that wise and orderly maxim of assigning to everything capable of ownership a legal
and dc·tl'rminate owuer." Approved
by 8P.:scER, Ch. J., in Hooker e.
Cummin~s. 20 Johns. 90, 101.
• Hnntlle v. Delaware, etc., Canal
Co., 1 Wnll. Jr., 275, ~94:, GRIKB, J.;
Hart D. Hill, 1 Wlwrt. 124.
1 Morgun tl. Rending-. 3 Sme. & ~far.
866; S. B. Mn~nolia "· Mnl'!lhnll, 89
Miss. 110; Schmmeit·r t'. ~t. Puul. etc.,
R R. Co., 10 llinn. 8:.!; .Mi,ldll'lnn e.
Pritchnrd, 4 lll.IHO; Houck'· Yates,
82 lll. 179.
' Lorman "· Benson, 8 liicb. 18.
• Gau·iL's Admrs. e. Chambers, 8
Ohio, 496.
1 Arnold e. Elmore, 16 Wia. ti09.
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Ste Marie,‘ the Saginaw,’ etc.’ Wliere this view prevails the
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rights of the public are rights of navigation, and of improve-

ment for the purposes of navigation; and where the State inter-

poses no obstacle, the owner may use the land covered by the

water. or the water itself for his own proﬁt. It has been held that

the right to gather ice therefrom was exclusive, and that the owner

might maintain an action against one who, by moving a raft in

front of his grounds, prevented his gathering an ice crop.‘ He

may also rightfully carry out the shore by embankment, or other-

wise, subject to two conditions, the ﬁrst of which is, that he

must not do that which diminishes or threatens the corresponding

rights of other riparian proprietors; ‘ and the second is, that he

' Ryan 0. Brown, 18 Mich. 196.

‘Bay City Gus Light Co. 0. Indus-

trial Works, 28 Mich. 182.

' See Smart o. Clark's < Lessee. 2

Swan, 9, where the common law rule

of private ownership was held appli-

cable to all fresh water streams.

Ste Marie,' the Saginaw,• etc.• Where this view prevails thlt
rights of the public are rights of navigation, and of' improvement for the purposes of navigation;- and where the State interposes no obstacle, the owner may use the land covered by th&
water. or the water it'"elf for his own profit. It has been held that
the right to gather icc therefrom was exclnsive, and that the owner
might maintain an action against one who, by moving a raft in
front of his grounds, prevented his gathering an icc crop.* He
may also rightfully cnrry ont the shore by cmbankmen t~ or otherwise, subject to two conditions, the first of which is, that he
must not do that which dimini~hes or threatens the corresponding
rights of other riparian proprietors; • and tho second is, that he

‘ Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18.

' In Bickett v. Morris, L. R.1 H. L.

Cas. Sc. Ap. 47, 61. Lord Wssramur
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says: “When, however. it is said that

the proprietors of the bank of a run-

ning stream are entitled to the bed

of the stream as their property uaquo

ad med£um_ﬁlum, it does not by any

means follow that that property is

capable of being used in the ordinary

way in which so much land uncov-

ered by water might he used; but it

must be used in such a manner as not

to alft-ct the interest of riparian pro-

prietors in the stream. Now, the in-

tcrest of a riparian proprietor in the

stream is not only to the extent of pre-

venting its being diverted or dimin-

ishcd, but it would extend also to

prevent the course being interfered

with or affected. so as to direct tho

current in any different way that

might possibly be attended with dam-

:ig6 at a future period to another pro-

prictor.

“ In the bed of a river there may,

possibly, be a dilference in the level

_ ___ __ M _ __§i

of the ground, which, as we know,

has the clfect of directing the title or

current in a particular direction.

Suppose the ordinary current ﬂows

in a manner which has created for

itself, by attrition, a hay, in a partic-

ular part of the bank; if that were

Obstructed by a building, the etftct

might be to alter the course of the

current, so as to direct the ﬂow with

a greater degree of violence upon the

opposire hunk, or some other portion

of the same bank; and then, if at

that part of the bank to which the

accelerated ﬂow of the water in

greater force is thus directed, thr-re

happens to be a building erected, the

ﬂow of tho water thus produced by

the artiﬁcial obstruction would have

the effect, possibly, of wearing away

the foundation of that building at

some remote period, and would there-

1 Ryan t~. Brown, 18 Mich. 106.
• Bay City G11S Light Co. t~. Induatrial Works, 28 ~lich. 182.
• See StnRrt "· Clark's . Lc.>ssee. 2
Swan, 9. where the common law rule
Of private ownership WRS held appli.
cable to 111l fresh water streams.
• LormRn "· Benson, 8 1\lich. 18.
• In Bickett 11. :Morrh.•, L. R. 1 H. L.
Cas. Sc. Ap. 47, 61. Lord WESTBURY
says: "When, however. It Is said that
the proprietors of the bRnk of a run.
ning stream are entitled to the bed
of the stream M their property UlfJ!U
ad m~dium .tuum, it does not hy any
means follow that that property is
capable of being used in the ordinary
way in which so much land uncov.
ered by water might be used; but it
must be used in such a manner as not
to afft·ct the interest of riparian pro.
prietors in the stream. Now, the in.
lerest of a rip:ll'ian proprietor In the
stream is not only to the extent of pre.
venting Its heing diverted or dimin.
ished, but it would extend also to
prevent the course being interfered
with or affected. Sfl as to direct tho
rurrent in any different way that
might possibly be attended with damnge at a future pel"iorl to another pr~
prietor.
"In the bed of a river there may,
possibly, be a difference in the level

of the ground. which, as we know,
bas the effl!ct of directing the title or
current In a particular dir<.-ction.
Suppose the ordinRry current flows
In a manner whir.h has created for
itself, by attrition, a bay, in a partie.
ular pan of the bank; If that were
obstructed by a building, the effl'Ct
might be to alter the course of the
current, so as to direct the flow with
a greater degree of violence upon the
opposi:e hank, or Rome other portion
of' the same~ bank; and thf'n, if at
that part of the bank to which the
accelerated flow of the wnter 1n
greater force is thus dlrectecl, thPre
happens to bo a building erer.ted, the
flow of tho water thus produced lly
the artificial obstruction would have
the effect, possibly, of wearing away
the foundation of that building at
some remote period, and would there.
by bo productive of very considerable
damage.
•• It is wise, therefore, to Jay down
the general rule, thnt even though im.
mediate damage cannot be described,
even though the actual loss cannot
be predicated, yet, If an obstt·uction
be made to the ttctual current of thn
stream, that obstruction is one tltat
constitutes an injury which the courts
will take notice of. as an encro:tch.
mcnt which adjacent proprietors hl\vo

·-
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must not abridge or obstruct the public easement, and must be

subject always to State police regulations. In Iowa and North

Carolina it is held that on streams which are navigable in‘ fact,

though not subject to tide-water ﬂow, the line of private owner-

ship is the bank, and not the thread of the river.‘ And this

view has the approval of the Federal Supreme Court.’

On the small streams which are highways only for rafting pur-

poses, the title of the bank-owner is conceded on all hands to

extend to the thread of the stream, but the public may use them

for rafting, taking care not needlessly, by checking the water or

otherwise, to injure adjacent lands.‘

Wliere land is bounded on a fresh-water lake, large or small,

the boundary line is perhaps low-water mark.‘ On waters where

the tide ebbs and ﬂows the line of high water is the limit of

exclusive private ownership,‘ though this rule in the Atlantic

a right to have removed. In this

sense the maxim has been applied by

the law of beotland, that meliur eat

aonllitio proliibentfs, that is to say,

you have a right to preserve the state

of things unimpaired and unpreju-
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diced in which you have that existing

mnt't not ab.-idge or obstruct the public easement, and must he
anbject always to State police regulations. In Iowa and North
Carolina it is held that on streams which are navigable in· fact,
though not subject to tide-water flow, the line of private ownerBhip is the bank, and not the thread of the river.' And this
view has the approval of the Federal Supreme Court.•
On the small streams which are highways only for raftiug purposes, the title of the bank-owner is conceded on all han<ls to
extend to the thread of the stream, but the public may use them
for rafting, taking care not needlessly, by checking the water or
otherwise, to injure adjacent lands. •
Where land is bounded on a fresh-water lake, large or small,
the boundary line is perhaps low.water mark.• On waters where
the tide ebbs and flows the line of high water is the limit of
exclusive private ownership,' though this rule in the Atlantic

interest."

‘ McMauus 0. Carmichael, 3 Iowa,

57; Huight '0. Keokuk, 4 Iowa, 199;

Tomlin v. Railroad Co., 82 Iowa. 106;

Wilson 0. Forbes, 2 Dev. B0; (‘ollins

o. Benbury, 8 Ired. 277; S. C. 5 Ired.

118; State 0. Glen, 7 Jones, (N. C.)

821. Bee Baiubridge 0. Sherlock, 29

Ind. 864.

‘ Barney 0. Keokuk, 94 U. S. Rep.

B24. In Ryan v.Brown,18 Mich. 196,

it was decided that the Suite could

not build structures in a fresh water

navigable stream without the consent

of the proprietor oi" the bank, or with-

out ﬂrst making compensation. The

decision in Barney 0. Keokuk is

contra.

' Grand Rapids Booming Co. e.

Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308; Middleton 0.

Flat River Booming Co.. 27 Mich.

538. Bee Brown v. Chadbourne, 31

Me. 9; Treat 0. Lord, 42 Me. 552;

Morgan 0. King. 35 N. Y. 454; Weise

0. Smith, 8 Orcg. 445; S. C. 8 Am.

Rep. 621; Hubbard o. Bell, 54 Ill.

110; Lawler 0. Baring Boom Co., 66

Me. 443. A stream not capable of

use for railing purposes in its natural

condition cannot lawfuliybe made so

by dams to the prejudice of land

owners. Thunder Bay Co. 0. Speeehly,

31 Mich. 336.

‘Waterman o. Johnson, 18 Pick.

261; Bradley 0. Rice, 18 Me. 198;

a right to have removed. In this
~~ense the maxim has been applied by
ltle law of bcotland, that rMlWr at
eunditio prol&ibentil, that is to say,
you have a right to preserve the state
of things unimpaired and unprrjndiced in which you have that existing
interest"
1 McManus D. Cannichnel, 8 Iowa,
ti7; Haight ,, Keokuk, 4 Iowa, 199;
Tomlin "· Railroad Co., 82 Iowa, 100;
Wilson D. Forhes, 2 Dev. 80; ('olliu~
v. Ben bury, 3 Ired. 2i7; S. C. 5 Ired.
118; State v. Glen, 7 Jones, (N.C.)
821. See Bainbridge tJ. Sherlock, 29
Ind. SM.
• Barney e. Kcnknk, 94 t.r. S. RPp.
824. In Ryan " · Brown, 18 ~i<'h. llltl,
it was decided that the State coul<l
not build structure~ in a fre~h wnter
navigable stream without the consent
of the proprietor of' the bank, or without first making compensation. The
decision in Barney e. Keokuk is
Mt&trtJ.

• Grand Rapids Booming Co. e.
Jarvis, 80 :Mich. 808; :Middleton e.
Flat River Booming Co., 27 :Mich.
G.CJS. See Brown "· Chadbourne, 81
lie. 9; Treat v. Lord, 42 He. ti52:
llorpn •· King. 85 N.Y. 4M; Weise

Champlain, etc., R. R. Co. o. Valen-

tine, 19 Barb. 484; Canal Commis-

sioners o. People, 5 Wend. 423;

Wheeler 0. Spinola, 54 N. Y. 3'77;

Fletcher o. Phelps, 28 Vt. 257; Jake-

way 0. Barrett. 38 Vt. 816; Austin 0.

Rutlnnd, etc., R. R Co., 45 Vt. 215;

State 0. Gilmanton,9 N. H. 461; West

Roxbury o. Stoddard, '1 Allen, 158.

In Rice 0. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125,

the owner of the bank on Luke Mus-

91

e. Smith, 8 Oreg. 4.45; S. C. 8 Am.
Rep. 621; Hubbard e. Bell, M Ill.
110; Lawler e. Buring Boom Co., 66
Me. 448. A stream not capable of
use for rafting purposes in its natural
condition cannot lawfully be made so
by dams to the prejudice of land
owner~. Thunder Bay Co. v. Speechly,
31 :Mich. 336.
'Waterman e. Johnson, 18 Pick.
261: Bradley e. Rice, 18 !tie. 108;
Champlain, etc., R. R. Co. e. Valentine, 19 Barb. 484; Canal Commissioners tl. People, 5 Wend. 42a;
Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N. Y. 377;
Fletcher"· Phelps, 28 Vt. 257; Jakeway fl. Barrett. 38 VL 816: Au~tin tl.
Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Vt. 216;
State"· Gilmanton, 9 N.H. 461; We-;t
Roxbury "· Stoddard, 7 Allen, 158.
In Rice "· Ruddiman, 10 liich. 1215,
the owner of the bank on Lake Muskegon, a small body of water throu,l!'h
which the river Muskegon passt>s
near its mouth, was held entitled to
the soil under the water in front of
his lands on tbe shore. And, see
Cobb"· Davenport, 82 N.J. 869.
• Pollurcl's Lessee"· Hagan, 8 How.
212; Martin e. Waddell, 16 Pet. 887;

Q3
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States is much modiﬁed either by legislation or by customary law.‘

And in respect to boundary on highways or fresh-water streams,

the rules above given are rules of presumption merely,’ and in

any grant of lands the words of conveyance may be such as to

bound the lands on the exterior line of a highway, or on the

bank of a stream, or on any other line sufﬁciently designated.‘

Possession of Lands. Land, the ownership of which has

passed from the sovereignty, in contemplation of law is always

States is much modified either by legislation or by customary law.'
And jn respect to boundary on bighways or fresh-water streams,
the rules above given are rules of presumption merely,s and in
any grant of lands the words of conveyance may be such as to
bonnd the lands on the exterior line of a highway, or on the
bank of a stream, or on any other line sufficiently designated.•

in the possession of some one. The possession may be rightful

or wrongful, and if rightful, it may be by one who has only a tem-

porary interest therein, as tenant for years or at will, or it may

be by one having a freehold estate. Where one has actual pos-

session, he does not lose it by temporary absences for pleasure or

business, but the possession will he kept for him by servants, if

any remain, or by his domestic animals or his goods. If one

occupies part of a known description of land, but has color of

title to the whole and claims the whole, he has constructively

possession of the whole provided no one else is occupying any

portion thereof.‘ If there is no pedis possessio of any part of
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the land, the real owner has constructive possession, and may sue

an intruder for the disturbance of his possessions, and will recover

if he makes out his title.‘ If possession has been taken from

the owner, his method of recovering it will depend upon the cir-

cumstances. At the common law he might have retalzen it by

force, but as this often led to serious breaches of the public peace,

East Hampton 1:. Kirk, 68 N.Y. 459;

Storer v. Freeman. 6 Mass. 436; State

0. Jersey City, 25 N. J. 525.

‘See opinion of Chief Justice

GREEN, in Gough 0. Bell, 22 N. J.

441; Bell o. Gough, 23 N. J. 624;

Commonwealth o. Vincent, 108 Muss.

441; Opinion, by GRAY, J.; Parker v.

Cutler Mill Dam Co., 20 Me. 353;

Nudd n. Hobbs, 17 N. H. 524.

Possession of Lands. Land, the ownership of which hM
passed from the sovereignty, in contemplation of law is always
in the possession of some one. The possession may be rightful
ot· wrongful, and if rightful, it may be by one who hR.S only a tempomry interest therein, as tenant for years or at will, or it may
be by one having a freehold estate. Where one has actual possession, he does not lose it by temporary absences for pleasure or
bnsiness, but the possession will he kept for him by servants, if
any remain, or by his domestic animals or his goods. If one
occupies part of a known description of land, bnt has color of
title to the whole and claims the whole, he has constructively
posse.;sion of the whole provided no one else is occupying any
portion thereof.• If there is no pedis possessio of any part of
the land, the real owner has constructive possession, and may sue
an intruder for the disturbance of his possessions, and will recover
if he makes out his title. • If possession has been taken from
the owner, his method of reco,·ering it will depend upon the circumstances. At the common law he might have retaken it by
force, bnt as this often led to serious breaches of the public peace,

“Waterman 1:. Johnson, 13 Pick.

261; Mott '0. Mott, as N. Y. 246.

” Alden o. Murdoch, 13 Mass. 256;

Petting-ill v. Porter, 3 Allen, 349: Ty-

ler o. Hammond, 11 Pick. 193; Smith

0. Slocomb, 9 Gray, 36; Howard 0.

Ingersoll, 13 How. 381; Hughes 0.

Providence, etc., R. R. Co., 2 R. I. 508;

Hoboken Land Co. 0 Kerrigan, 3l N.

J. 13; Morrow 0. Willard, 30 Vt.

118; Starr v. Child, 5 Denio, 599; Hal-

sey 1:. McCormick, 13 N. Y. 296;

Nickerson 0. Crawford, 16 Me. 245;

Rockwell 0. Baldwin, 53 lll. 19 ;

Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. o. Hel-

sel, 38 Mich.

‘ Aehey -v. Hull, 7 Mich. 423; Dobbs

0. Gullidge. 4 Dev. & Bat. 68; Bar-

ber 0. Trustees of Schools, 51 Ill. 396.

See Collins v. Benbury, 5 Ired. 118.

‘ Miller o. Miller, 41 Md. 623; Grif-

ﬁn v. Creppin, 60 Me. 270; Tolles 0.

Duneombe, 34 Mich. 101; Appleby

0. Obert, 1 Herr. 336.

East Hampton "· Kirk, 68 N.Y. 459;
Storer "· Freeman, 6 Mass. 436; State
"·Jersey City, 25 N.J. 525.
1 See opinion of Chief Justice
GREEl'i, in Gough e. Bell, 22 N.J.
441; Bell fl. Gough, 23 N. J. 624;
Commonwealth"· Vincent, 108 ~11188.
4-11; Opinion, by GRAY, J.; Parker e.
Cutll'r Mill Dam Co., 20 Me. 853;
Nudd "· Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524.
'Waterman "· Johnson, 13 Pick.
261; Mott "· Mott, 68 N.Y. 246.
1 Alden "· Murdoch, 13 Mass. 256;
Pettingill"· Porter, 3 Allen, 34.1); Tyler"· Hammond, 11 Pick. 193; Smith
"· Slocomb, 9 Gray, 36 ; Howard e.
Ingersoll, 13 How. 381 ; Hughes "·

Providence, etc., R. R Co., 2 R. I. ®8;
Hoboken Land Co. e Kerrigan, 81 N.
J. 13 ; Morrow "· Willard, SO Vl
118; Starr e. Cb ild, 5 Denio, 599; Hal.
sey "· McCormick, 13 N. Y. 296;
Nickerson e. Crawford, 16 Me. 245;
Rockwell e. Baldwin, 53 Ill. 19;
Grand Rapids. etc., R R Co. •· Hei.
ael, 38 Mich.
• Achey11. Hull, 7 Mich.423; Dobbs
•· Gullidge,-' Dev. & Bat. 68; Bar.
bcr "· Trustees of Schools, 51 Ill. 896.
Bee Collins "· Benbury, 5 Ired. 118.
• Miller e. Miller, 41 Md. 623; Griffin e. Creppin, 60 Me. 270; Tolles e.
Duncombe, 84 Mich. 101 ; Appleby
e. Obert, 1 Harr. 836.
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the Statute, 5 Rich. Il., C. 7, was enacted, which declared that
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“ none henceforth make entry into any lauds and tenements but

in cases where entry is given by the law, and in that case not

with strong hand, nor with multitude of people, but only in a

peaceable and easy manner.” This statute has been re-enacted

in the several American States, or recognized as a part of the

American common law. If, notwithstanding its prohibition, one

shall forcibly seize possession of lands, or if, after having in any

manner unlawfully obtained possession, he shall forcibly detain

the same against the owner, summary statutory remedies are

given by means of which the party forcibly expelled or wrong-

fully excluded by force, may regain possession. And title is no

defense to a complaint for a forcible entry.‘

There are several reasons why the law cannot suﬁ'er a forcible

entry upon a peaceable possession, even though it be in the asser-

tion of a valid title against a mere intruder. .Fh'st. Whoever

assumes to make such an entry makes himself judge in his own

cause, and enforces his own judgment. Second. He does this

by the employment of force against a peaceable party. Third.

As the other party must have an equal right to judge in his own

cause, and to employ force in giving effect to his judgment, a
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breach of the public peace would be invited, and any wrong, if

redressed at all, would be redressed at the cost of a public dis-

l'.Ul‘l)ﬂllC8, and perhaps of serious bodily injury to the parties.‘

The good of the State could not tolerate such proceedings, and

therefore when forcible possession is taken, the law compels a

restoration, and refuses to inquire into the title until it is made.

But if one lawfully entitled to possession can make peaceable

entry, even while another is in occupation, the entry, in contem-

plation of law, restores him to complete possession,‘ and it is not

unlawful for him to resort to such means, short of the employ-

ment of force, as will render further occupation by the other

impracticable.‘

‘ Newton 0. Harland, 1 M. & Gr.

644; Hillary 0. Gay, 6 C. 8: P. 234.

See Mugford 1:. Richardson, 6 Allen,

76; Gaul: v. Jenkins, 12 Wend. 488;

M ussey v. Scott, 32 Vt. 82.

’A mere right to possession can

never justify the use of force in order

to regain it. Parsons 0. Brown, 15

Barb. 590; Newkirk 0. Snblcr, 9

Barb. 652; State o.Yeaton,53 Me. 125.

' Esty o. Baker, 50 Me. 325.

‘The case of Stearns 0. Sampson,

59 Me. 568, is so full upon this point,

both in its (ll:CUSSl()!l and in citation

the Statute, 5 Rich. II., 0. 7, was enacted, which declared that
"none henceforth make entry into any lands and tenements bnt
in cases where entry is given by the law, and in that case not
with strong hand, nor with multitude of people, but only in a
peaceable and easy manner." This statute has been re-enacted
in the several American States, or recognized as a part of the
American common law. If, notwithstanding its prohibition, one
shal1 forcibly seize possession of lands, or if~ after having in any
manner unlawfully obtained posseEsion, he shall forcibly detain
the same against the owner, summary statutory remedies are
given by means of which the party forcibly expelled or wrongfully excluded by force, may regain possession. And title is no
defense to a complaint for a forcible entry.'
There are several reasons why the law cannot suffer a forcible
entry upon a peaceable possession, even though it be in the assertion of a valid title against a mere intruder. Firat. Whoever
assumes to make such an entry .makes himself judge in his own
cause, and enforces his own judgment. Second. He docs this
by the employment of force against a peaceable party. Third.
As the other party must have an equal right to judge in his own
cause, and to employ force in giving effect to his judgment, a
breach of the public peace would be invited, and any wrong, if
redressed at all, would be redressed at the cost of a pn blic disturbance, and perhaps of serious bodily injury to the parties.•
The good of the State could not tolerate such proceedings, and
therefore when forcible possession is taken, the law compels a
restoration, and refuses to inquire into the title until it is made.
But if one lawfully entitled to possession can make peaceable
entry, even while another is in occupation, the entry, in contemplation of law, restores him to complete possession,• and it is not
unlawful for him to resort to such means, short of the employment of force, as will render further occupation by the other
impracticable. •

of authorities, that we cannot do bet-

ter than to copy freely from it. The

1 Newton •· Harland, 1 H. & Gr.
M4 ; Hillary e. Gay, 6 C. & P. 294.
8oo Mugford e. Richardson, 6 Allen,
76; Gault e. Jenkins, 12 Wend. 488;
1rluuey e. Scott, 82 VL 82.
• A mere right to possession can
never juaLify the use or force in order
to regaln it. Paraona •· Brown, liS

Barb. 590; Newkirk "· Babler, 9
Barb. 052; State"· Yeaton, 53 Me.125.
1 Esty e. Baker, 50 Me. 82.1.
'The case or Stearne "· Snmpson,
59 Me. 568, is so full upon this poin~
both in its dbcussion and in citation
of authorities, that we caonot do bet.
tel' than to copy freely from ll The
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upon lands, provided the party intruded upon is prompt in his

action. If he, his family, or his servants, are upon the land at

the time, the necessary force may then be employed; but if the

intruder steals in unawares, the rightful possessor, instead of

treating this as a dispossession, may at once proceed to remove

him. “A mere trespasser cannot, by the very act of trespass,

immediately and without acquiescence, give himself what the

law understands by possession against the person whom he ejects,

and drive him to produce his

case was one in which a tenancy had

been properly terminated. The ten-

unts not leaving, the landlord entered

peaceably, requested them to quit and

remove their furniture, and upon

their refusal, burst open an inner

It is never unlawful, however, to expel by force an intruder
upon lands, provided the party intn1ded upon is prompt in hit~
action. If he, his family, or his ser,·ants, are upon the land at
the time, the necessary force may then be employed; but if the
intrnder steals in unawares, the rightful possessor, instead of
treating this as a dispossession, may at once proceed to remove
him. "A mere trespasser cannot, by the very act of trespass,
immediately and without a(•qniescence, give himself what the
law understands by possession against the person whom he ejects,
and dr:ve him ~ produce his title, if he can, without delay,.

door which the female servant had

fastened and refused to open, took off

the doors and windows on a cold day

in winter, brought a blood-hound into

the house, and refused to permit any

food to be brought in for the woman
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for several days. Armnrron, Ch. J.

(p. 572), says: “ Upon these facts the

presiding judge instructed the jury

as follows: ‘There is no controversey

that if he. the defendant, had ob-

tained peaceable possession, he had

a right to remain there, the property

being his at the time. But what was

the nature of his possession? Did he

go there for the purpose of deception,

merely to call as a friend on a visit,

or did he go there with the intention,

after making such an entry, to forci-

bly expcl the inmates? If that was

his design, then the entry would not

be recognized, in law, to give him a

peaceable possession.’ As the defen-

dant had aright to enter peaceably

into his own house, and being there

to remain, and to remove the tenant

wrongfully remaining, it does not af-

fect the rights of the parties whether

he disclosed or concealed his inten-

tion to remove his tenant. Nor is it

title, if he can, without delay,

material whether he entered with

such intention, or formed his inten-

tion ufter his entry, if his entry was

peaceble and without force. ‘It is

not necessary,’ remarks Lord TEN-

TERDEN, in Butcher 1:. Butcher, '7 B.

& C. 399, ‘that the party who makes

the entry should declare that he en-

ters to take possession; it is suﬁicient

if he does any act to show his inten-

tion.’ In the same case, BAILEY. J.,

says: ‘ I think that a party, having a

right to the land, acquires by entry

the lawful possession of it, and may

maintain trespass against any person

who, being in possession at the time

of his entry, wrongfully continues

upon the land.’ The defendant might

instantly bring trespass against the

plaintiff, wrongfully remaining in his

house, or he might remove her. A5

the law gave him a right to enter

case was one in which a tenancy had
been properly terminated. The ten.
11nts not leaving, the landlord entered
peaceably, requested them to quit and
remove their furniture, and upon
their refusal, bu~t open an inner
door which the female servant had
fastened and refused to open, took off'
the doors and windows on a cold day
in winter, brought a blood-hr.und into
the hou~c, and refused to permit any
food to be brought in for the woman
for several days. APPLETON, Ch. J.
(p. 572), says: "Upon thege facts the
presiding judge instructed the jury
as follows: • There is no controversey
that if he. the defendant, had obtained peaceable possession, he had
a right to remain there, the property
being his at the time. But what was
the nature of his possession t Did he
go there for the purpose of deception,
merely to call as a friend on a visit,
or did he go there with the intention,
after making such an entry, to forcl.
bly expel the inmates t if that was
his design, then the entry would not
be recognized, in law, to give him a.
peaceal>le possession.' As the defen.
uant had a right to enter peaceably
into his own bouse, and being there
to remain, and to remove the tenant
wrongfully remaining, it does not a.f.
feet the rights of the parties whether
he disclosed or concealed his inten.
lion to remove his tenant. Nor is it

material whether he entered with
auch intention, or formed his intention after his entry, if hie entry waa
peaceble and without force. • It i•
not necessary,' remarks Lord TBKTERDRN, in Butcher tJ. Butcher, 7 B.
& C. 899, • that the party who makes
the entry should declare that he t'D·
ters to take possession; it ls sumcient
if he does any act to show his intention.' In the same case, BAILEY, J.,
say!l: 'I think that a party, having a
right to the lflnd, acquires by entry
the lawful possession of it, and may
maintain trespass against any person
who, being in possession at the timeof his entry, wrongfully continues
upon tho land.' The defendant might
instantly bring trespass against the
plaintiff, wrongfully remaining in his
house, or he might remove her. As
the law gave him a right to enter
peaceably and remove his tenants and
their goods, if it could be done without a breach of tho peace, the inten.
tion to do what the law authorizes
cannot make an entry with such in.
tent wrongful.
"If there is any evidence to which
the latter part of the instructions can
apply, then the except ions shoulc\ be
sustained; for a peaceable entry can.
not be metamorphosed into a forcible
one, by reason of an existin~ and con.
cealed intention on the part of the
party entering to do, after entry, what
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reinstate himself in his former possession.‘ But instead of

WRONGS TO REAl.

PI:Ol'EI~TY.

3~5

rtsoi-ting to force, it is equally competent for the person ejected

to maintain trespass, provided he moves promptly and does not,

by sleeping on his rights, acquiesce in his dispossession.'

by law he was legally authorized to

do.

“The court instructed the jury that

the plaintiffs could not recover on the

reinstate himoelf in his former possession.• But instead of
rt·sorting to force, it is equally competent for the person ej<.>eted
to maintain trespass, provided he moves J>romptly and does not,
by sleeping on his rights, acquiesce in his dispossession.•

countfor brenkiny: and entering. But

if he was not a trespasst-r for enter-

in g into his own house, whatever his

purpose or intention, then, being

there, he might remove doors or win-

dows. If the plaintiffs could not

maintain trespass quara clrmsum for

his entry, neither could they for his

acts after such entry. Mcader 0.

Stone, 7 Met. 147. ‘The right of the

plaintiffs to the possession of the

house had terminated by their failure

to pay rent and the notice given to

them by the defendant to quit the
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same. In this state of facts,’ observes

DEWEY, J., in Mugford c. Richard-

son, 6 Allen, '76, ‘the defendant had

the right to enter upon the premises

and take outthe windows of the same.

¢ ¢ Being thus in peacenble pos-

se-sion of a portion of the ti-nt-ment,

the court properly instructed the jury

that if the female plaintitf undertook

to prevent him from taking out the

windows, he had a right to use as

much force as was necessary in order

to overcome her resistance.’ In Har-

ris 0. Gillingham, 6 N. H. 11, the

owner of the land, after requesting

his tenant to leave, upon his refusal

entered, tore down the cliimiiess, and

put the building in an uninhabitable

condition, for doing which the tenant

brought an action of trespass quaro

cluumm. ‘We are of opinion,’ say

the court, in delivering their opinion,

‘that the disturbance done to her pos-

session, by putting the house in a sit-

uation which compelled her to leave

it, did not make them trespassers ab

t'm'lio, because she had no right to he

there against the will of D. Gilling-

ham, the owner of the land. Erwin

0. Oltnstend, 7 Cow. 229; Wilde II.

Cantillon, 1 Johns. Cas. 123; Hyatt 0.

Wood, 4 Johns. 150; Ives 0. Ives, 13

Johns. 235.’ "

The court further cite Taunton 0.

Co<tar, '7 T. R41-ll; Newton 1:. liar-

land, 1 M. & G. 644; Harvey 0.

Brydges, 14 M. & W. 437; Pollen 0.

Brewer, 7 0. B. 8'71; Burling e. Read,

11 Q. B. (N. s.), 907; Ives 0. Ives, 13

Johns. 235; Mcader 0. S\oue,’7 Met.

147; Curtis 0. Galvin, 1 Allen, ‘J15;

Whitney o. Swett, 22 N. H. 10; Moore

r. Boyd, 24 Me. 242; Rollins 0. Moocrs,

25 Me. 102; Allen o. Bicknell, 36 Me.

436. The conclusion was that the

acts of defendant constituted neither

a trespass in respect to the realty. nor

by law be wu legally authorized &o
do.
"The court Instructed the jury that
the plalntiff:J could not recover on the
eount for break in~ and entering. But
If he waa not a trespassl'r for entertop: into his own bouae, wbntever his
purpose or intention, then, being
&here, he might remove doors or windoWI!I. If the plaintiffs could not
· maintain trespass quaN clmuum for
.his entry, neither could they for hie
acta after such entry. Meader •·
8t• •ae, 7 Mt·L 147. • The right of the
plaintiffs to the possession of the
bouse had terminated by their failure
~ pay rent. and the notice given to
&hetp by the defendant to quit the
81lme. In this state of facts,' observes
DEWEY, J., In Mugford "· Ricbt\rd81>n, 6 Allen, 76, • the defendant bad
the right to enter upon the premil88
and take out the windows of the same.
• • Being thus in peaceable poa.
ae·alon of a portion of the ll'nement,
the court properly instrul'ted the jury
dla& if the female plaintilf undertook
10 preftllt him t'rom taking out the
windows, he had a right to ue u
much force u waa necessary in order
to overcome her resistance.' In Harris e. Gillingham, 6 N. H. 11, the
owner of the land, after requestlng
bls tenant to leave, upon his refusal
enwred, tore down the chimneys, and
put the building ln an uninhabitable
eondiUon,for doing which the tenant
brought an action of trespas-s qw~N
dav~tm~.
• We are of opinion,• say
the court, in delivering their opinion,
• that the disturbance done to her pos.
~ion, by patting the ho1188 In a alt.
aatlon which comJH'Iled her to leave
ft. did DO& mate them tresp&1181'8 ab

~nitio, because abe bad no right to be
there against the will or D. Gilling.
ham, the owner or the land. Erwin
e. Olmstead, 7 Cow. 229; Wilde •·
Cantillon, 1 Johns. Cas.l28; Hyatt •·
Wood,.& Johna. 160; Ives e. Ivea, 18
Johns. 233.' "
The court furt.her cite Taunton •·
Co'itar, 7 T. R. 4!31; Newton "· Harland, 1 M. & G. 644; Ilarn•y e.
Bryd!!es, 14 M. & W. 487; Pollen •·
Brew~r, 7 C. B. 871 ; Burling"· Read,
11 Q. B. (N. e.), OOl; Iv~s e. lves, 18
Johns. 23.'i; Mcadf'r •· Stone, 7 Met.
147; Curtis e. Galvin, 1 Allrn, 211S;
Whitney e. Swett,~ N. R. 10; Moore
e. Boyd, 24 Me. 249; Rollins"· llnoers,
2.J !lie. 192; Allen"· Bicknell, 86 lie.
436. The conclusion was that t.he
acts or defendant constituted neither
a trespass in respect to the realty. nor
an &SBauU upon the female plaintiff.
1 Lord DENH.\ll', Cb. J., in Browne
.. Dawson, 12 Ad. & EL 624, 6~.
See Hillary "· <fay, 8 C. & P. 284:;
Aaher e. Whitlock, L. R 1 Q. B. 1;
Christy e. Scott, 1.& How. 28'l; Ward
•· Mcintosh, 12 Ohio, (N. 8.) 2al; Harrington •· Scott. 1 Mich. 17; Nichola
e. Todd. I Gray, &68.
• Browne e. Dawson, 19 Ad. & EL
m, 628. WhcreadiS!tf'izeeacqui81K'es
for the time ln his dispot~st'SIIlon, he
cannot afterward bring tret1pass for
Injuries to the freehold whiiP be wu
dlspol!se988d. Allen •· Thuyer, 17
Mass. 299; Rowland e. Rowt.md, 8
Obio,40; Wood 11. Lafay(•tte,(i8N. Y.
1&1. Nor can be maintain a.:sumpsit
for the value or Limber or other thinga
severed from the freehold and sold
while the disseizin continued. Bige.
low •· Jones, 10 Pick. 161. Oceaalonal
acta, such as an owner might perform
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From what has been said it appears that possession is either

rightful or wrongful. Presumptively, a peaceful possession is

always rightful, and the proof of it is sufficient evidence of title

to enable one to recover in ejectment against one who is sub-

sequently found in possession, and who shows no right in him-

self.‘ A tenant’s possession, while it continues, is as complete

for all purposes of redress against wrong-doers as is the posses-

sion of an owner in fee simple. An injury to real estate, while

the tenancy exists, may support two actions, one by the tenant,

Who, in any event, must suffer some legal injury, aiid one by the

reversioner, when the injury is of a nature to affect the reversion.

A trespass is an injury to the tenant, but his recovery is limited

to the injury suﬁcred by himself.’ Thus, the destruction of

buildings is an injury to both; so may be the ﬂooding of lands,

the cutting of timber, and the obstruction of a right of way

under circumstances of injury to the reversion.‘ An act to the

injury of the reversion is an act of waste, and whether com-

mitted by the tenant himself or by any third person, will support

an action on the case by the reversioner.‘

The entry of the landlord on the rightful possession of the

tenant is as much a trespass as the entry of any third person; '

but if the tenant hold over after the expiration of his term, the
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landlord may rightfully make a peaceablc entry,‘ and though it

on the premises, do not constitute of a buildingthcreon, and then have

possession. Swift v. Gage, 26 Vt. 224.

'Kilbourn v. Rewer, 8 Gray, 415;

Look o. Norton, 55 Me. 103; Black 0.

Grant, 50 Me. 364; Illinois, etc., Coal

Co. 0. Cobb, 82 Ill. 183; Austin 0.

Bailey, 37 Vt. 219; Van Anken 0.

Monroe, 38 Mich.

‘Gilbert o. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 5;

Foster 1;. Elliott, 33 Iowa, 216; Parks

From what bas been said it appears that possession is eitl1er
rightful or wrongful. Presumptively, a peaceful possession is
always rightful, and the proof of it is sufficient eviden~e of title
to enaLle one to recover in ejectment against one who is subsequently found in po~scssion, and who shows no right in himself:' A tenant's possession, while it continues, is as complete
for all purposes of redress against wrong-doers as is the possession of an owner in fee simple. An injury to real estate, while
the tenancy exists, may support two actions, one by the tenant,
who, in any event, must suffer some legal injury, ai1d one by the
reversioner, when the injury is of a nature to affect the ren~rsion.
A trespass is an injury to the tenant, but his recovery is limited
to the injury suffered by himself! Thus, the destruction of
buildings is an injury to both; so may be the flooding of landst
the cutting of timber, and the obstrnction of a right of way
under circumstances of injury to the re'•ersion.• An act to the
injury of the reversion is an act of waste, and whether committed by the tenant himself or by any third person, will support
an action on the case by the reversioner. •
The entry of the landlord on the rightful possession of the
tenant is as much a trespass as the entry of any third person; •
but if the tenant hold over after the expiration of his term, the
landlord may rightfully make a peaceable entry: and though it

0. Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Hosking 0.

Phillips, 3 Exch. 168. Any person is

to be deemed a tenant who, for the

time, has lawful possession of lands

subordinate to the right of another,

as, for example, one occupying under

a contract of purchase. Smith v.

Price, 42 Ill. 899; Ives o. Cress, 5

Penn. St 118. The owner, in leasing

lands, may reserve to himself the use

trespass qunra elaucum for an entry

and the carrying away ot his prop-

erty from that building. Jordan u.

Staples, 57 Me. 352. If one is in pos-

session of lands merely at the will of

the owner, the latter is constructively

in possession, and may sue trespass-

ers. Starr 0. Jackson, 11 Muss. 619.

' See Dobson v. Bl.lCkl1l0l'B, 9 Q. B.

991; Higgins v. Furnsworth. 48 Vt.

512; George 0. Norcross, 32 N. H. 82.

‘ Randall 0. Cleveland, 6 Conn. 323;

Lane 1:. Thompson, 43 N. H. 320. This

subject, however, will be considered

in another place.

' Luther 1;. Arnold, 8 Rich. 24; Bry-

ant 0. Sparrow, 62 Me. 546.

‘ Taylor v. Cole, 3 T. R. 292; Taun-

ton o. Costar, 7 T. R. 43!.

_,

on the premises, do not constitute
possession. Bwif\ e. Gage, 26 Vt. 224.
1 Kilbourn o. Rewer, 8 Gray, 415;
Look o. Norton, 5/S Me. 108; Black o.
Grant, 00 Me. 364; Illinois, etc., Coal
Co. e. Cobb, 82 Ill. 183; Austin e.
Bailey, 87 Vt. 219; Van Anken e.
Monroe, 88 Mich.
1 Gilbert e. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 5;
Foster e. Elliott, 88 Iowa, 216; Parks
o. Boston, liS Pick. 198; Hosking o.
Phillips, 8 Excb. 168. Any person is
to be dcem~d a tenant who, for the
time, has lawful possession of lands
subordinate to the right of another,
as, for example, one occupying under
a contrnct of purchase. Smith "·
Price, 42 Ill. 899 ; Ives "· Cress. 5
Penn. St. 118. Tbe owner, In leasing
lands, may reserve to himself tho use

of a building thereon, and then have
trespass qUilre ela~aum for an entry
and the carrying away ol his prop.
erty from that building. Jnrdan o.
Staples. 57 l\le. 352. If one is in pos.
session of lands merely at the will of
the owner, the latter is COil!itructivcly
in possession, and may sue trespas>
ers. Starr o. Jackson, 11 :Mn~s. 5111.
1 See Dobson t!. BLckmore, 9 Q. B.
991; Higgins e. Farnsworth, 48 Vt.
512; George o. Norcross, 82 N.H. 82.
• R11ndall o. Cleveland, 6 Conn. 3~;
Lane t!. Thompson, 43 N. H. 320. This
subject, however, will be considered
in another place.
• Luther "· Arnold, 8 Rich. 24; Bryant o. Sparrow, 62 M:c. 5!6.
• Taylor e. Vole, 3 T. R 292; Taunton o. Costar, 7 T. R 431.
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has been held in some cases, with much good reason, that he is

not warranted in employing force to expel the tenant,’ he may,

nevertheless, treat as trespassers all other persons who may then

be there without authority, or who may afterward make entry.’

His own peaceable entry gives him seizin, and the previous rela-

tion of landlord and tenant, and the possession of the tenant

under it is suﬁicient evidence of his title as against one who

shows no right in himself.’

. Tenants in Common. The possession by one tenant in com-

mon is in law the possession of both, and, therefore, if one makes

en try, he is presumed to do so in the right of both and to hold

in their right afterward.‘ But one tenant may disseize the other,

has been held in some cases, with much good renson, that he is
not warranted in employing force to expel the tenant,' he may,
nevertheless, treat as trespassers all other persons who may then
be there without authority, or who may afterward make entry.• •
His own peac('ablo entry gives l1im ~;eizin, and the previous relation of landlord and tenant, and the possession of the tenant
under it is sufficient e\·idence of his title as against one who
shows no right in himself.•

either hy a forcible expulsion or exclusion, or by an exclusive

receipt of the rents and proﬁts, accompanied by a denial of all

right in his co-tenant.‘ The ouster, however, must be by some

decisive, unequivocal act or conduct, for, as the tenant in pos-

session is rightfully there, the presumption must always be that

he holds only as he rightfully may—in the interest of both-

and not wrongfully to the other’s exclusion.‘ Wliere there is an

‘Newton 0. Harland, 1 M. & Gr.

644; Hillary 0. Gay, 6 C. & P. 284;

Moore 0. Boyd, 24 Me. M2; Dustin 0.
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Oowdry, 23 Vt. 631; Reeder 0. Purdy,

41 Ill. 279; Meader o. Stone, 7 Met.

147. There is a dispute on this point,

some courts holding that in acivil

suit against the landlord who has, by

force, put out a tenant at sntferance,

, Tenants in Common. The possession by one tenant in common is in law the possession of both, and, therefore, if one makes
entry, he is pre~nmed to do so in the right of both and to hold
in their right afterward.4 But one tenant may dis~eize the other,
either hy a forcible expulsion or exclusion, or by an exclusive
receipt of the reuts and profits, accompanied by a denial of' all
right in his co-tenant.• The ouster, however, must be by some
decisive, unequivocal act or condnct, for, as the tenant in possession is ri~htfn11y there, the presumption must always be that
he holds only as he rightfully may- in the interest of bothand not wrongfully to the other's exclusion.• Where there is an

his title is a. complete protection, and

that it is only when prosecuted crim-

inally for the force that he is pre-

cluded from showing title. See

Btcarns u. Sampson, 59 Me. 568; Ster-

ling 0. Warden, 51 N. H. 217, 2119;

Clark o.Kelihcr, 107 Muss. 406; Wood

0. Phillips, 43 N. Y. 152. But if the

tenant has gone away and locked up

the house, leaving some of his furni-

ture in it, this will not prevent the

landlord taking possession, and if

need be, he may break open doors for

the purpose. Turney o. Meymott, 1

Bing. 158; S. C. 7 Moore, 574.

' Hey 0. Moorhonse, 6 Bing. (N. O.)

52; Butcher o. Butcher, 7 B. & C. 400;

S. C. 1 M. & Ry. 220.

' Jayne o. Price, 5 Taunt. 326;

Dainlry o. Brocklehurst, 8 Exch. 207.

‘ Roberts 0. Morgan. 30 Vt. 819;

Dnbois 0. Campuu, 28 Mich. 304;

Vun Bibber v.Fruzicr,17 Md. 436; Mc-

Clung o. Ross, 5 Wlieut. 116; Bishop

0. Blair, 36 A1180.

' Bracket 0. Norcross, 1 Me. 89;

Abercrombie 0. Baldwin, 15 Ala. 863;

Larmnn 0. Huey's Heirs, 13 B. Mon.

436. Disseizin is not to be presumed

from the long continued possession

of one, even though it be continued

for twenty years. Northurp 0. Wright,

21 Wend. 221; Van Bibber 0. Frazier,

17 Md. 4 ‘6. Compare Purcell o. Wil-

sou, 4 Gratt. 16, and Dubois 0. Cam-

pau, 28 Mich. 804, and numerous

cast-s cited.

' Forward o. Dectz, 32 Penn. St. 69;

Bennett u. Bullock, 35 Penn. St. 86-1;

• Newton e. Harland, 1 M. & Gr.
M&; Hillary e. Gny, 6 C. & P. 284;
lloore e. Boyd, 24 lie. 242; Du:~tln e.
Oowdry, 28 Vt. 631; Reeder e. Purdy,
-41 Ill. 279; Meatier e. Stone, 'I lf.ct.
1-i'l. There is a dispute on this point,
aome courts holding that in a civil
.ult against the landlord who baa, by
force, put out a tenant at sufferance,
his title Ia a complete protection, and
that it Is only when prosecuted crhnlnally f'or the force that he is pre.
eluded from llhowlng title. Bee
Stearns 11. Bamp~n. :>9 Me. 668; Sterling e. Warden, 51 N. H. 217, 239;
Clark11.Kelihcr,107 :\h,;s.406; Wood
e. Phillips, 48 N.Y. 13:3. But if the
tenant baa gone away and locked up
the house, leaving some of his furniture in It, this will not prevent the
landlord taking possession, and if
need be, he may brenk open doors for
Ule purpose. Turney e. McymoU, 1
Bing. 168; B. C. 'I Moore, 574.

1 Hey e. :Moorbou~~e, 6 Bing. (N. 0.)
G9; Butcher e. Butcher, 'I B. & C. 400;
8. C. 1 :M. & Ry. 220.
1 Jayne e. Price, II TannL 326;
Dalntry e. Brockll'hurat, 8 Exch. 207.
• Roberta e. Morgan. 80 VL 819;
Dubois e. Campau, 28 Mich. 804;
VanBibber e. Frazier, 17 :M•l. 436; MeClung e. Ross,~ WheaL 116; Bishop
•· Blair, 86 Ala. 80.
1 Bracket e. Norcrou, 1 Me. 89;
Abercrombie e. Baldwin, 15 Ala. 868;
Larman e. Huey's llciN, lS B. Mon.
436. Disseizin is not to be presumed
from the long continued pos!!ession
of one, even though It be continued
for twenty years. ~ orthurp e. Wright,
2! W<'nd. 221; Van Billbt"r e. Frnzit•r,
17 :Md. 4 ·o. Compare Purcell e. Wil.
aon, 4 Gratt.. 16, and Dubnls 11. Campau, 28 Mich. 30f, and numerous
COSt'S cited.
1 Forward e. Deetz, ~ Penn. Bt. 69;
Bennett e. Bullock, 53 Penn. St. 86i;
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may be barred by a continuous adverse possession of his co-

tenant for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations.‘

\Vhcn the ousted tenant recovers, he may then maintain trespass

for the mesne proﬁts.’ For a distinct injury by one co-tenant to

the joint estate, during the joint possession, the other may have

the appropriate remedy against him, as where by negligence he

burns down a house, or by means of a dam on his several estate

ﬂoods the common property.‘ But in the use of the premises he

has large liberty of judgment and is only responsible for a clear

abuse.

Injuries to the possession of tenants in common are injuries

to all, and, therefore, all should join in suits for trespasses,

n lll>%tllC€S, etc.‘

Trespasses in Hunting. The very general acquiescence of

owners of lands in the pursuit by others of wild beasts and game

upon them establishes no law, and is to be looked upon rather as

Anders 0. Anders, 9 Ired. 214; Newell

11. Woodruif,80 Conn. 492; (folburn v.

Mason, 25 Me. 434; llanuon v. Han-

nah, 9 Grat. 146. Giving adeed of

actual ouster, the disseizee is put to his ejectment, and his right
may be barred by a continuous adverse possession of his cotenant for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations.•
·when the onsted tenant recovers, he may then maintain trespass
for the mesne profits.' For a distinct injnry by one co-tenant to
the joint estate, during the joint possessio~, the other may have
the appropriate remedy against him, as where by negligence he
horns down a house, or by means of a dam on his several estate
floods the common property.• Bnt in the use of the premises he
has large liberty of judgment and is only responsible tor a clear
abuse.
Injuries to the possession of tenants in common are injuries
to all, and, therefore, all should join in suits for trespasses,
nuh-am:es, e~. 4

the whole does not alone make out
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an ouster. Roberts v. Morgan, 80 Vt.

319; Wilson 0. Collishsw, 13 Penn.

St. 276.

' Russell's Heirs o. Mark’s Heirs, 3

Trespasses in Huntmg. The very general acquiescence of
owners of lands in the pursuit by others of wild beasts and game
upon them establish~s no law, and is to be looked upon rather as

Met. (Ky.) 87; Gill o. Fauntleroy’s

Heirs, S B. Mon. 1'77, 186; Dubois 0.

Campau, 28 Mich. 304. For ouster in

case of a partition wall, see Stedman

u. Smith, 8 El. & Bl. 1. Tenants in

common by agreement may appor-

tion the land between them, and in

that case each has the land he occu-

pies and may sue the other in tres-

pass for a disturbance of his posses-

sion. Kcay v. Goodwin, 16 Mass. 1.

’ Goodtitle o. Tombs, 3 Wils. 118;

Allen o. Carter, 8 Pick. 175; Critch-

ﬁeld 0. Humbert, 39 Penn. St. 427;

Tongue 0. Nutwell, 31 Md. B02. It

was held in McGill u. Ash, '7 Penn.

St. 397, and Erwin '0. Olmsted, 7 Cow.

229, that the ousted tenant in common

might at once maintain trespass

against his co-tenant, but the ﬁrst

case is overruled by Bennett v. Bul-

lock, B5 Penn. St. 364. And, see, Jones

1:. Chiles, 8 Dana, 163. If that which

is the subject of the tenancy is actu-

ally destroyed by one co-tenant, no

doubt the other may sue in trespass

Wilkinson 0. Haygarlh, 12 Q. B. 845;

Maddox v. Goddard, 15 Me. 218; Du-

bois 0. Beaver, 25 N. Y. 128.

‘ Chesley 0. Thompson, 3 N. H. 9;

Blanchard 1:. Boher, 8 110.253; Od.

iornc o. Lyford, 9 N. H. 502; Jones v.

Vl'en.tl1e1‘bG6,4 Sn-ob. 50. See Hutchin-

son e. Chase, 39 Me. 508; Guyther 0.

Pettijohn, 6 lred. 388; McLellan o.

Jenncss, 43 Vt. 183.

‘Phillips o. Sherman, 61 Me. 548;

Parke v. Kilhnm, S Cal. 77; Merrill u.

Berkshire, 11 Pick. ‘J69; Austin 0.

Hall, 13 Johns. 286. In Vermont, it

seems one may recover in trespass for

all. Hibbard v. Foster, 24 Vt. 542;

Bigelow 2:. Rising, 42 Vt. 678. See

Anders e. Anders, 9 Ired. 214; Newell
e. Woodruff,80 Conn. 492; Colburn"·
.Mason, 2IS He. 484; Hannon"· Hannah, 9 Grat. 146. Giving a deed of
~he whole does not alone make out
an ouster. Roberts "· Morgan, 80 Vl
319; Wilson e. Collisbaw, 13 Penn.
Sl276.
• Russell's Heirs e. Hark's Heirs, 8
Met. (Ky.) 8'7; Gill e. Fauntleroy's
Heirs, S B. Moo. 1'77, 186; Dubois e.
Campau, 28 Mich. 804. For ous~r in
caae of a partition wall, see Stedman
"· Smith, 8 El. & Bl. 1. Tenants in
common by agreement may apportion the land between them, and In
that case ench h11s ~be land be occupies and may sue the other in tree.
p888 for a disturbance of his posses.
sion. Keay "·Goodwin, 16 M888. 1.
1 Goodtitle e. Tombs, 8 Wils. 118;
Allen t. Carter, 8 Pick. 175; Critchfield "· Humbert, 89 Penn. St. 427;
Tongue e. Nutwell, 81 Md. 802. It
was held in llcGill e. Ash, 7 Penn.
St. 897, and Erwin"· Olmsted, 7 Cow.
229, that the ousted tenant in common

might at once maintain trespass
againat his co-tenant, but the first
case is overruled by Bcnnt>tt "· Bullock, 86 Penn. St. 864. And, see, Jones
e. Chiles, 8 Dana, 163. If that which
is the subject of the tenancy is acta.
ally destroyed by one co-tenant, no
doubt the other may sue in trt'Spus
Wilkinson t. Hay garth, 12 Q. B. 845;
lladdox "· Goddard, 15 Me. 218; Du.
bois 11. Beaver, 23 N. Y. 128.
• Che~ley "·Thompson, 8 N.H. 9;
Blanchard e. Boller, 8 lie. 2.'i3; Odiorne "· Lyford, 9 N. H. 502; Jones e.
Wcatherbee,4 Strob.50. See Hutchinson e. Chase, 89 l\Ie. 508; Guyther •·
Pettijohn, 6 Ired. 388; McLellan •·
Jenness, 43 Vt. 183.
• Phillips e. Sherman, 61 Me. 548;
Parke "· Kilham, S Cal. 77; Merrill "·
Berkshire, 11 Pick. 26!l; Austin e.
Hall, 18 Johns. 286. In Vermont, It
seems one may recover in trespass for
all. Hibbard "· Foster, 24 Vt.. Ma;
Bigelow "· Rising, 42 Vt. 678. See
Allen"· Gibson, 4 Rand. 468; WooleT
t. Campbell, 87 N. J. 163.
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make use of their lands for this purpose. And whenever one

goes upon the premises of another with dogs, and the dogs worry

the domestic animals of the land owner, or do him other damage,

the trespasser is responsible without evidence of his knowledge

of vicious propensities in his dogs, for it is his own trespass, and

the mischief done by the dogs is only matter of aggravation.‘

Trespasses in Fishing. The right to take ﬁsh in the fresh-

water streams of the country belongs to the owners of the soil

under them, to the exclusion of the public.’ As, however, the

exercise of the right by one riparian proprietor might unduly

encroach upon the rights of others, the ease is one that properly

a wah·er of a right to complain of a trespass than as a license to
make use of their lands for this purpose. And whenever one
goes upon the premises of another with dog~!-, and the dogs worry
the domestic animals of the land owner, or do him other damage,
the trespas~er is responsible without evidence of his knowledge
<>f vicious propensities in his dogs, for it is his own tre~pass, and
the mischief done by the dogs is only matter of aggrav.~tion.'

calls for regulating legislation; and the authority to regulate has

been very freely exercised, not only by forbidding the employ-

ment of seines and other means of taking ﬁsh otherwise than

singly in certain waters, but also by prohibiting their‘ being taken

at all at certain seasons, and requiring a free passage to be kept

open for the passage of ﬁsh in all streams in which rights ot

ﬁshery are important.’ In some States the power of regulation

is conferred, either generally or in particular instances, upon the

‘ Bcckwith v. Shot-dike, 4 Burr.

2092; Van Leuven v. Lyke, 1 N. Y.
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515. One has no legal right, when he

starts game, to follow it upon another

man’s land. Deane v. Clayton, 7

Taunt. 489. When parties go together

hunting. and commit a trespass in so

doing, each is responsible for the

whole damage. Hume v. Oldacre, 1

Stark. 351.

Trespasses in Fishing. The right to take fish in the freshwater streams of the country belongs to the owners of the soil
under them, to the exclusion of the public.' As, however, the
exercise of the right by one riparian proprietor might unduly
encroach upon the rights of others, the case is one that properly
calls for regulating le~islation; and the authority to regulate has
been very freely exercised, not only by forbidding the employment of seines and other means of tnkin~ fish otherwise than
singly in certain waters, but also by prohibiting their· being taken
at all at certain scagons, and requiring a free passage to be kept
open tor the passage of fish in all streams in which rights ot
fishery are important.• In some States the power of regulation
is conferred, either generally or in particular instances, upon the

" Browne 0. Kennedy, 5 H. & J. 195;

Waters o. Lilly,4 Pick. 145; Cottrill

o. Myrick, 12 Me. 222; Adamss. Pease,

2 Conn. 481; People 0. Platt, 17 Johns.

195; Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns.

90; Trustees, etc., v. Strong, 60 N. Y.

56; Ingram 0. Thrcadgill, 8 Dev. 59;

Williams 0. Buchanan, 1 Ired. 535;

Bee?-mun e. Kreamer, 43 Ill. 447;

Cobb o. Davenport. 32 N. J. 869; Same

0. Same,38 N. J. 233. The right is,

of course, not in.~up:\l'ttbl(' from own-

ership,but may be acquired distinct

therefrom by grant of the owner, or

by prescription. Cobb o. Davenport,

82 N. J. 36!); 34 N. J.223. But prime

farfe ow net s_hip in the bed of s stream

determines the right to ﬂsh in it.

Mayor, etc. 0. Graham, L. R. 4 Exch.

361; Trustees, etc. o. Strong, 60 N.

Y. 56.

‘Randolph 0. Braintree, 4 Mass.

315; Burnham 0. Webster, 5 Mass.

266; Nickerson 0. Bruckett, 10 Mass.

212; Commonwealth v. Chapin, 5

Pick. 199; Vinton o. Welsh, 9 Pick.

87; Commonwealth 1:. 'l‘it1"any, 119

Mass. 300; Lunt e. Holland, 14 Mass-.

149; Peables 0. Hnnnaford, 18 Me. 106;

State v. Skolﬂeld, 63 Me. 266; Budd o.

Sip, 13 N. J. 348; Haney 0. Compton,

36 N.J. 507; Hart 0. Hill, 1 Whart.

124; People o. Reed, 47 Barb. 285;

State o. Hockett. 29 Ind. 302; State o.

Boone, 30 Ind. 225; Stuttsmun 0. State,

57 Ind. 119.

' Beckwith "· Bhordike, 4 Barr.
2092; Van Leuven "· Lyke, 1 N.Y.
l;15. One has no legal right, when ho
starts game, to follow it upon another
man's land. Deane "· Clayton, 7
Taunt. 489. When parties go together
hunting, and commit a tre!lpass in so
doing, each is responl>ible for the
whole damage. Hume "· Oldacre, 1
Stark. 351.
1 Browne tJ. Kennedy,IS H. & J. 195;
Waters "·Lilly, 4 Pick. 14.5; Cottrill
"· llyrick, 12 Me. 222; Adnro!ltJ. Pease,
~Conn. 481; People tJ. Platt, 17 .Johns.
195; Hooker 11. Cummings, 20 Johns.
90; Tru!ltee!l, etc., 11. Strong, 60 N.Y.
l;6; Ingram "· Threadgill, 8 DtJv. 59;
Williams 11. Bucbnoan, 1 Ired. 535;
lkckman tt. Kre~&mer, 43 Ill. 447;
Cobb11. Davenport. a2N .•T.869; Same
t~. Same, 38 N. ,J. 2.!J. The right Is,
of course, not iu .• t!parabl<· from own.
~r:.hip, but may be acquired distinct

therefrom by grant of the owner, or
by prescription. Cobb"· Davenport,
82 N.J. 3o!l; 34 N. J.223. But prima
fac-ie owne1 s.hip in the bed of a stream
determines the right to fish in il
Mayor, etc. tJ. Graham, L. R. 4 Exch.
361; Trustees, etc. tJ. Strong, 60 N.
Y. 56.
1 Randolph o. Braintree, 4 Mass.
815; Burnham "· Webster, IS }lass.
2013; Nickerson tJ. Bruckett, 10 Maas.
212; Commonwealth 11. Chapin, 5
Pick. 199; Yintoo tJ. Welsh, 9 Picl{.
87; Commonwealth "· Titftmy, 1 llJ
Mass. 800; Luot "· Holland, 14 llnss.
149; Peables11. Hannaford, 18 Me. 106;
State "· Skoltlelu, 6;3 Me. 2GG; Budd"·
Sip, 13 N.J. 848; Haney"· Compton,
8GN.J.507; Hartt~. 1Iill,1 Whart.
121; People 11. Reed, 47 Barb. 235;
State tJ. Hockett 29 Ind. 302; State •·
Boone, 30 Ind. 225; Stuttaman o. State_
57 Ind. 119.
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county or township authorities,‘ and in Massachusetts and Maine

the towns have been allowed to exercise this power for the com-

mon beneﬁt of the people of the towns in their aggregate capacity,

and to sell or lease rights of ﬁshery in waters where, at the com-

mon law, the rights of the owners of the banks would have been

exclusive.’ Such regulations must-, of course, take notice of and

respect all other rights of the riparian owner, including his right

to the exclusive possession of his land not covered with water;

and if he has a mill-dam he cannot, under pretence of regulation,

be compelled to remove it without compensation made therei'or;'

though unquestionably, as regards any future constructions, it

would be competent to require that they be made, leaving free

passage for ﬁsh, according to established regulations.

The rule regarding i'resh-water streams applies to the small

lakes or ponds of the country.‘ That it applies to the larger

lakes is more than doubtful. In one well-considered case it has

been declared that the right of ﬁshery in Lake Winnipiseogee is

a public and general right, and that incident to this was the right

to protect the passage of the ﬁsh up and down the rivers which

form its outlets to the sea. “If it be admitted,” say the court,

“that the right of ﬁshing in the Winnipisaogee River belongs

exclusively to the riparian proprietors, and that the wrong done
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to one of these riparian proprietors by the act of another in

obstructing the passage of ﬁsh. is not of the nature which the

law will redress by a criminal prosecution, it does not follow that

the obstructions now complained of are not criminal. The ripa-

rian proprietors are not the only persons injured. The right of

ﬁshing in the lake is not limited to the proprietors of the shores,

but is common to all citizens of the State, just as much as the

' Bee Vinton 0. VVvlsh, 9 Pick. 87;

Cottrill o. Myrick, 12 Me. 222.

' Nickerson v. Braekett, 10 Mass.

212; Randolph 0. Braintree, 4 Mass.

315; Oottrill o. Myrick,12 Me. 222;

Peables 0. Hannaford, 18 Me. 106.

The explanation is given in 12 Me.

222, 229, that the common law on the

subject of common right in such ﬁsh-

cries was not adopted in the Massa,

chusctts colonies, being unsuited to

their circumstances. Nevertheless it

county or township authorities,' and in Massachusetts and Maine
the towns have been allowed to exercise this power for the common benefit of the people of the towns in their aggregate capacity,
and to sell or lease rights of fishery in waters whore, at the common law, the rights of the owners of the banks would have been
exclusive.' Such regulations must, of course, take notice of and
respect all other rights of the riparian owner, including his right
to the exclusi•e possession of his land not covered with watert
and if he has a mill-dam he cannot, under pretence of regulation,
be compelled to remove it without compensation made therefor;'
though unquestionably, as regards any future constructions, it
would be competent to require that they be made, leaving free
passage for fish, according to established regulations.
The rule regarding fresh-water streams applies to the small
lakes or ponds of the country.• That it applies to the larger
lakes is more than doubtfut In one well-considered case it ha&
been declared that the right of fishery in Lake Winnipiseogee is
a public and general right, and that incident to this was the right
to protect the passage of the fish up and down the rivers which
form its outlets to the sea. "If it be admitted," say the court,.
" that the right of fishing in the WinnipisdOgee River belongs
exclusively to the riparian proprietors, and that the wrong done
to one of these riparian proprietors by the act of another in
obstructing the passage of fish, is not of the nature which the
law will redress b,v a criminal prosecution, it does not follow that
the obstruct.ions now complained of are not criminal. The riparian proprietors are not the only persons injured. The right of
fishing in the lake is not limited to the proprietors of the shorest
but is common to all citizens of the State, just as much as the

prevails in the absence of any legisla-

tion on the subject. See Waters 0.

Lilley, 4 Pick. 145.

' State o. Glen, '7 Jones, (N. C.) 321.

In the New England States the right

of eminent domain is employed for

the improvement of ﬁsheries. See

Bristol 0. Water Co., 42 Conn. 403.

‘ Cobb 0. Davenport, 32 N. J. 369;

S. C. 33 N. J. 22:5. This case exam-

lnes the general subject very fully and

carefully.

• See Vinton e. W<'l~h, 9 Pick. 87;
Cottrill e. Myrick, 12 Me. 222.
' Nickerson e. Brackett, 10 Mass.
212; Randolph e. Braintree, 4 Mass.
315; Cottrill e. Myrick, 12 Me. 222;
Peables e. Hannaford, 18 Me. 106.
The explanation is given in 12 Me.
222, 229, that the common law on the
subject of common right in such fish.
cries was not adopted in the Massa..
chusetts colonies, being unsuited to
their circumstances. Neverthelesa it

prevails In the absence of any legislation on the subject. Bee Waters •·
Lilley, 4: Pick. 146.
• State"· Glen, 7 Jones, (N. C.) 821.
In the New England States the righ'
of eminent domuin is employed for
the improvement of fisheries. See
Bristol e. Water Co., 42 Conn. 408.
'Cobb e. Davenport, 32 N.J. 869;
8. C. 8S N.J. 223. This case examInes the general subject very fully and
carefully.
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ﬁshery in the tide-waters of the Piscataqua.” ' It was therefore

331

held that the maintenance of a dam without ﬁshways was a com-

mon-law nuisance, punishable by indictment. This doctrine

seems to be reasonable, but there may be some practicable dith-

culties in determining what bodies of water do and what do not

come within it.‘

In tide-waters the right to take ﬁsh belongs to the public, and

presumptively is common to all.‘ In Massachusetts the towns

have been allowed to appropriate the right to take ﬁsh within

their limits;‘ and private grants may be made by the State itself

to individuals, and individuals may also obtain exclusive rights

by prescription.’ The right of individuals to plant oyster-beds,

and to be protected in the enjoyment of them, has been very

generally recognized.‘ But the right of ﬁshery in tide-waters is

always subordinate to the public right of regulation and improve-

ment for the beneﬁt of navigation, and therefore a structure in

front of one’s premises bordering on tide-water, erected by State

authority for the beneﬁt of navigation, violates no right of the

owner of the shore so long as his access to the water for the pur-

poses of a highway is not obstructed.’ Indeed, in ail waters

navigable in fact, the right of navigation is the paramount right,‘

but those engaged in navigation must respect rights of ﬁshery,
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and they will be liable for any negligent injuries which their

‘ Slrrn, J ., in State 0. Franklin

Falls Co., 49 N. H. 240; S. C. 6 Am.

Rep. 513.

’ Bee West Roxbury 0. Stoddard, 7

Allen, 158.

' Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East. 603;

Bagott 0. Orr, 2 B. & P. 472; Martin

0. Weddell, 16 Pet. 367; Lay v. King,

6 Day, 72; Parker 1:. Cutler Mill Dam

Co., 20 Me. 353; Moulton o. Libbey,

:fishery in the tide-waterB of the Piscataqna."' It was therefore
held that the maintenance of a dam without fishways was a common-law nuisance, punishable by indictment. This doctrine
seems to be reasonable, but there may be some practicable difficulties in determining what bodies of water do and what do not
come within it.'
In tide-waters the rip:ht to take fish belongs to the public, and
presumptively is common to all.' In Massachusetts the towns
have been allowed to appropriate the right to take fish within
their limits;• and private g1·ants may be made by the State itself
to individuals, and individuals may also obtain exclusive rights
by prescription.• The right of individuals to plant oyster-beds,
and to be protected in the enjoyment of them, has been very
generally recognized.' But the right of fishery in tide.waters is
always subordinate to the public right of regulation and improvement for the benefit of navigation, and therefore a structure in
· front of one's premises bordering on tide-water, erected by State
authority for the benefit of navigation, violates no right of the
owner of the shore so long as his access to the water for the purposes of a highway is not obstructed.' Indeed, in all waters
navigable in fact, the right of navigation is the paramount right,'
but those engaged in navigation must respect rights of fishery,
and they will be liable for any negligent injuries which their

B7 Me. 472; Preblc o. Brown, 47 Me.

284; Cooledge 1:. Williams, 4 Mass.

140; Weston 0. Sampson, 8 Cush. 347;

Trustees, etc., 0. Strong, 60 N. Y. 56;

Proctor 0. Wells, 103 Mass. 216.

‘ Cooleilge o. Williums,4 Mass. 140.

' Chalker 0. Dickinson. 1 Conn.

B82; Gould o. James, 6 Cow. 369;

Bum o. Sutton, 2 R. I. 434; State v.

lledbury, 8 R. 1.138; Paul o. Hazle-

ton, 37 N. J. 106; Bennett 0. Boggs,

Baltlw. G0. See Easlham o. Anderson,

119 Mass. 526; Trustees, etc., 0. Strong,

60 N. Y. 56.

' Fleet v. Hcgeman, 14 Wend. 42;

Decker o. Fisher, 4 Barb. 592;

Lowndes 0. Dickerson, 34 Barb. 586;

Power v. Tazewells, 25 Gratl. 756;

State 0. Taylor, 27 N. J. 117; Haney

0. Compton, 36 N. J. 507. Compare

Brinckerhoff 0. Starkins, 11 Barb. 218.

There are statutes in some States for

the protection of ﬁshing rights ac-

quired by improvement. Sec above

cases. Also, Common wealth 0. Weath-

erhend, 110 Mass. 175.

" Tinicum Fishing Co. 0. Carter, 61

Penn. St. 21.

' Moulton 0. Libbey, 37 Me. 472.

8»ITB, J.. in State e. Franklin
Palla Co., 49 N.H. 240; S. 0. I Am.
Rep. 618.
1 See West Roxbury •· Stoddard. 'l
.Alleo, ltJS.
1 Crosby e. Wadsworth,6 East 80S;
Bagott e. Orr, 2 B. & P. 472; Martin
•· Waddell, 16 Pet. 867; Lay"· King,
G Day, 72; Parker "·Cutler llill Dam
Co., 20 Me. M3; Moulton e. Libbey,
87lle. 472; Preble e. Bruwn, 47 He.
184; Cooltdge •· Williams, 4 Mass.
140; Weston"· Sampson, 8 Cusb.847;
Trustees, etc.,"· Strong, 60 N.Y. G6;
Proctor o. Wells, 108 Mllss. 216.
• Cool edge "·Williams, 4 Muss. 140.
• Chalker •· Dickinson, 1 Conn.
8 ; Gould •· James, 6 Cow. 869;
Stat.e e. Sutton, 2 R I. 434; State e.
Kedbury, 8 R. 1.188; Paul e. Hazle1

ton, 87 N. J. 106; Bennett e. Boggs.
Balrlw. 60. See Eastham"· Andcr&On,
t 19 MaY.Ii26; Truatces, etc., •· Strong,
60 N.Y. 56.
1 Fleet o. Hegeman, 14 Wend. 42;
Decker e. Fisher, 4 Barb. ISH;
Lowndes "· Dickerson, 84 Barb. 586;
Power "· Tazcwells, 2S Gratt. 7136;
State"· Taylor, 27 N. J . 117; Haney
tt, Compton, 86 N. J. 507. Campare
Brinckerboff "·Stark ins, 11 Barb. 248.
There are statutes in eome States for
the protection or fishing right<J acquired by improvement. See above
eases. Also, Commonwealth e. Wcatl.t.
erbead, 110 Mass. 171S.
' Tinicum Fishing Co. •· Carter, 61
Penn. Sl21.
1 Moulton e. Libbey, 87 He. 472.

O5

332

CD

TH~

LAW 01!' TORTS.

LO

THE LAW OF TORTS-

vessels may cause to seines, oyster-beds, etc.‘ In North Carolina,

if fresh-water streams are navigable in fact, the right to take ﬁsh

therein is held to be in the public and not in the owners of the

banks.’ \Vhether the taking of ﬁsh in private waters, where the

public have been accustomed to take them, should be regarded as

a trespass is not clear. As the mere entry upon the water can

cause no damage, there is not the same reason for treating it as

a trespass which exists in the case of an entry upon lands, and

if the owner himself does not make use of the ﬁshery for pur-

poses of proﬁt, and is cognizant of the acts of others within it,

it would seem that a license to enter might well be implied until

in some manner the objection of the owner is manifested.

Trespass by.means of Inanimate Objects. It is a trespass to

cast inanimate objects upon the laud of another, or to throw

water upon it. or to cut trees so that they fall upon it, and this

whether the result was intended or not. It has accordingly been

vef'sels may cnnse to seines, oyster-beds, etc.' In N o1·th C4rolina,
if fresh-water streams are navigable in fact, the right to take fish
therein is held to be in the public and not in the owners of the
bauks.' 'Vhethcr the taking of fish in private waters, where the
public ha\·e been accustomed to take them, should be regarded as
a trespass is not clear. As the mere entry upon the water can
cause no damage, there is not the same reason for treating it as
a trespass which exists in the case of an entry upon lands, and
if the owner himself does not make use of the fishery for purposes of profit, and is cvgnizant of the acts of others within it,
it would seem that a license to enter might well be implied until
in some manner the objection of the owner is manifested.

held that, if where one is blasting rock, the fragments are thrown

upon the land of another, this is an actionable trespass, and it is

no defense that the party was guilty of no negligence.’ So, if
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one, in cutting down trees, causes one to fall, though without

meaning todo so, on the land of his neighbor.‘ But ifa deposit of

stones or other material on one man’s land is carried by a violent

storm upon the land of another, this is no trespass, and is to be

regarded as an accident merely.‘

Waste. Waste is an injury done or suffered by the owner of

the present estate which tends to destroy or lessen the value ot

the inheritance. This is an injury to any person having an

interest in the reversion, and it may be an injury to any person

having a lien on the land. Waste differs from trespass in its

being committed or suﬁ'ered by the person actually or construct-

ively in possession of the land, while trespass is an injury to the

possession itself.

' Marshall 1:. Steam Nav. Co., 8 B. ' Hay 0. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159;

Trespass by .means of Inanimate Objects. It is a trespass to
cast inanimate objects upon the land of another, or to throw
water upon it, or to cut trees so that they fall upon it, and this
whether the result was intended or not. It has accordingly
held that, if where one is blasting rock, the fragments are thrown
upon the land of another, this is an actionable trespass, and it is
no defense that the party was guilty of no negligence.~ So, if
one, in cutting down trees, causes one to fall, though without
meaning to do so, on the land of his neighbor.• But if a deposit of
stones or other material on one man's land is carried by a violent
storm upon the land of another, this is no trespass, and is to be
regarded as an accident merely.•

been

& S. 732; Cobb 0. Bennett, '75 Penn. 'l‘rvmain 0. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 163;

St. 326. St. Peter 9. Denison, 58 N. Y. 416.

' Wilson v. Forbes. 2 Dev. B0; Col- ‘ Newsmn v. Anderson, 2 Ired. 42.

lins v. Benhury, 3 Ired. 277; S. C. 5 'Snook 0. Brantford, 14 Up. Can.

Ired. 118; State v. Glen, '7 Jones, (N. Q. B. 255.

0.):-121.

_ __ — ﬁr — w - "~<-q-qd

Waste. Waste is an injury done or suffered by the owner of
the present estate which tends to destroy or lessen the value ot
the inheritance. This is an injury to any person having an
interest in the reversion, and it may be an injury to any person
having a lien on the land. Waste differs from trespass in its
being committed or suffered by the person actually or constructively in post:e~'>t;ion of the land, while trespa8s is an injury to the
possession itself.
• Marshall "'· Btenm Nav. Co., 8 B.
& S. 732; Cobb "· Bennett, 75 Penn.
St. 326.

Wilson "'· Forbes, 2 Dev. 80; Collins "· Bcnbury, 8 Ired. 277; B. C. IS
Ired. 118 ; State "· Glen, 7 Jones, (N.
1

C.) 821.

• Hay e. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159;
Tremain "· Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 168;
St. Peter"· Denison, 58 N. Y. 416.
4 Newsom "· Anderson, 2 Ired. 42.
• Snook "· Brantfor!l, 14 Up. Cao.
Q. B. 255.
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Waste is either voluntary or permissive. The ﬁrst consists of

888

some positively wrongful act which injures the inheritance; the

other consists in the neglect of some duty from which a like

injury follows. There is no absolute rule as to what shall con-

stitute waste under all circumstances, because many things are

injurious at some times and in some places which might be posi-

tively beneﬁcial in others. A striking illustration is afforded in

the case of the cutting of timber. The tenant of lands, whether

for lifeor for any lesser estate, is entitled to take wood for ordi-

nary uses thereon; for fuel, and for the repairs of buildings,

fences and agricultural implements;' and in England, and

some parts of this country, he would be limited strictly to what

was reasonable for these purposes, and would be liable for waste

if he exceeded what was reasonable.’ So he could only cut for

use on the premises, and would not be at liberty even to exchange

that which was growing upon the estate, but was unfit for his

purposes, for suitable wood procured elsewhere.’ But any such

strictness would be manifestly unsuited to the condition of things

in other parts of this country, because it could be of no service

to the inheritance. In the newer States, where timber is abun-

dant, it might, indeed, be beneﬁcial to the inheritance, rather

than wasteful, to permit the timber to be removed; and there-
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fore what is waste elsewhere might, in these sections of the

country, be permissible. It has been held in Ohio that a widow

endowed of wild lands might not only take the common law

estovers, but she might also cut wood upon the premises and sell

the same to pay the taxes upon the estate and the expenses of

overseeing the property and protecting it against trespasses and

other injury.‘ But she may, no doubt, go further than this,

where her assignment of dower is wholly or mainly of wild lands,

and clear 0ﬁ' a reasonable proportion of them for the purposes

of cultivation.‘ That would be a reasonable use of the land, and

not waste. So it might be a reasonable use of the premises to

' Bl. Com. 35; 1 Washb. Real Prop. son 0. York, 14 Me. 221; Phillips 0.

4111 ed. 128. Allen, 7 Allen, 115.

' Webster 0. Webster, 83 N. H. 18. 4 Crockett o. Crockett, 2 Ohio, (IN.

Bee Snrlcs e. Snrlcs, 3 Sandf. Ch. s.) 180.

601. ‘Perkins o. (.'oxe, 2 Hayw. 339;

* White 0. Cutler, 17 Pick. 248; Liv- Owen v. Hyde, 6 Ycrg. 334; Hastings

ingston 0. Reynolds. 2 Hill, 157; El- e. Cruncklclon,3Ycates, 261; Allen 0.

liott 0. Smith, 2 N. H. 430; Richard- McCoy, 8 Ohio, 418; Shine 0. Wil.

Wa8tc is either voluntary or permissive.

The first consists of

BOrne positively wrongful act which injures the inheritance; the

other consists in the neglect of some duty from which a like
injury follows. There is no absolute rule as to what shall constitute waste under all circumstances, because many things are
injurious at some times and in some places which might be positively beneficial in others. A striking illustration is afforded in
the ca~e of the cutting of timber. The tenant of lands, whether
for life· or for any lesser estate, is entitled to take wood for ordinary n.ses thereon; for fuel, and for the repairs of buildings,
fences and agricultural implements; 1 and in England, and
80me parts of this country, he would be limited strictly to what
was reasonable for these purposes, and would be liable for w.aste
if he exceeded what was reasonable.' So he could only cut for
use on the premises, and would not be at liberty e\·en to exchange
that which was growing upon the estate, but was unfit tor his
purposes, for suitable wood procured elsewhere." Bnt any such
strictness would be manifestly unsuited to the condition of things
in other parts of this country, because it could be of no service
to the inheritance. In the newer States, where timber is abundant, it might, indeed, be beneficial to the inheritance, rather
than wasteful, to permit the timber to be remo\·ed; and therefore what is waste elsewhere might, in these sections of the
country, be permissible. It has been held in Ohio that a widow
endowed of wild lands might not only take the common law
estovers, but she might also cut wood upon the premises and sell
the same to pay the ta.xcs upon the estate and the expenses of
overseeing the property and protecting it against trespasses and
other injury.• But she may, no doubt, go further than this,
where her assignment of dower is wholly or mainly of wild lands,
and clear off a reasonable proportion of them for the pnrpo~es
of cultivation.• That would be a reasonable use of the land, and
not waste. So it might be a reasonable use of the premises to
1

Bl. Com. 35; 1 Washb.Real Prop.

41h ed. 128.

• Wchster e. Webster, 88 N. ll. 18.

son e. York, 14 Me. 221; Phillips e.
Allen, 7 Allen, 115.
a Crockett e. Crockett, 2 Ohio, (K.

Bee Surles e. Sarlt>S, 8 Sandf. Ch.

B.) 180.

001.
• White e. Cutler, 17 Pick. 248; Livingston e. Reynolds. 2 Hill, 157; Elliot& t. Smith, 2 N.H. 430; Richard.

1 Parkins e. Coxe, 2 Hayw. 839;
Owen e. Hyde, 6 Yerg. 334; HasUnga
e. Cruncklcton, 3 Y cates, 261; .Allen e.
.McCoy, 8 Ohio, 418; Shine e. Wil-
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cut and sell hoop poles from them, if that had been the customary

use before the tenant’s estate began.‘

For the tenant to do upon leasehold premises that for which

the premises are leased can never be waste, provided it is done in

a proper manner. But, except where they are leased for a special

purpose. and always when the estate comes into existence by

operation of law, as in case of dower, the question of waste must

be governed largely by the previous use. This is particularly

true as regards buildings. It would be waste to turn a dwelling

into a shop or a stable; or, on the other hand, to makeover a

shop or a stable into a dwelling; the right of the tenant is to use

the buildings as they are, and not to force upon the reversioner

something new or different in the place of them.‘ Slight changes

may lawfully be made, provided they do not injure the inherit-

ance, but preserve the estate substantially the same.’ So with

respect to the land itself; it would be waste to cut up farming

lauds with excavations in search for minerals or to sell gravel or

clay; though if such had been the previous use of the premises

it would be different.‘ In England, any essential change in the

methods of cultivating farming lands might, perhaps, be waste;

as by changing arable land into meadow, and the like; but this

can now scarcely be a general rule in that country, and is not
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recognized in this

To sell manure made on the premises to be removed from it is

waste in the case of agricultural lands, because it is implied in

leasing such lands that the manure made is to be used thereon.‘

Permissive waste consists in suffering that to take place to the

cox, 1 Dev. & Bat Eq. 631. For the

Massachusetts rule see Conner 0.

Shepherd, 15 Mass. 164; White v. Cut-

ler, 17 Pick. 248.

‘ Clemence 1:. Steere, 1 R. I. 2'72.

’ Huntley v. Russell, 13 Q. B. 572.

“ See Winship o. Pitts, 3 Paige. 259.

The general principle governing

waste is, that the tenant shall not be

permitted to do any act of permanent

injury to the inheritance, except to

take his reasonable estovers. Web-

ster o. Webster, 33 N. II. 18, citing
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•
cut and sell hoop poles from them, if that had been the customary
use before the tenant's estA.te began. 1
For the te11ant to do upon leasehold premises that for which
the premises ure leased can never be waste, provided it is done in
a proper manner. But, except where they are leased for a special
purpose! and always when the estate comes into existence by
operation of law, as in case of dower, the question of waste must
be governed largely by the previous use. This is partieula.rly
true as regat·ds buildings. It would be wast.e to tum a dwelling
into a shop or a stable; or, on the other hand, to make.over a
shop or a stable into a dwelling; the right of the tenant is to use
the buildings as they are, and not to force upon the reversioner
something new or different in the place of them.' Slight changes
may lawfully be made, provided they do not injur.e the inhcritanee, hut preserve the estate substantially the same.• So with
respect to the land itself; it would bo waste to cut up farming
lands with excavations in search for minerals or to sell gravel or
clay; though if such had been the previous use of the premises
it wonld be different.• lu England, any essential change in the
methods of cultivating farming lands might, perhaps, be waste;
as by changing arable land into meadow, and the like; but this
can now scarcely he a general rule in that country, and is not
recognized in this
To sell manure made on the premises to be removed from it is
waste in the case of agricultural lands, because it is implied in
leasing such lands that the manure made is to be used thereon.'
Permissive waste consists in suffering that to take place to the

Chase 0. Haseltine, '1 N. H. 171; Pyn-

chon u. Btearns, 11 Met. 304. But de-

cayed and worthless buildings may

be taken down. Clemence 0. Stcere,

1 R I. 272; Beers 0. St. John, 16

Conn. 322.

4 Tenant for life of salt works may

open new wells. Findlay e. Smith,

6 Munt‘. 134, relying upon Clavering

0. Clavering, 2 P. Wins. 388.

‘See Washb. Real Prop. 4th ed.

145.

' Perry v. Carr, 44 N. H. 118; Hill

0. Dc Rochemont, 48 N. H. 87; Las

sell 0. Reed, 6 Me. 222; Lewis 0.

Jones, 17 Penn. St. 262; Daniels 0.

Pond, 21 Pick. 867.

cox, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 631. For the
Massachusetts rule see Conner e.
Shepherd, 15 Mass. 164; White'· Cut.
ler, 17 Pick. 248.
1 Clemence "· Steere, 1 R I. 272.
• Huntley e. Russell, 18 Q. B. 579.
1 Bee Winship e. Pitts, 8 Paige, 259.
The general principle governing
waste is, that the tenant shall not be
permitted to do any act of permanent
injury to the inheritance, except to
take his reasonable estovers. Webster e. Webster, 33 N. H. 18, citing
Chase e. Haseltine, 7 N. H. 171; Pynchon e. Stearns, 11 Met. 304. But de-

cayed and worthless buildings may
be taken down. Clemence e. Steere,
1 R I. 272; Beers e. St. John, 16
Conn. 3'.32.
• Tenant for life of salt works may
open new wells. Findlay e. Smith,
6 Munf. 134, relying upon Clavering
e. Clavering, 2 P. Wms. 888.
• Bee Washb. Real Prop. 4th ed.
145.

' Perry e. Carr, 44 N. H. 118; Hill
e. De Rochemont, 48 N. H. 87; L~
sell e. Reed, 6 Me. 222; Lewis •·
Jones, 17 Penn. St.. 262; Daniels •·
Fond, 21 Pick. 867.
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injury of the inheritance, which ordinary care would prevent.
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In respect to buildings, a tenant, unless he has covenanted to

335

make repairs, is under no obligation to do more than to exercise

reasonable diligence for their preservation; but a duty to that

extent is incident to the relation. A like duty arises to protect

the remainder of the estate against negligent waste and decay,

and this extends to protection against the acts of trespassers.‘ A

tenant is liable for waste if a building is injured or destroyed by

his negligence; but not for accidental ﬁres occurring without his

fault, unless upon covenants.’

While for waste actually committed, an action on the case for

the recovery of damages is the common remedy, a more effectual

protection for the interest of the reversioner is the preventive

remedy by injunction, when the waste is merely begun or

threatened. Where one has only a lien on the premises, he is

entitled to the like preventive remedy, but it is not so clear what

remedy he would have by action. In New York it has been

decided that if the mortgageor, or one in privity with him, com-

mits voluntary waste upon the mortgaged premises, and the

premises, in consequence, prove insuﬁicient for the satisfaction

of the mortgage debt, he may recover the damage done him by

the waste, of the party committing it, provided the mortgageor is
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insolvent, or not personally liable for the debt.‘ In Massachu-

setts the court goes fnrther, and holds that the damage is not to

be measured by proof of insuiliciency of the remaining security.

“ The mortgagee,” it is said, “is not obliged to accept what

remains as satisfaction pro tanto of his debt, at any valua-

tion whatever. He is entitled to the full beneﬁt of the mort-

gaged estate, for the full payment of his entire debt." ‘ But in

Massachusetts, as well as in other New England States, the mort-

gage vests the legal estate in the mortgagee, who, after condition

broken, may maintain trespass against the mortgageor for acts

of waste, though the latter still retains possession;' a state of

1 Attersoll 0. Stevens, 1 Taunt. 183; ‘ Byrnm 0. Chapin, 118 Mass. 808,

Cook v. Champlain,etc., Co., 1 Denio, citing Woodrutf v. Halsey, 8 Pick.

91. 333; Page v. Robinson, 10 Cush. 99.

' 4 Kent, 81, and note. And see Gooding 0. Shea, 103 Mass.

' Shepard 0. Little, 14 Johns. 210; 360.

Van Pelt 1;. McGraw, 4 N. Y. 110; ‘ Page 0. Robinson, 10 Cush. 99,

Yates v.J'oycc, 11 Johns. 136. citing Stowcll o. Pike, 2 Me. 887;

injury of the inheritance, which ordinary care would prevent.
In respect to buildings, a tenant, unless he has co.,·enantcd to
make repairs, is under no obligation to do more than to exercise
reasonable diligence for their preservation; but a duty to that
extent is inddcnt to the relation. A like duty arises to protect
the remainder of the estate against negligent waste and decay,
and this <'X tends to protection against the acts of trespassers. 1 A
tenant is liable for waste if a building is injured or destroyed by
his negligence; but not for accidental :fires occurring without his
fault, unless upon covenants.•
While tor waste actually committed, an action on the case for
the recovery of damages is the common remedy, a more effectual
protection for the interest of the reversioner is the preventive
remedy by injunction, when the waste is merely begun or
threatened. Where one has only a lien on the premises, he is
entitled to the like preventive remedy, but it is not so clear what
remedy he would have by action. In New York it has been
decided that if the mortgageor, or one in privity with him, commits voluntary waste upon the mortgaged premises, and the
premises, in consequence, prove insufficient for the satisfaction
of the mortg"S~ge debt, he may recover the damage done him by
the waste, of the party committing it, provided the mortgageor is
insolvent, or not personally liable for the debt.• In Massachusetts the court goes further, and holds that the damage is not to
be measured by proof of insufficiency of the remaining security.
"The mortgagee," it is aaid, "is not obliged to accept what
remains as satisfaction pro tanto of his debt, at any valuation whatever. He is entitled to the full benefit of the mortgaged estate, for the t'nll payment of his entire debt.''' But in
Massachusetts, as well as in other N cw England States, the mortgage vests. the 1(\,o-al estate in the mortgagee, who, after condition
broken, may maintain trespass against the mortgageor for acts
of waste, though the latter still retains possession; • a state of
' Attcrsollo. Stevens, 1 Taunl 183;
Cook II. Champlain, ete., eo.. 1 Denio,

su.

• -i Kent, 81, and note.
1 Shepard e. Little, 1-i Johns. 210;
Van Pel& o. McGraw, -i N.Y. 110;

Yatee •· J oyoo, 11 Johns. 188.

• Byrom o. Chapin, 118 llnss. HOS,
citing Woodruff o. Halsey, 8 Pick.
833; Page e. Robinson, 10 Cush. 99.
And see Uoodlng •· Shea, 103 )[aas.
860.
• Page •· Robinson, 10 Cush. n.
citing Stowell .. Plke, 9 He. 887&
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the law quite different from the law of New York, where the
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mortgagee has a mere lien on the land, and is not even entitled

to possession until foreclosure completed. In Rhode Island a

mortgagee is held entitled to wood and timber cut upon the mort-

gaged premises in waste of the same, and in substantial diminu-

tion of his security, though he could not sue in trespass for the

cutting; ‘ and in New Jersey, the fact that the waste renders the

security insuﬁicient seems to be regarded as the ground for giv-

ing the mortgagee a remedy by injunction.‘ And in Pennsylvania

the mortgagee if he recovers for waste committed before fore-

closure must account upon his debt for the amount received.‘

But probably in any of the States, if there has been an actual

sale in foreclosure of the mortgage, with right of redemption

afterward, the purchaser, when his estate is perfected, may recover

for any waste committed intermediate the sale and the period

when the right to redeem expired; for his right, when perfected,

relates back to the time of the sale.‘ And a purchaser at execution

sale would have a like right.‘

Smith 0. Goodwin, 2 Me. 1'73; Petten-

gill 0. Evans, 5 N H. 54; Sanders 0.

Reed, 12 N. H. 558, and other cases.

And see Gore 1:. Jenness, 19 Me. 53;
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Frothingham o. McKusick, 24 Me.

403; Harris 0. Haynes, 34 Vt. 220.

' Waterman 0. Matteson, 4 R. I.

539.

' Cogghill 1:. Millburn Land Co. 25

the law quite different from the law of New York, where the
mortgagee has a mere lien on the land, and is not even entitled
to possession until foreclosure completed. In Rhode Island a
mortgagee is held entitled to wood and timber cut upon the mortgaged premises in waste of the same, and in substantial diminution of his security, though he could not sue in trespass for the
cutting; 1 and in New Jersey, the fact that the waste renders thesecurity insufficient seems to be regarded as the ground for giving the mortgagee a remedy by injunction.• And in Pennsylvania
the mor~ooee if he rooovers for waste committed before foreclosure must account upon his debt for the amount received.'
But probably in any of the States, if there has been an actual
sale in foreclosure of the mortgage, with right. of redemption
afterward, the purchaser, when his estate is perfected, may recoverfor any waste committed intermediate the sale and the period
when the right to redeem expired; for his right, when perfected,
relates back to the time of the sale.' And a purchaser at execution
sale would have a like righ't.•

N. J. Eq. 87. In Minnesota the

owner of a mortgage, before foreclos

ure, is not entitled to timber cut from

the mortgaged premises. Adams 0.

Corriston, 7 Minn. 456. See Cooper

0. Davis, 15 Conn. 556; Wilson v.

Maltby.59 N. Y. 126.

' Guthrie v. Kahlc, 46 Penn. St. 831.

‘ Phoenix o. Clark, 6 N. J. Eq. 447.

‘Stout 0. Keyea, 2 Doug. (Mich.)

184.

~~2*—-an

Hmlth "·Goodwin, 2 Me.173; Petten.
glll "· Evans, IS N H. IS4; Sanders •·
Reed, 12 N. H. IS58, and other cases.
And see Gore "· Jenness, 19 Me. IS3;
Frothingham "· McKuslck, 24 Me.
408; Harris"· Haynes, 84 Vt. 220.
1 Waterman •· Matteson, 4 R. L

M9.
1 Cogghlll •· Millburn Land Co. 2IS
N. l. Eq. 87.
In Mlnneaota the

owner of a mortgage, before forecl~
ure, is not entitled to timber cut from
the mortgaged premises. Adams e.
Corriston, 7 Minn. 4M. See Cooper
•· Davis, 15 Conn. 656; Wilson 11.
Maltby. lSD N. Y.126.
• Guthrie "· Kahle, 46 Penn. St. 881 .
1 Phmni:z- "· Clark, 6 N.J. Eq. f47.
• Stout. •· Xeyee. B Doug. (Mich.)

1M.
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887

The common law made it the duty of every man to keep his

cattle within the limits of his own possessions. If he failed so

to keep them, he failed in duty, and when they strayed upon the

land of another, the owner was chargeable with a trespass. Nor

did his liability for the mischief done by them depend in any

degree upon his personal fault, since, if the cattle escaped from

his custody, notwithstanding due care on his part, his responsi-

bility for the injury actually committed by them was the same

that it would have been had he voluntarily permitted them to

CHAPTER XI.

roam at large. Nor did the common law impose upon the

owner of lands the obligation to enclose them as a protection

against the beasts of others; but he might, at his option, leave

INJURIES BY ANIMALS.

them entirely unenclosed, and it was then as unlawful for the

beasts of a neighbor to cross the invisible boundary line as it

would be to overleap or throw down the most substantial wall.‘

This rule became a part of the common law in most of the

American States, and it still remains a part of it, except as

legislation has modiﬁed or abolished it.’ And it is upon this

‘Wells v. Howell, 19 Johns. 885;

Stafford 0. Ingersoll, 8 Hill, 38; Ellis
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0. Lof.us Iron Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 10;

S. C. 11 Moak, 214. It has been held

that the owner of beasts is liable for

their trcspusses, even though a stran-

ger turned them into the road, from

whence they strayed. Noyes 0. Colby,

30 N. H. 148.

' .llaz'na: Little 0. Lathrop, 6 Me.

856; Lord v. Wormwood, 29 Me. 282.

New Hampslu're: Avery o. Ma.\well,

4 N. H. 36. Jlauachuaatta: Rust 0.

Low, 6 Mass. 90; Thayer o. Arnold,

4 Met. 589; Lyons 0. Merrick, 10-'5

Mass. 71. New York: Wells v. How-

ell, l9Johns. 38-3; Holladay v. Marsh,

3 Wend. 142. New Jersey: Angus o.

Radin, 5 N. J. B15; (‘oxe 0. Robbins,

9 N. J. 384. Pennxylrania: N. Y. &

The common law made it the duty of every man to keep his
cattle within the limits of his own possestoions. If he failed so
to keep them, he fuih..>d in duty, and when they strayed upon the
land of another, the owner was chargeable with a trespass. Nor
did his liability for the mischief done by them depend in any
degree upon his personal fault, since, if the cattle escaped from
his custody, notwithstanding due care on his part, his responsibility for the injury actually committed by them was the same
that it would hnve been had he voluntarily permitted them to
roam at large. Nor did the common law impose upon the
owner of lands the obligation to enclose them as a protection
against the bt:asts of others; but he might, at his option, leave
them entirely unenclosed, and it wa8 then as unlawful for the
beasts of a neighbor to cross the invisible boundary line as it
would be to overleap or throw down the most substantial wan.•
This rule became a part of the common law in most of the
American States, and it still remains a part ot' it, except as
legia;lation has modified or abolished it.' And it is upon this

Erie R. R. C0.1:. Skinner, 19 Penn. St.

298; Dolph 0. Ferris, 7 Watts & S.

367; Gregg o. Gregg, 65 Penn. St.

2'37. Illa);/land.‘ Richardson 0. Mil-

burn, 11 Md. 840. Indiana: Brady

0. Ball, 14 Ind. 817. Hicldgan; Wil-

liams 1*. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co.,2 Mich.

259. Wiuronsim Stone 0. Donaldson

1 Pinncy, 393; Harrison 0. Brown, 5

Wis. 27. Minnesota: Locke 0. First

22

1 Wells e. Hmvcll, 19 Johns. ~;
&afford e. Ingersoll, 8 Hill, 88; Ellis
o. Lof,us Iron Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 10;
8. C. 11 Hoak, 214. It bas been held
that the owner of beasts is lillblc for
their tre~pnsses, even though a stran.
ger turned them into the road, from
wll('nee they strayed. Noyes"· Colby,
~0 N.H. 148.
' Hni~: Little "· Lathrop, 3 }[e.
8G6; Lord 11. Wormwood, 29 lfe. 282.
N~UJ Hamplhire: Avery "· Ma.r.well,
4 N. H. 36. Mauad&vt.U.: Rust e.
Low, 8 M11ss. 90; Thayer "· Arnold,
4 Ket. li89; Lyons "· Merrick, 105

22

Mass. 71. NeUJ Y&rk: Wells "· Jiow.
e11,19 Johns. 38j; Holladay 'C. Marsh,
8 Wend. 142. New Jer1eg: An.t\"US e.

R:tdin, 5 N.J. 815; Coxt• 'C. Robbins,
9 N. J. 884. Penll$!llr:ania: N.Y. &
Erie R. H. Co. r. Skinner, 19 Penn. Sl
298; Dolph e. Ferris, 7 Wntts & S.
867; Gregg "· Gregg, M Penn. St.
2"37. Mnrgl,znd: Richardson "· Mil.
born, 11 lld. 840. lndinna: Brudy
11. Ball, 14 Ind. 817. Michigan; Williams "· Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 2 Mich.
269. Wi1tonnn: Stone e. Donaldson
1 Pinney, 898; Harrison e. Brown, 5
Wia. 27. Jliruu.ota: Locke •· Firs&
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ground that railway companies have in some cases been held not
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bound to fence their road for the protection of beasts that might

otherwise stray upon their tracks and be killed or injured; they

being proprietors of their tracks, and having the same right to

protection against trespnsses as any other land owners. There

have, nevertheless, been intimations in some of the newer States

that the common law on this subject was never suited to their

condition and circumstances, and was consequently never

adopted;‘ but it can scarcely be said that the point was ever

distinctly ruled. It has been repeatedly said, however, in par-

ticular States, that the common law on this subject was incon-

sistent with their legislation, and therefore not in force.’ And

in those States the owner of land is left to protect his lands

against injuries by domestic animals as he may think is for his

interest.

The statutes which, under some circumstances, or for some

purposes, require lands to be fenced by their owners, are so vari-

ous in the several States that it is not easy even to classify them.

Some of them provide merely that unless the owner shall cause

his lands to be fenced with such a fence as is particularly

described, he shall maintain no action for the trespasses of beasts

upon them. These statutes are generally limited in their force
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to exterior fences, and are intended as a part of a system under

which cattle are or may be allowed to depasture the highway.‘

Div. etc., R. 15 Minn. 350. Kansas: & Ohio R. R. Co., 9 W. Va. 252: Wag-

Union P. R. R. Co. o. Rollins, 5 Kan.

167, Delaware: Vnntlegrift 1;. Dela,

ware, etc., R. R. Co., 2 lloust.287.

Vermont: Hurd o. Rutland, etc., R. R.

Co., 25 Vt. 116.

‘See Secley 1:. Peters, 10 Ill. 130;

Michigan, etc., R. R. C0. v. Fisher, 27

Ind. 96; Vicksburg. etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Patton, 81 Miss. 156; Walker e. Her-

ron, 22 Tex. 55.

' Seeley 0. Peters, 10 I11. 130;

ground that railway companies have in some ca.ses been held not
bound to fence their road tor the protection of beasts that might
otherwise etray upon their tracks and be killed or injured; they
being proprietors of their tracks, and having the same right to
protection against trespasses as any other land owners. There
have, nevertheless, been intimations in some of the newer States
that the common law on this subject was never suited to their
condition and circumstances, and was consequently ne,·er
adoptcu; 1 but it can scarcely be said that the point was ever
di~tinct1y ruled. It has been repeatedly said, however, iu particular States~ that the common law on this subject was inconsistent with their legislation, and therefore not in force.' And
in those States the owner of land is left to protect his Jande
against injuries by domestic animals as he may think is for his
intet·est.
The statute& which, under some circumstances, or for some
purposes, require lands to be fenced by their owners, are so various in the several States that it is not easy even to classify them.
Some of them provide merely that unless the owner shall cause
his lands to be fenced with such a fence as is particularly
described, he shall maintain no action for the trespasses of beasta
upon them. These statutes are generally limited in their force
to exterior fence&, and are intended as a part of a system under
which cattle are or may be allowed to depasture the highway.•

Stoner 0. Shugnrt, 45 Ill. 76; Waters

0. Moss, 12 Cal. 585; Comexford '0.

Dupuy, 17 Cal. 808; Studwcll v. Bitch,

14 Conn. 291; Hine 0. Wootlin, 37

Conn. 123; Campbell v. Bridwcll, 5

Orcg. 811; Baylor 0. Bult. & Ohio R.

R. Co., 9 W. Vs. 2'70; Blaine 0. Chesap.

ner -0. Bissell, 3 Iowa, 396; Smith 0.

Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 96;

Kerwhucker 0. Cleveland, etc., R. R.

Co., 3 Ohio, (N. s.) 172; Cent. R. R.

Co. o. Davis, 19 Geo. 437; Macon, etc.,

R. R. C0. r. Baber, 42 Geo. 300; Mur-

ray v. Sou. Cur. R. R. Co., 10 Rich.

227; Laws 0. Nor. Car. R. R. Co., '7

Jones, (N. C.) 468; Jones o. Wither-

spoon, 7 Jones, (N. C.)5-55; Walker

0. Herron, 22 Tex. 55; Ala, etc, R. R

Co. e. Harris, 25 Ala. 232; Mobile, etc.,

R. R. Co. 0. Williams, 53 Ala. 595;

South, etc., R. R. (Jone. IIagoocl,53

Ala. 647. See Berry o. St Louis, etc.,

R. R. C0., 65 Mo. 172.

‘Johnson 1:. Wing, 3 Mich. 163;

Brady 0. Ball, 14 Ind. 817; Cook I.

Div. etc., R. 15 Minn. MO. Kan~tU:
Union P. R. R. Co."· Rollins, 15 Kan.
167. Delawnre: Vandcg1·ift "· Dela.
ware, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Houst. 287.
Vermont: Hurd "· Rutland, tltc., R. R.
Co., 25 Vt. 116.
1 See Serley "· Peters, 10 Ill. 180;
:Michigan, etc., R. R. Co."· Fisher, 2'7
Ind. OU; Vicksburg. etc., R. R. Co. e.
Patton, 81 Miss. 156; Walker •· Herron, 22 Tex. 5.>.
1 Seeley
"· Peters, 10 111. 180;
Stoner "· Shugart, 45 Ill. 76; Waters
"· Moss, 12 Cal. 535; Comerford "·
Dupuy, 17 Cal. 808; Studwcll "·Ritch,
14 Conn. 201; Hine "· Woodin, 87
Conn. 128; Campbell "· Bridwell, 5
Oreg. 311; .BBylor "· Butt. & Ohio R.
R. Co., 9 W. Va. 270; Blaine"· Chesap.

& Ohio R. R. Co., 9 W.Va. 252; Wagner "· Bissell, 8 Iowa, 896; Smith e.
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 84 Iowa, 96;
Kerwhacker "· Cleveland, etc., R. R.
Co., 8 Ohio, (N. a.) 172; Cent. R. R.
Co. "·Davis, 19 Geo. 4.37; Macon, etc.,
R. R. Co. t:. Baber, 42 Geo. 800; Mur.
ray •· Sou. Car. R. R. Co., 10 Rich.
227; Laws •· Nor. Car. R. R. Co., 7
Jones, (N. C.) 468; Jones "· Wit.herspnon, 7 Jones, (N. C.) 1555; Walker
"· Herron, 22 Tex. M; Ala.,.et<l, R. R.
Co. "· Harris, 25 Ala. 282; Jtlobile, etc.,
R. R. Co. "· W lll iams, 53 Al•. 595;
Sc1Utb, etc., R. R. Co. "· Hagood, 58
Ala. 647. See Berry"· St. Louis, etc.,
R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 172.
1 Johnson "· Wing, 8 Mich. 183;
Brady •· Ball, 14 Ind. 817; Cook •·
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In some States, from the earliest days, beasts have been allowed
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to roam at large in the highways and uuenclosed lands, either by

83V

general law or on a vote of the township or county to that effect;

a futile permission, if owners of lands are not required to fence

against them.‘ A more common provision is one requiring the

owners of adjoining premises to keep up, respectively, one-half

the partition fence between them, this being apportioned for the

purpose by agreement, by prescription, or by the order of fence

viewers. A neglect of duty under these statutes would not only

preclude the party in fault from maintaining suit for injuries

suffered by himself in consequence thereof, but it would seem

that if the domestic animals of his neighbor should wander upon

his lands, invited by his own neglect, and should there fall into

pits, or otherwise receive injury, he would beresponsible for this

injury as one occurring proximately from his own default.‘

The statutes which require the construction of partition fences

do so for the beneﬁt exclusively of the adjoining proprietors.

These proprietors may, at their option, by agreement, dispense

with them, and even if they do not agree to do so, but fail to

maintain them as the law contemplates, still, if the cattle of

third persons come wrongfully upon one mau’s lands, and from

there enter the adjoining enclosure, it is no answer to an action
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of trespass brought by the owner of the latter that the partition

fence provided for by the law was not maintained.‘

Morea, 33 Ind. 497; Herold v. Meyers, he is liable, if at all, only on some

20 Iowa, 378.

' See Kerwhacker 0. Cleveland, etc.,

R. R. Co., 8 Ohio, (N. s.) 172. In New

York, the authority to permit beasts

to pasture in the streets is denied, un-

less, when the laud was taken for the

public casement, the existing laws al-

lowed it, so that the appropriation

can be said to be for the pasturage as

well as the easement. Tonawanda R.

R. Co. v. Manger, 5 Denio, 255; S. C.

In some States, from the earliest days, beasts have been allowed
to roam at large in the highways and unenclosed lands, either by
general law or on a vote of the township or county to that effect;
a futile permission, if owners of lands are not required to fence
against them.• A more common provision is one requiring the
owners of adjoini11g premises to keep up, respectively, one-half
the pnrtition f€mce between them, this hcing apportioned for the
purpose by agreement, by prescription, or by the order of fence
viewers. A neglect of d\tty nnder these statutes would not only
preclude the party in fault from maintaining snit for injuries
suffered by himself in consequence thereof, but it would seem
that if the domestic animals of his neighbor should wander npon
his lands, invited by his own neglect, and should there fall into
pits, or otherwise receive injury, he would be responsible for tl1is
injury as one occurring proximately from his own default.•
The statutes which require the construction of partition fences
do so for the benefit exclusively of the adjoining proprietors.
These proprietors may, at their option, by agreement, dispense
with them, and even if they do not agree to do so, but fail to
maintain them as the law contemplates, still, if the cattle of
third persons como wrongfu11y upon one man's lands, and from
there enter the adjoining enclosure, it is no answer to an action
of' trespass brought by the owner of the latter that the partition
~nee provided for by the law was not maintained.'

4 N. Y. 349. See, also, Avery c. Max-

well, 4 N. H. 86. At the common

law, pauturagc in the streets belongs

to the adjoining owner, and it is no

wrong for him to leave his cattle in

the streets to take it; and it‘ an in-

jury to another arises in consequence,

showing of negligence, such, for in.

stance. as that the beast was VlCl0llS.

Holden o. Shnttuek, 84 Vt. 336.

' See Lee 0. Riley, 18 C. B. (N. s.)

722; Powell 11. S:ilisbury,_2 Y. & Jer.

391; Saxton v. Bacon.81 Vt. 540; Cate

0. Cate, 50 N. H. 144; Gilman 0. Noyes,

57 N. H. 629.

‘Avery 1;. Maxwell, 4 N. H. 36;

Lawrence v. Combs, 37 N. Ii. 331;

Little u. Lathrop, 5 Mc.3-56; Lord u.

Wormwood, 29 Me. 282; Eanies 0.

Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 08 Mass. 560;

Lyons v. Merrick, 105 Mass. 71; Hurd

0. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 116;

Wilder o. Wilder, 38 Vt. 678; Cham-

bers e. Mathews, 18 N. J. 369; Cook

0. Morea, 33 Ind. 497; Aylcsworth 0.

Morea, 83 Ind. 49'7; !Jerold •· Meycl"l,
10 Iowa, 878.

Bee Kerwhacker •· Cleveland, etc.,
R R. Co., 8 Ohio, (N.I.) li2. In New
York, the authority to permit beasts
to puture In the streets is denied, unless, when the land was taken for the
public casement, the existing laws al-'
lowed it, so that the appropriation
can be said to be for the pasturage as
well as the easement. Tonawanda R.
R. Co. tl. Munger, 5 Denio. 25:i; S. C.
4 N.Y. 849. See, also, Avery fl. lhxwell, 4 N. H. 86. At the common
law, pasturage In the streets belongs
1o the adjoining owner, ami it Is no
wrong for him to leave hi~ cattle in
the streeta to take it; and If an in.
Jury to another arises in consequence,
1

he Is liable, tr at all, only on some
showing of negligence, such, for in.
stnnce. as that the beast was v1cioua.
Holden "· Shattuck, 84 VL 836.
1 Bc.>e Lee •· Riley, 18 C. B. (R.I.)
'722; Powell •· Salisbury,_2 Y. & Jer.
891; Saxton fl. Bacon. 81 Vt. 540; Cate
t1.Cate,WN. H.144; Gilmant1. Noyes,
G7 N.H. 629.
1 Avery tl. Maxwell, 4 N. H. 86;
Lllwrence fl. Combs, 37 N. II. 331;
Little "· Lathrop. 5 Me. 356; Lord "·
Wormwood, 29 Me. 2.':!2; F.1lmes •·
Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 08 MWIS. IS60;
Ly11ns "· )lerrick, 10:) lla.~:~. 71; Hurd
•· Rutland, etc., R. It Co., 2.5 Vl 116;
Wilder fl. Wilder, 38 Vt. 678; Cl•ambers "· Mathews, 18 N.J. 868; Cook
•· Morea, 83 Ind . .{97' AylcaworUJ. v.
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Where beasts unlawfully enter upon the premises of another,

340
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and there commit mischief, because of some vicious propensity,

the owner is liable for this injury, whether he had notice of the

propensity or not. The particular injury might not of itself

support an action, but it is a part of the damage suffered from

the trespass, and goes to swell a recovery which the unlawful

entry ustiﬁes.‘

It has been held that if one’s horse reaches over the division

fence, and bites and injures another horse, this is a trespass

which renders the owner liable, irrespective of any question of

fault on his part.‘

The liability for the trespasses of animals is imposed, not

because of ownership, but because of possession, and the duty to

care for them. Therefore, if they are in the hands of an agister,

or of any one who, by agreement with the owner, has the care

and custody of them for the time being, and are suffered to

escape and do mischief, he, and not the owner, is the party respon-

sible.‘ But in Massachusetts it is held that either the general

Herrington, 1'7 Mich. 417. As to

fencing laws, see, further, Wright 0.

Wright. 21 Conn. 329; New Orleans,

etc., R. R. Co. 1:. Field, 46 Miss. 573;
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McManus 0. Finan, 4 Iowa, 288;

Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. o. Elliott, 4

Ohio, (N. B.) 4'74. The obligation t0

fence rests upon the occupier of lands.

Tewksbury 0. Bueklin, 7 N. H. 518.

Where beasts unlawfully enter upon the premises of another,
and there commit mischief, because of some vicious propensity,.
the owner is liable for this injury, whether he had notice of the
propensity or not. The particular injury might not of itself
support an action, but it is a part of the damage suffered from
the trespass, and goes to swell a recovery which the unlawful
entry justifies/
It has been held that if one's horse reaches over the division
fence, and bites and injures another horse, this is a trespass
which renders the owner liable, irresp~tive of any question of
fault on his part.'
The liability for the trespasses of animals is imposed, not
because of ownership, but because of possession, and the duty ro
care tor them. Therefore, if they are in the hands of an agister,
or of any one who, by agreement with the owner, has the care
and cnstody of them for the time being, and are suffered t<>
escape and do mischief, he, and not the owner, is the party responsible.• Bnt in Massachusetts it is held that either the general

Laws for fencing have no applica-

cation to the case of animals not

usually domesticated. Therefore, if

one undertakes to keep a buffalo bull,

he must, at his peril, keep him within

his enclosure; if he escapes, and

does damage on the lands of another,

he may be killed, whether the lands

are fenced or not. Canefox 0. Oren-

shaw, 24 Mo. 199. -

As between adjoining proprietors,

until the statutory assignment of

what he shall build and keep in re-

pair has been made to them respect-

ively, ench remains liable at the

common law for injuries done by

his beasts. Coxe 0. Robbins, 9 N.

J. 384; Rust 12. Low, 6 Mass. 90;

Heath u. Ricker, 2 Me. 72; Little 11.

Lathrop, 5 Me. 357; Knox 0. Tucker,

48 Me. 373; Bradbury o. Gilford, 53

Me.99; Harlow 0. Stinson, 60 Me.

847. Sec Aylesworth o. Herrington,

1'7 Mich. 417. Ii: the fence is divided

between them for construction and

repair, under the statute or by agree-

ment, and one neglects his part, and

is trespassed upon by his neighbor's

cattle in consequence, he has no

cause of action therefor. Phelps 0.

Cousins, 29 Ohio, (N. s) 135.

l Lyke 0. Van Leuven,4 Deni0,127;

S. C. 1 N. Y. 515; Mason v. Morgan,

24 Up. Can. Q. B. 328.

' Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R. 10

C. P. 10; S. C. 11 Moak, 214.

'Rossell 0. Cottom, 31 Penn. St.

625; Wartl ~21. Brown, 64 Ill. 307; S.

C. 16 Am Rep. 561. See Tewksbury

0. Bueklin, 7 N. H. 518.

—-‘ml

Herrington, 17 Mich. 417. As to
fencing laws, sec, further, Wright "·
Wright. 21 Conn. 829; New Orleans,
etc., R. R. Co. "· Field, 46 Miss. 573;
McManus "· Finan, 4: Iowa, 283;
Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co."· Elliott, 4
Ohio, (N. s.) 474. The obligation to
fence rests upon the occupier of lands.
Tewksbury "· Bucklin, 7 N. H. 518.
Laws for fencing have no applica.
cation to the case of animals not
usually domesticated. Therefore, if
one undertakes to keep a buffalo bull,
he must, at his peril, keep him within
his enclosure; if he escapes, and
does damage on the lands of another,
he may oo killed, whether the lands
are fenced or not. Canefox t~. Crenshaw, 24 Mo. 11J9.
As between adjoining proprietors,
until the statutory assignment of
what he shall build and keep in repair has been made to them respect.
ively, each remains liable at tho
common law for injuries done by

his beasts. Coxe e. Robbins, 9 N.
J. 384; Rust "· Low, 6 Mass. 90;
Heath "· Ricker, 2 Me. 72; Little t~.
Lathrop, 5 1\le. 857; Knox "· Tucker,
48 Me. 373; Bradbury e. Gilford, 53
!Ie. 91J; Harlow "· Stinson, 60 Me.
8!7. Soc Aylesworth "· Herrington,
17 Mich. 417. I( the fence is divided
between them for construction and
repair, under the statute or by agreement, and one n(•glects his part, and
is trespassed upon by his neighbor's
cattle in consequence, he h11s no
cause of action therefor. Phelps tl.
Cousins, 29 Ohio, (N. B) 135.
I Lyke". Van Leuven,4 Denio, 127 0
8. 0.1 N.Y. 515; l\lason "·Morgan,
24 Up. Can. Q. B. 828.
I Ellis tl. Loftus Iron eo., L. R. 10
C. P. 10; S. C. 11 :Moak, 214.
1 Rossell "· Cottom, 81 Penn. St.
525; Ward t~. Brown, 64 Ill. 307; S.
C. 16 Am Ucp. 561. See Tewksbury
"·Bucklin, 7 N.H. IUS.
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owner or the agister may be proceeded against, at the election
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of the party trespassed upon.‘

841

Cattle Escaping when being Driven. There is an exception

in the common law to the rule that every man at his peril must

keep his beasts from the lands of others. If one is driving his

domestic animals along the public highway, he is bound to

~wner

or the agistor may be proceeded against, at the election
<Jf the party trespassed upon!

observe due care. and if, notwithstanding he is guilty of no neg-

ligence, they escape from him and go upon private grounds, he

is not responsible, provided he removes them within a reasonable

time. . And what is a reasonable time must depend upon all the

circumstances.‘

Injuries by Vicious Animals. The reason why the common

law makes the owner of domestic animals responsible for such

injuries as have already been speciﬁed, is because. taking notice

of their propensities, it is his duty to anticipate that they will

commit them as opportunity offers, and to guard against it. The

difference in the nature of animals requires precautions in one

ease which it does not require in another. Thus, a dog which

has manifested no vicious propensity is not likely to commit

cattle Bsoaping when being Driven. There is an exception
in the common law to the rule that every man at his peril must
keep his beasts from the lands of others. If one is driving his
domestic animals along the public highway, he is bound to
observe dne care. and if, notwithstanding he is guilty of no negligence, they escape from him and go npon private grounds, be
is not responsible, provided he removes thorn within a reasonable
time.. And what is a reasonable time must depend upon ~11 the
ci rcnmstances.•

noticeable injury by merely crossing the premises of a neighbor.

Therefore the common law has never given an action of trespass

for the unlicensed entry of dogs upon the premises of other por-
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sons than their owners.’ But in the case of beasts whose subsis-

‘Sheridan 0. Bean, 8 Met. 284.

This case, though decided several

years before Rossell o. Cottom, supra,

is not there noticed. Possibly there

may be a distinction between the

cases, as in the Pennsylvania case it

is said the beasts were “prone to do

mischief," by which we understand

that, to use the common phrase, they

were unruly. Compare Stafford 0.

lncersoll, 3 Hill. 88.

’ Goodwin v. Chcvely, 4 II. & N.

631. This was the rule while land

Injuries by Vicious Animals.

The reason why the common
law makes the owner of domestic animals responsible for such
injnries as have already been specified, is because. taking notice
()f their propensities, it is his duty to anticipate that they will
-commit them as opportunity offers, and to gnard against it. The
difference in the nature of animals requires precautions in one
ca..~e which it does not require in another. Thus, a dog which
has manifested no vicions propensity is not likely to commit
noticeable injury by merely crossing the premises of a neighbor.
Titerefore the common law has never given an action of trespass
for the unlicensed entry of dogs upon the premises of other perl'ons than their owners.• But in tho case of beasts whose subsis-

owners were not required to fence

tin-irlands. Possibly when the stat-

ute provides for an exterior fence,

and the land owner has constructed

one along the road which meets the

statutory requirement, but which fails

to restrain cattle passing in the high.

way, a question may arise whether a

fair construction of the statute would

not give t'lu|m\_'_'es.

' Brown o. Giles. 1 C. & P. 118. It

would be diﬁbrent, however, if the

owner himself were to take them

there: it is then his trespass, and what

mischief the dog may do is an aggra-

vation of it. Beckwlth 0. Shoredike,

Burr. 2092. So if he were to send

his dogs upon another man's land to

worry the latter's cattle. Mitten 0.

Faudryc, Pop. 161. And where a dog

had a propensity for chasing and dc-

stroyiug gunie, of which his owner

was aware, the owner was held ro-

• Sheridan e. Bean, 8 Met. 284.
This case, though decided several
years before Rossell e. Cottom, aupra,
is not there noticed. Possibly tbero
muy be a distinction between the
-cn-cs, sa in the Penn!'ylvanla case it
it; ~<aid the beaats were "proM to do
mischief," by which we understand
that, to use the common phra.'IC, U1cy
were unruly. Compare Stafford e.
ln~crsoll, 8 Hill, 38.
' Go<1dwin "· Chcvely, -4 H. & N.
~1. This was tbe rule while land
owners were not required to fence
tbdr lands. Possibly when the stat.
ute provides fur an exterior fence,
and the lanU owner hu constructed
~ne wong the road which meeta the

statutory requirement, but which fails
to restrain cattle paasing in the high.
way, a question may arise whether a
fair construction of the statute would
not give damaJreS.
1 Brown "· Giles. 1 C. & P. 118.
It
would be different, howevt·r, if the
owner lllmself were to take them
there: it Is then his tresplll!s, Md what
mischief the dog may do is an aggra..
vation of il Beckwith 11. Shoredike,
Burr. 2092. So if he were to send
his dogs upon another man's land to
worry the latter's cattle. !Iitten e.
Faudrye, Pop. 161. And where a dog
had a propensity for chiLlling and d~
stroying game, of which his owner
was aware, the owner wu held re-
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tence is, wholly or in part, upon grass, grain, and vegetables,
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there was abundant reason for a diﬂ'ereut rule. If they break

into enclosures Where crops are being cultivated, some mischief

is certain to be committed. and it may be of a very serious char-

acter. lndeed, a few cattle or swine allowed to run at large

without any restraint might render proﬁtable cultivation impos-

sible in a whole township. Because of this destructive pro-

ensity, the common law requires every owner of cattle, horses,

sheep, swine, and other domestic animals which would naturally

commit destruction in private enclosures, to keep them at his

peril oﬁ' the lands of other persons; he must take notice of the

natural propensity of cattle to stray and trample down crops,

as one who keeps a beast of prey, must take notice that he will

kill and destroy animals and human beings if he is suffered to

escape.‘

But there are other mischiefs which may be committed by

domestic animals that one is under no obligation to anticipate

and guard against, because they are not the result of a general

propensity, but are committed, if at all, by exceptionally vicious

individuals of the particular species of animals. Thus, though

every horse will roam into neighboring ﬁelds if not restrained

from doing so, it is only in rare and exceptional cases that a
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horse will attack and injure those who come near him. There-

fore, while the owner should anticipate and protect against tres-

passes on lands by his horses, he is under no moral obligation to

anticipate that a horse in which no such disposition has been

discovered will suddenly make an assault upon and kick and bite

some passer-by who chances to come within his reach. For this

reason the keeper of a domestic animal is not in general respon-

sible for any mischief that may be done by such animal which

was of a kind not to be expected from him, and which it would

not be negligence in the keeper to fail to guard against.’

for this as an aggravation of the tres-

pass. Angus v. Radin, 5 N. J. 815;

sponsible for a trespass and for the

killing of pheasants bythe dog. Read

0. Edwards, 17 C. B. (N. s.) 245.

‘ Van Lenven 1;. Lykc, 1 N. Y. 515.

Where one’s cattle break into the en-

closure of another, and the-re commit

mischief of a kind not to he expected

from them—such as one cow goring

anoll1er—-their owner is responsible

Dolph 0. Ferris, '7 W. & S 367. See,

also, cases of injury by diseased sheep

trespassing. Anderson 0. Buckton,

tence is, wholly or in part, upon grass, grain, and vegetables,.
there was abundant reason for a difterent rule. If they break
into enclosures where crops are being cultivated, some mischief
is certain to be committed, and it may be of a very serious character. lmleed, a few cattle or swine allowed to run at large
without any restraint might render profitable cultivation impossible in a whole township. Because of this destructive proensity, the common law requires every owner of cattle, horses,
sheep, swine, and other domestic animals which would naturally
commit destruction in private enclosures, to keep them at his
peril off the lands of other persons; he must take notice of the
natural propensity of cattle to stray and trample down crops,
as one who keeps a beast of prey, must take notice that he will
kill and destroy animals and human beings if he is suffered toescape.1
But there are other mischiefs 'vhich may be committed by
domestic animals that one is under no obligation to anticipate
and guard against, because they are not tho result of a general
propensity, but are committed, if at all, by exceptionally vicious
individuals of the particular species of animals. Thus, though
every horse will roam into neighboring fields if not restrained'
from doing so, it is only in rare anrl exceptional cases that a
horse will attack and injure those who come near him. Therefore, while tho owner should anticipate and pr,>tect against trespasses on lands by his horses, he is under no moral obligation toanticipate that a horse in which no such disposition has been
discovered will suddenly make an assault upon and kick and bite
some passer-by who chances to come within his reach. For this
reason tlie keeper of a domestic animal is not in general responsible for any mischief that may be done by such animal which
was of a kind not to be expected from him, and-which it would
not be negl igcncc in the keeper to fail to guard against.'

Stra. 192; Barnum 0. Vandusen, 16

Conn. 200.

7 Vrooman 1». Lawyer,13Jolms.339;

Van Lenven 12. Lyke, 1 N. Y. 515;

“"€'rN

sponsible for a trespass and for the
killing of pheasants by the dog. Read
"·Edwards, 17 C. B. (N. s.) 245.
• VanLeuven"· Lyke, 1 N.Y. 515.
Where one's cattle break into the en.
closure of another, and there commit
mischief of a kind not to be expected
from them- such as one cow goring
another- t.tcir owner is responsi lJiu

for this as an aggravation of the tres.
pass. Angus "· Radin, 5 N. J. 815;
Dolph "· I<~erris, 7 W. & S 367. See,
also, cases of injury by diseased sheeptrespassing. Anderson "· Buckton,
Stra. 192; Barnum "· Vandusen, 16Conn. 200.
'Vrooman"· Lnwyer,13 Johns. :J:l9;
Van Leuvcn "· Lyke, 1 N. Y. 515•
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But thcrc are exceptional cases which rest upon substantially
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the same reasons with those which sustain an action against the

owner of straying beasts. If it be made to appear that any

domestic animal is vicious and accustomed to do hurt, and that

the owner has been notiﬁed of the fact, a duty is then imposed

upon him to keep the animal secure, and he is responsible for the

mischief done by the animal in consequence of the failure to

observe this duty.‘ The special notice which the owner has that

his beast is inclined to commit the particular injury stands in

the place of the general notice that the natural propensity of

cattle to roam gave in the case of trespasses by them upon lands,

and imposes upon him a corresponding obligation to prevent the

particular mischief which he now has reason to expect will be

oommittcd should the opportunity occur. Therefore, where the

owner is notiﬁed that his dog has been accustomed toworry sheep

or other animals, or to attack persons, if he still keeps him he

becomes, from the time of such notice, responsible for all injuries

of the sort he may thereafter oommit;’ and the fact that he en-

deavors to so keep the dog as to prevent the mischief will not pro-

tect him, but by keeping him he will take upon himself all risks.‘

So if one drive a bull along the public highway knowing ot' his

propensity to attack and gore any person wearing a red garment,
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and taking no precautions, he will be held responsible if such an

Smith o. Causcy, 22 Ala. 568; Worm- ' Jones 0. Perry, 2 Esp. 482; Sarch

Icy 0. Gregg, 65 Ill. 251; Dearth o.

Baker, 22 Wis. 73; Jackson r. Smith-

son, 15 M. & W. 563; Hudson o. Rob-

erts, 6 Exch. 097; Cox v. Burbritlge,

18 C. B (rt. s.) 430.

' Smith v. Pelah, Stra. 1264. “ The

Chief Justice ruled that if n. dog has

once bit a man, and the owner having

notice thereof keeps the dog, and lets

him go about, or lie at his door, an

But there are exceptional eases which rest npon substantially
the same reasons with those which sustain an action against the
owner of straying beasts. If it be made to appear that any
domestic animal is vicious and aC(:nstomed to do hurt, and that
the owner has l>t...>cn notified of the fact, a duty is then imposed
upon him to keep the animal secure, and ho is responsible for the
mischief done by the animal in consequence of the failure to
observe this duty.' The special notice which the owner has that
hie beast is inclined to commit the particular injury stands in
the place of the general notice that the natura] propensity of
cattle to roam gave in the case of trespasses by them upon lands,
and imposes upon him a corresponding obligation to prevent the
particular mi~c!tief which he uow has reason to expect will be
committed should the opportunity occur. Therefore, where the
owner is notified that his dog bas been accustomed to worry sheep
or other animals, or to attack persons, if he still keeps him he
becomes, trom the time of such notice, responsible for all injuries
of the sort he may thereafter commit; • and the fact that he endeavors to so keep the dog as to prevent tho mischief will not proteet bim, bnt by kt'eping him he will take upon himself all risks.'
So if one drive a bull along the public highway knowing of hie
propensity to attack and gore any person wearing a red garment,
and taking no precautions, he will be held responaible if such an

action will lie against him at the suit

of a person who is bit, though it hap-

pened by such person's I.l'c:\(ling on

the dog’s toes; for it was owing to

his not hanging the dog on the ﬁrst

notice. And the safety of the King's

subjects ought not afterwards to be

endangered. The acientcr is the git

of the action "

o. Blackburn, 4 C. & P. 297; Thomas

0. Morgan, 2 (J. M. & R, 496; Read 0.

Edwards, 17 C. B. tn. s.) 245; May 0.

Burdctt, 0 Q. B. (1v.s.) 101 ; Durdcn 0.

Burnett, 1’ Ala. 169; Pickering 0.

Orange, 2 Ill. 31‘-S; Kelghtlingcr 0.

Egan, 65 Ill. 235, and 75 Ill. 141;

Wormley o. Gregg, 65 Ill. 251; Part-

low 0. Haggarty_ 35 Ind. 178; Karrc.

Parks, 44 Cal. 46; Marsh c. Jones, 21

Vt. 878; Dearth 0. Baker, 22 Wis. 73;

McCaskill c. Elliott, 5 Strob. 196;

Murray v. Young, 12 Bush, 337; Buck.

ley 0. Leonard, 4 Denio, 500; Patf 0.

Slack, 7 Penn. St. 254; Campbell 0.

Brown, 19 Penn. St 859.

* Kt-lly 0. Tilton, 3 Keyes, 263;

Stumps 0. Kelly, 22 Ill. 140.

Smith •· Causey, 29 Ala. 668; Wormley .,. Grcgl(, 63 Ill. 231; Deal1h "·
Bater,l2 Wla. '78; Ja<'kson e. SmithlOU, 1G 11. & W. 368; Hud110n e. Rob.
er1a, e Exch. 69'7; Cox o. Burbridge,
18 a B. (K. a.) 430.
1 Smith"· Pc:lah, Stra. 1264.
•• The
Cblef Jnatlce ruled tbat If a dog hu
oace bit a mao, and the owner having
ooUce thereof keep• the dog, and lets
him go about, or lie at his door, an
acUon will lie against him at the suit
of a person who Ia bit, though It hap..
peoed by auch person's treading on
the dog'a toes; for It was owing &o
bia not banging tho dog on the drat
DOUce. And the safety of the King'a
abjecta ought not afterwards &o be
endangered. Tbo ICUniM ls tho gil
ot the action "

•.Jonea e. Perry, t Eap. 489; Sarch
.,. Blackburu, .f C. & P. 29'7; Tbomu
•. Horgan, I a 11. & R I 496; Read ..
Edwarda, 1'7 0. B. (K. 1.) 14:i; Kay e.
Burdett, 8 Q. B. (K. a.) 101 ; Durden e.
Bernett, '7 Ala. 169; Plckerlnr; e.
Orange, I Ill. 3:18; KelgbUlnger e.
Egao, 6:i Ill. 235, and '7~ Ill. 141 ;
Wormley e. Greg~. 65 Ill. 231; Partlow e. Haggarty, :W Ind. 1'78; Karre.
Parks, 44 Cal. 46; Marsh"· Jones, 21
Vr. 878; Dearth e. Baker, 22 Wla. '78;
11cCasklll o. Elliott, 6 Strob. 196;
llurrayv. Yonog, 12 Bush, 337; Buckley e. Leonard, • Denio, ~; Patf e.
Slack, '7 Penn. St. 2M; Campbell e.
Brown, 19 Penn. St. 859.
1 Kelly e. Tilton, 8 Keyt:a, 161;
&umpa "· Kelly, 21111. 1-tO.
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attack is made.‘ The same rule is applicable to all classes of
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domestic animals, and particulars need not be gone into here.’

The notice which charges the owner with the duty must be a

notice that the animal was inclined to do the particular mischief

that has been done. Notice that a dog is disposed to worry

sheep is no notice that he will attack persons. Notice thata

horse is unruly is no notice that he is likely to kick and bite.‘

But notice that a bull attacks and gores other domestic animals

is suﬁicient warning that he would attack persons in like man-

ner.‘ The question in each case is whether the notice was

snﬁicient to put the owner on his guard, and to require him to

anticipate the injury which has actually occurred.

The suﬂiciency of the notice is a question of what is suﬁicient

to put a reasonable and prudent man on his guard. It is not

necessary that it be notice of mischief actually committed; it is

the propensity to commit the mischief that constitutes the dan-

ger.‘ And if the mischief is of a sort that animals of the kind

are likely to commit at a certain season of the year--as in the

' Hudson 0. Roberts, 6 Exch. 697.

Sec Cockersham v. Nixon, 11 Ired.

269; Earhart '0. Youngblood, 27 Penn.

St. 331; Dolph v. Ferris, 7 W. & S.
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867; Barnes 1:. Chnpin, 4 Allen, 444.

’ Injuries by rams : Jacks-on o.

Smithson, 15 M. & W. 563; Oakes v.

Spnulding, 40 Vt. 347; Spaulding '0.

attack is made. 1 The same rule is applicable to all classes of
domestic animals, and particulars need not bo gone into here.'
The notice which charges the owner with the duty must be a
notice that the animal was inclined to do the particular mischief
that has been done. Notice that a dog is disposed to worrr
sheep is no notice that he will attack persons. Notice that a
horse is unruly is no notice that he is likely to kick and bite.'
But nc.tice that a bull attacks and gores other domestic animala
is sufficient warning that he would attack persons in like manner.' The question in each caso is whether the notice waa
sufficient to put the owner on his guard, and to require him to
anticipate the injury which has actually occurred.
The sufficienc.v of the notice is a q ucstion of what is sufficient
to put a reasonable and prudent man on his guard. It is not
necessary that it be notice of mischief actually committed; it ia
the propensity to commit the mi:schief that constitutes the uanger.• And if the miRchief is of a sort that animals of the kind
are likely to commit at a certain season of the year-as in the

Oakes. 42 Vt. 343. Injuries by hogs .'

Jenkins 0. Turner, Ld. Raym. 109;

Shcrfey 1:. Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58;

Morse v. Nixon, 6 Jones, (N. C.) 293.

Injurits by horses: Cox 1:. Burbridge,

18 C. B. (N. s.) 430; Popplcwell 0.

Pierce, 10 Cush. 509 ; Dickson 12. Mc-

Coy, 37 N. Y. 400; Goodman 0. Gay,

15 Penn. St. 188; Wales o. Ford, 8 N.

J. 267. Injuries by cows: Hewes v. Mc-

Namara, 106 Mass. 281; Stumps o.

Kelley, 22 I ll. 140; Cogswell v. Bald-

win, 15 Vt. 404. See, further. Van

Lcuvcn v. Lyke, 1 N. Y. 515; Woolf

v. Chnlker, 31 Conn. 121. In such an

action the gist of it is not the negli-

gent kecping of the vicious animal,

but the keeping him with knowledge

of the vicious propensity. Murray 0.

Young, 12 Bush, 337.

“See Spray 0. Ammerman, 66 Ill.

309; Kcightlinger 0. Egan, 65 Ill.

235; Cockersham o. Nixon, 11 Ired.

269; Hartley v. Halliwell, 2 Stark. 212.

‘ Earhart o.Youngblood, 27 Penn.

St 331; Cockersham 0. Nixon, 11

Ired. 269.

‘ 1l1cCaskill 0. Elliott, 5 Strob. 198;

Worth v. Gilling, L. R 2 O. P. 1.

Notice to defendant of mischief on a

single previous occasion seems to be

suﬂieient. Arnold o. Norton, 25

Conn. 92; Kittredge v. Elliott, 16 N.

H. 77, and cases cited. Compare

Bulkley v. Leonard, 4 Dcnio, 500; Ap-

pleby 1:. Percy, L. R. 9 C. P. 647. Di-

rect proof is not essential. Knowl-

edge may be made out by circum-

stances without it. Judge v. Cox, 1

Stark. 285; McCnskill 0. Elliott, 5

Strob. 196. Notice to a servant who

has charge of the beast is suflicient.

Baldwins. Casella, L. R.7 Exch. 325;

' Hudson "· Roberts, 6 Exch. 697.
St•e Cockersbam "· Nixon, 11 Ired.
269; Earhart"· Youngblood, 27 Penn.
St. 331; Dolph "· Ferris, 7 W. & B.
867; Barnes 'l!. Chapin, 4 Allen, 444.
1 Injuries by ramB: Jnck::;on e.
Smithson, 15 M. & W. 56:3; 011kes e.
Spaulding, 40 Vt. 347; Spaulding e.
Oakes, 4.2 VL 848. Injuries by hogB:
Jenkins e. Turner, Ld. Raym. 109;
Sherley "· Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58;
Morse 'l!. Nixon, 6 Jones, (N. C.) 293.
Injurh s by horBu: Cox 11. Burbridge,
18 C. B. (N. s.) 480; Popplewell e.
Pierce, 10 Cush. o09 ; Dickson "· McCoy, 37 N.Y. 400; Gllodman "·Gay,
15 Penn. St. 188; Waleu. Ford, 8 N.
J. 267. Injuries by cow•: Hewes tl. McNamara, 106 )lass. 281; Stumps "·
Kelley, 22 Ill. 140; Cogswell v. Baldwin, 15 Vl 404. Sec, further, Van
Lcuven "· Lyke, 1 N.Y. o15; Woolf
"· Chalker, 81 Conn. 121. In such an
action the gist of it is not the negligent keeping of the vicious animal,
but the keeping him with knowle1lgo

of the vicious propensity. Murray e.
Young, 12 Bush, 837.
1 Bee Spray "· Ammerman, 66 Ill.
309; Keigbtlinger "· Egan, 65 Ill.
235; Cockersham "· Nixon, 11 Ired.
269; Hartley"· Halliwell, 2 Stark. 212.
'Earhart "· Youugblood, 27 Penn.
St. 331; Cockersham e. Nixon, 11
Ired. 269.
• McCaskill e. Elliott, li Stroh. 198;
Worth "· Gilling, L. R. 2 C. P. 1.
Notice to defendant of mischief on a
single previous occasion seems to be
sufficient Arnoid e. Norton, 215
Conn. 92; Kittredge "· Elliolt, 16 N.
H. 77, and cases cited. Compare
Bulkley 11. Leonar.d, 4 Denio, 500 ; Ap.
pleby "· Percy, L. R. 9 C. P. 647. Di·
rect proof is not essential. Knowledge may be made out by circum.
stances without it. Judge "· Cox, 1
Stark. 285; McCaskill "· Elliott, 5
Stroh. 196. Notice to a servant who
bas charge of the beast is sufficient.
Baldwin v. Casella, L. R. 7 Exch. 895;
S. C. 3 Moak, 434.
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case of stallions — the owner should anticipate and guard against

845

it without any special notice or warning.‘

The rules above laid down are applicable to the case of cattle

which are accustomed to overleap or throw down the fences which

are suiﬁcient for cattle in general. The person having such cattle

will be liable for injuries resulting from the indulgence of this

propensity, even in the case of those whose duty it was to main-

tain the fence overleaped or thrown down. That duty is a duty

to keep up only such fences as are suﬁicient to protect against

cattle in general, and not such as vicious or unruly beasts make

necessary.’

.The duty to protect against vicious animals is imposed upon

the keeper irrespective of ownership.‘ If the injury committed.

was to a person, it is no defense to an action therefor that the

party injured was at the time committing some triﬂing trespass

upon the defendant’s land, for the law will not suffer a man to

defend his premises against mere trespasses by such dangerous

means as ferocious animals,‘ whose assault might be dangerous

to life or limb, any more than it will by scattering poison about

to kill animals that come upon them,‘ or by setting spring guns.‘

But doubtless a man might defend his house against burglars by

the use of a ferocious dog, and might even defend against casual
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trespasses with a dog not likely to do serious injury.’

‘ Meredith 0. Reed, 26 Ind. 334.

' Hine v.Woodlng, 3'7 Conn. 123;

Barnum e. Vundusen, 16 Conn. 200.

' Frammcll 0. Little, 16 Ind. 251;

Harsh 0. Jones, 21 Vt. 378; Wilkin-

son 0. Parrott, 32 Cal. 102

‘ Blackman 0. Simmons, 3 C. & P.

138; Loomis o. Terry, 17 Wend. 496;

Shcrfey r. Bartley, 4 Snccd, 58. Com-

pare Brock 0. Copeland, 1 Esp. 203.

case of stallions- the owner should anticipate and guard against
it without any special notice or warning.'
The rnles above laid down are applicable to tl1e case of cattle
which are accustomed to overleap or throw down the fences which
are sufficient for cattle in general. The person having such cattle
will be liable for injuries resulting from the indulgem:e of this
propensity, even in the case of those whose duty it was to maintain the fence overleaped or thrown down. That duty is a duty
to keep up only such fences as are sufficient to protect against
cattle in general, and not such as vicious or unruly beasts make
ne(.'eSSary .1
.The duty to protect against vicious animals is imposed upon
the keeper irrespective of ownership.• If the injury committed,
was to a person, it is no defense to an action therefor that the
party injured was at the time committing some trifling trespass
upon the defendant's land, for the law will not suffer a man to
defend his premises against mere trespasses by such dangerous
means as ferocious animals,• whose assault might be dangerous
to life or limb, any more than it ,vm by scattering poison about
to kill animals that come upon them: or by setting spring guns.•
But doubtless a man might defend his house against burglars by
the use of a ferocious dog, and might even detend against casual
trespasses with a dog not likely to do serious injury.'

Wiior-\-or kills domestic animals be-

cause they are trespassing is liable

for their value. Wright v. Ruuiscot,

1 Saund. B3; Dodson v. Mock, 4 Dev.

& Bat. 146; Tyner 0. Cory, 5 Ind.

216 (Dogs). Ford 0. Tuggart, 4 Tex.

492 (Cattle): Clark 0. Keliher, 107

Muss. 406; Johnson 0. Patterson, 14

Conn. 1 (liens). So he is liable for in-

jury to the dog of another by spikes

set in trees on his land for the pur-

pose. Dean 0. Clayton, 7 Tnunt. 489.

Bee Ilott 0. Wilkes, 8 B. & Ald. 304.

' Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1.

‘ See ante, p. 168.

‘ In Stll'£‘l1 v. Blackburn, 4 C. & P.

297, TINDALL, C. J., affirmed the right

of a man to defend his premises by a

dog, pr-ovitled he had given notice.

but held that a printed notice con-

spicuously displaycd was not suffi-

cient for the case of one who could

not read. Compare Curtis v. Mills,

5C.& P. 489. According to Lavernue

0. Manginnti, 41 Cal. 138, one who

keeps a vicious (log us a watch-dog is

responsible to one who is bitten by

him, though not at all in fault; an

accident putting the party injured in

his way.

Meredith"· Reed, 26 Ind. 834.
'Hine "·Wooding, 87 Conn. 123;
Barnum"· Vandusen, 16 Conn. 200.
1 Frammell "· Little, 16 Ind. 251;
Marsh 11. Jones, 21 Vt. 878 ; Wilkiotllm 11. Pa1rrott, 82 Cal. 102
• Blackman "· Simmons, S C. & P.
138; Loomis "·Terry, 17 Wend. 496;
Sherfey r. Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58. Compare Brock "· Copeland, 1 Esp. 203.
Whoever kills domestic animals because they are trespas;;ing is liable
for their value. Wright"· Unmscot,
1 Saund. ts3; Dod110n "· Mock, 4 DeY.
& Bat. 146; Tyner e. Cory, 5 Ind
216 (Dol!s). Fort\ 11. Taggllrt, 4 Tex.
492 (Cattle}. Clark 11. Kelihcr, 107
Muss. 406; Joho!!on "· Patterson, 14
Cono.1 (lien!!). So he i11lilsblc for Injury to t.be uog of another by spikes
1

set in trees on his land for the purpose. Dean 11. Clayton, 7 1'auoL 489.
Bee IloU1l. Wilkes, 8 B. & Ald. 804.
I J oboson "· Pattcr:10o, 14 Conn. 1.
1 See antt>, p. 168.
' In Barch "· Blackhurn, 4 C. & P.
2V7, TINDALL, C. J., affirmed the rigM
of a man to defend his premises by a
dog, provided he bad given notice,
but held that a printed notice coo.
apicuously displayed was not aufllcient for the case of one who could
not read. Compare Curtis 11. Hilla,
IS C. & P. 489. According to Lave rune
11. Mangiaoti, 41 Cal. 138, ooe who
keeps a vicious dog as a watch-dog la
responsible to one who is bitten by
him, though not at all In fault; an
accident putting t.be party iDjW"ed to.
his way.
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The doctrine of contributory negligence applies to the case of
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injury by animals. If a man heedlessly places himself on the

premises of another, in the way of a bull which he knows is

ﬁerce and dangerous, he has no lawful ground of complaint if he

is gored. But where a child is injured by vicious animals, the

party responsible for their keeping cannot escape liability because

the child did not exhibit a thoughtfulness and prudence beyond

his years.‘

Sometimes a vicious animal may lawfully be killed, though the

circumstances would not support an action against the owner.

Thus, if a savage dog is actually found doing mischief.’ or if it

becomes necessary, in order to protect property against him,‘ the

dog may be killed, whether the owner has notice of his disposi-

tion or not. And a dog that is ferocious and accustomed to bite,

or that has been bitten by a mad dog, may be killed as a common

nuisance.‘ But animals that are property at the common law

could not thus be destroyed. Before one could be jnstiﬁed in

killing them, it would be necessary to show that protection to

human beings or to more valuable property appeared to

require it.

One may use a dog in driving away

domestic animals trespassing on his
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grounds, but he will be liable if the

dog be ﬁerce and worry the animals

beyond what is neetlful to accomplish

the purpose. See Amick o. O'Hara,

6 Blackf. 258; Wood 0. LaRue, 9

llich. 158; Titft o.Titft, 4 Denio, 175;

Davis 0. Campbell, 23 Vt. 236.

The doctrine of contributory negligence applies to the case of
injnry by animals. If a man heedlessly places himself on the
premises of another, in the way of a bull which he knows is
fierce and dnngerons, he has no lawful ground of complaint if he
is gored. But where a child is injured by vicious animals, the
pa1'ty responsible for their keeping cannot escape liability because
the child did not exhibit a thoughtfulness and prudence beyond
his years.'
Sometimes a vicious animal may lawfully be killed, thongh the
circumstances wonld not support an action against the owner.
Thus, if a savage dog is actually found doing mischief.' or if it
becomes necessary, in order to protect property against him,' the
dog may be killed, whether the owner has notice of his disposi.
tion or not. And a dog that is ferocious and accustomed to bite,
or that has been bitten by a mad dog, may be killed as a common
nuisance. 4 Bnt animals that are property at the common law
conld not thus be destroyed. Betore one could be justified in
killing them, it would be necessary to show that protection to
human beings, or to more valuable property, appeared to
require it.•

' Munn o. Reed, 4 Allen, 431.

' Wadhurst o. Damme, Cro. Jae. 45;

Vere 0. Cawdor, 11 East, 568; Bar-

rington o. Turner, 2 Lev. 28; Prothe-

roe 0. Mathews, 5 C. & P. 581; Put-

nam o. Payne, 13 Johns. 812. But a

man has no right to kill a dog found

on his premises doing no mischief,

simply because he suspects him to

have done mischief before. Brent 0.

Kimball, 60 Ill. 211. Nor to enter

the owner's dwelling to kill a dog not

registered and collared. Bishop 0.

Fahay, 15 Gray, 61; Uhlein v. Cro-

mack, 109 Mass. 273.

Q9I

0

' J anson 0. Brown, 1 Camp. 41;

Wells 0. Head, 4 C. & P. 568.

‘ Barriugton 0. Turner, 2 Lev. 28;

Dodson '0. Mock, 4 Dev. & Bat. 146;

Perry 0. Phelps. 10 Ired. 261; Brown

0. Carpenter, 26 Vt. 638; Putnam o.

Payne, 13 Johns. 312; Hinckley s.

Emerson, 4 Cow. 351; Loomis o.

Terry, 17 Wend. 496; Maxwell o. Pal-

merston, 21 Wend. 406; Brill 0. Flag-

ler, 23 Wend. 854; Dunlap v. Snyder,

17 Barb. 561; Parker v. Misc, 27 Ala.

480. As to when he may be killed as

a trespasser, see King v. Kline, 6

Penn. St. 318.

‘See Woolf o. Chalker, 31 Conn.

121. The law of dogﬁghts is ably ex-

pounded iu Wiley u. Slater, 22 Barb.

506. Where a statute authorizes " any

person " to kill any dog going at large

and not licensed and collared as pro-

vided by the act, another dog cannot

assume to be " any person," and pro-

One may use a dog in driving away
domestic animals trespassing on his
grounds, but he will be liable If the
dog be fierce and worry the animals
beyond what is needful to accomplish
the purpose. See Amick "· O'Hara,
8 Bluckf. 258; Wood "· LaRue, 9
.Hich. 158; Tifft fl. Tim, 4 Denio, 175;
Davis 1:1. Campbell, 23 Vt. 236.
1 Munn 1:1. Reed, 4 Allen, 431.
1 Wadhurstfl. Damme, Cro. Jac. ~;
Vere 1:1. Cawdor, 11 East, 568; Barrington "· Turner, 2 Lev. 28; Prothe.
roe "· :Mathews, 5 C. & P. 581; Putnam 1:1. Payne, 13 Johns. 812. But a
man l1aa no right to kill a dog found
on his premises doing no mischief,
simply because he suspects him to
have done mischief before. Brent "·
Kimball, 60 Ill. 211. Nor to enter
the owner's dwelling to kill I\ dog not
registered and collared. Bishop o.
Fahay, 15 Gray, 61; Uhlein "· CromRCk, 109 Mass. 273.

Janson o. Brown, 1 Camp. '1;
Wells o. Head, 4 C. & P. 568.
• Barrington 1:1. Turner, 2 Lev. 28 •
Dodson 1:1. Mock, 4 Dev. & Bat. 146;
Perry"· Phelps, 10 Ired. 261; Brown
"· Carpenter, 26 Vt. 638; Putnam e.
Payne, 18 Johns. 812; Hinckley e.
Emerson, 4 Cow. 851; Loomis •·
Terry, 17 Wend. 406; Maxwellt~. Palmenton, 21 Wend. 406; Brlll tJ. FIKgler, 23 Wend. 85-l; Dunlap 11. Snyder,
17 Barb. 561; Parker o. Mise, 27 Ala.
480. As to when be may be killed u
a trespasser, see King o. Kline, 6
Penn. St. :ns.
• See Woolf 1:1. (,'balker, 81 Conn.
121. The law of dog jightl is ably expounded in Wiley 1:1. Slater, 22 Barb.
506. Where a statute authorizes "any
person" to kill any dog going at large
atnd not licensed and collared as pro.
vided by the act, another dog cannot
assume to be "any pc1son," and proceed to execute the law upon a delin1

•
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been greatly changed in some States by statutes.‘

quent, and if he does so, his owner

will be responsible. Hiesrodt 0. Hac-

kett, 34 Mich. 283. If one keep a

The liability of owners of dogs for injuries done by them has
been greatly changed in some States by statutes.•

vicious dog, duly licensed, collared

and conﬁned, for the protection of his

family, he may recover its market

value from one who kills it without

being attacked by it. Uhlein 0. Cro-

maek, 109 Mass. 273. But if one

suﬁ'ers his dog to prowl around his

neighbor's house at night and annoy

the family by howling, he cannot

complain it‘ the dog is regarded as a

private nuisance and abated as such.

Brill 0. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354. Minks

may be killed for the protection of

fowls even when the statute does not

permit them to be hunted. Aldrich

0. Wright, 53 N. H. B98.

‘T0 give these statutes would re-
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quire too much space The following

decisions under them may be of in-

terest: Alabama. Smith 0. Causey,

22 Ala. 568. Suit under statute giving

double damages for injury to stock

by dogs. Statute is highly penal and

must be strictly construed. Negli-

gence of del'endant’s servant docs not

render defendant liable under it. Con-

necticut. Jones o. Sherwood, 87 Conn.

466. Injury to sheep by dogs. Ques-

tions of construction of statute.

Woolf e. (lhalker, 81 Conn. 121. The

statute dispenses with proof of acfenter

by defendant of dog's evil disposition.

Maine. Smith e. Montgomery, 52 Me

178. Keeper of dog is to be deemed

owner. Prescott 0. Knowles, 6'3 Me.

277. Action does not abate on death

of plaintiff. illaaaacltusetta. Le Forest

0. Tolman, 117 Mame. 100. Statute

giving action for injuries by dogs

does not apply to injuries committed

out of State. Buddington u. Shearer,

20 Pick. 477. Dogs of diﬂ'erent own-

ers united in injury, no joint action.

McCarthy e. Guild, 12 Met. 291. Child

injured by dog, parent may bring

suit. Sherman e. Favour, 1 Allen,

191. Injury by dog frightening horse

is within statute. Osborn v. Lenox, 2

Allen, 207. Remedy against town for

injuries by dogs. Barrett 0. Maiden,

etc., R. R. Co., B Allen, 101. Question

who is to be deemed keeper of a dog.

Pressey 0. Wirth, 3 Allen, 191. Injury

by dog; scienter need not be proved;

computing double damages. Brewer

0. Crosby, 11 Gray, 29. Remedy given

for injury to any person includes in-

jury to property. Michigan. Swift 0.

Applebone, 23 Mich. 252. Action for

double damages for bite of dog;

acienter need not be proved, but may

be in aggravation of damages; coin-

puting double damages. Elliott 9.

Herz, 20 Mich. 202. Statute does not

quent, and it be does so, his owner
will be responsible. Hiearodt "·Hackett, 84 Mich. 283. If one keep a
vicious dog, duly licensed, collared
and confined, for the protection of his
family, be may recover ita market
value from one who kills it without
being attacked by it Uhlein "· Cro.
mack, 109 Mass. 273. But if one
autrers his dog to prowl around his
neighbor's bouse at night and annoy
t.be fllmily by howling, he cannot
complain if the dog is regarded as a
private nuisance and abated as such.
Brlll "·Flagler, 23 Wend. SM. Minks
may be killed for the protection of
fowls even when the statute does not
permit them to be bunted. Aldrich
•· Wright, 53 N. H. 898.
• To give these statutes would require too much apace The following
decisions under them may be of interest: Alabama. Smith •· Causey,
D Ala. 568. Suit under statute giving
double damages for injury to stock
bJ dogs. Statute is highly penal and
must be strictly construed. N egllgence of defendant's servant docs not
render defendant liable under il c~
..-icut. Jones"· SheM'mod, 87 Conn.
468. Injury to sheep by dogs. Quea.
tiona of construction of statute.
Woolf e. Clhalker, 81 Conn. 121. The
atatutc d ispenscs with proof of 1cz"ti&Ur
by defendant of dog's evil disposition.
Jlai"M. Smith e. Montgomery, 112 Me.
178. Keeper of dog fa to be deemed
owner. Prescott e. Knowles, 62 Me.
m. Action does not abate on death
of plaintiff. KaaaduudU. Le Forest
•· TolmRD, 117 Mass. 109. Statute
giving action for iojuries by dogs
does not apply to injuries committed
out of State. Buddington "· Shearer,
to Pick. 4:77. Dogs of different ownera united in injury, no Joint action.

McCarthy"· Guild, 12 Met. 291. Child
Injured by dog, pnrent may bring
suit. Sherman fl. Favour, 1 Allen,
191. Injury by dog frightening horse
Is within statute. Osborn"· Lenox, 2
Allen, 207. Remedy against town for
injuries by dogs. Barrett "· Malden,
etc., R. R. Co., 8 Allt>n", 101. Question
who is to be deemed keeper of a dog.
Preuey "· Wirth, 3 Allen, lDl. Injury
by dog; scienter need not be proved;
coutputing double damages. Brewer
o. Crosby, 11 Gray, 29. Remedy given
for Injury to any per11on includes injury to property. Jlicll.iga"" Swif\e~.
A.pplebone, 23 :Mich. 2.'i2. Action fl)r
double dama:,res for bite of dog;
1cienU-r need not be proved, bot may
be in aggravation of damages; computing double damages. Elliott. -.
Hcrz, 29 Mich. 202. Statute does not
apply to injuries by mad dogs. Mooroo e. Rose, 87 Mich.-. Construction of statute; consequential injuries.
NeiiJ Hamp11hir~. Orme e. Roberta. 61
N.H. 110. Action for double damages; proof of amnf4rdispensed with.
NN Yor~ Fish e. Skut, 21 Barb. 838.
Proof of acien.Ur dispensed with in
case of injury by dogs to sheep. Osincup "· Nichols, 49 Barb. 143. If the
injury is anything besides killlng or
wounding the sheep, 1cient6r must be
proved. PmnaylMr,ia. K~rn. O'Connor, 68 Penn. St. 341. Injury by dogs
to sheep; 1cimur need not be proved;
if dogs of different owners unite in
killing sheep, each 0\Vner is liable for
all damage. Under nn earlier statute,
.cient~r waa required to be proven.
Campbell ~. Brown, 19 Penn. St. 859.
Ohio. Gries ~. Zcck, 24 Ohio, (N. a.)
829. Person bitten by dog; tu:ienU,.
need not be proved. McAdams "·
Sutton, 24 Ohio, {N. a.) 83a. Action•
11gainst owners of dogs, which bad
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8 Tm: LAW or 'ro1:'1‘s.

Where the domestic animals of different owners nnite in committing an injury, the wrong is not a joint wrong of the owners,
bnt each owner must be sued separately for the damage done b1
his own beasts.' But in Ohio the ruling is otherwise.•

s

“$5; g

Where the domestic animals of different owners unite in com-

mitting an injury, the wrong is not a joint wrong of the owners,

but each owner must be sued separately for the damage done by

his own beasts.‘ But in Ohio the ruling is otherwise.’

Injuries by Wild Beasts. Lord HALE says in respect to

injuries by beasts that “these things seem to be agreeable to

law:

“ 1. If the owner have notice of the quality of his beast, and

it doth anybody hurt, he is chargeable with an action for it.

“ 2. Though he have no particular notice that he did any such

thing before, yet if it be a beast that is fame nrzmraa, as a lion,

a bear, a wolf, yea, an ape or a monkey, if he get loose and do
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harm any person, the owner is liable to an action for the

damagzgind so I knew it adjudged in An.(lr(;%/1Z'er’s Case,

whose child was bit by a monkey that broke ' . c main and got

loose.

Lord HALB says in respect to
injuries by beasts that "these things 8eem to be agreeable to
law:
"1. If the owner have notice of the quality of his beast, and
it doth anybody hurt, he is chargeable with an action for it.
"2. Thongh he have no particular notice that he did any snch
thin~ before, yet if it be a beast that is fe1'm 'TUlturm, as a lion,
a bear, a wolt~ yea, an ape or a monkey, if he get loose and do
harm tp., any person, the owner is liable to an action for the
damag~nd so I knew it adjudged in .Andrew/.(Ja~·e1''8 0a8B,
whose child was bit by a monkey that broke ~ain and got
loo1'e.
"3. And, therefore, in case of such a wild beast, or in case of
.a bull or cow that doth damage, where the owner knows of it, he
must at his peril keep him up safe from doing hurt, for though
he use his diligence to keep him up, if he escape and .do harm
the owner is liable to answer damages."'
If tqis doctrine is good law at this day, it must be because
the kec>ping of wild beasts accustomed to bite and worry mankind is unlawful. For, if the keeping of such beasts is not a
Injuries by Wild Beasts.

ii i

“ 3. And, therefore, in case of such a wild beast, or in case of

a bull or cow that doth damage, where the owner knows of it, he

must at his peril keep him up safe from doing hurt, for though

he use his diligence to keep him up, if he escape and do harm

the owner is liable to answer damages.” '

If this doctrine is good law at this day, it must be because

the keeping of wild beasts accustomed to bite and worry man-

kind is unlawful. For, if the keeping of such beasts is not a

united in killing sheep, sustained.

Vermont. Adams o. Hall, 2 Vt. 9.

Similar action to the last; held not sus-

tainable. Wisconsin. Tcnuey v.Lenz,

16 Wis. 566. Remedy over against

town. Kertschacke 0. Ludwig, 28 Wis.

430. Quere, whether statute dispenses

with proof of ecientor in other cases

than those of injuries to sheep; re-

peal of statute puts an end to actions

under it.

‘ Adams o. Hall, 2 Vt. 9; Budding-

ton 0. Shearer, 20 Pick. 477; Russell

0. Tomlinson, 2 Conn. 206; Van Steen-

burgh 0. Tobias, 17 Wend. 562; Anch-

muty 0. Ham, 1 Denlo, 495; Parten-

heimcr o. Van Order, 20 Barb. 4'79;

Wilbur 0. Hubbard, 35 Barb. 303;

MJ

tn

Denny 0. Correll, 9 Ind. 72; Powers

0. Kindt, 18 Kan. '74. The doctrine

of these cases was approved in Little

united in killing sheep, sustl\lned. Denny "· Correll, 9 Ind. '72; Powen
Vermont. Adams "· Hall, 2 Vl 9. e. Kindt, 18 Kiln. 74. The doctrine
Similaructiontothelast; heldnotsua. of these CRSes wu approved in Little
tninable. lVi1con•in. Tenney"· Lenz, Schuylkill Nav. Co. "· Hichards. rlt
liS Wi11. 566. Remedy over Rg-Rinst Penn. St. 142. It was there held that
town. Kcrtschacke "·Ludwig, 2ij Wis. if several persons, by their Individual
430. Quere, whetherst!\tute dit~penses action, without concert, throw rubwith proof of scientw In other CIUJeS bish Into a stream, which is carried
than those of injuries to sheep; re. down and deposited on plaintlfrs
peal of statute puts an end to actions land, they cannot be united in an
under it.
action brought for this nuisance.
1 McAdRms ll Sutton, 2! Ohio, (H. e.)
' Adams "· Hsll, 2 Vt. 9; Buddington e. Shearer, 20 Pick. 477; Russell 833; .Jack e. Hudnall, 23 Ohio, (K.e)
e. Tomlinson, 2 Conn. 206; Van Steen- 255; Boyd •· Watt, 27 Ohio, (ll. 1.)
burgh"· Tobias, 17 Wend. 562; Auch- 25!1.
muty "· Ham, 1 Denio, 495; Parten" 1 Hale, P. C.
1, c. 88. ·Bee
heimer e. Van Order, 20 Barb. 479; BuU. N. \'.• 7'lJ .......w...._
WUbW" o. HobbOU'd, SO Barb. 803; ..r~ ~~~

"!t.

\J. ._:;.

Schuylkill Nav. Co. o. Richards, 5'1

Penn. St. 142. It was there held that

if several persons, by their individual

action, without concert, throw rub-

bish into a stream, which is curried

down and deposited on plaintiffs

land. they cannot be united in an

action brought for this nuisance.

' McAdams v Sutton,2tOhio, (n.s.)

333; Jack 1:. Hudnall, 25 Ohio, (N. s)

255; Boyd o. Watt, 27 Ohio, (N. 8.)

259.
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wrong in itself, then no wrong can come from it until some

wrongful circumstance intervenes; in other words, until there is

negligence.

In May v. Bartlett, an action for an injury by the bite of a

monkey was sustained, though no negligence was charged in the A 0 ,4‘

declaration.‘ In Connecticut, this case has been cited as author-

ity to the point that the keeping of a. vicious dog, aftei notice of

M

his evil disposition, is wrongful and at the peril of the owner, %~

agnd, therefore, prima fade the owner is liable to any pcmon~Q

injured by such a dog, without any averment or proof of negli- wt‘ ' -5

gence in securing or taking care of it.”' But admitting tllCQV,~

/

prime facie case, may not the keeper show that the animal \va%

kept by him with due care and for some commendable pllTpO5€,%¢% *1-

and that he escaped under circumstances free from fault in him? »Z“‘\’

The keeping of wild animals for many purposes has come to be ‘"5
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recognized as proper and useful; they are exhibited through the fzi

country with the public license and approval; governments am lg ‘J.

municipal corporations expend large sums in obtaining and pro 0’~

viding for them; and the idea of legal wrong in keeping and '

exhibiting them is never indulgedtt It seems, therefore, safe to

say that the liability of the owner or keeper for any injury done 4“

by them to the person or property of others must rest on the #

doctrine of negligence.‘F'A very high degree of care is deinan(led~ "'

of those who have them in charge, but if, notwithstanding such; Q 7 '

care, they are enabled to commit mischief, the case should be referred to the category of accidental injuries, for which a civil

action will not lie.’

' May o. Burdett, 9 Q B (N. s.) 101.

The decision in this ease seems to be

that the keeper of such an animal is

prime facic responsible for the in-

juries done by it; but it is not de-

cided that he may not meet the case

wrong in itself, then no wrong can come from it until some
wrongful circumstance intervenes; in other words, until there is
negligence.
In .May v. Burdett, an action for an injury by the bite of a
monkey was snstained, though no negligence was charged in th e~" t.
declaration! In Connecticut, this case has been ci ted as author, ~
ity to the point that the keeping of a vicious dog, after notice of
~-j
his evil disposition, is wrongful and at the peril of the owner1 ~~
"and, therefore, prima facie the owner is liable to any person~~
injured by such a dog, without any averment or proof of negli -~~
gence in eecuring or taking car·e of it." 2 But admitting the~L ~
prima fa cie case, may not the keeper show that the animal wa~~~ .~
kept by him with due care and for some commendable purpose~ A.· J ~
and that he e caped under circumstances free from fiiult in him~ ~ ~ 1
The keeping of wild animals for many purposes has come to be~......,.
recognizetl as proper and useful; they are exhibited through the~~
country with the public licen e and appro,·al; governments and
,_.,:.
municipal corporations expend large sum s in obtaining and pro
,.._
vidin~ for them; ai!d t1le idea of legal wrong in keeping and
·
exhibiting them is never indulged:~ It seems, thel'efore, safe tosay that the liability of the owner or keeper for any injury done
llM
by them to the person or property of other·s must rest on the~#"
doctrine of negligence:=FA "er·y high degree of care is demanded
,.-41~
....:...•~· "·
of those who have them in charge, but if, notwithstanding snch /J
·
·
care, they are enabled to commit mi s<'l.tief, the case should bc c7
referr·ed to the category of accidental iujnries, for which a civil
action will not lie.•
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by showing that he observed in re-

spect to it proper care. Sec Rex 0.

Huggins, Ld. Raym. 1583; Besozzi 0.

llurris, 1 F. & F. 92; Van Leuven u.

Lyke, I N. Y. 515; Lavcrone 0. Mun-

giami, 41 Cal. 138.

' Woolt 0. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121,

180; Laverone 0. Mangiauti, 41 Cal.

138. -

is

it

‘See, for some discussion of this

subject, Earl v. Van Alstine, 8 Barb.

630, which was an action against the

owner of bees for an injury inﬂicted

by them upon plaintiff's horses as

they were passing along the highway.

It was held the defendant was not

May "'· Burdett, !l Q B (N. s.) 101.
The decision in this rase see ms to be
that the l< eeper of such an tmima l is
prima faci~ responsible for the injuries done by it; but i& is not decided that he may not meet the case
by showing that he observed in respect to it proper cnre. Sec Rex o.
Huggins, Ld. Raym. 1583; Besoz1.i v.
Harrill, 1 F . & F. !l2; VanLeuven 11.
Lyke, 1 N. Y. 515; Lavc·ronc 11. lfangianli, 41 Cal. 138.
t Woolf "'· Chalker, 81 Conn. 121,
180; Laveronc "'· Mangianti, 41 Cal.

See, for some discus~ion of this
suhject, Earl v. Vnn Alstine, 8 Bnrb.
630, which W !\S an action against the
owner of bees for an injury inflicteJ
by them upon plaintiff's horses o.s
they were pa sing along the hig hway.
It was held the defendant was not
lia ble unless he had notice that th e
bees were accustomed to such mischief. See, lll~~· ?J~efox 11. Crensh1n~v,
24 Mo. 10!l,
~ ,~:;.(,{ A
As to the law respecting the keep.
J.YI'
in g of wild beasts, we should say tha~
the higher cultivation of t he intellect
~
~.

188.

of the mass of the

1

liable unless he had notice that the

d.

bees were accustomc to such uns-

chief See, also C nefox 0 Crenshaw
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pared with two or three centuries

ago, and the recognition of wants in

human nature then ignored, must

have worked some changes, and that

we must take up the common law of

that period in this as in many other

particulars more to locate accurately

our point of departure than to ﬁx

deﬁnitely a stake to which we must

tie and adhere. When wild animals

are kept for some purpose recognized

as not censnrable, all we can demand

of the keeper is that he shall take

pared with two or three centuries
ago, and the recognition of wants in
human nature then ignored, must
have worked some changes, and that
we must tnke up the common law of
tl1at period in this as in many other
particulars more to locate accurately
our point of departure than to fix
definitely a stake to which we must
tie and adhere. When wild animals
are kept for some purpose recognized

as not censurable, all we can dem&nd
of the keeper is that he shall take
that superior precaution to prevent
their doing mischief which their pro.
pensitiea in that direction justly demand of him.
Where a horse is frightened by the
mere appearance of an elephant, and
mischief ensues, the owner of the
elephant is not responsible. Scribner
-. Kelley, 88 Barb. 14.

that superior precaution to prevent

their doing inischief which their pro-

pensities in that direction justly de-

mand of him.

Where a horse is frightened by the

mere appearance of an elephant, and

mischief ensues, the owner of the

elephant is not responsible. Scribner

\
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0. Kelley, 38 Barb. 14.
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INJURIES TO INOORPOBE.A.L RIGHTS.

\
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C H A PTE R X I I .

INJURIES TO mcoaronnu. motrrs.

Incorporeal rights are said to exist merely in idea and abstract

contemplation, though as regards many of them their effects, in

which consists their value, are objects eoguizable by the bodily

senses. In the classiﬁcation of property as real or personal,

some of these rights are designated incm-poreal hereditaments,

either because they are or may be inheritable, or because they

issue out of or are annexed to, or exercisable within corporeal

hereditaments. Thus, at the common law offices, dignities, fran-

CHAPTER XII.

chises, pensions and annuities may all be inlieritable, and so may

be the right to rents, and the right in the owner of one estate

INJURIES TO INCORPOREAL RIGHTS.

to pass and repass over the estate of his neighbor for the con-

venient enjoyment of his own. All these rights, it is perceived,

are intangible rights; the right to rents is not a right in certain

pieces of money, but it is a right to receive periodically a cer-

tain sum of money; and it is the satisfaction of the right to rents

that creates the right in the money received thereby. All such

rights have or may have a money value, and they are therefore,

with entire propriety, considered as property rights.
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Rights corresponding to these may exist which are only per-

sonal property, since they are neither inheritable, nor are they

in any manner connected with the realty. Among the chief

of these is the right which one has to the productions of his

intellect.

Copyrights and Patents. The governments of civilized coun-

tries have deemed it wise to make provision whereby the interests

of authors and inventors may be subserved by securing to them

for a certain length of time a monopoly in the publication or

reproduction of that which they have produced, invented, or

designed. This is done by copyright and patent laws, all of

which name certain conditions, which, when complied with, will

Incorporeal rights are sairl to exist merely in idea and abstract
contemplation, though as regards many of them their effects, in
which consists their value, are objects cognizable by the bodily
senses. In the classification of property as real or personal,
some of these rights are designated incorporeal hereditaments,
either because they are or may be inheritable, or because they
issue out of or are annexed to, or exercisable within corporeal
. hereditaments. Thus, at tho common law offices, dignities, franchises, pensions and annuities may all be inheritable, and so may
be the right to rents, and the right in the owner of one estate
to pass and repass over the estate of his neighbor for the convenient enjoyment of his own. All these rights, it is perceived,
are intangible rights; the right to rents is not a right in certain
pieces of money, but it is a right to receive periodically a certain sum of money; and it is the satisfaction of the right to rents
that creates the right in the money received thereby. All such
rights have or may have a money value, and they are therefore,
with entire propriety, considered as property rights.
Rights corresponding to these may exist which are only personal property, since they are neither inheritable, nor are they
in any manner connected with the realty. Among the chief
of these is tho right which one has to the productions of his
intellect.
Copyrights and Patents. The governments .of civilized conntries have deemed it wise to make provision whereby the interests
of authors and im·entors may be subserved by securing to them
lor a certain length of time a monopoly in the publication or
reproduction of that which they have produced, in\'cnted, or
designed. This is done by copyright and patent laws, all of
which name certain conditions, which, when complied with, will
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entitle the author, inventor, or designer to remedies by means of

which he may protect himself in his monopoly during the period

to which by law it is limited. The conditions in the case of a

book, writing, or design are:

That the applicant for a monopoly be the author or designer,

or the assignee thereof, and that he shall have applied for copy-

right in due form of law, and conformed to the requirements made

for the application, one of which usually is, the payment of a

small fee, and another the delivery of a copy to some national

institution or library. In general, also, it is required that the

applicant be a citizen, or at least a resident of the country.

The conditions in the case of an inventor are:

That the invention be new; that it be useful, and that, as in

the case of books, writings, etc., all legal formalities, be com-

plied with. '

When these appear, the proper certiﬁcate or patent is issued

as evidence of the right, and the violation of the monopoly

becomes a legal wrong, which is punished by penalties, or by the

recovery of damages, or, perhaps, by both. But the legal pro-

tection will fail if it shall turn out that the book, design, etc.,

purporting to be original was not so in fact, or that the invention

was not new. Such a monopoly, of course. cannot extend beyond
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the limits of the sovereignty granting it, though other countries,

if they see ﬁt, as they sometimes do, in consideration of reci-

procity, may give a similar monopoly within their own limits.

Inventions not Patented. It may be, however, that the author

or inventor will apply for no monopoly, and it then becomes

important to know whether the common law recognizes in him

any property in the productions of his intellect, and whether it

affords him any redress in case his rights therein are disregarded.

In touching upon this subject, it will be advisable to consider

separately the ease of inventions, because, as between these and

the others mentioned, the law appears to have made distinctions,

and there are grounds on which distinctions may very justly be

supported. It seems to be proved, by observation, that the most

striking and valuable inventions are approached gradually, and

that often the merit of the inventor consists only in this: That

entitle the antl10r, inventor, or designer to remedies by means or
which he may protect himself in his monopoly during the period
to which by law it is limited. The conditions in the case of a
book, writing, or design are:
That t.he applicant for a. monopoly be the author or designer,.
or tlw assignee thereof, and that he shall have applied tor copyright in due form of law, and conformed to the requirements made
for the application, one of which usually is, the payment of a
smaU fee, and another the delivery of a copy to some national
institution or library. In general, also, it is required that the
applicant be a citizen, or at least a resident of the country.
The c:onditions in the case of an inventor arc:
That the invention be new; that it be useful, and that, as in
the case of' books, writings, etc., all legal formalities, be complied with.
·
When these appear, the proper certificate or patent is issued
as evidence of the right, and the violation of the monopoly
becomes a legal wrong, which is punished by penalties, or by the
recovery of damages, or, perhaps, by both. Bnt the legal protection will fail if it shall turn out that the book, design, etc.,.
purporting to be original was not so in tact, or that the invention
was not new. Such a monopoly, of course. cannot ext~nd beyond
the limits of the sovereignty granting it, though other countries,
if they see fit, as they sometimes do, in consideration of reciprocity, may give a similar monopoly within their own limits.

he has ﬁrst discovered and brought into use what, had be never

lived, would only a little later have been discovered and brought

Inventions not Patented. It may be, however, that the author
or inventor will apply for no monopoly, and it then becomes
important to know whether the common law recognizes in him
any property in the productions of his intellect, and whether it
affords llim any redress in case his rights therein are disregarded.
In touching upon this subject, it will be advisable to consider
separately the case of inventions, because, as between these and
the others mentioned, the law appears to have made distinctionst
and there are grounds on which distinctions may very justly be
supported. It seems to be proved, by observation, that the most
striking and valuable inventions are approach~d gradnally, and
that often the merit of the inventor consists only in this: That
he has first discovered and bronght into use what, had be ne,·er
lived, would only a little later have been discovered and brought
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into use by some one else. Often, indeed, the very greatest diffi-

lN.JlTJ~TES TO INCORPOREAl. RIGRTS.

858

culty is encountered in determining with accuracy who is entitled

to the merit of an invention, and a controversy arises which is

contested before juries upon disputed facts. The ditiiculty of

reachinga. correct conclusion is very greatly increased it’ an inven-

tion is suffered to come into use before the title to it is claimed

and passed upon by the proper authorities. Therefore the law

refuses to recognize property in an invention after the inventor

has suﬁ'ered it to be published to the world without making, in

the manner pointed out by law, a claim on his own behalf to an

exclusive property therein.‘ In so doing it certainly escapes

many difficulties, without at the same time imposing upon the

inventor any unreasonable hardship. If he desires to secure and

retain a property in the production of his genius or skill, it is

not unreasonable to require that he shall formally claim it; and

if, instead of doing so, he voluntarily allows his invention to

come into use, he cannot complain of the presumption the law

then makes that his purpose has been to make a gift of his inven-

tion to the world.’ \Vhere, however, he has simply delayed

applying for letters patent until another has made the discovery

known, or even brought it into use, this will not prevent the ﬁrst

discoverer securing his monopoly afterwards; and even if there
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be two independent discoverers, only the ﬁrst is entitled to take

out letters patent which shall protect him.‘ But there is no

monopoly until the letters are obtained.

Literary and Artistic Productions. With writings, pictures,

etchings, etc., it is different. The author of a particular book

does not anticipate any one else when he produces it. Ot' any

important original work, it may conﬁdently be allirmed that if

the author had not produced it no one else would have done so.

The author may have made use of ideas that would have occurred

to and perhaps been used by others, but persons working inde-

pendently would never produce the same identical book or picture,

though they might, perhaps, reach the same identical discovery,

and apply it in useful machinery. Moreover, disputes respecting

' Bedford o. Hunt, 1 Mason, 302; 0. Stone, 1 Story, 273; ‘2 Kent. 369,notc.

Shaw u. Cooper. 7 Pet. 292. ' Woodcock o. Parker. 1 Gall. 438;

into use by some one else. Often, indeed, the '·ery greAtest difllcolty is encountered in determining with accnracy who is entitled
to the merit of an invention, and a controver:>y aris£!8 whirh is
contested before juries upon disputed facts. The difHcnlty of
reaching a correct conclusion is very greatly increased if an invention is suffered to come into use before the titl"' to it is claimed
and passed npon by the proper authorities. Therefore the law
refuses to rctoognize property in an invention after the inventor
ha.s suffered it to be published to the world without making, in
the manner pointed out by law, a cbim on his own ht>half to an
exclusive property therein.1 In so doing it certainly escapes
many difficulties, without nt the same time impo~ing npon the
inventor any nurensonRble hardship. If he desires to secnre and
retain a property in the production of his genius or skill, it is
not nnreasonabl~ to require that he shall formally claim it; and
if, insteAd of doing so, he voluntarily allows his invention to
come into use, he cannot complain of tho presumption the law
then makes that his purpose has been to make a gift of his invention to the world.' 'Vhero, however, he has simply delayed
applying tor letters pa~ent until another has made the discovery
known, or even brought it into usc, this will not prevent the first
discoverer ~ettring his monopoly afterwards; and even if there
be two independent discoverers, only the fit"St is entitled to take
ont letters pt>.tent which shall protect biro.• llnt there is no
monopoly until the letters are obtained.

' Whittt-more 0. Cutter, 1 Gall. 478; Redford 0. Hunt, 1 Mason, 802; 2

Pennock o. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1; Wyeth Kent, 869, note.
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With writin~s, pictures,
etchings, etc., it is different. The author of a particular book
does not anti<'ipnte any one else when he produces it. Of any
important original work, it may confidently be aftirmcd that if
the author had not produced it no one else would have done so.
The author may have made nse of ideas that would have OC<tnrred
to and perhaps been nsed by oth<'rs, but persons \Vorking independently \Vonld ne\"er produce the same i<lcntical book or picture,
though they might, perhaps, reach the same ideuti~l discovery,
and apply it in US('ful machinery. Moreover, disputes respecting
Literary and A.rtistto Productions.

• Bedford fl. Hanl, 1 lfason, 802;
Sbaw fl. Cooper, 7 Pet. 292.
t Whittemore~. Cotter, 1 Gall. 478;
PeDDock o. Dialogue, 9 Pet. 1; Wyeth

23

Stone,18tory, 273; 2 Kent. 869, note.
1 Woodcock o. Parker. 1 G1dl. 488;
Dcdfhrd e. Hant, 1 Muon. 809; 9
Kenl, 8891 note.
fl.
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the authorship of contemporary literary productions can seldom
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arise, or be troublesome when they do, and therefore no special

embarrassment is experienced when a common law right in libe-

rary productions and works of art is recognized.

Still here, as in the case of inventions, _no monopoly in publi-

cations is secured, except by compliance with the statute. But

an author may keep his lroduction by him indeﬁnitely, and

though others may see it, or hear it, or become familiar with

it, they are not at liberty to publish it without his consent. As

was said in the leading case of W/waton. v. Peters, “That an

author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and

may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or,

by improperly obtaining a copy, endeavors to realize a proﬁt by

its publication, cannot be doubted.”' He has no occasion to

take out a copyright until publication, and he may therefore con-

trol his own productions and publish them or not, at his option;

while an inventor, if he declines to take out a patent, cannot pre-

vent others, who may have knowledge of his invention, from

making use of it.

When, however, an author or an artist publishes his produc-

tion, he is supposcd to abandon it to the public, and he thereby

licenses the public to reproduce copies indeﬁnitely. The word
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publication, it should be remarked, is here employed in a some

what narrow sense; certainly not in the broad sense which it bears

in the law of libel and slander. A letter written by one person

and delivered to another to be read, is publication of a libelous

charge contained in it; but one may exhibit his literary produc-

tions to one person or many, without abandoning his rights

therein as author, where such has not been his intention. A

publication, to constitute an abandonment, must be literally one

which puts the production before the general public. A teacher

does not publish an original work in his department of study by

instructing his pupils in its principles.’ Neither does a pho-

tographer publish his photograph by loaning a copy to a friend; ‘

nor an author abandon his play to the public by allowing it to

' McI.EAN, J., Wheaten 0. Peters, Rob. (N. Y.) 38; Palmer v. De Witt.

8 Pct. 591, 657. Bee Bartlett v. Crit- 40 How. Pr. 293.

tenden, 5 McLean, 32; Ibid., 4 Mc- ’ Bartlett 0. Crittcnden, 4 McLean,

Lean, 300; Boucicault 0. Fox, 5 300; S. C. 5 McLean, 32.

Blatch. 87, 97; Keene o. Clarke, 5 ' Mayall 0. Higbcy, 1 H. & C. 148.

-

the authorship of contemporary literary productions can seldom
arise, or be troublesome when they do, and therefore no special
embarrassment is experienced when a common law right in literary productions and works of art is recognized.
Still here, as in the case of inventions, .no monopoly in publications is secured, except by compliance with the statuto. But
an author may keep his 1 roduction by him indefinitely, and
though others may see it, or hear it, or l1t>corne familiar with
it, they are not at liberty to publish it without his consent. Aa
was said in the leading case of Wheaton. v. Petera, "That an
author, at common law, has a propm·ty in his manuscript, and
may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or,
by improperly obtaining a copy, endea>ors to realize a profit by
its publication, cannot bo doubted."' He has no occasion to
take out a copyright until publication, and he may therefore control his own productions and publish them or not, at his option;
while an inventor, if he declines to take out a patent, cannot prevent others, who may have knowledge of his invention, from
making use of it.
When, however, an author or an artist publishes llis production, he is supposed to abandon it to the public, and he thereby
licenses the public to reproduce copies indefinitely. The word
publication, it should be remarked, is hero employed in a somewhat narrow sense; certainly not in the broad sense which it bears
in the law of libel and slander. A letter written by one person
a11d delivered to another to be read, is publication of a libelous
charge contained in it; bnt one may exhibit his literary productions to one pe•·son or many, without abandoning his rights
therein as author, where such has not been his intention. A
publication, to constitute an abandonment, must be literally one
which puts the production before the general public. A teacher
dOt.lS not publish an original work in his department of study by
instructing his pupils in its principles.• Neither does a photographer publish his photograph b,v loaning a copy to a friend; •
nor an author abandon his play to the public by allowing it to
1 McLEAN, J., Wheaton e. Peters,
8 Pet. 591, 657. S<:c Bartlett e. Crittenden, 5 McLean, 32; Ibid., 4 :McLean, 800; Boucicault e. Fox, 5
Blatch. 87, 97; Keene e. Clarke, IS

Rob. (N. Y.) 88; Palmer "· De WitL.
40 How. Pr. 2U3.
' Bartl<·tt e. Crittenden, 4 McLean,
300; S.C. 5 McLean, 3~.
1 Mayall e. Higbcy, 1 H. & C. 148.
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be publicly acted.‘ In short, the writer of any literary, dramatic,
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or musical composition or work of art is entitled of right to give

it a restricted publication, and to be still protected in his property,

provided he gives evidence of a clear intent to make his publica-

tion a restricted one only. The right to the ﬁrst general publi-

cation belongs to him; he may enjoin any attempt to take it

from him; and if he see ﬁt to do so, he may refuse any publica-

tion whatever. Nor is his death an abandonment of the right

to publish, but his representatives may exercise and control it

afterwards. Moreover, this common law right is not local, but

would be protected in any country where the common law prevails,

and probably wherever the civil law prevails also.

If the author elects to publish, and secures his copyright, this

copyright may be violated by the republication of the whole or

any distinct part thereof verbatim, by the publication of an

abridgement, or by reproducing the whole or a part, with such

alterations or disguises as are mlcnlated and designed to give it

the character of a new work.’ In some cases it is a very nice

question what amounts to a piracy of a work. “Thus, if large

extracts are made therefrom in a review, it might be a question

whether those extracts were designed to be bonaﬁde for the mere

purpose of criticism, or were designed to supersede the original
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work under pretense of a review, by giving its substance in a

fugitive form. The same ditliculty may arise in relation to an

abridgement of an original work. The question in such a case

must be compounded of various considerations; whether it be a

bona ﬁde abridgement, or only an evasion by the omission of

some unimportant parts; whether it will, in its present form,

prejudice or supersede the original work; whether it will be

adapted to the same class of readers; and many other considera-

tions of the same sort which may enter as elements in ascertain-

ing whether there has been a piracy or not. Although the

doctrine is often laid down in the books that an abridgement is

not a piracy of the original copyright, yet this proposition must

be received with many qualiﬁcations. In many cases the ques-

tion may naturally turn upon the point, not so much of the quan-

tity as of the value of the selected materials.” ' But a new plan,

' Mncklin v. Richardson, Amb.69-1; ' Curtis on Copyrights. 288.

Boncicnult v. Fox, 5 Blatch. 87; Pal- ' Gray o. Russell, 1 Story, 11. 19.

mer 0. De Witt, 40 How. Pr 298. citing Bramwell 0. Halcomb, 3 My].

be puL1ic1y acted.• In short, the writer of any literary, dramatic,
or mush:al compo:3ition or work of art is entitled of right to give
it a restricted pnulication, and toLe still protected in his property,
provided he gives evidence of a clear intent to make his publication a restricted one only. The ri-ght to the :fir8t general publication belongs to him; he may eujuin any attcm pt to take it
from him; and if he see fit to do so, he may refnse any puulication whate\·er. Nor is his death an abandonment of the right
to publish, but his representatives may exercise and control it
afterwards. Moreover, this common law right is not local, bot
would be protected in any country where the common law prevails,
and probably wherever the civil law prevails also.
If the author elects to publish, and secures his copyright, this
copyright may be violated by the republication of the whole or
any distinct part thereof verbatim, by the publication of an
abridgement, or by reproducing the w:wle or a part, with such
alterations or disguises as are calcnlated and designed to give i~
the character of a new \vork.' In some cases it is u. very nice
question what amounts to a piracy of a work. "Thus, if large
extracts are made therefrom in a review, it might be a question
whether those extracts were designed to be bona .fole for the mere
purpose of criticism, or were designed to supersede the original
work under pretense of a review, by giving its substance in a
fugitive form. The same difficulty may arise in relation to an
abridgement of an ori#{inal work. The question in such a case
must be compounded of various considerations; whether it be a
hona fidtJ abridgement, or only an evasion by the omission of
some unimportant pnrts; whether it will, in its present form,
prejndiee or supersede the original work; whether it will be
adapted to the same class of' readers; and many other considerations of the same sort which may entt•r as elements in ascertaining whether there has been a piracy or not. Although the
doctrine is often laid down in the books that an abridgement iR
not a piracy of the original copyright, yet this proposition must
be received with many qunlitications. In many cases the question may naturally turn upon the point, not so much of the quantity as of the value of tl1e sclectt.>d materials." • Bnt a new plan,
Macklin"· Richardson, Amb. 694;
Boucicault t. Fox, 5 Blatch. 87; Palmer e. De Witt, 40 How. Pr 293.
1

• Curtis on Copyrights. 2.qs.
• Gray "· Rn!lsell, 1 Stnry, 11, 19.
citing Bramwell •· Halcomb, 8 Myl.
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arrangement and illustration of old materials may not only be no

piracy, but may entitle the author thereof to a copyright, as in

the case of scientiﬁc works.‘ So may the translation of an

original work.’ -

An author's rights in his publications may be injured in other

ways than by pirating them. Thus, he may be libelled in respect

to them, or the books themselves may be libelled by false state-

ments’ and suggestions regarding their purpose or tendency,

their originality or truthfulness, or by garbled extracts or per-

versious of language or meaning in criticism. To publish, for

example, that a work purporting to be original was, in fact, a

translation, or was largely made up of plagiarisms, would, if

false, be libelous, because it would not only be likely to affect

injuriously the sale of the book, but would injure the reputation

of the author also. So would an insinuation based on unfair

deductions or garbled extracts, that its purpose or tendency was

to inculcate bad morals.‘ Fair criticism is allowable, but the

author is entitled to substantial redress when malice inspires

unjust and untruthful comments.‘
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Private Letters. Private letters often have a value for publi-

cation, and the question who, as between the writer and receiver,

has the right to control their publication is sometimes the subject

of litigation. For the purpose of an examination of the ques-

tions which may come up in such eases, letters may be classiﬁed

as having value, pecuniarily or otherwise, as follows:

arrangement and illustration of old materials may not only be no
piracy, but may entitle the author thereof to a copyright, as in
the case of scientific works: So may the translation of an
original work.•
An author's rigltts in his pulllications may be injured in other
ways than by pirating them. Thus, he may be libelled in ~pect
to them, or the books themselves may be libelled by false statements • and suggestions regarding their purpose or tendency,
their originality or truthfulness, or by garbled extracts or perversions of language or meaning in criticism. To publish, for
example, that a work purporting to be original was, in tact, a
translation, or was largely made up of plagiarisms, would, if
false, be libelous, beca.na:>e it would not only be likely to affect
injuriously the sale of the book, but would injure the reputation
of the author also. So would an insinuation based on unfair
deductions or garbled extracts, that its purpose or tendency was.
to inculcate bad morn.13! Fair criticism is allowable, but the
author is entitled to substantial redress when malice inspire&
unjust and untruthful comments.•

1. As literary productions.

As historical documents.

As “evidence of facts important to individuals.

9°$°

ti‘

& Cr. 737; Saunders 0. Smith, 3 My].

& Cr. 711; Whcaton o. Peters, 8 Pet.

591. And, see Folsom o. Marsh, 2

Story, 100.

‘Emerson 0. Davies, 3 Story, 768,

citing Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Bcav. 6.

‘ Stowe 0. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr., 547.

See Shook 1:. Rankin, 6 Biss. 477.

' The plaintitf sold his copyright

to defendant. The latter brought out

Private Letters. Private letters often have a value for publication, and the question who, as between the writer and receh·er,
has the right to control their publication is sometimes the subject
of litigation. For the purpose of an examination of the questions which may come up in such cases, letters may be classified
as having value, pecuniarily or otherwise, as follows:
1. As literary productions.
2. As historical documents.
3. As ·evidence of facts important to individuals.
4. As a means of personal vindication to the writer or receiver.

a new edition, not edited by phnntitf,

though purchasers would naturally

As a means of personal vindication to the writer or receiver.

suppose it was. The edition con-

tained mistakes and errors. Such a

publication. calculated to injure the

reputation of the author, is action-

able. Archibold 0. Sweet, 5 C. & P.

219.

‘ See Rt-tide o. Sweetzer, 6 Ahb. Pr.

(R. s.) 9, notc.

‘Cooper 0. Greely, 1 Dcnio, 347;

Cooper o. Stone, 24 Wend. 434; S. C.

in error, 2 Dcnio, 293; Macleod 0.

Wakley, 8 C. & P. 811.

A_-_

& Cr. 737; Saunders e. Smith, 8 Myl.
& Cr. 711 ; Wheaton e. Peters, 8 Pet.
591. And, see Folsom e. Marsh, 2
Story, 100.
• Emerson e. Dsvies, 8 Story, 768,
citing Lewis tl. Fullarton, 2 BeAv. 6.
1 Stowe tl. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr., 547.
Bee Shook tl. R~tnkin. 6 Bisa. 477.
• The plaintiff sold his copyright
to defendant. The latter brought out
a new edition, not edited by plamtilf,
~bough purebasenl would naturally

suppose It was. The edition con.
tained mistakes and errors. Such a
publicaUon, cslcuh&ted to injure the
reputation of the author, is actionable. Arcbibold e. Sweet, 5 C. & P.
21D.
4 See Reade e. Sweetzer, 6 Abb. Pr.
(B. s.) 9, note.
• Cooper e. Greely, 1 Denio, 847;
Cooper e. Stone, 24 Wend. 4::w; 8. C.
inerror, 2 Denio, 298; Macleod •·
Wakley, 8 C. & P. 81L
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5. As a means of inﬂicting injury on the writer or receiver.

6. As autographs.
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Under the head of letters valuable as literary productions

should be classed all those letters which, from their intrinsic

literary merits, it might be deemed desirable to publish under an

expectation of proiit. Such were tlwltters of Horace \Valpole,

of Lord Chesterfield to his son, and any others. ' As regards

the right to make use of such letters, the rule of law appears to

be well settled. The literary property in them and the right to

determine their publication is in the writer, not thercceiver.

'1‘-his is so unless they are transmitted to the party addressed

under circumstances from which may fairly be implied an under-

standing that he is to be at liberty to make use of them for pub-

lication: in other words, that they are given to him for that

purpose.‘

But though the property is in the writer, it is not clear how,

under all circumstances, he is to avail himself of it. The decis-

ion in Pope v. Curl was that he might.enjoin the publication

by the receiver, but it was not said that he might recall the

letters from the receiver for the purpose of publishing himself.

N or could such a doctrine be sanctioned. When one writes and

sends a letter, he at least parts with the property in the paper on
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which the letter is written, and there is no implied reservation of

a liberty to recall it. If the writer has retained copies, he has

the means of making his literary property available; but if not,

he would be powerless to obtain them by any legal process.

Where letters have a value as historical documents, they are

likely also to possess what must be considered a literary value;

that is, a value for publication with a view to proﬁt. As such,

they of course come under the preceding head. But it is not

believed the literary property of the writer in them would pre-

vent the receiver making use of them as historical evidence, or

allowing others to make use of them for that purpose.

Where letters are of value only as they give evidence of pri-

vate transactions which may become the subject of a legal contro-

versy, the writer cannot be regarded as having in them any

property whatever. He may compel their production as evidence

in court whenever they will assist him in his suits, but so may

I

' Pope 0. Curl, 2 Atk. 842.

G. As a means of inflicting injury on the writer or receiver.
6. As aut()graphs.
Under the head of letters valuable as literary productions
should be classed all tho:.e letters which, from their intrinsic
literary merits, it might be deemed desirable to publish under an
expectation of profit. Such were tl~etters of Horace ·walpole,
of Lord Cbestl•rtield to his son, and,any others. · As regards
the right to make use of such letters, the rnle of law appear:; to
be well settled. The literary propet·ty in them and tho right to
determine their pnbli<"atiou is in the writer, not the receiver.
'f.his is so unletis tLey 1u-e tramm it ted to the party ~ddrcssed
nuder circumstances from which may fairly be implied an understanding that he is to be at liberty to make use of them fur publication: in other words, that they are given to him fur that
purpose.'
But though the property is in the writer, it is not clear how,
nuder all circumstances, he is to a\·ail himself of it. The decision in Pope v. Curl was that he might.enjoin the publication
by the receiver, bnt it was not said that he might rec!:Lll the
ll'tters from the recei\·er for the purpose of publishing himself'.
Nor t'Onld such a doctrine be sanctioned. When one writes and
st-nds a letter, he at least parts with the property in the paper on
which the letter is written, and there is no implied reservation of
.a liberty to recall it. It' the writer has retained copies, he has
the means of making his literary property 8\"ailnhle; but if not,
be wonld be powerless to obtain them by any legal process.
Where letters have a value as historical documents, they are
likely also to possess what mnst be consider<..>d a litcrnry value;
that is, a value for publication with a view to profit. As such,
tltey of course come under the preceding head. But it is not
believed the literary property of the writer in them would prevent the receiver making nse of them as histork-al e\·idence, or
allowing others to make use of them tor that purpose.
Where letters are of value only as they give evidence of pri~
vate transactions which may become the snbject of a legal controversy, the writer cannot be regarded as having in them any
p1·operty whatever. He may com pel their prod nction as e\·idence
in court whenever they will assist him in his suits, l>ut so ma1
1

Pope •· Curl, 9 A.tk. 842.
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any other person upon whose business transactions they may

358

TilE LAW OF TORTS.

throw light. The property in such letters, so far as there is any,

must be in the receiver; the writer having only a contingent

interest in them for the purposes of his litigation, but not a.

right that would prevent any disposition the receiver might sec

ﬁt to make of them.

If the value of the letter consists in the means it may afford

for the vindication of the writer against any unfounded charge,

he is also without the power to make it available, except as the

preservation of a copy may aid him. But the receiver may

make use of them for his own vindication, subject, however, to

the ordinary responsibility for libel in case he shall publish what

shall prove untrue and defamatory respecting others.

As is intimated above, the method of protecting literary prop-

erty in letters is usually by enjoining their publication by the

receiver. This, it is true, is an imperfect remedy; it prevents

others from making proﬁt from their publication, but it does not

enable the writer himself to obtain possession of them. It has

been decided in New York that chaueery will not enjoin the pub-

lication of private letters unless they possess a literary value.‘

It was also held that if the contents of the letter were such that

it could not be supposed the writer would consent to its publi-
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cation, the conclusion must be that the letter has no value as a

literary production.‘ But this seems a remarkable non sequitu-r,

especially as in the very case in which the decision was made the

defendant had published the plaintiﬂ"s letters, surreptitiously

obtained, expecting to derive a proﬁt therefrom.’ Mr. Justice

'Wclmore 0. Scovel, 3 Edw. Ch.

515; Hoyt 0. Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch.

8%.

’ Hoyt 0. Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 320.

‘The diary of Psmrs, so interest-

ing and of such historical value, was

carefully written down in a cipher

supposed to be unintelligible to oth-

ers, in order that the presentation of

weaknesses and foibles there made

might be concealed from the world;

but its value is increased by the very

circumstances that then induced the

any other pet·son upon whose business transactions they may
throw light. The property in such letters, so tar as there is any,
mnst be in the reeeiver; the writer having only a contingent
interest in them for the purposes of his litigation, but not a.
right that would prevent any disposition the receiver might see
fit to make of them.
If the vnlne of the letter consists in the means it may afford
for the vindication of the writer against any unfounded charge'"
he is also without the powet• to make it available, except as the
prcf:ervation of a copy may aid him. But the recei,·er may
make use of them for his own vindication, subject, however, tothe ordinary responsibility for libel in case he shall publish what
shall prove untrue and defamatory rcspeeting others.
As is intimated abo\·e, the method ot' protecting literary property in letters is usually by enjoining their publication by the
receiver. This, it is true, is an impet·fect remedy; it prevents
others from making profit from their publication, but it docs not
enable the writer hims~lf to obtain possession of them. It has.
been decided in New York that chancery will not enjoin the publication of private letters unless they possess a literary value.'
It was also held that if the contents of the letter were sueh that
it could not be snpposed the writer would consent to its publication, the conclusion must be that the letter has no value as a.
literary production.• But this seems a remarkable non sequitur<tespecially as in the very case in which the decision was made the
defendant had published the plaintiff's letters, surreptitiously
obtained, expecting to derive a profit therefrom.• Mr. Justice

secrecy.

The doctrine of Chancellor War.

wonrrn, in Hoyt 0. Mackenzie, in-

volves the following conclusions as

regards letters surreptitiously obtain-

ed, and which the purloiner proposes

to publish:

1. The writer cannot restrain their

publication where, from an inspec-

tion ot‘ their contents, it satisfactorily

appears that the writer himself would

not voluntarily have published them.

2. The receiver cannot restrain it,

because his property is only in the

paper on which the letters are writ-

tcn, and publication of copies will

not affect that.

1 Wetmore il. Scovel, 8 Edw. Ch.
ISliS; Hoyt "· Mackenzie, S Barb. Ch.

820.

Hoyt"· Mackenzie, S Barb. Ch. 820.
• The diary of PEPYB, so interest.
lng and of such historical value, waa
carefully written down in a cipher
allpposed to be unintelli~i!Jle toothers, in order that the presentation of
weaknesses o.nd foibles there made
might be concealed from the world;
but its value is increased by the very
circumstances that then Induced the
secrecy.
The doctrine of Cho.ncellor WAI,
1

in Hoyt il. 1\lack<·nzie, involves the following conclusions 118
regards letters surreptitiously obtain.
ed, nnd which the purloiner proposes.
to publish:
1. The writer cannot restrain their
publication where, from an inspeCtion of tlH·ir contents, it satisfactorily
appears that the writer bimse f would
nut voluntarily have published them.
2. The receiver cannot restrain it~
because his property is only in tlut
paper on which the letters are written, nnd publication of copies will
not affect that.
WORTH,
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Srronr has strongly contended for the jurisdiction of equity to
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restrain the publication of private letters on the ground of viola-

tion of conﬁdence and injury to the feelings;' and this seems

Sro:aY has strongly contemlcd for the jnrisJiction of eqnity to

much the more sensible doctrine, and it receives countenance

from cases cited in the margin.’

Where a. letter is valuable only as a curiosity or as an auto-

graph, the property must be in the receiver. But we should say

the receiver was under no obligation to treat such letters as a part

of his general estate. They are to be made use of as property

only at his option: they cannot be taken from him on execution,

or demanded from him by an assignee in banl<ruptcy.' Nobody

can be compelled to make market wares of his private letters

merely because they would sell in market. At his death they

would be family papers which his administrator could not of

right demand.‘ But it should be different with autographs which

have been bought for a collection. It‘ one has put his money in

them, and no matter of personal conﬁdence as between himself

and the writer is involved, they ought to be regarded, as any

other collection of curiosities might be, as constituting a part of

the owner's general estate, and as being subject to all the inci-

dents of personal property in general.

Wrongs in respect to Trade Marks. Persons engaged in a
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reputable business, and who purpose to build up a good will

therein which shall be valuable, usually carry on their business

under some particular name or designation that soon becomes

3. Third persons who might be in-

jured cannot restrain it. because the

only interest they cun have is to be

protected against defamation, and it

is settled that courts will not enjoin

the publication of defamatory matter,

restrain the publication of private letter~ on the ground of violation of confiJenee and injury to the feelings; 1 and this seems
much the mo1·e sensible Joctrinc, and it receives countenance
from cases cited in the margin.'
Where a letter is valunblc only as a curiosity or as an autograph, the propc1·ty must be in the receiver. But we should say
the receiver was under no obligation to treat such letters as a part
of his general estate. They are to be made use of ns property
only at his option: they cannot be taken from him on execution,
or demanded from him by an assignee in bankrnptcy.J Nobody
can be compelled to make market wares of his pri\"ate letters
merely becan::c they would sell in mat·ket. At his death they
would be family papers which his administrator could not of
right demand.' But it should be Jiffercnt with autographs which
havt> been hought for a collection. If one has pnt his money in
them, and no matter of personal confiden(..-e as between himself
and the writer is involved, they onght to be regarded, as any
other collection of curiosities might be, as constituting a part of
the owner's general estate, and as being subject to all the incidents of personal property in general.

but will leave that to be dealt with

after it is publishrd. See Gee 0. Prit-

chard, 2 Swanst. 402; Brandrrth 0.

Lance, 8 Paige, 24. Therefore nobody

can restrain the lawless action of one

who purloins the private letters ot'

Wrongs in respect to Trade Marks. Persons engaged in a
reputable business, and who purpose to build np a good will
therein which shall be valuable, usually carry on their business
under some particular name or designation that soon becomes

others and proposes to publish them!

For a case in which the publication

of libelous matter was enjoined, see

Dixon 0. Holden, L. R 7 Eq. 488.

' 2 Story, Eq. J uris. §§ 946-948.

' Woolsey 0. J udd, 4 Duer, 879;

Eyre 0. Hlgbec-,35 Barb. 502; Grigshy

0. Breckinridge, 2 Bush, 480.

' Soc Thompson 0. Stanhope, Amb.

737; Gee 0. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402;

Earl of Grannard v. Dunkin, 1 Ball

& B. 207.

‘ See the case of Tobias Lear's Let-

ters, Eyre 0. H igbee, 35 Barb. 502. It

is held in this case that the adminis-

trator has no right to take possession

of and sell the private letters of his

intestate. Also, that as between the

heir and the widow, long possession

of the letters by the latter after the

husband’s death will justify a pre-

sumption that they were given to her.

8. Third persona who might be Injured cannot restrain it. because the
only interest they Ctm have is to be
protected agtlinat defamtltlon, and I&
la aettled that Murts will not enjoin
the publication of Ul'fumatory matter,
bnt will leave that to be dealt with
after it is publishrd. See Gee o. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402; Brandrt·th ~.
Lance, 8 Paige, 24. Then·fore nobody
can rf'F-trnln the lawless action of one
who purloins the prh·ate letters or'
others and proposes to publish them I
For a cn~:~e in which the pul•lication
of Hbelnus matter w:~s enjoined, see
Dixon "· Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 488.
s 2 Story, Eq. Juris.§§ 946-048.

• Woolsey •· Judd, ~ Duer, 879;
Eyre o. H lgbet-, 35 Br.rb. 502; Grigsby
e. Breekinridge, 2 Bush, 480.
• 8<-e Thompson "· Stanhope, Amb.
787; Gee "· Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402;
Earl of Grannard "· Dunk.in, 1 Ball
& B. 207.
'St>e the esse of Tobia9 J..ear's Let.
ters, Eyre 11. Higbee, 35 Barb. 502. It
is held in this case that the aliminis.
tr:1tor hHs no right to take possession
of and sell the private letters of his
intl'statc. Also, that as between the
heir and the widow, long possession
of the letters by the latter :\fler tbu
husband's denth will justify a pre.
aumplion that they were given to her.

--~~~~~~
~-.---,1.4~"'}-. • ZIU'fb~~F_,.
~~ ~ ~ ~

sag;

l

~5tit>\\'11, and constitutes an assurance to the public that t~

nntlung use of the name or desigmtion in that business continue

~~~''" n

~nown,

év‘/"7: P?/. t carry it on in the customary way. So a manufacturer adopts

J77,

t£%;g"ro|n all others, and the public who have been accustomed

understanding that in doing so they are purchasing the same

article to which the device or label has before been aﬂixed. So a

newspaper or magazine has its title, and a coach may be painted

and named for a particular route, upon which the public will

understand it is to run, and will not after a time need to have the

fact otherwise advertised.

Whatever name, designation, label, or device has thus in any

manner been appropriated by a person or association of persons

engaged in any lawful business becomes a trade mark, in the use

of which he or they are entitled to be protected. The right to

protection springs from two circumstances : First. That by

adopting and making use of the trade mark a property right has

been acquired therein which is valuable; and, Second. That

another in making use of it practices a fraud, not only upon the
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public, who are thereby deceived into purchasing one article when

they suppose they are getting another, but also upon the pro-

prietor or proprietors of the trade mark, whose own dealings

with the public are likely to be limited in proportion as the

public are induced to deal with the fraudulent; appropriator.'

Therefore the law will protect the proprietor of a trade mark,

not only by enjoining the use of it by another, but by giving

damages for the violation of the right to its exclusive use.“

5-.:;2¢€.:._/z:7iCc/4.,

‘Davis 0. Kendall, 2 R. I. 556;

Walton 0. Crowley, 3 Blutch. 440;

McCartney 0. Garnhnrt, 45 Mo. 593;

Filley 0. Fnssett, 44 Mo. 168; Amos-

keag Manuf. Co. 0. Spear, 2 Sandf.

599.

’ High on Injunctions, 673; Hirstv.

Denham, L. R. 14 Eq. Cas. 542; S. C.

8 Monk, 833; Coﬁieen o. Brunton, 4

ua;::e4...l

.....

~C(~-:;_

•

...

and con:;titutcs an assurance to the public that ~
m'aking use of tlic name or designation in that bnsine:;s continue
~ carry it on in the customary way. So a manufacturer adopta
~~-fJitl,device or label f.Jr his wares, intending thereby to distinguish
~R~~ tJiCfl!! )'rom all others, and the public who have hecn accustomed
"T" ~- with him purchase the article with this device or label,
understanding that in dl>ing l\0 they are purchasing the same
article to which the device or label has O\!fore been atlixed. So a
newspaper or magazine has its title, and a coach may be painted
and named for a particular route, upon which the public will
understand it is to mn, and will not after a time need to have the
fact otherwise advertised.
Whatever name, designation, label, or deYice has thus in any
manner been appropriated by a person or association of persons
engaged in any lawful business beL-omcs a trade mark, in the use
of which he or they are entitled to be protected. The right to
protection springs from two circumstances : First. That by
adopting and making use of the trade mark a property right hu
been acquired therein which is '\"aluable; and, Second. That
another in making use of it practices a fraud, not only upon the
public, who are thereby deceived into purchasing one article when
they suppose they are getting another, but also upon the proprietor or proprietors of the trade mark, whose own dealings
with the pnb1ie are likel)· to be limited in proportion as the
public are induced to deal with the ft·audulent appropriator.•
Therefore the law will protect the proprietor of a trade mark,
not only by enjoining the use of it by another, but by giving
damages for the violation of the right to its exclusive use.'

' eJ,

% hidevice or label for his wares, intending thereby to distinguish

to with him purchase the article with this device or label,

;9l!TS"..£"

·; '71,

McLean. 516; Congress, etc., Spring

Co. 0. Highrock, etc., Spring Co., 45

N.Y.291; S. C.6At11. Rep. 82; stone-

breaker 0. Stonebraker. 33 Md. 252;

Perry v. Trueﬂtt, 6 Beav. 66. The

gr-neral principles governing the pro-

tection of trade marks cannot be bet-

ter stated than in the language of a

recent decision: “The principle upon

which relief is given in these cases

is that one man cannot offer his goods

for sale, representing them to be the

manutitcture of a rival trader. Sup-

posing the rival to have obtained

celebrity in his manufacture, he is

entitled to all the advantages of that

celebrity, whether resulting from tho

greater demand for his goods or from

the higher price which the public are

Davie e. Kendall, 9 R. I. lili6;
Wallon •· Crowley, 8 Dlatcb. 440;
McCartney v. Garnhl\rt, ~ Mo. G83;
Filley v. Fassett, 44 Jtlo. 168; Amos.
keag Manuf. Co. •· Spear, 2 Saodf.
699.
t Hlghon lnjunctione,673; Hlratv.
Denham, L. R. 14 Eq. Cas. 542; S.C.
8 Moak, 833; Coffeen •· Brunton, '
McLeun. 516; Congress, etc., Spring
Co. e. IIighrock, etc., Spring Co., 45
N.Y. 291 ; B. C. 6 Am. Rep. 82; Stonebrea&ker •· Stonebraker. 33 Jtld. 252;
Perry •· Trueau, 6 Beav. 66. The
1

grneral principles @'Ovcming the protection nf trade mllrks cannot be bet.
wr stated than in the language of •
recent decision: "The principle upou
which relillf Ia given in tbcso cuea
is that one man cannot offer his goode
for sale, repn•.;cntinp; them to be the
manufacture of a rinl trader. Sap.
polling the rival to have obtained
celebrity in his manufacture, be Ia
l'Dlillcd to all the advantages of that
celebrity, whether resulting from tho
,rreatt'r dem11nd for his goods or from
tbc higher price which the pnblic are
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for a trade mark wha.te\'er he chooses; but when he asserts and

seeks to enforce exclusive right therein, it becomes necessary to

ascertain whether it is just to others that this be permitted. -If

the name, device, or designation is purely arbitrary or fanciful,

willing to give for them. rather than

for goods of other manufacturers

whose reputation is not so high.

Whore, therefore, a manufacturer has

What may be a Trade Hark. In general, a man may adppt
for a trade mark whatt·,·er he chooses; bot when he asserts anti
seeks to enforce exclusive right therein, it becomes necessary to
ascertain whether it is just to others that thi~ be permitted. •If
the name, device, or designation is purely arbitrary or fa.ucifpl,

been in the habit of stamping the

goods which he has manufactured

with a particular mark or brand, so

that thereby persons purchasing

goods of that description know them

to be of his manufacture, no other

manufacturer has a right to adopt the

same stamp. By so doing he would

be substantially reprvsenting the

goods to be the manufacture of the

manufacturer who had previously

adopted the stamp or mark in ques-

tlon, and so would or might be de-
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priving him of the proﬁt he might

have made by the sale of the goods

which, an h_i/porlwsi, the purchaser in-

tended to buy.

“The law considers this to be wrong

towards the person whose mark is

thus assumed, for which wrong he

has a right of action, or, which is

the more effectual remedy, a right to

restrain by injunction the wrongful

use of the mark thus pirated.

“It is obvious that, in these cases.

questions of considerable nicety may

arise as to whether the mark adopted

by one trader is or is not the same as

that previously used by another trader

complaining of its illegal use, and it

is hardly necessary to say llmt, in

order to entitle n party to relief, it is

by no means necessary that there

should be absolute identity.

"What degree of resemblance is

necessary from the nature of things,

is a matter incapable of deﬁnition

1) prion‘. All that courts of justice

can do is to say that no trader can

adopt a trade mark so resembling

that of a rival as that ordinary pur-

chascrs, purchasing with ordinary

caution, are likely to be misled.

“ It would be n mistake, however,

to suppose that the resemblance must

be such as would deceive persons who

should see the two marks placed side

by side. The rule so restricted would

be of no practical use." Scixo 0.

Provezende, L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 191. 195.

See, also, McLean v. Fleming, U. B.

Sup. Ct., April, 1878.

For further cases, reference is made

to Wolfe o. Barnett, 24 La. Ann. 97;

S. C. 13 Am. Rep. 111; Gillott 0. Ea

terbrook, 48 N. Y. 874; S. C. B Am.

Rep. 553: Meriden Britania Co. 0.

Parker, 39 Conn. 450; S. C. 12 Am.

Rep. 401; Boardman 0. Meriden, etc.,

Un.. 86 (‘onn. 207; Morrison 0. Case.

willing to give for them. rather than
for ,goods of other manufacturers
whose rl'putation fa not eo high.
\Vhcre, tlwrefol'(', a m:lnufacturer has
been in the habit of stamping the
gooU& which he bas manufactured
with a partirular mark or brand, so
tba' then·hy p<•rsons purch:•sing
good~ of that description know them
w be of his mauulilcture, no other
manufacturer has a right to ac1opt the
same stamp. By so doing he would
be substantially rt>pr('Sl'nting the
goods to be the manufacture of the
manufacturer who bad previously
sdopted the stamp or mark in question, and 110 would or might be de.
priving him of the profit be might
have made by the sale of tho goods
w11ich, u h,l/potl.ai, the purchaser intcndt•d to Luy.
"The lnw considers this to be wrong
towards the person whose mark it>
thus assumed, for which wrong be
ba~ a right of action, or, which is
the more effectual remedy, a right to
rc~;train by injunction the wrongful
ase of the mruk thus pirated.
"It is obvious that, in these cases,
qul'.~tions of consiclernble nicety mny
ari..c as to whether the mark adopted
by one tro.dtor is or is not the same aa
thllt previously used hy another trade-r
compl11inlng of it:! illcg1ll use, and U
is hardly necessnry to !'ay thut, in
order to entitle a party to relief, it Ia
by no means nec<·ssl\ry tl1nt there
~;lumld be absolute identity.
"What dt•grce of resemblance Ia
neecssary from the n:lture of things.
ia a matter iuc·llpablc of dl'tlnition
4 prir>ri. All thut comts of jua~Lico

can do ia to say that no trader can
adopt. a trade mark so resembling
that or a rival lUI that ordinary purchnsers, pun•hasing with ordinary
caution, are likely to ho misled.
"It would be a n1istake, however,
to suppose that the resemblance mu~t
be such as would deceive persons whn
should see the two marks placed side
by side. The rule !IO restricted wo\&ld
be of no practical use." Scixo e~.
Prove7.endc, L. R. 1 Cb. Ap. 191, 1~.
See, also, )lcLeRn "· Fleming, U. 8.
Sup. Vt., April, 1871:1.
Fnr further cases, reference is m!Uie
~Wolfe e~. Barnett, 24 La. Ann. 07;
S. C. 13 Am. Rep. 111; Gillott e~. Es..
tcrbrook, 48 N.Y. 374; S.C. 8 Am.
Rep. 5,j3: Meriden Brit.ania Co. "·
Parker, 811 Conn. 450; S. C. 12 Am.
Rep. 401; Boardman c. Meriden, etc.,
Co.. 86 C'unn. 207; Morrison e~. Case.
9 Blntchf. 548; Stonebraker •· Stonc.
brakcr, 3S Mrl. 252.
To constitute piracy of a trade
mark, the resemblance need not be
exact: it is sumcient if a purchaser,
looking at the 11rlicle ufft·red to him,
would nntur11lly be led, l'rom tbl.' mark
lmpre~Pd on it, to suppose it to be
the pr<'ductton of the riv~tl manufRCturer, and would pnrC'11:\se it in that
belief. Seixo e~. Pron•zrtu.1e, L. R. 1
Ch. Ap. 101, 196; Burke l!. Cassin, 4/i
Cal. 467; 8. C. 13 Am. Hl.'p. 204.
In the "t;nitNl States trade marks
may be patl.'ntct.l. 1\lul to tnke out letters pntent may be a convl.'nient way
of avoiding dimculties. For the law,
and decisions under the same, 1ee
Bump on Patents, etc., 348.
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exclusive use of it is unquestionable.‘ But the mere designa-

tion of a quality, as “ nourishing,” applied to an article of drink,

cannot be appropriated as a trade mark;’ neither can any gen-

eral description, by words in common use, of a kind of article,

or of its nature or qualities.‘ Nor, as a general thing, can a man

acquire an exclusive right to his own name as a trade mark, as

against others of the same name who may see ﬁt to engage in

the same business; ‘ though if the latter resort to any such arti-

ﬁce or device, in connection with a use of the name, as shall be

calculated to mislead the public, they may be restrained from

such use; for it cannot be tolerated that one shall take advantage

of the accidental circumstance of an identity of names to with-

draw trade from a rival by practicing a deception upon the

public.‘ Nor can the name of a place be appropriated as a trade

mark as against others who may see ﬁt to engage in the same

‘As the “ New Era." newspaper;

Bell o Locke, 8 Paige, '75. See, also,

Hogg 0. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215; Maxwell

0. Hoggl L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 307; “Dr.

Johnson's Yellow Ointment." Single-

ton o. Bolton, 3 Doug. 293; The “Veg-
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etable Puin Killer," Davis o. Kendall,

2 R. I. 566; " Congress Spring," Con-

and has been first brought into use by him, his right to th&
exclusi\·e use of it is unquestionable.' But the mere designation of a quality, as "nourishing," applied to an article of drink,
cannot be appropriated as a trade mark;' neither can any general description, by words in common use, of a kind of article,
or of its nature or qualities." Nor, as a general thing, can a man
acquire an exclusi,·e right to his own name as a trade mark, as
against others of the same name who may see fit to engage in
the same business; • though if the latter resort to any such artifice or dC\·icc, in connection with a use of the name, as shall be
calculated to mislead the public, they may be restrained from
such use; for it cannot be tolerated that one shall take ad,·antage
of the accidental circumstance of an identity of names to withdraw trade from a rival by practicing a deception upon the
public.' Nor eRn the name of a place be appropriated as a trade
mark as against others who may see fit to engage in the same

gress, etc., Spring Co. -n. High Rock,

etc., Spring Co., 45 N. Y. 291; “Eu-

reka Shirt," Ford 0. Foster, L R.7

Ch. Ap. 611; “ What Cheer House,”

Woodward ~u. Lazar, 21 Cal. 448; “ Re-

vere House," as the designation of a

coach to run to that house; Marsh o.

Billings, '7 Cush. 322; “Roger Wil-

liams Long Cloth," Barrows v. Knight,

6 R. 1.434. And, see Taylor v. Car-

penter, 3 Story, 4'18; S. C. 2 Wood &

M. 1; Burnett 1:. Phalon, 3 Keyes, 594;

Me.-indrews 0. Bnssett, 10 Jurist. (N.

s.) 550; S. C. 12 W. R. 777.

' Raggett 0. Findlater, L. R. 17 Eq.

Gas. 29; S. C. '7 Moak, 653. See Tay-

lor 0. Gillies, 59 N. Y 331; S. C. 17

Am. Rep. 333; Stokes 0. Landgruﬂ‘,

17 Barb. 608; Caswell v. Davis, 58 N.

Y. 223; S. C. 1'7 Am. Rep. 233; Can-

dee 0. Deere, 54 Ill. 439: S. 0.5 Am.

Rep. 125; Burke 0. Cassin, 45 Cal. 467;

S. C. 13 Am. Rep. 204.

' Gilman 9. Hunuewell, 122 Mass.

189; Wolfe 0. Goulard, 18 How. Pr.

64; Amoskeag Manuf. (‘o. o. Spear, 2

Sandf. Ch. 599; Dunbar v. Glenn, 42

Wis, 118; Clmynski 0. Cohen, 39 Cal.

501; S. C. 2 Am. Rep. 476; Burke 0.

(Jassin, 4-3 Gal. 467; S. C. 13 Am. Rep.

204; Taylor o. Gillies, 59 N. Y. 331;

Caswell 0. Davis, 58 N. Y. 223; S. C.

17 Am. Rep. 233.

' Rogers 0. Taintor, 97 Mass. 291;

Emerson v. Badger, 101 Mass. 82; Gil-

mun v. Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 139;

Clark '0. Clark, 25 Barb. '79; Faber o.

Faber, 49 Barb. 357; Meneely v. Me-

necly, 62 N. Y. 427; S. C. 20 Am. Rep.

489. But he will be protected in -his

exclusive use of it as against another

oi‘ a dilferent name. Millington 0.

Fox, 3 Myl. & Or. 338; Burke 0. Cas-

sin, 45 Cal. 467; S. C. 13 Am. Rep.

204

1 As the '' NeuJ Era" newspaper;
Bell ., Locke, 8 Paige, 75. See, also,
Hogg t~. Kirby, 8 Ves. 21;); Maxwell
t~. llogg, L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 807; " Dr.
Johnson's Yellow Ointment.'' Single.
ton"· Bolton, 8 Doug. 298; The "Veg.
etable Pain Killer," Davis"· Kendall,
2 R.I. 566; "Congn·ss Spring," Con.
gress, ete., Spring Co. "· High Rock,
etc., Spring Co., 45 N.Y. 291; "Eureka Shirt," Ford "· Foster, L R. 'l
Cb. Ap. 611; " What Cheer House,"
WoodwiU"dil. Lazar, 21 Cal. 448; '' Revere House," as the designation of a
coach to run to that house; Marsh e.
Billings, 7 Cush. 82~; "Roger Williams Long Cloth," Barrowu. Knight,
6 R. 1. 484. And, see Taylor "· Carpenter, S Story, 4")8; S.C. 2 Wood &
ll. 1 ; Burnett"'· Phalon, 3 Keyes, 594;
McAndrews "· Bns!lelt, 10 Jurist. (N.
B.) 550; R. 0. 12 w. H. 777.
• Haggett"· Findlater, L. R. 17 Eq.
Cas. 29; S. C. 7 .M oak, 6:i3. See Taylor "· Gillies, 59 N . Y R31; S. C. 17
Am. Rep. 33:J; Stokes t!. Land gruff,
17 Barb. 608; Caswell"· Davis, 58 N.
Y. 223; S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 233; Candee t~. Deere, 54 Ill. 439: B. C. 5 Am.

Rep. 125; Burke e. Cassin, 45 Cal. 46'7 >
B. C. 13 Am. Rep. 204.
• Uilman e. Hunnewell, 122 Mass.
189; Wolfe t!. Uoulard, 18 How. Pr.
64; Amoskeag M~&nuf. C'o. " · Spear,ll
Sandf. Ch. 5U9; Dunbar "·Glenn, 4~
Wis, 118; Choyn~>ki 11. Cohen, 39 Cal.
501; B. C. 2 Am. Rep. 476; Burke "·
Cassin, 4.3 Cal. 467; B. C. 13 Am. Uep.
204; Tnylor "· Gillies, 59 N. Y. 881>
Caswell t!. Davis, 58 N. Y. 223; B. C.
17 Am. Rep. 233.
' Rogers "· Taintor, 97 .!\lass. 291>
Emerson"· Badger, lOt Mas.~. 82; Gilman "· Hunnewell, 122 Ma!ls. 189;
Clark"· Clark, 2:> Barh. 79; Faber.,_
Faber, 49 Barb. 3.'>7; lleneely 11. 1\le.
neely, 62 N.Y. 427; S.C. 20 Am. Rep.
489. But he will be protected in -his
exclusive use of It RS against another
of a different name. Millington e.
Fox, S 1\lyl. & Cr. 3:l8; Burke"· CRSsln, 45 Cal. 467; B. C. 18 Am. Rep.
204.
• Croft to. Day, 7 Beav. 84; Rod~ers
o. Nowill, 5 .M. G. & B. 109; Burgess
t~. Burgess, 3 De G. M. & G 896; Cnlladay "· Hulrd, 4 Phil. 141; Sykes t!.
Sykes, 8 B. & C. 541; Meriden Bri-
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who, at a diﬁerent place, undertakes to appropriate it; as where

parties at Syracuse proposed to sell cement under the designa-

tion “ Akron,” which was the name under which the cement pro-

duced at Akron had been previously sold.‘

The trade mark may be applied to a natural product as well as

to a. manut'acture, as in the case of the celebrated “ Congress”

water,‘ the “ Bethesda ” water,‘ etc. The right to it may be sold

with the business, but not without.‘ And it may be lost by being

tsnia Co. 0. Parker, 89 Conn. 450; S.

C. 12 Am. Rep. 401; Holmes v.

Holmes, etc., Co., 87 Conn. 278; S. C.

9 Am. Rep. 324. As where the plain-

tlﬂ' was proprietor of “Hol|oway’s

Pills," and the defendant commenced

business at the same p18.<.-e,' though it may be as agaiust one
who, at a different place, undertakes to appt·opriate it; a.., whero
parties at Syracuse proposed to sell cement under the designation "Akron," which was the name under which the cement produced at Akron had been pl'evionsly sold.'
The trade mark niay be applied to a natural product ns well as
to a manufacture, as in the case of the celebrated "Cotlgt·e:5s"
water,• the "Bethesda" water: etc. The right to it mny l>e sold
with the business, but not witho~t.· And it may be lost by being

selling pills as " H. Holl0way’s Pills,”

but put up in boxes and pots, and

with labels similar to the plaintiﬂ"s.

Lord LANGDALE: "I think this as

plain and as clearly avowed a fraud

as I ever knew. Ido not mean to say

that I have any sort of respect for
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this sort of medicines; Ihave none.

But the law protects persons from

fraudulent misrepresentations, and

this is a species of property which

the law docs allow, and so long as

the law recognizes it, it must be pro-

tected, and persons in the situation

of the defendant will not be allowed

to practice a fraud like that here com-

plained of." Holloway e. Holloway,

13 Bcav. 209, 213. Compare Seixo 0.

Provezende, L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 191. In

all such cases the vital question is,

whether that which is done by the

defendant is calculated to deceive and

defraud. Leather Cloth Co. o. Am.

Leather Cloth Co., 11 H. L. Cas. 528;

Singer Manut‘. C0. 0. Wilson, 2 Ch.

Div. -134; S. C. 16 Monk, 827; James

0. James, L R. 13 Eq. 421; Brook-

lyn White Lead Co. o. Masury,25

Barb. 416; Candee 0. Deere, 54 Ill.

439; S C. 5 Am. Rep. 125; Gilman 0.

Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 139; Delaware,

etc., Canal Co. 0. Clark, 13 Wall. 811.

A corporation will be protected in its

name as a trade mark. Newby 0.

Oregon, etc., R. Co., 1 Deady, 609.

‘Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler, 75

Penn. St. 467; S C. 15 Am. Rep. 599;

Candee o. Deere, 54 Ill. 439; S. C. 5

Am. Rep. 125; Brooklyn White Lead

(,‘o.o. Masury, 25 Barb. 416; Dunbar

v. Glenn, 42 Wis. 118; Canal Co.o.

Clark, 13 Wall. 311.

' Newman o. Alvord, 49 Barb. 588;

S. C. on Appeal, 51 N. Y. 189; S. C.

10 Am. Rep. 588. See Glen, etc.,

Manuf. Co. 0. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226; B.

C. 19 Am. Rep. 278. But where the

name is made use of, even by a resi-

dent, in a way calculated to mislead,

the deceptive use may he enjoined.

Lee 0. Haley, L. R. 5 Ch. Ap.155;

Raddc v. Norman, L. R. 14 Eq. Cas.

348; S. C. 8 Monk, 776; WUlllL'i‘Sp00l1

o. Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 508: Mc.-\n-

tanla Co. tJ, Parkrr, 39 Conn. 41i0; B.
0. 12 Am. Rep. 401; Holm<'S "·
Holmes, etc., Co., 37 Conn. 278; B. C.
9 Am. Rep. 324. As where the plaintift' was proprietor of "Holluwuy's
Pills," and the defendnntcommenccd
eelllng pills as" H. Holloway's Pills,"
but put up in boxes and pots, and
wllh labels similar lo the plRinlift''e.
Lord LANGDALE: •• I think this as
plain and as clearly avowed a fraud
u I ever knew. I do not mean to say
\bat I have any sort of resprct for
Ulla sort of medicines; I have none.
But the l&w protects persons from
fraudulent misrepresentations, and
tbla Is a species ot property which
&be law docs allow, and so long as
Che law recognizes it, it must be protected, and peraona in the situation
of tbe defendant will not be &llowed
to practice a fraud like that here r.om.
plained of." Holloway e. Holloway,
18 Bcav. 209, 218. Compare 8elxo e.
Prove:r.ende, L. R. 1 Cb. Ap. 191. In
all such cases the vital question is,
whether that which Is done by the
defendant is calculated to deceh•e and
defl'l\ud. Lellther Cloth Co. "· Am.
Leather Cloth Co., 11 H. L. Cas. 52.ct;
Binger Manuf. Co. "· Wilson, 2 Ch.
Dlv. 434; B. C. 16 Moak, 827; James
•· James, L. R. 13 Eq. 421; Brooklyn White Lend Co. "· Masury, 2:i
Barb. 416; Candee "· Deere, 54 Ill.
439; 8. C. 5 Am. Rep. 121S; Gilman e.
Hunnewell, 122 Mll8S. 189; Delaware,

etc., Cunni Co."· ClRrk, 18 Wull. 311.
A corpoi'Rtlon will be protected In its
name as 11 tra1le mark. Newby "·
Oregon, etc., R Co., 1 Deady, 600.
1 Gll·n<lon
Iron Co. ~'· Uhler, 7G
Penn. St. 467; B C. 15 Am. Rep. 599;
Cundec e. Deere, 54 Ill. 4:11}; 8. C. 5
Am. Hep. 125; Brooklyn White Lead
Co. tJ. Muury, 2.') Barb. 416; Dunbar
e. Glenn, 42 Wis. 118; Canal Co. "·
Clark, 18 Wall. 311.
1 Newmun e. Alvord, 49 Barb. :iSS:
B. C. on Appeal, 51 N.Y. 189; S.C.
10 Am. Hep. 588. See Glen, etc.,
Manuf. Co."· Hull, 61 N.Y. 226; B.
C. 10 Am. Uep. 2';8. But where the
name is made U"C of, even by a resident, In a way calc-ulated to mlslearl,
the deceptive use may be enjoined.
Lee e. Haley, L. R. 5 Ch. Ap. 1M i
Rnddc ~'· Norman, L. R. 14 Eq. Cns.
348; B. C. 8 :!\Ioak, 776; Wother!lpoon
e. Currie, L. R 5 H. L. li08; }leAndrew e. Bassett, 4 De G. J. & B. aBO.
See the subject examined in Del &
Hud. Canal Co. e. Clark, 18 Wall. 311.
• Congress, etc., Spr log Co. "· Ilil!h
Rock, etc., Spring Co., 45 N. Y. 291;
B. C. 6 Am. Rep. 82. And see Lee e.
Haley, L. R. 5 Cb. Ap. Iilli.
• Dunbar "· Glenn, 42 Wis. 118.
The snhjcctof trnde marks is carefully
ancl fully cont~idcrt.od in this CllSC, as
it Is also In ~I· · Lean "· Fleming, U.
B. Sup. Ct April, 1878, not yet in tile
reporlS.
• Btulka ~. Gibson, 84 Beav. 566;
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suffered, without objection, to'come into common use in the

864

TDE LAW OF TORTS.

trade.‘ An oﬁicial inspector, who brands the packages packed

by him in his business with his oﬁicial brand, cannot thereby

acquire a private right in the brand as a trade-mark.’

What is an Infringement. In order to constitute an infringe-

ment it is not necessary that the imitation should be exact. It

is suﬁicient that there is such a substantial similarity that the

public would be likely to be deceived.’ Thus a change from

suffered, without objection, to· come into eommon use in the
trade.1 An official inspector, who brands the packages packed
by him in his business with his offieiul brand, cannot thereby
acqnire a pri \'ate right in the brand as a trade-mark.•

“ Hostetter’s Celebrated Stomach Bitters ” to “ lI0lsteter’s Cele-

brated Stomach Bitters” is manifestly merely colorable;‘ and

changes much more considerable might, nevertheless, leave the

similarity sufﬁcient to mislead. It has been said that when

ordinary attention on the part of customers will enable them to

discriminate between trade marks of different parties the court

will not interfere; ’ but where the evident purpose is to mislead,

this is a rule that courts would not be likely to apply with much

liberality in favor of a party attempting an unfair advantage}

Aliens resident in the country will be given protection in their

trade marks, as well as citizens; ’ but a trade mark that in itself

is fraudulent and deceptive cannot be the subject of property, and

will not be protected. Thus, where the trade mark in Spanish,

of cigars made in New York, contained the representation that
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they were made in Havana, a bill to restrain the use of an imita-

tion was dismissed. “The maxim which is generally expressed,

‘He twho comes into equity must come with clean hands,’ but

sometimes in stronger language, ‘ He that hath committed iniquity

Leather Cloth Co. 0. Am. Leather

What is an Infringement. In order to cohstitute an infringement it is not necessary that the imitation should be exact. It
is sufficient that there is such a substantial similarity that the
public would be likely to be deceived.• Thus a change from
"Hostetter's Celebrated Stomach Bitters" to'' Holsteter's Celebrated Stomach Bitters" is manifestly merely colorable; • and
ehanges mnch more considerable might, nevertheless, leave the
similarity sufficient to mislead. It has been said that when
ordinary attention on the part of customers will enable them to
discriminate between trade marks of' different parties the court
will not interfere; • bnt where the evident purpose is to mislead,
th;o is a rule that eourts would not be likely to apply with much
liberality in favor of a party attemptirig an unfair advantage.•

Cloth Co., 11 H. L. 533.

' Ford 0. Foster, L. R. 7 Ch. Ap.

611; S. C. 3 Moak, 538; Caswell 0.

Davis, 58 N. Y. 223; S. C. 17 Am. Rep.

‘Z33.

‘Chase 0. Mayo, 121 Mass. 843.

For further cases of more or less in-

terest, reference is made to Filley 0.

Fassett. 44 Mo. 168; Marsh -v. Bil-

lings,7 Cush. 322; Gorham 0. Plate,

40 Ual. 593; S. O. 6 Am. Rep. 639.

' Bradley 0. Norton, 33 Conn. 157;

Cotfcen 0. Brunton, 4 McLean, 516;

Aliens resident in the country will be given protection in tlleir
trade marks, as well as citizens;' but a trade mark that in itself
is fraudulent and dec·eptive cannot be the subject of property, and
will not be protected. Thus, where the trade mark in Spanish,
of cigars made in New York, contained the representation that
they were made in Hava1~a, a bill to restrain the use of an imit;a..
tion was dismis~ed. "The maxim which is generally ox pressed,
'He twho comes into equity mnst come with clean hands,' but
sometimes in stronger language,' He tha.t hath committed iuiquit1

Taylor 0. Carpenter, 2 Sandi‘. Ch. 608;

Partridge 0. Menck, 2 Sandi‘. Ch. 622;

Popham 0. Cole, 66 N. Y. 69; S C.

23 Am. Rep. 22.

‘ Hostelter o. Vowinkle, 1 Dill. 329.

' Popham o. Cole, 66 N. Y. 69; S.

C. 23 Am. Rep. 22.

' Boardman 0. Meriden, etc., Co.,

Leather Cloth Co. e. Am. Leather
Cloth Co., 11 R. L. ~23.
1 Ford e. Foster, L. R. 'l Ch. Ap.
611 ; B. C. 8 Hoak, 538; Caswell e.
Davis, 58 N.Y. 223; B. C.17 Am. Rep.
~8.

85 Conn. 402; Caswell v. Davis, 58 N.

Y. 223; S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 233; Gor-

hnm Co. 0. White, 14 Wall. 511. 52$.

' State v. Gibbs, 56 Mo. 133; Tay-

lor o. Carpenter, 8 Story, 468.

1 Chl\88 •· Mayo, 121 Maes. 843.
For further cases of more or less in.
t<'rest, reference is made to Filley e.
FRSSett. 44 Mo. 168; Harsh e. Billings, 7 Cush. 822; Gorham "·Plate,
40 Cal. 598; 8. 0. 6 Am. Rep. 689.
• Bradley e. Norton, S3 Cnnn. 157;
Coffeen •· Brunton, 4 McLean, 616;

Taylor•. Carpenter, 9 Sandt'. Ch. 803;
Partridge e. Menck, 2 Sandt: Oh. 622;
Popham e. Cole, 66 N. Y. 6D; 8 a.
23 Am. Rep. 22.
• Hostettere. Vowinkle,l Dill. S.
• Popbant e. Cole, 66 N. Y. 88; 8.
0. 28 Am. Rep. 22.
• Boardman e. Meriden, etc., Oo.,
SIS Conn. 402; Caswell e. Davis, ISS N.
Y. 223; B. C. 17 Am. Rep. 23!1; Gorham Co. e. Wb ite, 14 WIllI. IU 1, IJSS.
'State e. Gibbs, 56 Mo. 138; Ta7lor .. Carpenter, 8 Btoey, 4.158.
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shall not have equity,’ has been often applied to bills to restrain

865

by injunction the counterfeiting of trade marks. The ground

on which thejurisdiction of equity in such cases is rested is the

promotion of honesty and fair dealing. because no one has a right to

sell his own goods as the goods of another.‘ ‘It is perfectly mani-

fest,’ said Lord LANGDALE, ‘that to do this is a fraud, and a very

gross fraud.’ It is plain that there is no class of (mses in which

the maxim referred to can be more properly applied. The party

who attempts to deceive the public by the use of a trade mark

which contains on its face a falsehood as to the place where his

goods are manufactured, in order to have the benelit of the repu-

tation which such goods have acquired in the market, is guilty

of the same fraud of which he complains in the defendant. He

certainly can have no claim to the extraordinary interposition of

a tribunal constituted to administer equity, for the purpose of

securing to him the proﬁts arising from his fraudulent act.”'

Good will of a Business. What has been said about the

infringement of rights in trade marks will apply to all devices

by means of which one endeavors to deprive another of the value

of the good will of his business by deceiving the public. The

good will of a business is often very valuable property,’ and the

use of a trade mark is only one method of building it up. Other
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deceptions besides the piracy of a trade mark may be equally

effectual in destroying its value in some cases; and here, as in

shaH not have equity,' bas been often applied to billa to restrain
by injunction the counterfeiting of trade marks. The ground
on which the jurisdiction of equity in such cases is rested is the
promotion of honesty and fair dealing. because no one has a right to
sell his own goods as the goods of another.' 'It is perfectly manifest,' said Lord LANGDALE, 'that to do this is a frand, and a very
gross fraud.' It is plain that there is no class of cases in which
the maxim referred to can be more properly applied. The party
who attempts to deceive the public by the use of a trade mark
which contains on its face a falsehood as to the place where his
~:,roods aro manufactured, in order to have the benefit of the reputation which etnch goods have acquired in the market, is guilty
of the same f:raud of which he complains in the defendant. lle
certainly can have no claim to the extraordinary interposition of
a tribunal constitutt.>d to administer equity, for the purpose of
securing to him the profits arising from his fraudulent act." •

other cases of fraud, it is not the means the law regards so much

as the end which the deception is intended to accomplish. To

steal or to injure the good will of a business by any species of

deception is a wrong which will be rcdressed by remedies appro-

priate to the circumstances.

' Citing Croft 0. Day, 7 Beav. 84.

' Smtuswoon, J ., in Palmer o. Hur-

ris, 60 Penn. St. 156, 160, citing Pid-

ding v. How, 8 Sim. 4'77; Fluvel 0.

Harrison, 10 Hare,-167; Leather Cloth

Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., 11

H. L. Cats. 523. A similar decision

on the same grounds was made in

Laird 0. Wilder, 9 Bush, 131; S. C. 15

Am. Rep. 707. See, also. as to decep-

tive trade marks, Perry 0. Trueﬂtt,6

Beav. 66.

' Questions concerning property in

the good will of a business were con-

Good will of a Business.

What has been said about the
infringement of rights in trade marks will apply to all devices
by means of which one endeavors to deprive another of the value
of the good will of his business by deceiving the public. The
good will of a bm;iness is often very valuable property,' and the
use of a trade mark is only one method of building it up. Other
deceptions besides the piracy of a trade mark may be equally
effectual in destroying its value in some cases; and here, as in
other cases of fraud, it is not the means the law regards so mneh
as the end which the deception is intended to accomplish. To
steal or to injure the good wiJl of a business by any species of
deception is a wrong which will be redressed by remedies appropriate to the circumstances.

sidered in the following cases: Brad-

ford u. Peckham, 9 R I. ‘Z50; Cruess

12. Fessler, 39 Cal. 336; Sent:-r 0. Davis,

88 Cal. 451; Mussclmun o. Clarkson,

62 Penn. St. 81; Elliott's Appeal, 60

Penn. St. 161; Rupp v. Over, 3 Brew-

ster, 133; Succession of Journe, 21

La. Ann. 891; Spier 0. Lambdin, 45

Geo. 319.

Citing CroR e. Day, 'l Beav. 84.
J., in Palmer e. Har.
ris, 60 Penn. St. 156, 160, citing Pid.
ding e. How, 8 Sim. 477; Flavel e.
Harrison, 10 Hare, 467; Leather Cloth
Co. e. AmPriran Leather Clulh Co., 11
H. L. Cas. 523. A. similar decision
on the same grounds was m1\(le in
Laird o. Wilder, 9 Bush, 131 ; 8. C. 15
Am. Rep. 'lO'l. See, also, &!t to dect>ptlve trade marks, Perry e. TrueftU, 8
1

1 8BARSWOOD,

BeaY. 68.

• Questions concerning property In
the good will of a busint'SS were con.
sidered in the following ra~:s: Brad.
ford D. Peckham, D R I. 2.10; Crucss
tl. Fessll•r, SD Cal. 336; Sent(·r o. Davis,
38 Cal. 451; llu8&'lman e. Clark,;oo,
62 Penn. St. 81; Elliott's Appenl, 60
Peon. St. 161; Rupp "· Over, 3 Brew.
stcr, 183; Succt>ssioo of Joume, 21
La. Ann. 891; Spier e. Lambdlu, 45
Geo. 318.
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Rights of Common. A right of common consists in the right
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to have some deﬁnite common enjoyment with the owner in eer-

tain real estate. The rights of common possessed by tenants of

a. manor in many cases furnish suitable illustrations. Belonging

to the lord of the manor were, perhaps, pasture lands, on which,

from time immemorial, the inhabitants had been accustomed to

pasture their beasts in common, or wood lands, from which they

had in common taken wood for domestic purposes, or turf beds,

from which they had taken fuel, or there were waters, from which

in common they had taken ﬁsh; and the immemorial custom to

enjoy this privilege had ﬁxed theirright, not only as against each

other, but as against the lord of the manor also. To exclude

one of them, or disturb him in the equal enjoyment of the right,

was an actionable wrong, and an excessive appropriation was a

wrong to all, and might be enjoined as such. Of late the policy

of English legislation has been in the direction of diminishing

the number and extent of these rights; but we have no occasion

to examine it here.

The circumstances attending the settlement of America were

not favorable to the establishment of similar rights. The culti-

vators of land for the most part acquired and owned independent

estates. In the New England Colonies lands were indeed granted
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in common to those who planted a new town, and some of these

lands, under a town proprietorship, were for a considerable period

made use of in common by the inhabitants. Perhaps, also, such

rights of property as existed within the limits of a town were

properly to be regarded as rights of common participation in

that of which the body of the inhabitants constituting the town

were proprietors. So the taking of shell-ﬁsh along the shores

of tidewater, between high and low water mark, was and is of

common right to the people, except where by colonial ordinance,

the riparian proprietorship was extended to low water mark.

The same may be said of the taking of sea weed thrown up by

the sea and deposited between high and low water mark,‘ with

the same exception, that where the shore proprietorship is

‘Emans e. Turnbull, 2 Johns. 313; cast above the high water mark.

Mather o. Chapman, 40 Conn. 382; Church v. Meeker, 34 Conn. 421. See

S. C. 16 Am. liep, 46; Peck v. Loek- Barker 0. Bates, 13 Pick. 255.

wood, 5 Day, 22. But not where it is

Bights of Common. A right of common consists in the right
to have some definite common enjoyment with the owner in certain real estate. The rights of common possessed by tenants of
a manor in many cases furnish suitable illustrations. Belonging
to the lord of the manor were, perhaps, pasture lands, on which,
from time immemorial, the inhabitants had been accustomed to
pastm'C their l>eAsts in common, or wood lands, from which they
had in common taken wood tor domestic purposes, or turf beds,
from which they had taken fuel, oc there were waters, from which
in common they had taken fish; and the immemorial culltom to
enjoy this privilege had tixed their right, not only as against each
other, but as against the lord of the manor also. To exclude
one of them, or disturb him in the equal enjoyment of the right,
was an actionable wrong, and an cxcessi ve appropriation was a
wrong to all, and might be enjoined as such. Of late the policy
of English legislation has been in the direction of diminishing
the number and extent of these rights; but we have no occasion
to examine it here.
The circumstances attending the settlement of America were
not favorable to the establish111ent of similar rights. The cultivators of land for the most part acquired and owned independent
estates. In the New England Colonies lands were indeed granted
in common to those who planted a new town, and some of these
lands, under a town proprietorship, were for a considerable period
made use of in common by the inhabitants. Perhaps, also, such
rights of property as existed within the limits of a town were
properly to be regarded as rights of common participation in
that of which the body of the inhabitants constituting the town
were proprietors. So the taking of shell-fish along the shores
of tidewater, between high and low water mark, was and is of
common right to the people, except where by colonial ordinance,
the riparian proprietorship was extended to low water mark.
The same may be said of' the taking of sea weed thrown up by
the sea and deposited between high and low water mark,' with
the same exception, that where the shore proprietorship is
Emans "·Turnbull, 2 Johns. 818;
Mather "· Chapman, 40 Conn. 882;
8. C. 16 Am. ltep, 46; Peck "· Lockwood, G Day, 22. But not where it is
1

•

cast above the high water mark.
Church tt. Meeker, 84 Conn. 421. See
Barker •· Bates, 18 Pick. 251S.
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extended to low water mark, an entry by any other than the pro-
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prietor for the purpose of gathering it would be a trespass.‘

It is important, however, to distinguish between what are

properly rights in common arid the right to participate with the

general public in the enjoyment of those rights which pertain

to the sovereignty. The latter are not rights of common, and

the idea of ownership has no place when they are in question;

their enjoyment is only a part of the civil rights of the people.

Of these are the right to make use of the public highways, com-

mons, parks and boulevards, the right to take ﬁsh in public

waters, the right to visit and have the customary beneﬁt of public

oﬁices, records, etc. These emanate from the sovereignty, and

their equal enjoyment by all will be protected by it.’ No doubt

where they are susceptible of being made available for proﬁt, as

in the case of ﬁsheries, exclusive rights may be granted in them

by the State, if that shall seem the best method of making them

available for the common beneﬁt; but that is exclusively a matter

of sovereign discretion.

In the case of any of these public rights one might be wronged

in being excluded therefrom by another, or in being impeded in

its enjoyment; as if one were to have his ﬁshing nets torn up

through another’s malice or carelessness.‘ But it would be diﬂi-
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cnlt to plant an action against another for a merely excessive

appropriation of that which was common to the use of all; as,

for example, if one, by his enterprise and energy, should appro-

priate the chief beneﬁts of a ﬁshery, without at the same time

interfering with the operations of others. In the absence of

legislation limiting his operations, the limit would only be

found where they obstructed others.

One’s right to the use of highways might be invaded by excl ud-

ing him from it. or rendering access to it dillicult, as where a

railroad company constructs a high embankment, or makes a

deep excavation in the highway in front of one’s premises; ‘ or

‘Phillips o. Rhodes. '7 Met. 322;

Hill 0. Lord, 48 Me. 83; Nudd v.

Hobbs, 1'7 N. H. 527. See Blundell

0. Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 268; Kenyon

0. Nichols, 1 R. l. 106; Hall e. Law-

rence, 2 ll I. 218; Parker e. Cutler

Mildam Co., 20 Me. 853, as to rights

between high and low water mark.

' Craudnll o. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35.

' See ante, p. 831.

‘ Haynes o. Thomas, '7 Ind. 88;

Protzinsn o. lndinnupolis, etc., R R.

Co., 9 Ind. 467; New Albany, etc., R.

R.'Co. v. O’Dailcy. 18 Ind. 353; Craw-

ford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, (N. s.) 459;

~xtcnded

to low water mark, an entry by any ot11er than the proprietor for the purpose of gathering it would be a trespass.'
It is important, however, to distinguish between what aro
properly rights in common aiid the right to participate with the
general public in the enjoyment of those rights whieh pertain
to the SO\'Creignty. The latter are not rights of common, and
the idea of ownership has no place when they are in qncEtion;
their enjoyment is only a part of the civil rights of the people.
Of these are the right to make use of the public highways, commons, parks and boulevards, tho right to take fi:;h in publin
water!§, the right to visit ami have the cnstumary benefit of pnblic
offices, records, etc. These emanate from the so\·ercignty, and
their equal enjoyment by all will Le protected by it. 3 No doubt
where they are susceptible of being made available for profit, as
in the case of fisheries, exclusive rights may be granted in them
by the State, if that shall seem the best method of making them
available for the common benefit; but that is exclusively a matter
()f so,·ereign discretion.
In the case of any of these public rights one might be wronged
in being excluded therefrom by another, or ill being impeded in
its enjoyment; as if one were to have his fishing nets torn np
throngh another's malice or carelessness.• But it would be difficult to plant an action against another for a merely excessive
appropriation of that which was common to the usc of all; as,
for example, it' one, by his enterprise and energy, should appropriate the chief beuctits of a fishery, without at the same time
interfering with the operations of others. In the absence of
legislation limiting his operations, the limit would only be
found where they obstructed others.
One's right to the use of highways might be invl\ded by excluding him from it. or rendering access to it dilli~ult, as where a
railroad company constructs a high embankment, or makes a
deep excavation in the highway in front of one's premises; 4 or

Street Railway 0. Cumminsville, 14

1 Phillips "· Rhodes, 7 MeL 322;
Hill "· Lord, 4~ .&le. 83; Nudd "·
Hobbs, 17 N. H. 627. See Blundell
"· Catterall, IS B. & Ald. 268; Kenyon
"· Ni<-hols, 1 R. l. 106; Hall 11. Law.
renee, 2 R I. 218; Pllrker "· Cutler
Mildam Co., 20 Me. 8.).1, as to rights
between high and low water mark.

Crandall 11. Nevnda, B Wall. S:S.
Brc ante, p. 331.
• Haynes t:t. Thomas, 7 Ind. 88;
Protzman t:t. Indinoupolis, etc., R It
Co., D Ind. 467; New Alhany, etc., R.
U:Co. ~'· O'Dailcy.lS Ind. 353; Crawford 11. Delsware, 7 Ohio, (N. 8.) 4:i9;
1

1

Street Railway "· Cummiuville, 14
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where it occupies a street with its cars unreasonably, or annoys

a6s
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adjoining proprietors by unnecessarily sounding its whistles or

bells. But'these eases will more properly be referred to when

nuisances are under consideration.

In order that there may be equal enjoyment of the public

highway, it is usual to provide by law that when two persons

meet they shall turn to the right of the middle of the main trav-

eled path; and in the absence of any statute, perhaps this

requirement may be considered a part of the common law of the

land. If one is injured by reason of the failure of another to

observe this rule, he has his action for the recovery of the darn-

ages suﬁbred, provided he was himself free from fault. But one

who ﬁnds that another whom he is about to meet is not turning

out as he should, must endeavor to avoid collision, and if he takes

no pains to do so and a collision occurs, he may lose his remedy

through his contributory negligence.‘

Ohio, t1v.s.)523. In Illinois it is held

that where a city grants permission

to a railroad C0lllpn.ny to occupy one

of its streets, and the privilege is so

exercised as to interfere with the con-

venient access of a lot owner to his
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lot, the city is liable to him for this

injury. Some reliance is placed on

where it occupies a street with ita cars unreasonably, or annoys
adjoining proprietors by unnecessarily sounding its whistles or
bells. But •these cases will more properly be referred to when
nuisances are under consideration.
In order that there may be equal enjoyment of the public
highway, it is usual to provide by law that when two pE'rsons
meet they shall turn to the right of the middle of the main traveled path; and in the absence of any statute, perhaps this
requirement may be considered a part of the common law of the
land. If one is injured by reason of the failure of anoth~r to
observe this rule, he has his action for the recovery of the damages suffered, provided he was himself free from fault. Bot one
who finds that another whom he is about to meet is nut turning
out as he should, must endeavor to avoid collision, and if he takes
no pains to do so and a collision occurs, he may lose his rem~dy
through his contributory negligence.'

the peculiar wording of the constitu-

tional provision that “private prop-

erty should not be taken or (Imnrlgad

for public use without just compen-

sation.” Pekin 0. Brereton, 67 Ill. 477,

480; Stack v East bit. Louis. 5 Cent. L.

Jour. 385. In Haynes o. Thomas, 7

Ind. 38, 43, it is said: “ The right to

use a street in a town adjoining a lot

abutting on it, is as much property as

the lot itself, and the legislature has

as little power to take away one as

the other. \Vhelher the act of dedi-

cation transfers the fee from the donor

to the pub] ic is not a material inquiry."

So in Elizabethtown, etc.,R. R. Co.

1:. Combs, 10 Bush, 382, S. C. 19 Am.

Rep. 67, it is said: “It is * 4' well

settled, both here and elsewhere, that

the owners of lots ‘have a peculiar

interest in the adjacent street, which

neither the local nor general public

can pretend to claim — a private right,

in the nature of an incorporcal here-

ditament, legally attached to their

contiguous gronnd—an incidental

title to certain facilities and franchises

assured to them by contract and by

law,’ and which are as iuviolable as

the property in the lots themselves."

Citing Lexington, etc., R. R. C0. 0.

Applcgate, 8 Dana, 294; Haynes o.

Thomas, 7 Ind. 38; Rowan v. Port-

land, 8 B. Mon 232; Le Clercq 0. Gal-

lipolis, '7 Ohio, 217; Cincinnati 0.

White, 6 Pct. 431. Sec, further, Tate

0. Ohio, ctc., R. R. Co., '7 Ind. 479;

Hutton 0. Indiana Cent. R. R. Co.. 7

Ind. 522; Stetson o. Chicago, etc., It

R. Co, 75 Ill. 74; Stone u. Fairbury,

etc., R. R. Co., 68 Ill. 394; Mix u.

Lafayette, ctc., R. R. Co., 67 Ill. 819.

‘Baker 0. Portland, 58 Me. 199;

B. C. 4 Am. Rep. 274; Daniels 0.

Clegg, % Mich. 32. The middle of

Ohio, IN. a.) 523. In Illinois it Ia held
that where a city grants pcrmit<sion
to a railroad company to occupy one
of Us streets, and the privilege is so
exercised as to interfere with the convenient access of a lot owner to his
Jot, the city is liable to bim for this
it'ljury. Some reliance Is placed on
the peculiar wording of the e<matitutlonal provision that .. private vrop.
erty should not be taken or dam11g«l
for public usc without just cOinpenll&lion." Pekin"· Brereton, 61 Ill. 477,
4.80; Stack " East l:tt. Louis. 5 Cenl L.
Jour. ggs_ In Haynes "· Thom119, '7
Ind. 38, 43, It is said: "The right to
use a street In a town adjoining a lot
abutting on it, Is as much propt>rty as
tho lot itself, and the legislature has
as little power to take away onP as
the other. Whether the act of dedication transfers the fee from the donor
to the ptthl ic is not a mo.terillllnq u iry."
So in Elizabethtown, etc., R. R Co.
v. Combs, 10 Bush, 382, S. C. 19 Am.
Rep. 67, it is said: "It is • • well
aettled, both here and elsewhere, that
the owners of lots 'have a peculiar
interest in the adjacent street, which

neltbez: the local nor general public
can Jlretend to cla&im - a private right,
In the nature of an Incorporeal here.
ditament, legally attached to their
contiguous ground -an incidental
title to certain facilities and franchille8
assured to them by contract and by
law,' and which are aa lnviohtble aa
the property in the Iota themselves."
Ching Lexington, etc., R. R. Co. e.
Applegate, 8 Dana, 20-1; Haynes e.
Thomns, '7 Ind. 38; Rowan "· Portland, 8 B. Moo 232; Le Clercq "· Galli po1is, '7 Ohio, 217; Cincinnati e.
Whitt>, 6 Pet. 431. M<'c, further, Tate
e. Ohio, etc., R. R. Co., 7 loll. 479;
Hutton e. Indiana Cent. R. R. Co.. 7
Ind. 522; Stetson o. Chi<'ago, etc., R.
R Co, 75 Ill. '74; Stone "· Fairbury,
etc., R R. Co., 68 Ill. 894; Mix e.
Lafayette, etc., R. R. Co., 67 Ill. 319.
1 Baker tl. Portland, G8 Me. 199;
B. C. j Am. Rep. 274; Daniels •·
Clegg, 28 )lich. 82. The middle of
the road means the middle of the
Wf•lUght part of the road. Clark "·
Commonwealth, j Pick. 125; Dani<'b
tl. Clegg, supra. Compare Commonwealth e. Alletlt 11 Met. 403.
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variety, and importance to modern civilization: they have become

so numerous that it is diﬂicult even to classify them. A few of

the more important will be named.

Where adjoining or neighboring lands might be affected in

value by the use that may be made of a particular lot, or by the

manner in whiclrit is built npon, contracts are sometimes entered

into which control the building or the use. Such contracts estab-

lish rights in the nature of easements, which may be enforced

in equity at the instance of the owners of the lands for the

beneﬁt of which they are established, and which, in respect to

them, may be called the dominant tenements.‘ So the proprietor

of a town plat may, in the deeds he gives, insert a provision

respecting the use of the premises, or the character of "the build-

ings that may be erected thereon, or the location of buildings:

such as that a business regarded as offensive shall never be per-

mitted on the premises,’ or that the buildings shall he con-

structed a certain distance from the streets.’ In contemplation

of equity, all the purchasers from such a proprietor, and their

privies, acquire rights in such stipulations, and may enforce them

by injunction should their violation be attempted or threatened.‘

There would be diﬁiculty in maintaining actions at law in such
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cascs— indeed the relief in equity is a\varded in part because the

law can afford none.’

A more common easement is that of right to pass or repass

over the land of another. This may come into existence by

grant, in which case it is necessary that the way be deﬁned and

located, either by the grant itself or by the acts of the parties;

and if not located by grant or consent, the grantee may select the

route for it.‘ Or it may be established by prescription; and in

' Ilills o. Miller, 8 Paige, 254; Gil-

bert v. Fetc-1er,3S Barb. 498; Trus-

tees, etc., v. Oowen, 4 Paige, 510.

' Kemp 0. Sober, 1 Sim. (N. s.) 517;

Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige, 351.

' Hubbell 0. Warren, 8 Allen, 173.

SeerGillis 0. Bailey, 21 N. H. 149;

Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774; Mann

v. Stephens, 15 Sim. 377; Coles 0.

Sims, 5 DcG. M’N. & G. 1; Western

0. McDei-molt, L. R 1 Eq. 469; S. C.

L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 72; Whntman 0. Gib-

son, 9Sim. 196; Brewer v. Marshall,

19 N. J. Eq. 537; Greene 0. Creighton,

Injuries to Rights in Easements. Easements owe their increa.~e,
variety, and importance to modern ci,·ilization: they ~ve become
so numerous that it is difficult <!Yen to classify them. A few of
the more important will be named.
Where adjoining or neighboring lands might be affected in
value by the use that may be made of a particular lot, or by the
manner in whicll'it is built upon, contracts are sometimes entered
into which contwl the building or the use. Such contracts £•:>tablish rights in the nature of easements, which may be enfot·l·ed
in equity at the in~:;tance of the owners of the lands tor the
benefit of whi<'h they are establi:-:hed, and which, in respect to
them, may he called the dominn.ut tenements. 1 So the proprietor
of a town plat may, in the deeds he gives, inset·t a provision
respecting the use of the premises, or the character ofthe buildings that may be erected thereon, or the location of buildings:
such as that a business regarded as offensive shall never be permitted on the premises,• or that the buildings shall he constructed a certain distance from the strcets. 3 In t'Ontemplation
of equity, all the purchasers from snch a proprietor, and their
privies, acquire rights in such stipulations, and may enforce them
by injunction should their violation be attempted or threatened.•
There would be difficulty in maintaining actions at law in such
cases- indeed the relief in equity is awarded in part been use the
law can afford none.'
A more common easement is that of right to pass or repnss
over the land of another. This may come into existence by
grant, in which case it is necessary that the wn.y be defined and
located, either by the grant itself or by the acts of the parties;
and it' not located by grant or consent, the grantee may select the
route for it.' Or it may be established by presct·iption; and in

'7 R. I. 1; Tallmadgc 0. East River

Bank, 26 N. Y. 105; Coleman 0. Cole-

man, 19 Penn. St. 100.

‘Mann o. Stephens, 15 Sim. 377;

High on Injunctions, § 547.

' Brewer 0. Marshall, 19 N. J. Eq.

539, 543. ‘

' Hart v. Connor, 25 Conn. 331.
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1 IIi lis "· Miller, 8 Paige, 254; Gilbert "· rctclcr, 38 Bnrb. 488; Trus·
tees, etc., "· Cowen, 4 Paige, IHO.
1 Kemp"· Sober, 1 Bim. (N. a.) ~17;
Barrow"· Richard, 8 Paige, H:Sl.
• Hubbell "·Warren, 8 Allen, 173.
See Gillis "· Bailey, 21 N. H. 149;
Talk "· Moxhay, 2 Phil. 714; Mann
"· Stephens, 16 Bim. 877; Coles "·
Sims, ~ DeG. M'N. & G. 1; Western
e. McDermott, L. R. 1 Eq. 469; B. C.

24

L. R. 2 Oh. Ap. 72; Whatman "· Gib.
son, 9 Slm. 196; Brewer 11. :Marshall,
19 N.J. Eq. 537; Greene"· Creighton,
7 R. I. 1 ; Tallmadge "· East River
Bank, 26 N.Y. 105; Coleman"· Cole.
man, 19 Penn. St. 100.
• Mann "· Stephens, liS Sim. 877;
High on Injunctions. § M7.
• Brewer e. Marshall, 19 N.J. Eq.
1)39, 543.
..
• Hart "· Connor, 2G Conn. 881.
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THE LAW OF TORTS-

such case the user itself must determine the location. An

in_deﬁnite right of passage cannot be thus acquired.‘ Or the way

may come into existence as a way of necessity. This happens

where one grants a parcel of land so surrounded by other lands

owned by himself that access to it except over such lands is

impracticable; or where he grants lands so surrounding a parcel

retained by himself that the latter is practically inaccessible

except over that he has granted. In the former case, by implica-

tion he grants a right of way over his own lands to that he has

sold, and in the latter he reserves such a right.‘ In either case

the owner of the tenement over which the way must extend may

locate it, but he must exercise the right reasonably and with due

regard to the other’s convenience. If he refuses, on request, to

locate the way, or locates it unfairly, the party entitled to the

easement may locate it himself. In any case when a way is once

located, it is ﬁxed permanently and for all purposes, and neither

party can change it except by mutual consent.’

Besides the right of way for the passage of persons, beasts, and

vehicles, there may be a right of way for pipes to carry water,
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gas, steam, etc., or for drains, and for any purpose whatsoever,

for which one might have occasion to make use of a passage

across his neighbor's land for the greater or more convenient

enjoyment of his own. These also may be acquired by grant or

prescription, under the rules already given, but they do not come

into existence as ways of necessity strictly, though they often

arise by implication from grants the beneﬁts of which cannot be

enjoyed without them, and must therefore be understood to have

contemplated them.‘ An illustration is where the owner of two

' Jones 0. Percival, 5 Pick. 485. See

Atwater 0. Boclﬁsh, 11 Gray, 150;

Hang v. Delorme, 80 Wis. 591; Bel-

knap v. Trimble, 3 Paige, 577.

* But the necessity must be posi-

tive; it is not enough that a way over

the land granted would be more con-

venient than some other. Turnbull

v. Rivers, 3 McCord, 131; McDonald

v. Lindall, 3 Rawle, 492; Gayetty 0.

such case the user itself must determine the location. An
in.definite rlght of passa~e cannot be thus acquired.' Or the way
may come into existence as a way of necessity. This happens
where one grants a parcel of land so surrounded by other lands
owned by himself that access to it except over such lands is
impracticable; or where he grants lands so surrounding a parcel
retained by himself that the latter is practically inaccessible
except over that he has granted. In the former case, by implication he grants a right of way over his own lands to that he has
sold, and in the latter he reserves such a right. 1 In either case
the owner of the tenement over which the way must extend may
locate it, but he must exercise the right reasonably and with due
regard to the other's convenience. If he refuses, on request, to
locate the way, or locates it unfairly, the party entitled to the
easement may locate it himself. In any case when a way is once
loeated, it is fixed permanently and for all purposes, and neither
party can change it except by mutual consent.1
Besides the right of way for the passage of persons, beasts, and
Yehiclcs, there may be a right of way for pipes to carry water,
gas, steam, etc., or for drains, and for any purpose whatsoever,
for which one might have occasion to make use of a passage
across his neighbor's land for the greater or more convenient
enjoyment of his own. These also may be acquired by grant or
prescription, under the rules already given, but they do not come
into existence as ways of necessity strictly, though they often
arise by implication from grants the benefits of which cannot be
enjoyed without them, and must therefore be understood to have
contemplated them.• An illustration is where the owner of two

Bethune, 14 Mass. 49; Suﬂield 0.

Brown, 4 DeG. J. & S. 185.

‘Holmes 1:. Seely, 19 Wend. 507;

Brice v. Randall, 7 Gill & J. 349. The

easement of aright of way of neces-

sity ceases when the party acquires,

by subsequent purchase, a convenient

way over his own lands. Holmes 0.

Goring, 2 Bing. 76.

‘ Where one grants lands bounding

them on a highway where there is

none, he thereby conveys to the

grantee a private right of way along

the supposed street, if he is owner of

the soil. See Wyman o. New York,

11 Wend. 487; Smith 0. Lock, 18

Mich. 56.

Jones"· Percival, 5 Pick. 485. See
Atwater "· Bodfish, 11 Gray, 100;
Haag "· Delorme, SO Wis. 591; Belknap 1l. Trimble, 8 Paige, 577.
11 But the necessity must be post.
ttve; it is not enough that a way over
the land granted would be more convenient than some other. Turnbull
"· Rivers, 8 McCord, 181 ; McDonald
"· LindaU, 8 Rawle, 492; Gayetty "·
Bethune, 14 Mass. 49; Muffield •·
Brown, 4 DeG. J. & S. 18.'5.
• Holmes "· Heely, 19 Wend. 507;
Brice e. Randall, 7 Gill & J. 849. The
1

easement of a right of way of necessity ceases when the party acquires,
by subsequent purchase, a convenient
way over his own lands. Holmes "·
Goring, 2 Bing. 76.
t Where one grants lands bounding
them on a. high way where there is
none, he thereby conveys to the
grantee a private right of way along
the supposed ~;treet, if he is owner of
the soil. See Wyman e. New York.,
11 Wend. 487; Smith •· Lock, 18
Mich. 56.
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estates conveys one of them, over which a drain has been con-
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structed and is then in existence for the beneﬁt of the other. If
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this drain is known to the grantee at the time he receives his

conveyance, and is essential to the reasonable enjoyment of the

estate retained, an easement may arise by implication, because

the presumption that the parties understood it was to exist will

be reasonable.‘ Easements of light and air, and for the support

of buildings, frequently come into existence by implication from

grants in the same way.

Grants of right of way are to be so construed as not needlessly

to restrict the enjoyment of his estate by the owner of the ser-

vient tenement. The owner of the easement is entitled to the

fair enjoyment of his privilege, but nothing more,’ and therefore

the owner of the servient tenement may erect gates at the

termini of a private way, when it is not unreasonable to do so.‘

Any obstruction to an easement, any encroachment upon it, or

any disturbance of the soil, or of that by means of which the ease-

ment is enjoyed, is an actionable wrong, provided damage is

caused by it. It is to be observed in respect to easements that

possession of the lands over which they are enjoyed, or which are

subject to them, is in the owner of the land, and not in the party

who has the easement, and therefore the latter cannot bring eject-
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ment against a disturber; and those acts which would constitute

trespasses on lands are not trespasses in respect to the easement.

Therefore, any intei-meddling with the lands to which his easement

attaches is not a wrong to him unless in some manner it affects

him injuriously in the enjoyment of the easement. But if the act

be one which, if persisted in, may at length ripen into an adverse

right, an injury will be presumed. Thus, if a drain be stopped, or a

fence he erected across a private way, or a water-course be

diverted, and the like, an injury is presumed, because these, if

persisted in, may extinguish the easement.‘ But where the ease-

ment is for a special and temporary purpose only, as a right of

way to repair a house, there could not, in contemplation of law,

' Carbrey 0. Willis, 7 Allen, 364. Elliott 0. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 10

* Atkins v. Bordman, 2 Met. 457. Cush. 191; Roundtree o. Brantley, 34

‘Maxwell o. McAtce, 9 B. Mon. Ala. 544; Welton 0. Martin, '7 Mo.

20; Garland v. Furbcr, 47 N. H. 301. 307; Clifford v. Iloare, L. R. 9 C. P.

‘Wood v. Wand, 3 Exch. 748; 362; S. C. 9 Moak, 449; Ante, pp.

Nicklin 0. Williams, 10 Exch. 259; 64-68.

estates conveys one of them, over which a drain has been constructed and is then in existence tor the benefit of the other. If
this drain is known to the grantee at the time he receives his
conveyance, and is essential to the reasonable enjoyment of the
estate retained, an easement may arise by implication, because
the presumption that the parties understood it was to exist will
be reasonable.' Easements of light and air, and for the support
of buildings, frequently come into existence by implication from
grants in the same way.
Grants of right of way are to be so construed as not needlessly
to restrict the enjoyment of his estate by the owner of the servient tenement. The owner of the easement is entitled to the
fair enjoyment of his privilege, but nothing more,' and therefore
the owner of the servient tenement may erect gates at the
termini of a private way, when it is not unreasonable to do so.•
Any obstruction to an easement, any encroachment upon it, or
any disturbance of the soil, or of that by means of which the easement is enjoyed, is an actionable w'rong, provided damage is
caused by it. It is to be observed in respect to easements that
possession of the lands over which they are enjoyed, or which are
subject to them, is in the owner of the land, and not in the party
who has the easement, and therefore the latter cannot bring ejectment ~O'S.inst a. disturber; and those acts which would constitute
trespasses ori lands are not trespasses in respect to the easement.
Therefore, any intermeddling with the lands to which his easement
attAches is not a wrong to him unless in some manner it affects
him injuriously in the enjoyment of the easement. Bot if the act
be one which, if persisted in, may at length ripen into an a.d\·erse
right, an injury will be presumed. Thns, if a. drain be stopped, or a
fence be erected across a. private way, or a. wa.ter-conrse be
diverted, and tbe Hke, an injury is presumed, because these, if
persisted in, may extinguish the easement.• Bnt where the easement is for a. special and temporary purpose gnly, as a. right of
way to repair a house, there could not, in contemplation of law,
Carbrey "· Willis. 7 Allen, 864.
Atkins"· Bordman, 2 Met. 457.
• Maxwell "· McAtee, 9 B. Mon.
90; Garland"· Furber, 47 N. H. 301.
'Wood o. WKud, 8 Exch. 748;
Nicklin "· Williams, 10 Exch. 259;
1

t

Elliott e. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 10
Cush. 191 ; Roundtree "· Brantley, M
Ala. 544; Welton "· Martin, 'l .Mo.
807; Clifford "· Hoare, L. R. 9 C. P .
862; S. C. 9 .M.oak, 448; Ante, pp.
64-as.
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be an obstruction, except at such time as there was occasion to
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make use of the way,‘ and therefore nothing done at other times

could support an adverse claim. _

Whoever is owner of the dominant tenement at the time an

easement is disturbed, or has any interest therein which entitles

him to the enjoyment of the easement, may maintain an action

for the injury; ’ and where the dominant tenement is under lease,

the reversioner may also sue, if the injury is one that affects his

rights as reversioner.‘ Suit may be brought against the owner

of the servient tenement if the injury was done by him or with

his permission; and if it consists in an obstruction or encroach-

ment, which is continued by his successor in the title, the latter

may be held responsible if he fails to remove it within a reason-

able time after notice.‘ As an obstruction or encroachment

would constitute a private nuisance, the owner of the easement

may, wherever it is practicable, and under the rules applicable to

the abatement of nuisances in general, proceed to abate it.‘ But

if in doing this, or in the enjoyment of the easement, he exceeds

his right, he thereby becomes a trespasser.' So in abating the

nuisance he must, at his peril, see that he causes no injury to a

third person, for the wrong of one inan cannot justify visiting

upon an innocent person the consequences.’
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Party Walls. A party wall is a wall on the division line of

estates which each proprietor is at liberty to use as a support to

his building. Wllen such a wall stands in part on the land of each

it is presumed to be owned by the two, unless the contrary is

‘ Phipps 0. Johnson, 99 Mass. 26. Grigsby o. Clear Lake, 40 Cal. 396;

‘Hastings 0. Livcrmore, '7 Gray,

194.

ﬂKi(lgill v. Moor, 9 O. B. 364;

Queen's College '0. Hallett, 14 East,

489; Buttishill o. Reed, 18 C. B. 696;

be an obstruction, except at such time as there was occasion to
make use of the way,' and therefore nothing done at other times
could support an adverse claim.
Whoever is owner of the dominant tenement at the time an
easement is disturbed, or has any interest therein which entitles
him to the enjoyment of the easement, may maintain an action
for the injury; s and where the dominant tenement is under lease,
the reversioner may also sue, if the injury is qne that aftects his
rights a.s reversioner.' Suit may be brought against the owner
of the servient tenement if the injm·y was done by him or with
his permjssion; and if it consists in an obstruction or encroachment, which is continued by his successor in the title, the latter
may be held responsible if he fails to remove it within a reasonable time after notice.• As an obstruction or encroachment
would constitute a private nuisance, the owner of the easement
may, wherever it is practicable, and under the rules applicable to
the abatement of nuisances in general, proceed to abate it.• But
if in doing this, or in the enjoyment of the easement, he exceeds
his right, he thereby becomes a trespasser. • So in abating the
nuisance he must, at his peril, see that he causes no injury to a
third person, for the wrong of one man cannot justi(y visiting'
upon an innocent person the consequences.7

Brown 1:. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519; Tins-

man 0. Bclvidere R. R. Co., 25 N. J.

255. As to what would be an injury

to the reversioner, see Dobson o.

Blackmore, 9 Q. B. 991; Metropoli-

tau Association 0. Petch, 5 U. B.

(N. s.) 504.

Party Walls. A party wall is a wall on the division line of
estates which each proprietor is at liberty to use as a support to
his building. When such a wall stands in part on the land of ench
it is presumed to be owned by the two, unless the contrary is

‘Woodman o. Tufts, 9 N. H. 88;

Thornton u. Smith, 11 Minn. 15;

Dodge e Stacy, 39 Vt. 558; Caldwell

0. Gale, 11 Mich. '77.

‘ Amick 1;. Tharp, 18 Grat. 564;

Great Falls Co. v. Worster, 15 N. H.

412; Hutchinson o. Granger, 13 Vt.

386; Adams v. Barney, 25 Vt. 225;

Ballard v. Butler, 30 Me. 94; Jewell v.

Gardiner, 12 Mass. 312; Rhea 0. For-

syth, 37 Penn. St. 503.

'Ganley v. Looney, 14 Allen, 40.

See Dyer v. Depui, 5 Whart. 584;

Wright ‘v. Moore, 38 Ala. 593; Heath

0. Williams, 25 Me. 209.

' Amick o. Tharp, 13 Grat. 564.

* -=mu\Il

'Phipps"· Johnson, 99 Mass. 26.
'Hastings t~. Livermore, 7 Gray,
194.
1 Kid gill fl. Moor, 9 C. B. 864;
Queen's College "· Hallett, 14 Enst,
489; Bnttishill t~. Reed, 18 0. B. 696 ;
Brown "· Bowen, 80 N. Y. 519; Tins.
man t~. Belvidere R. R. Co., 25 N. J.
2155. As to what would be an injury
to the reversioner, see Dobson o.
Blackmore, 9 Q. B. 991 ; 1tletropolitan Association o. Petch, 5 (). B.
(N. B.) 504.
• Woodman t~. Tufts, 9 N. H. 88;
Thornton 11. Smith, 11 Minn. 15;

Grigsby t~. Clear Lake, 40 Cal. 896;
Dodge " Stacy, 39 Vt. 558; Caldwell
o. Gale, 11 Mich. 77.
1 Amick 11. Tharp, 18 Grat. 561;
Great Fnlls Co. c. Worster, 15 N. H.
412; Hutchinson t~. Granger, 13 Vt.
386; Adams c. Bnrney, 25 Vt. 225;
Bnllard o. Butler, 30 Me. 94; Jcwell11.
Gardiner, 12 lhss. 31~; Rhea"· Forsyth, 37 Penn. St 508.
' Ganley t~. Looney, 14 Allen, 40.
Bee Dyer c. Depul, 5 Wbart. 584;
Wright "· Moore, 38 Ala.. 593; Heath
e. Williams, 2.'} Me. 209.
1 Amick "· Tharp, 18 Grat. 5M.
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shown.‘ At the common law no person was under obligation to

373

unite with his neighbor in building a party wall, or even to fur-

nish his proportion of the land for it to stand upon; but an

erection might be made a party wall by agreement, and if one

person allowed another to make use of his wall for the support

of a building, and to continue the use for twenty years, the grant

of a right to do so was presumed, and the wall became a party

wall by prescription. The inconveniences of the common-law

rule have been obviated to some extent by statutes which permit

a proprietor to build into his neigliboi-’s wall for the support of

his own building, provided the wall is sufficient for the purpose,

on making payment of the just proportion of 'the cost. These

statutes establish the rule of the civil law.

Where a party wall is built by agreement, the strict rule of law

requires a deed, but if the agreement was by parol only, the case

would be a very strong one for the application of the doctrine of

equitable estoppel, and no doubt a dissatisﬁed proprietor would

be enjoined from repudiating the arrangement and interfering

with his neighbor’s enjoyment of the wall as a party wall after-

wards.‘ If one erects a block of houses or shops, and then eon-

veys them separately to purchasers, the walls between them

become party \valls for the mutual beneﬁt.’ Where a party wall
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exists, each proprietor has an easement in the land of the other

for its use, repair, and support; but the extent of his rights may

be limited by the contract between them with respect to the wall,

or by the user or the statute under which it was built or is

owned.‘ Rights in party walls pass with the land to heirs or

assignees without being specially mentioned in the conveyance.‘

Each proprietor owes to the other the duty to do nothing that

shall weaken or endanger it,‘ and though each may rightfully,

when he ﬁnds it for his interest to do so, increase its height, sink

' ('ampbe1l o. Mesier, 4.1’ ohns. Ch. ' See Standish 0. Lawrence, 111

834; Mutts 1:. Hawkins, 5 Taunt. 20. Muss. 111; Brooks 0. Curtis. 4 Lan-

' See Bell 1:. Ruwson, 30 Geo. 712. sing, 283. See Warner 0. Rogers, 23

‘ Matts v. Hawkins, 5 Taunt. 20; Minn. 34.

Richards 1:. Rose, 9 Excl1.218; Wcb- ‘ Eno v. Del Vccchio, 6 Ducr, 17;

ster r. Stevens, 5 Duer, 553; Wheeler Brooks 0. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639; S. C.

0. Clark, 58 N. Y. 267. 10 Am. Rep. 545; Dowling v. Hen.

‘ Brooks 0. Curtis. 4 Lansing, 283; nings, 20 Md. 1'79; Hleatt 0. Morris,

Brooks 1:. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639; S. O. 10 Ohio, (N. s.) 523.

10 Am. Rep. 545.

shown.' At the common law rio person was under obligation to
unite with his neighbor in building a party wall, or even to furnish his proportion of the land for it to stand upon; but an
erection might be made a party wall by agreement, and if one
person allowed another to make use of his wall for the support
of a building, and to continue the use for twenty years, the grant
of a right to do so was presumed, and the wall became a party
wall by prescription. The inconveniences of t.he common-law
rule have been obviated to some extent by statutes which permit
a proprietor to build into his neighbor's wall for the support of
his own building, provided the wall is sufficient for the purpose,
on making payment of the just proportion of'the cost. These
statutes establish the role of the civil law.
Where a party wall is built by agreement, the strict rule of law
requires a deed, but if the agreement was by parol only, the case
would ·be a very strong one for the application of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, and no doubt a dissatisfied proprietor would
be enjoined from repudiating the arrangement and interfering
with his neighbor's enjoyment of the wall as a party wall afterwards.• If one erects a block of houses or shops, and then conYeJd them separately to purchasers, the walls between them
become party walls for the mutual benefit.• Where a party wall
exiFots, each proprietor has an easement in the land of the other
for its use, repair, and support; but the extent of his rights may
be limited by the contract between them with respect to the wall,
or by the user or the statute under which it was built or is
owned.' Rights in party walls pasH with the land to heirs or
assignees without being specially mentioned in the oonveyance.•
Each proprietor owes to the other the duty to do nothing that
shall weaken or endanger it,• and though each may rightfully,
when he finds it for his interest to do so, increase its height, sink
('ampbell e. Mesler, 4: Johns. Ch.
834; Matts e. Hawkins, li Taunl 20.
'Hee Bell"· Rawson, 80 Geo. 712.
a :Matts "· Hawkins, I> Taunt. 20;
Richards e. Rose, 9 Excb. 218; Webster "· Stevens, :; Duer, G:J8; Wheeler
e. Clark, ISS N. Y. 267.
• Brooks "· Curtis, 4: Lansing, 283;
Brookt e. Ourtia, ISO N . Y. 639; B. 0.
10 Am. Rep. MG.
1

• Bee Standish e. Lawrence, 111
Mass. 111; Brooks "· Curtis, 4: Lansing, 283. See Warner "· Rogers, 23
Minn. 84:.
• Eno e. Del Vecchio, 6 Duer, 17;
Brooks e. Curtis, ISO N. Y. 639; B. C.
10 Am. Rep. M5; Dowling "· Hennings, 20 M.d. 179; Bleau •· llorrla,
10 Ohio, (N. a.} 1>23.
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the foundations deeper, or on his own side add to it,‘ yet it seems
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that in doing so he is insurer against damages to the other pro-

prietor.’ If the wall becomes ruinous, and ceases to answer the

purposes of support, the easement is at an end, and each pro-

prietor may build as he pleases upon his o\vn land without any

obligation to accommodate the other.‘

‘Matts v. Hawkins, 5 Taunt. 20; v. Morris. 10 Ohio, (N. s.) 523; Dow-

Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601; ling 1:. Hennings, 20 Md. 1'79: Brad-

Brooks Iv. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639; S. C. bee 0. Christ’s Hospital, 4 M. & G.

10 Am.Rep. 545; Price o. McConnell, 714.

the fonndations deeper, or on his bwn side add to it,1 yet it seems
that in doing so he is insnrer against damages to the other proprietor.' If the wall bet'Omes ruinous, and ceases to answer the
purposes of support, the easement is at an end, and each proprietor may build as he pleases upon his own land without any
obligation to accommodate the other.'

27 Ill. 255. ' Partridge o. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601 ;

' Webster 0. Stevens, 5 Duer, 553; Sherred v. Ciseo, 4 Sandt‘. 480; Camp-

Euo v. Del Veeehio, 4 Duer, 53. See bell o. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. 334; Or-

Phillips v. Bordman, 4 Allen, 147; man 0. Day, 5 Fla. 385.

Potter o. White, 6 Bosw. 644; Hieatt

l

1 Matts "· Hawkins, 5 TaunL 20;
Partridge f:). Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601;
Brooks f:). Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639; B. C.
10 Am. Rep. 545; Price o. McConnell,

27 Ill. 255.
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1 Webster"· Stevens, 5 Dner, 553;
Eno o. Del Vecchio, 4 Duer, 53. See
Phillips 11. Bordman, 4 Allen, 147;
Potter "· White, 6 Boaw. 64.4:; Hieatt

o. Morris, 10 Ohio, (N. a.) 528; Dowling o. Hennings, 20 Md. 179; Bradbee o. Christ's Hospital, 4 M. & G.
714.
1 Partridge "· Gilbert, 15 N.Y. 601 ;
Sherred f:). Cisco, 4 Sand f. 480; Camp..
bell"· .Mesler, 4 Johns. Ch. 834; Orman o. Day, 5 Fla. SSG.
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Oﬁices are Trusts. Although the incumbent of a public

oﬁice has a property right in it, yet the ofﬁce itself is a public

trust, and is conferred, not for his beneﬁt, but for the benefit of

the political society.‘ It is therefore from the standpoint of

public interest that any failure in duty is to be regarded, and

the remedy for such failure must be indicated by the nature

of the duty, and the purpose intended to be accomplished in

imposing it.

Classiﬁcation. Oﬁicial duties are supposed to be susceptible

CHAPTER XIII.

of classiﬁcation under the three heads of legislative, executive

and judicial, corresponding to the three departments of govern-

NEGLEm'S OF OFFICIAL DUTY.

ment bearing the same designations; but the classiﬁcation cannot

be very exact, and there are many oiﬁcers whose duties cannot

properly, or, at least, exclusively, be arranged under either of

these heads. A single case may suflice as an illustration. The

oﬁicers chosen to levy and apportion taxes for the inferior muni-

cipal subdivisions of the State are in some cases -authorized: 1,

to determine what taxes shall be levied within the municipality

for the year, 2, to value the property which is to be assessed

for these taxes, 3, to apportion the taves as between the several
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items of property assessed; and 4, to receive from their supe-

rior oﬂicers the statements of taxes to be assessed for more general

purposes, and to apportion these in the same way. The ﬁrst of

these duties partakes of the legislative, the second of the udicial,

OfBcee are 'l'rusta.

Although the incumbent of a public
office has a property right in it, yet the office itself is a public
trust, and is conferred, not tor his benefit, but for the benefit of
the political society.' It is therefore from the standpoint of
public interest that any failure in duty is to be regarded, and
the remedy tor such failure must be indicated by the nature
of the duty, and the purpose intended to be accomplished in
imposing it.

the third and fourth of the executive; but in strictness, none of

them can be classed as belonging specially to either department

of the government, and the oﬂicers who perform them are usually

designated administrative officers. Those oﬂicers, on the other

' Beebe v. Robinson, 52_Ala. 66; Er purte Lambert, 52 Ala. '79.

Cla88i1loation. Official duties are supposed to be susceptible
of classification under the three heads of legislative, executive
and judicial, corresponding to the three departments of government bearing the same designations; but the classification cannot
be very exact, and there are many officers whose duties cannot
properly, or, at least, exclusively, be arranged under either of
these heads. A single case may suffice as an illustration. The
officers chosen to levy and apportion taxes for the interior m un icipal subdivisions of the State are in some cases authorized: 1,
to determine what taxes shall be levied within the municipality
for the year, 2, to value the property which is to be at;sessed
for these taxes, 3~ to apportion the taxes as between the i'evernl
items of property ass(·ssed; and 4, to receive from their superior officers the statements of taxes to be assessed for more general
purposes, and to apportion these in the same way. The first of
these duties vartakes of the legislati\'e, the f!econd of the judicial,
the third and fourth of the executive; but in strictness, none of
them can be classed as belonging specially to either department
of the government, and the officers who perform them are Utiually
designated administrative officers. Those officers, on the other·
I

Beebe •· Robin110n, 52. Ala. 66; E.r purte Lambert, 52 Ala. 79.
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hand, who merely execute the commands of superiors, are prop-

erly denominated ministerial.

Classiﬁcation of Duties. Wliile oﬂices are established and

ﬁlled on public reasons, the incumbents of some are required to

hand, who merely execute the commands of superiors, are prop.
erly denominated ministerial.

perform duties which specially concern individuals, and only

indirectly concern the public. The case of the sheriff will fur-

nish us with an apt illustration here. This oﬁicer serves criminal

process, arrests and conﬁnes persons accused of crime, preserves

order in court, and is conservator of the public peace, but he serves

civil process also. The nature of the duty in any case suggests

the remedy in case of neglect. If the duty he has failed to per-

form is a duty to the State, he is amenable to the State for his

fault; while for the neglect of duties to individuals, only tho

person who is injured may maintain suit. It is, however, as a

general thing, only against ministerial ofﬁcers that an action will

lie for neglect of oﬁieial duty. The reason generally assigned is,

that in the ease of other oflicers, it is inconsistent with the nature

of their functions that they should be made to respond in dam-

ages for failure in satisfactory performance. In many cases this

is a sufﬁcient reason, but in others it is inadequate.

If we take the case of legislative oﬁicers, their rightful exemp-

tion from liability is very plain. Let it be supposed that an
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individual has a just claim against the State which the legislature

ought to allow, but neglects or refuses to allow. In such a case

there may be a moral wrong, but there can be no legal wrong.

The legislature has full discretionary authority in all matters of

legislation, and it is not consistent with this that the members

should be called to account at the suit of individuals for their

acts and neglects. Discretionary power is, in its nature, inde-

pendent; to make those who wield it liable to be called toaccount

by some other authority is to take away discretion and destroy

independence. This remark is not true, exclusively, of legislative

bodies proper, but it applies also to inferior legislative bodies,

such as boards of supervisors, county commissioners, city coun-

cils, and the like.‘ \Vhen such bodies neglect and refuse to pro-

ceed to the discharge of their duties, the courts may interpose

to set them in motion; but they cannot require them to reach

1 Baker 1:. State, 27 Ind. 485. See Morris 0. People, 3 Dcnio, 381.

n s _ -~é ~ —_I§

Olassifloation of Duties. While offices are established and
filled on public reasons, the incumbents of some are required to
perform duties which specially concern indi vidnals, and only
indirectly concern the public. The case of the sheriff will furnish us with an apt illustration here. This officer serves criminal
process, arrests and confines persons accused of crime, preserv~
order in court, and is conservator of the public peace, but he serves
civil process all~o. The nature of the duty in any case suggests
the remedy in case of neglect. If the duty he has failed to perform is a duty to the State, he is amenable to the State for his
fi1.ult; while for the neglect of duties to individuals, only tho
person who is injured may maintain snit. It is, however, as a
gcnera1 thing, only against ministerial officers that an action will
lie for neglect of official duty. The reason generally assigned is,
that in the case of other officers, it is inconsistent with the nature
of their functions that they should be made to respond in damages tor failure in satisfactory performance. In many ~ this
is a sufficient reason, but in others it is inadequate.
If we take the case of legislative officers, their rightful exemption from liability is very plain. Let it be supposed that an
individual has a just claim against the State which the legislature
ought to allow, but neglects or refuses to allow. In such a case
there may bo a moral wrong, but the1·e can be no legal wrong.
The legislature has full discretionary authority in all matters of
'legislation, and it is not consistent with this that the members
should be called to account at the suit of individuals for their
acts and neglects. Discretionary power is, in its naturo, independent; to make those who wield it liable to be called to account
by some other authority is to take away discretion aud destroy
independence. This remark is not true, exclusively, of legislative
bodies proper, but it applies also to inferior legislative bodies,
such as boarlls of supervisors, county commissioners, city councils, and the like. 1 'Vhen such bodies neglect and refuse to proceed to the discharge of their duties, the courts may interpose
to set them in motion; but they cannot require them to reach
1 Baker

"· State, ~ Ind. 485. See }[orris e. People, 8 Denio, 881.
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particular conclusions, nor, for their failure to do so, impose the

payment of damages upon them, or upon the municipality they

represent.‘

It is only when some particular duty of a ministerial character

is imposed upon a legislative body, in the performance of which

its members severally are required to act —no liberty of action

being allowed, and no discretion—that there can be a private

action for neglect. Such ministerial duties are sometimes imposed

upon the members of subordinate boards, like supervisors and

county commissioners, and when they are, if they are imposed

for the beneﬁt of individuals, the members may be personally

responsible for failure in performance.

If we take next the case of executive oﬁicers, the rule will be

found to be the same. The governor of the State is vested with

a power to grant pardons and reprieves, to command the militia,

to refuse his assent to laws, and to take the steps necessary for

the proper enforcement of the-laws; but neglect of none of these

can make him responsible in damages to the party suffering
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therefrom. No one has any legal right to be pardoned, or to

have any particular law signed by the governor, or to have any

deﬁnite step taken by the governor in the enforcement of the

laws. The executive, in these particulars, exercises his discretion,

and he is not responsible to the courts for the manner in which

his duties are performed. Moreover. he could not be ‘made

responsible to private parties without subordinating the execu-

tive department to the judicial department, and this would be

inconsistent with the theory of republican institutions. Each

department, within its province, is and must be independent.

Taking next the case of the judicial department, the same

rule still applies. For mere neglect in judicial duties no action

can lie. A judge cannot be sued because of delaying his judg-

ments, or because he fails to bring to his duties all the care,

prudence and diligence that he ought to bring, or because he

decides on partial views and without sufficient information. Ilis

‘ Wells 1;. Atlanta,43 Geo. 67. Even

the allegation of fraud cannot. be

listened to for the purpose of estab-

lishing such a liability. Wilson 0.

New York, 1 De-nio, 595; Frceport 0.

Marks, 59 Penn. St. 253; Bucll r. Ball,

20 Iowa, 282. A penalty ls some-

times imposed on members of such

boards for neglect to perform speciﬁc

duties, even when they seem to par-

take of the judicial. See Morris 1:.

particular conclusions, nor, for their failure to do so, impose the
payment of dama~ upon them, or upon the municipality they
rep resent.'
It is only when some particular duty of a ministerial character
is imposed upon a legislative body, in the performance of which
its members severalJy are required to act -no liberty of action
being allowed, and no discretion- that there can be a private
action for neglect. Such ministerial duties are somcti mes imposed
upon the members of subordinate boards, like supervisors and
county commissioners, and when they are, if they are imposed
for the benefit of individuals, the members may be personally
responsible tor failure in performance.
If we take next the case of executive officers, the rule will be
found to be the same. The governor of the State is ,·ested with
a power to grant pardons and reprieves, to <:ommand the militia,
to refuse his assent to laws, and to take the steps necessary for
the proper enforcement of the. laws; hut neglect of none of these
can make him responsible in damages to the party suffering
therefrom. No one has any legal right to be pardoned, or to
ha\'e any particular law signed by the governor, or to have any
definite step taken by the governor in the enforcement of the
la\vs. The ex~utive, in theRe particulars, exercises his discretion,
and he is not responsible to the courts for the manner in which
his duties are performed~ Moreover. he could not be 'made
responsible to private parties without subordinating the executive department to the judicial dt>partment, and this would be
ineonsistent with the theory of republican institutions. Each
department, within its province, is and must be independent.
Taking next the case of the judicial department, the same
role still applies. }'or mere neglect in jndicial duties no action
can lie. A jndge cannot be sued because ot' delaying his judgments, or because he fails to bring to his duties all the care,
prudence and diligence that he onght to Lring, or because he
decides on partial views and without sufficient information. His

People, 8 Denlo, 881.

1

Wells"· Atlanta,43 Gco. 67. Even

tllC allegation of fraud cannoL be

1istened to for the purpose of establishing such a liability. Wilson "·
New York, 1 Df'nio, I)IJ,'); Fr('rport "·
}lurks, 59 Penn. St. 253; Buell r. Ball,

20 Iowa, 282. A penalty is sometimes imposed on membt•rs of such
boards for ncglecUo perform speci!lc
duties, even when they seem to partake of the judicial. See Morris "·
People, 8 Denio, 881.
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selection for his oﬂice implies that he is to be governed in it by

his own judgment; and it is always to be assumed that that judg-

ment has been honestly exercised and applied.

Ministerial action by Judicial Oﬂicers. Nevertheless, all

judges may have duties imposed upon them which are purely

selection for his office implies that he is to be governed in it by
his own judgment; and it is always to be assumed that that judgment has been honestly exercised and applied.

ministerial, and where any discretionary action is not permitted.‘

An illustration is to be found in the luzbeas corpus acts. These,

generally, make it imperative that a judge, when an application

for the writ is presented which makes out a facie case of

illegal conﬁnement, shall issue the writ forthwith; and the judge

is expressly made responsible in damages if he fails to obey the

law. A similar liability arises when a justice of the peace

refuses to issue a summons to one who lawfully demands it, or

an execution on a judgment he has rendered,’ or to enter up a

judgment he has determined upon,‘ or to perform any other

oﬁicial act which in its nature is ,purely ministerial;‘ or when,

in performing an oﬁicial duty, he is guilty of misconduct, to the

prejudice ot' a party, as where he makes a false return to a writ

of certz'01'a1'i.'

' The principle was very fully ex-

amined and discussed in Ferguson v.
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Earl of Kinnoull, 9 Cl. & Fin. 251.

The action was brought against a

member of a Scotch Presbytery for

the refusal of the Presbytery to take

the plaintiff, who was prcsentee to a

church, on his trials. The court sus-

tained the action, holding that the

Nevertheless, all
jndges may have duties imposed npon them which are purely
ministerial, and where any discretionary action is not permitted.1
An illustration is to be found in the habetU oorpu~~ acts. These,
genet·ally, make it imperative that a judge, when an application
for the writ is presented which makes out a prima facie case of
illegal confinement, shall issne the writ forthwith; and the judge
is expressly made responsible in damages if he fails to obey the
law. A similar liability arises when a justice of the peace
refuses to issne a summons to one who lawfully demands it, or
an execution on a judgment he has rendered: or to enter up a
judgment he has determined upon,' or to perform any other
official act which in its nature is .purely ministerial; • or when,
in performing an official duty, he is guilty of misconduct, to the
prejudice of a party, as where he makes a false retllrn to a writ
of certi01•ari. •
]l[inisterial action by Judicial OfBcera.

Presbytery acted ministerially in re-

spect to the particular duty, and had

no discretion to refuse. Also, that

the members were liable iutlividually

and collectively for the refusal.

‘Place 1:. Taylor, 22 Ohio, (N. s.)

317; Gaylor v. Hunt, 23 Ohio, (N. s.)

255. For the general rule see Wil-

son r. New York, 1 Denio, 595 ; Roch-

ester White Lead Co. 0. Rochester, 3

N. Y. 463; Noxon 0. Hill, 2 Allen,

215; Way o. Townsend, 4 Allen, 114.

If the justice issues an invalid exc-

eution, he is liable to plaintiff for

nominal damages, but not for the

costs of a levy or of an attempt to

collect, those being too remote. Nox-

on v. lllll, 2 Allen, 215.

’ Fairehild v. Keith, 29 Ohio, (N. s.)

156.

‘ Such as to return in due time the

papers on an appeal taken from his

judgment. Peters 0. Land, 5 Blackf.

12. Or to take security on issuing a

writ of replevin. Smith 0. Trawl, 1

Root, 165. (Jr security on an appeal.

Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend. 462.

The general rule is, that when judi-

cial oﬂicers are required to perform

ministerial acts, they may be sued for

neglect to do so. Ferguson 0. Earl

of Kinnoull, 9 Cl. & Fin. 251; Nox-

on v. Hill, 2 Allen, 215. The justice

who issues an attachment without the

statutory prerequisites is a trespasser.

Vosburgh 0. Welch, 11 Johns. 174.

‘ Pangburn o. Ramsay, 11 Johns.

141.

'.__,!

1 The principle was very fu11y ex.
amlned and discussed in Ferguson t~.
Earl of Kinnoull, 9 Cl. & Fin. 251.
The action was brought against a
member of a 8cotch .Prl'shytery for
the refusal of the PreMbytery to take
the plaintifl', who was presentee to a
church, on his trials. The court sus.
tained the action, holding that the
Presbytery acted mlnistcriully in re .
spect to the particular duty, and had
no discretion to refuse. Al~o. that
the members were liable individuallyand collectively for the refusnl.
1 Place t~. Taylor, 22 Ohio, (N. s.)
817; Gaylor "· Hunt, 23 Ohi,,, (N. s.)
2.15. For the general rule see Wilson r. New York, 1 Denio, 5!)5; Rochester White Lead Co. t~. Rochester, 3
N. Y. 463; Noxon "· Hill, 2 Allen,
215; Way t~. Townsend, 4 Allen, 114.
If the justice issues an invalid execution, he is liable to plaintiff for
nominal damages, but not for the

costs of a levy or ~f an attempt to
collect, those being too remote. Nox.
on~. Hill, 2 Allen, 215.
• Fairchild "· Keith, 29 Ohio, (N. s.)
156.
4 Such as to return in due time the
papers on au appeal taken from his
judgment. Peters fl. Land, 5 Blackf.
12. Or to take security on issuing a
writ of replevin. 8mith tl. Trawl, 1
Root, 165. Or security on an appeal.
Tompkins "· Sands, 8 Wend. 462.
The general rule is, that when judicial officers are required to perform
ministerial acts, they may be sued for
neglect to do so. Ferguson "· Earl
of Kinnoull, 9 Cl. & Fin. 251; Noxon 11. Hill, 2 Allen, 215. The justice
who issues an attachment without the
statutory prerequisites is a trespasser.
Vosburgh t~. Welch, 11 Johns. 174.
• Pangburn "· Ramsay, 11 Johns.
141.
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But, while in cases of merely discretionary powers, it is stifli-

879

ciently manifest that there can be no responsibility to individuals

for the manner in which they are performed, there are many

cases of powers not discretionary, in which the right to exemp-

tion from liability is equally plain. The sheriff, for example, in

the execution of a convict, is allowed no discretion; but the idea

of responsibility to individuals for any neglect of duty in respect

to the execution, or for any improper conduct, would be a mani-

fest absurdity. It is not, then, solely because the duties are dis-

cretionary that oﬂicers are exempt from civil suits in respect to

their performance, and some further reason must be sought for.

The reason in the case instanced is plain enough;-for the duty

neglected or improperly performed is a public duty exclusively,

and no single individual of the public can be in any degree

legally concerned with the manner of its performance. Now, no

man can have any ground for a. private action until some duty

owing to him has been neglected; and if the oﬁicer owed him

no duty, no foundation can exist upon which to support his action.

But had the sheriff received from him for service an execution

against the goods and chattels of his debtor, the case would have

been different. The sheriff ’s duty would have been the same in

nature-—that is, it would still have been ministerial— but it
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would have been a duty owing to the individual, and for a fail-

ure in performance the individual must be entitled to appropriate

redress.

When Oﬂlcers Liable to Private Suits. The rule of oﬂicial

responsibility, then, appears to be this : That if the duty which

the official authority imposes upon an oﬁicer is a duty to the

public, a failure to perform it. or an inadequate or erroneous per-

formance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must

be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. On

the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a

neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual

wrong, and may support an individual action for damages.

The case of discretionary powers may be brought under this

rule as well as all others, for these are only conferred where the

duties to be performed are public duties: concerning the public

Bnt, while in caaes of merely discretionary powers, it is sufficiently manifest that there can be no ret\ponsibility to individuals
for the manner in which they are performed, there are many
cases of powers not discretionary, in which the right to exemption from liability is equally plain. The sheriff, for example, in
the execution of a c.'Onvict, is allowed no discretion; hut the idea
of responsibility to individuals tor any neglect of duty in respect
to tl:e execution, or for any improper conduct, would be a manifest absurdity. It is not, then, solely because the duties are discretionary that officers are exempt from civil suits in respect to
their performance, and some further reason mnst be sought for.
The reason in the case instanced is plain enough;· for the d n ty
neglected or improperly performed is a public duty exclusively.
and no single individual of the public can be in any degree
legally concerned with the manner of its performance. Now, no
man can have any ground for a private action until some duty
owing to him has been neglected; and if the officer owed him
no duty, no foundation can exist upon which to support his action.
But had the sheriff received from him for service an execution
against the goods ~nd chattels of his debtor, the case would have
been different. The sheriff's duty would have been the same in
nature- that is, it would still have been ministerial- but it
would have been a duty owing to the individual, and for a failure in performance the individual must be entitled to appropriate

red reB&.

primarily and specially, and individuals only incidentally. This

is readily perceived in the case of powers conferred upon legisla-

When Ofllcen Liable to Private Suits. The rule of official
responsibility, then, appears to be this : That if ihe duty which
the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the
public, a f'!-ilure to perform it. or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must
be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. On
the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a
neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual
wrong, and may support an individual action for damages.
The case of discretionary powers may be brought under this
rule as well as all others, for these are only conferred where the
duties to be performed are public duties: conc-erning the public
primarily and speciaJiy, and individuals only incidentally. This
is readily perceh·ed in the case of powers conterred upon legisla-
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tive bodies. Members of these bodies are not chosen to perform
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duties to individuals, but duties to the State. The performance

of these may beneﬁt individuals, and the failure to perform them

may prejudice individuals, but this is only incidental. The State

expends moneys in draining extensive tracts of low lands; this

beneﬁts the land owner living near the land drained, but it was

not in his interest that the improvement was provided for, but

for the general beneﬁt. The State relieves a certain class of prop-

erty from taxation: this may prejudice those who own no such

property, but it violates no duties which the legislators owed to

any individual. In any such legislation, the citizen can be sup-

posed to have no individual rights whatsoever; and it will be

made, amended, or repealed without the necessity of considering

in any manner his private interest. It is the same when a pri-

vate claim is allowed and its payment ordered: this beneﬁts the

claimant, but the allowance is made in the interest of the State

at large, and because it is for the public good that all. just claims

upon the State should be recognized and provided for. If the

claim should be rejected instead of being allowed, there would

still be the same presumption that the public interest had been

consulted, and that the claim was rejected because it had no just

foundation. In either case the duty which was imposed on the
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members of the legislature—which was a duty to the public

0nly—- is supposed to have been performed.

The case of the judge is not essentially diﬁerent. His doing

justice as between particular individuals, when they have a con-

troversy before him, is not the end and object which were in view

when his court was created, and he was selected to preside over

or sit in it. Courts are created on public grounds; they are to

do justice as between suitors, to the end that peace and order may

prevail in the political society, _and that rights may be protected

and preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be accom-

plished is public: the individual advantage or loss results from

the proper and thorough or improper and imperfect performance

of a duty for which his controversy is only the occasion. The

judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice between

individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals,

he may be called to account by the State in such form and before

such tribunal as the law may have provided. But as the duty

neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for an

?j' ‘innit

tive bodies. Members of these bodies are not chosen to perform
duties to individuals, but duties to the State. The performance
of these may benefit individuals, and the failure to perform them
may prejudice individuals, but this is only incidental. The State
expends moneys in draining extensive tracts of low lands; this
benefits the land owner living near the land drained, but it was
not in his interest that the improvement was provided for, but
for the general benefit. The State relie,·es a <.-ertain class of property from taxation: this may prejudice those who own no such
property, but it violates no duties which the legislators owed to
an.v individual. In any such lc#rislation, the citizen can be supposed to have no individual rights whatsoever; and it will be
made, amended, or repealed without the necessity of considering
in any' manner his private interest. It is the same when a private claim is allowed and its payment ordered: this benefits the
clair~umt, but the allowance is made in the interest of the State
at large, and because it is for the public good that all.just claims
upou the State should be recognized and provided tor. If the
claim should be rejected instead of being allowed, there would
still be the same presumption that the public interest had been
consulted, and that the claim was rejected because it had no just
foundation. In either case the duty which was imposed on the
rnemLers of the legislature-which was a duty to the public
only- is supposed to have been performed.
The case of the judge is not essentially different. His doi!l~
justice as between particular individuals, when they have a controversy before him, is not the end and object which were in view
when his court was created, and he was selected to pr·eside over
or sit in it. Courts are created on public grounds; they are to
do jn:;tice as hctween suitors, to the end that peace and order may
prevail in the political society, _and that rights may be protected
and preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be accomplished is public: the individual advantage or loss results from
the proper and thorough or improper and imperfect performance
of a duty for which his controversy is only the occasion. The
judge performs his duty to the public by doing jnstice between
individuals, or, if be tails to do justice as between individuals,
he may be called to account by the State in such form and before
such tribunal as the law may have provided. But as the duty
neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for an
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individual injury, is not admissible. This, as we shall see here-
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after, is not the sole reason for judicial exemption from individual

suits, but it is one reason, and a very conclusive one.

The dignity of the oﬁiee is sometimes supposed to have some-

thing to do with this immunity from private suits; but this is a

mistake. The rule stated does not depend at all on the grade of

the ofﬁce, but exclusively upon the nature of the duty. This

may be shown by taking as an illustration the case of the police-

man; one of the lowest grade of public oﬁieers. His duty is to

serve criminal warrants; to arrest persons who commit offenses

in his view, to bring night-walkers to account, and to perform

various oﬂices of similar nature. Within his beat he should

watch the premises of individuals, and protect them against bur-

glaries and arsons. But suppose he goes to sleep on his beat,

and while thus off duty a robbery is committed or a house burned

down, either of which might have been prevented had he been

vigilant,— who shall bring him to account for this neglect of

duty? Not the individual who has suffered from the crime, cer-

tainly, for the otiieer was not his policeman; was not hired by

him, paid by him, or controlled by him; and consequently owed

to him no legal duty.‘ The duty imposed upon the oﬂieer was a

duty to the public— to the State, of which the individual suﬂ'erer
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was only a fractional part, and incapable as such of enforcing

obligations which were not individual but general. If a police-

man fails to guard the premises of a citizen with due vigilance,

the neglect is a breach of duty of exactly the same sort as when,

ﬁnding the same citizen indulging in riotous conduct, he fails

to arrest him; and if the citizen could sue him for the one neg-

lect, he could also for the other. And here it will be noted that

the duty neglected in either case is in no proper sense discre-

tionary.

' In Butler o. Kent, 19 Johns. 223, a

public lottery commissioner was sued

by one who had purchased several

lottery tickets to sell again, and who

complained that by the carelessness

and mismanagement of the commis-

sioner public conﬁdence in the fair-

ness of the drawing was destroyed,

and the market value of the tickets

diminished. The court held that the

action would not lie. The plaintiff

showed no loss peculiar to himself;

the duty neglected was a public duly:

besides the allegation of damage was

individual injury, is not admissible. This, as we shall see hereafter, is not the sole reason for judicial exemption from individual
suits, but it is one reason, and a very conclusive one.
The dignity of the office is sometimes supposed to have something to do with this immunity from private suits; but this is a
mistake. The rule stated does not depend at all on the grade of
the office, but exclusively upon the nature of the duty. This
may be shown by taking as an illustration the case of the policeman; one of the lowest grade of public officers. His duty is to
serve criminal warrl\nts; to al'l·est persons who commit offenses
in his view, to bring night-walkers to account, and to perform
various offices of similar nature. Within his beat he should
'vatch the premises of indi"iduals, and protect them against burglaries and arsons. But suppose he goes to sleep on his beat,
and while thus off duty a robbery is committed or a house burned
down, either of which might have been pre\'ented had he been
vigilant,- who shall bring him to account tor this neglect of
duty~ Not the individual who has suffered from the crime, certainly, for the officer was not his policeman; was not hired by
him, paid by him, or controlled by him; and consequently owed
to him no legal duty. 1 The duty imposed upon the officer was a
duty to the public- to the State, of which the individnalsuflerer
was only a fractional part, and incapable as such of enforcing
obligations which were not individual but general. If a policeman fails to guard the premises of a citizen with dne vigilance,
the neglect is a breach of duty of exactly the same sort as when,
finding the same citizen indulging in riotous conduct, he fails
to arrest him; and if the citizen could sue him for the one nf.'glect, he could also for the other. And here it will be noted that
the duty neglected in either case is in no proper scnso discretionary.

vague and indeﬁnite: it was like a

general avermeut in Iveson v. Moore,

1 Salk. 16, that plaintiilflost custom.

ers by reason of a bad name being

applied to his wife—no particulars

being given toshow the loss.

1 In Butler"· Kent, 19 Johns. 228, a
public lottery commi~iont>r was sued
IJy one who had purchased several
Iou.cry tickets to sell o.gnin, and who
complainell that by 1.he carelessness
and mismanagement of the commissioner public conftdence in t.be fair.
ness of the drawing was destroyed,
and t.be market. value of the tickets
diminished. Tbe court held t.hat the

action would not lie. The plaintiff
showed no loss peculiar to himself;
the duty neglected was a public duty:
beside:~ the allc)!atiou of damago was
vague and indefinite: it was like a
general averment in Iveson o. Moore,
1 Salk. 16, that plaintiff'" lost customers by reason of a bad name being
applied to his wife- no partlculara
being given to &how the loSL
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What has been said is also true of officers to whom is entrusted
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the power to lay out, alter, or discontinue highways. They may

decline to lay out a road which an individual desires, or they may

conclude to discontinue one which it is for his interest should be

retained. There is in such acase a damage to him but no wrong

to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the

oﬂticer has touched his interest to his prejudice. But the officer

owed no duty to him as an individual: the duty performed or

neglected was a public duty. An individual can never be suffered

to sue for an injury which technically is one to the public only:

he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage

alone does not constitute a wrong.‘

It may be said that the case of the highway commissioner who

improperly opens or discontinues a road, to the prejudice of an

individual, is like that of one wl1o commits a public nuisance to

the injury of an individual. In each case there is a public wrong

and also a private damage. But the two cases differ in this: the

common law imposes upon every one a duty to his neighbor as

well as to the public not to make his premises a. nuisance; but

the duties imposed upon the road oﬁicer, in laying out and dis-

continuing roads, are only that they shall faithfully serve the

public. If it shall be found that in his oﬂicial action he has
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failed to regard suﬁiciently the interests of individuals, proof of

the fact does not make out a right of action, because, there being

no duty to the individual, there would be nothing of which the

injured party could complain except of the breach of public duty.

But the State must complain of this, not individuals.’ The road

oﬁicer, however, owes to every individual the duty not to proceed

illegally to his prejudice; and, therefore, if the steps taken for

laying out a highway are not in accordance with the law, the

ofﬁcer becomes a trespasser if he relies upon them in entering

upon the lands of individuals.

Another illustration of the general rule is that of the quaran-

tine ofﬁcer. His duty requires him to take the proper steps to

prevent the spread of contagion, and he will be culpable in a very

high degree if he neglects to do so, because the duty is a public

duty of the very highest importance and value. Let it be sup-

posed that a neglect occurs, and that a great number of persons

' Waterer 0. Freeman, Hob. 266. ’ Sage 1:. Laurain, 19 Mich. 137.

See ante, p. 62.

_ ___.

What has been said is also true of officers to whom is entrusted
the power to lay out, alter, or discontinue highways. They may
decline to lay out a road which an individual desires, or they may
conclude to discontinue one which it is for his interest should be
retained. There is in such a case a damage to him but no wrong
to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the
officer has touched his interest to his prejudice. But the officer
owed no duty to him as an individual: the duty performed or
neglected was a public duty. An individual can never be suffered
to sue for an injury which technically is one to the public only:
he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage
alone does not constitute a wrong.'
It may be said that the case of the highway commissioner who
improperly opens or discontinues a road, to the prejudice of an
individual, is like that of one who commits a public nuisance to
the injury of an individual. In each case there is a public wrong
and also a private damage. But the two cases differ in this: the
common law imposes npon every one a duty to his neighbor as
well as to the public not to make his premises a nuisance; but
the duties imposed upon the road officer, in laying out and discontinuing roads, are only that they shall faithfully serve the
public. If it shall be found that in his official action he has
failed to regard sufficiently the interests of individuals, proof of
the fact does not make out a right of action, because, there being
no duty to the individual, there would be nothing of which the
injured party could complain except of the breach of public duty.
But the State mnst complain of this, not individuals.• The road
officer, however, owes to every individual the duty not to proceed
illegally to his prejudice; and, therefore, if the steps taken for
laying out a highway are not in accordance with the law, the
officer becomes a trespasser if he relies upon them in entering
upon the lands of individuals.
Another illustration of the general rule is that of the quarantine officer. His duty requires him to take the proper steps to
prevent the spread of contagion, and he will be culpable in a very
high degree if he neglects to do so, because the duty is a public
duty of the. very highest importance and value. Let it be supposed that a neglect occurs, and that a great number of persons
J Waterer 11. Freeman, Hob. 266.
Bee ante, p. 62.

1

Sage 11. Laurain,

1~

Mich. 187.
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are infected in consequence. Not one of these persons can
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demand of the ofﬁcer a personal redress. The reason is obvious:

the duty was laid on the oﬁicer as a public duty —- a duty to pro-

tect the general public— but the oﬁice did not charge the incum-

bent with any individual duty to any particular person. If one

rather than another was injured by the neglect, it was only that

the consequences of the public wrong chanced to fall upon him

rather than upon another; ust as the ravages of war may chance

to reach one and spare another, though the purpose of the gov-

ernment is to protect all equally.‘

Recorder of Deeds. On the other hand there are oﬁices which,

though created for the public beneﬁt, have duties devolved upon

their incumbents which are duties to individuals exclusively. - In

other words, in these cases, instead of individuals being beneﬁted

by the performance of public duties, the public is to be inciden-

tally beneﬁted by the performance of duties to individuals. One

are infected in consequence. Not one of these persons can
demand of the officer a personal redress. The reason is obvions:
the dnty was laid on the officer as a public dnty- a duty to protect the general public- but the office did not charge the incumbent with any individual duty to any particular person. If one
rather than another was injured by the neglect, it was only that
the consequences of the public wrong chanced to fall upon him
rather than upon another; just as the ravages of war may chance
to reach one and spare another, though the purpose of the government is to protect all equally.'

conspicuous illustration is that of the recorder of deeds. The

otlice may be said to be created because it is for the general public

good that all titles should appear of record, and that all pur-

chasers should have some record upon which they may rely for

accurate information. But although a public oﬁicer is chosen to

keep such a record, the duties imposed upon him are for the
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most part duties only to the persons who have occasion for his

oﬁicial services. He is simply required to record for those who

apply to him their individual conveyances, and to give to them

abstracts or copies from the record if they request them and

tender the legal fees. All these are duties to individuals, to

be performed for a consideration; the State is not expected to

enforce the performance, nor does it generally provide for pun-

ishing as a breach of public duty the failure in performance.

But the right to a private action on breach of the duty follows

as of course.’ The breach is an individual wrong, and resulting

' Bee White 1;. Marshﬁeld,48Vt.20;

llrlnkmeyer 0. Evansville, 29 Ind.

187; Ogg 0. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495;

Western College, etc., o. Cleveland, 12

Ohio, (N. s ) 375; Hill o. Charlotte. '72

N. C. 3'3; S. C. 21Am. Rep. 451 ; Free-

port 0. lsbell, 83 Ill. 440; Pontiac 0.

Carter, 32 Mich. 164.

‘A ministerial oﬁicer charged by

statute with an absolute and certain

duty. in the performance of which an

individual has a special interest, is

liable to an action if he refuse to per-

form it, notwithstanding his disobe-

dience may be prompted by an honest

On the other hand there are offices which,
though created for the public benefit, have duties devolved upon
their incumbents which are duties to individuals exclusively. ·In
other words, in these cases, instead of individuals being benefited
by the performance of public duties, the public is to be incidentally benefited by the performance of duties to individuals. One
conspicuous illustration is that of the recorder of deeds. The
oflk-e may be said to be created because it is for the genera] public
good that alJ titles should appear of record, and that all purchasers should have some record upon which they may rely for
accurate information. But although a public officer is chosen to
keep such a record, the duties imposed upon him are for the
most part duties only to the persons who have occasion for his
official services. He is simply required to record for those who
apply to him their individual conveyances, and to give to them
abstracts or copies from the record if they request them and
tender the legal fees. All these are dnties to individuals, to
be performed for a consideration; the State is not expected to
enforce the performance, nor does it generally provide for punishing as a breach of public duty the failure in performance.
But the right to a private action on breach of the duty follows
as of course.' The breach is an individual wrong, and resulting
Beoorder of Deeds.

belief that the statute is unconstitu-

1 Bee White "·Marshfield, 48 Vt. 20;
Brinkmeyer "· Ev&ll8ville, 29 Ind.
187; Ogg "· Lansing, SIS Iowa, 49tl;
Western College, etc.,"· Cleveland, 12
Ohio, (N. s) 375; Hill"· Charlotte, 72
N. C. M; 8. C. 21 Am. Rep. 451; Free.
port "· Isbell, 88 Ill. 440; Pontiac •·
C&rter, 82 Mich. 164.

• A ministerial officer charged by
statute with an absolute and certain
duty. in the performiUlce of which an
individual has a special interest, is
liable to an action if be refuse to perform it, notwithstanding his disobe.
dience may be prompted by an honest
belief that the statute ia unconat.itu-
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damage must be presumed, whether it is or is not susceptible of
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proof.

An actionable wrong may be committed by the recorder by

refusing to receive and record a conveyance when it is tendered

to him for recording accompanied with the proper fees. He may

also be chargeable with a like wrong if, in undertaking to record

a deed, he commits an error which makes the conveyance appear

of record to be something different from what it is; for his duty

is to record it accurately. In this last case the question of dith-

culty would concern, not so much the existence of a right of

action, as the person entitled to maintain it; in other words,

who the party is who is wronged by the recorder’s mistake.

The authorities are not agreed on the question who should

sustain the loss when the grantee in a deed has duly left it for

record, and the recorder has failed to record it correctly. The

question in such a case would commonly arise between the grantee

in such a deed and some person claiming under a subsequent

conveyance by the same grantor, which has been put upon record

while the error in the other remained uncorrected. In some

cases it has been held that the grantee in the ﬁrst deed is not to

be prejudiced by the recorder’s error. The reason has been given

in one case as follows: The person seeking to take advantage of
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the error, it is said, “is, in effect, claiming to enforce a statute

penalty imposed upon the grantee in the deed by reason of his

having omitted to do something the law required him to do to

protect himself and preserve his rights. The law never intended

a grantee should suffer this forfeiture if he has conformed to its

provisions. The plaintiff claiming the beneﬁt of this statute,

being, as it is, in derogation of the common law, and conferring

aright before unknown, he must ﬁnd in the provisions of the

statute itself the letter which gives him that right. To the

statute alone we must look for a purely statutory right. All

that this law required of the grantee in the deed was, that he

should ﬁle his deed for record in the recorder’s oflice, in order to

secure his rights under the deed. When he does that, the require-

ments of the law are satisﬁed, and no right to claim this forfeit-

tlonal. Clark 0. Miller, 54 N. Y. 528. common law accrues on breach of the

His motive, whether honest or mali- duty, if the statute fails to prescribi-

cious, is immaterial. Keith -v. How- the remedy. Commissioners ‘v.Duck-

ard, 24 Pick. 292. An action as at ett, 20 Md. 468.

f _._€,

damage must be presumed, whether it is or is not susceptible of
proof.
An actionable wrong may be committed by the recorder by
refusing to receive and record a conveyance when it is tendered
to him for recording accompanied with the proper fees. He may
also be chargeable with a like wrong if, in undertaking to record
a deed, he commits an error which makes the conveyance appear
of record to be something different from what it is; for his duty
is to record it accurately. In this ]ast case the question of difficulty would concerri, not so much the existence of a right of
action, as the person entitled to maintain it; in other words,
who the party is who is wronged by the recorder's mistake.
The authorities are not agreed on the question who should
sustain the loss when the grantee in a deed has duly left it for
record, and the recorder has failed to record it correctly. The
question in such a case would commonly arise between the grantee
in such a deed and some person claiming under a subsequent
conveyance by the same grantor, which has been put upon record
while the error in the other remained uncorrected. In some
cases it has been held that the g1·antee in the first deed is not to
be prejudiced by the recorder's error. The reason has been ~i\·en
in one case as follows: The person seeking to take advantage of
the error, it is said, "i11, in effect, claiming to enforce a statute
penalty imposed upon the gmntee in the deed by reason of his
having omitted to do something the law required him to do to
protect himself and preserve his rights. The law never intended
a grantee should suffer this forfeiture if he has conformed to its
provisions. The plaintift' claiming the benefit of this statute,
being, as it is, in derogation of the common law, and conferring
a right before unknown, he must find in the provisions Clf the
statute itself the letter which gives him that right. To the
statute alone we must look for a purely statutory right. All
that this law required of the grantee in the deed was, that he
should file his deed for record in the recorder's office, in order to
secure his rights under the deed. When he does that, the requirements ot' the law are satisfied, and no right to claim this forfeittlon&l. Clark "· Mtller, M N. Y. fl28.
His motive, whether honest or malicious, is immaterial. Keith "· Howard, 24: Pick. 292. An action as at

common law accrues on breach of the
duty, if the statute fails to prescribe
the remedy. Commissioners "·Duckett, 20 Md. 468.
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urc can be set up by a subsequent purchaser. The statute does
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not give to the subsequent purchaser the right to have the ﬁrst

deed postponed to his, if the deed is not actually recorded, but

only if it is not ﬁled for record.”‘ IIere, it is perceived. the

court ﬁnds that the grantee has brought himself strictly within

the letter of the statute, and has performed all that the statute

in terms makes requisite for his protection. He has duly ﬁled

his deed for record, and the statute required no more. A like

decision was made in Alabama under a statute which made the

deed “operative as a record ” from the time it was delivered by

the grantee for the purpose.’

Where such is the rule of la\v, it would seem that the recorder

could hardly be responsible in damages to the grantee for failing

correctly to record his deed,’ unless, in consequence of something

which subsequently takes place, an actual damage is suffered

which can be shown. Such damage might befall, if afterwards

he should negotiate a sale, and ﬁnd the erroneous record to stand

in the way of its completion; but as the deed, if still in exist-

ence, could be recorded over again on payment of the statutory

fees, it may reasonably be said that the cost of a new record

would be the measure of recovery, provided that, in the mean-

time, nothing else had occurred to endanger the title by reason
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of the error. If, however, the deed were lost or destroyed, a

second recording would be impossible, and the question of rem-

edy might then be more serious. As the inconvenience the

grantee would suffer in such a case, and the danger to his title

would result from the conjunction of the two circumstances -—

ﬁrst, the error in the record, and second, the loss of the deed—-

‘Bani-zsr, J., in Merrick v.Wa1lacc, without notice; and all such deeds

19 Ill. 486, 497. The same view. in

effect, is taken by J udge Dnmtuoxn

in Polk 1:. Cosgrove, 4 Biss. 437, and

Riggs v. Boylnn, Ibid., 445. See, also.

Garrard 1.-. Davis, 53 Mo. 322. The

statute under which the Illinois de-

cisions were made provided that “ all

deeds and other title papers which are

required by law to be recorded, shall

take effect and be in force from and

after the time of ﬁling the same for

ore can be set up by a subsequent porcltaser. The statute does
not give to the subsequent purchaser the right to have the first
deed postponed to his, if the deed is not actually recorded, bot
only if it is not filed for ret'Ord."' llere, it is perceived. the
court finds that the grantee has brought himself strictly within
the letter of the statute, and haa performed all that the statute
in terms makes requisite for his prt>tection. He has duly filed
ltis deed for record, and the statute required no more. A like
decision was made in Alabama onder a statute which made the
deed "operative as a record" from the time it was de~ivered by
the grantee for the purpose.'
Where such is the rule of law, it would seem that the recorder
could hardly be responsible in damages to the grantee for failing
correctly to record his dood,' unless, in consequence of something
which subsequently takes place, an actual damage is suffered
which can be shown. Such damage might befall, if afterwat-ds
he shonld negotiate a sale, and find the erroneous record to stand
in the way of its completion; but as the deed, if still in existence, could be recorded over again on payment of the shttntory
fees, it may reasonably be said that the cost of a new record
would be the measure of reeo,·cry, provided that, in the meantime, nothing else had occurred to endanger the title by reason
of the error. If, however, the deed were lost or destroyed, a
second recording would be impo:;~Sible, and the question of remedy might then be more serious. As the in<.'Onvcnience the
grantee would suffer in such a CRse, and the danger to his title
would result from the conjunction of the two circumstances-:first, the error in the record, and second, the loss of the deed-

record, and not before, as to all cred-

itors and subsequent purchasers

and title papers shall be adjudged

void as to all such creditors and sub-

sequent purchasers without notice,

until the same shall have been ﬁled

for record in the county where the

said lands may lie."

’ Mims v. Mims, 85 Ala.23. See

M’Grcgor u. Hall, 3 Stew. & Port.

397.

' Except, of course, to the extentof

what had been paid to him for mak-

ing a record which he has failed to

make.

25

1 BREES II', J., In llcrrick "·Wallace,
19 111. 486, 49'7. The same view. in
effect, is taken by Judge DRt'lOlOND
in Polk t:. Cosgrove, 4 Biss. 4.37, and
Riggs "· Boylan, Ibid., «5. See, also.
Garrard -c. Davis, 68 Mo. :.!22. The
statute under which the Illinois decisions were made provided that "all
deeds and other title papers which are
required by law to be recorded, shall
take effect and be In force from and
after the time of filing the same for
record, and not before, u to all cred.
itora and subsequent purchasera

26

without notice; and an such deeds
and title papers shall be adjudged
void as to all suC'h creditors and sub.
sequent purchasers without notice,
until tbe same shall have bet>n filed
for record in the county where the
anld lands may lie."
1 .Mims e. Mims, 8/S AlL 23. Bee
ll'Gregor e. Hall, 8 Stew. & Port.
897.

'Except, of course, to the extent of
what had been paid to him for mat.
lug a record which he hu failed to

make.
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the question of remote and proximate cause would be involved,
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and it is not easy to say what damage can be said to have fol-

lowed, as a natural consequence, directly and proximately from

the recorder’s fault.

On the other hand, there are many cases in which it has been

decided that every one has a right to rely upon the record actually

made as being correct, and that, it’ it is erroneous, the peril is

upon him whose deed has been incorrectly recorded. These cases,

like those previously given, are planted upon the statute. The

leading case was one in which a mortgage of three thousand

dollars was recorded as one for three hundred dollars only. The

statute provided that “ no mortgage should defeat or prejudice

the title of any bonaﬁde purchaser, unless the same shall have

been duly registered.” Said Chancellor KENT: “The true con-

struction of the act appears to be that the registry is notice oi

the contents of it, and no more, and that the purchaser is not to

be charged with notice of the contents of the mortgage an y further

than they may be contained in the registry. The purchaser is

not bound to attend to the correctness of the registry. It is

the business of the mortgagee; and if a mistake occurs to his

prejudice, the consequences of it lie between him and the clerk,

and not between him and the bona ﬁde purchaser. The act. in
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providing that all persons might have recourse to the registry,

intended that as the correct and suﬁicient source of information;

and it would be a doctrine productive of immense mischief to

oblige the purchaser to look, at his peril, to the contents of every

mortgage, and to be bound by them when different from the

contents as declared in the registry. The registry might prove

only a snare to the purchaser, and no person could be safe in his

purchase without hunting out and inspecting the original mort-

gage, a task of great toil and diﬁiculty. I am satisﬁed that this

was not the intention, as it certainly is not the sound policy of

the statute.” ' Many decisions to the same eﬂ'ect have been

made in other States.’

‘Frost o. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch.

288, 298. The case was reversed on

another ground. Beekman 0. Frost,

18 Johns. 544. See. also. N. Y. Life

Ins. Co. 0. White, 17 N. Y. 469.

’ Sanger o. Craigue, 10 Vt. 555;

~_

Baldwin 0. Marshall, 2 Humph.116;

[I1-ister‘s Lessee v. Fortner,2 Binn.

40; Lally v. Holland, 1 Swan, 896;

Shcplmrd v. Burkhalter, 13 Geo.

444; Miller 0. Bradford, 12 Iowa, 14;

Chamberlain 0. Bell, 7 Cal. 292; Par-

the question of remote and proximate ca.nse would be involved,
and it is not easy to say what damage can be i'aid to have followed, as a natural consequence, directly and proximately from
the recorder's fault.
On the other hand, there are many cases in which it has Leen
decided that every one has a right to rely upon the record actually
made as being correct, and that, if it is erroneous, the peril is
upon him whose deed has been incorrectly recorded. The:,;c cai'e&,
like those previously gi\'en, are planted upon the statute. The
leading case was one in which a mortgage of three thousand
dollarli was recorded as one tor three hundred dollars only. The
statute provided that ., no mortgage should defeat or prejudice
the title of any bonafide purchaser, unless the same shall have
been duly registered." Said Chancellor K~o:~T: '"The true construction of the act appears to be that the registry is notice of
the contents of it, and no more, and that the Jmrchascr is not to
be charged with notice of the contents of the mortga~re any fnrther
than they may be contained in the registry. The purchaser is
not bound to attend to the correctness of the regii'try. It is
the business of the mortgagee; and if a mistake occurs to his
p~iudice, the consequences of it lie between him and the derk,
and not between him and the bona fols purchaser. The act, in
providing that all persons might have recourse to the registry,
intenllCll that as the correct and snffieient source of information;
and it would be a doctt·iue producti\·e of immense mischief to
oblige the purchaser to look, at his peril, to the contents of e\·ery
mortg-age, and to be bound by them when diffet·ent from the
contents as declared in the registry. The registt·,r might prove
only a snare to the purchaser, and no person could be sate in his
purchase without hunting out and inspecting the original mortgage, a task of gr~at toil and difficulty. I am satisfied that this
was not the intention, as it certaiuly is not the sound poliey of
the statute." 1 Many decisions to the same effect have been
made in other States. 1
1 Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch.
288, 298. The case was reversed on
another ground. Beekman v. Frost,
18 Johns. 544. See, also, N.Y. Life
Ins. Co.!!. White, 17 N.Y. 469.

'Sanger "· Craigue, 10 Vt. 556;

Baldwin v. Marshall, 2 Humpl1.ll6;
Ih·ister's Lessee v. Fortner, 2 Binn.
40; Lally v. Holland, 1 Swan, 896;
ShPplwrd l'. Burkhalter, 18 Geo.
444: )Iiller fl. Bradford. 12 Iowa, 14;
Chamberlain o. Bell, 7 Cal. 292; Par.
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Sometimes the error of the recorder consists in not indexing
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the conveyance, or in indexing it incorrectly. Herc, also, the

effect of error must depend upon the statute, and the purpose it

has in view in requiring an index to be made. In general, the

purpose probably is to facilitate the examination of the records

by the oﬁicer; not to protect the interests of those whose con-

veyances are recorded; ‘ and where such is the fact, an error in

the index, or a failure to index a deed, would not prejudice the

title of the grantee.‘ But some statutes require the index to

give information of the contents of the deed, and particularly

What land is conveyed by it; and where this is the case, the record

is not constructive notice of the conveyance of anything which

the index does not indicate.‘

In order to understand what rights of action might arise from

errors in records, we may suppose a case arising in a State where

the statute puts upon the grantee himself the responsibility to

see that his deed is correctly recorded. Suppose the deed to be

so recorded, that the record fails to describe the land actually con-

veyed, and the grantor then sells the land a second time to one

having no knowledge of the prior conveyance, thereby cutting

Oil‘ the ﬁrst conveyance. There would be under such circum-

stances, a direct loss to the ﬁrst grantee of the whole value of the
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land, and it is plain that he must be entitled to a remedy against

some one for the recovery of compensation. That he might

treat the second conveyance by the grantor as one made in his

interest, and sue and recover from him the amount received front

the second grantee, we should say would be clear. This would

be only the ordinary case of one atiirming a sale, wrongfully made

by another, of his property, and recovering the proceeds thereof;

the familiar case of waiving a tort and suing in assum1m't for the

rett 0. Shaubhut, 5 Minn. 323; Ban ' See Schell e. Stein, 76 Penn. St.

nurd 0. Carnpau, 29 Mich. 162; Ter-

rell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309;

Brydon 0. Campbell, 40 Md. 331;

Jenning‘s Lessee v. Wood, 20 Ohio,

261. The defects in these cases were

various. In the Ohio case the name

of the grantor was incorrectly given,

and in the Minnesota case the name

of one of the witnesses was not cop-

ied into the record.

398.

' (‘urtis v. Lyman, 24 Vt. 338; (‘om-

Sometimes the error of the recorder consists in not indexing
the conn•yance, or in indexing it incorrectly. Her(', also, tho
effect of error mu~t depend upon the statute, and the purpose it
has in view in requiring an index to be made. In general, the
purpose probably is to facilitate the examination of the record,.;
by the officer; not to protect the interests of those whose eonveyanccs are recorded;' and where such is the fact, an error in
the index, or a failure to index a deed, would not pn·jndiee the
title of the grantee.' But some statutes n·<plire the index to
give information of the contents of the deed. and particularly
what land is conveyed by it; and where thiA is the case, the re<'ord
is not constructive noti<·e of the conveyance of anything which
the index does not indicate.'
In order to understand what rights of action might aris(' from
errors in records, we may suppose a ease ari~ing in a State where
the statute puts npon the grantee him8elf the responsibility to
see that his deed is correctly recorded. Suppose the deed to be
so recorded, that the record fails to desC"rihe the land actually convey('d, and the grantor then sells the land a 11ceond time to one
having no knowledge of the prior conveyance, thereby cutting
off the first conveyance. There would be under such circumstances, a direct loss to the fhst grantee of the whole value of the
land~ and it is plain that he mm;t be entitled to a remedy agai11st
some one for the recovery of compenr-ntion. Tlmt he might
trent the second conveyance by the grantor as one made in his
interest, and sue and recover from It:m the amount rc<'eivcd from
the second gran tel', we shonld Fa)' would be cicar. This won hl
be only the ordinat·y case of one affirming a Fale, wrongfully made
by another, of his property, and reco,·ering the proceL>ds then•t•f;
the familiar case of waiving a tort and suing in ~8ll111J~it for the

missioners v. Bahcock, 5 Orcg. 472;

Schell 0. Stein 76 Penn. St. 239$;

Bishop 0. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472; S.

C. 2Am. Rep. 533.

‘Scoles e. Wilscy. 11 Iowa. ‘.261;

Breed 1-. Conley, 14 Iowa, 269; Gwynu

0. Turner, 18 Iowa, 1.

rett "· Shanbhut, li llinn. 823; Barnard "· Campau, 29 Mich. 162; Terrell "· Andrew County, 44 ~lo. 30!);
Brydon "· Campbell, 40 Md. mH;
Jenning';~ Lt>sset• 11. Wood, 20 Ollio,
261. The defects In these cases were
various. In the Ohio ca.<~e the name
of the grantor was incorrectly given,
and in the :Minnesota case the name
of one of the witnesses was not cop.
led into the record.

1 Bee Schell "· Stc·in, iG Penn. St.
31)8.
' C'urtls "· Lyman, 24 Vt. 338; Commisqioncrs "· Babr.ock, 5 Oreg. 472;
Sehell "· Stein 76 Penn. St. :1!1'1:
Bishflp "· S<'lllll'idcr, 46 ~lo. 4';2; 8.
C. 2 Am. Hep. .'i:l3.
• Scoles "· Wil!lcy. 11 lnwa. 201 ;
Breed r. Conley, U Iowa, 2!19; Gw)·nu
tl. Turner, 18 luwa, 1.
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money received. But in many cases such redress might be inad-
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equate, because less than the value of the land would be likely

to be received on a. second sale made, as it would be, with knowl-

edge on the part of the vendor that he had no title; and no reason

is perceived why the real owner might not sue in tort for the value

of that which he has lost, if that should promise more satisfactory

redress.’ If one, knowing he has already conveyed away certain

lands, gives a new deed which defeats the ﬁrst, this is agross and

palpable fraud, and, though like the selling of property in market

overt, it may pass the title, it cannot protect the seller when called

upon by the owner to account for the property of which the lat-

ter has been defrauded.’ But the question of a remedy against

the recorder would, in this case, as well as that before suggested,

be complicated as a question of proximate and remote cause, and

would require a consideration which, up to this time, it has

never, so far as we are aware, received. Does the loss of the

estate result from the error of the recorder? or does that merely

furnish the opportunity for another event, to which the loss is in

fact attributable as the proximate cause? The question would

be still further complicated if, before the second conveyance by

the original grantor, the ﬁrst grantee had himself disposed of the

land, so that the loss would fall, not upon ‘the party whose deed
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was defectively recorded, but upon one claiming under him.

Here the damage, instead of following directly the reeorder’s

misfeasance, follows it only after two intermediate steps; a con-

veyance by the ﬁrst grantee, and another by the ﬁrst grantor

which has the effect to defeat it.

The recorder of deeds may also injure some person by giving

him an erroneous certiﬁcate. The liability for this is clear if the

giving of the certiﬁcate was an oiiicial act; otherwise not. It

was an oﬁicial act if it was something the person obtaining it

had a right to, and which it was the recorder’s duty to give. Thus,

‘ Sec Hanold o. Bacon, 36 Mich. 1.

‘Andrews '0. Blakeslce, 12 Iowa,

577. The‘ second grantee would of

course get no title if he took his deed

with notice of the ﬁrst; and in that

case he might be liable to the ﬁrst

grantee if he should sell to a bonaﬁde

purchaser, and thereby defeat the

real owner. The principle may be

stated as follows: That when one is

placed in circumstances which put it

into his power wrongfully to convey

another man’s estate away from him,

money received. But in many cases such redt·css might be inadequate, because less than the value of the laud would be likely
to be received on a second sale made, as it would be, with knowledge on the part of the vendor that he had no title; and no reason
is perceived why the real owner might not sne in tort for the value
of that which ho has lost, if that should promise more satistilctor_,.
redress.' If one, knowing he has already conveyed away certain
lands, gives a new deed which defel\ts the first, this is a gross and
palpable fraud, and, though like the selling of property in market
o\·ert, it may pass the title, it cannot protect the seller when called
upon by the owner to account for the property of which the latter has been defrauded.' Bnt the question of ~ remedy against
the recorder would, in this case, as well as that before suggested,
be complicated as a question of proximate and J•emote c.'lu~c. and
would require a consideration which, up to this time, it has
never, so tar as we are aware, recei,·ed. Does the loss of the
estate result from the error of the recorder? or does that merely
furnish the opportunity tor another e\'ent, to which the loss is in
f~ct attributable as the proximate cnnse1 The question would
be still further complicated if, b!.'fore the second conve_va11ce by
the original grantor, the first gt·antee had himself disposed of the
land, so that the loss would tid!, not upon the party whose deed
was defectively recorded, bnt 11pon one claiming under him.
Here the damage, inst.ead of following directly the recor<ier~s
misfeasance, follows it only after two intermediate steps; a conveyance by the first grantee, and another by the first grantor
which has the effect to defeat it.
The recorder of de!'ds may also injure some person by giving
him an erroneous certificate. The liability for this is clear if the
giving of the certificate was an official act; otherwise not. It
was an official act if it was something the person obtaining it
had a. right to, a.ud which it was the recorder's duty to give. Thus,

the law imposes upon him the duty

to abstain from doing so; and for

a breach of this duty an action lies

to recover the value of what is lost.

—-1-1

Sec Hanold "· BllCon, 30 Mich. 1.
Andrews "· Blakeslee, 12 Iowa,
577. The' second grantee would of
course get no title if he took his deed
with notice of the flrst: and in that
CllSe he might be liable to the first
grantee if he shonld sell to a bonafide
purchaser, and thereby defeat the
real owner. The principle may be
1

1

statPd as follows: That when one is
placed in circumstances which put it
into his power wrongfully to con\·py
another man's estate away from him,
the law imposes upon him the duty
to abstain from doing so: and for
a bn~ueh of this duty an 11ctinn lie!'
m recover the value of whaL is lost.
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one has alright to call f'or_ copies to be made from the records,

and for official statenlentslcfywhat appears thereon; and he is

entitled to have these certiﬁed to him correctly. But he is not

entitled to call upon the recorder fora certiﬁcate that a particular

title is good or bad; and such certiﬁcate, if given, would not be

official. The reason for this is that acertificatc to that effect

must necessarily cover facts which the record cannot show; and

a title may be good or be defective for reasons which cannot,

under any recording laws, appear of record. Therefore, if the

register certiﬁes that a titie is good, he only expresses an opinion

on facts, some of which he may oflicially know, but others of

which he cannot know as recorder, and to which, therefore, he

cannot oﬁicially certify '

But suppose the register’s certiﬁcate to cover nothing he might

not be required to certify officially, and, therefore, to be properly

and strictly an official act, but incorrect, and suppose the person

who applies for and receives it is not injured by it, but a subse-

quent purchaser, to whom he has delivered it with his title deeds,
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is injured—has such subsequent purchaser a right of action

against the recorder? In other words, if it be conceded that it

is a duty the recorder owes to every one who may have occasion

to rely upon his records, to see that they are correctly made, is it

also his duty to every one who may have occasion to rely upon

his certiﬁcates to see that they are correct also?

The difference between the two cases may be said to be this:

That the records are for public and general inspection, and are

required to be kept that all persons may have, by means of them,

accurate information concerning the titles; while the giving of

a certiﬁcate respecting something recorded is a matter between

the recorder and the person calling for it, and legally concerns no

one else. The recorder knows that his records are to be seen,

and titles to be made in reliance upon them; he is not bound lo

know that his certiﬁcate is for the use or reliance of any one but

the person who receives it, nor can it be assumed that he gives it

for any other use. He contracts with the person who requests it

and pays for it to give a certiﬁcate which shall state the facts, but

he enters into no relation of contract or otherwise in re.-pect to

it with any other person, and if another relies upon it to his

injury, he cannot have redress from the recorder, because the

recorder assumed no duty for his protection. It has, therefore,

one has o. right to call for. copies to be m:ule from the records,
and for official statcment~what appears thereon; and he is
entitled to have these cer-tified to him correctly. But he is not
entitled to call upon the recorder tor a certificate that a particular
title is good or bad; and such certificate, if given, would not be
official. The reason for this is that a certificate to that effect
mnst necessarily cover fact.il which the record c:mnot show; fllld
a title may be good or be defective for reasons which cannot,
under any recording laws, appear of record. Therefore, if the
register certifies that a tit1e is good, he only expresses an opinion
on facts, some of which he may officially know, but other·s ot'
which he cannot know as recorder, and to which, therefore, he
cannot officially certi(y
·
But snppose the register's certificate to co\"er nothing he might
not be rel1uired to certify officially, and, therefore, to Le prl)pm·!y
and strictly an official act, but incorrect, an1l suppot'e the person
who applies for and receives it is not injuretl by it, but a subsequent purchaser, to whom he bas deli\'er·cd it with his title deeds,
is injured- has such subsequent purclmscr a right of action
against the recorder~ In other words, if it be conceded that it
is a duty the recorder owes to every one who mny have occasion
to rely npon his records, to see that they are t'urrectly made, is it
also his duty to every one who may have occasion to rely upon
his certificates to see that they are correct also~
The difference between the two cases may be f'aid to be this:
That the records ar·e for pnhlic and general inspection! and ar'C
required to be kept that all persons may have, by rneaus of them,
accurate information concerning the titles; while the gidng of
a eertificate ret:pPcting something recorded is a matter between
the recorder and the person calling for it, and legally concerns uo
one else. The recorder knows that his rec01-ds arc to be :"cen,
and titles to be made in reliance up:m them; he is not. bonnd lo
know that his certificate is for the usc or reliance of any one hut
the person who receive~; it, nor can it he assumed that he gi\·cs it
for any other ut>e. He contracts with the pcr·son who re1pwsts it
and pays for it to give a certificate which shall state the filets, but
he enters into no relation of contract or otherwise in rel"pect to
it with any other person, and if auothcr relies upon ;t to hi@
injnr,v, he cannot have redr·ess from the recor·der, Lcl!an::c the
recorder as~;umcd uo duty tor his protection. It has, thereii.1re,
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procuring his certiﬁcate, though another may have acted in

reliance upon it and been injured by his error.‘

The recorder may also be responsible for recording papers not

entitled to record, provided the rccord, when made, may cause

legal injury. and, provided further, he is aware that the record is

unauthorized. Thus, a paper he knows to be forged he has no

right to record. and if he puts it upon record to the damage of

any one, the misfeasance is actionable.’ So it would seem the

recorder should be liable if he were knowingly to put upon r0;'o1'd

a deed purporting to be acknowledged beforc a proper oilicer,

when in fact the person purporting to take the H.L'l{|l0\\'lC'(lglIl(3llt

was not an ofiicer at all.‘ But the case is one which has never

yet, so far as we are aware, been the subject of judicial decision.

Inspectors. The case of inspector of provisions is also one in

which duties are imposed in respect to the public and also in

respect to individuals. The requirement of inspection is an

important sanitary regulation, and to some extent the public

depend upon it for protection against the diseases that might be

engendered or disseminated by the sale of unwholesome food.

But it is also important to individual purchasers; they have a

been decided that the recorder is r('gponsible on l.v to the p:-~r!y
procuring his certificate, though another may have acteJ in
reliance upon it and been injured by his error.'
The recorder may al8o be re:,;ponsible for reeording pape1·s not
entitled to record, pro\·ided t!te rl'cord, when made, may c:m~e
le~al injur.r. aml, provided further, he is aware that the record i~
tmantlwri.r.ed. Thus, a paper he knows to be forged he has no
right to record. and if he putg it upon rerord to the damn!-!"e of
any one, the misfeasance iil al'tionahle." So it would seem tho
recorder should be liable if he were knowingly to pnt upon re:•ord
a deed purporting to be acknowll'dged betorc a prope1· ofli.eer,
when in fact the person purporting to take the R.l'!mowledglllent
was not an officer at all." Bnt the case is one which iaas nc,·er
yet, so far as we are awnre, been the snhject of judicial decision.

right to rely upon it. and if they are betrayed by such reliance

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:42 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

they may have their action.‘ Other otlicers performing similar

services come under the same liability.

' Housman 0. Girard Building, etc.,

Association, 81 Penn. St. 256. Coin-

pare Ware v. Brown, 2 Bond, 267. If,

however, the certiﬁcates were pur-

poscly and knowingly mude false

with fraudulent intent, no doubt the

recorder might be liable to one dc,

fraudcd by it. Wood 0. Rul:|nd,10

Mo. 143.

’ Ramsey 1;. Riley, 13 Ohio, 1-'17.

“In many, perhaps most, of the

States the recorder is to take notice

Inspectors. The case of inspector of provi~ionA is also one in
which duties are impot'ed in respect to the pnhlic and abo in
respect to individuals. Tlte re<piirement of in~pection is an
important sanitary regulation, and to some cxteut the pnhlic
depend upon it for protection against the dit>cailes that might be
engendered or disseminated by the f'lale of nm"lwlesome food.
But it is also important to indi\'idual purcha.o;eJ•,;; they ha,·e a
rigllt to rely upon it. and if they are betrayed by such reliance
they may have their action.' Other officers performing similar
services come under the same liability.

of the otﬁcial character and signature

of those assuming to have authority

to take acknowledgment of deeds. If

he records a deed the acknowledg-

ment of which is certiﬁed by some

one not such oiliccr as he represents

himself to be, a purchaser under it

may buy a worthless title. ls the rc-

cordcr liable in such a case? Proba-

bly not, unless he knew the want of

oﬁicial character. Ramsey v. Riley,

13 Ohio, 157. But the ques'ion sug-

gt-sls the absurdity and danger of re-

quiring an other-r to uct upon an

assumption of fi\('lS in respect in

which he will often have no knowl-

(3ll_'_"l', and \\'hi-re to him personally it

is limiter of indilicrcnce whether the

f:u~1.< are or are not as he B:'5lll1lC§

them to be.

' llayes v. Porter, 22 Me. 371 ; Nick-

crson v Thompson, 33 Me. 433; Tar-

dos v. Bozant, 1 Lu. Ann. 199. In

Seaman 0. Patten, 2 Cuines, 312, it is

—-- as

1 IIou:;man "· Girnrd Builtling, l'tc.,
As,oodatiou, 81 Penn. St. 2J6. Compare Ware"· Brown. 2 Hond. 267. If,
howe\·er, the certificates were pur.
po!>ely and knowingly made false
with fraudulent intent, no doubt the
recorder might be liable to onf' defrauded by iL Wood "· Rnlan!l, 10
:Mo. 143.
1 Hamsey fl. Riley, 18 Ohio, t.)7.
3 In many, pcrlutps most, of the
Stutes the recorder is to take not ice
of the official character and 11ignature
of tho~e assuming to lmvc authority
to take acknowledgment of deeds. If
be records 8 dl•ed the acknowledg.
meut of which i:J certified by some
one not such officer as he represents

him~elf to b<', a purchaser nndt•r it
mny \my 8 worthle~s title. Is tht• re.
corder I iablc in such a casl'? Prolm.
bly not, unless he knew the want of
official charneter. Rl\lllsey "· Hi ley,
13 Ohio, 157. But the ques·ion sug.
,!!PS~ the absurdity 11nd danger of rc.
qniring an offict•r to net upon an
assumption of far·ts in re:-speet to
wh ieh he will oft1·n havl' no knowlellp:!•, and wlwre to him person,1lly it
is mattPr of inJiffcl·!'tH~l' whctht•r tl1c
fal'l:< nrc or urc not as he a,;:-nmc;
them to be.
• Hayes"· Porter, 22 ~I c. 371; Xick.
l'rson tJ Thompson, 3:~ l\Ic. 43:3; Tardos "· Bozant, 1 Ln. Ann. 19!1. In
Seaman "· Plltten, 2 C11incs, 312, it is

NEGL1-ZCTS OF OFFICIAL DUTY. 391

NEGLECTS OF OFFICIAL DUTY.

Postmasters. The case of the postmaster affords a similar
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illustration. It was decided at an early day that the duties of

the Postmaster General were exclusively public; that the post

oﬂice was an institution of the government, established and reg-

ulated by law; that all of its oﬁieers and agents were oflieers and

agents of the government and not of the Postmaster General;

that as between the Postmaster General or any oﬁieer or agent

of the post otﬁce on the one hand, and the public aceommolated

by it on the other, there \vere no implied contract relations; and

that while each oﬁicer and agent might be liable in a proper form

of action to any individual who suffered from his neglect of duty,

no one of them was liable for the default of another, and there-

fore the Postmaster General could not be held responsible for the

loss of a letter containing exchequer bills which was opened and

the bills taken out in the London post oﬁii.-e.‘ But the local

postmaster unquestionably has imposed upon him duties to indi-

viduals as well as to the public. He is to receive and forward

mail to other oilii-es; to keep correct accounts with the depart-

ment, and perhaps with contractors; to draw money orders, etc.

But in respect to mail matter received at his otliee for delivery,

a duty is ﬁxed upon him in behalf of the several persons to whom

each letter, paper, or parcel is directed. When the proper person
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calls for what is there for delivery, the postmaster must deliver

it, and his refusal to do so is a tort.’ The postmaster is also

liable to the person entitled to it for the loss, through his own

carelessness or that of any of his clerks or servants, of any letter

or other mail matter which shall have come to his oﬁieial cus-

tody.‘ But it has been held in several cases that the postmaster

is not lial)le for the loss or abstraction of a letter by one of his

sworn assistants, whose appointment must be approved and can

held that the inspector is only liable

when malice or corruption is alleged

and proved. The fact that the statute

imposes a penalty on the ofﬂcer for

neglect of duty will not preclude a

private action. Hayes v. Porter, 22

Me. 371.

' Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 648;

S. C. 12 Mod. 472, 1 Salk. 17. Bee

Smith v. Powditch, Cowp. 182; Rowa-

ing 0. Gooilchild, 2 W. Bl. 906: W115

ﬁultl v Le DeSp<-ncer, Cowp. 754, 76-");

lluli-hins v. Bruckett, 2'2 N. II 252.

' Teull 0. Felton, 1 N. Y. -337;

•

Postmasters. The case of the postmaster affords a similar
illustration. It was decided at an early day that the dnties of
the Postmaster General were exclusively public; that the post
office was an institution of the government, established and regulated by law; that all of its officers and a;ents were officers and
agents of the government and not of the Postmn.ster Genet·al;
that as between the Pol!tmaster General or any officer or agent
of the post office on the one hand, and the public aceommo· ~a ted
by it on the other, there were no implied contrnd relations; and
that while each officer and agent might ~e liable in a pl'oper form
of action to any indi\·idnal who suffered from his neglect of duty,
no oue of them was liable for the detault of another, and thel'efore the Postmaster Gcnrt"al eould not be hchl rc:Ooponsible for the
los!! of a letter containing exchequer bills which was opened aud
the bills taken out in the London post office.' llnt the loeal
postmaster un<piCstionably has imposed upon him duties to individuals as well as to the public. He is tu receive and forward
mail to other o1li(·es; to keep correct accounts with the department, and perhaps with contractors; to draw money order~, etc.
But in respect to mail matter received at his office for delivery,
a rluty is fixed upon him in behalf of the sc\·cral pet·sons to whom
each letter, paper, or parcel is direl'te(l. \rhcn the proper pt~rson
calls for what is there fur deli...-ery, the posrmastcr must deliver
it, and his refusal to do so is a tort.• The postmaster is also
liable to the person entitled to it tor the loss, througl1 his own
carelcs:mess or that of any of his ch!rks or servants, of any letter
or other mail matter which shall have come to his oftiC'ial cua.
tody.• But it has been hehl in SC\'Cra.l cases that tho postmaster
is not liuble for the loss or abstraction of a letter by one of hit;
sworn assistants, whose appointment must be appro\'etl and can

in error, 12 llow. 281.

3 Bishop 0. “'illiamson, 11 Me. 495;

Bolan o. \Villiamson, 1 Brev. 181;

(‘ol mun 0. Frazier, 4 Rich. 146;

Chrisly v. Smith, 23 Vt. 663; Ford 0.

Parker, 4 Ohio, (H. I.) 576.

FF

Q

held that the inspc<'lor is only liable
when malice or C'orrnption is nllcgcd
and prov~:d. The fact that the stntutc
imposes a penalty on the officer for
neglect of duty will not preclude a
private action. Hayes 11. Porter, 22

!t:e. 371.
1

Lnne "· Cotton, 1 Ld. Huym. 646;

8. C. 12 :Mod. 472, 1 8nlk. 17. &·e
Smith"· Powditch, Cowp.182; Rown-

fng "· Goo,Jchild, 9 W. Bl. 906; Wh"
fl ,·Jtl " Le Dt•SJwncrr, Cowp. ';'54, j(i.;;
Hukhlns "· Brackett, 22 N. II :?.i2.
'Teall"· Felton, 1 N.Y. :J:J7; 8. C.
in vror, 12 llmv. 28!.
a Bbhop o. Willl"mson, 11 ?tl<•. 41);):
Bolan "· Willian~son, 1 B1·cv. 181;
C'nl man "· FrnziPr, 4 Hkh. 146;
Chri:.ty 11. Smith, 23 Vt. 6Ga; }'onl o.
Parker, 4 Ohio, {K. 1.) 576.
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at any time be terminated by the department.‘ Neither is a

mail carrier responsible for the loss of mail matter through the

carelessness or dishonesty of one of his sworn assistants;’ but

he is liable if the loss is attributable to his own servant, or to

any unsworn assistant.‘

Clerks of Courts, etc. The clerk of a court may be liable to

the party damniﬁed for neglecting to put a usse on the docket

when his duty required it,‘ for failure to enter up a judgment

at any time be terminated by the department.• Neither is a
mail carrier responsible for the loss of mail matter through the
earelessn.ess or dishonesty of one of his sworn assistants; 1 bot
he is liable if the loss is attributable to his own servant, or to
any unsworn assistant.•

upon the roll; ‘ for taking upon himself without the sanction of

the court to issue an order for the release of a judgment debtor; “

for wrongfully approving of an appeal bond, the penalty in which

was less than that required by law; ’ and for any similar mislea-

sance or nonfeasance.' So a highway commissioner is liable who

willfully neglects to return as paid a highway tax which has been

paid in labor.’ So a commissioner of customs is liable to an

importer for refusal to sign a bill of entry except upon payment

of excessive fees." So an action will lie against a supervisor who,

being required by law to report a claim to the county board for

allowance, neglects to do so.“ So an election inspector may be

liable for refusal to receive the vote of an elector; but the cir-

cumstances which create such liability will be considered in the

next chapter.
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Sheriﬂb. The case of a sheriff is also that of an ofﬁcer upon

whom the law imposes duties to individuals as well as to the

' Schroyer o. Lynch, 8 Watts, 453;

Wiggins o. Hathaway, 6 Barb. 632;

Bolan v. Williamson, 2 Bay, 551.

’ Hutcheus v. Brnckett. 22 N. II. 252;

Conwell 9. Voorliees, 13 Ohio, 523.

“Sawyer 0. Corse, 17 Grat. 2330.

where there is a city delivery if a

carrier loses or misappropriates a

letter. doubtless he may be held re-

The clerk of a court may be liahle to
the party damnified for neglecting to pot a case on the docket
when his duty required it; • tor failure to enter up a judgment
upon the roll; • for taking upon himself without the sanction of
the court to issue an order for the releasoof a judgment debtor; •
for wrongfully approving of an appeal bond, the penalty in which
was less than that required by law;' and for any similar misfeasance or noofeasanoo.• So a highway commissioner is liable who
willfully neglects to return as })Rid a highway tax which has bt.>en
paid in labor.' So a commissioner of customs is liable to an
importer tor refusal to sign a bill of entry except upon payment
of excessive fees!• So an action will lie against a supervisor who,
being required by law to report a claim to the county board for
allowance, neglects to do so/' So an election inspector may be
liable for refnsal to receive the vote of an elector; but the circumstances which create such liability will be considered in the
next chapter.
Clerks of Courts, eto.

sponsible; but he could not be con-

sidered the servant of the postmaster

so as to make the latter liable. The

The case of a sheriff is also that of an officer upon
whom the law imposes duties to individuals as well as to the
Sheriml.

postmaster would be liable. however,

if he gave orders which were obeyed,

that delivery should not be made un-

til some inadmissible condition was

complied with; as, for instance, pay-

ment for making delivery. Barnes 0.

Foley, 1 W. Bl. 643; S. U. Burr. 2149.

‘ Brown o. Lester, 21 Miss. 392.

' Douglass 0. Yullop, Burr, 722.

‘ Robinson v. Gcll, 12 C. B. 191.

‘ Billings 11. Lall'e|'ty, 31 Ill. 318.

9 See, further, Wright v. Wheeler, 8

Ired. 184; Anderson o. Johett, 14 La.

Ann. 614.

' Strickfaden 0. Zipprick, 49 Ill.

286.

'° Barry 0. Arnnud,10 Ad. & El. 646,

citing and relying upon Schinotti 0.

Bumsted, 6 T. R. 646; Lacon o.

Hooper; 6 T. R. 224.

“ Clark 0. Miller, 51 N. Y. 528.

1 Schroyer "· Lynch, 8 W att.s, 458 ;
Wiggins "· Hathaway, 6 Barb. 632;
Bolan "· Williamson, 2 Bay. 551.
1 Hutchenstl. Brack~tt. 22 N.H. ~2;
Conwell 'D. Voorhees, 18 Ohio, 5:.!3.
a SKwyer "· Corse, 17 Grat. 230.
• here there is a city delivery if a
carrier lo:,.cs or misappropriates a
letter. doubtless he may be held responsible; but he could not be considered the servant of the postmaster
so ns to make the latter liable. The
postmaster wnuld be liable, howe\'er,
if be gave orders which were obeyed,
that delivery shnuld not be made un.
til some in~tdmissible condition was
complied with; as, for instance, pay.

ml'nt for mRking delivery. Barnes"·
Foley, 1 W. Bl. 643; B. C. Burr. 2149.
• Brown "· Lester, 21 :\lisa. 892.
• Dou~lass "· Yllllop, Burr, 722.
1 Robinson"· Hell, 12 C. B. 191.
' Billings "· Lafferty, 31 Ill. 318.
• St·e, further, Wright "· Wheeler, 8
Ired. 184; Anderson tl. Johett, 14 La.
Aun. 614.
• Strickfaden e. Zipprick, 4.9 DL
286.
10 Barry"· Arnnud,lO Ad. & El. 646,
citing and relying upon Schinotti e.
Bumsted, 6 T. R. 646; Lacon e.
Hoopei, 6 T. R. 224.
u Clark e. .Miller, 51 N. Y. 628.
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public. In so far as he acts as a peace oiiicer, and in the service

of criminal process, individuals are concerned only that he shall

commit no trespass upon them or their property. In the service

of civil process, however, the sheriff is charged with duties only

to the parties to the proceedings. Thus, he is liable to the plain-

tiﬂ' for refusal or neglect to serve process, or want of diligence

in service;' for the escape of

arrested on civil process, either

1 Howe v. White. 49 cu. ass; saw

o. Lawrence, 64 N. C. 433; State 9.

Porter, 1 Harr. 126; Hininan o. Bor-

den, 10 Wcnd. 367; Bank of Rome 0.

public. In so tar as he acts as a peace officer, and in the service
of criminal process, indh·idnals are concerned only that he shall
commit no trespass upon them or their property. In the service
of civil process, however, the sheriff is charged with duties only
to the parties to the proceedings. Thus, he is liable to the plaintiff for refusal or neglect to serve process, or want of diligence
in ser,·ice; • for the escape of a dettmdant who was lawfully
arrested on civil process, either mesne or final; • for neglect or

Curtiss,1 Hill, 275; Todd 0. Hoagland,

36 N. J. 852; Hongland e. Todd, 37

N. J. 544. If the oﬂiccr cannot serve

process, he can only excuse himself

by turning it over to another oﬂicer

for service. Freudenstein 0. liIcNier,

81 Ill. 208.

A sheriff or constable. having a

ﬁerifucias, is compelled to act at his
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peril. If the property seized is not

that of the delendant, he incurs lia-

bility by levying and taking the prop-

erty. On the other hand, it' the prop-

erty is that of the defendant, and he

knows of it, or can know it by rea-

sonable etfort, and is required by the

plaintiff to levy on it, and he fails or

refuses to do so, he becomes liable to

the plaintitf in the execution. Pike

1: Colvin, 67 Ill. 227. See Harris 0.

Kirkpatrick, 3-3 N. J. 392.

As to the liability of the sheriff for

failure to proceed with due diligence

to collect a judgment, see Kimbro 0.

Edmondson, 46 Geo. 130; Noble 0.

Whetstone, 45 Ala 861; Lowe v. Own-

by, 49 Mo. 71. As to his ri_1_'ht to

demand indemnity in cases of doubt,

see Bonnell e. Bowmin,-33 Ill. 460;

Smith 0. Cicotte, 11 Mich. 383.

’ Furns\\'0t‘th 0. Tilton, 1 D. Chip.

297; Middle-bury 0. Haight, 1 Vt. 423;

Wait o. Dana. Brayt. 37; Crary 0.

Turner, 6 Johns. 51; Kellogg v. Gil-

bert, 10 Johns. 220; Currie v. Worthy,

a defendant who was lawfully

mesne or ﬁnal;’ for neglect or

8Jones, (N. C.) 315; Lash v. Ziglar,

5 lrcd. 702; Faulkner 1:. State, 6 Ark.

150; Hopkinson e. Leeds, 78 Penn.

St. 39-‘l; Lantz o. Lutz, 8 Penn. St.

405; Browning 0. Rittenhouse, 38 N.

J . 279; Crane 0. Stone, 15 Kan. 94;

Brown C0. 0 Butt, 2 Ohio, 348;

Ilootman 0. Shrincr, 15 Ohio, (N. s.)

43; Slate 0. Mullen, 50 Ind. 598;

Pt-use u. Hubbard, 37 Ill. 257. Every

liberty given to a prisoner, not au-

thorized by law, is an escape. Colby

0. Sampson, 5 Mass. 810. So is a re-

moval of the prisoner out of the

county without authority. McGruder

0. Russell, 2 Blackf. 1S. Only the act

of God or of the public enemy can

excuse an escape. Saxon v. Boyce, 1

Bailey, 66; Cook 0. Irving, 4 Slrob.

• Howe "· White, 49 Cal. 638; State
v. Lawrence, 64 N . 0. 483; State e.
Porter, 1 Harr. 126; Hinman v. Borden, 10 Wend. 867; Bank of Rome e.
Curtiss, 1 Hill, 275; Todd"· Hoagland,
86 N.J. 852; Hoagland v. Todd, 37
N. J. 544. If the oftlcer cannot serve
process, he can only ucuse hlmselC
by turning tt over to another ofllcer
for service. Freudensteln e.llcNier,
811ll. 208.
A sheriff or constable, having a
jkn' furitu, ia compelled to act at hla
peril. If the property seized ia not
that of the dt'leodant, he incurs lla.
bllity by levying and taking the prop.
erty. On the other band, if the prop.
erty is that of the defendant, and he
knows of it, or can know it by rea.
aonable effort, and ia required by the
plaintiff to levy on It, and he ftt.ils or
refuses to do so, he becomes liallle to
the plaintiff In the execution. Pike
fl Colvin, 67 Ill. 227. St-e Harris e.
Kirkpatrick, s;; N.J. 892.
As to the liability of the sheriff for
failure to proceed with due diligence
to collect a Judgment, see Kimbro •·
Edmondson, 46 Geo. I:JO; Noble •·
Whetstone, 46 Ala. 861; Lowe"· Ownby, 49 .Mo. 71. As to his rl~tht to
demand indemnity in cases of doubt,
eee Bonnell v. Bowm •n, ;;s Ill. 400;
Smith"· Cicotte, llllicb. 38.1.
• Ftt.rnt'wortb •· Tilton, 1 D. Chip.
297; Middlebury v. Haight, 1 Vt. 428;
Watt "· Dana. Brayt. 37; Crary v.
Turner, 6 Johns. 51; Kt>llogg 11. Gll!Mln, 10 Johns. 2'l0; Currie 11. Worthy,

8 Jones, (N.C.) SUS; Lash v. Ziglar,
~ Ired. 702; Faulkner 11. 8tatn, 6 Ark.
150; Hopkinson e. Leeds, 76 Peon.
SL 393; Lantz "· Lutz, 8 Penn. St.
40.i; Browning e. Rittenboulle, 38 N.
J. 2i9; Crane "· Stone, 1~ Kan. N;
Brown Co. " Butt, 2 Ohio, 348;
Hootman "· Shriner, 15 Ohio, (N. s.)
4:J; SLate e. Mullen, 50 Ind. 508;
Pt.>ase "· Hubbard, 117 Ill. 237. Every
lit.erty givt'n to a prisoner, not authorized by law, is an escape. Colby
"· Sampsllo, ~ lf8811. 810. So is a removal of the pria?ner ol!t of the
county without authority. H<·Gruder
"· Russell, 2 Blackf. 18. Only the act
of Gud or of the public enemy can
excuse an e!lcape. Saxon v. Boyce, 1
Bailt.>y, 66; C01•k v. Irving, 4 Strob.
904; Smith e. H11rt, 2 Btt.y, 395; Shat.
tuck"· Sttt.te, 51 Miss. 575. The sheriff
nt.'Cd not go behind a writ fair on Us
f~tcc to inquire into the regularity of
the Judgmt>nl Watson "· W~ttsoo, S.
Coon. l.W; Wcllber e. Gay. 24 Wend.
48.'1; Wilmarth "· Burt, 7 llel.. 2-57.
Bu' in an action for an escapt• he may
show that the pri!!Ooer was privil('~
from arr('Sl Hi11sell v. Kip, 5 Johns. ~
89; Scott v. Shaw, 1!1 Johns. :li~.
And It ls of course a defense that the
proccsi was void. Contant "· <'h11p.
man, 2 Q B. 771; Albee "· Ward, 8
llasa. 7\J; Howard v. Cra\\ofetrd, 15
Geo.423; Rayv. Hogeboom,tt John!!.
483; Phelps v. Harton, 18 Wend. 68;
Carpenter v. Willett, 81 N. Y. 00.
And for the purpol!CS of any such
action the proccse ia to be considered
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refusal to return process;‘ for making a false return;‘ for negli-

3U-!
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gently caring for goods, whereby some of them are lost;’ for

neglect to pay over moneys collected,‘ and the like. The rules

applicable to the case of a constable are the same, and need not

be separately examined.‘

The same act or neglect of a sheriff may sometimes afford

ground for an action on behalf of each party to the writ; as

where, having levied upon property, he suffers it to be lost or

destroyed through his negligence. In such a ease the plaintiff

may be wronged, because he is prevented from collecting his

debt, and the defendant may be wronged because a surplus that

would have remained after satistyingtlte debt is lost to him.

The oﬁicer owed to each the duty to keep the property with

reasonable care; and there is a breach of duty to each when he

fails to do so.‘

void, even though good on its face, if

in fnct it was unlawfully issued.

Therefore the sheriff is not liable who

suffers a prisoner arrested on a war-

rant to escape, though the warrant is

fair on its face, it‘ it issued without

the preliminary showing required by

refusat to return process;' for making a false return;~ for negligently caring for goods, whereby some of them are lost; • tor
neglect to pay over moneys collected: and the like. The rules
applicable to the case of a constable are the same, and need not
be separately examined. •
The same act or neglect of a sheriff may sometimes afford
ground for an action on behalf of each party to the writ; as
where, ha\·ing levied upon property, he sufi'ers it to be lust or
destroyed through his negligence. In such a case the plaintiff
may be wronged, because he is pre\·cutetl fi·om collel'tiug his
debt, and the defendant may be wronged bcl'anse a surp!ns that
would ha,·e remained after sath;(ying. the debt is lust to him.
The officer owed to each the duty to keep the property with
reasonable care; and there is a breach uf duty to each when he
fails to do so.•
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statute. Housh 0. People, 75 Ill. -187.

Of course whatever shows that the

plaintiff has sutfered no damage, or

damage only to a nominal amount,

will limit the recovery; as, that the

prisoner was insolvent. Hootnmn 0.

Shriner, 15 Ohio, (N. s.) 43; State v.

Mullen, 50 Ind. 598. See Williams v.

Mostyn, 4 M. & W. 145; Smith 0.

Hart, 2 Bay, 395; Lovell 0. Bellows,

'7 N. H. 375; Burrell 0. Lithgow, 2

Mass. 526; Crane 0. Stone, 15 Kan. 94.

' For a discussion of the liability of

the sheriff for making an insufficient

levy. see French v. Snyder, :10 Ill. 3239.

' State r. Schar, 50 Mo. 393. But

the sheriff can only be liable to the

person to whom the particular duty

was owing: “the pnrtyto whom he

is bound by the duty of his oﬂilee."

Harrington v. Ward, 9 Mass 251.

‘ Duncan '0. Webb, 7 Gen. 187.

‘Jenner 0. J oliﬂ'e, 9 Johns. 381 ; Con-

over 0. Gntcwood, 2 A. K. Marsh. 568.

‘ Norton in. Nye. 56 Me. 211.

' The following ens-es consider the

liability of a jnilor for escapes: Al-

scpt v. Eyles. 2 H. Bl. 10$: Elliott 0.

l\'orfolk, 4 T. R 789; Fuller r. Davis,

1 Gray, 612; Way v. Wright. 5 Mctc.

381); \Vilekins '0. Willct,1 Keyes, 521;

Shuttuck e. State.5l lll.“. 575. The

sheritf in this country is generally

the jailer, either in person or by

deputy.

‘Jenner 0. Jolitf-ir, 9 Johns. 381,

345; Bunk of Rome v. Mott, lT Wend.

554; Bond a. W=m1, 7 Mass. 133, 1'29;

Purrington o. Lorin_:, 7 Muss. 388;

Barrett 0. \Vhite. 3 N. H. 2.0. 2324;

Weld v. Green, 10 Me. 20; Frunklii

Bunk v. Small, 24 Me. 52; Mitchell v.

(Jommomveulth, 37 Penn. St. 187;

Hnrlleib 11. l\IeLan , 44 l‘enn. St. 510;

Gilmore v. Moore, 31) Geo. 63$; Ban-

ker e. Caldwell, 3 Minn. 94; Tudor 0.

Lewis, 3 Met (Ky.) 378; Abbott r.

void, even though ~ood on its fRee, if
in f11Ct it was unlawfully issued.
Therefo1·e the sheriff Is not liable who
sutl'ers a prisoner arrested on a. war.
rant to esc:ape, though the wurrant is
fa.ir on its fa.ce, if it issued without
thtl preliminary showing requirNl by
statute. Housh "· People, 75 Ill. -!':!7.
Of course whatever shows that tile
plaintiff has suffered no damage, or
damage only to a nominal amount,
will limit the recovery; as, that the
prisoner Wl\8 insolvent. Hootman "·
Shriner, 15 Ohio, (N. s.) 43; State 11.
Mullen, 150 Ind. 598. See Williams"·
Mostyn, 4 M. & W. 145; Smith "·
Hart, 2 Bay, 395; Lovell "· Bellows,
7 N. H. 375; BuiTell "· Lithgow, 2
Mass. 526; Crane "· Stone, 15 Kan. 94.
· For a discussion of the liability of
the sheriff' for making an insuffici('nt
levy. see French v. Snyder, :mIll. 3:J!l.
1 State ~. 13chRr, 50 Mo. 393.
But
the sheriff can only be liiLhle to the
person t<l whom the particular duty
Wl\8 owing: "the party to whom he
is bound by the duty of his office."
Harrington ·11. Wart!, 9 Mass 251.
'Duncan"'· Webb, 7 Geo. 187.
• Jenner 1l. J oliffe, 9 J obns. 381 ; Con.

over "· Gatewood, 2 A. K. Marsh, 5G8.
• Norton ·fl. Nyc, 56 ~I e. 211.
1 The f"llowint:r cases consider the
liability of a jailor fr~r csc:tpl•s: A.l!:ept ll. Kyles. 2 H. lll. 10.) : E:lintt "·
Nnrfolk, 4 T. R 71:11.1; Fuller c . Oavis,
1 <tray. 612; Way t~. Wri)!ht. 5 }lctc.
380; Wilckins "· Willet, 1 Keyes, 521;
Shattuck "· State, 51 ~lis'. ,)j;). The
sheriff in this connLl'Y is generally
the jailer, either in pc1·soa or by
deputy.
6 J t·rmer "· Joli ff·•J·, 9 ,Johns. 381,
:F.'i; Bank of Rome 11. :'llott, 17 Wend.
554; llond c. Ward, 7 )I"'""· 123, 129:
Purrington "· L01·in!!, 7 ~I:tss. 3~8;
Barrett "· \Vh it e. 3 N. H. 2. 0. 224;
Weld v. Gr<•cn, 10 lie. 20; Fr:tnkli 1
Bank"· Small, 24 ~Ie. 52; Mitchell"·
Vommonwl•alth, 37 Penn. St. 1~7;
Htlrlll•ill v. McLun , 44 l'cnn. St. 510;
Gilmore 1). :Moore, :30 Ge•1. n~~: Banker"· C1Lldwell, 3 J\liun. 1)4; Tudor"·
Lewis, 3 ::\let (Ky.) 378; Ahhott l'.
Kimball, 19 Vt. 551; Fuy r. ~lnn,;ou,
40 Vt. 468. If a bnilee of the offi ~·cr
misuses the property the • fficer is
liable. Briggs ll. Gleason, 2fl Yt 'i8;
Gilbert '!l. Crandall, 34 Vt. 18S; Aus.
tin "· Burlingtuu, 3! Vl 50J.
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\Vrongs to the defendant in the process are committed either

NEGLECTS OF OFFICIAL DUTY.

3!)5

by the service upon him of process issued without authority, or

otherwise void, or by disregard of so1ne'pri\'ilege the law gives

him, or by abuse of the process in service. The ease of void

process has been referred to in another place. All the provisions

which are made by law in regulation of the ofﬁcer’s proceedings

on civil process, which can be of importance to the del'eudant‘s

interest, are supposed to he made for his beneﬁt, and they estab-

lish duties in his behalf. ()ne of the most important provisions

made in his interest is that which sets apart certain speciﬁed

property of which he may be owner, and wholly exempts it from

levy on execution or attachment. In some States this exemption

is a mere privilege, and will be waived if not claimed; but in

others the law absolutely, and of its own force, wholly exempts

the property, and the oliicer will be a trespasser if he proceeds in

disregard of the provisions of law which require him to take

steps to have the property set apart for the debtor, even thou_-_;h

the debtor remains passive.‘ So a defendant when under arrest

is generally entitled to certain privileges in the law, among which,

in the cases in which it is given by statute, is the privilege of

jail limits. But in any case he is entitled to be treated with

ordinary humanity, and any unnecessary severity could not be
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justiﬁed by the writ.

It would be an abuse of process if the oﬂicer having an execu-

tion against property should himself become purchaser of goods

sold under it;’ or if he should make sale without giving the

notice required by law, the purpose of notice being to attract the

attention and invite the presence of parties desiring to purchase.‘

Or if he sells more than is sutiicient to satisfy the demand and

costs.‘ <

‘ The statutes on this subject are so

different that space cannot he allowed

here for presenting their peculiar feu-

tures and pointing out the different

consequences when their provisions

are disregarded by the oﬂlccr. They

are collected, and cases in the several

States referred to. in Smyth on Home-

stead and Exemptions, Ch. XIV.

" Giberson 0. Wilber, 2 N. J. 410.

‘Carrier v. Esbaugh. 70 Penn. St.

239; Hayes r. Buzzell, 60 Me. 203;

bnwycr 0. Wilson, (ll Me. 529. Or

\Vrongs to the defendant in the process are committed either
by the service upon him of process h;sucd without authority, or
otherwise void, or by disreg.ud of some' privile~e the law gives
him, or by abuse of the pi'Oeess in service. The ca!'e of void
process has been refened to in another place. ..All the provisions
which are made by law in regulation of the officer's proc•ef'dings
on ci,·il process, which can be of importance to the defendant's
interest, are supposed to he made for his beuefit, and they establish duties in his behalf. One of the most important provi~ions
made in his interest is that which sets apart certain ~pecilied
property of which he may be owner, and \vlwlly cxempto it from
levy on execution or attachment. In some States this exemption
is a mere prh•ile~e, ami will be waived if not clailllcd; but in
others the law absolutely, and of its own force, wholly exempts
the property, and the oHicer will be a trespa,.;:,;er if he proct~eds in
dist·egard of the provitiions of law which re11uire him to take
stepo to ha,·e the property set apart for the debtot·, e,·en th,,u~h
the debtor remains pnssi,·e! So a. defendant when under arrc~t
is genera.lly entitled to cc1'tnin privileges in the law, among whid1,
in the cases in which it is given by statute, is the privilege of
jail limits. But in any case he is entitled to be treated with
ordinary humanity, and any unut!cessary severity could uot be
justified by the writ.
It would be an abuse of process if the officer having an execution awdust property should himself' become vnrchaser of goous
sold under it; • or if he should make sale without giving the
notice required by law, the purpose of notice heing to attract the
attention and invite the presence of partie,; de,; iring to purchase.'
Or if ho sells more than is sufficient to satisl)' the" demand and
costs.•

should sell at a different time from

that stated in the notice. Smith v.

Gates. 21 Pick. 55; Pierce v. Benja-

min,14 Pick. 356. Or at a different

place. Hall r. Ray. 40 Vt. 576. See

Ross r. Philbrick_ 39 Me. 29; Blake

0. Johnson, 1 N. II. 91.

‘ Aldrcd 0. Constable, 6 Q. B. 370,

881; Stead v. Gascoigne, 8 Taunt. 526.

The statutes on this suhjcrt arP so
different that space cannot be allowt•d
here for presenting tlwir peculi11r features and pointing out the different
consf'quences when their pro\·isions
arc disregarded by the offircr. They
are collected, and cases in the several
States rl.'ferred to, In Smyth on Homestead nnd Exemptions, Ch. XIV.
• Gibt•rson "·Wilber, 2 N.J. 410.
• Carrier w. Esbaugh. 70 Penn. St.
1

239; Hayes f'. Bu:r.:r.Pll, GJ Me. 20:;;
~uwyer "· Wll<~on, Ill ~le. 529. Or
should sell at a different time from
that stutell in the notice. Smith r.
Gates. 21 Pick. 55; Pierce "- Bt•njamin, 1-l Pick. 3.56. Or at a different
plnce. Hall r. Rn~v. 40 Vl 576. See
Rns!! r. Philbrick. :J!I )I e. 29; Blake
"·Johnson, 1 N.H. 91.
• Altlrl'd "· Constnble, 6 Q. B. 370,
881; Stead w. Gascoigne, 8 Taunt. 526.
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Wrongs by a sheriff to others than the parties to suits are gen-
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erally a consequence of his mistakes or his carelessness. Thus,

he may on an execution against one person by mistake seize the

goods of another. He must at his peril make no mistakes here.‘

It might be urged that, in such cases, the sheriff should have the

ordinary protection of judicial oﬁieers; for he must inquire into

the facts, and he must decide upon the facts who the owner is.

But this does not render the functions of the sheriﬁ‘ judicial.

Ownership is matter of fact, and the otlicer is supposed capable

of ascertaining who is the owner of goods, just as any one may

learn who is proprietor of a particular shop, or member of a

speciﬁed corporation or partnership, or alderman of a city, etc.

It is diﬁicult to name any subject in respect to which questions

may not be raised; and if the existence of a question could be

the test between judicial and ministerial action, there would be

very little that could be classed as ministerial. Judicial action

implies not merely a question, but a question referred for solu-

tion to the judgment or discretion of the oﬁicer himselt'. If the

sheriff is commanded to levy upon the goods of a named person,

the fact of his obedience is determined by ascertaining whether

or not he has done so; if a magistrate is required to decide justly

the controversy between two named persons, or if the assessor is
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required to value in just proportion the property of two named

persons, no one can know whether or not the requirement has

been obeyed unless he can look into the otlicer’s mind and, by

thus ascertaining what was his real judgment, determine whether

he has actually obeyed it in giving decision or in making the

assessment. The difference is that the sheriff is to obey an exact

The sheriﬂ' is liable in trover for the

excessive sale in such case, but cannot

be treated as trespasser ab t'm't¢'u.

Shorlaud 1:. Govett, 5 B. & C. 485.

‘Davies 0. Jenkins, 11 M. & W.

745; Screws 0. Watson, 48 Ala. 823;

Duke o. Vincent, 29 Iowa, 808; Win-

tringham o. Lafoy, '7 Cow. 735; Well-

man v. English, 38 Cal. 583. He is

liable for the error, though the names

are the same. Jarmain v. Hooper, 6

M. &G. 827. Trespass lies for seiz-

Wrongs by a sheriff to others than the parties to suits are generally a consequence of his mistakes or his carelessness. Thus,
he may on an execution against one per,;on by mistake seize the
goods of another. He must at his peril make no mistakes here.'
It might be urged that, in such cases, the sheriff should have the
ordinary protection of judicial officers; for he must inquire into
the facts, and he must decide upon the facts who the owner is.
But this does not render the functions of the sheriff judi<:ial.
Ownership is matter of fact, and the officer is suppofo;ed capable
of ascertaining who is the owner of goods, just as any one may
learn who is proprietor of a pat"ticnlar shop, or member of :.t
specified corporation or partnership, or alderman of a city, etc.
It is difficult to name any subject in respect to which questions
may not be raised; and if the existence of a question could be
the test between judicial and ministerial action, there would be
very little that could be classed as ministerial. Judicial action
implies not merely a question, but a question refet-rcd for solution to the judgment or discretion of the officer himself. If the
sheriff is commanded to levy upon the goods of a named person,
the fact of his obedience is determined by ascet·taiuing whether
or not he has done so; if a magistrate is required to decide justly
the controversy between two named persons, or if the assessor is
required to value in just proportion the property of two named
persons, no one can know whether or not the requirement has
been obeyed unless he can look into the officer's mind and, hy
thus ascertaining what wa.'3 his real jn(lgrncnt, determine whether
he has actually obeyed it in giving .decision or in making the
assessment. The difierence is that the sheriff is to obey an exact

ing the goods of a stranger to the

writ, notwithstanding they are so in-

termingled with the goods of the

debtor that the oﬂlcer cannot distin-

guish them, if the owner is present

and offers to select his own. Yates 0.

Wormell, 60 Me. 495. But if the

sheriff attaches the goods of the

wrong person, and while they are in

his hands attaches them on a subsc-

quent writ, the Inst attachment is no

trespass; the goods at the time having

been in the custody of the law. Gins-

bcrg v. Pohl, 35 Md. 505.

_ _ _ __ ___€g

The sheriff is liable in trover for the
excessive sale in such case, but cnnnot
be treated as trespasser ab initio.
Bhorland "· Govclt, 5 B. & C. 48;).
1 Davies "· Jenkins, 11 M. & W.
745: Screws "· Watson, 48 Ala. 62~;
Duke"· Vincent, 29 Iowa, 808; Wintringham "·Lafoy, 7 Cow. 735; Wellman "D. English, 88 Cal. 583. He is
liable for the error, though the names
are the same. Jarmain "· Hooper, 6
:M. & G. 827. Trespass lies for seizing the goods of a stranger to the

writ, notwithstanding they are so intermin~led with the goods of the
debtor that the officer cl\nnot distinguish thL·m, if the owner is prc!'eat
and offl·rs to select his own. Yates "·
Wormell, 60 :Me. 495. But if the
sheriff attaches the ~oods of the
wrong person, and while they are in
his hmHis attache!! them on a subsequent writ, the last llltiiCbment is no
trespass; the goodsnt the time having
been in the custody of the lu.w. Gms.
berg v. Pohl, 35 Md. 50/i.
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command, but the judicial oﬁicer is to follow his judgment.

NEGLECTS 011' OFFIOIAL DC'TY.

Even when the sheriff is embarrassed by the fact that the name

of the defendant in the writ is the same with that of others in

the neighborhood, he must at his peril ascertain who the real

defendant is, and make service upon him.‘

The sheriff in seizing property upon his writ must always

respect the liens of third persons. Thus, if he be authorized on

a writ against a mortgageor, to levy upon the goods mortgaged,

he can only take them subject to the superior rights of the mort-

gagce, and all his subsequent proceedings must be in subordina-

tion to such right.‘ So, where mechanics’ or any other liens

exist, he must recognize and take in subordination to them, and

whatever he may do that prejudices the lien is wrongful.

It has been stated in another place that a sheriff is responsible

for the misfeasance and nonfeasance of his deputies. This is the

general rule. \Vhcre, however, the deputy is employed to do

something not connected with his oflice, although he may be

employed because of the office, he must be regarded as a. mere

private agent, and the sheriff is not responsible for his conduct.

An illustration is where a chattel mortgage is delivered to the

deputy to foreclose by seizing the property mortgaged. As any

agent might do this, it is plainly not an ollicial act.’ The same
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is true of a deputy serving a distress warrant,‘ or doing any

other act which the law does not require the sheriff otlicially to

perform.‘

Nor is the sheriff liable where, by consent of the plaintiff in

the writ, the deputy does something not within his oflicial

authority, such as giving credit on an execution sale; " or

accepting in payment something besides 1noney;’ nor in any

case is he liable to the plaintiff for acts of the deputy which the

plaintiff himself, or his attorney, directed or advised,‘ or in res-

' Ja n ' . o . . 2 ‘ M ulton o. Norton. 5 Barb. 286.

ri nine II opcr,61lI &G 8 7,

847.

'Hobart v. Frisbie, 5 Conn. 592;

O‘Neal 0. Wilson, 21 Ala. 288; Mer-

ritt v. Niles. 25 Ill. 282; Worthington

v. Hanna, 23 Mich. 530; Saxton u.

Williams, 15 Wis. 292; Schradcr o.

Wolﬂn, 21 Ind. 238; Wootton 0.

Wheeler, 22 Tex. 888

' Dorr 0. Mickley, 16 Minn. 20.

‘Harrington e. Fuller, 18 Me. 277,

citing Knowlton e. Bartlett, 1 Pick.

command, but the judicial officer is to follow his jndgmC'nt.
Even when the sheriff is embarrassed by the fact that the name
of the defendant in the writ is the same with that of othert~ in
the neighborhood, he must at his peril ascertain who tho real
defendant is, aud make service upon him. 1
The sheriff in seizing property upon his writ most always
respect the liens of third persons. Thus, if he be authorized on
a writ against a mortgngeor, to levy upon the broods morthragt.-d,
ho can only take them subject to the superior rights of' the mortgagee, and all his subsequent proceedings must be in subordination to such right.• So, where mechanics' or any other liens
exist, he must recognize and take in subordination to them, and
whate-rer he may do that pr~judic·es the lien is wrougful.
It has been stated in another place that a sheriff is rc:oponsible
for the misteasance and nonfeasance of' his deputies. This is the
general rule. Where, however, the deputy is employed to do
something not connectecl with his ofti<.:e, although he may be
employed because of the office, he must be regarded as a mere
pri\·atc age~t, and the sheriff is not responsible fur his conduct.
An illustration is where a chattel mortgage is deli\·ered to tho
deputy to foreclose by seizing the property mortgaged. .As any
agent might do this, it is pluiuly not an otHcial act.• The toamc
is true of a deputy serving a distress warrant,• or doing any
other act which the law docs not require the sheriff officially to
perform.•
Nor is the sl1criff liable where, by CO'lsent of the plaintiff in
the writ, the depnty does something not within his otliciaJ
anthority, snch as giving credit on an execution sale; • or
accepting in payment something besides money;' nor in an,y
case is he liable to the plaintiff for acts of the deputy which tlte
plaintiff himself, or his attorney, directed or adYised,' or in res-

271; (‘ook v. Palmer, 6 B. & C. 739.

‘ Gorham v. Gale, '7 Cow. ".39; Arm-

strong v. Garroiv, 6 Cow. 465.

" Moore 1:. Jarrett, 10 Tex. 210.

' Cook e. Pnlmcr, 6 B. & C. 739;

Marshall '0. Ilosmcr, 4 Mass. 60; To-

bey v. Leonard, 15 Mass. 200; Smith

1 Jarmain e. Ilooper,6 11. & G. 827,
847.
' Hobart 11. Frisbie, 5 Conn. 502;
O'Neal e. Wilson, 21 Ala. 288; Merritt e. Nil<"S. 2S Ill. 2H2; Worthington
11. H11nna, 23 Mich. 530; Saxton e.
Williams, 16 Wis. 292; Schrader e.
Woltln, 21 Ind. 238; Wootton e.
Wheeler. 22 Tex. 888
• Dorr e. Mickley, 16 Minn. 90.

':M olton e. Norton, 5 Barb. 286.
1 llarrlngtnn e. Fuller, 18 :&lc. 277,
citio~ Knowlton e. Bartlett, 1 Pick.
271; Cook e. Palmer, 6 B. & C. 789.
• tfflrham e. 01\le, 7 Cow."'J9; Armstrong e. 6arrow, 6 Cow. 46J.
'Moore e. Jarrett, 10 Tex. 210.
• Cook e. PHI mer, 6 B. & C. 739;
:Marshall e. Hosmer, 4 llass. 60; To.
bey o. Leonard, 15 Ma68. 200; Smith
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pect to which they gave discretionary authority to the deputy,

within which he conﬁned his action.‘

pect to which they gave discretionary authority to the deputy,
within which he confined his a.ction. 1

Notaries Public. A notary public, by assuming to perform

any oﬁicial duty on request of aparty concerned, impliedl y under-

takes to discharge it faithfully, and is liable to the extent of any

resulting injury if he fails to do so. An illustration is, where

commercial paper is delivered to him for protest and notice

to the endorsers;' or where he undertakes to certity to the

acki wledvment of a eon\e\ auee '

-ye...

‘% g ﬁcers. ‘ ' I s tl i to e1y a‘

Ofheers whose duty reqmr

tax to satisfy a judgment, and who refuse or neglect to do s

though commanded to proceed by competent judicial authority,

are liable to the judgment creditor for their failure. “ The rule,”

it is said, in such a case, “is well settled, that where the law

Notaries Public. A notary pnbli<'" by assuming to perf(,mt
any official dnty on request of" party con<-"erned, impliedly nudertakes to discharge it faithfully, and is liable to the extent l)f any
resulting injury if he fails to do so. An i1!u!'tration i:;, where
commercial p:1per is deli\'<'red to him for protest and notiec
to the endorsers;' or where he undertake~ to certi(y to the
,(k.~ment of a rom•c,·ance.•

.J• ~:;)v ~~g' Jr;~:t~f§ ~s:;tJfffit i~ ·
1

requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public

oﬁicer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be com-

pelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising

from his conduct. There is an unbroken current of authorities

to this effect. A mistake as to his duty, and honest intentions,

will not excuse the oﬁ'ender.” ‘
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1:. Berry, 87 Me. 298; Aeker 1:. Led-

ynrd, 8 Barb. 514; Humphrey v. Ila-

thorn, 24 Barb. 278; Stevens v. Colby,

46 N. H. 163.

‘Dehloranda o. Dunkin, 4 T. R.

120; Strong v. Bradley, 14 Vt. 55.

9 Bank of Mobile v. Mnrston, 7 Ala.

108; Bowling 12. Arthur, 34 Miss. 41.

But the notary is not liable if he

'

tax to satisfy a judgment, and who refuse o1· neglect to do s ' - ~
though commanded to proceed by competent judicial authority, 'C'
are liable to the jmlgment creditor for their failure. "The rule," ~
it is said, in sn<-"h a case, "is well settled, that where the law
j
requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public
.$
officer, and he neglects or refuses to <.lo such act, he may be com- ~-~
pelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury ari:;ing
~
from his conduct. There is an unbroken current of authorities
·
to this effect. A mistake as to his duty, and honest intentions,
will not excuse the offender." •

obeys directions, even though they

prove erroneous. Commercial Bunk

'v.Varnum. 40 N. Y. ‘Z69. Nor where by

the neglect of the holder of the note

to keep good his rights as they then

existed, the notary lost _a valuable

right of subrogation. Emmerling v.

Graham, 14 La. Ann. 389. Nor where

the endorser has voluntarily made

payment after the negleetof the no-

tary to ﬁx his liability. Warren Bank

0. Parker, 8 Gray, 221. Nor where,

independent of the notice which the

L ___. ._

notary has failed to give to the en-

dorscr, the holder of the paper can hold

the endnrser on other grounds. Frank-

lin 1:. Smith, 21 Wend. 623.

3 Notary held responsible for not

certifying to the facts requsite to

make out a sutlicicnt acknowledg-

ment. Fogurty v. Finlay, 10 Cal. 239.

The notary who gives it false certiﬁ-

cate ot‘ acknowledgment is liable to

the grantee only; not to a subsequent

purchaser under him, who may ﬁnd

his title defective in consequence.

Ware 1-. Brown. 2 Bond, 267.

' SWAYNE, J., in Amy 0. Supervi-

sors, 11 Wall. 180, 138 In the case

ot' an oﬁicial neglect, the delinquent.

otﬁcer could only be liable for the

actual damages. Tracy 0. S\vart\\-out,

10 Pet. S0. And ifthc duty consisted

in giving credit formoncys, he would

not be chargeable in damages beyond

€

WM /’§‘7§g\,\..-t\*“‘

e. Berry, 87 ~I e. 298; Acker e. Ledyard, 8 Bnrb. 514; Humphrey r. Ila..
thorn, 24 Barb. 278; Stevens tt. Colby,
46 N.H. 163.
• De:\loranda tl. Dunkin, 4 T. R.
120; Strong ll. Bradley, 14 Vt. 55.
' Bank of !lobile "·Marston, 7 Ala.
108; Bowling '!l. Arthur, 34 ::\lifls. 41.
But the notary is not liable if he
obeys directions, even though tlH.'y
prove erroneous. Commercial Bnnk
1l.Varnum.4D N.Y. 26!). Nor when• by
the ncgl ..ct of the holder of the note
to keep good his rights as they tlwn
existed, the notary lost .a valuable
right of subrogation. Emmerling"·
Grnhnm, 14 La. Ann. 3F!I. Nor where
the endorser has voluntarily made
payment after the neglect of the notary to fix his liability. Warren Bank
"· Parker, 8 Gray, 221. Xor wl]('re,
independent of the notice which the

notary has fniled to give to tJ1e endorser, the holder of the papt•r can lwld
the emlnrsrr on other grounds. Franklin~- Smith, 21 Wend. 623.
'Notnry held responsible for not
cerlifylng to the facts r<·qul'ite to
make out a sufficient acknowledgment. Fogarty "·Pin lay, 10 Cal. 2:19.
The nota1·y who gi\'C~s a false certificate of Kcknowlcdgment is liable to
the> grantee only; not to a subsequent
purchnser under him, who mny tiud
his title d<'fcctive in conM·quence.
1Vnre tt. Brown. 2 Boml. 26i.
• SwAYNE, J., in Amy tl. Supervi.
son'l, 11 Wall. 13H, 1a8 In the cnse
nl' an otllcinl ne~lert, the delinqm•nt
officer could only be liKhle for the
actual damage~. TrRcy "·Swartwout,
10 Pet. 80. And if the duty consbted
in giving credit for moneys. he would
not be chargeable in damages beyond

i1
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Want of Means to Perform a Duty. \Vhere a ministerial

399

officer is charged with a duty which is only performed by an

Want of Means to Perform a Duty. 'Vhere a mini~terial
officer is charged with a <lnty which is only performed by an
expenditure of public funds, he cannot be in fault unless the
funds are provided for the purpose, or unle:<El; by virtue of his
office, he may raise the nece~sary means by levying a tax, or in
some other mode. But when tho funds are at his cornmaml. ami
the duty is still neglected, there is no reR.'ion why he should not
be held responsible to parties injnrcd. In ::'ew York, on this
ground, the superintendent of CRnnl repairs, who n€'glecte1l to
perform his duty, was held liable to parties who were pt·en•ntcJ
from making use of the canal, or delayed in its use in consequence.' So commissioners who ha,re charge of cutting and
keeping open public drains, while they could not be liahle tn
individuals for any neglect to cause drains to be cnt, ina.-rnuch as
they could not be chR.rgeable with a duty to any particular individual in respect thereto, yet when the drains are actually cut,
they are chargeable with a duty to every person who would he
injured by neglect to keep them open; awl if they snffer them
to become obstructed, to the injury of neighboring Jandi', when
they have the means at their command tor keeping them open,
the right of action against them is complete.'

expenditure of public funds, he cannot be in fault unless the

funds are provided for the purpose, or unless,‘ by virtue of his

oﬁice, he may raise the necessary means by levying a tax, or in

some other mode. But when the funds are at his command. and

the duty is still neglected, there is no reason why he should not

be held responsible to parties injured. In Few York, on this

ground, the superintendent of canal repairs, who neglected to

perform his duty, was held liable to parties who were prevented

from making use of the canal, or delayed in its use in conse-

quence.‘ So commissioners who have charge of cutting and

keeping open public drains, while they could not be liable to

individuals for any neglect to cause drains to be cut, inasmuch as

they could not be chargeable with a duty to any particular indi-

vidual in respect thereto, yet when the drains are actually cut,

they are chargeable with a duty to every person who would be

injured by neglect to keep them open; and if they snﬁl-r them

to become obstructed, to the injury of neighboring lands, when

they have the means at their command for keeping them open,

the right of action against them is complete.’

Highway Oﬂicers. There seems to be. a little difliculty in
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determining whether, where an oﬂicer is charged with the duty

of making and repairing highways and public bridges, this duty

can be regarded as a duty to individuals who may hare occasion

to use the public way, or whether, on the other hand, it is to be

considered a duty to the public only. In New York it was

decided, in an early case, that an action would not lie agalnst an

overseer of highways, at the suit of a party injured in conse-

the interest on the moneys. Kendall

v. Stokes, 3 Ilow. 8'7.

Where an oillcer fails to perform a

plain duty imposed upon him by law,

no question of contributory negli-

gence can arise, because it is impos-

sible that the party concerned can

contribute to his neglect. Strickfa-

den o. Zipprick, 49 Ill. 286.

‘ Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill, 630; Shep-

herd o. Lincoln, 1'7 Wend. 250; Griﬁlth

0. Follctt. 20 Barb. 620; Rohimon v.

Chamberlain. 34 N. Y. 351?; lll.>lll‘1\llC0

Co. v. Baldwin, 37 N. Y. 648.

~

~

Highway OfD.oers. There seems to be. a little difficulty in
determining whether, whet·e an officer is charged with the duty
of making and repairing highways and public hridges, tid=- duty
can be regnrrled as a duty to iuJividnals who may hnYe oct·a~ion
to use the puhlic way, or whether, on the other hand, it is to be
considered a duty to the public only. In New York it was
decided, in an early case, that an aetion would not lie a~a:11:it an
overseer of highways, at the suit of a party injured iu conse-

' $1-e Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, 41;

Parker 1:. Lowell. 11 Gray, 353; Bar-

ton 1:. Syracuse, 37 Barb. 2212; Hover

Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113; Wallace 0.

Muscatine, 4 Greene, (Iowa.) 373;

Phillips 1:. Commonwealth, 44 Penn.

St. 197.

the int!'rest on the moneys. Kendall
"· Stokes, 3 How. 87.
Where an officer fails to perform a
plain duty imposed upon him by law,
no question of contributory ne~ll
gencc can arise, because it is impos.
aible tbat tbe party concerned can
contribute to his neglect Strickfa..
den"· Zipprick, 49 Ill. 286.
J Adsit o. Brady, 4 Hill, 630; Shep.
herd"· Lincoln, 17 Wend. 230; Griffith

"· Follett, 20 Barb. 620; RohitNlll "·
Chawberlnin,34 N. Y.:l~!l; In,\ll'aucc
Co. "· Baldwin, 3'i X. Y. 6Hl
t See Child "· Bostnn, 4 Allen, 41;
Parker ~. Lowell. 11 Gmy, 853; Barton e. Syracuse, 3'i Barb. 2112; Hover
Bnrkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113; Wallace "·
.Mu~catine, 4 Greene, (Iowa.) 3i3;
Phillips e. Commonwc:tiUJ, 44 Penn.
St. 107.
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quence of a bridge within his jurisdiction being out of repair.

400
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The decision was grounded in part upon the fact that the declar-

ation did not show that the overseer had in his hands or under

his control the means for performing the duty of repair, and

in part upon a doubt whether the superior otiicers, the com-

missioners of highways, were not the parties in fault; but the

reasoning goes to the full extent, that the duty of repair was a

duty to the public, not to individuals.‘ The doctrine of that case

has been fully approved in South Carolina,’ Indiana,‘ Ohio‘ and

Nebraska.‘ Later I\'cw York cases, where suits have been brought

against commissioners of highways, lay down a diﬁerent doe-

trine, and hold them responsible for injuries caused by their neg-

lect to keep the public ways in repair, provided they have the

means of doing so.‘ The rule of law on the subject in that State,

as it is now settled, is veryterselystated in a recent case: “That

commissioners of highways, having the requisite funds in hand,

or under their control, are bound to repair bridges which are out

of repair, they. having notice of their condition; and they are

bound to repair them with reasonable and ordinary care and dili-

gence, and if they omit this duty, they are liable to individuals

who sustain special damages from such neglect. I do not mean

to limit the rule to cases where they have actual notice of the
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1 Bartlett 0. Crozier, 1'7 Johns. 489,

reversing same case, 15 Johns. 250.

' M’Kenzie v. Chovin, 1 Mcl\lul.

222. In this case, as in Bartlett 0.

Crozier, importance was attached to

the fact that the duties of the ot’ﬂ-

cer were compulsory and uncompen-

sated. “The duty of keeping the

roads and bridges in repair is pre-

scribed and regulated by the statute,

qnence of a bridge within his jurisdiction being ont of repair.
The decision was gronnded in part npon the fact that the declaration did not show that the o\·erseer had in his hands or under
his control the means for performing the duty of repair, and
in part npon a doubt whether the superior officers, the commissioners of highways, were not the parties in fanlt; but the
reasoning goes to tl1e full extent, that the duty of repair was a
duty to the public, not to individuals.' The doctrine of that case
has been fully approved in South Carolina,~ Indiana; Ohio • and
N ebraska.• Later X cw York cases, where suits have been hrought
against commissioners of highways, lay down a different doctrine, and hold them responsible for injuries caused by their neglect to keep the .public ways in repair, provided they have the
means of doing so.' The rule of law on the snhj£>ct in that State,
as it is now settled, is veryterselystated in a reeent case: "That
commissioners of highways, having the requisite funds m hand,
or under their control, are bound to repair brid~es which are out
of repair, they. having notice of their condition; and they are
bound to repair them with rca~onable and ordinary care and diligence, and if they omit this duty, they are liable to individuals
who sustain special damages from such neglect. I do not mean
to limit the rule to cases where they have actual notice of the

a duty imposed on the commissioners

under a penalty for refusing to serve,

as well as for not repairing, recover-

able by indictment; and it would be

against every principle of justice and

right to hold them responsible, out of

their private estates, for every injury

that an individual may sustain, as

well as liable to be indicted for every

neglect of duty; to compel them to

serve, and then subject them to a lia-

'\

bility from which their constituents

and employers are exempt. We can-

not suppose such was the intention of

the legislature." bee, also, the pre-

vious case of Young 0. Commission-

ers. 2 Nott & 1\Ir:Cord, 537.

’ Lynn v. Adams, 2 Ind. 143. The

reasoning in this case was similar to

that in the cases above noted, and the

same remark may be made of the two

which follow.

‘ Dunlap o. Knapp, 14 Ohio, (N. s)

64.

' McConnell 0. Dewey,-5 Ncb. 385.

' Smith 0. Wright, 24 Barb. 170.

This case was disapproved in Gar-

linghouse 1:. Jacobs, 29 N. Y. 297;

but the principle was afﬂrnn-d as

sound in Hover 0. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y.

113.

- .________,,,

a Bartlett e. Crozter, 17 Johns. 439,
reversing same case, 15 Johns. 250.
1 M'Kenzie "· Cbovln, 1 Mc:'llul.
222. In this case, as in lJ11rtlett o.
Crozier, Importance was attncbed to
the fact that the dntil'S of the om.
cer were rompulsory and uncompenaated. "The duty of keeping the
roads and bridges in repair is prescri~d and regulated by the s•atute,
a duty imposed on tbe commissioners
under a penalty for refusing to serve,
as well ns for not repairing, recovert&ble by indictment; and it would be
against every principle of justice and
right to hold them responsible, out of
their private estates, for every injury
that an individual may sustain, aa
well as liable to be indicted for every
neglect of duty; to compel them to
serve, and then subject them to a lia..

bility from which their conshtaenta
and employers are exempt. We cannot suppose such was the Intention of
the legislature.'' bee, also, the pre.
'rious <'Ase of Young o. Commissioners. 2 Nolt & McC'.ord, 537.
s Lynn o. Adnms, 2 Ind. 143. The
reasoning in this case was similu to
that in the ~ascs above noted, and the
same remark may be made of the two
which follow.
' Dunlap o. Knapp, 14: Ohio, (N. a)
64.

McConnell "· Dewey, 5 Neb. 885.
• l:!mith o. Wright, 24 B11rb. 170.
This case was disapproved in Garlinghouse o. Jacobs, 29 N.Y. 297;
but the principle was afllrmt'd as
sound in Hover e. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y.
113.
1
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condition of the bridges. because there may be cases where their
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ignorance of their condition would be culpable. And public

401

policy favors this rule. Defective bridges are dangerous, and

travelers generally have no means of knowing whether they are

safe or not. They have to rely upon the ﬁdelity and vigilance

of the highway commissioners, who are the only persons whose

duty it is to see that the bridges are in repair. The burden

imposed upon these officers by this rule is not too great. All it

requires of them is, that they shall, with reasonable care and

ﬁdelity, discharge the duties which they have solemnly sworn to

pert'orm.”' A similar liability is recognized as being imposed

by statute in North Carolina.‘

De faoto Oﬂloers. What has been said respecting the liabitity

of oflicers will apply to those who are such dejilcto only, as well

as to those who hold the oﬁice of right.‘ Indeed, so far as one

‘ Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113.

125, per Earl. Comr. Wherea bridge

crosses astream on the dividing line

between towns, the commissioners of

the two towns may be joined as de-

condition of the bridges. because there may be cases where th<'ir
ignorance of their condition would be culpable. And public
policy favors this rule. Defective bridges are dangerous, and
travelers generally have no means of knowing whetLer they are
safe or not. They have to rely upon the fidelity and "igilance
of the highway commissioners, who are the only persons whose
duty it is to see that the bridges are in repair. The burden
impo!'ed upon these officers by this rnle is not too great. All it
requires of them is, that they shall, with reasonnble care and
fidelity, discharge the duties which they ha,·e solemnly sworn to
perform." 1 A similar liability is recognized as being imposed
by statute in North Carolina.'

fendants in a suit for injury caused

by neglect to keep the bridge in re-
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pair. liryan n. Landon, 3 llun, 500.

That a commissioner who constructs

a bridge is liable for negligently leav-

De ftl.oto Oftloers. What has been said respecting the ]iabitity
of officers will apply to those who are such defiu:to only, as well
as to those who hold the office of right.• Indeed, so tin as one

ing it in a dangerous condition, see

Rector n. Pierce, 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (T.

& (7.) 416.

' Hathaway 0. Hinton, 1 Jones, (N.

C.) 248. In Huffman 0. San Joaquin

Co., 21 Cal. 426, the county was sued

for such an injury. FlEl.D, Ch. J.

says: “ If any remedy exists for in-

juries resulting from neglecting to

keep such bridges in repair, it must

be sought either against the road

overseers or supervisors personally."

See. also, Sutton 0. Board of Police,

41 Miss. 236. In Maryland in was

decided, in County Commissioners 0.

Duckett, 20 Md. 468, that the county

commissioners. being clothed ll] their

corporate capacity with charge of and

control over the property owned by

the county, and over the county roads

and bridges, with power to levy the

needtul taxes to keep them in repair,

and with such power and control over

the road supervisors as was sulllcient

to render the supervisors, in the eye

of the law, their agents, were liable

for tlamages resulting from the detect

ivc condition of the public roads.

Subsequently a statute was ])t\S~('ll

making the supervisors liable, and

requiring them to give bond, which

might be sued for the beneﬁt of any

person sutfering for the supervisor’s

neglect. This statute did not relieve

county commissioners of their pre-

vious liability. County Commis-

sioners r. Gibson. 36 Md. 229.

‘ As to who are otﬁcers dc fncto, sec

O‘l$rian o. Knivan, Cro. Jac. 552;

Harris e. Jays, Cro. Eliz. G99; Parker

e. Kett, Ld. Raym. 658; Cooke r. Hal-

sey, 16 Pet. 71; Fowler 0. Beehce, 9

Mass. 231; Taylor r. Skric, 3 Brev.

516; Parker 1-. Baker, 8 Paige, 428;

1 Hover 11. HRrkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113,
125, per ERrl. Co1nr. Where a bridge
crosses a streaJU on the dividing line
between towns, the commissioners of
the two towns may be joined as defendants In a suit for injury cnuscd
by neglect to keep the bridge in repair. liryan 11. Landon, 3 Hun, tiOO.
That a commissioner who cnnstructs
a bridge is liable for Dl.'gli~cntly lcav.
ing It in a dangerous condition, sl.'e
Hector"· Pierce, 3 N.Y. Sup. Ut. (T.
& C.) 416.
1 Hathaway "· Hinton, 1 Jones,(~.
C.) 248. In Huffman "·San J,Jnquin
Co., 21 Clll. 426, the county was sued
for such an injury. Fmr.u, Ch. J.
says: "If any remedy exists for in.
1urit•s rt·sulting from neglecting to
keep such brhlgcs in repair, it must
be sou .~ht either against the road
oversl.'crs or supervisors personally."
See, also, Sutton "· lionrd of Police,
41 }lis'S. 236. In 1tlaryland in was
decided, in County Commis,.ioners 11.
Duckett, 20 1tfd. 468, that the county
commissioners, b(•ing clothed m their
eorporute capacity with charge of and
control over the property owned by

26

the county, and over the county ronds
and bridg~. with power to levy the
needful taxes to keep them in rc.>puir,
aml with such power and control over
the road supervisors as was sufficil•nt
to render fhe supervisors, in the eye
of the law, their Rgents, were liable
for damR.!!l'S resulting from the defect.
ivc condition of the public roads.
Buhsl'qucntly a statute Wl\8 pRS·(·tl
making Lhe supervisor" liable, and
rl'quirlng them to give bond, which
might be sued for the bcneftt of any
person suffering for the !\Upcrvh10r'11
Dl'J!II'I't. This statute did not relieve
county commissioners of their pre.
vious liability.
County Commi&.
sion('r:o~ r. Gibson. 36 ?tid. 229.
1 As to who Rre officers de far-t<J, sre
O'Brian "· Knivao, Cro. Jac. 552;
H nrris 11. Jays, Cro. Eliz. fi99; Parker
~. Kl'tt, Ld. Rr~ym. 6.38; Cuckt· r. Halsl.'y, 16 Pet. 71; Fowlrr "· )jeehcc, 9
)las.<~. 231; Taylor r. Bkrie, S Brcv.
51fi; Parkc1· r. B11ker, 8 Pnigr, 42:i;
Wil(·ox 11. Smith, 3 Wend. 231; P('op1e
Kane, 23 Wend. 414; People r.
Whit1:, 24 Wl·nd. 1i20; Hurkc r. Elliott,
4 Ired, 8M; Brown "· Lunt, 37 .Me.

r:
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\

has actually exercised the functions of a public oﬂicer, he would

402
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be estopped to deny that he was properly ﬁlling it, for the pur-

pose of escaping liability: ‘ though doubtless he might abandon

the oﬂice into which he had intruded at any time, on claim being

made by the rightful party entitled, or even without such claim,

unless he had given bonds to perform the duties. Such aban-

donment, however, could not excuse him from liabilities already

incurred.

423; State 1:. Bloom, 17 Wis. 521;

People 0. Bangs, 24 Ill. 184; Munson

0. Minor, 22 Ill.594; Barlow v. Stand-

ford 82 Ill. 298; Clark o. Common-

ltas actually exercised the functions of a public officer, he would
be estopped to deny that he was properly filling it, for the purpose of escaping liability: 1 though doubtless he might abandon
the office into which he had intruded at any time, on claim being
made by the rightful party entitled, or even without snch claim,
unless he had given bOnds to perform the duties. Such abandonment, however, could not excuse him from liabilities already
incurred.~ ·

wealth, 29 Penn. St. 129; Common;

wealth '0. McCombs, 56 Penn. St.

436; Kimball 0. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151;

Plymouth 0. Painter, 17 Conn. 585;

State 0. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; S. C. 9

Am. Rep. 409; State v. liIcl<‘arland, 25

La. Ann. 547; Keeler o. Newbern, 1

Phil. (N. O.) 505; Kreidlcr 1:. State, 24

Ohio, (N. s.) 25; Jhons 0. People, 25
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Mich. 499. The acts of such oﬂicers

within the authority of the oﬂ‘lce are

perfectly good, so far as the public

and third persons are concerned, and

can only be questioned in a direct

proceeding to try their title, or in

some suit in which they seek to es-

tablish in their own favor some right

growing out of or dependent upon

the oﬁieial character. See cases above

cited. Also, Bucknan u. Ruggles, 15

Mass. 180; Attorney General 0. Leth-

rop, 24 Mich. 235; Blackstone 0. Taft,

4 Gray, 250; Samis o. King, 40 Conn.

298; Downer '0. Woodbury, 19 Vt. 329;

Ex parts Strang, 21 Ohio, (N. s.) 610;

Gregg v. Jamison, 55 Penn. St. 468;

Cabot 0. Given, 45 Me. 144; State 0.

Tolan, 33 N. J. 195; Leach o. Cassidy,

23 Ind. 449; McCormick o. Fitch, 14

Minn. 252.

'Longacre v. State, 3 Miss. 637;

Marshall c. Hamilton, 41 Miss. 229;

Borden v. Houston, 2 Texas, 594; Bil-

lingsley 0. State, 14 Md. 369. The

principle has often been applied to

persons who have assumed the func-

tions of collectors of the public rev-

enue. Sandwich o. Fish,2 Gray, 298,

801; Williamstown v. Willis, 15 Gray,

427; Johnston -v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202,

206; Horn o. Whittaker, 6 N. H.88;

Jones 0. Scanland, 6 Humph. 195;

Trescott 0. Moan, 50 Me. 347; Went-

worth v. Gove, 45 N. H. 160.

1 Persons undertaking to act as as-

sessors of a town, without having

been legally elected as such. are per-

sonally liable for the acts of acol-

lector to whom they have issued a

warrant for the collection of taxes as-

sessed by them. Allen v. Archer, 49

Me. 346. Same rule applied to ﬁsh

C0l'nmiSSlO".el'B. Bearce 1:. Fossett, 34

Me. 575. So a justice is personally

liable who issues process without

having taken the oath of oﬂlce. Cour-

Tolan, 83 N.J. 105; Leach 11. Cassidy,
People "'· Bangs, 24 Ill. 184; Munson 28 Ind. 449; McCormick "· Fitch, 14
"'· Minor, 22 Ill. ~94; Barlow"· Stand- Minn. 252.
1 Longttcre "· Sblte, 8 Miss. 687;
ford 82 Ill. 298; Vlark "· Commonwealth, 29 Penn. St. 129; Common- Marshall "· Hamilton, 41 MillS. 229;
wealth 11. McCombs, 56 Penn. Sl Borden "· Houston, 2 Texas, 594; Bil436; Kimball"· Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151; lingsley "· State, 14 Md. 869. The
Plymouth "· Painter, 17 Conn. 585; principle has often been applied to
State "· Carroll, 88 Conn. 449; B. C. 9 persou11 who have assumed the funcAm. Rep. 409; State "'· Mclt'arland, 25 tions of collectors of the public revLa. Ann. 547; KeP.ler 11. Newbern, 1 enue. Sandwich "· Fish, 2 Gray, 298.
Phil. (N. C.) 600; Kreidler"· State, 24 801; Williamstown"· Willis, 15 Gray,
Ohio, (N. s.) 25; Jilons "· People, 25 427; Johnston"· Wilson, 2 N.H. 202,
Mich. 499. The acts of such officers 206; Horn "· Whittaker, 6 N. H. 88;
within the authority of the ofllce are Jones "· Bcaoland, 6 Humph. 195;
perfectly good, so far as the public Trescott "· Moan, 50 Me. 347; Wentand third persons are concerned, and worth v. Gove, 45 N. H. 160.
' Persons undertaking to act as as..
can only be questioned in a direct
proceeding to try their title, or in sessora of a town, without. having
some suit in which they seek to t>s- been legally elected as such. are pertal.Jlish in their own favor some right sonally liable for the acts of a colgrowing out of or dependent upon lector to whom they have issued a
the official character. l:lee cases above warrant for the collection of taxes ascited. Also, Bucknan "· Ruggles, 15 sessed by them. Allen "·Archer, 49
Mass. 180; Attorney General "· Loth- lie. 846. Same rule applied to fish
rop, 24 M.ich. 286; Blackstone"· Tan, comm:ssio-:crs. Bearce !1. Fossett, 34
4 6ray, 250; Samis "·King, 40 Conn. Me. 575. So a justice is personally
298; Downer"· Woodbury, 19 Vt. 829; liuhle who issues process without
Ex part~ Strang, 21 Ohio, (N. A.) 610; having takt>n the oath of office. CourGregg "·Jamison, 55 Penn. St. 468; ser"· Powers, .84 Vt. 517.
Cabot 11. Given, 46 Me. 144:; State tJ.
428 ; State "'· :Uloom, 17 Wis. l'i21 ;
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In the last chapter it was shown that where an oﬁicer is charged

with a duty to an individual which he fails to perform, an action

will lie against him on behalf of the person to whom the duty

was owing. It was also shown that where a duty is only imposed

as a duty to the public, no individual action will lie, though the

consequence of a breach may happen to fall exclusively upon one

or more individuals. It was admitted at the same time that it

is not always easy to determine whether a particular oflice is

charged with duties to individuals, and that the question must

usually be decided on a consideration of the nature of the duty,

and whether it contemplates only general protection and beneﬁt,

CHAPTER XIV.

or the protection and beneﬁt of such individuals as are liable to

be specially affected. When the latter is the case, the duty is

IMliUNITY OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS FROM PRIVATE SUITS.

distributive, and arises in behalf of any one who is exposed to

the injury meant to be guarded against whenever the exposure

takes place.

The general subject requires further examination, as it con-

cerns a class of oﬁieial duties which are public in their nature,

though in their discharge specially affecting individuals; but the

time, manner and extent of the performance of which are left to

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:42 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the wisdom, integrity and judgment of the oﬁcer himself. In

these cases it is conceded that, as a general rule, the only liability

of the oﬂicer is to the criminal law, in case he shall wrongfully

and maliciously neglect to perform his duties, or shall perform

them improperly. Duties of this nature are usually spoken of

as duties in the exercise of discretionary and judicial powers, and

it is deemed a conclusive answer to any private action for an

injury resulting from neglect or unfaithful performance to say

that where a matter is trusted to the discretion or judgment of

an oﬁicer, the very nature of the authority is inconsistent with

In the last chapter it was shown that where an officer is charged
with a duty to an individual which he fails to perform, an action
will lie against him on behalf of the person to whom the dnty
was owing. It was also shown that where a duty is only imposed
as a duty to the public, uo individual action will lie, though the
consequence of a breach may happen to tall exclusively upon one
or more individuals. It was admitted at the same time that it
is not always easy to determine whether a particular office is
charged with duties to individuals, and that the question must
usually be decided on a consideration of the nature of the duty,
and whether it contemplates only general protection and benefit,
or the protection and benefit of such individuals as are liable to
be specially affected. When the latter is the case, the duty is
distributive, and' arises in behalf of any one who is exposed to
the injury meant to be guarded against whenever the exposure
takes place.
The general subject requires further examination, as it concerns a class of official dnties which are public in their nature,
though in their discharge specially affecting individuals; but the
time, manner and extent of' the performance of which are left to
the wisdom, integrity and judgment of the officer himself. In
these eases it is conceded that, as a general rule, the only liability
of the officer is to the criminal law, in case he shall wrongfully
and maliciously neglect to perform his duties, or shall perform
them improperly. Duties of this nature are usually spoken of
as dnties in the exercise of discretionary and judicial powers, and
it is deemed a conclusive answer to any private action for an
injury resulting from neglect or unfaithful performance to say
that where a matter is trusted to the discretion or judgment of
an officer, the \'ery nature of the authority is inconsistent with
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responsibility in damages for the manner of its exercise, since to
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hold the oilieer to such responsibility would be to confer a dis-

cretion and then make its exercise a wrong. Lord Chief Justice

N omn expressed the idea very tersely in the following language:

“ If a jury will ﬁnd a special verdict, if a judge will advise and

take time to consider, if a bishop will delay a patron and impanel

a jury to inquire of the right of patronage, you cannot bring an

action for these delays, though you suppose it to be done mali-

ciously and on purpose to put you to charges; though you sup-

pose it to be done scienter, knowing the law to be clear; for they

take but the liberty the law has provided for their safety, and

there can be no demonstration that they have not real doubts,

for these are within their own breasts; it would be very mis-

chievous that a man might not have leave to doubt without so

great peril.” '

\Vhen it is said there can be no demonstration that there were

not real doubts, or what were the real motives within the oﬁicial

breast, it is not meant that it is impossible for the law to investi-

gate the faet. In many cases suits are allowed where a bad

motive must be the gravamen of the complaint, and the motive

is arrived at by showing that while the defendant has done one

thing, all honest inducements, so far as they can be presented in
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evidence, should have inclined him to do something different.

An inspection of his motives is thus invited in‘tlie light of the

exposure which the facts known by or accessible to him makes;

and though he asserts one motive, it may satisfactorily appear

that he must have indulged another, because these facts, with the

motive he pretends to, should have impelled him in a direction

the opposite of that he took. And in the case of otlicials of even

the highest station, when the State calls them to account for mis-

conduct, they do not put aside the charge by pleading that their

duties were discretionary or judicial, and by denying the compe-

tency of the State to look into their breasts and make demonstra-

tion that their motives were not pure and their purposes not

honest; the State rejects such an answer, and does not hesitate

to inﬂict very serious punishment when it is satisfactorily shown

that the discretion was abused through malice, or the judgment

‘ Barnardiston '0. Sonme, 6 State Downes. 3 Moore, P. C. C. 36; Randall

Trials, 1063, 1099. And, see Taalfc 11. -v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523.

__ , -

responsibility in damages tor the manner of its exercise, since to
hold the oflit-er to snch responsibility would be to confer a discretion and then make its exercise a wrong. Lord Chief Justice
NoRTH expressed the idea very tersely in the following language:
"If a jury will find a special verdict, if a judge wi11 advise and
take time to consider, if a bishop will delay a patron and impanel
a jury to inquire of the right of patronage, you cannot bring an
action tor these delays, though yon suppose it to be done maliciously and on purpose to put you to charges; though you suppose it to be done scienter, knowing the law to be clear; tor they
take but the liberty the law has provided tor their safety, and
there can be no demonstration that they have not real doubts,
for these are within their own breasts; it would be very mischievous that a man might not have leave to doubt without so
great peril."'
When it is said there can be no demonstration that there were
not real doubts, or what were tho real motives within the official
breast, it is not meant that it is impossible for the law to investigate the fact. In many cases snits are allowed where a bad
moth·e must be the gravamen of the complaint, and the motive
is arrh·ed at by showing that while the defendant has done one
thing, all honest indo<.-ements, so far as they can be presented in
evidence, should have inclined him to do something different.
An inspection of his motives is thus im·ited in~he light of the
exposure which the facts known by or accessible to him makes;
and though he asserts one motive, it may satisfactorily appear
that he must have indulged another, because these fncts, with the
motive he pretends to, should have impelled him in a direction
the opposite of that he took. And in the case of officials of even
the highest station, when the State calls them to account for misconduct, they do not put aside the charg-e by pleading that their
duties were discretionary or judicial, and by denying the compe.
teney of the State to look into their breasts and make demonstration that their motives were not pure and their purposes not
honest; the State rejects such an answer, and does not hesitate
to inflict very serious punishment when it is satisfactorily shown
that the discretion was abused through malice, or the judgment
1 Bsrnardiston "· Boame, 6 State
Trials, 1068, 1099. And, see Taaffe "·

DownE'S. 3 Moore, P. C. C. 36; Rundall
"·Brigham, 7 Wall. 523.
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perverted through favoritism or other improper motive. It is
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not, therefore, the mere diﬂiculty of an inquiry into the facts
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that precludes civil liability to the party who has been injured

by a neglect of judicial duty or an abuse of discretion.

If, however, we select the case of any judicial ofﬁcer, and

endeavor to satisfy ourselves what would be the practical work-

ing of the opposite doctrine, we shall not be long in doubt that

reasons abundant exist why the judge should be exempt from

individual responsibility to those interested in the discharge of

his duties. W'e shall also be able to perceive that while the

upright judge may have reasons for desiring to he shielded against

harassing litigation at the suit of those who inay be displeased

with his action, the general public has interests still more import-

an't which demand for him this immunity.

First, as regards the interest of the udge: \Vhoeverl)1-ings his

controversy before the courts may be assumed to believe that

his case is sound both on the law and on the facts, and that if

justice is done him, judgment \vill pass in his favor. Whoever

defends a suit brought against him, may also be supposed to

believe that he ought to succeed in his defense. One of the two

must fail, and when he fails he can generally attribute it to some

ruling of the judge which either conclusively determined the
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case, or gave such direction to the deliberations of the jury as

required the result which they reached. The reasons assigned by

the judge for his rulings may or may not be satisfactory to par-

ties, and necessarily in the case of the defeated party, they are

received by a mind prepared in advance not to agree to them.

If, now, the judge can be held responsible to the defeated party

for his action, it must be on the ground either, 1"z'rst, that by a.

wrong judgment, where duty required of him a. right udgment,

he has inﬂicted injury; or, Second, that he has done wrong by

not making use of his honest judgment, hut allowing passion or

prejudice to control his action. ()ne or the other of these is the

only conceivable ground on which an action against the judge

can be supported.

If an action were maintained on the ﬁrst ground, it would be

apparent that no man ﬁt for the position, and having anything

either of property or reputation to put at stake, would consent

to occupy a judicial position. If at the peril of his fortune, hc

must justify his judgments to the satisfaction of a jury sum-

perverted through favoritism or other improper motive. It is
not, therefore, the mere difficulty of an inquiry into the facts
that precludes civil liability to the party who has been injured
by a neglect of judicial duty or an abut>e ot' discretion.
If, however, we select the case of any judicial officer, and
endeavor to satisfy ourselves what would be the practical working of the opposite doctrine, we shall not be long in doubt that
rensons abundant exist why the judge should be exempt from
individnul responsibility to those interested in the discharge of
his duties. We shall also be able to perceive that while the
upright judge mny have reasons tor desiring to be shielded against
harassing litigation at the suit of those who inay be displeased
with his action, the general public has interests still wore important which demand fur him this immunity.
First, as regards the interest of the judge: 'Vhoever brings his
controversy before the courts may be assumed to believe that
his case is sound both on the law and on the facts, and that if
justiee is done him, judgment will pass in his fa\'Or. Whoe\·er
defends a snit brought a~'l1linst him, may also be supposed to
believe that he onght to succeed in his defense. One of the two
must fail, and when he fails he can generally attribute it to some
ruling of the judge which either conclusively determined the
case, or gave such direction to the deliberations of the jury as
required the result which they reached. The reasons as~igned by
the judge for his rulings may or may not be satisfactory to parties, and necessarily iu the case of the defeated party, they are
received by a mind prepared in admnce not to ~ree to till'm.
If, now, the judge can be held re:-;ponsible to the defeated pa•·ty
for his action, it must be on the ground either, .First, that by a
wrong judgment, where duty required of him a right judgmeut,
he has inflicted injury; or, Second, that he has done wrong by
not making use of his honest judgment, hut allowing pa~Ssion or
prejudice to control his action. One or the other of these is the
only conceivable ground on which an action against the judge
can be supported.
If an action were maintniued on the first g•·otmd, it would be
apparent that no man fit for the po::;ition, and having anything
either of property or reputation to pnt at stake, would consent
to occupy a judicial position. If at the peril of his fi,rtnnc, he
must justi(y his judgments to the satisfaction of a jury sum-
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moned by a dissatisﬁed litigant to review them, it would be pre-
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sumptuous for any man to place himself in that position. Nor

would the protection be sensibly greater if his liability were to

depend upon a showing of bad motive. And here we cannot do

better than to reproduce the language of a recent decision.

“Controversies involving not merely great pecuniary interests,

but the liability and character of the parties, and consequently

exciting the deepest feelings, are being constantly determined in

the courts, in which there is great conﬂict in the evidence. and

great doubt as to the law which should govern their decision.

It is this class of cases that impose upon the judge the severest

labor, and often create in his mind a fearful sense of responsi-

bility. Yet it is in precisely this class of cases that the losing

party feels most keenly the decision against him, and most readily

accepts anything but the soundness of the decision in explana-

tion of the action of the judge. Just in proportion to the

strength of his conviction of the correctness of h-is own view of

the case is he aptto complain of the judgment against him, and

from complaints of the judgment to pass to the ascription of

improper motives to the judge. When the controversy involves

questions affecting large amounts of property, or relates to a |nat-

ter of general public concern, or touches the interests of numer-
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ous parties, the disappointment occasioned by an adverse decision

often ﬁnds vent in imputations of this character, and from the

imperfection of human nature this is hardly a subject of wonder.

If civil actions could be maintained in such cases against the

judge, because the losing party should see ﬁt to allege in his

complaint that the acts of the judge were done with partiality,

or maliciously, or corruptly, the protection essential to judicial

independence would be entirel_v swept away. Few persons, sulﬁ-

ciently irritated to institute an action against a judge for his

judicial acts, would hesitate to ascribe any character to the acts

which would be essential to the maintenance of the action.”‘

Turning, now, to the public aspect which such a suit would

present, the following may be assigned as reasons why the public

interest could not sulfer such a suit to be brought:

1. The necessary result of the liability would be to occupy the

‘ FIELD, J ., in Bradley Io. Fisher, 18 Fray o. Blackburn, 3 Best & S. 576_

Wall. 348. To the same effect is And, see Le Caux v. Eden, Doug. 594.
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moned by a dissatisfied litigant to review them, it wonld be presumptuous for any man to place himself in that position. X or
would the protection be sensibly greater if his liability were to
depend upon a showing of bad motive. And here we cannot do
better than to reproduce the language of a recent decision.
"Controversies invol¥ing not merely great pecuniary intereEts,
bnt the liabiJity and character of the parties, and consequently
exciting the deepest feelings, are being constantly determined in
the courts, in which there is great conflict in the evidence. and
great doubt as to the law which should govern their dech•ion.
It is this class of cases that impose upon the jndge the severest
labor, and often create in his mind a fearful sense of responsibility. Yet it is in precisely this class of cases that the losing
party feels most keenly the decision ugainst him, and most readily
accepts anything but the soundness of the decision in explanation of the action of the judge. J ost in proportion to the
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the case is he apt to complain of' the judgment against him, and
from complaints of the judgment to pass to the ascription of
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judge, because the losing party should see fit to allege in his
complaint that the acts of the judge were done with partiality,
or maliciously, or corruptly, the pr~tection essential to judicial
independence would be entirely swept away. Few persons, sufficiently irritated to institute an action against a jud~e tor his
judicial acts, would he~>itate to ascribe any character to the acts
which would be essential to the maintenance of the action." 1
Turning, now, to the public aspect which such a snit woulc.l
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judge’s time and mind with the defense of his own interests,

when he should be giving them up wholly to his public duties,

thereby defeating, to some extent, the very purpose for which his

oﬁice was created.

2. The effect of putting the judge on his defense as a wrong-

doer necessarily is to lower the estimation in which his oﬂice is

held by the public, and any adjudication against him lessens the

weight of his subsequent decisions. This of itself is a serious

evil, affecting the whole community; for the conﬁdence and

respect of the people for the government will always repose most

securely on the judicial authority when it is esteemed, and must

always be unstable and unreliable when this is not respected. If

the judiciary is unjustly assailed in the public press, the wise judge

refuses to put himself in position ofdelcndant by responding, but

he leaves the tempest to rage until an awakened public sentiment

silences his detractors. But if he is forced upon his defense, as

was well said in an early case, it“ would tend to the scandal and

subversion of all justice, and those who are most sincere would

not be free from continual calumniations.” '

3. The civil responsibility of the judge would often be an

incentive to dishonest instead of honest judgments, and would

invite him to consult public opinion and public prejudices, when
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he ought to be wholly above and unintluenoed by them. As

every suit against him would be to some extent an appeal topop-

ular feeling, a judge, caring specially for his own protection,

rather than -for the cause of justice. could not well resist a lean-

ing adverse to the parties against whom the popular passion or

prejudice for the time being was running, and he would thus

become a persccutor in the cases where he ought to be a pro-

tector, and might count with conﬁdence on escaping responsi-

bility in the very cases in which he ought to be punished. Of

what avail, for example, could the civil liability of the judge

have been to the victims of the brutality of Jeffries, if, while he

was at the height of his power and inﬂuence, and was wreaking

his brutal passions upon them amidst the applause of crowded

court rooms, these victims had demanded redress against him at

the hands of any other court and jury of the realm!

4. Such civil responsibility would constitute a serious obstruc-

‘ Floyd 0. Barker, 12 Co. 25; quoted in 13 Wall. 319.

judge's time and mind with the defense of his own interests,
when he shvuld be giving them np who11y to his public duties,
thereby defeating, to some extent, the very purpo3e for which his
office was created.
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become a persecutor in the cases where he ought to be a protector, and might count with confidence on escaping responsibility in the very cases in which he ought to be punished. Of
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tion to justice, in that it would render essential a large increase

in the judicial force, not only as it would multiply litigation, but

as it would open each case to endless controversy. This of itself

would be an incalculable evil. The interest of the public in gen-

eral rules and in settled order is vastly greater than in any results

which only affect individuals; courts are for the general beneﬁt

rather than for theindividual; and it is more importantthat their

action shall tend to the peace and quiet of society than that, at

the expense of order, and after many suits, they shall ﬁnally pun-

ish an oﬁicer with damages for his misconduct. And it is to be

borne in mind that if one judge can be tried for his judgment,

the one who presides on the trial may also be tried for his, and

thus the process may go on until it becomes intolerable.

5.‘ But where the judge is really deserving of condemnation a

prosecution at the instance of the State is a much more eill-ctual

method of bringing him to account than the private suit. A

want of integrity, a, failure to apply his judgment to the case

before him, a reckless or malicious disposition to delay or defeat

justice may exist and be perfectly capable of being shown, and

yet not be made so apparent by the facts of any particular case

that in a trial conﬁned to those facts he would be condemned.

It may require the facts of many cases to establish the fault; it
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may be necessary to show the oﬁicial action for years. Wliere an

oiiicer is impeached, the whole oﬁie-ial career is or may be gone

into; in thatcase one delinquency after another is perhaps shown

-—each tends to characterize the other, and the whole will enable

the triers to form a just opinion of the otlicial integrity. But in

a private suit the party would be conﬁned to the facts of his own

case: it is against inﬂexible rules that one man should be allowed

to base a. recovery for his own beneﬁt on a wrong done to another,

and could it be permitted, the person ﬁrst wronged, and whose

right to redress would be as complete as any, would lose this

advantage by the very fact that he stood ﬁrst in the line of

injured persons.

\Vhenever, therefore, the State confers judicial powers upon an

individual, it confers them with full immunity from private suits.

In effect, the State says to the otﬁeer that these duties are con-

ﬁded to his judgment; that he is to exercise his judgment fully,

freely, and without favor, and he may exercise it without fear;

that the duties concern individuals, but they concern more

-I

tion to justice, in that it would render essential a large increase
in the judicial force, not only as it would multiply litigation, bat
as it would open each case to endless oontro,•ersy. This of itself
would be an incalculable evil. The intel'est of the public iu general rules anrl in settled order is vastly greater than in any results
which only affec't individuals; courts are for the ~I'Cneral benefit
rather than for the individual; and it is more important that their
action shall tend to the peace and quiet of society than that, at
the expense of order, and 11.fter many snits, they shall finally punish an officer with damagea for his misconduct. And it is to be
borne in mind that if one jndge can be tried tor his judgment,
the one who presides on the trial may also be tried for his, and
thus the process may go on until it becomes intolerable.
5; Bnt where the judge is really deserving of condemnation a
prosecution at the instance of the State is a much more effectual
method of bringing him to account than the private suit. A
want of integrity, ~ failure to apply his judgment to the case
before him, a reckless or malicious disposition to delay or defeat
justice may exist and be perfectly capable of being shown, and
yet not be made so apparent by the facts of any particular case
that in a trial confined to those facts he would be condemned.
It may require the facts of many cases to establish the fault; it
may be necessary to show the official action tor years. Where an
officer is impeu.ched, the whole offi~ial career is or may be gone
into; in that case one delinquency after another is perhaps shown
-each tends to characterize the other, and the whole will enable
the triers to form a just opinion of the official integrity. But in
a private snit the party would be confined to the facts of his own
case: it is against inflexible rules that one ma.n shonld be allowed
to base a recovery for his own benefit on a wrong done to another,
and could it be permi tt<.'<l, the person first wronged, and whose
right to redress would be as complete as any, would lose this
advantage by the very fact that he stood first in the line of
injured persons.
Whenever, therefore, the State confers judicial powers upon an
individual, it confers them with full immunity from private snits.
In effect, the State says to the officer that these duties are confided to his judgment; that he is to exercise his judgment fully,
freely, and without fiwor, and he may exercise it without fear;
that the duties con<.-ern individuals, but they concern more

IMMUNITY or JUDICIAL oamcans. 409

especially the welfare of the State, and the peace and happiness
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of society; that if he shall fail in a faithful discharge of them he

shall be called to account as a criminal; but that in order that he

may not be annoyed, disturbed, and impeded in the performance

of these high functions, a dissatisﬁed individual shall not be suf-

fered to call in question his oﬂicial action in a suit for damages.

This is what the State, speaking by the mouth of the common

law, says to the judicial oﬁicer.

The rule thus laid down applies to large classes of oﬂiees,

embracing some the powers attached to which are very extensive,

and others whose authority is exceedingly limited. It applies to

the highest judge in the State or nation,‘ but it also applies to

the lowest oﬁicer who sits as a court and tries petty causes,’ and

' Dicas o. Lor-l Brougham, 6 C. &

P. 249; Fray v. Blackburn,3 Best &

S. 576; Yates o. Lansing, 5 Johns.

282; S. C. 9 Johns. 394; Lining 0.

Bentham, 2 Bay, 1; Bradley o. Fisher,

13 Wall. 335.

' Floyd v. Barker, 12 Co. 25; Mos-

especially the welfare of the State, and the peace and happiness
of society; that if he shall fail in a. faithful discharhre of tl:em he
shall be called to account as a. criminal; but that in order that he
may not be annoyed, disturbed, and impeded
the performance
of these high functions, a dissatisfied individual shall not be suffet·ed to call in question his official action in a. suit for damages.
This is what the State, speaking by the month of the common
law, says to the judicial officer.
The rule thus laid down applies to large clas~es of ofii<-es,
emht"acing some the powers attached to which are vet·y extensive,
and others whose authority is exceedingly limited. It applies to
the highest judge in the State or nation, • but it a.lilo applies to
the lowest officer who sits as a. court and tries petty causes,1 and

in

tyn v. Fabrigas. Cowp. 161; Lowther

0. Earl of Radnor, 8 East, 113; Pike
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v. Carter, 3 Bing. 78; Basten 0. Carew,

3 B. & C. 652; Mills 0. Collett, 6 Bing.

85; Holroyd v. Breare, 2 B. & Ald. 773;

Fawcctt 0. Fowlis, 7 B. & C. 394;

Brodie o. Rutledge, 2 Bay, 69; Evans

o. Foster, 1 N. H. 374; Green 0. Mead,

18 N. H. 505; Burnham 0. Stevens,

38 N. H. 247; Jordan v. Hanson, 49

N. H. 199; Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush.

63; Kelly o. Bemis, 4 Gray. 83; Am-

bler o. Church, 1 Root, 211; Moore o.

Ames. 3 Gaines, 170; McDowell 0.

Van Deuscn, 12 Johns. 356; Cunning-

ham v. Bucklin, 8 Cow. 178; Stewart

0. Hawley, 21 Wend. 552; Ramsey 0.

Riley, 13 Ohio, 157; Stewart 0. South-

ard, 1'1 Ohio, 402; Stone 0. Graves. 8

Mo. 148; Lenox 0. Grant, 8 Mo. 254;

Taylor o. Doremus, 16 N. J. 473:

Morris o. Carey, 27 N. J. 377; Man-

gold 0. Thorpe, 33 N. J. 134; Little v.

Moore, 4 N. J. 74; Hamilton v. Wil-

liams, 26 Ala. 527; Walker 0. Halleck,

B2 Iml. 239; Deal 0. Harris, 8 Md. 40;

Morrison 0. McDonald, 21 Me. 550;

Downing o. Herrick, 47 Me. 462;

Bailey v. Wiggins, 5 Harr. 462; Reid

0. Hood, 2 N.& McCord,47l; Wasson

0. Mitchell, 18 Iowa, 153; Londegan

0. Hammer, 30 Iowa, 508; Fuller 0.

Gould, 20 Vt. 643; Ely o. Thompson,

3 A. K. Marsh. '70. In Phelps v. Sill,

1 Day. 315, it is held that an action

will not lie against a judge ol' pro-

bate for neglecting to take security

from the guardian of an infant, al-

though such an infant had personal

estate and the guardian was a bank-

rupt. 'l‘hou<__:h a judge Ullt-ll:ll(oS, it

was said, it is sutllcient for him that

he actcdjudicially. For a remarka-

ble casein which a justice was held

not responsible. though he seems to

have acted very improperly and in

deﬁance of law, see Raymond a.

Bolles, 11 Cush. 315. The case of

Stone 0. Graves. 8 Mo. 148, was also

I Dicas "· Lor-1 Brougham, 6 C. &
P. 249; Fr.1y "· Blackburn, 3 llest &
B. 576; Yates "-- Lansing, 5 J obns.
282; B. C. 9 Johns. 894; Lining "·
Bentham, 2 Bay, 1; Bradley"· Fisher,
13 Wall. 335.
' Floyd "· Barker, 12 Co. 1M; Mos.
tyn e. Fabrigas. Cowp. 161 ; Lowther
e. Earl of Rl\dnor, 8 East, 113; I' ike
"·Carter, 8 Bing. 78; Basten"· Carew,
3 B. & C. 652; Millu. Collett, 6 Bing.
8;3; Holroyd"· Breare, 2 B. & Ald. 773;
Fawcett v. Fowlis, 7 B. & C. 3!)4;
Brodie "· Rutledge, 2 Bay, 69; Evans
"· Foster, 1 N.H. 374.; Green fl. :;\lead,
18 N. H. 505; Burnham "· Stevens,
38 N.H. 247; Jordan "· Hanson, 49
N. H. 199; Pratt "· Gardner, 2 Cush.
63; Kelly "· liemis, 4 Gray. 8:1; Ambler fl. Church, 1 Root, 211; :Moore"·
Ames, 8 Cuine~. 170; :McD;Jwell "·
Van Deusen, 12 J olms. 3.")(1; Cnnn ingham "·Bucklin, 8 Cow. 17M; Sl!!wart
e. Hawley, 2l Wend. 5;j2; Ramsey "·
Riley, 13 Ohio, 157; Stewart"· Southard, 17 Ohio, 402; Stone fl. Graves. 8
llo. 148; Lenox "·Grant, 8 Mo. 2..'i4;
Taylor 11. Doremus, 16 N. J. 473:
Morris"· Carey, 27 N. J. 377; )laogold"· Thorpe, 3:l N.J. 134; Little e.
Moore, 4 N.J. 74; Hamilton "· Williams, 26 Ala. 527; Walkeu. Halleck,

82 Ind. 239; Deal"· Harris, 8 Md. 40;
Morrison e. llcDonald, 21 Me. 550;
Downing "· Herrick, 47 }[e. 462;
Bailey"· Wiggins, 5 H:ll'r. 402; Reid
"· Ilood, 2 N. & :McCord, 471; Wasson
"· 1tl itchcll, 18 Iowa, 15:3; Lon <Ieg-an
"· Hammer, 30 Iowa, 508; Fuller e.
Gould, 20 Vt 643; Ely fl. Thompson,
8 A. K. :Marsh. 70. In Phelps "· Sill,
1 Duy. 315, it is held th~t an nction
will not lie against a jutl.~e of pro.
bate for neglecting to take security
from the guardian of an infant, although such an infant had perlffinal
estate and the guardian was a bankrupt Thou~h a jutlge mi!oltakf's, it
was s~lid, it is sufficient for him that
he acted judicially. For a remarka.
blc case in which a ju:~tice was held
not responsible. though he seems to
have acted very improperly and in
defiance of law, see Haymond ;,.
Bolles, 11 Cush. 315. The casu of
Stone "· Graves. 8 Mo. 148, was also
one of great apparent misbehaviol'.
There arc dirl,r in some c:lst•s that
a justice is <'ivilly respousihle when
he acts maliciously or corruptly. hut
they are not well founded, and the
express decisions are against them, aa
the authorities above collected abundantly show. It la said in Garfield
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TilE LAW OF TORTS.

it applies not in respect to their judgments merely, but to all

process awarded by them for carrying their judgments into

effect.‘

Nor is this rule of judicial immunity restricted in its protec-

tion to the judges proper, but it extends also to military and

naval oﬁicers in exercising their authority to order courts-martial

for the trial of their interiors, or in putting their inferiors under

arrest preliminary to trial; and no inquiry into their motives in

doing so can be suffered in a civil suit.’ It extends also to grand

and petit jurors in the discharge of their duties as such;' to

assessors upon whom is imposed the duty of valuing property

for the purpose of a levy of ta.\'es;‘ to commissioners appointed

to appraise damages when property is taken under the right of

eminent domain;' to oiiicers empowered to lay out, alter, and

discontinue highways;" to highway oﬂicers in deciding that a

0. Douglass, 22 Ill. 100, that if a jus-

tice corruptly, or from improper mo-

tives, alters his docket, he will be

liable both civilly and criminally;

but such an act would not be judicial,

but purely uuoﬂicial and wrongful.

A justice exercises a judicial dis-

it applies not in respect to their judgments merely, but to all
process awarded by them for carrying their judgments into
effect.•
Nor is this rule of judicial immunity restricted in its protection to the judges proper, but it extends also to military and
naval officers in exercising their authority to order courts-martial
for the trial of their interio1·s, or in putting their inferiors under
arrest preliminary to trial; and no inquiry into their motives in
doing so can be suffered in a civil snit.' It extends also to grand
and I>etit jurors in the discharge of their duties as such; 1 to
aseessors upon whom is imposed the duty of valuing property
for the purpose of a levy of taxes; • to commissioners appointed
to appraise damages when property is taken under the right of
eminent domain; 1 to officers eml'owe1·ed to lay out, alter, and
discontinue highways; • to highway officers in decidiug that a
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cretion in determining to exclude

persons from his court-room while a

trial is in progress. State 0. Copp, 15

N. H. 212.

1 Hammond 0. Howell, 1 Mod. 184;

Dicas 0. Lord Brougham, 6 C. & P.

249. And, see cases cited in last note

generally.

’ Sutton c. Johnstone, 1 T. R 493;

Grcar v. Marshall, 4 Fost. & F. 485;

Dun-kins v. Lord Paulet, L. R. 5 Q. B.

94; S. C. 9 Best & S. 768; Dawkins v.

Lord Rokcby, 4 Fost. & F. 806, where

the subject was largely examined.

Coroners, in holding inquests, are

judges, and are not liable for exclud-

ing persons they think should not be

present. Garnett 1:. Ferrand, 6 B. &

C. (ill.

' Hunter 0. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356.

‘ Weaver 1:. Dr-vendorf, 3 Denio,

117. See Auditor v Atchison, etc.,

R. R. Co., 6 Kan. 500, and a full

discussion of the subject, with cita-

tions of numerous eases, in Cooley on

Taxation, pp. 551 to 557.

' Van Stcenbcrgh 0. Bige‘ow, 8

Wend. 42.

‘Sage 0. Lnurain, 19 Mich. 137.

The case of Turnpike Road 0. (‘hamp-

ncy, 2 N. H. 1n9, is rontra. The action

in that case was forlnying out a high-

way merely for the purpose of ena-

bling passengers to avoid the plain-

titi"s toll-gate. Rrcnmnsoiv, Ch.J.,

snys: " The powers given to selcctmen

by the statutes are to be exercised for

purposes of public and private con-

venience and accommodation, and

when honestly and properly exer-

cised, the statutc will be a sulilcient

warrant for the doings of selectmen.

But if unmiudful of the true objects

of these statutes, sclectmen lay out

public or private ways for purposes

of wrong and injury to individuals,

they are not to be protected by these

"· Douglass, 2-J Ill. tOO, that if a jus.
tice corruptly, or from improper mo.
tives, alters his docket, he will be
liable both civilly and criminally;
but such an act would not be judicial,
but purely unomcial and wron~orful.
A justice exercises a judicial discretion in determining to exclude
persons from his cou1·t-room while a
trial is In progress. State "· Copp, 15

N.H. 212.
1 Hammond "· Bowell, 1 ~lod. 184;
Dicas "· Lord Brougham, 6 C. & P.
249. And, see cases cited in last note
generally.
1 Sutton "· Jobn!ltone, 1 T. R 493;
Grear "· Marshall, 4 Fost. & F. 485;
Dawkins "·Lord Paulet, L. R 5 Q. B.
94; S.C. 9 Best& S. 768; Dnwkinsl'.
Lord Rol\ehy, 4 Fost. & F. 806, where
the subject was largely examined.
Corouers, in holding inq•Jests, are
judges, and are not liable f11r excluding persons they think shoul,l not be
present. Garnett "· Ferrand, 6 B. &

c. 611.

• Hunter , , Mathia, 40 Ind. 856.
• Weaver ,_ Devendorf, 8 Denio,
117. See Auditor " Atchison, etc.,
R. R. Co., 6 Kan. 600, and a full

discussion of the subject, with citations of numerous cases, in Cooley on
Taxation, pp..;:n to 557.
• Va'l Stcenbcrgh "· Bige'ow, S
Wend. 42.
1 Sage "· Lauro.in, 19 ~Iich. 137.
The case of Turnpike Road c. C'hamp.
ney, 2 N. H. l:.u, is ron.tra. The action
in that case was fur laying out a highwny merely for the purpose of enabling pas~cngers to avoid the plalntitf's toll-gate. RtcRA.RDSON, Ch. J.,
snys: "The pow<>rs given to sel!'ctmcn
by the statutes are to be exercised f11r
purposes of public and private convenience and accommodation, and
when honestly nnd properly exer.
clsed, the stKtute will be a snffir.ient
warrant for the doings of st·h·ctmen.
But if unmiullful of the true objects
of these statutes, selectmen lay out
public or private ways for pnrposes
of wrong and injury to individuals,
they are not to be protected by these
statutes, bnt, like other wNng.docrs,
must be held answerable for the damages that flow from their unlawful
acts. There is nothing in the nat:tre
of the powcn conferred in this instance that can protect selectmen from
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person claiming exemption from a road tax is not in fact exempt,‘
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or that one arrested is in default for not having worked out the

assessment;' to members of a township board in deciding upon

the allowance of claims;' to arbitrators,‘ and to the collector of

customs in exercising his authority to sell perishable property,

and in ﬁxing upon the time for notice of sale.‘

But it is an interesting and very important question whether,

in the case of that class of oﬁicers who do not hold courts, but

exercise what may be and often is called power quasi judicial,

like assessors of lands for taxation, the immunity is not after all

only partial and limited by good faith and honest purpose. There

are certainly many cases which hold, and more which assume,

that the law will hold such officers liable if they act maliciously

to the prejudice of individuals.‘

an action. They seem to stand in the

situation of a moderator of a town

meeting, who is unquestionably an-

swerable for maliciously rejecting the

vote of one who has a right to vote.

If the selcctmen should lay out a

road round a turnpike-gate merely

person claiming exemption from a road tax is not in fact exempt/
or that one arrested is in default for not having worked out th~
assessment; • to members. of a township board in deciding upon
the allowance of claims; • to arbitrators,• and to the collector ot'
customs in exercising his authority to sell perishable property,
and in fixing upon the time .for notk-e of sale.•
But it is an interesting and very important question whether,
in the case of that class of offic-ers who do not hnld <.-ourts, but
exercise what may be and often is called power quasi judicial,
like assessors of lands for taxation, the immunity is not after all
only partial and limited by good faith and honest purpose. There
are certainly many cases which hold, and more which assume,
that the law will hold such offiecrs liable if they act maliciously
to the prejudice of individuals.' Thus, it is said that the mem-

for the purpose of enabling travelers
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to evade the payment of toll, it is im-

possible to doubt that an action might

be maintained for the injury. For

the law aﬁords no other remedy for

the injury. On the other hand, should

the public convenience requirearoad

to be laid out [parallel] to a turnpike,

it might, without doubt, be lawfully

done, although it might enable pas-

sengers to evade the payment of toll.

The public convenience and accom-

modation are in no case to be sacri-

ﬁced to the local situation of a turn-

pike gate.

" In this case, the petition, upon

which the defendant acted, stated as

a reason why the road should be laid

out. that the petitioners were griev-

ously burthened with paying toll at

the gate. If for this cause only the

defendants proceeded to lay out the

road, their proceedings were most

manifestly illegal. Such a grievance

Thus, it is said that the mem-

it was not their province to redress.

They had no right to interfere. If

the corporation have abused their

privileges granted by the charter by

erecting a gate at this place, there is,

without doubt, a remedy; but it is

notto be given by the selectmen in

this manner."

1 Harrington v. Commissioners, etc.,

2 M00-ord, 400.

' Freeman v. Cornwall, 10 Johns. 4'70.

' Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228.

‘ Pappa v. Rose, L. R. 7 C. P. 82.

" Gould 0. Hammond, 1 MeAllister,

235. He is not liable, it is said, ex-

cept for acting from corrupt motive.

' See Hoggntt 1:. Bigley, 6 Humph.

236; Baker e. State, 27 lnd. 485;

Chickering v. Robinson. 8 Cush. 543;

Gregory 0. Brooks, 37 Conn. 365;

Wall o. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228; Sea-

man 1:. Patten, 2 Caines, 812; Tomp-

kins e. Sands, 8 Wend. 462; Reed 0.

an action. They seem to stand In the
it was not their province to redress.
situation of a moderator of a town
They had no right to interfere. If
meeting, who is unquestionably an. the corporation have abused their
swerable fur maliciously rejecting the privilegl's gn.nted by the charter by
vote of one who has a right to vote. ' erecting a gate at this place, there is,
If the selectmen should lay out a without dnubt, a rem<:uy; but it is
road round a turnpike-gate merely not to be given by the selectmen in
for the purpose t\f enabling travelers this manner."
1 Harrington "· Commissioners, etc.,
to evade the payment of toll, it is impossible to doubt that an action migM S Mc.>Cord, 400.
be maintained for the injury. For
'Fn·eman "· ComwaiJ,10Johns. 470.
1 Wnll "·Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228.
the law affords no other remedy for
the injury. On the other hand, should
' Pappa "· Rose, L. R. 7 C. P. 82.
• Gould 11. Hummond, 1 McAllister,
the public convenience require a road
to be laid out [parallel] to a turnpike, 235. lie is not liable, it is said, exit might, without doubt, be 11\wfully cept for acting from corrupt motive.
'Bee Hf).!:!gntt 11. Bigley, 6 Humph.
done, although It might enable passengers to evade the payment of toll. 236; Baker "· Htste, 27 Ind. 485;
The public convenience and accom- Chickering "· Robinson, 8 Cush. 543;
modation are in no case to be sacri- Gregory "· Bmoks, 87 Conn. 365;
ficed to the local situation of a tum- Wall c. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228; Sea..
pike gate.
man 11. Patten, 2 Caines, 812; Tomp.
·• In this case, the petition, upon kins c. Bands, 8 Wend. 46'J; Heed 11.
which the defendant acted, stated as Cimwny, 20 Mo. 22; Lilienthal "·
a reason why the road should be ll\id C11mphell, 22 La. Ann. 600. In Harout, that the petlt.ione~ were griev- man 11. Tappenden, 1 East, 5;)5, it is asously bnrthened with paying toll at sumed that an action will lie agRinst
the gate. If for this cause only the officers of corporation if, in disfrandefendants proceeded to lay out the chising members, they act maliciously
road, their proceedings were most or on purp·•sc to deprive the plaintiff
manifesUy illegal. Such a grievance of that particular advantage which
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bers of a school boa may be he responsible thr the dismissal ~

of a teacher, if they act maliciously and with'out cause;‘ and a

county clerk, for willfully and maliciously approving an insuﬁi-

cient appeal bond; ’ and a wharfmaster, for the removal of a ship

from a certain dock, where it can be shown that the order was

given maliciously, and with the purpose to cause injury.‘ It has

of a teacher, if they act maliciously and witliout cause; 1 and a
county clerk, for willfully and maliciously approving an insufficient appeal bond;' and a wharfmaster, for the removal of a ship
from a certain dock, where it can be shown that the order was
given maliciously, and with the purpose to cause injury.' It has
also been assumed that the selectmen of a town mav
.. be held
liable to one tor whom they appoint an overseer as an incompetent person, provided they act from malkoe and without probable
cause.' Also, that members of a court martial may be liable to
parties maliciously convicted by them of delinquency in the performance of military duty.•

also been assumed that the seleetmen of a town may be held

liable to one for whom they appoint an overseer as an incompe-

tent person, provided they act from malice and without probable

it
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is y

cause.‘ Also, that members of

parties maliciously convicted by

formance of military duty.‘

resulted to him from his corporate

character. Some of these cases as-

sume that a justice of the peace is lia-

ble where he acts maliciously; but

the authorities will not justify this

assumption. See Lenox o. Grant, 8

Mo. 254; Stone 1:. Graves, 8 Mo. 148;

Morrison u. McDonald, 21 Me. 550;

Taylor u. Doremus, 16 N. J. 473; Way

0. Townsend, 4 Allen, 114; Bailey -u.

Wiggins. 5 Harr. 462; Little o. Moore,

4 N. J . 74.

‘ Bennett v. Fulmer, 49 Penn. St. 157.

A school committee is not liable for

expelling children from school ifthcy

act in good faith. Donahoe v. Rich-

ards, 38 Me. 379; Stewart 0. Southard,

17 Ohio, 402; Stephenson 0. Hall, 14

Barb. 222. See Spear 0. Cummings,

23 Pick. 224. See Ferriter o. ‘Tyler,

48 Vt. 444; S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 133.

"Billings v. Latferty, 81 Ill. 318.

In Reed 0. Conway, 20 Mo. 22, there

is an important negative pregnant in

the holdnig that a surveyor general

is not liable to an action for revoking

the commission of a deputy surveyor,

annulling a surveying contract. and

refusing to receive and examine the

ﬁeld notes, where, without malice. and

in good faith, he exercises his judg-

ment.

' Gregory o. Brooks, 3'1 Conn. 365.

See Brown 0. Lester, 21 Miss. 392.

a court martial may he liable to

them of delinquency in the per-

Also, Wasson 0. Mitchell, 18 Iowa,

153 (case of supervisors); Walker o.

Halleck. 32 llJtl.239(lI1L'llll)0l‘S of com-

mon council); Culver v. Avery, 7

W'end. 380 (loan otﬁcer); Downing 0.

McFadden, 18 Penn. St. 334 (canal

commissioner); Gregory v. Brown, 4

resulted to him from hie corporate Also, Wnsson e. Mlt<'hell, 18 lows,'
character. Some of these cases as- 153 (cue of supervisors); Waiker e.
sume that a justice of the peace is Iia. Halleck, 32 Inu. 23D (members of comble where he acts maliciously; but mon council); Culver "· Avery, 7
the authorities will not justify this Wend. 380 (loan omcer); Downing •·
assumption. See Lenox "· Grant, 8 McF11.dden, 18 P~nn. St. 334 (canal
Mo. 2M; Stone "· Graves, 8 Mo. 148; commissioner); Gregory o. Brown, 4
Morrison D. McDonald, 21 Me. MO; • Bibb, 28 (justice of the peace).
Taylon. Doremus, 16 N.J. 473; Way
'Pnrmalee "·Baldwin, 1 Conn. 313.
• Shoemaker"· Nesbit. 2 Rawle, 201;
•· Townsend, 4 Allen, 114; Bailey"·
Wiggins, 5 Barr. 462; Littlu.lloore, Macon"· Cook, 2 N. & McCord, 879.
This seems to be going a great way.
4 N.J. 74.
1 Bcnnettt1. Fulmer,49 Penn. St.1~7.
but certainly no further than the case
A. school committee is not liable for of Stewart u. Cooley, 23 Minn. 347; B.
expelling children from school ifthey C. 23 Am. Rep. 690. The action in that
act in good faith. Donahoe tl. Rich- case wu against the judge of a muards, 88 Me. 379; Stewart o. Southard, nicipal court and others, charging
17 Ohio, 402; Stephenson "·Hall, 14 that they conspired to institute a ma.
Barb. 222. See Spear tl. Cummings, licious prosecution against the plain.
2S Pick. 224. See Ferriter "·Tyler, tiff, and that one of the l.lefcndanla
made complaint against the plaintiff
48 Yt. 444; S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 183.
' Hillings "· Lafferty, 81 Ill. 818. for perjwy. upon which the judge
In Heed 11. Conway, 20 Mo. 22, there and clerk issued a warrant for his
is an important negative pregnant in IU'I'CSt, which was served, and the
the boldnig that a surveyor general plaintiff brought into court for exis not liable to an action for revoking amination, whereupon be was distho commission of a deputy surveyor, charged for the failure of the comannulling a surveying contract. and plainant to appear. This complaint
refusing to receive and examine the was held to set forth a good cause of
field notes, where, without malice. and action. The wrongful act on tbe
in good faith, he exercises his judg- part of the judge here must have conment.
sisted in the issuing of process; and
1 Gregory t~. Brooks, 8'7 Conn. 865.
as to that he could have bad no disSee Brown e. Lester, 21 Miss. 392. cretion if the complaint waa eotll-
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In respect to these last eases, though they seem out of har-
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mony with the general rule above laid do\vn, and the reasons on

which it rests, yet we may perhaps, safely concede that there are

various duties lying along the borders between those of a minis-

terial and those of a judicial nature, which are usually intrusted

to inferior oﬁicers, and in the performance of which it is highly

important that they be kept as closely as possible within strict

rules. If courts lean against recognizing in them full discre-

tionary powers, and hold them strictly within the limits of good

faith, it is probably a leaning that, in most cases, will be found

to harmonize with public policy.‘

Wlietlier oﬁicers having charge of elections, and of the pre--

liminary registration and other proceedings, should be shielded

by the same immunity that protects judicial oflieers in general,

is adisputed question. In the leading case of As/iby v. ll’/rite,’

the returning otlicer who refused to admit a qualiﬁed elector to

vote was held liable in damages at his suit.‘ This ruling was

followed in Massachusetts at an early day, Chief Justice 1’.uu<r-:1:

setting forth the reasons with great clearness and cogency:

“ The selectmen of a town,” he says, “ cannot be proceeded against

criminally for depriving a citizen of his vote, unless their con-

duct is the effect of corruption or some wicked and base motive.
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If, then, a civil action does not lie against them, the party is

deprived of his franchise Without any relief, and has no way of

establishing his right to any future suffrage. Thus a man may

be prevented for his life from exercising a constitutional privi-

lege, by the incapacity or inattention of those who are appointed

to regulate elections. The decision of the seleetmen is necessarily

ﬁnal and conclusive as to the existing election. No means are

cient. or if he hnd, it was ajudicial cases. and the election oﬂl:-(H is now

discretion, and to hold him liable by

charging some bad motive lying back

of it seems to come directly within

the condemnation of Bradley v.

Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, above referred

to.

' See Pike 0. Megoun, 44 Mo. 491.

' Lil Rriym 9335; 1 Salk. 19; IS State

Trials, 8!). Compare Drew v. Coul-

ton, 1 East, 568. note.

' It is proper to say that this de-

cision has been qualiﬁed by later

In respect to' these last cases, though . they seem out of harmony with the general rule above laid down, and tho reasons on
whi<·h it rests, yet we may perhaps, safely concede that there are
various duties lying along the borders between those of a ministerial and those of a judicial nature, which are usually intrut~tcd
to inferior officers, and in the performance of which it is highly
important that they be kept as c:osely as possible within strict
rules. If courts lean against recognizing in them full discretionary powers, and hold them strictly within the limits of good
faith, it is probably a leaning that, in most cases, will be found
to harmonize with public policy.1
Whether officers hav-ing charge of elections, and of the JH'&·
lirninary registration and other proceedings, should be shielded
by tl1e same immunity that pa·otccts judicial ofti<:ers in !,'"CnE.'ral,
is a disputed question. In the leading case of .A1Jhhy v. lVhite,s
the returning officer who refused to admit a qualitiml elector to
vote was held liable in damages at his suit.• This ruling was
followed in Massachusetts at an early day, Chief Justice PARKER
setting forth tho reasons with great clearness and cogency:
"The selectmen of a town," he says, "cannot be proceeded against
criminally for depriving a citizen of his ~ote, unless their conduct is the effect of corruption or ~owe wicked and base motive.
If, then, a civil action does not lie against them, the party is
deprh·ed of his franchise without any relief, and has no way of
establishing his right to any future suffrage. Tim:; a mnn may
be prevent<.'<.~ for his life from exereising a constitutionalJ'rivilcge, by the incapacity or inattention of those who are appointed
to regulate election$. The decision of the se]e('tmen is na't·ssarily
final and conclusive as to the exi,;ting election. No means are

held not llnblc for an erroneous rc-

jeetion of a vote, provided he acted

b0Iur_/ide. See Cullen 1:. Morris, 2

Stark. 577. The same rule applied to

a church warden as oﬂicer of a pur-

ish election. Tozer 0. Child, 6 El. &

Bl. 289; S. C. in Exchequer (‘ham-

bcr, 7 El. & Bl. 377. 23", where the

question is made whether Lord Hour

did not ins'st on mmice as essential

to the action.

clent, or If be b11d, it was a judicial
discretion, and to hold him liable by
charging some bad motive lying back
of it seems to come directly within
tbe condt>mnatlon of Bradley "·
Fisher, 13 Wall. saJ, above referre<l
to.
• Sec Pike e. )legoun, 44 ~lo. 491.
' Ld R:,ym 98j; 1 Salk. 19; ~ 8tnte
Trials, 8U. Coinpare Drew e. Coulton, 1 Eas~ 363, note.
a It is proper to say that this d~
clalon has been quallfted by later

and tht> t>lcctlon offi('(' • is now
held not liable for an t·rront>ous re.
jt'ction or a vote, providt>U he acted
bQita fidt. See Cullen e. ::\lnrris, 9
Stnrk. 3H. The 81\mc rule applied to
a church warden as offir.cr of a parish election. T•,zcr e. Child, 6 El. &
Dl. ~0; 8. C. in Exl'ht>qncr ('bamher, 7 El. & Bl. Sii, 3 q, where the
question is made whether Lonl llOLT
did not lns"st on m~ttice as essential
to the actioD.

emit'S,
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known by which the rejected vote may be counted by any other
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tribunal, so as to have its inﬂuence upon the election; or, at least,

no practice of that kind has ever been adopted in this State.

There is, therefore, not only an injury to the individual, but to

the whole community, the theory of our government requiring

that each elective oﬁicer shall be appointed by the majority of

votes of all the qualiﬁed citizens who choose to exercise their

privilege. Now if a party duly qualiﬁed is unjustly prevented

from voting, and yet can maintain no action for so important an

injury, unless he is able to prove an ill design in those who

obstruct him, he is entirely shut out from a judicial investigation

of his right; and succeeding injuries may be founded on one

originally committed by mistake. He may thus be perpetually

excluded from the common privilege of citizens, without any

lawful means of asserting his rights and restoring himself to the

rank of an active citizen. Such a doctrine would be inconsistent

with the principles and provisions of our free constitution, and

must give way to the necessity of maintaining the peoplein their

rights, secured to them by the form of their government.” ‘

It will be seen from the foregoing that the learned judge plants

his conclusion on the ground of State necessity and the preserva-

tion of free institutions. Our institutions rest upon the ballot,
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and must be preserved by protecting the liberty of casting it.

If any oﬁicer denies or obstructs this liberty, he takes away a

privilege valuable to the possessor and necessary to the country,

and if he does this by mistake, and not of malice, the conse-

quences should nevertheless fall upon him. The same rule has

been laid down in Ohio.’

In other States this doctrine is denied, and inspectors of elec-

tion are put upon the footing of quasi judicial officers, and are

protected when they act within the limits of good faith, but are

made to respond in damages when they maliciously deny the

voter’s right. Says BARTOL, Ch. J ., referring to the Massachu-

setts and Ohio decisions: “The decisions in those States rest upon

I Lincoln 0. Hapgood,11 Mass. 350, Keith 0. Howard, 24 Pick. 292;

355. See, also, Gardner 1:. Ward, 2 Blanchard 0'. Slearns, 5 Met. 298.

Mass. 244, note; Kilham 0. Ward, 2 ‘Jeffries 0. Ankcuy, 11 Ohio. 372;

Mass. 236; Henshaw 0. F- stcr, 9 Pick. Anderson v. Millikcn, 9 Ohio, (N. s.)

312; Capen 0. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; 568; Monroe 0. Collins, 17 Ohio, (N.

s.) 665.

known by which the rejected vote may be counted by any other
tribunal, so a.s to have its influence upon the election; or, at least,
no practice of that kind has ever been adopted in this State.
There is, therefore, not only an injury to the individual, but to
the whole community, the theory of our government requiring
that each elective officer shall be appointed by the m~jority of
votes of aU the qualified citizens who choose to exercise their
privilege. Now if a party duly qualified is unjustly prevented
from voting, and yet can maintain no action for so important an
injury, unless he is able to prove an ill design in those who
obstruct him, he is entirely shut out from a judicial investigation
of his right; and succeeding injuries may be founded on one
originally committed by mistake. He may thus be perpetually
excluded from the common privilege of citizens, without any
lawful means of asserting his rights and restoring himself to the
rank of an active citizen. Such a doctrine would be inconsistent
with the principles and provisions of our free constitution, and
must give way to the necessity of maintaining the people in their
rights, secured to them by the form of their government." 1
It will be seen from the foregoing that the learned judge plants
his conclusio~ on the ground of State nece~>sity and the preservation of free institutions. Our institutions rest upon the ballot,
and must be presen·ed by protecting the liberty uf casting it.
If any officer denies or obstl'llcts this liberty, he takes away a
privilege valuable to the possessor and necessary to the country,
and if' he does this by mistake, and not of malice, the consequences should nevertheless fall upon him. The same rule has
been laid down in Ohio.'
In other States this doctrine is denied, and inspectors of election are put upon the footing of quasi judicial officers, and are
protected when they act within the limits of good faith, but are
made to respond in damages when they maliciously deny the
voter's right. Says BARTOL, Ch. J., refcrt•ing to the Massachu'l!eUs and Ohio decisions: "The decisions in those States rest upon
t Lincoln "· Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350,
855. See, also, Gardner "· Ward, 2
Mass. 244, note; Kilham "· Ward, 2
Mass. 286; Henshaw"· F·•ster, 9 Pick.
812; Capen .,, Foster, 12 Pick. 485;

Keith "· Howard, 24 Pick. 292;
Stearns, 5 Mel 298.
• Jt:ffries "·Ankeny, 11 Ohio, 872;
Anderson "· Milliken, 9 Ohio, (N. s.)
568; Monroe"· Collins, 17 Ohio, (N.
8.) 66:;.

·Blanchard"~
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the principle that a party who, liire the plaintiff, has been
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deprived of a right, is thereby injured, and must have a remedy.

It seems to us that the error in the application of that principle

to this case consists in a misapplication of what is the right of a

citizen under our election laws. In one sense, if he is a legal

voter, he has the right to vote, and is injured if deprived of it;

but the law has appointed a means whereby his right to vote is

decided, and for that purpose has provided judges to determine

that question, and has also provided the most careful guarantees

for a proper discharge of their duties by the judges, by the mode

of their selection and their oaths of ofﬁce. In all govern-

ments power and trust must be reposcd somewhere; all that can

be done is to deﬁne its limits, and provide means for its proper

exercise. \Vhen the act in question is that of a judicial oilicer,

all that the law can secure is that they shall not with impunity

do wrong willfully, fraudulently, or corruptly. If they do so

act, they are liable both civilly and criminally; but for an error

of judgment, they are not liable either civilly or criminally. If

the citizen has had a fair and honest exercise of judgment by a

judicial oﬁicer in his case, it is all the law entitles him to, and

although the judgment may be erroneous, and the party injured,

it is damnum absque injuria, for which no action lies.”‘ Like
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reasoning has led to the same conclusion in other States.‘ And

the principle applies as well to the oiﬁcers who have charge of

the registration of voters preliminary to an election as to the

judges or inspectors who receive the ballots.‘

‘ Bevard 0. Hoﬂ'mau, 18 Md. 479, Doug. (Mich) 411. New Ilampxhire:

482. And, see Elbin 0. Wilson, 38

Md. 135; Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md.

531; Friend 0. Hamill, 84 Md. 298.

‘New York: Jenkins 0. Waldron,

11 Johns. 114; Goetchcus 1:. Matthew-

son,(i1 N. Y. 420 (where l)wmn'r. com-

missioner, examines the subject with

fullness and ability). Pennsylmm'u.'

Weckerly 2». Geyer, 11'S. & R. 35.

I1'vnrm~ky.' Caulﬂeld 0. Bullock, 18 B.

Mon. 495; Morgan v. Dudley, 18 B.

the principle that a party who, like the plaintiff, has heen
deprived of a right, is thereby injnred, and mnst have a remedy.
It seems to us that the error in the application of that principle
to this case consists in a misapplication of what is the right of a
citizen under our election laws. In one sense, if he is a legal
voter, he bas the right to vote, and is injured if deprived of it;
but the law has appointed a means whereby his right to vote is
decided, and for that pnrpose has provided judges to determine
that question, and has also provided the mofilt careful guarantees
for a proper discharge of their duties by the judges, by the motle
of their selection and their oaths of office. In all governments power and trnst must be reposed somewhere; all that can
be done is to define its limits, and pro,•ide means for its proper
exercise. Wben the act in question is that of a judicial officer,
all that the law can secnre is that they shall not with impunity
do wrong wil(fully, fraudnlently, or <..'Orruptly. If they do so
act, they are liable both civilly and criminally; but for an error
of judgment, they are not liable either civilly or criminally. If
the citizen has had a fair and honest exercise ·of judgment by a
judidal officer in his ease, it is all the law entitles him to, and
although the judgment may be erroneous, and the party injured,
it is damnum absque injuria, for whic~h no action lies." • Like
reasoning has led to the same conclusion in other States.~ And
the prinei ple applies R8 well to the officers who have charge of
the registration of voters preliminary to an election as to the
judges or inspectors who receive the ballots.•

Mon. 693; Chrisman 1:. Bruce, 1 Duv.

63; Miller 0. Rucker, 1 Bush, 1&5.

Indiana: Carter o. Harrison, 5 Blackf.

138. Michigan.‘ Gordon v. Farrar, 2

Wheeler 0. Patterson. 1 N. H. 88;

Turnpike Co. v. Champney, 2 N. H.

199. North Carolina: Peavey v. Rob-

bins, 3J ones, 839. Tcmuaiu-e: Rail 0.

Potts. 8 Humph. 225. lVvat Vi;-g4'm'a.'

Fausler o. Parsons. 6 W. Va. 456; S.

C. 20 Am. Rep. 431. Delaware.‘ State

v. McDonald.-i Hart. 555; State o.

Porter, 4 Harr. 556. Louiuhna:

Dwight 1:. Rice, 5 La. Ann. 580; Bridge

0. Oakey, 2 La. Ann. 968; Patterson

0. D’Auterive, 6 La. Ann. 41:7.

-‘ Fausler 1:. Parsons, 6 W. Va. 486;

Pike r. Magoun, 44 Mo. 492. If reg-

istration oﬂicers refuse to register a

1 Bevard e. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479,
482. And, see Elbln e. Wilson, 83
Md. 18.'S; Ande~n e. Baker, 23 Md.
G31; Friend e. Hamill, 84 }I d. 298.
'Nno Yurlc: Jenkins e. Waldron,
11 Johns. 114.; G()('tcbeus e. Matthewson, 61 N.Y. 420 (where DwmnT, commissioner, eJ:aminea Ute subject witb
fullness and ability). P~nn.ylurnia:
Weckerly '!'. Geyer, 11' B. & R. 35.
Ktnturky: Caulfield e. Bullock, 18 H.
Mon. 493; Morgan e. Dudley, 18 B.
lion. 003; Chrisman e. Br-uce, 1 Duv.
68; Killer e. Rucker, 1 Bush, 18/i.
Indiana: Carter e. Harrison, GB!ackf.
188. JlicAigan: Gordon •· Farrar, 2

Doug. (Mich.) 411. NnJJ HampRMrt:
Wheeler e. Patterson, 1 N. H. HH;
Turnpike c.,. t!. Champn«.>y, 2 N. H .
199. Nqrf.h Carolina: Pellvey "·Robbina,8Jones,839. Ttllllt3-rt: Ruile.
Potts. 8 Humph. 29..:>. W,•,tt Virginia:
Fausler e. Pn•·sons. 6 W.Va. 4t;6; 8.
C. 20 Am. Rep. 431. Ihlarcan: State
"· McDonald, 4. Harr. 555; State .,.
Porter, 4 Harr. M6. lhui•iano.:
Dwighh. Rice, U.a.Ann. 580; Bridge
e. Oakey, 2 LL Ann. 968; Patterson
• · D'Auterive, 6 La. Ann. 467.
3 Fausler r. P&niOns, 6 W.Va. -'86;
Pike r. Magoun, 44 Mo. 492. If reg.
tetration officers refuse to register a
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In some States it has been deemed wise to make the voter
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himself the conclusive judge of his right to vote. If his right

is questioned, an oath which embraces the several requisites of

qualiﬁcation is tendered to him, and if he will take this, and

thus give evidence that he answers all the conditions, he must be

registered for voting— if registration is required — and his ballot

must be received when offered. This legislation assumes that

the course marked out by it is safer and less liable to abuses than

leaving the decision to any tribunal. The oath is taken with the

penalties of perjury in view, and these penalties are thought to

be a. better protection to the privilege of suffrage than any eon-

clusion of judges or inspectors, whose means of information

must often be defective, and who may not only act under honest

mistakes, but also, when called upon to act in the excitement of

an election which calls up and intensiﬁes the party passions, be

inﬂuenced by partisan or other improper feelings or prejudices.

Whenever the law thus makes a man the ﬁnal judge of his own

right, the election oﬂicers have only a ministerial duty to per-

form; they must receive the vote if the oath is taken, and they

are responsible as in other cases of ministerial duties if they

refuse.‘

Jurisdiction Essential. Every judicial oﬁicer, whether the

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:42 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

grade be high or low, must take care, before acting, to inform

himself whether the circumstances justify his exercise of the

judicial function. A judge is not such at all times and for all

voter, but afterwards, and before the

election reconsider their action, and

place his name on the list, so that he

may vote if he shall present himself

at the polls, which he fails to do, they

are notliable. Bacon 0. Benchley 2

In some States it has been deemed wise to make tho voter
himself the conclusive judge of his right to vote. If his right
is questioned, au oath which embraces the several requisites of
qualification is tendered to him, and if be will take this, and
thus give evidence that he answers all the conditions, he must be
registered for voting- if registration is required- and his ballot
J_DUBt be received when offered. This legislation assumes that
the course marked out by it is safer and less liable to abuses than
leaving the decision to any tribunal. The oath is taken with the
penalties of perjury in view, and these penalties are thought to
be a better protection to the pri viJege of suffrage than any conclusion of judges or inspectors, whose means of information
must often be detective, and who may not only act under honest
mistakes, but also, when called upon to act in the excitement of
an election which calls up and intensifies the party passions, be
inflneneed by partisan or other improper feelings or prejudices.
Whenever the law thus makes a man the final judge of his own
right, the election officers have only a ministerial duty to perform; they rnnst receive the vote if the oath is taken, and they
are responsible as in other cases of ministerial duties if they
refuse.'

Cush. 100.

Judges of election are not liable if,

in good faith, they reject the vote of

one who is an elector in fact, but

whose actions at the time of present-

ing his ballot, led them to believe he

was not. Humphrey e. Kingman, 5

Jurisdiction Baaentlal. Every judicial ofBeer, whether the
grade be high or low, must take care, before acting, to inform
himself whether the circumstances justify his exercise of the
judicial function. A judge is not snch at all times and for all

Met. 162. Bee Gates 1;. Neal, 23 Pick.

308.

For the evidence receivable to show

improper motives in the election oili-

cers in rejecting votes, see Elbin e.

Wilson, 33 Md. 135; Friend 0. Ha-

mill, 34 Md. 298.

Where one’s right to vote depends

upon payment of a tax, an assessor is

not liable to one upon whom he fails

to assess a tax, unless it be shown that

the omission was willful and mali-

cious. Griilin v. Rising, 11 Met. 339.

' Sec Spragins 0. Houghton, 3 Ill.

377; State iv. Robb, 17 Ind. 536; Gil-

lespie 0. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544; People

1:. Pease, 30 Barb. 588; Chrisman 11.

Bruce, 1 Duv. 63; People 0. Gordon,

5 Cal. 235.

voter, but afterwards, and before the
election reconsider their action, and .
place his name on the liat, so that he
may vote if he shall present himself
at the polls, which he fails to do, they
are not liable. Bacon •· Benchley J
Cush. 100.
Judges o( election are not liable it,
in good faith, they r<>ject the vote of
one who is an elector in fact, but
whose fiCtions at the time of prescu~
ing his ballot, led them to believe he
was not. Humphrey e. Kingman, G
llet. 162. Bee Gates e. N eu.l, 2S Pick.
808.

For the evidence receivable to show

improper motives in the- election om.
cers in rejecting votes, see Elbin e.
Wilson, 33 )(d. 185; Friend e. Ha.
mill, 34 ~td. 298.
Where one's right to vote depends
upon payment of a tax, an assessor is
not liable to one upon whom he fails
to a•sc,.s a tax, unless it be shown that
the omis~;ion was willful and malicious. Griffin e. Rising, 11 Met. 389.
1 See Spragins e. Houghton, 8 Ill.
877; State"'· Robb, 17 Ind. l53tl; Gillespie"· Palmer, 20 Wis. M4; People
e. PeasP, 30 Barb. 1>88; Chrisman e.
Bruce, 1 Duv. 68; People e. Gordon,
5 Cal. 236.
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purposes: when he acts he must be clothed with jurisdiction;
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and acting without this, he is but the individual falsely assuming

an authority he does not possess. The oﬁicer is judge in the

cases in which the law has empowered him to act, and in respect

to persons lawfully brought before him; but he is not judge

when he assumes to decide cases of a class which the law with-

holds from his cognizance, or cases between persons who are not,

either actually or constructively, before him for the purpose.

Neither is he exercising the judicial function when, being em-

powered to enter one judgment or make one order, he enters or

makes one wholly different in nature. When he does this he

steps over the boundary of his judicial authority, and is as much

out of the protection of the law in respect to the particular act

as if he held no oﬂice at all. This is a general rule.‘

Jurisdiction in a judge may be deﬁned as the authority of law

to act oﬂicially in the matter then in hand. One set of facts

under the law confers it in the case of the assessor of taxes, and

another set of facts confers it in the case of the commissioner of

highways or the sewer commissioner. Most of the oﬂicers who

exercise an inferior authority have no jurisdiction at all until cer-

tain preliminary action lias been taken which is particularly

pointed out by statute; and neither in their case nor in the case

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:42 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of the inferior courts will any inteudment of law be made in

favor of jurisdiction when their action is called in question, but

they must show by their written records that the circumstances

existed which authorized them to act.’ In favor of the action of

the superior courts, however, to which vast interests and general

powers are conﬁded, it will be intended that they have acted with

full jurisdiction, and that they have assumed to do nothing that

the law does not sanction.’

‘Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Co.

68; Groenvelt o. Burwell, 1 Ld. Rayin.

454; Yates 0. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282;

Phelps u. Sill, 1 Day, 315; Palmer 0.

Carroll, 24 N. H. 314; Rowe 11. Addi-

son, 34 N. H. 306; Craig e. Burnett,

32 Ala. 728; Clarke 0. May, 2 Gray,

410; Piper 0. Pearson, 2 Gray, 120;

State o. Nerland, 7 B. C. (11. s.) 241.

‘The rule for jurisdiction is that

nothing shall be intended to be out

of the jurisdiction of a superior

court but that which specially ap-

purposes: when he acts he must be clothed with jurisdiction;
and acting without this, he is but the individnal falsely assuming
an authority he does not po~:~sess. The officer is judge in the
, cases in which the law has empowered him to act, and in respect
to persons lawfully brought before him; but he is not judge
when he assumes to decide cases of a class which the law withholds from his cogniznnce, or cases between persons who are not,
either actually or constructively, betore him for the purpose.
Neither is he exercising the judicial function when, being empowered to enter one judgment or make one order, he enters or
makes one wholly different in nature. When he does this he
stept~ over the boundary of his judicial authority, and is as mnch
out of the protection of the law in respect to the particular act
as it' he held no office a\ all. This is a general rule.•
Jurisdiction in a judge may be defined as the authority of law
to act officially in the matter then in hand. One set of facts
under the law confers it in the case of the assessor of taxes, and
another set of facts confers it in the ease of the commissioner of
highways or the sewer eommissioner. Most of the officers who
exercise an inferior authority have no jurisdiction at all nntil certain preliminary action has been taken which is particularly
pointed out by statute; and neither in their case nor in the case
of the inferior courts will any intendment of law be made in
favor ot' jurisdiction when their action is called in question, but
they must show by their written records that the circumstances
existed which authorized them to act.• In favor of the action of
the superior courts, however, to which vast interes*s and general
powers are confided, it will be intended that they have acted with
full jurisdiction, and that they have assumed to do nothing that
the law does not sanction.•

pears to be so, while nothing shall be

intended to be within the jurisdiction

of an inferior court but that which is

specially so alleged. 1 S.1und. ‘T4.

And, see The Brewers’ Case, 1 Roll.

Rep. 184; Parsons 0. Loyd, 8 Wils.

841.

““'I‘he chief distinction between

judgments pronounced by courts of

27

1 Case of the H&r8balsea, 10 Co.
68; Groenvelt •· Burwell,1 Ld. Ra:·m.
~(; Yates"· Lansing, IS Johns. 282;
Phelps e. 8111, 1 Day, 31~; Palmer e.
Carroll, 94 N.H. 814; Rowe "· Addison, 84 N. H. 806; Craig "· Burnett,
32 Ala. 728; Clarke e. May, 9 Gray,
•to; Piper "· Peanon, 2 Gray, 120;
State e. Nerland, 7 8. C. (If. s.) 241.
• The role for Jurisdiction is that
no&hing aball be lntended to be out

27

of the jurisdiction of a superior
court but that which specially appears to be so, while nothing shall be
intended to be within the jurisdiction
or an inferior court but that which fa
specially so alleged. 1 B.mod. 74.
And, see The Brewers' Cue, 1 Roll.
Rep. 184; Parsona "· Loyd, 8 Wlla.
341.
1 "The chief distinction between

Judgments pronounced b7 coul18 of
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When it is said that the jurisdiction of an inferior court must
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appear, what is meant is, that it must appear by the record itself;

it cannot be supplied by intendment, or rest in the mere knowl-

edge of witnesses to be brought out when the authority is ques-

tioned. Therefore, a warrant of commitment which does not in

its recitals show authority in the magistrate to issue it cannot be

upheld.‘ Neither can a warrant issued by a magistrate for a

seizure of goods, in which the same inﬁrmity is manifest.‘ Nor

a justice’s commitment of a witness for contempt, issued after

record and those pronounced by

courts not of record, arises from the

presumption of law that the former

courts act within their jurisdiction,

while,so far as jurisdiction is con-

Wlten it is said that the jurisdiction of an inferior court most
appear, what is meant is, that it must appear by the record itself;
it cannot be supplied by intendment, or rest in the mere knowledge of witnesses to be brought out when the authority is questioned. Therefore, a warrant of commitment which does not in
its recitals show authority in the magistrate to issue it cannot be
upheld. 1 Neither can a warrant issued by a magistrate tor a
seizure of goods, in which the same infirmity is manifest.1 Nor
a justice's commitment of a witness for contempt, issued after

cerned, no presumption is indulged

in favor of the latter. Whoever relies

upon the judgment of a court of spe-

cialjurisdiction must establish every

fact necessary to confer jurisdiction

upon the court. The proceedingsof all

courts not of record must be shown

to be within the powers granted to
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them by law, or such proceedings

will be entirely disregarded. The

acts of these two classes of couris

have been properly likened to the

acts of general agents and the acts of

special agents. The former are to be

regarded as valid in all cases tothe

extent that all persons relying upon

them need show nothing beyond the

general grant of authority; while the

latter, to be binding, must ﬁrst be

shown to fall within the limits of a

special or restricted grant. Clark v.

Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 390; Sears 0.

Terry, 26 Conn. 273; Shufeldt o. Buck-

ley, 45 Ill. 223; Stanton 1:. Styles, 5

Exch. 578; Gray 0. McNeal, 12 Geo.

424; Harrington 0. People, 6 Barb.

607; Taylor 0. Bruscup, 27 Md. 219;

0. & M. R. R. Co. v. Shullz, 31 Ind.

150; Thompson u. Multnomah Co, 2

Or. 34. There is a further distinction

in regard to the proceedings of these

two classes of courts, arising from the

fact that courts of special jurisdiction

have no record. and therefore no un-

impeachable memorial of theirtrans-

actions. - Any statement in relation to

jurisdiction found among the papers,

minutes. or other written matter kept

by these courts, seems to be but prima

fade evidence ; in opposition to

which it may be shown by any satis-

factory means of proof that the au-

thority of the court did not extend

over the matter in controversy, nor

over the parties to the suit." Free-

man on Judgments, § 517, citing

many cases.

It has been held. however, that this

rule does not go so far as to permit

the contradiction, in actions against a

justice, of the returns of oﬁlcers of

the service of process by them by

means of which suits were instituted;

Lightsey 0. Harris, 20 Ala. 409; nor

the recital of a justice in his docket

record and thoae pronounced by
courts not of record, arises from the
presumption of law that the former
courts act within their jurisdiction,
while, so far as jurisdiction Is concerned, no presumption is indulged
, in favor of the latter. WhoevPr reliea
upon the judgment of a court of special jurisdiction must establish every
fact necessary to confer jurisdiction
upon the court. 111e proceedings of all
courts not of record must be shown
to be within the powers granted to
them by law, or such proceedings
will be entirely disregarded. The
acts of these two classes of courts
have been properly likened to the
acts of general agents and the nets of
special agents. The former are to be
regarded as '1"&1 id in all cases to the
extent that all persons relying upon
them need show nothing beyond the
genPral grant of authority; while the
latter, to be binding, must first be
shown to fall within the limits of a
special or r<1stricted grant. Clark 1).
Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 890; Sears11.
Terry, 26 Conn. 273; Shufeldt 11. Buckley, 46 Ill. 223; Stanton 11. Styles, li
Exch. 578; Gray "· McNeal, 12 Gco.
424; Harrington "· People, 6 Barb.
607; Taylor "· Bruscup, 27 1\ld. 219;
0. & M. R. R. Co. "· Shultz, 31 Ind.
150; Thompson v. Multnomah Co, 2
Or. 34. There is a further distinction
ln regard to the proceedings of the~

two classes of courts, arising from the
fact that courts of special jurisdi<'tion
have no record. and therefore no unimpc:~chable memorial of their trans.
actions .• Any statement in relation to
jurisdiction fount.l among the papers,
minutes. or other written matter kept
by these courts, seems to be but primn
fade evidence ; in opposition to
which it may be shown by any satisfactory means of proof tht't the authority of the court did not extend
over the matter in controveJ"Sy, nor
over the parties to the suit." Freeman on Judgments, ~ 517, citing
mtmy cases.
It bas been held. howe\'cr, that this
rule dc.es not go so far ns to permit
the contrnd ic-tion, in RCtions agninst a
justice, of the returns of officers of
the service of process by them by
means of which suits were instituted;
LightMey 1). Harris, 20 Ala. 40!1: nor
the recital of a justice in his docket
that the parties appeared and went to
trial b~forc him. Facey "· Fuller, 13
:Mich. 527. See Gray "· Cookson, 16
Etst, 13. Not even on a charge that the
record wns made up falsely and corruptly can the record of the justice
be impeached in a suit agains' him.
Kelly tl. Dresser, 11 Allen, 31.
1 Wicke~ 11. Clotterbuck, 2 Bing. 483.
Bee Hill "· Prillc, 4 Call, 107.
1 Newman 11. Earl of Hardwicke, 8
A. & E.123.
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the case in which he was called had been disposed of.‘ But where
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the facts alleged before a. magistrate are suﬁicient to give him

jurisdiction, and he proceeds upon them to judgment and execu-

tion, his right to exemption from liability cannot be affected by

the truth or falsity of those facts, or the suﬁiciency or insuﬁ'i-

ciency of the evidence adduced for the purpose of establishing

them.’

In the ease of some oﬁicers the jurisdiction does not and cannot

depend upon record. Thus, the jurisdiction of an assessor to

impose a personal tax may depend npon the fact of residence, of

which no record exists;_ and, therefore, the fact must always rest

in the knowledge of witnesses. But where an ofﬁcer is to pro-

ceed upon evidence in writing, and the statute points out what

this evidence shall be, it intends that it shall be found of record

in the proper oﬂice, and not that important public matters shall

be left to uncertain parol testimony.’

It is universally conceded that when inferior courts or judicial

ofﬁcers act without jurisdiction the law can give them no protec-

tion whatever. Recently, however, the rule has been held to be

otherwise in the case of judges of the superior courts where the

error consisted in exceeding their authority. The particular case

was one in which the judge, sitting in one court, ordered the
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name of an attorney to be stricken from the rolls for a contempt

of authority committed in another court, of which the judge was

also a member. It was held by the Federal Supreme Court that he

was not responsible in a civil action for this error.‘ Hail it been

ajustice of the peace who had committed a like error, an action

would have been supported, however honest might have been his

' Clark 0. May, 2 Gray, 410. In

Louisiana it has been decided‘ that a

justice empowered to issue a warrant

on proofs being made, though he is-

sues one without proofs, is not liable;

this being only an error in judgment.

Maguire iv. Hughes, 13 Lu. Ann. 281.

But quere of this. In Ackerley o. Pur-

kinson, 3 M. ti: S. 411, it is held that

if a judicial oﬂicer has jurisdiction

of the subject-matter, he is not liable

for proceeding upon acitation, though

the citation is void.

the case in which he was called had been disposed of.• But where
the facts alleged before a magistrate are sufficient to give him
jurisdiction, and he proceeds upon them to judgment and execution, his right to exemption from liability cannot Pc affected by
the truth or falsity of those facts, or the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence adduced for the purpose of establishing
them.'
In the ease of some officers the jurisdiction does not and cannot
depend upon record. Thus, tbe jurisdiction of an &l'scsso•· to
impose a personal tax may depend upon the fact of residence, of
which no record exists~ and, therefore, the fact most always rest
in the knowledge of witnesses. But where an officer is to proceed upon evidence in writing, and the statute points out whnt
this evidence shall be, it intends that it shall be found of record
in the proper office, and not that imp01·tant public matters shall
be left to uncertain parol testimony. •
It is universally conceded that when inferior courts or judicial
offi<:ers act without jurisdiction the law can give them no protection whatever. Recently, however, the rule has been l1eld to be
otherwise in the case of jndg~ of the superior courts where the
error consistt.:d in exceeding their authority. The particular C8l:ic
was one in which the judge, sitting in one court, ordered the
name of an attorney to be t'tricken from the rolls for a contempt
of authority committed in another court, of which the judge was
also a member. It was held by the Ft->deral Supreme Court that he
was not responsible in a civil action tor this error.• Had it been
a justice of the peace who had committed a like error, an action
would have been supported, however honest might have been his

' Cave 0. Mountain, 1 M. & G. 257.

The same principle was applied in

the case of a court-martial, in Shoe-

maker o. Nesbit, 2 Rawle, 201, assum-

ing that the members actt-ml balm ﬁtl».

On the general subject, sec notes to

Crops 0. Durden, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas.

971. See, also, Olliet v. Besscy, 2 W.

Jones, 214; Houlden 0. Smith, 14 Q.

B. 841.

' Cardigan 0. Page, 6 N. H. 182, I91;

Moser u. White, 29 Mich. 59. 60; Pen.

ple v. Higliway Cumra, 14 Mich. 52$.

~ Bradley 0. Fisher, 13 mi. an."

• Clark "· Hay, 2 Gray, 410. In
Louisiana it has been decided' that a
justice empowered to Issue a warrant
on proofs being made, though he iaeues one without proofs, is not liable;
this being only an error in judgment.
Maguire "· Hughes, 18 LB. Ann. 281.
But quere of this. In Ackerley "· Pl\l'kinson, 8 M. & S. ,11, it is held that
if a Judicial officer has Jurisdiction
of the su bJect.matter, he is not liable
for proceeding upon a citation, though
the citation is V<'id.
1 Can o. Mountain, 1 H. & G. 257.

The same principle was upJllied in
the ca.cre of a court-martial, in Shoemaker"· Nesbit, 2 Rawle, 201, as~um
log that the m<'mbera nct('(l bo11,, .till-'.
On tbc gt>nernl subject, see nott-s to
Creps "· Durden, 1 Smith, Lead. l'IL...
971. See, also, Olliet "· Bessey, 2 W.
Jones, 214; Boulden "· Smith, 14 Q.
B. 841.

' CIU'digan "· Page, 6 N.H. 182, 191;
Moser u. Wh lte, 29 Mich.IS9, 60; Pen.
pie"· Highw~ty Comra., J.l Mich. 52M.
• Bradley •· Fisher, 18 Wal. 81$.1.'
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motives, and however plain it might have appeared that he was
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intending to keep within his powers.

\Vhy the law should protect the one judge and not the other,

and why if it protects one only, it should be the very one who,

from his higher position and presumed superior learning and

ability ought to be most free from error, are questions of which

the following may be suggested as the solution:

The inferior judicial oﬁicer is not excused for exceeding his

jurisdiction because, a limited authority only having been con-

ferred upon him, he best observes the spirit of the law by solving

all questions of doubt against his juris_diction. If he errs in

this direction, no harm is done, because he can always be set

right by the court having appellate authority over him, and he

can have no occasion to take hazards so long as his decision is

subject to review. The rule of law, therefore, which compels

him to keep within his jurisdiction at his peril, cannot be unjust

to him, because, by declining to exercise any questionable

authority, he can always keep within safe bounds, and will

violate no duty in doing so. Moreover, in doing so he keeps

with the presumptions of law, for these are always against the

rightfulness of any authority in an inferior court which, under

the law, appears doubtful.‘ On the other hand, when a grant of
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general jurisdiction is made, a presumption accompanies it that

it is to be exercised generally until an exception appears which

is clearly beyond its intent: its very nature is such as to confer

upon the officer entrusted with it more liberty of action in

deciding upon his powers than could arise from a grant expressly

conﬁned within narrow limits. and the law would he inconsistent

with itself if it were not to protect him in the exercise of this

judgment. Moreover, for him to decline to exercise an authority

because of the existence of a question, when his own judgment

favored it, would be to that extent to decline the performance of

duty, and measurably to defeat the purpose of the law creating

his oflice; for it cannot be supposed that this contemplated that

the judge should act otlicially as though all presumptions

opposed his authority when the fact was directly the contrary.

' It is no protection that theinferior Waite. 6 M. & W. 739; Houlden o.

court in good faith decides that the Smith, 14 Q. 13.841; Piper 0. Pearson,

law confers jurisdiction. Wingate 0. 2 Gray, 120.

I

I

_ _ ?_ _______...--J

motives, and however plain it might have appeared that he was
intending to keep within his powers.
Why the law should protect the one judge and not the other,
and why if it protects one only, it should be the very one who,
from his higher position and presumed superior learning and
· a.bi1ity ought to be most free from error, are questions of which
the following may be suggested as the ~ol uti on:
The inferior judicial officer is not excused for exceeding his
jurisdiction beeause, a limited authority only having been conferred upon him, he best observes the spirit of the law by soh·ing
a.11 questions of doubt against his j1ll·is~iiction. If he errs in
this direction, no harm is done, because he can always be set
right by the court having appellate authority over him, and he
can have no occusion to take hazards so long as his decision is
subject to review. The rule of law, therefore, which compels
him to keep within his jurisdiction at his peril, cannot be unjust
to him, because, by declining to exercise any questionable
authority, he can alwuys keep within sate bounds, and will
violate 110 duty in doing so. .Moreover, in doing so he keeps
with the presumptions of law, tor these are always agaim;t the
rightfulness of any authority in an inferior court which, under
the law, appears doubtful.' On the other hand, when a grant of
general jurisdiction is made, a presumption accompanies it that
it is to be exercised gencmlly until an exception appears which
is clearly beyond its intent: its vc1·y nature is such as to confer
upon the officer entrusted with it more libeJ·ty of acrion in
deciding upon his powers than could arise from a grant expressly
confined within narrow limits, and the law wonld he inconsistent
with itself if it were not to protect him in the exercise of this
judgment. Moreover, for him to deeline to exercise an authority
because of the existence of a question, when his own judgment
favored it, would be to that extent to decline the performance of
duty, and measurably to defeat the purpose of the law creating
his office; for it cannot be supposed that this contemplated that
the judge should act officially as though all presumptions
opposed his authority when the fact was directly the contrary.
1 It is no protection that the inferior
court in good faith decilles that the
law confers jurisdiction. Wingate"·

II

Waite, 6 M. & W. 730; Hnuld<>n "·
Smith, 14 Q. B. 841; Piper v. Pearson,
2 Gray, 120.
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Judge Interested. The magistrate or oﬁicer cannot protect

himself behind his judicial or discretionary action, if it shall

turn out that he was interested, and has assumed to sit or act in

his own case, or in that of one of his near relatives, in whose

case he would be disqualiﬁed to sit as a juror. His action under .

such circumstances is a more nullity.‘ So, in general, if he is

complainant or moving party in a prosecution or proceeding, he

cannot act in decidingit.' But there are some apparent excep-

tions to this general rule. The following are cases: A justice of

the peace may, of his own motion, call upon a party to answer

to a contempt of his authority committed in his presence, and

may proceed to hear and dispose of the case, though he occupies

the apparently inconsistent positions of accuser and judge; if a

felony or a breach of the peace is committed in his presence, he

may at once deal with the case, without complaint being entered;

and where township or other municipal boards are empowered to

pass upon all municipal claims, the interest of the members

docs not preclude their passing upon their own among the rest.

But any authority conferred upon such hoards will be strictly

construed, and power to adjudgc upon their own claims will not

be held included, unless it is very clearly conferred. “ In legal
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reasoning, and in the construction of constitutions and statutes,

we are often compelled to content ourselves with conclusions

somewhat less certain than those involved in mathematical

axioms; because neither conventions nor legislatures always use

language with mathematical accuracy, and neither the human

mind nor human aﬁiiirs will always submit to merely mathemat-

ical rule. For various reasons, and upon various grounds, excep-

tions or qualiﬁcations are sometimes implied, though not ex-

pressed. An act or constitution which should give to justices

of the peace, or to a certain court, the right to try all cases

involving certain amounts, or of a general character, would give

neither the justice nor the judge the right to try his own cause,

‘Hallo. Thayer, 105 Mass 219, cit. Slockwell o. White Lake, 22 Mich.

ing Davis v. Allen, 11 Pick. 466; Wol- 341. See Scanlan o. Turner. 1 Bailey,

colt v. Ely, 2 Allen, 838; MeGough v. 4:1l.

Wellington, 6 Allen, 505; Fox v. Ha- ' Rex 0. Great Yarnionth. 6 B. & C.

zelton, 10 Pick. 275; Strange. Strong. 646; Rex 0. lloscasun. 14 East, 605,

9 Cush. 560, 574. And. sce Dimes u. 603.

Proprietors, etc., 8 II. L. Cas. 787;

Judge Interested. The magistrate or officer cannot protect
himself behind his judicial or discretionary action, if it shall
turn out that he was interested, and has assumed to sit or act in
his own case, or in that of one of his near relatives, in whose
case he would be disqualified to sit as a juror. His action under
such circumstances is a mere nu11ity. 1 So, in general, if he is •
<.-omplainant or moving party in a proticcution or proceeding, he
cannot act in deciding it.' But there are some apparent exceptions to this general rule. The following are cases: A justice of
the peace may, of his own motion, cnll npon a party to answer
to a contempt of his authority committed in his pt·cscnce, and
may proceed to hear and dispose of the case, though he o<.:CUJ>ies
the apparently inconsistent positions of accuoer and judge; it' a
felony or a breach of the peace is committed in his presence, he
may at once deal with the case, without complaint being entered;
and where township or other municipal b.>at-ds are empowered to
pass upon all municipal claims, the interest of the members
docs not preclude their passing upon their own among the rest.
But any authority conferred upon such hoards will be strictly
construed, and power to adjudge upon their own claims will not
be held included, unless it is very clearly conferred. "In legal
reasoning, and in the construction of constitutions and statutt'S,
we are often compelled to content ourselves with conclusions
somewhat less certain than thos" invoh.cd in mathematical
axioms; because neither conventions nor legislatures always uso
language with mathematical accUJ-acy, and neither the human
mind nor hnman affairs
always submit to merely mathematical rule. For various reasons, and upon various grounds, exceptions or qualifications are sometimes implied, though not expressed. An act or constitution which should give to justices
ot' the peace, or to a certain court, the right to try all ca:;cs
involving certain amounts, or of a ~neral character, wonld gi\'6
neither the justice nor the judge the right to try his own cause;

'"ill

1 Hall e. Thayer, 105 Mass 219. cit.
log Daviu. Allen, 11 Pick. 466; Wo).
cott e. Ely, 2 Allen, 838; McGough e.
Wellington, 6 Allen, 605; Fox 11. Ha.
zclton, 10 Pick. 276; Strongt~. 8trong,
9 Cush. 660, 674. And, see Dimes 11.
Proprieton, etc., 8 H. L. Cas. 787;

8tuckwe11 e. White Lake, 22 Mich.
8-U. See Scanlan 11. Turner.1 Bailey,
421.

• Rex 11. Great Yarmouth, 6 B. & C.
646; Rex e. llo:ie&>OD, 1' Eut, ~.
608.
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or to give ﬁnal judgment in his own favor, though the case. in
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every other respect, should fall within the class he was expressly

authorized totry. An exception of such cases would be implied,

and the exception would be just as valid and just as readily recog-

nized by all courts as if it had been expressed.”'

Legislative action cannot be held invalid because of the interest

of legislators in the subject matter upon which they have acted.

This rule applies to legislative bodies of all grades. Adminis-

trative oilicers, also, such as assessors of taxes, sometimes net

from the necessity of the case, \vhere their own interests are

involved; but where the law admits of any other course, it would

seem plain that this was inadmissible. Thus, one is not at lib-

erty to sit in forming a quorum of a board to decide upon some

matter in which he is concerned, if the law provides for a quorum

without him.‘

It is proper to say here that the judicial function can never be

delegated by oﬂicers of any grade. \Vhoever, therefore, shall

assume to act by delegation, can perform only nugatory acts.’

Contempts of Authority. The nrisdiction to punish for con-

tempts of authority is a very delicate one, and requires to be

exercised with great care and caution. The reason has already

been hinted" at: The judge occupies the position of accuser also,
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and when he punishes, is dealing with conduct which is eon-

temptuous of his own authority, and perhaps insulting to himself.

A contempt of authority exists when one is guilty of conduct

which directly tends to prevent or impede the performance of

public duty by a competent tribunal then in session or about to

or to givE.- final judgment in hi~ own favor, tl1ongb the case.. in
every other respect, should fall within the class he was {'X}H't's8ly
authorized to try. An excPption of snch cases would be impliN.l,
and the exception would be just as valid and ju~;t as readily ~~ug
nized by all courts as if it had been expressed."'
Legislative action cannot be held invalid because of the interest
of legislators in the subject matter upon which they have acted.
ThiR rnle applies to legislative bodies of all grades. Administrati ve officers, also. such as ast'essors of taxes, sometiJm.-s net
from the necessity of the case, where their own interests arc
involved; but where the law admits of an.v other course, it wonld
seem plain that this was inadmissible. Thns, one is not at liberty to sit in forming a qnorntn of a hoard to de<>ide upon some
matter in which he is concerned, if the law provides for a quorum
without him.'
It is proper to say here that the judicial function can never be
delegated by officers of any grade. 'Vhoever, therefore, shall
assume to act by delegation, can perform only nugatory acts.•

convene for the purpose. The power to inﬂict summary pun-

ishment for such contcmpts is inherent in each house of the

'Cnms'r1/mcr, J., in Kennedy o.

Gics, 25 Mich. 83. The constitutional

provisions under controversy empow-

ered the county auditors to adjust and

allow ﬁnally all claims against the

county. Iidd, that this did not pre-

clude the salaries oi‘ the auditors

themselves being ﬁxed by law, though

they were payable by the county.

‘Regina o. Justices, etc., 6 Q. B.

753; Stockwell 0. White Lake, 22

Mich. 341. '

‘Andrews 0. Marris, 1 Q. B. 3;

Whitelc-g_:: c. lliclmrds, 2 B. & C. 45;

The jurisdiction to punish for <.-ontempts of authority is a very delicate one, and requires to be
exercised with great care and caution. The re~m has already
been hinted· at: The jud~re occupies the position of accuser al~,
and when he punishes, is dealing with conduct which is contemptuous of his own authority, and perhaps insulting to himself.
A contempt ot' authority exi~>ts when one is guilty of conduct
which directly tends to pre,·ent ur impede the performance of
public duty b.v a competent tribunal then in session or about to
convene for the purpose. The power to inflict snmmar.v punishment tor such contcmpts is inhe•·tmt in each house of the
Contempte of Authority.

Dcws o. Riley, 11 U. B. 434; Van

Slykc o. Insurance Co., 2&9 \Vi.~". 390;

S. C. 2) Am. Rep. 50; Slate o. J|.~tl'er-

son, 66 N. C. 309; Cohen v. Hotl, 3

Brev. 500. A court cannot delegate

to one of its members the power to

punish for contempt. Van S:1u(lu.u

0. Turner, 6 Q. B. 773.

1 CHRTSTIANCY, J., In Kennrdy "·
Gies, 25 Mich. 83. The constitutional
provisions under controversy empowered Ute county auditors to adjust and
allow finally all claims against the
county. HrU, that this dill not preclude the salaries of the auditors
themselves being fixed by law, though
they were payable by the county.
1 Regina "· Justices, etc., 6 Q. B.
753; Stockwell "· White J.ake, 22
lllch. 341.

An•lrews "· Marris, 1 Q. B. 8;
ltirh11rds, 2 B. & C. 4;);
Dews e. Riley, 11 C. B. 43-l; Van
f;lyke "· Insurance Co.• ll9 Wilt. SDO;
B. C. 2) Am. Rl'p. 50; State "· J t•fferson, 6G N. C. 309; Cohen "· Hoff, 3
Brev. oOO. A court Cll.nnot delegate
to one of its members the power to
punish for contempt. Van Sandau
•· Turner, 6 Q. B. 773.
1
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legislative department,‘ but it is a power which must be exercised
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by the house itself, and cannot be delegated to committees.

Imprisonment may be imposed as a punishment, but when it is,

it must terminate with the session at which it is imposed, and

the party is then entitled to his discharge.‘ The warrant of the

presiding oﬂicer reciting the fact of conviction is suﬁicient

authority for the commitment, even though it fails to show in

what the contempt consisted.‘ This is upon the ground that the

same presumptions support the action of the supreme legislative

authority which uphold that of the superior courts. Interior

bodies, with limited legislative powers, such as municipal coun-

cils, boards of supervisors, etc., cannot punish for eontempts.

In this country even the legislature cannot confer the power

upon them.‘

The power to punish for contempts is granted as a necessary

incident in establishing a tribunal as a court.‘ It is therefore

possessed by the courts of justices of the peace.‘ But court

commissioners have no such powers.

1

The necessity that urisdiction should exist in the punishment

'Bhnﬂsbury's Case. 1 Mod. 144;

Murray's Case, 1 Wils. 299; Flnwer‘s
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Case, 8 T. R. 314; Crosby's Case, 3

Wils. 188; Burdett 0. Abbot, 14 East,

1; Gosset 0. Howard, 10 Q. B. 411;

Anderson e. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204;

State v. Mathews, 37 N. H. 450; Burn-

ham v. Morrisscy. 14 Gray, 226.

..

legialative department,1 but it is a power which must be exercised
by the house itself, and cannot be delegated to committees.
Imprisonment may be imposed 88 a punishmen~ bot when it is,
it must terminate with the session at which it is imposed, and
the party is theu entitled to his discharge.' The warrant of the
presiding officer reciting the fact ot' conviction is sufficient
authority for the commitment, even though it fails to show in
what the contempt consisted.• This is UJlOn the ground that the
same presumptions support the action of the supreme legislati vo
authority which upholrl that of the superior courts. Interior
bodies, with limited legislative powers, such as municipal councils, boards of supervisors, etc., cannot pnnish for conternpts.
In this country e\'cn the legislature cannot confer the power
upon them.•
The power to punish for contempts is granted 88 a necessary
incident in establishing a tribunal 88 a court.• It is therefore
possessed by the courts of justit:cs of the peace.• But court
commissionerzJ have no such powers.'
The necessity thnt jurisdiction should exist in the punishment

‘Jefferson's Manual, § 18; Rich-

ard's Case, 1 Lev. 165; 1 Sid. 245; T.

Baym. 120. .

' Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204;

See Burdett o. Abbot, 14 East, 1; Gos-

set 0. Howard, 10 Q. B. 411.

‘ Whitcomb’s Case, 120 Mass. 118,

in which the subject is carefully ex-

amined by Mr. Justice GRAY. Re

Hammel, 9 R. I. 248, was a case of

punishment for contempt by a town

council, but this point was not raised.

' United States 0. New Bedford

Bridge C0.,1 Wood & M. 401; Uni-

ted Slates 0. Hudson, 7 Cram-l1.32;

Robinson an parts, 19 Wall. 505;

Respublica 0. Oswald, 1 Dall. 819;

States 0. White, 1 T. U. P. Charl.

136; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395;

Sanders r. Metcalf, 1 Tenn. Ch. R. 419,

428; Midmllebrook n. Stale, 43 Conn.

257; People v. “'ilson, 64 Ill. 195;

Cossart n. State, 14 Ark. 538; Clark

0. People, Breese, 266; Oswald's Case,

1 Dull. 319; Neel v. Stale, 9 Ark. 263;

Cossart 0. Stale, 14 Ark. 538; State v.

Morrill, 16 Ark. 384; Gorhnm v. Luck-

en, 6 B. Mon. 638; Slate 1». Woodﬂn,

5 ll'01l. 199; E'.tparlc Adams, 25 Miss.

882}; Morrison v. McDonald, 21 Me.

550; State r. Tiplon,1 Blackf. 166;

People 0. Turner, 1 Cu]. 152; McDer-

mott o.Judges, etc., L. R 2 Pr. C. (Ins.

341.

' Rex 0. Revel, 1 Stra. 420; Regina

0. R-15.11-rs. 7 Mod. 28; Lining 0. Ben-

tham, 2 Bay, 1, 8; Ondertlonk r. Ran-

lett, 8 Hill, 323; Re Cooper, 32 Vt.

258.

' In re Remington, 7 Wis. 643;

Haight v. Lucia, 36 Wis. 355.

1 tJbRtlabury's Case. 1 Mod. 144;
Morray's Cuse, 1 Wlls. 299; Flower'•
Case, 8 T. R. 314; Crf\shy's Case, 8
Wils. 188; Burdett"· Abbot, 14 East,
1; Gosset "· Howard, 10 Q. JJ. 411;
Anderson e. Dunn, 6 Wheal 90-i;
State to. Mathews, 87 N. H. 450; BW1lbam"· Morrissey. 14 Gray, 226.
• Jefferson's Manual, § 18; Richard's Case, 1 LeY. 165; 1 Sid. 24:>; T.
Raym.120. .
• Anderson "· Dunn, 8 Wheal 204;
tJee Burdett e. Abbot, 14 Enst, 1; Goa.
ae~ ~. Howard, 10 Q. B. 411.
• Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118,
1D which the subject is carefully examined by Mr. Justice GRAY. &
Hammel, 9 ll I. 9-18, was a ease of
pUDishment for cont.emp~ by a town
council, bu\ \his point was not raised.
• United ~tntca e. New Bedford
Bridge Co., 1 Wood & M. 401; United t3tatea "· Hudson, '7 (.,"ranch, 82;
Robinson u pt~rU, 19 Wall. 005;
Bespubllca e. Oswnld, 1 Dall. 819;

Statt>s e. White, 1 T. U. P. Chari.
136; Yates e. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395;
Sanders r. ~[etcftlf, 1 Tenn. ('b. R 419,
428; lliddlcbrook "· State, 43 Conn.
257; People ~. WilaJon, M lll. 19:5;
Cossart •· State, 14 Ark. ~38; Clark
~. Pl'Ople, Breese, 966; Oswald's Case,
1 Dall. 819; Nee) e. State, 9 Ark. 268;
Co!<Sart e. State, 14 Ark. li38; Htate "·
:Morrill, 16 Ark. 884; Gorluun "·Luckett, 6 B. Mon. 688; State tt. Woodfin,
6 Ired. 100; Ez parte Adams, 25 MIM.
883; )(orrison '· llcDonald, 21 Me.
5.l0; State r. Tipton, 1 Blackf. 166;
People •· Turner, 1 Cal. 132; lieDermot& e.Jud~ etc., L. R. 2 Pr. C. C!lS.
841.

• Rex e. Revel, 1 Stra. 420; Re~lna
e. Uu~t·rs, 7 llod. 28; Lining e. Ben.
tbam, 2 llay, 1, 8; Ondcnlonk r. Ranlett, 8 Hill, 823; & Cooper, 32 Vt.
253.
' In n1 Remington, '7 Wis. 6!3;
Haight ~. Lucia, 36 Wla. SM.
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for contempts is the same as in all other cases; but where the
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punishment is imposed by a court of general jurisdiction, the

rule applies that it must be presumed to have acted within the

limits of its authority, and that its judgment is warranted by

the law and by the facts.‘ It is otherwise in the case of a court

of special or limited jurisdiction, for in that case the record of

the court must show that the party is convicted of conduct which

in law constituted a contempt of court,’ and the process issued in

execution of the judgment of the court will be void if it fails to

show by its recitals that misconduct was charged which prima

facie constituted a contempt.‘ But if the misconduct charged

was such as might be a contempt of court, the court itself must

be the conclusive judge, whether in fact it was one or not,‘ and

the judge will not be liable for an erroneous commitment where

he had jurisdiction.‘

To specify in detail the conduct that might constitute contempt

of court would be to enumerate the ways in which misbehavior

might obstruct the courts of justice. Assaults in the presence

of the court, disorders of any description which interrupt its

proceedings, abuse of the court, refusal of one called as a wit-

ness to testify, neglect of official duty, or other misbehavior by

an ollicer of the court, neglect to obey the orders or process of
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the court, etc., may all be punished as contempts. So might be

any acts of violence and disorder calculated and designed to

prevent the court convening. It has also been held in many

cases that the publication of an article in a newspaper comment-

ing on- proceedings in court then pending and undetermined, or

upon the court in its relation thereto, made at a time and under

circumstances calculated to affect the course of justice in such

proceedings, and obviously intended for that purpose, may be

punished as acontempt, even tl10n_*_§'ll the court was not in session

when the publication was made.“ Such a publication, when

‘Yates 0. People, 6 Johns. 337;

Yates 1:. Lansing, 9 Johns. 39-3; Fer-

‘In. re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253. See

Middlebrook Io. State, 43 Com. 257.

nandcz ea: parte, 10 C. B. (N. s.) 3.

" Lining 0. Bentham, 2 Bay, 1; Peo-

ple v. Turner, 1 Cal. 152; Bachelder

0. Moore, 42 Cal. 412; Turner v. Com-

monwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 619; People

0. Conner, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 430.

' Thatcher ac parte, 7 Ill. 167.

‘L

‘Morrison 0. McDonald, 21 Me.

550. See Watson 0. Bodell, 14 M. &

for oontempts is the same as in all other eases; but where tho
punishment is imposed by a court of general jurisdiction, the
rule applies that it must be presumed to ha,·e acted within tho
limits of its authority, and that its judgment is warranted by
the law and by the facts! It is otherwise in the case of a court
of special or limited jurisdiction, for in that case the record of
the court must show that the party is convicted of conduct which
in law constituted a contempt of cout·t.' and the process issued in
execution ot' the judgment of the court will be void if it fails to
show by its recitals that misoonduct wu charbred which prima
facie constituted a contempt.' But if the misconduct charged
was such as might be a contempt of court, the court itself must
be the conclusive jndg~, whether in fact it was one or not,• and
the j ndge will not be liable for an erroneous commitment where
he had jurisdiction.•
To specify in detail the condt1ct that might constitute contempt
of court won!d be to enumerate the ways in which misbehavior
might obstruct the courts of justice. Assaults in the presence
of the court., disorders of any description which interrupt its
proceedings, abuse of the court, refusal ot' one called as a witness to testify, neglect of' official duty, or other misbehavior by
an otlioor of the court, neglect to obey the orders or process of
the court, etc., may all be punished as contempts. So might be
any acts of violence and disorder calculated and designed to
prevent the court con1:ening. It has also been held in many
cases that the publication of an article in a newspaper eommenting on· proceedings in court then pending and undetermined, or
upon the court in its relation thereto, made at a time and under
circumstances calculated to affect the comsc ot' justice in such
proceedings, and obviously intended tor that purpose, may be
punished as a. contempt, even thongh the court wzls not in session
when the publication was made.e Such a publication, when

W. 57, 69.

° Matter of Bturoc, 48 N. H. 428;

Rcspublica 0. Passmore, 3 Yeales, 438;

Respublica 0. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319;

Dew 1. Eloy, L. R. 7 Eq. Cas. 49; Ba

1 Yates e. People, 6 Johns. 337;
Yates e. Lansing, 9 Johns. 81);); Fernandez cz parte, 10 C. B. (N. s.) 3.
• Lining "· Bentham, 2 llay, 1; Peo..
pie e. TurnPr, 1 Cal. 152; Hacbclder
"· Moore, 42 Cal. 412; Turner c. Commonwealth, 2 Mel (Ky.) 619; People
v. Conner, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 430.
1 Thatcher u pa1U, 7 Ill. 167.

• In N Cooper, 82 Vt. 2SS. Bee
Middlebrook -11. State, 43 Com. 257.
6 Mornson "· McDonald, 21 Me.
1550. See Watson e. Bodell, 14 M. &
W.l57, 69.
• )(utter of Bturoc, 48 N. H. 428;
Rcspublica e. Passmore, 3 Yeatea, 438;
Respublica e. Oswald, 1 Dall. 819;
Daw e. Elcy, L. R. 7 Eq. Cu. 49; .&
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made, however, is a continuous wrong, as much as would be

something of a physical nature, planned in advance, and so

arranged as that its natural and necessary results should be to

throw the court into disorder and confusion when its sitting

should commence.

A warrant issued to carry into execution a conviction for con-

tempt, by an inferior court, should show that opportunity

was given the party to be heard in his defense. The right to a

hearing is absolute, and cannot be denied in a court of any grade.‘

And the punishment must be one warranted by law. Where a

justice commits one to prison for refusal to answer a question in

a suit before him, the committal is for the purpose of compelling

an answer; and if it appears that the suit has been disposed of

when the order for commitment was made, the order is void.‘

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., for misconduct as such, may be pun-

ished by having their names stricken from the rolls;‘ but they

do not forfeit their right to their oﬂice by misconduct in respect

to the court as suitors or citizens merely, and therefore cannot

be punished by being deprived of it on conviction for other
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contempts.‘

The punishment imposed for contempt of court must be cer-

tain. An order of commitment, until discharged by due course

of law, would be void for uncertainty.‘

The cases in the nature of contempts, where the purpose of the

proceedings is to enforce some civil remedy, such as the payment

of costs, or of alimony, will come under the salne rules in respect

to jurisdiction as the cases of criminal contempts above spoken of.

Cheltenham, etc., Co. L. R. 8 Eq. Cris.

580; People 0. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195. In

ex parte Hickey, 12 Miss. 751, this au-

thority was denied, and in Storey 0.

People, 79 Ill. 45, it is decided that

under the present constitution of Illi-

nois a person charged with such mis-

conduct can only be punished on

indictment, and is entitled to jury

trial.

made, however, is a continuous wrong, as much as would be
something of a physical nature, planned in advance, and so
arranged as that its natural and necessary results should be to
throw the court into disorder and confusion when its sitting
should commence.
A warrant issued to carry into execution a conviction for contempt, by an inferior court, should show that opportunity
wa'i given the party to be heard in his defense. The right to a
hearing is absolute, and cannot be denied in a court of any grade.'
And the punishment must be one warrn.nted by law. "'he1"C a
justice commits one to prison for refusal to answer a question in
a suit before him, the committal is for the purpose of <.'ompelling
an answer; and if it appears that the snit has been disposed of
when the order for commitment was made, the order is void.•
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., for misconduct as such, may be punished by having their names stricken from the rolls; • but they
do not fol'ieit their right to their office by misconduct in respect
to the court as suitors or citizens merely, and therefore cannot
be punished by being deprived of it on conviction for ot!ter
con tempts.•
The punishment imposed fur contempt of court must be certain. An order of commitment, until discharged by due course
of law, would be void for uncertainty.•
The cases in the uatnre of con tempts, where the purpose of the
proceedings is to enforce some civil remedy, such as the .payment
of costs, or of alimony, will come under the same rules in respect
to jurisdiction as the cases of criminal contempt& above spoken of.

‘ E2: parts Bradley, '7 Wall. 864;

Lowe c. Suite, 9 Ohio. (N. s.) 337; I21:

parte Pollard, L. It. 2 Pr. C. Cas. 106.

See Bacheldcr 0. Moore, 42 Cal. 412;

Turner 0 Commonwealth, 2 Met. Ky.

619; E1: parts Kilgore, 3 Texas. Ct.

Ap. 247. in this lust case the point

is considered fully.

' Clarke o. May, 2 Gray, 410.

‘ E: parte Moore, 63 N. C. 397, and

cases cited; E1: parte Bradley, 7 Wall.

864.

‘ Re Wallace, L. R1 Pr. C. Cas. 283.

' Rex o. James. 5 B. & Ald. 894; R0

Hammel, 9 R 1.248. Bee Crawford's

Case, 13 Q. B. 618.

Cheltenham, etc., Co. L. R 8 Eq. Cas.
580; People 1). Wilson, 64 Ill. lOa. In
u parl6 Hickey, 12 M.iss. 751, this au.
thority was denied, and in ~torey 1),
People, 79 Ill. 45, it is deciued that
under the present constitution of Illinois a person charged with such misconduct can only be punished on
indictment, and is entilled to jury
trial.
1 Bz pam .Hradley, 7 Wall. 864;
Lowe"· ::nate, 9 Ohio, (N. s.) 387; Rz
p1ru Pollard, L. R. 2 Pr. C. Cas. 106.

8ee Bl\cheldcr tl. lloore, 42 Cal. 412;
Turner 1) Commonwealth, 2 Met. Ky.
619; E:e parte Kilgore, 8 Texas. Ct.
Ap. 247. Jn this lust cuse the point
is considered fully.
1 Clarke 1l. May, 2 Gray, 410.
a Ez paru Moore, 6.'3 N. C. 397, and
cnses cited; E.z parte Bradley, 7 WalL
864.
• & Wallace, L. R.1 Pr. C. Cas. 283.
• Hex "· J amrs. li H. & Ald. 894; .&
Hammel, 9 H J. 2-IS. I:Jee Crawford's
Case, 18 Q. .H. 613.
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waonos IN assrncr 'ro PERSONAL PROPERTY.

The classiﬁcation of property as real and personal is extremely

artiﬁcial, and is governed more by circumstances than by the

nature or inherent qualities of things. The common law idea

of real estate comes from a time and a condition of things when

nearly all that was valued highly, and upon which families were

built up and sustained, was to he found in the freehold estate,

and in those things in the nature of heir looms which, in legal

contemplation, attached themselves to it and passed with it to the

heir. The estate held by feudal tenure of the feudal superior,

with the castle and mansion house upon it, the deer in the park,

OHAPTER XV.

the family pictures, the family jewels, the charters of nobility or

of, precedence, if any, perhaps the ancestral carriage; anything,

WRONGS IN RESPECT TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.

in short, which distinctively pertained to the family as such, and

gained importance and imparted importance as it was pre~er\'ed

with and held inseparable from that which gave the family its

chief prominence, that is to say, the landed estate; these were

the matters of consequence, and these were, in fact as well as in

legal designation, the real property until modern times. There

might be temporary interests in land, held perhaps at the will of

the owner of the freehold, or even for terms of years; there were
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beasts raised for the market, and wares in which traders dealt;

but such property was not property of that digniﬁed importance

and character upon which families were based; it had not eon-

nected with it the same idea of permanence; it was for tempo-

rary support or for trade, and not to be kept and perpetuated iu

families; it was property, but it pertained rather to the person

who for the time owned and controlled it, and who might dispose

of it to-morrow or himself pass away, than to the family which,

in legal contemplation, was perpetual. It was, therefore, not

improperly designated personal property in eontradistinction to

the real property which was before mentioned.

_ - - — - _.___--vﬁ

The classification of property as real and personal is extremely
artificial, and is governed more by circumstances than by the
nature or inherent qualities of things. The common law ides
of real estate comes from a time and a condition of things when
nearly all that was valued highly, and upon which families were
bnilt np and sustained, was to be found in the freehold e~:~ta~
and in those things iu the nature of heir looms which, in legal
contemplation, attached themselves to it and passed with it to the
heir. The estate held by feudal tenure of the tendal superior,
with the castle and mansion house upon it, the deer in the park,
the family pictures, the family jewels, the charters of nobility or
of. precedence, if any, perhaps the ancestral carriahl"6; anything,
in short, which distinctively pertained to the family as such, and
gained importance and imparted importance as it was pre,er\·cd
with and held inseparable from that which gave the family its
chief prominence, that is to say, the landed estate; these were
the matters of consequence, and these were, in fact as well as in
legal designation, the real property until modern times. There
might be temporary interests in land, held perhaps at the will of
the owner ot' the freehold, or even for te1·ms of years; there were
beasts raised for the market, and wares in which t1·aders dealt;
but such property was not property of that dignified importance
and character upon which families were based; it had not <:onnected with it the same idea of permanence; it was for temporary support or for trade, and not to be kept and perpetuated in
families; it was property, but it pertained rather ~ the per:;on
who for the time owned and controlled it, and who might dispose
of it to-morrow or himself pass away, than to the family which,
in legal contemplation, was perpetual. It was, therefore, not
improperly designated personal property in contradistinction to
the real property which was before mentioned.
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In thus classifying certain property as real property the prom-

inent idea doubtless is that of permanence in interest and owner-

ship. But the representative of this permanency was the land,

and the other things which constituted real property connected

themselves with the land, and were real only because of the asso-

ciation. The deer in the park were real property only as they

were a part of the great estate; the family pictures were chietly

important as they were kept as heir-looms; even the castle and

mansion house would lose its value and become a mere temporary

shelter if it could be supposed to be set down upon the land of

another and subject to be ordered off at the will of the owner of

the freehold. Thus a small piece of land, insigniﬁcant in value

in itself, might give incalculable value to the structure erected

upon it, since it would give local habitation and a permanent

abiding place to the family which the building alone, unconnected

with an ownership in the land, could not afford. Therefore,

when traders and others erected buildings on land in which they

had no freehold, the owner of the freehold was looked upon as

having property of the substantial and real class, and the owner
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of the building as having that of the less substantial nature.

The land was consequently real property, though it might be of

little money value, and the building was personal property, a

mere chattel, though its money value might be much greater

than the value of that upon which it stood. The distinction still

exists; the building constitutes a part of the freehold in the one

case; in the other it is a removable ﬁxture, and is personalty.

The actual or presumed intent on the part of the party attaching

achattel to the realty, that it shall constitute apart of the realty, or,

on the other hand, that it shall remain a chattel, is usually the most

important circumstance to be considered in determining the fact; ‘

‘ Mr. Ewell well says that, “The

weight of modern authority and of

reason, keeping in mind the excep-

tions as to constructive annexation

admitted by all the authorities to exist,

seems to establish the doctrine that

the true criterion of an irremovable

ﬁxture consists in the united applica-

tion of several tests:

“ 1. Real or constructive annexa-

In thns classifying certain property as real property the prominent idea doubtless is that of pe1·manence in interest and owne•·ship. But the representative of this permanency was the land,
and the other things which constituted real property connected
themselves with the land, and were real only because of the association. The deer in the park were real property only as they
were a part of the great estate; the family pictureo were cltictly
important as they were kept as heir-looms; even the castle and
mansion house wonld lose its value and become a mere tern porary
shelter if it could be supposed to be set down upon the land of
another and subject to be ordered off at the will of the owner of
the freehold. Thus a small piece of lane, insignificant in value
in itself, might give incalculable vn.lue to the structure el'CC'ted
upon it, since it would give local habitation and a permanent
abiding place to the family which the building alone, unconnected
with an ownership in the land, could not afford. Therefore,
when traders and others erected buildings on land in which they
had no freehold, the owner of the freehold was looked upon as
having property ot' the substantial and real cluss, and the owner
of the building as havin~ that of the less substantial nature.
The land was consequently real property, though it might be of
little money value, and the building was personal propet'ty, a
mere chattel, though its money mlue might be mnch greater
than the value of that npon which it stood. The distinction still
exists; the building constitutea a part of the freehold in th~ one
case; in the other it is a removable fixture, and is per.-onalty.
The actual or presumed intent on the part of the party attaching
a chattel to the realty, that it shall constitute a part of the realty, or,
on the other hand, that it shall remain a chattel, is usually the most
important circumstance to be considered in determining the fact; •

tion of the article in question to the

realty.

"B. Appropriation or adaption to

the use or purpose of that part of the

realty with which it is connected.

"8. The intention of the party mak-

ing the annexation to make the ar-

ticle a permanent accession to the

freehold, this intention being inferred

from the nature of the article aﬂlxed,

the relation and situation of the party

making the annexation, and the pol-

icy of the law in relation thereto, the

structure and mode of the annexation,

1 Mr. Ewell well says t.hat, "The
weight of modern authority and of
reason, keeping in mind the execp.
tions as t.o constructive !lnnexation
admitted by all the ~~outhorities to exist,
scPms to establish the tluctrine that
the true criterion of an irremovable
fixture consists in the unil.ed application of several tests:
"1. Real or constructive annrxa.
tion of the article in quc~>Lion to the
really.

"I. Appropriation or adaption \o
the usc or purpose uf that part of the
realty with which it is connected.
"8. The intention of the p~rty mak.
ing the annexation to make the article a permanent acce:::sion to the
freehold, this intention being inferred
from the nature of U1e article affixed,
the relation aud situation of the pHrty
making the a.nneution, and the pol.
icy of the law in relation thereto, the

BLnlcWI'e and mode of tho annexation,
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whom the annexation was made, it might well be suffered to be

controlling in all cases. But as the question of ownership often

depends on the question whether a ﬁxture is removable or not,

and men make purchases and accept liens upon property, sup-

posing it to be of that nature, either real or personal, that appear-

ances would indicate, it would be not only impolitic, but in many

cases unjust, to suffer a secret intent to control where appear-

ances would indicate the existence of an intent of a different

nature. The law, therefore, usually acts upon the presumed rather

than upon any actual intent, and the general rules which govern

the question of the removability of ﬁxtures are few and simple.

If a building is erected by the owner of the freehold by way

of improvement thereof, and apparently for permanent use and

enjoyment with it, or if machinery is put up and attached to a

building apparently for like permanent use, in the place where it

is put, or if a pump is put in the well, or fence constructed to

divide off ﬁelds, or any erection whatsoever made which appa-

rently is calculated to increase the permanent value of the estate

for use and enjoyment, a reasonable presumption arises that the

owner intended to make them a part of the realty, and the law

accepts this intent as conclusive, and considers them real estate
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from the time they are constructed or aﬁixed. The owner’s deed,

mortgage, or lease of the land will convey them as a part of it,

and when he dies they pass with the land to his devisee or heir-

at-law. Nor is the particular manner of annexation to the free-

hold specially important;' though structures evidently put up

for a mere temporary purpose, and aﬁixed to the realty in a man-

ner indicating no intent that they should be permanent, will of

course remain personalty.

On the other hand, a similar erection or attachment by one not

and the purpose or use for which the

annexation has been made.

“ Of these three tests, the clear ten-

dency of modern authority seems to

beto give pre-eminence to the ques-

tion of intention to make the article

a permanent accession to the freehold,

and others seem to derive their chief

value as evidence of such intention."

Ewell on Fixtures, p. 21, 28. See

McConnell 0. Blood, 128 Mass. 47;

‘Iv

State Savings Bank 0. Kerchevnl, 6

Mo. 682, 686.

and if no one were concerned with the question bnt the party by
whom the anne~ation was made, it might well be suffered to be
controlling in all cases. But as the question of O\mership often
depends on the question whether a fixture is rcm0vable or not,
and men make purchases and accept lien~ upon property, supposing it to be of that natnr~ either real or personal, that appearances would indicate, it would be not only impolitic, but in many
cases unjust, to snfter a secret intent to control where appearances would indicate the existence of au intent of a difterent
nature. The law, therefore, usually acts upon the pre&umeJ rather
than upon any actual intent, and the general rules which govern
the question of the remov11bility of fixtures are few and simple.
If a building is erected by the owner of the freehold by way
of improvement the•·eof, and apparently for permanent use and
enjoyment with it, or if machinery is put up and attached to a
building apparently for like permanent use, in the pluce where it
is put, or if a pump is put in the well, or fence constructed to
divide off fields, or any erection whatsoever made which apparently is calculated to increase the permanent value of the estate
for use and enjoyment, a reasonable presumption arises that the
owner intended to make them a part of the realty, and the law
accepts this intent as conclusive, and considers them real estiJ.te
from the time they are constructed or affixed. The owner's deed,
mortgage, or lease of the land will convey them as a part of it,
and when he dies they pass with the land to his de\·isee or heirat-law. Nor is the particular manner of annexation to the freehold specially important; • though structures evidently put up
for a mere temporary purpose, and affixed to the realty in a manner indicating no intent that they should be permanent, will of
course remain personalty.
On the other hand, I! similar erection or attachment by one not

' Whether the rolling stock of rail-

roads is to be considered a part of the

realty. is a point on which the author-

ities are greatly at variance. See

Minnesota v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co.,

2 Wall. 609; Williamson 1). N. J. Sou.

R. R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 311; Ewell on

Fixtures, 84, and cases cited.

_ ___ 7- - ié _ _ __._.——--III

and the purpose or use for which the
annexation has been made.
"Of these three tests, the clear ten.
dency of modern authority seems to
be to give pre-eminence to the question of Intention to make the 8rticle
a permanent accession to the freehold,
and others seem to derive their chief
value as evidence of such intention.,
Ewell on Fixtures, p. 21, 28. See
McConnell e. Mlood, 128 Maas. jl;

State Savings Bank "· Kercheval, 6
Mo. 682, 686.
J Whether the rolling stock of rail.
roads is to be considered a part of the
tf'alty. is a point on which the author.
ities are greRtly at vnriance. See
Minnesota "· St. Paul, etc., R R Co.,
2 Wall. 609; Williamson fJ. N.J. Sou.
R. R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 811; Ewell on
Fixtures, 84, and cases cited.
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the owner of the freehold might well be presumed to be made
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with the intent of removing it as a chattel. This presumption

would be reasonable in most cases, because. if he intended it as

a permanent annexation, he would lose title to it immediately,

since if he made it a part of the realty, the ownership must pass

to the owner of the realty. Therefore, the person making the

annexation under such circumstances is allowed to retain his

ownership in it as a chattel, wherever no principle of justice or

public policy is contravened by doing so.

Annexations made by a tenant for the more convenient and

proﬁtable enjoyment of his estate for the term, or even by way

of ornament, if not inconsistent with the purpose for which the

estate is leased to him, remain his, and of course remain personal

property. This is the general rule.‘ So when a building is

erected under a mere license given by the owner of the freehold,

and which is subject to be recalled at any time, a like presump-

tion arises that the licensee intended to preserve his property in

the structure, and it will remain personal property accordingly.’

But there are some cases in which, though the erection is

made by one not the owner of the freehold, an intent to retain a

property in the ﬁxtures as a chattel could not be presumed, and

others in which the policy of the law could not suffer effect to
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be given to it if it actually existed. Thus, if one, though not

the owner, is,in possession under an exucutory contract of pur-

chase, it is a reasonable presumption that he expects to complete

the purchase, and that whatever he attaches to the realty in such

a manner that if it were so attached by the owner of the freehold

it would become a part of it, he intends shall be a part of it.’

So, if one, without license, express or implied, on the part of the

owner of the freehold, shall enter and make permanent erections

thereon, the law will not reward his conduct or encourage others

‘Elm-s 11. Maw, 8 East, 38; S. C.

2 Smith Lead. Cas. 228; Lancaster v.

Eve, 5 C. B. (x. s.) 717; Van Ncss c.

Pacard, 2 Pet. 137; Holmes v. Trem-

per, 20 Johns. 29; Mcigs’ Appeal, 62

Penn. St. 28; O‘Donncll 0. Hitchcock,

118 Mass. 401; Thomas v. Crout, 5

Bush, 37; Teal!‘ 0. Hewitt, 1 Ohio,

(1:. s.)5l1.

' Cowin 0. Cowan, 12 Ohio, (11. s.)

629; Wagner 0. Cleveland, etc., R. R.

Co., 22 Ohio, (rt. s.) 568; Rickcr v.

Kelly, 1 Me. 117; Hincklcy 0. Bax-

ter, 18 Allen, 139; Noble v. Sylvester,

the owner of the freehold might well be presumed to be made
with the intent ot' removing it as a chattel. This pre.mrnption
would he reasonable in most cases, because, if he inten,Jed it a.:;
a permanent annexation, he would lose title to it immediately,
since if he made it a part of the realty, the ownership must pa~s
to the O\vner of the realty. Theretore, the per80n making the
annexation nnder such circumstances is allowed to reta.iu his
ownership in it as a chattel, wherever no principle of justice or
public policy is contravened by doing so.
Annexations made by a tenant for the more convenient and
profitable enjoyment of his estate for the term, or even hy way
of ornament, if not inconsistent with the purpose for which the
estate is leased to him, remain his, and of course remain personal
property. This is the general rule.' So when a buildiug is
erected under a mere license given by the owner of the free:1old,
and which is subject to be recalled at any time, a like presumption arises that the licensee intended to pt·eserve his propm·ty in
the structure, and it will remain personal property accordingly.'
Bnt there are some cn:'es in which, though the erection is
made by one not the owner of the freehold, an intent to retain a
property in the fixtures as a chattel could not be presumed, and
others in which the policy of the law could not suffer effect to
be gi,•en to it if it actually existed. Thus, if one~ though not
the owner, is,in possession under an exL•cntory contract of purchase, it is a reasonable presumption that he expects to complete
the purchase, and that whate\'er he attaC'hes to the realty in RU<~h
a manner that if it were so attached by the owner of the freehold
it would become a part of it, he intends shall be a part of it.•
So, if one, without license, express or implied, on the pat·t of the
owner of the freehold, shall enter and make permanent ereetions
thereon, the law w!ll not reward his conduct or encour~ooe other~

42 Vt. 146; Wilgus 0. Getting.-i, 21

Iowa, 177; Wcathcrsby 0. Sl(~('|)t'I', 42

Miss. 732; Fenluson u. Racklitf, 50

Me. 302; Nor. Cent. R. Co. e. Canton

Co., 30 Md. 347.

' See Crane v. Dwyer, 9 Mich. 350.

1 Elwes "· Maw, 8 Enst, 38; S. C.
2 Smith Lead. Cas. 228; Lancaster"·
Eve,/5 C. B. (N. s.) 717; Yan Ness "·
Pacard, 2 Pet. 187; Holmes 11. Trcm.
per, 20 Johns. 29; Meigs' Appeal, 62
Peon. St. 28; O'Donnell "· H it<:hcock,
118 1\lass. 401; Thomas "· Crout, 5
Bush, 87; Teaff e. Hewitt, 1 Oh lo,

(N. 8.) 511.
t

Cowin e. Cowan, 19 Ohio, (N. L)

629; W 1\)!DCr e. Clc\·eland, etc., R. R.
Co., 22 Ohio, (N. 8.) 568; Ricker "·
Kelly, 1 :Me. 117; Hlnckh·y "· Bax..
ter, 18 Allen, 139; Noble"· Sylvester,
42 Vt. 146; Wilgus "· Getting.~. 21
lows, 177; Wt'nthcrsby 11. Sh•Ppt•r, 42
lli,;s. 732: Fenlu:~Ho "· Rackliff, 50
Me. 3fi2: Nor. Cent. R. Co. e. Canton
Co., SO Md 347.
1 Bee Crane o. Dwyer, 9 Mich. :mo.
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in that of like character, by allowing him to remove what he has
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thus unlawfully attached.‘ So, if any one having a right to attach

a removable ﬁxture to the freehold owned by another shall so

attach it that it cannot be removed without serious injury to the

realty, the law will not suffer him to reserve a right of removal

to the prejudice of the owner of the inheritance.’

On the other hand, for similar reasons, if one, without the

consent of the owner, shall take the building of another and

remove it upon and attach it to his own realty, or shall take

another’s machinery and put it up in a permanent way in his

own mill, he cannot by such unauthorized act, make the personal

property of another his own real estate, but the qualities of real

and personal property will still be preserved, and the separate

ownership will remain.‘

It should be added to the foregoing that the parties concerned

may, by agreement between themselves, in due form, give to ﬁx-

tures the legal character of realty or personalty, at their option,

and the law will respect and enforce their understandings where-

ever the rights of third persons will not be prejudiced, or any

general policy of the law violated. Thus, a house constituting a

part of the realty may be iiiortgugcd separate from the land, or

sold separate from it, and the mortgage or sale will be perfectly
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valid, if made in such form as to be suliicient under the Statute

of Frauds as a transfer of an interest in lands. But here the

rights of third persons might possibly intervene; for if the owner

of the land were to sell it to one ignorant of what had been done

respecting the ﬁxture, and without implied notice of it, the pur-

' Mr. Ewell collects the cases of this

nature in his treatise otfthe Law of

Brastow, 4 Pick. 310; Sccger 0. Pet-

tit. 77 Penn. St. 437.

Fixtures, Ch. 2. This rule, in Mc-

Kiernan 0. Hesse, 51 Cal. 594. was ap-

plied to erections made without per-

mission, on the lands of the United

States. Compare Pcnnybccker v.

McDougal, 48 Cal. 160.

‘The injury, however, which will

preclude removal, when the structure

in that of like character, by allowing him to rP.move what he bas
thus unlawfully attached.' So, if a11y one having a right to attach
a removable fixture to the freehold owned by another shall so
attach it that it cannot be removed without serious injury to the
realty, the law will not suffer him to reserve a right of removal
to the prejudice of the owner of the inheritance.•
On the other hand, for similar reasons, if one, without tl1e
consent of the owner, shall take the building of another and
remove it upon and attach it to his own realty, or shall take
another's machinery and pnt it up in a permanent way in his
own mill, he cannot by such unnn thorized act, make the personal
property of another his own real estate, but the qualities of real
and personal property will still be preserved, and the separate
ownertlhip will remain.•
It should be add3d to the foregoing that the parties concerned
may, by agreement between themselves, in dne form, give to fixtures the legal character of realty or personalty, at their option,
and the law will re::;pect and entort-e their understandings whereeYer the rights of third persons will not be prej udi<.-ed, or any
general policy of the law violated. Thus, a house constituting a
part of the realty may be mortga:rcd separate from the land, or
sold separate from it, and the mm·tgage or sale will be perfectly
valid, if made in such fo1·m as to be sufficient nuder tho Statute
of Frauds as a transfer of an interest in lands. llut here the
rights of third persons might JlORsiLly intcr,·ene; for if the owner
of the land were to sell it to one ignorant of what had been done
respecting the fixture, and without implied notice of it, the pur-

is erected or attached by a tenant or

licensee, must be something more

than merely nominal. See Avery v.

Chcslyn, 8 Ad. & El. 75; Whiting v.

‘Cochran 1:. Flint, 57 N. H. 514,

544. L.ann,J.¢ “The rule is, and this

is eh-incntary, that the movable must

be uﬁlxetl by the owner of it. and

afllxed in the course of his general

use and occupation of the immova-

ble; and I venture the remark that

nola case can be found where it is

held that the owner would be divest-

ed of his title if the movable thing is

aﬂlxed without his consent, either ex-

press or implied. D'Eyncourt 0.

Gregory, L. R 8 Eq. 882, 894."

1 Mr. Ewell collects the CII.Ses of this
n11.ture in his treati•e od"the L11w of
Fixtures, Ch. 2. This role, in MeKiernan 1). Hesse, In Cal.IJ94, WBS applied to erections made without per.
mission, on the lands of the l:nited
States.
Compare Pcnnybecker •·
McDougal, 48 Cal. 160.
1 The injury, however, which will
preclude removal, when the structure
is erected or attached by a tenant or
licensee, must be something more
than merely nominal. See Avery"·
Cbeslyn, 8 Ad. & El. 71S; Whiting "·

Bra.<~tow, -' Pick. 810; Berger e. Pet.
tit. 77 Penn. St. 437.
• Cochran "· Flint, IS7 N. H. 1>14.
lS44. LADD, J.c "The role is, and this
is eh·mcntary, that the movable must
be nffixcd by the owner of it. autl
affixed in the course of his general
uso and occupation of the immoVAble; and I venture the remark that
not a case can be found where it is
held that the owner would be di\·est·
ed of his title if the movable thing is
affixed without his consent, either ex.
press or implied. D'Eyncourt •·
Gregory, L. R. 8 Eq. 882, 894.."
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he would have a right to suppose it constituted a part.‘ The

owner of machinery may consent that it be put up in the mill

of another under a contract of conditional sale, and with the

understanding that his title therein as personalty shall be retained;

and this understanding will also be enforced as against the owner

of the land, or any other person who has not been deceived by

appearances into a purchase of the land or taking a mortgage

upon it, on the supposition that his deed or mortgage covered the

machinery as well as the land and building.’ Landlord and ten-

ant may also, by the lease or other agreement, control the whole

subject of ﬁxtures as they may see ﬁt.

When a licensee has a right to remove ﬁxtures, he will lose

them unless he removes them within a reasonable time, to be

determined by the circumstances, after his license has been

revoked.’ A tenant must take away his removable ﬁxtures at or

before the expiration of his term, or at least within such reason-

able time thereafter as he may, by consent or otherwise, lawfully

continue in possession.‘ But if the tenancy is for an uncertain

period, as where it is for life or at will, ﬁxtures may be removed

within a reasonable time after the tenancy is ended. If the

tenant commits an act of forfeiture, this is a forfeiture of his
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interest in the land only;' but when enforced against him, and

possession obtained, by ejectment or other proceeding, his right

' Burk 0. Hollis, 98 Muss. 55; Poor

0. Oakman, 104 Mass. 809; Gibbs u.

Estey, 15 Gray, 587; Richardson 0.

Copeland, 6 Gray, 536.

' Crippen 0. Morrison, 18 Mich. 28,

and cases cited; Shell 0. Haywood,

16 Penn. St. 523; Piper 0. Martin, 8

Penn. St. 206; Ford 0. Cobb, 20 N. Y.

844; Motto. Palmer, 1 N. Y. 564;

Cross 0. Marston, 17 Vt. 583; Russell

v. Richards, 10 Me. 429; Hilborne 0.

chaser would take the land ·with the house as a part of it, because
he would ha,•e a right to suppose it constituted a part.• The
owner of machinery may consent that it Lc put up iu the mill
of another under a contract of conditional sale, and with the
understanding that his title therein as personalty shall be retaineu;
and this understanding will also be enforced as against the owner
of the land, or any other person who has not been deceived by
appearances into a purchase of the land or taking n mortgahre
upon it, on the supposition that his deed or mortgage <~overed the
machinery as well as the land and building.~ Landlord and tenant may also, by the lease or other agreement, control the whole
subject of fixtures as they may see fit.
When a licensee has a right to remove fixtures, he will lose
them unless he removes them within a reasonable time, to be
determined by the circnmstances, after his license has hccn
revoked. 1 A tenant must take away his removable fixtures at or
before the expiration of his term, or at least within such reasonable time thereafter as he may, by consent or otherwi:;c, lawfully
continue in possession. • But if the tenancy is tor an uncertain
period, as where it is tor life or at will, fixtures may be removed
within a reasonable time after the tenancy is ended. If the
tenant commits an act of forfeiture, this is a torteitnrc of his
interest in the land only; • but when enforced against him, and
posression obtained, by ejectment or other proceeding, his right

Brown, 12 Me. 162; Smith v. Benson,

1 Hill, 176; Pierce 0. Emery, 82 N.

H. 485; Haven v. Emery, 33 N. H.643;

Wood 0. Hewett, 8 Q. B. 913. In

Massachusetts the strict rule is ap-

plied. that whatever the understand-

ing between the mortgageor and one

who attaches to the realty ﬁxtures

which, if attached by the mort_~_r:igeor

himself, would become a part of it,

they will, when so attached, become

realty, so as to be covered by the lien

ofan existin mortgage. Hunt v. Bay,

etc. Co., 97 gnss. 279; Clary v. Owen,

15 Gray, 522; Bartholomew v. llam-

ilton, 105 Mass. 239.

» ‘Antoni 1:. Belknup, 102 Mass. 193;

Ombony 0. Jones, 19 N. Y. 234, 2:28.

See Overton v. Willis-ton, 81 Penn. St.

155; Sullivan e. Carberry, 67 Me. 531.

‘ Penton 1:. Robart, 2 East, S8;

Weeton 0. W00(lCOCl{, '7 M. & W. 14;

Lyde 0. Russell, 1 B. & Ad. 394; Om:

bony v. Jones, 19 N. Y. 234; Conner

v. Coﬁin. 22 N. ll. 538. 541.

‘ See Davis v. Eyton, 7 Bing. 154.

• Burk "· Hollis, 98 Mass. 55; Poor
"· Ollkman, 104 Mass. 809; Gibbs "·
Estey, 15 Gray, 587; Richardson "·
Copeland, 6 Gray, 536.
t Crippen "· Morrison, 18 Mich. 28,
and cases cited; Mhell "· Haywood,
16 Penn. St. 523; Piper "· Martin, 8
Penn. St. 206; Ford"· Cobb, 20 N.Y.
344; Mott "· Palmer, 1 N.Y. 564;
Cross "· Marston, 17 Vt. 533; Russell
"·Richards, 10 Me. 429: Hilbome "·
Brown, 12 ?tie. 162; Smith"· Benson,
1 Hill, 176; Pierce •· Emery, 82 N.
H. 483; Haven"· Emery, 38 N. H. 66;
Wood "· Hewett, 8 Q. B. 013. In
Massachusetts the strict rule is ap.
plied, that whatever the underst:mding between the mortgagcor and one
who attaches to the realty ft.xturea

which, if attached by the mort~a~cor
himself, woulc.l become a part of it,
they will, when so attnched, become
re~tlty, S!) as to be covered by the lien
ofnn exi!\tin~mortgage. Hunt"· Bay,
etc. Co., 07 ltal's. ~';'!}; Clary"· Owen,
15 Gray, 522; Bartholomew "· Ham.
ilton, 10;) ~lass. 239.
• Antoni"· Belknap, 102 Mnss. l!J:J;
Om bony "·Jones, lD N. Y. 2:w, ~;:~.
&•e Overton"· Williston, 81 Penn. St.
155: Snll ivan "· Carberry, 67 lie. 5:Jl.
4 Penton t'. Robart, 2 East, 88;
Wceton "·Woodcock, 7 ?tl. & W. 14;
Lyde "· Russell, 1 B. & Ad. 804; Om~
bony"· Jones, 19 N.Y. 2;l!; Conner
"· Coffin. 22 X. II. 538, 541.
• 8ee Davis "· Eyton, 7 Bing. 154.
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to such ﬁxtures as are not already removed, is gone.‘ It has
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been held, in some cases, that _one who accepts a renewal of a.

lease without stipulating to reserve his rights in existing ﬁxtures,

abandons his right to them as he would on surrendering posses-

sion without removing them; ’ but this seems unreasonable,

and has been questioned.‘

All removable ﬁxtures, being personalty, are subject to all the

rules of law which govern that species of property, even though

they still continue attached to the freehold. Still, if the owner is

injured in respect to his rights therein, while this annexation

continues and while he is still in possession of the land, the

wrong should be considered an injury in respect to his posses-

sion of the realty, and trover for the ﬁxture will not lie.‘ But

all ﬁxtures become personalty when severed, whether the act of

severance is rightful or wrongful.‘

' Weeton v. Woodcock, '7 M. & W.

14: Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W.

450; Pugh e. Arton, L. R. 8 Eq. Cas.

626; Whipley v. Dewey, 8 Cal. 36;

Kntter e. Smith, 2 Wall. 491. See

Keogh '0. Daniel], 12 Wis. 163.

* Merritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59; Lough-

to such fixture! as are not already removed, is gone.1 It bas
been held, in some cases, that .one who accepts a renewal of a
lease without stipulating to re~en·e his rights in existing fixtures,
abandons his right to them as he would on surrendering postJe&.
sion without removing them;' bot this seems unreasonable,
and bas been questioned. 1
AU removable fixtures, being personalty, are subject to all the
rules of law which govern that species of property, even though
they still continue attached to the freehold. Still, it" the owner is
injured in respect to his rights therein, while this annexation
continues and while he is still in possession of the land, the
wrong should be considered an injury in respect to his posse~
sion of the realty, and trover for the fixture will not lie. t Bot
aU fixtures become personalty when severed, whether the a.et of
severance is rightful or wrongful. •
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ran 0. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792.

' Kerr 1:. Kingsbury, 88 Mich.

‘Minshall 0. Lloyd, 2 M. &

450; Mackintosh v. Trotter, 3 M.

W. 184.

‘In the rules respecting ﬁxtures

we note the gradual departure from

notions which had their origin in a

system which had little in common

with modern enterprise‘ and thrift.

As has already been said, land for-

merly was of chief importance; com-

merce was subordinate to martial

prowess. The Jew, who best repre-

sented the movable property of the

country, prudently hid his jewels and

his gold in his unpretending and

mean habitation, or secreted them

upon his person sewed into the old

clothes which appeared to express

misery and poverty. His wealth did

not make him respected, but he was

despised for the qualities which pro-

ta»?

duced it. and when the master of the

sword found hi debt to the Jew

usurer falling due, it might be a

question whether he should be paid

in coin or in blows; whether he

should be robbed and driven from the

land, or spared as a necessary but

hated convenience. The idea grew

up very slowly that the non-land-

owner, who would make his industry

available by the improvement 01

lands, should be encouraged to do so

by saving to him an ownership in the

buildings he attached to the soil. The

old idea re(:0_'_'nlZ(3d but faintly a dis-

tinct ownership in the shop which

the tenant put upon the land, and if

it was at all of a substantial nature,

the landlord would be likely to claim

it as having become a part of the soil

by being atﬁxed to it. A hundred

years ago it was scarcely settled that

an agricultural tenant might remove

Weeton "·Woodcock, 7 M. & W.
14; Minshall "· Lloyd, 2 M. & W.
450; Pugh 1:1. Arton, L. R. 8 Eq. Cas.
626; Whi pley "· Dewey, 8 Cal. 36;
Kutter "· Smith, 2 Wall. 491. See
Keogh "· Daniell, 12 Wis. 16::1,
• Merritt"· Judd, 14 Cal. 59; Loughran "· Ross, ~ N. Y. 792.
1 Kerr "· Kingsbury, 88 Mich.
• llinshall "· Lloyd, 2 M. & W.
460: Mackintosh 11. Trotter, 8 M. &
W. 184.
• In the rules respecting fixtures
we note the gradual departure from
notions which bad their origin in a
system which had little in common
with modern enterprise• and thrift.
As has already been said, land formerly was of chief importance; commerce wa~:~ subordinate to martial
prowess. The Jew, who best represented the movable property of the
country, prudently hid his jewels and
his gold in his unpretending and
mean hnbltat!on, or secreted them
upon his person sewed into the old
clothes which appeared to express
misery null poverty. His wealth did
not make him respected, but be was
despised for the qualities which pro1

duced it, and when the master of the
sword found his debt to the Jew
usurer falling due, it might be a
question whether be should be paid
in c11in or in blows; whether he
should be robbed and driven frnm the
land, or spared 88 a necessary but
hated convenience. The idea grew
up very slowly that the non-landowner, who would mRke his Industry
avuilaLic by the improvement oi
lands, should be encouragt.-d tn do so
by saving to him an ownership in the
buildings be attached to the soil. The
old idea reco.:.mized but faintly a dis.
tinct ownership in the shop which
the tenant put upon the land, and if
it was at all of a substantial nature,
the landlord would be likely to cluim
it as having l>Ccome a part of the soil
by being affixed to it. A hundred
years ago it was scarcely settled that
an agricultural tenant might remove
his fixtures at the end of his term,
and the idea was still prevalent that
to entitle any tenant to retain a'i per.
sonalty the structure he put up for
use in connection with the reulty, he
should abstain fmm putting it on
foundations that seemed to be perma-
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Betterments. The laws known as betterment or occupying
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claimant laws, establish a peculiar species of property in those

entitled to the beneﬁt of their provisions. The purpose of these

laws is to do equity as between the party who has erected build-

ings of a permanent character, or made other improvements,

upon lands which at the time he supposed were his own, but

which are recovered by another on claim of paramount title. At

the common law the owner, in recovering the land, would become

entitled to the improvements also. The laws mentioned have

changed this by requiring the owner, after establishing his title,

to pay for the improvements as a condition of being put in pos-

session, and by conﬁrming the occupant in possession, if pay-

ment is declined. While the right of election remains, the right

of the occupant has some of the qualities of a lien and some of

a conditional title; but his remedies for wrongs would obviously

be those of an occupant of the realty.

Sidewalks, etc. Sidewalks constructed by the owner of urban

property in front of his lot, or curbstones, etc., planted there by

him, are his property, whether the title to the soil in the street

is in him or not. While a sidewalk remains it is a part of the

1ealty;‘ but when any such structure is taken up, the materials

become personalty, and trespass (le bonis or trover will lie if the
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city authorities, or individuals, unlawfully appropriate them.’

Right to Crops. Growing crops are presumptively the prop-

lletterments. Tho laws known as betterment or occupying
claimant laws, establish a peculiar species of property in those
entitled to the benefit of their provisions. The purpose of these
laws is to do equity as between the party who has erected buildings of a permanent character, or made other improvements,
upon lands which at the time he supposed were his own, but
which are recovered by another on claim of paramount title. At
the common law the owner, in recovering the land, wonld bl':'come
entitled to the improvements als\). The laws mentioned have
changed this by requiring the owner, after establishing his title,
to pay for the improvements as a condition of being pnt in possession, and by confirming the occupant in possession, if payment is declined. While the right of election remains, the right
of the occupant has some of the qualities of a lien and some of
a conditional title; bnt his remedies for wrongs would obviously
be those of an occupant of the realty.

erty of the owner of the soil; but this is only a presumption,

and often proves to be unfounded. A more general rule is that

nent. With the vast increase in per- it so is irresistible, but it does not be-

sonai property which has taken place

within a century, the artiﬁcial dis-

tinctions between realty and person-

alty are being gradually put aside or

modiﬁed, and those only are strictly

adhered .0 which have solid grounds

for their support. Cities grow upon

leased grounds, and substantial struc-

Sidewalks, etc. Sidewalks constructed by the owner of urban
property in front of his lot, or curbstones, etc., planted there hy
him, are his property, whether the title to the soil in the street
is in him or not. While a sidewalk remains it is a part of the
tealty; • but when any such structure is taken up, the matet·ials
become personalty, and trespass de boni~ or trover will lie if the
city authorities, or individuals, unlawfully appropriate them.•

tures for houses and shops are, as

between landlord and tenant, the per-

sonal estate of the latter. The house

becomes a part of the land if atiixed

to the land by the owner, because

Growing crops are presumptively the property of the owner of the soil; but this is only a presumption,
and often pro,·es to be unfounded. A more general rule is that
Right to Crops.

then the inference of intent to make

come a part df it when aﬂixed by the

tenant, because the difference in own-

ership of house and land will prevent

the merger which is necessary to

their becoming one in contemplation

of law. The tenant's supposed in-

tent to keep separate as personal

chattels the boards, the bricks, etc.,

which he builds into the house, is

respected and is conclusive.

' Rogers v. Randall, 29 Mich. 41.

' Muzzey 0. Davis, 54 Me. 861. See

Rogers o. Randall, 29 Mich. 41.

28

ncnt. With the vast Increase in per- it so is irresistible, but it does not be..
sonal property which has taken placo come a part
it when amxeJ by the
within a century, the artificial dl~ tenant, because the difference in own.
tinction& between realty and person- el'!!hip of house and land will prevent
alty are being gradualJy put aside or the merger which is necessary to
modified, and those only are strictly ·their becoming one in contemplation
adhered .o which have solid grounds of law. The tenant's supposed in.
for Uwir support. Cities grow upon tent to keep separate as personal
leased grounds, and substantialstrue- chattels t.he boards, the bricks, etc.,
tures for houses and shops arc, as which ho builds into the house, ia
between landlord and tenant, the per- respected and is conclusive.
1 Rogers "· &ndalJ, 29 Mich. 41.
sonal estate of the latter. The house
becomes a part of the land if am xed
• Muzzey "· Davis, r54 lie. 861. See
to th6 land by the owner, because
Rogers "· Randall, 29 Mich. 41.
then the inference of intent to make

of

28
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growing crops are the property of the person who rightfull_v has
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planted and grown them. Therefore, crops grown by a tenant

are his property. He may sell or mortgage them as such while

they are growing, and he may harvest and appropriate them

when ripened.‘ The exception to this general statement is this:

that if the tenant shall sow or plant crops which, in the ordinary

course of nature, will not ripen during his term. he will lose

them. If the rule were otherwise, he would be enabled, by his

own act and without the consent of the lessor, to prolong beyond

the duration of his term his possession of the land planted.’

But where the duration of the lease is uncertain, as where it is

a lease at will, or for the life of some person designated, or its

duration depends upon some contingency, and it is terminated

otherwise than by the voluntary act of the tenant himself, the

tenant or his personal representative is entitled to the growing

crops as e1nblements,' and may enter upon the land to cultivate

them and to remove them when ready for harvest. The landlord,

if he refuses to recognize this right and excludes him, is liable

on the special case; and if he harvests the crop and appropriates

it to his own use, he may be sued either in trespass or trover for

the value.‘ So one who sows crops on the land of another under

a license has rights after the license is revoked corresponding to
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those of a tenant at will whose estate has been terminated by

the landlord.‘ Wvhere crops are raised “on shares,” the owner

of the land and the person raising them are tenants in common

of the crop until it has been harvested and divided.’ Trees,

' Doremus v. Howard, 28 N. J. 390;

Brown 0. Turner, 60 Mo. 21; Clark o.

Harvey, 54 Penn. St. 142; Fobes u.

Shattuck. 22 Barb. 568.

' Bain 1:. Clark, 10 Johns. 424; Har-

ris v. Carson, 7 Leigh, 632; Kingsbury

u. Collins, 4'Bing. 202.

‘ Bevans o. Briscoe, 4 Har.& J . 139;

Davis v. Thompson, 13 Me. 209; Davis

0. Brocklebank, 9 N. H. 73; 0rland's

Case, 5 Co. 116.

‘ Stewart 0. Doughty, 9 Johns. 108;

growing crops are the property of the person who rightfully has
planted and grown them. Therefore, crops grown by a tenant
are his property. He may sell or mortgage them as such while
they are growing, and he may harvest and appropriate them
when ripened: The exception to this general statement is this:
that if the tenant shall sow or plant crops which, in the ordinary
course of nature, will not ripen during his term. he will lose
them. If the rule were otherwise, he would be enabled, by his
own act and without the consent of the lessor, to prolong beyond
the duration of his term his possession of the land planted.'
But where the duration of the lease is uncertain, as where it is
a lease at will, or tor the life of some person designated, or its
duration depends upon some contingency, and it is terminated
otherwise than by the voluntary act of the tenant himself, the
tenant or his personal repret'entative is entitled to the growing
crops as emblement£',' and may enter upon the land to cultivate
them and to remove them when ready for harvest.. The landlord,
if he refuses to recognize this rigllt am] excludes him, is !iahle
on the special case; and if he harvests the crop and appropriates
it to his own use, he may be sued either in trespass or trover for
the value.• So one who sows crops on the land of another under
a license has rights after the license is revuked corresponding to
those of a tenant at will whose estate has been terminated by
the landlord.' Whe1·e crops are raised "on shares," the O\t'ner
of the land and the person raising them A-re tenants in common
of the crop until it has been hRn·estc.J and dh·iued." Trees,

Forsythc 1;. Price, 8 Watts. 282; Rob-

inson '0. Kruse, 29 Ark. 575; Harris v.

Frink, 49 N. Y. 24.

' Smith 0. J enks, 1 Denio, 580;

_~ _ --

Jencks v. Smith, 1 N. Y. 90; Harris

0. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24.

‘Daniels r. Daniels, 7 Mass. 136;

Delaney v. Root, 99 Mass. 546; Foole

v. Colvin, 3 Johns. 216; Bradish 0.

Scbenck, 8 Johns. 151; (Iarlcr v. Jar-

vis, 9 John. 143; Putnam o. Wise.1

Hill, 234: Taylor c. Bradley, 39 N. Y.

129; Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24;

Moulton v. Robinson, 27 N. H. 550;

Daniels 0. Brown, 34 N. H. 454;

Hatch v. Hart, 40 N. H. 93; Carr 0.

Dodge, 40 N. H. 403; llurd 1:. Dar.

ling, 14 Vt. 214; Belts 1:. Ratliff, 56

• Doremus 'D. Howard, 28 N.J. 300;
Brown "· Turner, 60 Mo. 21; Clark "·
HRrvcy, M Penn. t;t. 142; Fobes "·
Shattuck. 22 Bwb. 568.
' Hain "· Clark, 10 Johns. 424; Harris 'C. Carson, 7 Leigh, 632; Kingsbury
"·Collins, 4·Bing. 202.
• Bevans "· Briscoe, 4 Har. & J. 139;
Davis 'C. Thompson,18 Me. 209; Davis
"· Brocklebank, 9 N. H. 73; Orland's
Case, 5 Co. 116.
• Stewart il. Doughty, 9 Johns. 108;
Forsythe "· Price, 8 Watts, 282; Robinson 11. Kruse, 29 Ark. 575; Harris 11.
Frink, 49 N. Y. 24.
• Smit.h il. Jenks, 1 Denio, 580;

Miss. 561; Doty e. Helh, 52 Miss. 530;

Briggs 0. Thompson, 9 Penn. St. 338;

..

J~:ncks il. Smith, 1 N.Y. 90; Harris
"· }'rink, 49 N. Y. 24.
• Dllniels t". Daniels, 7 MAss. 136;
Delant>y l'. Root, 99 llass. 5!(); Foote
"· Colvin, 3 Johns. 216; Bradish "·
Schenck, t! Johns. 151; C11.rtcr "· J~tr.
vis, 9 .John. 143; Putnam "·Wise. 1
Hill, 234: Taylor r. Bradlf'y, 39 N.Y.
129; H~trris r. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24;
Moulton "· RniJinson, 27 N.H. 5JO;
Daniels "· Brown, 34 N. H. 41>4:
Hatch il. Hart, 40 N. H. 93; Carr c.
Dodge, 40 N.H. 403: Hurd r. Dnr.
ling, 14 Vt. 214; Betts "· Ratliff'. 50
Miss. 561; Duty"· Hcth. 52lliss. 5:i0;
Briggs "· Thompson, 9 Penn. St. 338;
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plants and crops sowed or planted on land by a stranger to the
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title, and without authority, belong to the owner of the soil.‘

Wild Animals. There is no property in wild animals until

they have been subjected to the control of man. If one secures

and tames them, they are his property; if he does not tame

plants and crops sowed or planted on lund by a stranger to the
title, and without authority, belong to the owner of the soil.'

them, they are still his so long as they are kept conﬁned and

under his control.’ In the case of wild bees, those rules are

somewhat qualiﬁed. Bees have a local habitation, more often

in a tree than elsewhere, and while there they may be said to be

within control, because the tree may at any time be felled. But

the right to cut it is in the owner of the soil, and, therefore, such

property as the wild bees are susceptible of is in him also. A

hunter’s custom may recognize a right to the tree in the ﬁrst

ﬁnder, but the law of the land knows nothing of this, and he

will be a tl'esp:1sset‘ if, without permission, he enters upon the

land to cut it.‘ Even a license given by the owner of the soil to

enter and cut the tree may be revoked at any time before it has

been acted on.‘ But if the bees have once been domesticated

and have then escaped, the loser retains his property therein, and

may reclaim them if he pursues after them with reasonable

promptness.‘

As regards beasts of the chase, the English rule is that if _the
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hunter starts and captures a beast on the land of another, the

Alwood v. Ruckman, 21 Ill. 200. But 9. Mason, 7 Johns. 16; Buster r. New-

the relation of landlord and tenant

may exist, although the rent is to be

paid by a portion of the crop, in

which case the parties are not tenants

in common of the crop raised. Dixon

0. N iccolls, 39 Ill. 872.

‘Ewell on Fixtures, 64; Simpklns

v. Rogers, 15 Ill. 397; Mitchell 0.

Billingsley, 17 Ala. 391; R».-id v. Kirk,

12 Rich. 54: Madigan 0. McCarthy,

108 Mass. Rep. 876; S. C. 11 Am. 371.

Wild Animals. There is no property in wild animals until
tl1ey ha\·e been subjected to the control of man. If one secure8
and tames them, they are his pt·operty; if he docs not tame
them, they are still his so long as they are kept confined and
under his control.• In the case of wild bees, these rules at·e
somewhat qualified. Bees have a local habitation, more often
in a tree than elsewhere, and while there they may he said to be
within control, because the tree may at any time be felled. But
the right to cut it is in the owner of the soil, and, therefore, such
property as the wild bees are susceptible of is in him also. A
hunter's custom may recognize a right to the tree in the first
finder, but the law of the land knows nothing of this, and he
will be a trespasser if, without permission, he enters upon the
land to cut it.' Even a license given by the owner of the soil to
enter and cut the tree may be revoked at any time before it ·has
been acted on.• But if the bees have once hecn domesticatt.'<l
and have then escaped, the loser retains his property therein, and
may reclaim them if he pursues after them with reasonable
promptness. 1
As regards beasts of tho chase, the English rule is that if _the
hunter starts and captures a beast on the land of another, the

‘Amory 0. Flynn, 10 Johns. 102;

Rex v. Brooks, 4 C. & P. 131; Regina

v. Shickle, L. R. 1 C. C. 158: S. C. 11

Cox, C. C. 189; Commonwealth 0.

Chace, 9 Pick. 15.

‘Merrill 0. Goodwin, 1 Root, 209;

Pierson 0. Post, B Gaines, 175; Gillet

kirk, 20 Johns. 75: Ferguson v. Miller,

1 (1ow.2-13; Idol v.Joncs. 1 Dev. 162;

Cock r. Weatherby, 5 S. & M.

‘Ferguson 0. Miller, 1 (low. 243.

See Adams 1". Benton, 43 Vt. 30.

' Gull‘ r. Kilts, 15 Wend. 550. The

right, however, might be of little

value if they were found on the land

of another who should refuse to per-

mit the pursucr to enter and reclaim

them. Possibly it might be held—:is

we think it certainly ought to bc—-

that the owner of the bccs might

enter and retake them, if he could do

so without doing an injury to the

land; but the law would give no im-

plied license to cut a tree for the

purpose.

Alwood 11. Ruckman, 21 Ill. 200. But
the relation of landlord ami tenant
may exist, although the rent is tn be
paid by a porlion of the crop, in
which case the parties are not tenants
in common of the crop raised. Dixon
11. Niccolls, 39 Ill. 879.
• Ewell on Fixtures, 64; Simpkins
'· Rogers, 15 Ill. 397; ~litchell e.
Billingsley, 17 Ala. 391; Rdd "·Kirk,
12 Rich. M: )ladigan 11. McCarthy,
108 Mass. Ucp. 876; 8. C. 11 Am. 371.
• Amory e. Flynn, 10 Johns. 102;
Rex e. Brooks, 4 C. & P. 181; Regina
11. Shickle, L. R. 1 C. C. 158; 8. C. 11
Cox, C. C. 189; Commonwealth "·
Chace, 9 Pick. 15.
• Merrill e. Goodwin, 1 Root. 200;
Pierson e. Post, 8 Caines, 175; Gillet

e. Mason, 7 .Johns. 16; Buster r. New.
kirk, 20Johns. 75: Ferguson tl. Miller,
1 Cow. 243; Idol r.. JonC~J, 1 J>ev. 162;
Cock r. Weatherby, 5 8 . & M. 333.
'Ferguson e. Miller, 1 Cow. 243.
See Adams r. Benton, 43 Vt. ao.
1 Goff r . Kilts, 15 Wend . MO.
The
right, bowc\'cr, might be of little
value if they were found on the hmd
of another who should refuse to per.
mit the pursuer to enter and n·clalm
them. Possibly it might be hehl-:1s
we think it cert.ainly ougM to bethat the owner of the bees might
enter and retake them, if he could do
so without doing an injury to the
land; but the law would giv:! no im.
plied license to cut a tree for the
purpose.
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property in him is in the owner of the land.‘ Under the civil
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law the property passed to the captor,’ and such is believed to

be the recognized rule in America even when the capture has

been effected by means of a trespass on another’s land.’

How Wrongs may be Done. The methods in which one may

be wronged in respect to his ownership of personal estate are

the following: 4

property in him is in the owner of the land.' Under the ci\-il
law the property passed to the captor,' and such is believed to
be tho recognized rule in America even when the capture has
been effected by means of a trespass on another's land.'

1. By the direct application of force, injuring or destroying

it, or disturbing the owner in his possession.

2. By indirect injuries, whether through negligence or of

intent.

3. By converting the property to the use of the wrong-doer.

4. By failure to respond to any obligation of bailment in

respect to it.

5. By neglect to restore possession to the owner when it has

been acquired without his consent, or when a possession once

rightful has become wrongful by failure to comply with a lawful

demand to surrender it to the owner.

Trespass to Personalty. The ﬁrst of these wrongs is techni-

cally known as a trespass. A trespass to property consists in

the unlawful disturbance by force of another’s possession. There-

fore, that is not a trespass which consists merely in some wrong
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done to property by one to whom, for any purpose, the posses-

sion has been transferred by the owner, and who at the time of

the wrong was lawfully holding it.‘ But a possession obtained

by fraud and for the very purpose of the wrong, is not a. lawful

possession, and an injury by force, while it continues, must be

How Wrongs may be Done. The methods in which one may
be wronged in respect to his ownership of personal estate are
the following:
1. By the direct application of force, injuring or destroying
it, or disturbing the 0\yner in his possession.
2. By indirect injuries, whether through negligence or of
intent.
3. By converting the property to the use of the wrong.doer.
4. By failure to respond to any obligation of bailment in
respect to it.
5. By neglect to restore possession to the owner when it has
been acquired without his consent, or when a possc~sion once
rightful has become wrongful by failure to comply with a lawful
demand to surrender it to the owner.

deemed a trespass on the possession of the owner.‘

The possession disturbed by a trespass may be either, 1, that

of a general owner of the property; or, 2, that of one having

a special property therein as mortgagee, bailee, or oﬁicer;' or,

‘ Rigg 11. Earl of Lonsdnle, 1 H. &

N. 923; Blades 0. Higgs_12 C. B. (N.

s.) 501; 13 0. B. (N. s.) 844; s. 0. in

Error, 11 H. L. Cas. 621.

9 Justinian, Inst. Lib. 2,t. 1, § 12.

‘Fish are the property of those

who take them, and a whale belongs

to the captors. Taber 0. Jenny, 1

Sprague, 315.

' Furlong 0. Bartlett, 21 Pick. 401;

Bradley 0. Davis, 14 Me. 44.

‘ Butler v. Collins, 12 Cal. 457.

' Brownell v. Manchester, 1 Pick.

232; Casher 0. Peterson, 4 N. J. 317;

Browning o. Skillman,24 N. J. 351;

Trespass to Personalty. The first of these wrongs is technically known as a trespass. A trespass to property consists in
the unlawful disturbance by force of another's possession. Therefor~, that is not a trespass which consists merely in some wrong
done to property by one to whom, for any purpose, the possession has been transferred by the owner, and who at the time of
the wrong was lawfully holdinl! it.• But a pos:;ession obtained
by fraud and for the very p'nrpose of the wrong, is not a lawful
pos,.;ession, and an injury by force, while it continues, must be
deemed a trespass on the possession of the ownet·. •
The possession disturbed by a tre!'pass may be either, 1, that
of' a general owner of the property; or, 2, that of one having
a special property therein as mortgagee, bailee, m· officer; • or,

Taylor 0. Manderson, 1 Ashm. 130:

Whitney 1:. Ladd, 10 Vt. 165; Sewell

0. Harrington, 11 Vt. 141.

~i _

1 Rigg "· Earl of Lonsdale, 1 H. &
N. 923; Blades fl. Higgs. 12 C. B. (N.
s.) 501; 13 C. B. (N. s.) 844; 8. C. in
Error, 11 H. L. Cas. 621.
'Ju ~ Unian, lost. Lib. 2, t. 1, § 12.
' Fish are the property of those
who take them, and a whale helongs
to the captors. Tauer fl. Jenny, 1
Sprague, 315.

•

' Furlong fl. Bm11ett, 21 Pick. 401 ;
Bradlcy "· Davis, 14 Me. 44.
• Butler"· Collins, 12 Cal. 457.
• Brownell fl. ~lanchest~r. 1 Pick.
232; Casher fl. Peterson,4N.J.317;
Browning fl. Skillman, 2! N. J. 351;
Tnylor "· :Manderson, 1 Ashm. 130:
Whitm•y to. Larld, 10 Vt. 165; Sewell
"· Harrington, 11 Vt. 141.
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3, that of a mere possessor, by which is meant one who has a

peaceable possession, but who shows in himself no other right.

This mere possession is suﬂicient as against one who disturbs it

without right in himself, and who, therefore, occupies the posi-

tion of an iutermeddler in that in which he has no interest.

Thus, though an heir as such is not entitled to the possession of

the personalty of his ancestor, yet if he have actual possession,

he may sue in respect thereof any intruder.‘ So an agister of

cattle, though having no lien, may maintain trespass against a

stranger for taking them away;’ and so may one who is simply

intrusted with goods for safe keeping without compensation.’

Says SAVAGE, Ch. J.: “It would be monstrously inconvenient if

a wrong-doer could come and take things out of the possession

of him who had the possession under the rightful owner.‘

Though a mere servant has not such a special property as will

enable him to maintain trover, yet a bailee or trustee, or any

other person who is responsible to his principal, may maintain

the action, and the lawful possession of the goods is priznafacie

evidence of property.” ‘ But possession may be either actual or

constructive. The right to the possession of chattels draws to it,

in contemplation of law, the possession itself, so that one party
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may sometimes be entitled to sue on his actual possession, while

another may sue on his constructive possession. Thus, though

a. bailee or a mortgageor of chattels who is left in possession

thereof may bring trespass against one who disturbs his posses-

sion, still if the mortgagee or bailee is of right entitled to

demand and take possession at any time, this right draws to it

the possession, and the wrong-doer is a trespasser upon him

also.‘ S0, if one cut wood on the land of another, he has, as to

' Hyde 0. Stone, '7 Wend. 854;

Beecher 0. Crouse, 19 Wend. I206. Bee

Webb 0. Fox. 7 T. R. 391; Carter o.

Bennett, 4 Fla. 283, cases of trover.

Trespass will not lie against one

whose property, in the hands of a

bailee, has been taken with the latter‘s

consent. Marshall o. Davis, 1 Wend.

109. But trover will lie if the prop-

arty is not restored on demand, or is

disposed of. See Terry v. Bamherger,

44 Conn. 558. '

3, that of a mere poeee880r, by which is meant one who has a
peaceable possession, but who shows in himselt' no other right.
This mere possession is sufficient as against one who disturbs it
without right in himself, and who, therefore, O(:cupies the position of an intermeddler in that in which he has no interest.
Thns, thongh an heir as such is not entitled to the possession of
the personalty of his ancestor, yet if he have actual possession,
he may sue in respect thereof any intntder.• So an agister of
cattle, though having no lien, may maintain trespass against a
stranger for taking them away;' and so inay one who is simply
intrusted with goods for sate keaping without cornpen~ation.'
Says SAVAGE, Ch. J.: "It would be monstrously inconvenient if
a wrong-doer could come and take thin~~ out of the possession
of him who had the possession under the rightful owner.4
Thongh a mere servant has not such a special property as will
enable him to maintain trover, yet a bailee or trustee, or any
other person who is responsible to his principal, may maintain
the action, and the lawful possession of ~he goods is prima facie
evidence of property." • Bnt possession may be either actual or
constructive. The right to th~ possession of chattels draws to it,
in contemplation of law, the possession itself, so that one party
may sometimes be entitled to sne on his actual pos~rssion, while
another may sue on his constructive possession. Thus, though
a bailee or a mor~cor of chattels who is left in possession
thereof may bring trespass 3oaainst one who disturbs his pot!session, still if the mortg!l,bJ"OO or bailee is of right entitled to
demand and take possession at any time, this right draw~ to it
the possession, and the wrong-doer is a trespast'er upon him
also.• So, if one cut wood on the land of' another, he has. as to

' Bass 0. Pierce, 16 Bnrb. 595.

' Faulkner v Brown. 13 Wend. 63;

Cowing o. Snow, 11 Mass. 415.

‘ Citing Sutton v. Buck, 2 Taunt.

309, per CHAMBER, J usticc.

‘ Faulkner 0. Brown. 18 Wend. 63,

64, citing cases. That a scri-ant can-

not bring trespass on the possession

he holds for his master is held in

Tuthill 2*. Wheeler, 6 Barb. 362.

' White v. Brantley, 37 Ala. 430; Ov.

erhy v. McGee, 15 Ark. 459; Staples v.

Smith, 48 Me 470; Strong 0. Adams, 30

Vt. 221; White 0. Webb, 15 Conn. 302.

1 Hyde e. Stone, '7 Wend. 8M ;
Beecher "· Crouse, 19 Wend. ::06. See
Webb "· Fox, 7 T. R. 891; Carter "·
Bennett, 4 Fla. 283, cues of trover.
Trespass will not lie against one
whose property, in &be bands of a
b"ilee, baa been taken with the hlteer'a
conaenL Marshall "· Davis, 1 Wend.
109. But trover will lie iC the prop.
erty is no~ restored on demand, or ia
disp•>sed of. See Terry"· Bamberger,
"Conn. 558.
•
' Bus •· Pierce, te Barb. G8G.

• Faulkner" Browu, 18 Wend. 68;
c,,wiog "· Snow, 11 Ma!lll. 413.
• Citing Sutton "· Buck, 2 Taunt.
809, per CHAKBBK, Justk-e.
' Faulkner "· Brown. 18 Wrnd. 68,
64, citing c:1ses. That a t.ervant c"D·
no~ bring trespasa on the poSl!l'll~ion
he holdo~ fhr his mMter Ia held in
Tuthill t'. Wheeler, 6 Barb. 862.
• Wbite11. Brantley,37 Ala.430; Overby 11. ~[cGce, 1:; Ark. 4li9; Staples v.
Smith, 48 Me. 470; Strong"· Adams, 30
VL Ul; Whltee. Webb,lG Conn. sot.
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all third persons, the possession of the wood cut, and may bring
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suits as possessor against intermeddlers; but if he has cut with-

out right, the wood belongs to the owner of the land, and is

deemed to be in his possession.‘ So the ﬁnder of a chattel has

rightful possession of \vhat he ﬁnds, except as against the owner;

but the latter has constructive possession, and if the ﬁnder

intentionally or carelessly abuses or injures it, he becomes him-

self a trespasser, and cannot, in a suit by the owner, justify even

the original taking.’

A trespass may be intentional or unintentional. A more

aecident—which, as has already been said, is an event happening

without fault'—ca.n never be a trespass; and, therefore, if one,

in hurriedly removing goods from a burning building, should

injure another without being chargeable with negligence, he

would not be liable for the injury; while, if carelessly or reck-

lessly, he were to throw the goods into the street, where many

persons were congregated or were passing, he would justly be

held a trespasser upon any one injured. That, however, which is

done purposely, though by mistake, is not to be deemed acci-

dental. Therefore, if one goes upon the land of another to take

away his own sheep, and by mistake takes some which do not

belong to him, his mistake cannot excuse the trespass.‘ So, if
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‘Ward 1:. Andrews 2 Chit. 636;

Bulkley v. Dolbeare, 7 Conn. 232.

*Oxley 0. Watts, 1 T. R. 12. A

horse was taken up as an cstray and

afterward worked. llrid to eonst‘:tute

the party taking him up a trespasser

1b i/titio. See Clark c. Maloney, 3

Harr. 68; Brandon 0. Huntsville

Bank, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 320; McLaughlin

'0. Waite, 9 Cow. 670.

all third persons, the possession of the wood cut, and may hrin_;
suits as possessor against intermeddlers; but if he has eut without right, the wood belongs to the owner of the land, an•l is
deemed to be in his possession.• So the finder of a chattel has
rightful possession of what he finds, except as again::;t the owner;
but the latter has constmctive })OBsession, and if the tinder
intentionally or car·elessly abuses or injures it, he becomes himself a trespasser, and cannot, in a suit by the owner, justifY even
the original taking.•
A trespass may be intentional or unintentional. A mere
accident-which, as has already been said, is an event happening
without fault '-can never be a trespass; and, therefore, if one,
in hurriedly removing goods from a burning building, shonhl
injnre another without being chargeable with negligence, he
would not be liable for the iuj ury; while, if carelessly or recklessly, he wer·e to throw the goods into the street, where many
persons were congregated or were pas~ing, he would ju::.tly be
held a trespasser upon any one injured. That, however, which is
done purposely, though by mistake, is not to be deemed accidental. Therefore, if one goes upon the land of another to take
away his own sheep, and by mistake takes some which do not
belong to him, his mistake cannot excuse the trespass.• So, if
-.....:._

' Ante, p. 80.

‘ Dexter 1:. Cole. 6 Wis. 319. COLE,

J.: “ We have no doubt but the action

of trespass would lie in this case. In

driving oil‘ the sheep the defendant

in error, without doubt, unlawfully

interfered with the property of De.\:-,

ter, and it has been frequently de-

cided that lo maintain trespass do

bonis Il.Ep¢/)'tﬂll'8 it was not necessary

to prove actual forcible dispossession

of property; but that evidence of any

unlawful interference with, or exer-

cise of acts of ownership over prop-

erty, to the exclusion of the owm'I'.

would sustain the action. Gibbs 1:.

Chase. 10 Mass. 125; Miller 0. Baker,

1 Met. 27; Phillips 1:. Hall, 8 Wend.

610; Morgan v. Varirk, 8 Wend. 587;

Wintringham 0. Lafoy, 7 Cow. 735;

Reynolds 0. Shuler, 5 (‘ow. 323; 1

(fhit. Pl. 11 Am. Ed. 170, and cases

cited in the notes. Neither is it neces-

sary to prove that the act was (lone

with a wrongful intent, it being stifli-

cieut if it was without a justiﬁable

cause or purpose, though it were

done accidentally or by mistake. 2

Greenl. Ev. § 622; Guille v. Swan, 19

Johns. 391. There is nothing incon-

sistent with these authorities in the

case of Parker 0. Walrod, 13 Wend.

~_s _ -__.--1»:

1 Ward t:J. Andrews
2 Chit. 636;
Bulkley t:J. Dolbeare, 'l Conn. 232.
'Oxley t:J. Watts, 1 T. R. 12. A
horse was taken up as an estray and
afterwurd worked. !If'ld to const 'tuw
the party taking him up a tre!:<passer
1b itu"tio. See Clark fl. Maloney, 8
Harr. 68 ; Brandon t:J. Hunt:;ville
Bank, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 320; McLaughlin
t:J. Waite, 9 Cow. 670.
• Ante, p. 80.
4 Dexter t:J. Cole, 6 Wis. 319.
COLE,
J.: "We have no doubt but the 1\ction
of trespass would lie in this case. In
driving off the sheep the defendant
in error, without doubt, unlawfully
interfered with the property of Dcx;
ter, and it bas been frequent!y decidt..'<l that to maintnin tr<!spass d8
boniB mprrrtnliB it was not necessary
to prove actual forcible dispossea.sion

of properly; but that evidence of any
unliLWful intl·rfcrence with, or exer.
cisc of acts of ownet·ship over prop.
erty, to the exclusion of the owner,
would sustain thc ac1i11n. Gibbs r.
Chase, 10 Mass. l::!!i; )I i lh·r "· Baker,
1 M:et. 27; Phillips "· H:lll, 8 Wend.
610; Morgan 11. Varirk, 8 Wl•nd. 687;
Wintringhnm t:J. Lufoy, 7 Cuw. 735;
Rcynolds t:J. Simler, 5 C'ow. 323; 1
Chit. Pl. 11 Am. Ed. 170, and CllSCS
citl'tl in the notes. X either is it necl'l4eary to prove that the act Wl\..'1 done
with a wro:-~gfnl intent, it IJeinJ; sufftcient if it was without a jut-liftable
cause or purpose, though It were
done acr.idl'ntally or by mistake. 2
Green!. Ev. ~ 622; Guille "· Bwan, 19
Johns. 3Sl. There is nothing incon.
sistcnt with these aulhol"ities in the
case of Parker fl. Walrod, 13 Wend.
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one is sent to take property, and does so in good faith, believing
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it to belong to his employer, this is trespass in him if the belief

proves unfounded.’ ~ But an employment of force to which the

plaintiff assents is no trespass upon his rights unless the assent

was in itself illegal, as we have seen it is in some cases of per-

sonal injury.‘

The force that constitutes trespass may be applied either,

1, by the party himself who is responsible for it; or, 2, by some

other person for whose conduct, as servant or otherwise, he is

accountable; or, 3, by his domestic animals. The principle on

which the party is held responsible in the second and third cases

is explained elsewhere.

The force may beexpress or implied. Thus false or illegal

imprisonment is a trespass to the person imprisoned, though it

is sometimes effected by threats or by otherwise exciting the per-

son’s fears. So setting a ﬁre which directly communicates with

the property of another and destroys it, has been held to be a tres-

pass in respect to such property.’ But this seems questionable.

The degree of force is immaterial to the right of action. If

one’s horse is hitched where he had a right to hitch him, it is 'a

trespass if another, without permission, unhitches and removes

him to another post, however near; ‘ but one may ustify unhitch-
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ing a horse from his own fence or shade tree, and removing him,

provided it is to a place of safety.‘

As regards the directness of the injury which will distinguish

a case in trespass from one in which the remedy must be sought on

the special case, there seems to be no better test than this: That

if the unlawful force caused the injury before it was spent, this

injury must be deemed direct; but if. after the unlawful force

was spent, the injury occurred, as a collateral or secondary con-

sequence, it is to be considered indirect.

Thus, where one was injured by the throwing of a lighted

squib into a crowd, which only reached him after several persons,

in self protection, had repelled it from themselves. this was a

trespass, because the plaintiff was injured as a direct consequence

296." See a similar casein Hobart 0. general principle, Cadwell 0. Farrell,

Hagget, 12 Me. 67. 28 Ill. 438.

‘ Higginson 0. York, 5 Mass. Ml. ‘Jordan v. Wyatt, 4 Grat. 151.

Bee Busely v. Clurkson, 8 Lev. 87. ‘ Burch 0. Carter, 82 N. J. 554.

' See auto, p. 163. Also, for the ' Gilman 0. Emery, 54 Me. 460.

one is sent to take property, and does so in good faitl•, believing
it to belong to his employer, this is trespass in him if the belief
proves unfounded.' · But an employment of fon:e to which the
plaintiff assents is no trespass upon his rights unles:; the assent
was in itself illegal, as we have seen it is in some ca:;es of personal injury.•
The force that constitutes tresplliB may be applied eitber,
1, by the }>arty himself who is responsible for it; or, 2, by some
other }>Crson tor whose conduct, as servant or otherwise, he is
accountable; or, 3, by his domestic animals. The principle on
which the party is held J'e:)}>onsible in the seoond and third cases
is explained elsewhere.
The force may be express or implied. Thus false or illegal
impri:..;oument is a trespass to the person imprisoned, though it
is sometimes effected by threats or by otherwise excitiug the person's tears. So setting a tire which directly <.-ommunicates with
the property of another and destroys it, has been held to be a trespass in respect to snch property.' But this seems qnestionable.
The degree of force is immaterial to the right of action. If
one·s horse is hitched where he had a right to hitch him, it is ·a
trcspnss if another, without }lermission, unhitches and romovee
him to another post, however 'Dear; • but one may justi(y unhitching a horse from his own fence or shade tree, and removing him,
provided it is to a plRCe of safety.•
As regards the directness of the injury which will distinguish
a case in trellpass from one in which the remedy must be sought on
the special case, there seems to be no better test than this: That
if the unlawful force caused the injury before it was spent, this
injury must be deemed direct; but if. after the unlawful force
was spent, the injnry occurred, as a collateral or secondary consequence, it is to be considered indirect.
Thus, where one was injured by the throwiug of a lighted
squib into a crowd, which only reached him after se\"eral perlions,
in self protection, had repelled it from themselves. this was a
trespass, because the plaintiff was injured as a direct consequence
296." See a atmtlar cue to Hobart •·
Hagget, 12 Me. 67.
' IIigginson "· York, 5 Mass. 341.
Bee Basely o. Clarkson, 8 Lev. 87.
• See an\e, p. 163. A.lao, for the

general principle, Cadwell e. Farrell.
2I:J

Ill.~.

'Jordan"· Wyatt., 4 Grall:Sl.
t Burch e. Car1er, 82 N.J. 6.'i4.
• Gilman •· Emery, 54 .Me. 460.
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of the unlawful act, and before its force was spent.‘ So it is a
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trespass if one injure another in the careless handling of tire-

arms.’ S0, “if a man throws a log into the highway, and in

that act it hits me, I may maintain trespass, because it is an imme-

diate wrong; but if, as it lies there, I tumble over it and receive

an injury, I must bring an action upon the case, because it is

only prejudicial in consequence, for which originally I could have

no action at all.” ‘ So it is a trespass if one turn a stream upon

his neigl1bor’s land by carrying a ditch over the line; but if he

only set up a spout on other lands, which may carry water there

when it rains, or a dam, which may turn it there, the injury,

when it comes, will arise on the special case.‘ So if one care-

lessly drives against another, this is a trespass; ‘ but if his

servant is guilty of the like want of care, the action should be

case.’ So, though one of several stage proprietors, who is him-

self driving the coach, might be sued in trespass for carelessly

driving against the plaintiff and injuring him; yet if other pro-

prietors-are sued with him who were not personally connected

with the force, the action must be case.’

A disturbance of an incorporeal hereditament, such, for exam-

ple, as a right of way, is not a trespass, because the right, being

intangible. is not the subject of force. Neither is a forcible
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injury to property, in which the plaintiif has only a reversionary

' Scott o. Shepherd, 8 Wils. 403.

' Underwood v. Hewson, Stra. 596;

Weaver Iv. Ward, Hob. 134; Taylor 0.

Rainbow, 2 H. & N. 423.

’ Psnxnn, Ch. J ., in Reynolds v.

Clarke, Stra. 634, 686.

‘ Reynolds 0. Clarke, Stra. 634.

' Leame v. Bray, 3 East, 593. See,

to the same effect, Sheldrick v. Abery,

1 Esp. 55; Day 0. Edwards, 5 T. R.

of the unlawful act; and before its force was spent.1 So it is a
trespass if one injure another in the careless handling of firearms.' So, "if a man thro\VS a Jog into the highway, and in
that act it hits me, I may maintain trespass, because it is an immediate wrong; but if, as it lies there, I tumble over it and receive
an injury, I must bring an action upon the case, because it is
only prejudicial in consequence, for which originally I could have
no action at all." 1 So it is a trespass if one turn a stream upon
his neighbor's land by carrying a ditch over the line; but if he
only set up a spout on other lands, which may carry water there
when it rains, or a dam, which may turn it there, the injury,
when it comes, will arise on the special case.• So if oue carelessly drives against another, this is a trespass; • but if his
servant is guilty of the like want of care, the action should be
case.• So, though one of several stage proprietors, who is himself driving the coach, might be sned in trespass for carelessly
driving again~t the plaintiff and injuring him; yet if other
prietors• are sued with him who were not personally connected
with the force, the action must be case.'
A disturbance of au incorporeal hereditament, such, for example, as a right of way, is not a trespass, because the right, being
intangible, is not the subject of force. Neither is a forcible
injury to property, in which the plaintiff has only a reversionary

pro-

648; Savignac v. Roome, 6 T. R. 125.

° Haggett v. Montgomery, 5 Esp.

(2 N. R.) 446. Compare Williams 0.

Holland, 6 C. & P. 23, and Ogle v.

Barnes, S T. R 187, explained in

L€8.l1lC v. Bray. 3 East, 5915, 595. An

action of trespass docs not lie against

a railroad company for the destruc-

tion or injury of animals run over by

its cars or engines, unless the wrong-

ful act was done by its direction, or

with its assent. The conductor, en-

gineer, or other subordinate agent

who has charge of the train at the

time of the accident is not, for this

purpose, the representative of the cor-

poration. Selma, Rome & Dalton R.

R. Co. v. Webb, 49 Ala. 240, citing

Phil., Gereed 85 N. R. R. Co. 0. Wilt,

4 Whart 143.

" llloreton v. Hardern,4 B. & C. 223;

S. C. 6 D. & Ry. 275. Perhaps, how-

ever, where negligence is the gist of

action, case may at all times be

brought, even though the injury may

be direct.

Scott "· Shepherd, 8 Wils. 403.
Underwood "·Hewson, Strl\. 596;
Weaver ·D. Ward, Hob. 134; Taylor"·
Rainbow, 2 H. & N. 423.
1 PARKER, Ch. J., in Reynolds 11.
Clarke, Stra. 634, 636.
• Reynolds 1l. Clarke, Stra. 634.
• Leame 1l. Bray, 3 E~tst, 593. See,
to the same effect, Sl.teld•·ick o. Abery,
1 Esp. 55; Day "· Edwards, 5 T. R.
G48; Savignac 1l. Roome, 6 T. R. 125.
1 Haggett 1l. Montgomery, 5 Esp.
(2 N. R) 446. Compare Williams 1l.
Holland, 6 C. & P. 23, and Ogle 1l.
Barnes, 8 T. R. 187, explained in
Leame "· Bray, 8 East, 59:), 505. An
action of trespass doos not lie against
a. railroad company for the destrue1

1

tlon or injury of animals mn over by
it!l cars or engines, unless the wrongful act was dune by its direction, or
with its assent. The conductor, engineer, or other subordinate agent
who has charge of the train at the
t.irue of the accident is not, for this
purpose, the representath·e of the corporation. 81·lma, Rome & Dalton R.
R. Co. "· Webb, 49 Ala. 240, citing
Phil., Gereed & N. R. R. Co."· Wilt,
4 Whllrt 143.
, lloreton "· Hard ern, 4 B. & C. 223;
8. C. 6 D. & Ry. 275. Perhaps, however, where negligence is the gist of
action, case may at all times be
brought, even though the injury may
be direcl
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interest, a trespass, since he can have in such property no
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constructive possession.‘

Anything is the subject of trespass in which the law recognizes

any property, complete or partial. Therefore, to kill one’s dog

or cat, or even a wild beast kept in conﬁnement, is a trespass,

unless it can be justiﬁed.’

The remedies for a trespass are either, 1, an action for the

recovery of damages, which will lie in all cases. 2, recaption of

the goods, when the trespasser has taken them into his posses-

sion, and they can be retaken without breach of the peace; and,

3, replevin or recapture of the goods by legal process.‘ A tres-

pass may also generally be treated as a conversion.

Indirect Injuries. These are generally injuries of negligence,

and are committed by a failure to observe that care in respect to

the rights of others which is their due. But they may be inju-

ries intended, and differing from trespasses only in this: that

they are secondary, and not a direct result of the unlawful act.

Thus, if one shoot a gun into a crowd and injure some one of the

persons there congregated, the act is a trespass; but if he pur-

interest, a trespass, since he can have in such property no
constructi \'e possession.1
Anything is the sn bject of tresp888 in which the law recognizes
any property, complete or partial. Therefore, to kill one's dog
or cat, or even a wild beast kept in confinement, is a trespass,
nnle"s it can be justified.•
The remedies tor a trespass are either, 1, an action for the
recovery of damages, which will lie in all cases, 2, recaption of
the goods, when the trespasser has taken them into his possession, and they can be retaken without breach of the peaoo; and,
3, replevin or recapture of the goods by legal process.• A trespass may also generally be treated as a conversion.

posely, and with evil intent, leave a loaded pistol where children

will be likely to handle it, he will be equally liable when an injury

occurs, but the action must be on the special case, because the
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injury is indirect, and does not happen until some secondary

agency has intervened.‘

TBOVKR.

The injury which is redressed in an action of trovcr is techni-

cally called conversion, and the declaration counts upon the real

' Hall v. Pickard, 8 Camp. 187.

The case was one in which horses had

been let by the plaintiﬂ‘ for a certain

time, and one of them was run against

and kllled before the time had expired.

And see Lunt u. Brown, 13 Me. 236.

’ Parker o. Misc, 27 Ala. 480; Dod-

son v. Mock, 4 Dev. & Bat. 146;

Wheatley 0. Harris, 4 Sneed, 468;

Indirect Injuries. These are generally injuries of negligence,
and are committed by a failure to observe that care in respect to
the rights of others which is their due. But they may be injuries intended, and differing from trespasses only in this: that
they are secondary, and not a direct result of the unlawful act.
Thus, if one shoot a gun into a crowd and injure some one of the
persons there congregated, the act is a trespass; but if he purposely, and with evil intent, leave a loaded pistol where children
will be likely to handle it, he will be equally liable when au injury
occurs, but the action must be on the special case, because the
injury is indirect, and does not happen until some secondary
agency has intervened.•

Dunlap a. Snyder, 17 Barb. 561; Wolf

0. (Jhalker, 31 Conn. 121; Perry o.

TROVER.

Phipps, 10 Ired. 259; Lentz 0. Stroh,

6 S. dz R 84.

' A citizen. whose horse was taken

The injury which is redressed in an action of trover is technically called conversion, and the declaration counts upon the real

and carried otf by the army, and is

ﬁnally found in private hands, may

lawfully retake it, and if the party in

possession claims it, he is called upon

to show how the owner lost his title.

Hawkins 0. Nelson. 40 Ala. 558.

4 Dixon r. Bell, 5 M. & 8.198. See

Welch 2:. Durand, 36 Conn. 182; S. C.

4 Am. Rep. 55; Tancred 0. Allgood,

4 H. & N. 438. -

1 Hall t. Pickard, 8 Camp. 187.
The case was one in which horses had
been let by the plaintiff fur a certain
time, and one of them was run against
and killed before the time bad expired.
And sec Lunt "· Brown, 13 Me. 2:16.
• Parker"· ~lise, 27 .AlL 480; DodliOn "· Mock, 4 Dev. & Bal 146;
Wheatley 11. Harris, 4 Sneed, 468;
Dunlap"· Snyder, 17 Barb. 561; Wolf
"· Chalker, 31 Coon. 121; Perry "·
Phipps, 10 Ired. 259; Lentz tl. Stroh,
6S.&R M.

• A citizt'n, wbo•c horse was taken
and cnrried off by the army, and is
finally found in private hands, may
lawfully retake it, and if the party In
po~session claims it, he is called upon
to show how the owner lost hie title.
Hawkins"· Nel!lon, 40 Ala. 5.'13.
' Dixon r. &II, ts M. & B. 198. See
Welch ~:. Durand, 36 Coon. 182; S. e.
-i Am. Rep. 55; Tancred •· Allgood,

jH.&N.438.
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or supposed fact that the plaintiff casually lost his goods, and the
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defendant found and appropriated them. “ In tbrm the action is

a ﬁction; in substance, a remedy to recover the value of personal

chattels wrongfully converted by another to his own use. The

form supposes the defendant may have come lawfully by the pos-

sion of the goods. This action lies, and has been brought in

many cases where, in truth, the defendant has got the possession

lawfully. lVhere the defendant takes them wrongfully. and by

trespass, the plaintiﬂ', if he thinks ﬁt to_bring this action, waives

the trespass, and admits the possession to have been lawfully

gotten.”‘ If the plaintiff prefers to recover hack the speciﬁc

property, he brings replevin instead of trover, provided the goods

are still in the defendant’s possession, and he might formerly

have brought the now nearly obsolete action of detinue.'

There are two principal differences between the actions of tres-

pass and trover for personalty appropriated by defendant; the

ﬁrst of which is, that in trespass there is always either an original

wrongful taking, or a taking made wrongful ab initio by subse-

quent mise0nduct,' while in trover, the original taking is Sll1)I)U.\CLl

or assumed to be lawful, and often the only wrong consists in a

refusal to surrender a possession which was originally rightful,

but the right to which has terminated. The second is, that
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trespass lies for any wrongful force, but the wrongful ‘force is no

conversion where it is employed in recognition of the owner's

right, and with no purpose to deprive him of his right, temporarily

or permanently. Thus, if one take up the beast of another, in

order to prevent his straying away, and afterwards turn him out

again, he may be liable in trespass for so doing, but his act is no

conversion, because the owner’s dominion is not disputed, and

the intent to make a wrongful appropriation is absent.‘

Who may bring Trover. It is commonly said that “ to sustain

trover, the plaintiff must show a legal title; he must have prop-

‘ Lord Mmvsrtann, Ch. J ., in

Cooper 0. Chitty, Burr. 3. See the

nature of the action explained in Bur-

roughes v. Bayne, 5 H. & N. 296, 309.

' There are statutes in some States

which permit the plaintiff in an ac-

tion of replevin to proceed in it as in

trover, and recover the value of the

7 — 7 -"' -— '- — m w

property in case the otﬁcer fails to

ﬁnd it to return to him on the writ.

or supposed flk}t that the plaintiff casually lost his goods, and the
def~mdant found and appropriated them. "In form the action is
a fiction; in substance, a remedy to recover the value of personal
chattels wrongfully converted by another to his own usc. The
furm suppose~ the defendant may have come lawfully by the pos..
sion of the goods. This action lies, aud has been brought in
many cases where, in truth, the defendant has gut the possession
lawfully. 'Vhere the defendant takes them wrougfu1ly, and by
trespass, tho plaintiff, if he thinks fit to. bring this action~ wah·es
the trcl'pass, and admits the possession to have been lawfully
gotten."' If the plaintiff prefers to recover back the specific
property, he brings replevin instead of trover, provided the goous
are still in the defendant's possession, and he might formerly
have brought the now nearly obsolete action of detinue.•
There are two principal differences between the actions of trespass and trover for personalty appropriated by defendant; the
firz>t of which is, that in tret.:pass there is always either an original
wrongful taking, or a taking made wrongful ah initio by subsequent misconduct,• while in trover, the ori~rinal taking is suppo::.cJ
or assumed to be lawful, and oftcu the only wrong <.'Onsists in a
refusal to surrender a possession which was originally rightful,
but the right to which has terminated. The second is, that
trespass lies for any wrongful force, but the wrongful ·force is no
conversion where it is employed in rel'ognition of the owner's
right, and with no purpose to deprive him of his right, temporarily
or permanently. Thus, if oue take up the beatit of another, in
order to prevent his straying away, and afterwards turn him out
again, he may be liable in trespass for so doing, hut his act is no
conversion, because the owtwr's dominion is not disputed, and
the intent to make a wrongful appropriation is absent.•

‘ Van Brunt v. Schcnck, ll Johns,

377; Parker o. Walrod, 13 Wend. 296;

S. C. in error, 16 Wend. 514.

Who may bring Trover. It is commonly said that " to Rnstain
trover, the plaintiff must show a legal title; he must have pt·op-

‘ Wilson 0. McLaughlin, 107 Muss.

587.

1 Lord
MusnELD, Ch. J., in
Cooper e. Chitty, Burr. 8. See the
nature of the action explained in Bw·rougbes "·Bayne, G H. & N. 296,809.
1 There are statutes in some States
which permit the plaintiff in an action of replevin to proceed in it as in
trover, and :recover the value of the

property in case the officer fails to
find it to return to him on the writ.
' Van Drunt "· Schenck, 11 J oltns,
877; Purkcr "· Walrod, 18 W enu. ~;
8. C. in error, 16 Wend. 514.
4 Wil110n •· .McLaughlin, 107 HIUIS.
587.
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erty, general or special, or actual possession or the right to i|mne-

443

diate possession at the time of the conversion; ”' and in some

cases the defendant has been allowed to defeat a recovery by

merely showing property in a third person, without at all con-

necting himself with the right of such person. Thus, in Rotan

v. Fletcher, the suit was trover for a cow taken from the posses-

sion of the plaintiff, and which he had bought of the wife of one

Hcininway, the owner, who had absconded. There was some

evidence of an attachment of the cow for a debt of Heminway,

but the court, without relying upon this, held the action not

maintainable. “The action was trover, and it was competent for

the defendant to prove property in a third person. The pre-

tended sale from Mrs. Ileminway did not transfer the property

to the plaintiff below. She had no authority to sell the cow;

and besides, it was offered to be proved that even this sale was

fraudulent.” ' S0 in T at/till v. Wheeler, it was decided that one

in possession of a canal boat for the season, under a contract with

the owner to navigate it, and to be accountable for any injury to

it, could not bring trover against one who had taken it from his

possession, because he had at the time in the boat neither a

special nor a general ownership.‘ The reason is thus given by

the Supreme Court of Maine: “The defendant in an action of
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trover, may prove that the title to the property claimed was, when

the suit was commenced, in a third person, and thus defeat the

action. If he could not, he might subsequently be compelled to

pay for the same property again to such third person, he being a

stranger to the ﬁrst suit.” ‘ But as the liability is also incurred

where trespass is brought on a mere possession, it is manifest

that it cannot constitute any sufficient reason for holding that a

party may sue in one form of action but not in the other.

' Drury o. Mutual, etc., Ins. Co., 88

Md. 242, 249, per Minnsn, J.; Ste-

phenson o. Little, 10 Mich. 433, 439,

per lllasnmo, J.; Owens v. Weed-

man, 82 Ill.409, 417, per DICKEY, J.

Of course the husband cannot bring

trover for the conversion of the wife's

property. Taylor 0. Jones, 62 Ala.

78.

’ Rotan '0. Fletcher, 15 Johns. 206.

See Sheldon 0. Super, 14 Johns. 852;

Grady v. Newby, 6 Blackf.442; Glenn

0. Garrison. 17 N. J. 1, 4.

erty, general or special, or actual possession or the right to immediate possession at the time of the conversion; " 1 and in some
cases the defendant has been allowed to defeat a re<.:overy by
merely showing property in a third person, without at all connecting himself with the right of such person. Thus, in Rotan
v. .Fletcher, the suit was tro,·er for a cow taken from the possession of the plaintiff, and which he had bought of the wife of one
Hcrninway, the owner, who had absconded. There was some
evidence of an attachment of the cow for a debt of Heminway,
but the court, without relying upon this, held the action nut
maintainable. "The action was trover, and it was competent fur
the det(mdant to prove property in a thil·d person. The }lretended sale from Mrs. Ileminway did not transter the property
to the plaintiff below. She had no authority to sell the cow;
and besides, it was offered to be proved that e\·en this sale was
fraudulent." • So in Tuthill v. Wheeler, it was decided that uue
in possession of a canal boat for the season, under a (:untract with
the owner to nc~.vigate it, and to be accountable tor any injury to
it, c:ould not bring trover against one who had taken it from his
po~session, because he had at the time in the boat neither a
special nor a general ownership.• The reason is thus gi,·en by
the Supreme Court of Maine: "The defendant in an action of
trover, may prove that the title to the property claimed was, when
the suit was commenced, in a third Jlerson, and thus defeat the
action. If he c:onld not, he might sub&'qnently be compelled to
pay tor the same propm·ty again to such third person, he being a
stranger to the first suit." • But as the liability is also incurred
where trespass is brought on a mere pos,;ession, it is munitest
that it cannot constitute any sufficient reason fur holding that a
party may sue in one form of action but not in the other.

‘Tuthill 0. Wheeler. 6 Barb. 862.

‘ (llnpp 0. Glidden, 39 Me. 448. 451.

It has been held in the same Slate,

however, that the existence of a lien

on goods in favor of a common ear.

rier was no defense to a wrong.

doer sued by the owner for a conver-

sion of the goods. Amcs 0. Palmer,

42 Me. 197.

Drury e. Mutual, etc., Ins. Co., 88
:MILLER, J.; Ste.
pbenson e. Little, 10 Mich. 438, 439,
per )lANNING, J.; Owens 11. Weed.
man, 82 Ill. 409, 417, per DICKEY, J.
Of course the husband cannot bring
trover for the conversion of the wife's
property. Taylor e. Jones, 62 Ala.
1

lid. 242, 249, per

78.

• Rotan "· Fletcher, 16 Johns. 206.
See Sheldon e. Soper, 14 Johns. 852;

Grady tt. Newby, 6 Blackf.442; Glenn
e. Garrison. 17 X. J. 1, 4.
1 Tuthill tt. Wheeler. 6 Barb. 862.
'Clapp tt. Glidden, 89 Me. 448. 451.
It bas been held in the same Stale,
however, that the existence of a lien
on goods in favor of a common c11r·
rier Wl\8 no defeuse to a wrong.
doer sued by the owner for a conver.
aion of the goods. Ames e. Palmer,
42 He. ten.
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In the foregoing cases the general doctrine is so stated as to
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render it misleading. It has often been decided that possession

alone is suﬁicient to enable one to maintain the action of trover,

and in a leading case, always since recognized as authority, the

ﬁnder of a jewel was held entitled to bring trover against one

who, having taken the jewel for examination, refused to restore

it.‘ It may, indeed, be said of this case that here was something

more than a bare possession, for a ﬁnder of goods has a special

property therein which is good against all the world but the real

owner; but other cases go further, and hold, in the language of

Lord CAMPBELL, that “the law is, that a person possessed of

goods as his property has a good title as against every stranger,

and that one who takes them from him, having no title in him-

self, is a wrong-doer, and cannot defend himself by showing that

there was a title in some third person, for against a wrong-doer

possession is title. The law is so stated by the very learned

annotator in note to Wilbra/tam v. Snow,‘ and I think it most

reasonable law, and essential for the interests of society, that

peaeeable possession should not be disturbed by wrong-doers.

* * * It is not disputed that thejue tertii cannot be set up

as a defense to an action of trespass for disturbing the posses-

sion. In this respect I see no difference between trespass and
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trover; for, in truth, the presumption of law is that the person

who has the possession has the property. Can that presumption

be rebutted by evidence that the property was in a third person,

when offered as a defense by one who admits that he himself

had no title and was a. wrong-doer when he converted the goods?

I IEID of opinion that this cannot be done.” '

So, in New York, it has been held that trover will lie “on a

bare possession” against a stranger,‘ and that a defendant in

trover cannot set up property in a third person without showing

some claim, title or interest in himself derived from such person.‘

‘Armory 0. Delamirie, Btra. 505;

McLaughlin 0. Waite, 9 Cow. 670;

Brandon 0. Planters, etc., Bank, 1

Stew. 320; Clark 1:. Maloney, 8 Hart.

68. See 1\IcAvoy 0. Medina, 11 Allen,

548.

' 2 Wms. Saunders, 47 f.

' Jeffcries 0. Great Western R. Co.,

5 El. & Bl. 802. The defendant having

failed to make out any right in him-

self songht to show that by an act of

bankruptcy the title had passed to

assignees. Held, inadmissible.

‘ Daniels 1:. Ball, 11 Wend. 57, note.

In the foregoing cases the general d..:;ctrine is so stated as to
render it misleHding. It has often been decided that possession
alone is sufficient to enable one to maintain the action of trover,
and in a leading case, always since recognized as authority, the
finder of a jewel was held entitled to bring trover against one
who, having taken the jewel for examination, refused to restore
it.' It may, indeed, be said of this case that here was something
mor·e than a bare possession, for a finder of goods has a special
property therein which is good against all the world but the real
owner; but other cases go further, and hold, in the language of
Lord CAMPBELL, that "the law is, that a person possessed of
goods 88 his property has a good title as against e\·ery stranger,
and that one who takes them from him, having no title in himself, is a wrong-doer, and cannot defend himself by showing that
there was a title in some third person, for against a wron~-doer
possession is title. The law is so stated by the very learned
annotator in note to lVilbraltam v. Snow,• and I think it most
reasonable law, and essential for the interests of society, that
pea<.-eable possession should not be disturbed by wrong-doers.
* * * It is not disputed that the jm tertii cannot be set up
88 a defense to an action of trespass tor disturbing the possession. In this respect I see no difference between trespass and
trover; for, in truth, the presumption of law is that the person
who has the possession has the property. Can that presumption
be rebutted by evidence that the property was in a third person,
when offered as a defense by one who admits that he himself
had no title and was a wrong-doer when he converted the goods l
I 'am of opinion that this cannot be done." •
So, in New York, it has been held that trover will lie "on &.
bare possession" against a stranger/ and that a det{mdant in
trover cannot I:'Ct up property in a third person without showing
some claim, title or interest in himself derived from such person.•

' Duncan v. Spear, 11 Wend. 54,

approved in Harkcr o. Dement, 9 Gill,

9, 12.

• Armory e. Delamirie, Btra. 50.1;
McLaughlin e. Waite, 9 Cow. 670;
Brandon "· Planters, etc., Bank, 1
Stew. 320; <Jlark "· Maloney, 3 Harr.
68. Bee McAvoy"· Medina, ll.A.llen,
MS.
1 2 Wms. Saunders, 47 f.
1 Jefferies "· Great Western R Co.,
li El. & Bl. 802. The defendant having

•

failed to make out any right in himself sought to show that by an act of
bankruptcy the title hnd passed to
assignees. Held, inadmissible.
'Daniels 11. Ball, 11 Wend. 57, note.
• Duncan "· Spear, 11 Wend. 54:,
approved in Harker"· Dement, 9 Gill,
9, 12.
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In Vermont the same doctrine is asserted, though it is conceded

445

that if one have a bare possession only, which he voluntarily

surrenders to another, he cannot afterward rely upon it as

evidence of ownership.‘ In New Hampshire it is said, in one

ease, “ The plaintiff had possession, and that is suﬁicieut in trover

against a wrong-doer. It is enough until the defendant shows

a. better title.”’ Other cases are to the same eﬁ'eet.'

lVhcn, therefore, it is said that the plaintiff in trover must

have had, at the time of the conversion, the right to the prop-

erty, and also a right of possession, nothing more can be intended

than this: that the right of which he complains he has been

deprived must have been either a right actually in possession, or

a right immediately to take possession; it is not enough that it

be merely a right in action or a right to take possession at some

future day.‘ If then the plaintiﬁ’ shows that property in his

possession has been taken and converted, he shows prizna frwie

his right to maintain the suit; and it is only when he is com-

pelled to show his title, in order to make out his right to imme-

diate possession, that it can be important for him to go further.-‘

In illustration of cases in which a showing of title is not

suﬁicient, those may be instaneed in which the owner has parted

with the right of possession for a time under some contract of
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lease or bailment. In such a case, if the term has not expired

or the bailment been terminated at the time conversion takes

place, the owner cannot sue in trover,' because not having had

the right to possession his only injury is in his reversionary

interest, and in suing for that he must count on the special case

and not on a conversion.’ So, if one purchases property to be

paid for on delivery, and pays in part only, he cannot bring

' Knapp 0. Winchester, 11 Vt. 351.

‘Bartlett 0. Hoyt, 29 N. H. 317,

‘Gordon v. Harper, '7 T. R. 9;

“'heelcr u. Train, 3 Pick. 255, 253;

citing Sutton 1:. Buck, 2 Taunt. 302.

' Carter 0. Bennett, 4 Fla. 283, 355;

Burke 0. Savage, 18 Allen, 408; Hub-

bard o. Lyman, 8 Allen, 520; Magrec 0.

Scott, 9 Cush. 148; Cook v. Patterson,

35 Ala. 102; Vining v. Baker, 53 Me.

544; Coﬂln v. Anderson, 4 Blackf. 395.

‘ See Wilson v. Wilson, 37 Md. 1;

Dudley v. Abner, 52 Ala. 572.

In Vermont the aame doctri~e is asserted, though it is conceded
that if one have a b~ possession only, which he voluntarily
surrenders to another, he cannot afterward rely upon it as
evidence ot' ownership.• In New Hampshire it is aaid, in one
case, "The plain tift' had possession, and that is snfficieut in tro,·er
against a wrong-doer. It is enough until the defendant shO\\"S
a better title.'" Other cases are to the same effect.•
When, therefore, it is said that the plaintiff in trover most
have had, at the time of the convcrsiou, the right to the property, and also a right of posse~-.ion, nothing more can be intended
than this: that the right of which he complains he ha.a been
deprived most have been either a right actually in possession, or
a right immediately to take posses8ion; it is not enough that it
be merely a right in action or a right to take possession at some
fotore day.• If then the plaintiff shows that property in his
possession has been taken and converted, he shows prima fru-i-8
his right to mllintain the snit; and it is only when he is compelled to show his title, in order to make out his right to imme<liate possession, that it can be important for him to go further.~
In illustration of cases in which a showing of title is not
sufficient, those may be instanced in which the owner hns parted
with the ri~ht of possession for a time under some contract of
lease or bailment. In such a cnse, if the term has not expired
or the bailment been terminated at the time convcl'sion takes
place, the owner cannot sue in trover,' because not having had
the right to possession his only injury is in his reversionary
in~rest, and in suing for that he must connt on the special ca~
and not on a conversion.' So, if one JHlr<.·hases property to be
paid for on delivery, and pays in Jlart only, he cannot bring

‘ See Foster v. Chamberlain, 41 Ala.

158, and cases cited.

Fuirbnnk r. Phelps, 22 Pick. 535;

Caldwell v. (‘ow:m, 9 Yerg. 262; Clark

0. Draper, 19 N. H. 419; Forth r.

Parsley, 82 ll]. I52; Winship o.

Neale, 10 Gray, 382.

" McGowan v. Chapen, 2 Mnrph. 61;

Hillard 0. Dorich, 3 Hawks, 246;

Ayer 0. Bartlett, 9 Pick. 150; Mm"-

shall v. Davis, 1Wcnd. 109; Arthur v.

Gayle, 88 Ala 259.

' Knapp e. Winchester, 11 Vt. 851.
B .• rtleU e. Hoyt, 29 N. H. 817,
cltlng Sutton e. Buck, I Taunt. 302.
• Varter e. Bennett, ' Fla. ~3, 33ri ;
Burke e. Savage, 18 Allen, 408; Hub.
bard e. Lyman, 8 Allen, 520; :Maf!'<.'C e.
Scott, 9 Cuab. 148; Cook e. Patterson,
85 Ala. 102; VIning e. Baker, IJS )le.
G«; CotB.n "· Anderson, 4 Blackf. 893.
• 8£>e Wilson e. Wilson, 87 Md. 1;
Dudley e. Abner, 52 Ala. 1Ji2.
1 See Foster e. Chamberlain, 41 Ala.
t

158, aod cues cited.

• Gordon e. Harper, 7 T. R. 9;
Wheeler e. Train, 3 Pick. 2.35, 2:JS;
Fnlrbnok ~- Phclp!l, 22 Pick. IJ:J:J;
Cahlwell tt. Cowan, 9 Yerg. 262; Clark
e. Draper, 10 N. H. .(19; Forth ~'·
Pursley, 82 Ill. 1:>2: Winship e.
Neale, 10 Gray, 882.
1 )lcGowan e. Chapen, 2 )furpb. ftt;
Billard e. Dortch, 8 Hawks, 246;
Ayer e. Bartlett., 9 Pick. 1M; Mar.
sltall e. D:n·is. 1 Wcnd.109; Arthur e.
Gayle, 88 Ala 269.
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that aims a possession has been gaine>/ and one who disturbs

trover against a subsequent vendee from his vendor, since his

part payment did not invest him with the right of possession.‘

In a certain sense, however, one always shows a right of prop-

erty when he shows that he has gained an apparently rightful

possession. Such a possession is evidence of property, and who-

ever, by force or fraud, intercepts it without being able to show

any right in himself, is liable to this action. Indeed, the pos-

session gained is not only evidence of right as against such a.

person, but it is conclusive evidence, unless he is able in some

manner to so connect himself with the right of the real owner

as to be entitled to defend in such owner’s interest. Thus, if one

has a bare possession, and this is taken from him by one having

no right, the latter may defend against an action of trover by

showing that he had been notiﬁed by the owner to retain the

property for him.’ And where the plaintiﬁ"s possession was not

rightful as against the owner, a surrender of the possession to

the owner would be a complete defense to a suit in trover.‘

There must also be many cases in which a mere showing of the

wrongful character of the plaintil’f’s possession would defeat his

action, as where a thief sues the oﬁicer for the stolen property
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taken from him in making the arrest, or a trespasser brings suit

against one who stops him while carrying oﬂ' the goods he has

wrongfully taliep;rTl‘l'e§e are cases in which it cannot be sai

this wrongful iﬁual possession may defend in the right of the

. \-L

owner, whether expressly authorized to do so or not.‘ r °

On the principle that where one has the right of property this

draws to it the right of possession, if one's goods are held with-

out right by another, and a third person converts them to his

own use, the owner may maintain trover for such conversion.‘

’ Owens 0. Woodman, 82 Ill. 409,

citing Bloxam e. Sanders, 4 B. & C.

of letters the administrator had noti-

ﬁed him not to deliver them to the

941; Wilmshurst v. Bowker, 5 Bing.

(N. 0.) 541.

* A warehouseman, being bailee of

the goods from the plaintiff, may

show in defense to an action of trover

that the goods are a part of the esfate

of a deceased person and were bailed

?.

trover against a subsequent vendee from his vendor, since his
part payment did not invest him with the right of possession.'
In a certain sense, however, one always shows a right of property when he ehows that he has gained an apparently rightful
possession. Such a possession is evidence of property, and whoever, by force or fraud, intercepts it without being able to show
any right in himself, is liable to this action. Indeed, the possession gained is not only evidence of right as apinst such a
person, but it is conclusive evidence, unless he is able in some
manner to so connect himself with the right of the real owner
as to be entitled to defend in such owner's interest. Thus, if one
has a bare possession, and this is taken from him by one having
no right, the latter may defend against an action of trover by
showing that he had been notified by the owner to retain the
property for him.• And where the plaintiff's possession was not
rightful as against the owner, a sm·render of the po~session to
the owner would be a complete defense to a suit in trover.•
There must also be many cases in which a mere showing of the
wrongful character of the plaintiff's pot:session would defeat his
action, as where a thief snes the oftieor for the stolen property
taken from him in making the arrest, or a trespasser brings snit
against one who stops him while earryin~ off the goods he has
wrongfully taken. r'fltese are eases in which it cannot be sai
---that -iiiTaw ~ession hii.S been gaine · and one who disturbs
this wrong n manual possession may defend in the right of the tL
owner, whether expret~sly anthoa·ized to do so or not.•
r-o
On the principle that where one has the right of property this
draws to it the right of possession, if one's goods are held without right by another, and a third person converts them to his
own use, the owner may maintain trover for such conversion.•

to him before administration granted

thereon, but that since the taking out

—* — Y -- - -_ <-I;-g

plaintitf. Thorne e. Tilbury, 8 H. &

N. 534.

‘ Ogle 0. Atkinson, 5 Taunt. 759;

King '0. Richards, 6 Whart. 418.

‘Sec Lacloueh o. Towle, 3 Esp.

114; Cheesman ~v. Exall, 6 Exch. 341.

‘Clark 0. Rideout, 39 N. H. 233;

Eggleston 0. Mundy, 4 Mich. 295;

Carter o. Kingman, 103 Mass. 518.

1 Owens .,. Weedman, 132 Ill. 409,
citing Bloxam "· Banders, 4 B. & C.
941; Wilmshurst "· Bowker, 5 Bing.
(N.C.) 541.
1 A. warehouseman, being bailee of
the goods from the plaintiff, may
show in defense to an action of trover
that the goods are a part of the es!ate
of a deceased person and were bailed
to him before administration granted
thereon, but that since the taking out

•

of Ietu>rs the administrator bad noti.
fled him not to deliver them to the
plaintiff. Thorne •· Tilbury, 3 H. &
N.58-i.
1 Ogle e. Atkinson, 5 Taunl 759;
King "· Richards, 6 Wharl 418.
4 See Laclouch e. Towle, 3 Esp.
114; Cheesman "· ExaH, 6 Exch. 3-ll.
• Clark "· Rideout, 89 N. H. 233;
Eggleston "· Mundy, 4 Mich. 290;
Carter "· Kingman, 1()3 Mase. 518.
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So the vendor in a void sale to a married woman may bring trover
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against a sheriff who levies on the goods as the property of

the Woman’s husband.‘ So a mortgagee of chattels who, under

his mortgage, is entitled to immediate possession, may sue in

trover for a conversion while they remained in the hands of the

mortgageor; ' but a servant cannot bring trover for the conver-

sion of his master’s goods, since his possession is the p08S(}.~Sl0[l

of his master.‘ A factor, on the other hand, or a bailcc, or any

other person with a right of his own, however special or trivial,

has a property sufﬁcient for the purposes of this action, and as

against a more wrong-doer may recover the whole value of the

property, being accountable over to the general owner.‘

What may be Converted. Anything which is the subject oi

property. and is of a personal nature, is the subject of conver-

sion, even though it have no value except to the owner. The

maker of a note who has paid it, may maintain trover against

the payee, who, instead of surrendering it, wrongfully disposes

of it, whereby the maker is compelled to make payment a see-

So the vendor in a void sale to a married woman may brmg trover
against a sheriff' who levies on the goods as the property of
the woman's husband.' So a mortgagee of chattels who, under
his mortgage, is entitled to immediate possession, may sne in
trover for a conversion while they remained in the hands of the
mortgageor; • but a servant cannot bring trover for the com·ersion of his master's goods, since his possession is the posse .. ~ion
of his master.' A factor, on the other hand, or a bailee, or nny
other person with a right of his own, however special or tri,·ial,
has a property sufficient for the purposes of this action, and as
against a mere wrong-doer may recover the whole value of the
property, being accountable over to the general owner.•

ond time.‘ Even a refusal to surrender a paid note to the payee

‘Smith 0. Plomer, 15 East, 607.

The distinction between these cases

and those in which it has been held

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:42 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

that a lessor cannot bring suit in

trover for the conversion of thc goods

leased, is that in these the conversion

took away the plaintiff ‘s present

right, but in the case of goods leased

it is the termor, not the lessor, whose

present right is takcu. and who, con-

What may be Converted. Anything which is the snhject ot
property, and is of a personal nature, is the snhject of Clmvcrsfon, even though it have no va]ne ('XC'ept to the owner. The
maker of a note who has paid it, may maintain trover agailu~t
the payee, who, instead of surrendering it, w•·ongfnlly dispo~cs
of it, whereby tho maker is compelled to mnke payment a ~ee
ond time.• Even a refusal to surrender a paid note to the payee

sequently, is wronged by the conver-

sion. The terinor may bring suit in

trover and recover the whole vnluc

of the property, being himself liable

over to the lessor when his term is

ended. Gordon 0. Harper, 7 T. R. 9.

'McConeghy v. McCaw, 31 Ala.

447; Robinson 0. Krusc, 29 Ark. 5'75;

Colcs 0. Clark, 8 Cush. 399; Cham-

berl.iin v. Clemence, 8 Gray, 389; Bel-

lune e. Wallace, 2 Rich. 80; Spriggs

1:. Camp, 2 Speers, 181; Badger v.

Batavia Manuf. Co., 70 Ill. 802;

Melody 0. Chandler, 12 Me. 282;

Jones 0. Webster. 48 Ala. 109; Brough.

ton 0. Atchison, 52 Ala. 62; Grove v.

Wise, 38 Mich. —-. Where the mort-

gagec is not entitled to possession the

mortgagcor may sue in case for the

injury to his rcversionary interest.

Googins 0. Gilmore. 47 )1e.9; Forbes

0. Parker, 16 Pick. -N52; Manning u.

Monaghan, 23 N. Y. 539.

‘Lt-high Co. o. Field, 8 W. & S.

232; Farmers’ Bank 0. McKee, 2

Penn. St. 318.

‘ Beyer 0. Bush, 50 Ala. 19. Case

is the proper form of action to be

brought against one who takes pos-

session of a crop grown by a tenant

on which the landlord has a statutory

lieu. I-Iussey v. Pecbles. 53 Ala. 432.

‘ Buck 1:. Kent, 3 Vt. 99; Pierce 0.

Gilson, 9 Vt. 216; Murray n. Burling,

10 Johns. 172; Otistlcld r. Muyherry,

63 Me. 197. Compare Platt e. Potts,

11 Ired. 266; Besherer 0. Swislnr, 3

N. J . 748.

1 Smith e. Plomer, 15 Enst, 607.
Tbe distinction between these cases
and those in which it has been held
that a lessor cannot bring suit in
trover for the conversion of the goods
leased, is that in these the conversion
took away the plaintiff's present
right, but in the case of goods leased
it is the termor, not the lessor, whose
present right is taken. And who, consequently, is wronged by the conversion. The termor may bring suit in
trover and reco,·er the whole value
of the property, bein~ himself liable
over to the lessor when bis term is
ended. Gordon e. Harper, 7 T. R. D.
• McConeghy "· McCaw, 81 Ala.
447; Robinson e. Kruse, 29 Ark. 575;
Coles "· Clark, 8 Cush. 399; Chambcrl.lin "· Clemence, 8 Gray, 389; BelJune 1:. Wallace, 2 Rich. 80; SprifrgB
~. Camp, 2 Speers. 1~1 ; Bad:;t>r "·
Batavia Manu f. Co., 70 Ill. 802;
Jdelmly •· Chandler, 12 Me. 282;

Jones 11. Wehster. 4R All\.109; Brough.
ton "· Atchison, 52 Ala. 62; Grm·e "·
Wise, 38 :ltlich. -. \\.here the mortgn,!.;CC is not entitlctl to poss1·ssion the
murtl!ngeor mny sue in cuse for the
injury to his reversionary in!<'rl';;t.
Googins"· Gilmore. 47 ~lc. 0; Forbl·s
e. Parker, 16 Pick. 4fl2; Manning"·
llonagban, 23 N. Y. :i:m.
• Lehigh Co. "· Field, 8 W. & 8.
232; Fanners' Bank. e. Me Kce, 2
Penn. St. 318.
• Beyer "· Bush, 50 Ala. 19. Ca.'lc
is the proper forn1 of action to be
brought agninst one who tnkl's po!lscssion of a crop grown by a tcnnnt
on which the landlord hns a statutory
lien. Hussey"· Peebles. 53 Ala. -'32.
• Buck ,:, Kent, S Vt. 99; Pierce e.
Gilson, 0 Vt. 216; Murray"· Hurling,
10 Johns. 172; Otistleld r. llnyherry,
63 :Me. l!l7. Compare Platt "· Pntts,
11 Ired. ~66; .Hesherer "· Swisl1t r, 8

N.J. 748.
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is a conversion, he being entitled to its possession as evidence of
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payment; but the damages in such case would only be nominal.‘

So trover will lie by the maker of a note which has never been

delivered, against the payee, who wrongfully obtains possession,

and refuses to give it up on demand.’ But it will not lie against

a magistrate for papers used in evidence by the plaintiff, before

him, and placed on ﬁle.‘

One may bring trover for a building or other ﬁxture owned by

him on the land of another, which the owner of the land refuses

to permit him to take away, and converts to his own use.‘

What Constitutes Conversion. Any distinct act of dominion

wrongfully exerted over one’s property in denial of his right. or

inconsistent with it, is a conversion. “ The action of trover

being founded on a conjoint right of property and possession,

any act of the defendant which negatives or is inconsistent with

such right amounts, in law, to a conversion. It is not necessary

is a conversion, he being entitled to its possession as evidence of
payment; but the damages in such case would only be nominal.'
So trover will lie by the maker of a note which has never been
delivered, ~0'8.inst the payee, who wrongfully obtains possession,
and refuses to give it np on dcmand.t But it will not lie against
a magistrate for papers usetl in evidence by the plaintiff, before
him, and placed on file. •
One may bring trover for a building or other fixture owned by
him on the land of another, which the owner of the land refuses
to permit him to take away, and converts to his own use.•

to a conversion that there should be a manual taking of the thing

in question by the defendant; it is not necessary that it should

be shown that he has applied it to his own use. Does he exer-

cise a dominion over it in exclusion or in deﬁance of the plain-

tiﬁ"s right? If he does, that is in law a conversion, be it tor his

own or another person’s use.” ‘ \Vhile. therefore, it is a conversion
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where one takes the plaintitl"s property and sells or otherwise

disposes of it,‘ it is equally a conversion if he takes it for a. tem-

porary purpose only, if in disregard of the plaintiff ’s right.

1 Pierce 0. Gilson, 9 Vt. 216; Spen-

cer v. Denrth, 43 Vt. 98; Stone o.

Clough, 41 N. H. 290. In New York

and Alabama it has been held that

trover will not lie under such circum-

stances. Todd v.Crookslnmks, 8 Johns.

432; Lowremore 1:. Berry, 19 Ala. 130.

’ Groggerlcy v. Cuthbert. 5 B. 8: P.

1'70; Evens 0. K_vmer, 1 B. & Ad. 528;

Neal v. Hanson, 60 Me. 84.

‘ Greene 0. Mead, 18 N. H. 505. Tro-

ver for parish records has been sus-

What Constitutes Conversion. Any distinct act of dominion
wrongfully exerted O\'er one's property in denial of his right. or
inconsistent with it, is a conversion. ,. The action of trover
being fonnded on a conjoint right of p1·operty and possession,
any act of the defendant which nc~ntives or is inconsistent with
such right amonnts, in law, to a conversion. It is not neces~ary
to a con\'ersion that there should be a manual taking of the thing
in question by the rletcndant; it is not neeessary that it should
be shown that he has applied it to his own use. Does he cxer.
cise a dominion over it in exclusion or in defiance of the plain.
tiff's right! If he does~ that is in law a COII\'ersion, be it tor his
own or another person's use." • 'Yhile. therefore, it is a com·ersion
where one takes the plnintiff'~> property and sells or otherwise
disposes of it,• it is equally a conversion if he takes it for a tern.
porary purpose only, if in disregard. of the plaintiff's right.

tained. Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 487;

Stebbins 0. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172;

Sawyer 0. Baldwin, 11 Pick. 492.

‘ Osgood v. Howard, 6 Me. 452; Rus-

sell 1:. Richards, 11 Me. 371; Hilborn

~- - — '~— “—'<"

o. Brown, 12 Me. 162; Smith v. Benson,

1 Hill, 176; Dame v Dame, 38 N. H.

429; Crippin 1:. Morrison, 13 Mich. 23.

Compare Overton v. Williston, 81

Penn. 155 ; Prescott o.Wells, 3 Nev. 82.

‘ Warm mt. J., in Liptrot 0. Holmes,

1 Kelly, 351, 391. Sec Hare 0. Pear-

son, 4 lred. 76; Gilman 0. Hill, 36 N.

H.311; Boyce v. lirockway. 31 N. Y.

490; Reid 1:. Colcock, 1 Nott & )IcC.

592; West J crsey R. R. Co. 0. Trenton,

etc., Co., 32 N. J. 517; Webber 0. Da-

vis, 44 Me. 147.

° Thompson 0. Currier, 24 N. H.

237; Pickering v. Coleman, 12 N. H.

148; Shaw Pcckctt, 25 Vt. 423;

Blood u. Sayre, 17 Vt. 609.

t Pierce "· Gilson, 9 Vt. 216; Spen.
cer "· Dearth, 43 Vt. 98; Stone "·
C1ough, 41 N.H. 290. In New 'lnrk
and Alabama it bas been held that
trover will not lie under such circum.
,;tnnces. Todd tl.Crookshanks. 3 Johns.
432; Low rem ore"· Berry, 19 Alu. 130.
1 Groggerley "· Cuthbert, 5 B. & P.
170; Evens"· Kymer, 1 B. & Ad. 528:
Neal"· Hanson. 60 l'tle. 84.
1 Greene"· Mead, 18 N. H.li05. Tro.
ver for parish records has lJeen sustained. Baker "· Fales, 10 }lass. 487;
Stebbins "· Jennings, 10 Pick. 172;
Sawyer"· Baldwin, 11 Pick. 492.
• Osgood 1!. Howard, 6 Me. 452; Ruseell "· Richards, 11 }[e. 871; llilllorn

"·Brown, 12lle.162; Smith"· Benson,
1 Hill, 176; Dame" Dame, 3S N . H.
429; Crippin 11. :Uorri!lon, 13 Mich. 23.
Compare o~crton "· Williston, 81
Penn. 1r;5; Prescott t~.Wclls, 3 Nev. 82.
• WARNEn,J., in Lipti'Otfl. Holmes,
1 Kelly, ;;::;1, :J!.ll. 8cc Hare"· Penrson, 4 Ired. 76; Gilmnn "·Hill, :m N.
II. 311; Boyce "· Brockway. 31 N . Y.
490; Hcid "· Colcock, 1 Nott & llcC.
592; West Jersey R. H. Co.11. Trenton,
etc., Co., 82 N.J. 517; Webber"· Davis, 44 Me. 147.
• Thompson "· Currier, 24 N. H.
237; Pickering "· Colem:m, 12 N. H.
148; Shaw "· Pcckt'tt, 23 Vt. 423;
Blood"· Sayre, 17 Vt. 609,
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Therefore, if one hire a horse to go to one place, and drive him
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to another, this is a conversion, though he return him to the

owner.‘ “ The word conversion, by a long course of practice,

has acquired a technical meaning. It means detaining goods so

as to deprive the person entitled to the possession of them of his

dominion over them.” ' “Any asportation of a chattel for the use

of a defendant or a third person amounts to a conversion, for this

simple reason: that it is an act inconsistent with the general right

of dominion which the owner of the chattel has in it, who is

entitled to the use of it at all times, and in all places. Wlien,

therefore, a man takes that chattel, either for the use of himself

or of another, it is a conversion.”' The act must, indeed, be

intended, and not merely accidental or negligent; ‘ but it is not

necessary that the result which actually follows should have been

contemplated. Thus, an agent has been held liable in trover

who, being intrusted with a note to get it discounted, and expressly

directed not to let it go without the money, allowed another to

take it to obtain the discount, who did so, but appropriated the

proceeds.‘ Here was a distinct wrongful act in the agent, and

not a mere negligent failure in the performance of a duty con-

ﬁded to him. So one having property entrusted to him to sell,

is liable in trover if he exchanges it for other property, this being
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beyond his authority.’ So is the vendee in a conditional sale, if

he disposes of the article before he has acquired any property by

' Homer 0. Thwing, 3 Pick. 492;

Rotch o. Hawes, 12 Pick. 130; llorsely

0. Branch, 1 Humph. 199; Crockcr o.

Gullifer, 44 Me. 491; Fisher o. Kyle,

2'7 Mich. 4-‘:4; Hall 0. Corcoran, 107

Mass. 251.

' Mxnrm, B., in Burroughes 0.

Bayne, 5 H. & N. 296, 302. For -one

to put another’s cow in his own pas-

ture without authority is proof of a

conversion. lrcland 0. Horseman, 65

Therefore, if one hire a horse to go to one place, and drive him
to another, this is a conversion, though he return him to the
owner. 1 "The word conversion, by a long course of practice,
has acquired a technical meaning. It means detaining goods so
as to deprive the person entitled to the possession of them of his
dominion over them." • "Any asportation of a chattel for the usc
of a defendant or a third person amounts to a conversion, for this
simple reason: that it is an act inconsistent with the gene1-al right
of dominion which the owner of the chattel has in it, who is
entitled to the use of it at all times, and in all places. When,
therefore, a man takes that chattel, either for the nse of himself
or of another, it is a conversion." • The act must, indeed, be
intended, and not merely accidental or negligent; • but it is not
necessary that the result which actually follows should have been
contemplated. Thus, an agent has been held liable in trover
who, being intrusted with a note to get it discounted, and expressly
directed not to let it go without the money, allowed another to
take it to obtain the discount, who did so, hut appropriated the
proceeds.• Here was a distinct wrongful act in the agent, and
not a mere negligent failure in the pel'iormatwe of a duty confided to him. So one having property entrusted to him to !'ell,
is liable in trover if he exchange" it for other property~ this being
beyond his authority.• So is the vendee in a conditional sRle, if
he disposes of the article b~tore he has acquired any property by

Mo. 51]. So it is conversion for one to

take goods from a seizing otﬁcer on a

defective writ of replevin. Adams 0.

McGlinchy, 62 Me. 533.

' Annanson, B., in Fouldes o. Wil-

loughby, 8 M. & W. 540.

‘ Simmons v. Lillystonc, 8 Exch.

431. Bee Bowlin 0. Nye, 10 Cush. 416.

A mere delay to deliver property by

a carrier is no conversion. Briggs

v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 28 Burb.

515.

‘ Lavcrty 0. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522.

The court cite and rely upon Syeds o.

Hay, 4 T. R. 260; Spencer 0. Black-

man, 9 Wend.167; Mchiorris v. Simp-

son, 21 Wend. 610, and distinguish

the case from those in which the

agent did nothing he was not author-

ized to do, but disobeyed instructions

in doing it. Dufresne v. Hutchinson,

3 Tauut. 117; Sarjeaut 0. Blunt, 16

Jolms. '74; Palmer v. Jermain, 2 M.

& W. 282; Cairnes o. Bleeeker, 12

Johns. 300. And, see Dean o. Tur-

ner, 31 Md. 52.

‘ Haas v. Damon, 9 Iowa, 589.

29

J Homer •· Thwing, S Pick. 492;
Rotch e. Hawes, 12 Pick. 136; llorsely
•· Branch, 1 Humph. 199; Crocker c.
Gulli fer, 44 ~le. 491; Fisher c. Kyle,
2'7 Mich. 4-H; Hall e. Corcoran, 107
Mass. 2.'>1.
' MARTIN, B., in Burroughee e.
Bayne, 5 H. & N. 296, 802. For ·une
to put another's cow in his own pasture without authority is proof of a
conversion. Ireland tl. Hor~eman, 65
Mo. 511. So it is conversion for one to
take goods from a seizing offic<:r on a
defective writ of replevin. Adama "·
McGiincby, 62 lie. 533.
I ALDBBSON, B., in Fouldet~ •. wn.
loughby, 8 M. & W. MO.
' Simmons c. Lillystone, 8 Exch.
481. &e Bowlin e. Nye,lO Cush. 4:16.

29

A mere delay to ddil"er property by
a carrier is no conversion. Briggs
"· New York, etc., R. R. Co., 28 Buri.J.
515.

' Lnverty "· Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522.
The court cite and rely upon Byeds e.
Hay, 4 T. R. 200; Spencer e. BlRck.
man, 9 Wend.167; Mcllorris tl. Simp.
son, 21 Wend. 610, and distinguish
the case from those in which the
agent did nothing he was nol author.
ized to do, but d:sobcyed instructions
in doing it. Dufrt'sne "·Hutchinson,
8 Taunt. 117; 81U'jeaut e. Blunt, 16
Johns. 74; Palmer "· Jarrnain, 2 M.
& W. 282; Cairnes e. Ble('cker, 12
Johns. 800. And, ace Dean a. Tur.
ner, 81 Md. 52.
' Haaa e. Damon, 9 Iowa, 589.
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making payment.‘ So, if one obtains property by fraudulently
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pretending to have a lien upon it when he has not, the owner,

though he delivered possession when the fraudulent claim was

made, may bring trover for the value, the taking from him being

wrongful.’ So if an oﬁicer levies upon property which is exempt

from execution, and proceeds to a sale of the same, the owner

may treat this as a conversion.‘ But a bailee will not be liable

in trover for a loss of the property through larceny or negligence,

though he might be, perhaps, on his implied contract of bail-

ment.‘ And where a bank was entrusted with bonds for safe

keeping. which, when called for, were found to be gone, and the

evidence tended equally to show that they had been lost, stolen,

or misdelivered. it was held trover would not lie, since it could

only be for a misdelivery that the bank, under the circumstances,

could be liable, and the misdelivery was not established.‘ In

any case, the act of a bailee that shall amount to a conversion

must be inconsistent with the bailment, and known by him to

be so. Therefore a commission merchant who continues to make

sales after his authority has terminated, but without notice to

him of the fact, is not guilty of conversion, but is liable only for

an accounting.‘

When'tl1e mortgageor of chattels is left in possession, he has
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not only such a special property as will enable him to maintain

trover against a wrong-doer, but he has also, in his right of

redemption, a property which is or may be valuable, and which

he may lawfully sell in recognition of the right of the mortgagee.

Such a sale is therefore no conversion of the m0rtgagee's interest.’

But a sale in denial of the mortgagee‘s right would be a con ver-

sion in him, and. perhaps, in the purchaser also. It would cer-

tainly be a conversion in the purchaser, if he took the property

'Sargento.Gile,8N. H. 325; Grace 318. Nor does the larceny of the

0. McKissack, 49 Ala. 163. S0 is the

purchaser from him. Eaton 0. Mun-

roe, 52 Me. 63.

' Dudley v. Abner, 52 Ala. 5'72.

‘ Sanborn 0. Hamilton, 18 Vt. 590.

‘ Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill, 586;

Packard 0. Getman, 4 Wend. 613. A

mere negligent injury is no conver-

sion. Nelson o. Whetmorc, 1 Rich.

ii __ —i L? -~k—-mi

goods from an oﬂicer render him liable

in trover. Dormun v. Kane. 5 Allen,

38.

making payment.• So, if one obtains property by frandnlently
pretending to have a lien upon it when he has not, the owner,
though he delivered possession when the fraudulent claim was
made, may bring trover for the -ralue, the taking from him being
wrongful.' So if an officer levies upon property which is exempt
from execution, and proceeds to a sale of the same, the owner
may treat this as a conversion! Bnt a bailee will not be liable
in trover for a loss of the property through larceny or negligt>nce,
thongb he might be, perhaps, on his implied contract of bailment.• And where a bank was entn1sted with bonds for safe
keeping. which, when called for, were fonnd to be gone, and the
evidence tended equally to show that they had been lost, stolen,
or misdeli\·ered, it was held trover would not lie, since it could
only be for a misdelivery that the bank, under the circnm8tances,
conld be liable, and the misdelivery was not established.• In
any case, the act of a bailee that shall amount to a conversion
must be inconsistent with the bailment, and known by him to
be so. Therefore a commission merchant who continues to make
sales after his authority has terminated, hnt without notice to
him of the fact, is not guilty of conversion, but is liable only for
an acconnting.'
When· the mortgageor of chRttels is left in possession, he has
not only such a special property as will enable him to maintain
trover against a wrO!Ig-docr, but he has also, in his right of
redemption, a property which is or may be valuable, an<l "·hich
he may lawfull.r sell in recognition of the right of the mortga;rce.
Such a sale is therefore no conversion of the mortga~ree's interest.'
But a sale in denial of the mortgagee's right would be a con-rersion in him, and. perhaps, in the purchRser also. It would certainly be a conversion in the purchaser, if he took the prop;)rty

° Deurbourn 0. Union Nat. Bank,

58 Me. 273.

° Jones o. Hodgkins, 61 Me. 480.

See. for the same principle, Fiﬁcltl 0.

Maine Cent. R. R. Co. 62 Me. 77.

‘ White 0. Phelps, 12 N. H. 382.

I Bargentt1. Gile, 8 N.H. R25: Grace
"· McKissack, 49 Ala. 16.3. So is the
purchaser from him. Eaton t1. Munroe, 52 Me. 63.
• Dudley "· Abner, 52 Ala. li72.
'Sanborn"· Hamilton, 18 Vt. li90.
• Hawkins .,. Hoffman, 6 Hill, 586;
Packard"· Getman, 4 Wend. 613. A
mere negligent injury is no conversion. Nelson •· Whetmorc, 1 !Uch.

318. Nor dor!l the lnrceny of the
goo1ls from an officer render him liable
in trover. Dorman '0. Kane. 5 Allen,
38.
• Dcarbourn "· Union Nat. Hank,
liS }{c. 273.
• .Jones "· Hodgkins, 61 ]le. 480.
Bee. for the same principle, Fifield t1.
l\lninc Cent. R. R. C.). 62 ~le. 77.
1 White tl. Phelps, 12 N. H. 382.
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on a purchase of the whole interest, and persisted in a denial of
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the mortgagee’s rights afterwards.‘

Neither the ﬁrst mortgagee, nor one to whom he has sold the

property, is liable in trover to the second mortgagee. Having

the right of possession defeasable only on performance of the

condition of the mortgage, he may assign his mortgage and sell

his mortgaged property to a third person, subject only to the

right of redemption of the mortgageor and those who claim under

him.’ But it seems that he cannot sell out the property in par-

cels, and if he should, trover would lie, as this would impair, and

perhaps defeat the right to redeem .’

One who buys property must, at his peril, ascertain the owner-

ship, and if he buys of one who has no authority to sell, his taking

possession, in denial of the owner’s right. is a conversion.‘ The

vendor is equally liable, whether he sells the property as his own

or as officer or agent; and so is the party for whom he acts, if he

assists in or advises the sale.‘ So it is no protection to one who

has received property and disposed of it in the usual course of

trade, that he did so in good faith, and in the belief that the per-

‘ See this discussed in Millar v. Al-

len, 10 R I. 49, where Dumrnn, J.,

cites and comments upon Ashmead 0.
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Kellogg. 28 Conn. 70, and Coles 0.

Clark, 3 Cush. 399, with approval, and

refers also to White 0. Phelps, 12 N.

H. 882; Bellune o. Wallace, 2 Rich.

80; Spriggs v. Camp, 2 Speers, 181.

' Landon u. Emmons, 97 Muss. 37,

on a purchase of the whole interest, and persisted in a denial of
the mort~'s rights afterwards.'
Neither the first mortgagee, nor one to whom he hM sold tho
property, is liable in trover to the second mortgagee. Having
the right of possession dcfeasable only on performanee of the
condition of the mortgage, he may assign his mortgage and seH
b'is mortgaged property to a third person, subject only to the
right of redemption of the mortgagror and those who claim under
him.• But it seems that he cannot sell ont the property in parcels, and if he should, trover would lie, as this would impair, and
perhRps defeat the right to redeem.'
One who boys property must, at his peril, ascertRin the ownership, and it' he buys of one who has no authority to selJ, his takin~
possession, in denial of the owner's right, is a conversion.• The
vendor is equally liable, whether he sells the property as his own
or as officer or agent; and so is the party for whom he acts, if he
assists in or advises the sale.• So it is no prote<·tinn to one who
has received property and disposed of it in the usual conrse of
trade, that he did so in good faith, and in the belief' that the per-

citing Homes 0. Crane, 2 Pick. 610.

He may be liable if he assunes tosell

the complete title. Ashmead 0. Kel-

logg, 23 Conn. 70.

3 Spaulding o. Barnes. 4 Gray, 380.

It would seem, however, that it‘ the

mortgage was past due, this should

be regarded as foreclosure and satis-

faction to the extent of the sales.

Trover will lie against mortgagee

who sells before condition broken.

Eslow v Mitchell, 26 Mich. 500.

It is a conversion to draw oil‘ part

of a cask of liquor and ﬁll it up with

water. Richardson v. Atkinson, 1

Stra. 576. And while one, the iden-

tity of whose property is lost, by be-

ing commingled with something oif-

ferent may claim the whole, so he

may treat the commingling as a con-

version. at his election.

‘ Miller o. Thompson, 69 Me. 322.

Another who C'vnt..*ibnt1's to the pur-

chase price. and gets the vessel in-

sured in his own name-,will bejointly

liable with him. Id. See Hyde 0.

Noble, 13 N. H. 494; Clark 1:. Ride-

out, 39 N. ii. 2‘8: Williams v. Merle,

11 Wend. 80; Abbott 0. May, 50 Ala.

97.

‘ Biilitcr r. Young, 6 El. & 131.1;

Cooper 0. Chilly. Burr. 3; Garland

0. Carlisle, 4 Cl. & F. 693; Monre v.

Eldred, 42 Vt. 18; Culkins e. Lock-

w--011,17 Conn. 155. A town oﬂicer

who removes a quantity of fence from

the land of its owner, mistakenly sup.

posing it to belong to the town, is

liable for the value in trover. Smith

tn. Colby, 67 Me. 169.

, See this discull!led In Millar e. At.
len, 10 R I. 49, where l>uRPBB, J.,
cites and comments upon Ashmead e.
Kellogg. S8 O>nn. 70, and Coles "·
Clark, 8 L'usb. 899, with approval, anti
refers a1eo ">White "· Phelps, 12 N.
H. 881; Bellone "· Wallace, 2 Rich.
80; Spriggs e. Camp, 2 Bpet~rs, 181.
1 Landon e. Emmons, 97 Muaa. :17,
citing Homes "· Crane, 2 Pick. 610.
He may be liable if be asannea tullell
the complete Utle. Ashmead "· Kellogg, 28 Conn. 70.
; Spaulding e. Barnf's, 4 Gray, SSO.
It would seem. however, that if the
mortgage was past due, this should
be regarded as forecloeure and eaUsfactlun w the extent ot the salf'B.
Trover will lie against mortgagc.oe
who sella before condition broken.
Es1ow " Mitchell, 96 :Mich. 300.
It Is a conversion w draw off pan
ot a cask ot liquor and ftll Jt up with
water. Richard8011 •· Atkinson, 1
8&ra. 676. And while one, the ideo.

t1ty of whose property Ia lillt, by being commingled with something aifterent may claim the whole, eo he
may treat the commingling as a convt-rsion. ell his electinn.
4 lllller "· Tbmupson, 6!) Me. 822.
Another who c·•nt:-ibutl'a to the pur.
chase price, and gets the ve!!St'l io.
so red in his own name, will be jnlntly
liable wlth him. ld. Bee Hyde "·
Noble, 13 N. H. 494; Clark "· Hide.
out. 39 N. II. 2 '8: Williams"· lll'rle,
11 Wend. 80; AbboU "· Kay, 50 Ala.
97.

• Billiter t'. Young, 6 El. & Bl. 1;
Cooper "· Chitty, Burr. S; Gurlaod
•· Carlisle, • Cl. & F. 698; Mnore 11.
Eldred, 49 Vt. 18: Calkin" tt. J.ockW·•Oli, 17 Conn. 155. A town ofticcr
who removca a quantity of fence from
&he land of ite owner, milltakeoly sup.
posing it to belong to the town, is
liable for the value in trover. Bmilll
"· Colby, 67 Me. 168.

,w ~. )1\.ll.f""" ~-

' feJ:

.

~'f.. o.<,'~' ~v.~, pa~ ?"~~~~ ~ !'. rP,.p. ff~ ~/J) ~ :; ·~ ,Lq ?&::?~/,;).

\‘ H, ‘F

hi

1/./9»/1.t/*F’_4/4»/ztyz-»L., L/'~~ 1-£/£72-/9

>*~>< -U

; 4:.‘ I

1»—¢-1/1-4.4- . "'<~ "1-Q?

"I’1§‘LAw OF ms 2' ” '"’/

‘T T ‘. . ¢<

¢¢z¢---/ .uu~/#3 @1114 /~/£5271‘/iv 5;-7‘ t 2;

“U4 / son from whom he took it was owner, if in fact the possessi ‘Q

4'4? of the latter was tortious.'*But merely receiving property from

§ :7 Z the wrongful possessor, and returning it before notice of his

Z‘ 4* /' want of title, is no conversion.‘ Nor is it a conversion merely to

ﬁx ‘R, assist a mortgageor to remove the goods from one place to another,

.4!’ Q the mortgageor being left in possession.‘ Butone who assists in

¥;( Qa wrongful taking of goods is liable, though he acted as agent

it K merely, for agency cannot be recognized as a protection in wrongs.‘

Q14 So if one hires a horse for another, who drives it to death, while

lxthe hirer drives another beside it, the two are jointly liable to the

jﬂrowner in trover.‘ But it is no conversion to ﬁnd a purchaser for

one who wrongfully sells the goods, even though defendant also

.\ Kreceives the proceeds of the sale, applying them on a demand

against the owner. \
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Demand of Poss 881011 and Refusal to Deliver. Where the

defendant has come into the possession of property lawfully or

without fault, it is in general necessary to make demand of pos-

session of him before suit will lie. “\Vhat is meant by one

coming lawfully into possession of the property is, where he

' Hardman o. Booth, 1 H. & C. 808;

=~~~91~'7!&~~~;> ~ ~
~~
~t.t..--;'~l$n.;wo~-iD~_;:::.;.---.<..~~
~u-+b a
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-- ~

d' t.,~ 4

son from whom he took it was owner, if in fact the possess1
')t,.~·
~of the latter was tortious!~ But merely receiving property from
't( ~ of the wrongful possessor, and returning it before notice of his
~ ~ Jt- ,·want of title, is no conversion.' Nor is it a conversion merely to
'i• .'Y':.Y~ assist a mortgageor to remove the goods from one place to another,
:\ ~ ~ the mor~o-eor being left in possession.• But one who assists in
x~~ "<'-a Wrongful taking of g•)Ods is liable, though he acted as agent
~A_~ merely, for agency cannot uc rct"Ognized as a protection in wrongs!
"¥_~So if one hires a horse for another, who drives it to death, while
'~-· '!tl ~-the hirer drives another beside it, the two are jointly liable to the
17~''.()>wner in trover.• But it is no conversion to find a purchaser for
~ · .t:-.,~ one who wrongfully sells the goods, even though defendant also
'-~~~receives the proceeds of the sale, applying them on a demand
~z..;;., against the owner.' ...

. 't:,"..

c. 1/~~ ~~.

;nem.and of Poaafssion and Befwial to Deliver. Where the
det(mdant has come into the possession of property lawfully or
without fault, it is in general necessary to make demand of possession of him before snit will lie. " 'Vhat is meant by one
coming lawfully into possession of the property is, where he

Hollins 0. Fowler, L. R. '7 H. L. Cas.

757; S. C. 14 Moak, 188; S. C. in Ex.

Ch. L. R. 7 Q. B.6l6; S. C. 3 Moak. 232.

' Ilill 0. Hayes, 38 Conn. 532. The

assignee of one who holds goods for

sale, with a lien upon them for a cer-

tain amount in his own favor, is lia-

ble in trover if he proceeds to sell

them. For, though he has a right to

retain them until the lien is satisﬁed,

the authority to sell is a personal

trust, and cannot be assigned. Terry

0. Bamberger, 44 Conn. 558.

' S'rickland 0. Barrett, 20 Pick. 415.

See Sparks 1:. Purdy, 11 Mo 210; Nel-

son v. Whetmore, 1 Rich. 318; Bushel

0. Miller, Stra. 128.

‘ McPartland '0. Read, ll Allen, 231;

Edgerly v. Whalan, 106 Mass. 307.

It is a conversion to buy from tr: s-

pnssers fruit stolen from the plain-

tiﬁ"s land. Freeman u. Underwood,

66 Me. 229.

‘ Banﬁeld 0. Whipple, 10 AHPD. 27.

‘Presley o. Powers, 82 lll. 125.

The case was peculiar. A married

woman bought the goods on credit,

and died before paying for them.

The creditor called on the husband

for payment, ﬁnding him in posses-

session. The husband otfered to svll

back the goods, but the creditor de-

clined to purchase, otfering, however,

to ﬁnd a purchaser, which he did.

The husband sold to the purchaser,

handing the proceeds over to the

creditor. On suit being subsequently

brought by the administrator of the

wife against the creditor, held, no

conversion by him.

Hardman "· Booth, 1 H. & C. 808;
Hollins "· Fowler, L. R. 7 H. L. Cas.
757; 8. U. 14 Moak, 188; 8. C. in Ex.
Ch. L. R 7 Q. B. 616; 8. C. 3 )I oak. 282.
'Ilill "· Hayes, 88 Conn. 5a2. The
assignee of one who holds goods for
sale, with a lien upon them for a certain amount in his own favor, is liable in trover if he proceeds to sell
them. For, though he has a right to
retain them until the lien is satisfied,
the authority to sell is a personal
trust, and cannot be assigned. Terry
"·Bamberger, 44 Conn. 558.
I s·rickla.nd "·Barrett, 20 Pick. 415.
See Sparksll. Purdy, 111\lo 210; N e)son ll. Whetmore, 1 Rich. 818; Bushel
"·:Miller, Strn. 128.
•McPartland ll. Rend, 11 Allen, 231;
Edgerly "· Whalan, 106 Mass. 807.
It is a conversion to buy from tn s.
pa!l!lers fruit st<•len from the plnintifi"'s land. F~eman D. Underwood,
66 Me. 229.
1

'Banfield"· Whipple, 10 All•·n. 27.
8 Presley "·
Pol\·ers, ~2 Ill. 125.
The case was peculiar. A married
woman bought the A"oods on credit,
and dil'(] before paying for them.
The creditor called on the husband
for payment, finding him in po~es.
session. The husband offered to s•·ll
back the goods, but the creditor declined to purchase, offering, however,
to find a purchaser, which he did.
The husbiUld sold to the purchaser,
handing the procf.'eds over to the
creditor. On suit being subsequt'otly
brought by the admioistmtor of the
wife against the creditor, kW.i, no
conversion by him.
Where the horses of one mnn wf.'re
taken for government use as the prnJlerty of another, and the lntt~r was
allowed nod paid the price therefor,
IU!'d, to be n conversion by him.
Thomas"· St.clDhcimer, 29 Md. 268.
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ﬁnds it and retains it for the true owner, or where he obtains the

possession ot' the property by the permission or consent of the

plaintiff, as where the relation of bailor and bailee exists. In

this latter class of cases a demand and refusal would be neces-

sary, unless it could be shown the defendant had appropriated

the article so found tn his own use, or had disposed of the prop-

erty bailed contrary to the terms and stipulations of the contract

of bailment.”‘ An instance has been given of an abuse of the

contract of bailment in the case of property hired for one pur-

pose and appropriated or used for another. In such a case the

abuse terminates the bailment, and the owner may retake his

property without demand, or sue for its value. It has been

made a question whether the pledgee of property repledging it

without authority before the debt is pajd,__{<{_._\vhich he held it.

docs not thereby terminate the bailnient s as Itourénidef him

liable for a conversion; but it is settled that he does not.‘

Neither would he had the pledge been sold instead of repledged.‘

This, it will be observed, was a case in which the plaintiff was

not, according to the contract of bailment, entitled to have the
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property restored to him until his debt was paid. Had the

pledgee held the property subject to the owner’s order, a sale‘ or

a mere delivery t.o another, without right,’ would have constituted

aconversion and rendered demand of possession unnecessary.

And he would have held it subject to the owner’s order had he

purchased it of one who had no authority to sell it.‘

A man acquires rightful possession of chattels if they are

upon land at the time he recovers it in ejectment, and trover

will not lie for their conversion until after demand and refusal

' Wanxxn, J., in Liptrot o. Joncs,1

Kelly, 381, 391-2. See Dean c. Tur-

ner, 81 Md. 52.

’ Donald 0. Suckling, L. R. 1 Q. B.

585.

' Halliday 0. Holgate, L. R. 8 Exch.

299. Compare Bulkeley o. Welch, 31

Conn. 339; Baltimore, etc., Co. 0.

Dalrymplc, 25 Md. 269; Lawrence 0.

Maxwell, 53 N. Y. 19.

finds it and retains it for the trne owner, or where he obtains the
possession of the property by the permission or consent of the
plaintiff, as where the relation of bailor and bailee exists. In
this latter class of cases a demand and refnsal would he necessary, unless it could be shown the defendant had appropriated
the article so found to his own use, or had di"posed of the prop·
erty bailed contrary to the terms and stipulations of the c:ontract
of bailment."' An instance has been given of an abuse of the
contract of bailment in the case of property hired tor one purpose and appropriated or used for another. In such a case the
r
abuse terminates the bailment, and the owner may retake his
property without demand, or sue for its valne. It has been •.
made a question wl1ether the pledgee of property repledging it ,
without authority before the debt is P.ajJ,.(<?.r,.wh!~~ l!e, l~~l it, ·, ····
does not thereby terminate the bailment ~ as to renuef him
liable for a conversion; but it is settled that he docs not.'
.Neither would he had the pledge been sold instead of repledged.'
This, it will be observed, was a case in which the plllintift' was
not, aC{.'Ording to the contract of bailment, entitled to ha,·e the
property restored to him until his debt was paid. Had the
}>ledgee held the property subject to the owner's order, a sale 4 or
a mere delivery to another, without rigl{t," would hanl con:;titutcd
a conversion and rendered demand of poooe~osion nnueccssary.
And he wonld have held it subject to the owner's order had he
purchased it of one who had no authority tu sell it.'
A man acc1uires rightful possession of chattels if they are
upon land at the time he reeo,·ers it in ejectment, and trover
will not lie for their conversion until after demand and refu:;al

‘ Bloxam 0. Hubbard, 5 East, 407.

‘ Sycds 1:. Hay, 4 T. R. 260.

‘ Kimball 0. Billings, 55 Me. 147,

citing Coles 0. Clark, 3 Cush. 899.

The property was government bonds,

received and sold by the defendant in

good faith, but of course his good

faith could not protect him when

sucd by the owner for the conversion.

It was held in Gilmore u. Newton, 9

Allen, 171. that one who receives pos-

session from another who had no

right, and treats the property as his

own, is not entitled to a demn- d.

Sec, also, Trudo 0. Anderson. 10 Mich.

357; Prime 0. Cobb, 63 Me. 200.

1 WARNER, J., ln Llptrot o. Jones, 1
Kelly, 381, 301-2. See Dean o. Turner, 81 lid. 52.
' Donald o. Suckling, L. R. 1 Q. B.

585.
• Halliday o. Holgate, L. R. 8 Excb.
299. Compare Bulkeley "·Welch, :H
Coon. 389; Baltimore, etc., Co. e.
Dalrymple, 25 Md. 269; Lawrence o.
llaxwell, 53 N.Y. 19.
• Bloxam o. Hubbard, 5 East, 407.
• Sycds o. Hay, 4 T. R 260.
1 Klmbull e. Billing:~, 5,j Me. 147,

citing Coles o. Clark, 8 Cush. 899.
The property was government bonds,
received and sold l.ly the defendant in
good faith, but of course his good
faith could not protect him when
sul'<l by the owner f()r the conversion.
It was held in Gilmore o. Newton, 9
Allen, 171. that ouc who receives possession from uoother who had no
right, and trcuts the property as Ilia
own. is nnt entitled to s demn• d .
See, also, Trudo o. Anderson. 10 llich.
357; Prime o. Cobb, 63 .Me. 200.
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to allow the plaintiff to take them away.‘ There need, howe-ce:".
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be no formal demand in such a ease, for if the owner atteim ts

to remove his property, and is not suffered to do so, his attempt

is equivalent to a demand.’

The refusal to surrender possession in response to a demand

is not of itself a conversion; it is only evidence of a conversion,

and like other inconclusive acts is open to explanation.’ It may,

for instance, be shown that the property has perished, or been

lost without the bailee’s fault, and that he does not surrender

possession simply because it has become impossible.‘ In any

case where at the time of the demand the defendant has neither

the actual nor constructive possession, and, therefore, c:1nn0L

deliver the property in response to the demand, his liability is in

no manner affected by the demand and refusal; ior if he had

been guilty of a conversion before, the demand was unnecessary,

and if he had not been, a failure to do what for any reason he

was unable to do, could not render him so. Still the demand

may, even under such circumstances, have this importance: it

may put the defendant apparently in the wrong, and throw

upon him the burden of showing why he fails to surrender the

property.“

'Thorogood v. Robinson, 6 Q. B.
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769. See Witherspoon 0. Blewett, 47

Miss. 570.

' Badger 0. Batavia Paper Co., '70

Ill. 302. See, also, \Voodis v. Jordan,

62 Me. 490. Merely selling and giving

a deed of land by the landlord is no

conversion of the tenant‘s ﬁxtures;

the tenant's right to take them away

is not affected by the convt~_vance.

•
to allow the plaintiff to take them away.' There neod, ho\'"en~:·.
be no formal demand in sueh a case, for if the owner attt•m; t~
to remove his property, and is not suffered to do so, his attt·mpt
is equivalent to a demand.•
The refusal to surrenucr poss~ssion in re::ponse to a demand
is not of it8elf a convernion; it is only evidence of a c.eonversion,
and like other inconclusive acts is open to explanation.• It may~
for instance, be shown that the property has perished, or bt't'll
lost without the bailee's fault, and that he does not surrender
possession simply because it has become impossible.• In auy
case where at the time of the demand the defendant has neither
the actual nor constructive posses:;ion, and, therefore. c:mnot
deliver the property in response to the demand, his liability i8 in
no manner afJectOO by the demand and refusal; tor if he hau
been guilty of a conversion before, the demand was unneee8sary,
and if he bad not been, a failure to do what tor any rea~Wn he
was unable to do, could not render him ~>O. Still the demand
may, even under such circumstance~, have this importance: it
may put the defendant apparently in the wroago, and throw
upon him the burden of showing why he tails to surrender the
property.•

Davis 0. Bulfum, 51 Me. 160, citing

Burnside 1:. Twitchell, 43 N. H. 390.

‘Thompson v. Rose, 16 Conn. '71;

Bturges v. Keith, 5'7 Ill. 451; (‘oﬂln 12.

Anderson, 4 Blackf. 395; Beckman o.

Mcl{:\y,14 Cal. 250; Diulus '0. Fuss,

8 Md. 148.

‘ Deurbourn 0. Union National

Bank, 58 Me. 273; Jcffi-rson 1*. Hale,

81 Ark. 286. As wlnre it was taken

from him by an armed force without

his fault. Abraham v. Nunn. 42 Ala.

-- — s ~— —_ <_~,_--_=-1

51. Bee Griffltli 0. Zippenwick, 28

Ohio, (N. s) 388.

' Davis v. Butfnm. 51 Me. 160. Re-

fusal to comply with n preninture

demand is no evidence of conversion.

Hagar e. Randall, 62 Me. 439. If

demand is made by an agent. and is

not complied with becauserthe ug_'<~nt

gives no evidence of authority, this

does not make out a conversion. Watt

0. Potter. 2 Mason, 77. Compare ln-

gnlls v. Bulkley. 15 HL224; Robinson

0. Burleigh, 5 N. II. 225. So, if de-

mand is made 01 nn agent for prop.

orty held by him for his principal.

his refusal to deliver does not render

him liable in trover. Carey v. Brizht,

58 Penn. St. 70 If at the time of

demand the property is present. and

no objection is made to its bi-ing

taken, and the only rt-fusril is a refusal

to carry and deliver it to the owner at

Thorogood "· R'lbinson, 6 Q. B.
See Witherspoon "· Blewett, 47
Miss. 1570.
• Badger "· Batavia Paper Co., 70
Ill. 802. See, also, Woodis 11. Jm·dnn,
62 Me. 490. Merely selling and giving
a deed of land by the landlord is no
conversion of the tenant's fixtures;
the tenant's right to take them away
is not affected by the convl"~·nnce.
Davis "· Butlum, 151 Me. 160, <'iliug
Burnside 11. Twitchell, 48 N. H. :mo.
• Thompson 11. Rose, 16 Conn. 71;
Bturgt'S o. Keith, 157 Ill. 451 ; Coffin o.
Anderson, 4 Black f. 895; Beckman "·
McKny, 14 Cal. 250; Dietus 11. Fu•s,
I

769.

8 Md. 148.
4 Dearbourn
"· Union National
Bank, 68 Me. 278; Jcff~·rson t'. Rille,
81 Ark. 286. As whne it wa.<1 taken
f'rom him by an armed force without
his fault. Abt·aluuu "· Nunn, 42 Ah.

Sec Griffith e. Zlppenwick, 28
Ohio, (N. s) lJ88.
1 Da,·is "· Buffum. 51 Me. 160.
Refusal to <'omply wilh a pn.·mntnre
demnml Is nn evidence of con,·ersion.
Hagar "· R!lndall, 62 Me. 4:19. If
demand is made by an agt>nt. and is
not complied with because·the a~t·nt
gives no evidence of authority, 1his
does not make out a conversion. Watt
"· Putter. 2 Mason, 77. Compare Ingalls tl. Bulklt•y, 151ll. 224; Uobinson
11. Burleigh, 15 N. II. 225. ~o. if demand Is made n l an agpnt for prop..
crty held by him for his principsl.
his rl•fu11al to deliver dm·s not render
him liable in trover. Carey"· Bri ::-ht,
58 Penn. St. 70 If at the time of
demand the property is present. and
no objection is made to its h<·ing
taken, and the only rl·fus:tl is a refus:U
to carry and deliver it to the owner at
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Conversion by Tenant in Common. The authorities are irre-

concilably at variance as to what may constitute a conversion by

one tenant in common of his co-tenant’s interest, agreeing only in

this, that a culpable loss or destruction by one will render him

liable.‘ The rule in England is that neither a claim to exclusive

ownership by one, nor the exclusion of the other from posses-

sion, nor even a sale of the whole, can be treated in the law as

the equivalent of loss or destruction, or be considered a conver-

si0n;’ and this rule is adopted in some cases in Vermont,“ and

in North Carolina it is also followed, but with this qualiﬁcation,

that a sale of the property out of the State may be treated as a

loss or destruction.‘ But in other eases any sale of the whole

interest by one tenant in common has been held a conversion.‘

And in still others it has been held that even a sale is not neces-

sary to make out a conversion; that the doctrine that one tenant

in common cannot maintain trover against his co-tenant without

proving a loss, destruction, or sale of the article, applies only to

things in their nature so far indivisible that the share of one

cannot be distinguished from that of the other. It can have no
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reasonable application to such commodities as are readily divisi-

ble, by tale or measure, into portions absolutely alike in quality,

such as grain or money. Tlms, if one is entitled to the half of

a certain number of bushels of wheat, he is entitled to the halt

in severalty; and if his co-tenant in. actual possession refuse to

surrender the half on demand, and deny his right, this is a eon-

version, because it deprives him of his right as effectually as

his home, this is no conversion, even

though defendant ought to have so

See Symonds 0. Harris, 51 Me. 14.

And in Gilbert 1:. Dickerson, 7 Wend.

carried it. Farrar v. Rollins, 37 Vt.

295.

‘ Mayhew 0. Herrick. '7 C. B. 229;

Hyde 0. Stone, 9 Cow. 230; White 0.

Brooks, 43 N. H. 402.

Oonvel'llion by Tenant in Common. The authorities are irre.
concilably at variance as to what may constitute a conversion by
one tenant in common of his co.tenant's interest, agreeing only in
this, that a culpable loss or destruction by one will render him
liable.' The rule in England is that neither a claim to exclusive
ownership by one, nor the exclusion of the other from postioes.
sion, nor even a sale of the whole, can be treated in the law as
the equivalent of loss or destruction, or bo considered a convcr·
sion; s and this rule is adopted in some case..; in Vermont,s and
in North Carolina it is also followed, bnt with this qualification,
that a sale of the property out of the State may be treated as a
loss or destruction.' Bot in other t'.ascs any sale of the whole
interest by one tenant in common hat:~ been held a conversion.'
And in still others it has been held that even a sale is not neces.
sary to make out a conversion; that the doctrine that one tenant
in common cannot maintain trover n~aiust his eo.tenant without
proving a loss, destruction, or sale of the article, applies only to
things in their nature so far indivisible that the share of one
cannot be distinguished from that of the other. It can have no
reasonable &}>plication to such commodities as are readily dh·isible, by tale or measure, into portions absolnteiy alike in quality,
such as grain or money. Thus, if one is entitled to the halt' of
a certain number of bushels of wheat, he is entitled to the halt
in severalty; and if his eo-tenant in. actual possession refuse to
surrender the half on demand, and deny his right, this is a <.-onversion, because it depri\·es him ot' his right as effectually as

' Muyhcw o. Herrick, 7 C. B. 229.

See Barnardistone 0. Chapman, Bull.

N. P. 34.

'Tubbs 0. Richardson, 6 Vt. 442;

Sanborn o. Merrill, 15 Vt. 700; Bar-

ton 0. Burton, 27 Vt. 93. In Maine,

the mere cluim to the exclusive own-

ership of a horse is held to be no con-

version. Dain 0. Cowing, 22 Me. 347.

449, the same ruling was made where

the property was not only detained

from the co-tenant, but locked up.

‘ Pitt 0:. Pctwcy, 12 Ired. 69.

' Wilson v. Reed, 8 Johns. 175;

Hyde n. Stone, 9 Cow. 280; Gilbert 0.

Dickerson, '7 Wend. -H1); .\iumford u.

McKay, 8 Wend. 442; Dyckinan 0.

Valiente, 42 N. Y. 549; lvcld v. Oliver

21 Pick. 559; While 0. Brooks, -L3

N. H. 402; Ncilson o. Slade, 49 Ala.

253; Courts 0. Ilapple, 49 Ala. $34;

Green v. Edick, 66 Barb. 564; Wheeler

0. Wheeler, 38 Me. 347.

hla home, thts is no conTersion, even
though defendant ought to have so
carried l'- Farrar o. Uollioa, 87 Vt.

M.
• Mayhew o. Herrick, 7 C. B. 229;
Hyde o. Stone, 9 Cow. 280; White •·
Brooks, 48 N. H. 402.
• Ma&ybcw e. Herrick, 7 C. B. 229.
See Barnardistone e. Chapman, Bull.
N. P.M.
• Tubbs •· Richardson, 6 Vt. 4'2;
Sanborn •· Morrill, 16 Vt. 700; Bar.
too e. Bunon, 27 Vt. 93. In :Maine,
the mere claim to the exclusive ownership of a hone ia held w be no conYenion. Dain .. Cowing, 22 Me. M7.

Bee Symonds o. IIarri-1, 61 lie. 14.
And in Gilbert e. Dickcr>~on, 7 Wend.
449, t11e same ruling w1u made where
the property was not only detained
from the co.tenant, but locked up.
• Pitt e. Petwcy, 12 Ired. 69.
• Will>On e. Reed, 8 Johns. 17~;
Bydt> "· Stone, 9 Cow. 230; Gilbert e.
Dickerson, 7 Wend. 44:>; )[umford o.
McKay, 8 Wtond. 442; Dyckwan o.
Valiente, 42 N.Y. MU; Weld e. Oliver
21 Pick. 559; White e. Brooks, 4:J
N. H. 402; ~cil110n o. SialiC, 49 Ala.
2.>3; Courts e. IIapple, 49 Ala. 23!;
Gret>n 11. Edick, 66 Barb. G64; Wheeler
e. Wheeler, 88 :Me. M7.

•
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would a sale.‘ In a. subsequent case this doctrine was applied to
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an interest in a machine which one of the tenants in common

had taken and annexed to the freehold, denying the right of the

other.’

Bailees. It is no conversion by a common carrier or other

bailee who has received property from one not rightfully entitled

to possession, to deliver it in pursuance of the bailment, if this

would a sale.' In a subsequent case this doctrine was applied to
an interest in a machine which one of the tenants in common
had taken and annexed to the freehold, denying the right of the
other!

is done before notice of the rights of the real owner.‘ After

such notice he acts at his peril. A delivery to the party entitled

to the possession will be a protection to him, and he may defend

in the right of such party before delivery.‘

Extent of Injury. Trover is most commonly brought when a

complete conversion of the property has taken place, but as it

lies in all cases where one makes an unlawful use of another’s

personalty, the injury is sometimes very small.‘ Thus, if one

‘CAMPBELL. J., in Fiquet e. Alli-

son, 12 Mich. 328, 331. See Ripley 1:.

Davis, 15 Mich. 75. And see Clark

Bailees. It is no conversion by a common carrier or other
bailee who has received property from one not rightfully entitled
to possession, to deliver it in pursuance of the bailment, if this
is done before notice of the rights of the real owner.• After
snch notice he acts at his peril. A delivery to the party entitled
to the possession will be a protection to him, and he may defend
in the right of snch party before delivery.'

v. Griiﬁth, 24 N. Y. 595. Of course

trover will not lie where one has only

a right to have an undislinguished

portion of a. greater quantity sot out

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:42 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

to him, but the title to which has

never passed. Morrison v. Dingley, 63

Trover is most commonly brought when a
complete conversion of the property has taken place, but as it
lies in all cases where one makes an unlawful use of another's
personalty, the injury is sometimes very small.' Thu8, if one
Extent of Injury.

Me. 5525. See Browning 1:. Hamilton,

42 Ala. 484.

'Grove -v. Wise, 38 Mich. See,

also, Strickland v. Parker, 54 M11263.

It is a conversion of a joint owner's

interest in a note if the other joint

owner takes it for collection and sur-

renders it to the maker for cancel-

ment. Winner 0. Pennimnn. 35 Md.

163. If one tenant in common takes

the joint property and disposes of it

to a third person for uses not justiﬁed

by the joint holding, the other co-

tenant may maintain trover against

the purchaser. Agnew o. Johnson,

1'7 Penn. St. 373. See Collins o. Ayres,

57 Ind. 239.

“Nelson o. Iverson, 17 Ala. 216;

Burditto. Hunt, 25 Me. 419. See Nel-

son v. Anderson, 1 B. & Ad. 450, Mor-

ris u. Hall, 41 Ala. 510.

4 Sheridan 0. New Quay Co. 4 C. B.

(N. s.) 619; Ogle 0. Atkinson, 5 Taunt.

759; Thorne o. Tilbury, 3 H. & N.

534; Biddle o. Bond, 6 Best & S. 225;

Hnrdmnn 0. Willcock, 9 Bing. 382;

King 1:. Richards, 6 Whart. 418; Bates

0. Stanton, 1 Duer, '79; Bliven v. Hud-

son R. R. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 403. It is

a defense to the bailee if goods are

taken from him on legal process.

Bliven c. Hudson R. R. R. Co., 35

Barb.» 188, and 36 N. Y. 403; Wells o.

Thornton, 45 Barb. 390; Vim Winkle

0. Mail. etc., Co., 37 Barb. 122; Burton

o. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186. See Stiles

v. Da.vis,1 Black, 101. Compare Kiﬂ'

v. Old Colony. etc., Co. 117 Mass 591.

‘ Where an actual conversion has

taken place, but the property still ex-

ists, and the wrong-doer offers to re-

turn it, the owner is under no obliga-

tion to lake it back. Higgins 0. Whit.-

ney, 24 W'cnd. 3'79; Otis 0. Jones, 21

Wend. 394; Hanmer v. Wilscy, 17

CAMPBELL, J., In Fiquet "· Alllson, 12 1\lich. 828, 331. See Ripley"·
Davis, 15 Mir.h. 75. And sec Clark
"· Griffith, 24 N. Y. 595. Of course
trover will not lie where one llHs only
a right to have an undistinguished
portion of a greater quantity set out
to him, but the title to which has
never passed. Morrison o. Dingley, 63
Me. 553. See Browning "· Hamilton,
42 Ala. 484.
t Grove v. Wise, 88 Mich.
See,
also, Strickland "·Parker, 54 ~Ie. 263.
It is a conversion of a joint owner's
interest in a note if the other joint
owner takes it for collection and sur.
!'enders it to the maker for cancclment. Winner "· Penniman, a5 :Md.
163. If one tenant in common takes
the joint property and disposes of it
to a third per11on for uses not justified
by the joint holding, the other cotenant may maintain trover against
the purchaser. Agnew "· J ollnson,
17 Penn. St. 873. See Collins"· Ayres,
o7 Ind. 239.
1 Nelson "· Iverson, 17 Ala. 216;
Burditt11. Hunt, 20 Me. 419. See Ncl1

son "· Anderson, 1 B. & Ad. 450, Mor.
ris "· Hall, 41 Ala. 510.
~Sheridan"· New Quay Co. 4 C. B.
(N. ll.) 619; Ogle "·Atkinson, 5 Taunt.
759; Thoi"Ue "· Tilbury, 3 H. & N.
5a4; Middle "· Bond, 6 Best & 8. 225;
Hurdman "· Willcock, 9 Bing. 382;
King v. Hich~trds, 6 Whart. 418; Bates
"· Stun too, 1 Duer, 79; Bliven"· Hud.
son R R H. Co., 86 N. Y. 403. It is
a defense to the bailee if goods are
taken from him on legal proc.:ss.
Bliven c. Hudson R. H. H. Co., 35
Harb: 1~. and 36 N.Y. 40:3; Wells"·
Thoi'Dton, 4.'i Barb. 390; Van \\"inkle
"·Mail, etc., Co., 37 Barb. 122; Burton
"· Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 11)6. See Stiles
"· D11.vis, 1 Black, 101. Compare Kill
"·Old Colony, etc., Co. 117 ~fass 591.
' Where an actual conversion has
taken place, but the property still ex.
ists, and the wrong.dotlr offers to re.
turn it, the owner is under no obliga.
tion to take it back. Higgins"· Whitney, 24 Wend. 879; Otis "· Jones, 21
Wend. 394; Hanmer 11. Wilsey, 17
Wend. 91; Brewster "· Silliman, 38
N. Y. 423. If he does take it back,
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hires a horse for one journey, and starts with him in an opposite
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direction on another, a conversion has then taken place, and the

owner may bring suit. But here, if the bailee returns the horse

before the trial, as he may, the owner is not injured to the extent

of his value, since the horse has only temporarily been converted

to the wrong-doer’s use, and the injury is likely to be small, per-

haps nominal. But where the conversion is complete, the injury

suffered, of course, is the value of what is converted.‘ Even this

this does not bar his right ot‘ action,

but goes in mitigation of damages.

Gibbs 0. Chase, 10 Mass. 125; Brew-

ster 0. Silliman, 38 N. Y. 423.

' Although the consideration of

hires a horse for one journey, and starts with him in an opposite
direction on another, a conversion has then taken place, and the
owner may bring suit. But here, if the bailee returns the horse
before the trial, as he may, the owner is not injured to tbe extent
of his value, since the horse has only temporarily been converted
to tho wrong-doer's use, and the injury is likely to be smalt, perhaps nominal. But whct·e the com·ersion is complete, the injury
suffered, of course, is the valne of what is con \'erted.' Even this

damages more properly belongs to a

work specially devoted to the reme-

dies for torts, it may not be inappro-

priate here to say, that in respect to

actions of trover. the rule of dam-

ages has always been more or less un-

settled. When the conversion was

complete, it has been held in some

cases that the plaintitf should be en-
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titled to the highest market price be-

tween the time of conversion and the

time of trial. Markham 0. Jaudon,

41 N. Y. 235; Burt o. Dutcher, 34 N.

Y. 403; Romaine 0. Van Allen, 26 N.

Y. 309; Morgan o. Gregg, 46 Barb.

183; Wilson 0. Mathews, 24 Barb.

295. At least, that the jury might

award this in their discretion. Green-

ing o. Wilkinson, 1 C. & P. 625; Ew-

ing v. Blount, 20 Ala 694; Jenkins 0.

McConico, 26 Ala. 213. Especially

if the property was subject to consid-

erable ﬂuctuations in value. Doug.

lass 0. Kraft, 9 Cal. 582; Hamer o.

Hathaway, 33 Cal. 117. Qualified in

Barrante v. Gnrratt, 50 Cal. 112. But

a more just rule obviously is that

which gives inst indemnity to the

party injured for the loss which is the

natural, reasonable and proximate rc-

sult of the wrongful act complained

of; and this, where the article con-

verted was always in market, may,

perhaps, be the market value at the

time of the conversion, and any ad-

vance thereon that may have taken

place within a reasonable time there-

aﬂer for replacing it. Baker o. Drake,

53 N. Y. 211; Mathews n. Coe, 49 N.

Y. 57; Devlin 0. Pike, 5 Daly. 85;

Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412. Sec \Vey-

mouth 0. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 17

Wis. 567. But in most cases where

the circumstances are not such as to

warrant exemplary damages, a just

indemnity will consist in the value

of the property at the time of the

conversion, with interest thereon to

the time of trial. Greeley 0. Stilson,

27 Mich. 153: Winchester 0. Craig;38

Mich. 205; Ripley e. Davis. 15 Mich.

'75; Dalton c. Laudahn,27 M it-h.529;

Yater 0. Mullen, 24 Ind. 277; Keaggy

0. Hite, 12 Ill. 09; Otter v. Williams,

21 Ill. 113; Turner 0. Rotter, 58 Ill.

264; Jetlerson n. Hale. B1 Ark, 236;

this does not bar his right of action,
but goea in mitigation of damages.
Gibbs"· Chase, 10 Mass. 125; Brewster "· Silliman, 88 N. Y. 423.
' Although the considerution of
damages more properly belongs to a
work specially devoted to the reme.
dies for torts, it may not be lnl\ppro.
priutc here to say, that in respect to
actions of trover, the rule of damages has always been more or less unsettled. When the conversion was
complete, it has been hel•l in some
cases that the plsintiff should be entitled to the highest market price between the time of conversion and the
time of trial. Markham "· Jaudon,
41 N. Y. ~15; Burt "· Dutrher, 34 N.
Y. 403; Romaine"· Van Allen, 26 N.
Y. 300; }forgan "· Gregg, 46 Barb.
183; Wilson "· Mathews, 24: Barb.
293. At lenst, that the jury might
award this in their discretion. Grt-ening "· Wilkinson, 1 C. & :P. 625; Ewing"· lllount, 20 Ala. 694; Jenkins fl.
llcConico, 26 Ala. 218. Especially
if t11e property was subject to considerable fluctuations in value. Douglass "· Kraft, 9 Cui. 562; Hamer "·
Hathaway, SS Cal. 117. Qualified in
Barrante "· Gurratt. 50 Cal. 112. But
a more jm~t rule obviously is that
which gives lust indemnity to the
party injured for the loss which is the
natural, rei\Sonable and proximate result of the wrongful act complsined
of; and this, where the article converted was a) ways in market, may,
perhaps, be the market value at the

time of tbe conversion, and any advance thereon that may have taken
place within a reasonable time thereafter for replacing it. Baker "· Drske,
58 N.Y. 211; .Mathews"· Coe, 4U N.
Y. 57; Devlin "· Pike, 5 Daly. 85;
Page t7. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412. See Wey.
mouth"· Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 17
Wis. 567. But in most cast's where
the circumstances are not such as to
warrant exemplary damages, a just
indemnity will consist in the value
of the prnperty at the time of the
con\'ersiou, with interest thereon to
Ute time of trial. Gn-eley t7. Stilson,
27 Mich. Ui3: Winchester"· Cruig; SS
llich. 205; Ripley "· Davis, 15 llich.
7.1; Daltnn "· L•1udahn, 27 )lirh. 529;
Yater tt. llullen, 24 Ind. 277: Kea~r~y
"·Rite, 12 Ill. 00; Otter"· Wilhams,
21 Ill. 11ij; Turner "· lkttcr, !jij Ill.
264; Jefferson "· Hale, 81 Ark, 2~;
Ryburn t7. Pryor, 14 Ark. 005; HI edge
"·Reid, 73 N.C. 440; Thomas r. Hternheimer, 2!l )ld. 268; Herzberg "·
Adams, 39 :Md. 300; Polk's Admr. "·
Allen, 19 llo. 467; Kennedy r. Whitwell. 4 Pick. 466; Fowler"· Gilmun,
13 llet. 267; Greenfield Brmk "·
Leavitt, 17 Pick. 1; Pierce "· Benja.
min, 14 Pick. 356; B:arj.!"f'ant "·
Franklin Ins. Co., 8 Pick. UO; ,John.
son"· Sumner, 1 )let. 172; Barry "·
Bennett, 7 )(et. 3.34; Hurd r Hubbell,
26 Conn. 889; Cook tt. Loom i~, 26
Conn. 483; Hobiuson "· Hartrhlge, ta
Fla. 501; Vsughan "·Webster, 5 Harr.
256; Lillaud "·Whittaker, Sliibb, 92;
Thrall "· Lathrop, 30 Vt 80'7; Hay.

,
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statement does not fully cover the ground, for the value may
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depend largely on the time the conversion is deemed to have taken

place. If, for example, one has received property to be returned

on demand, and declines to return it, the property is not changed

by the demand and refusal, but the owner may still 1'eplc\'_\' the

goods; and if in the meantime they have largely increased in

value, it would seem that he should be entitled to that increase,

if he fails to recover the goods. The rule seems to be, however,

that if he treats the demand and refusal as _a conversion, his

injury is measured by the value at that time;' but he might, no

doubt, make a subsequent demand, and rely upon a failure to

respond to that as his grievance.‘

Eﬂ‘ect of Judgment. It was decided in Adams v. Broug/zton '

that udgment in trover or trespass for the value of the property

vested the title in the defendant; and this decision has been tol-

lowed in this country to some extent.‘ But the present English

rule is, that it is not the judgment alone, but judgment and the

satisfaction thereof, that passes the title to the defendant; ‘ and

statement does not fully cover the ground, ior the \"alue may
depend largely on the time the conversion is deemed to have taken
place. If, for exam pie, one bas recei vcd property to be returned
on demand, aod declines to return it, the property is not changed
by the demand and refusal, bnt the owner may still reple,·y the
goods; and if in the meantime they have largely increased in
value, it would seem that he should be entitled to that increase,
if he tails to recover the goods. The rule seems to be, howe,·er,
that if he treats the demand and refusal as .a t'OnVcT!)ion, l1is
injury is measnred by the value at that time;' bot he mi~ht, no
doubt, make a subsequent demand, and rely upon a failure to
respond to that as his grievance.•

this may be said to be the accepted doctrine in_ this country at

the present time.‘ The title by relation vests as of the time

when the conversion took place; but this relation is not eiiectual

for all purposes; it could not render a third party a trespasser

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:42 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

den o. Bartlett, 35 Me. 203; Tenney 0.

State Bank, 20 Wis. 152; Carlyon 1;.

Lannan,4 Nev. 156; Neiler 1:. Kelley,

69 Penn. St. 403; Whitﬁeld 0. Whit-

ﬁeld. 40 Miss. 352; Newton, etc., Co.

0. White. 53 Geo. 895; Sturges n.

Keith, 57 Ill. 451.

‘ Burk '0. Webb, 32 Mich. 173. See

Third National Bank '0. Boyd,44 Md.

4'7.

' If the property is largely in-

Bmtot of Judgment. It was decided in Adam..s v. Broughton •
that judgment in trover or trespa:;s for the value of the property
vested the title in the defendant; and this decision has been tollowed in this country to some extent.' But the present English
role is, that it is not the jndgment alone, bot judgment and the
satisfaction thereof, that pa,;ses the title to the defendant; • and
this may be said to be the accepted doctrine in. this country at
the present time.• The title by relation vests as of the time
when the conversion took place; but this relation is not effectual
for all purposes; it could not rende1· a third party a trespasser

creased in value by the action of the

wrong-doer himself, as, for instance,

where he takes heavy articles a long

distance to market, it seems he should

be charged only with the value at the

time of the wrongful taking, and in-

terest thereon, unless there were bad

faith or circumstances of aggravation.

Winchester 0. Craig, 83 Mich. 205.

See Burton Coal C0. 0. Cox, 39 Md. 1.

' Stra. 1078: S. C. Andrews, 13.

‘ C:irlis‘e o. Burley,3 Me. 2.30; Rog.

ers r. Moore, Rice, (S. C.) 60: Bogan

0. \\'ilburn, 1 Speers, 179; Floyd 0.

Browne, 1 Rnwle, 121 ; Marsh r. Pier,

4Rawle. 2'73; Fox v Northern Liber-

ties, 3 Watts & S. 103; Merrick's Es-

tate, 5 W. & S. 9; Curtis u. Groat, 6

Johns. 168; Fox u. Prickett, 34 N. J.

13.

‘ Brinsmead 0. llarrison, L. R. 6 C.

P. 534.

‘ Lovejoy 0. Murray, 3 W'ull. 1; El.

liott 1;. Hayden, 104 Muss. 180; United

Society v. Underwood, 11 Bush, 265;

S. C. 21Ain.R"p. 214; Smith n.Sn1ith,

51 N. H. 571; Hyde 1:. Noble. I3 N.

H. 494; Bell v. Perry, 43 lowa, 868;

Bacon 0. Kimmell, 14 Mich. 201.

den e. Bartlett, 81) Me. 203; Tenney e.
State Bank, 20 Wis. 11)2; Carlyon e.
Lanoan,4 Nev. 156; Neiler e. Kelley,
69 Penn. SL 408; Whitfield e. Whit.
field, 40 Miss. 852; Newton, etc.• Co.
"· White, 53 Geo. 895; Sturges e.
Keith, 57 Ill. 41i1.
1 Burk "·Webb, 82 Mich. 178.
See
Third National Bank e. Boyd, 44 Md.

47.
1 If the property is largely increased in value by the action of the
wrong-doer himself, as, for instance,
where he takes heavy articles a long
distance to market, it seems he should
be charged only with the value at the
time of the wrongful taking, and interest thereon, unless there were bad
faith or circumstances of aggravation.
Winchester e. Craig, 88 Mich. 205.

Bee Barton Coal Co. e. Cox, 89 Md. 1.
1 Stra. lOi~; B. C. Andrews, 18.
• Carlis'e "· Burley,S l\le. 2W; Rogers t'. Moore, I~ce, (S. C.) 60: Bogan
"· Wilburn, 1 Speera, 179; Floyd e.
Browne, 1 Rnwle, 121; :U•m;h r. Pier,
4 R:lwle. 273; Fox I' Nnrlhl'rn LiiK>rties, 3 Watts & B. 108; Merrick's Es.
tate, I) W. & S. 9; Curtis o. (iroat. 6
Johns. 168; Fox "· Prickett, 34 N.J.
18.
1 Brlnsmead "· llarrison, L. R 6 C.
P. 584.
• Lovejoy"· llurrny, 3 Wall. 1; El.
liott v. Hav<len, 104 )lnss. 1~0; Cnited
Society r;. U nJerwood, 11 Bush, 263;
8. C. 21 Am. R"p. 214; Smith D. Hmitb,
51 N.H. 571; Hyde"· Noble, 18 N.
H. 494; Bell "· P~rry, 43 Iowa, 3a8;
Bacvn v. Kimmell, 14 Mich. 20!.

a

U'OYQ' the court will uader MrtaiD cirnmstaDCn. permit
the de~endant after suit brou&ht. to brina the property

·

~f

n \Y0\1.;\', the court will under certain circumstances, permit

thedcfcndant after suit brought, to bring the property

clsiina into court for ihc defendant with the costs up_to that

time and the court will then order a slay of proceedings or

rmit the plaintiﬁ to proceed with the action at the risk ot

lifts»; the costs ﬁnally adjudged against him unless he be

able to show that he has been iipeciall damaged by the

conversion of the property by the dcfciuilzint in addition to

iis value at the time of its return. Or the court will in a

proper case after verdict, upon a tender of the property, re-

(wv-the verdict to nomina damages.

w/1% \""" *--H?--1 av-v.
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‘7for anything done by him inter-

•-.an
tile.,.._..

c:~ court"l>r tbe deFendant with the

time aad
Del"lllit

c;.:-.:1: that

wiU dlea order a llaJ' of
· p or
to proceed with the action at the riik of
laaYiua the costa tmally adju4fsed apioat hilll auJ.. be be
able to show tha• he bu been aDic:iaUY damapd ~ the
- - - - o( the ~ by the "defeadut ill ildclitioll ID
unalue at the time '!f' Ita rewru. Or die coun will in a
proper . - wwdic:t, ..,oa a CIIDder ol the properqr, ce~ nrdict ID ooaainal claaqea.
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''-t
~/7 Y• \ -rr-- .,.. •. .,...;....: a #'fJ.
(for anything done by him mtermeamte tae aonvenion and the judgment;' and if, after coll\·crsion, the plaintiff has sold his interest in the property, the purchaser will not be affected by the suit, and the plaintifF will be
• entitled to re<..'Over nominal damages only, sin<~c, by the sale, he
has disabled himself from passing title to the defendant.• And
in neither trover nor trespa~t: will the title be chan;.,l't·d if the
ret'Overy was only tbr an injury to the property, or t(.,r a temporary use, and not for the value.

inemate the conversion and the jiidgineiit;' and if, after conver-

sion, the plaintiff has sold his interest in the property, the pur-

.:ustifloation under Prooeu. 'Vhen an interference with the
property of another is justified under legal proceedings, it is
important to know the JlOBition the party justi(ving occnpies in
respect to them. In some particulars the rules of protection are
somewhat different ae respects the sevt>rnl eases of magistrate,
ministerial officer and patty, or complainant, and they will therefore be given separately.

chaser will not be affected by the suit, and the plaintiff will be

entitled to recover nominal damages only, since, by the sale, he

has disabled himself from passing title to the defendant.’ And

in neither trover nor trespass will the title be changed if the

recovery was only for an injury to the property, or for a tempo-

rary use, and not for the value.
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iustiﬂcation under Process. \Vhen an interference with the

property of another is justified under legal proceedings, it is

important to know the position the party jiistifying occupies in

respect to them. In some particulars the rules of protection are

somewhat different as respects the several eases of magistrate,

ministerial oﬁicer and party, or complainant, and they will there-

fore be given separately.

The Omcer. For the purpose of interfering with one’s pos-

session of chattels, the ministerial otiieer is always supposed to

be armed with legal process, which he can exhibit us his authority.

There may be a few special eases in which this would not he

necessary to his justiﬁcation. Such a case would be that of a

thief caught jlag/‘ante delicto, with the stolen property in his

possession. No doubt the otlieer might take the thief without

warrant, and he might also take the stolen property, and retain

it for identiﬁcation and evidence of ownership. So, in making

arrest for a supposed felony, the otiicer might take from the per-

son arrested whatever was supposed to have been the instrument

in committing the crinie, or whatever would probably be impor-

tant to be used in evidence on the trial. So, doubtless, under

proper statute or municipal by-law, implements of gaining found

in actual use in violation of law, might be seized. These cases

suggest others, but they cannot be numerous. In general, the

oﬁicer must seek protection behind process.

The process that shall protect an oliicer must, to use the ciis-

toinary legal exprfssion, be ﬂair on its face. By this is not

meant that it shall appear to be perfectly regular, and in all

’ Bacon o. Kiinnicl, 14 Mich. 201. " Brady, 0. Whitney, 24 Mich. 154.

See ante, 95, 96.

,

The omoer. For the purpose of interfering with one's posses8ion of chattels, the ministerial officer is always suppohCtJ to
be armed with legal process~ whicb he can exhibit as his authority.
There may be a few special cases in which this would not he
necessary to his justification. Such a case wonld be that of a
thief caught flagrant6 delh1to, with the stolen property in his
possession. No doubt the offi<:er might take the thief without
warrant, and he might also take the stol~n property, and retain
it tor identification and evident-a of owne1~hip. So, in making
arrest for a supposed felony, the officer might take from the person arrested whatever was supposed to have been the instrument
in C.'Ommitting the crime, or whatever would probably be important to be used in evidence on the trial. So, doubtlflss, under
proper statute or municipal by-law, implements ot" ~o.raming found
in actual use in violation of law, might be seized. Thege cases
suggest others, but they cannot be numerous. In g.!neral, tho
officer must seek prott~ction behirHI pro<.>css.
The process that shall proted an utliccr mnst, to n~ the austomary legal exprlssion, be fair ou, its face. By thid is not
meant tJtat it shall appear to be perfectly regular, and in all
J Bacon e. Klmmel, " lllch. SOt.
See ante, 93, M.

'Bnuly, •· Whitney, 24 Mich. 1M.
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respects in accord with proper practice, and after the most
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approved form; but what is intended is, that it shall apparently

be process lawfully issued, and such as the oﬁieer might la\vt'ully

serve. More precisely, that process may be said to be fair on its

thee which proceeds from a court, magistrate, or body having

authority of law to issue process of that nature, and which is

legal in form, and on its face contains nothing to notify or fairly

apprise the oiﬁcer that it is issued without authority.‘ When

such appears to be the process, the oﬂicer is protected in making

service, and he is not concerned with any illegalities that may

106 Mass. 296; Le Roy 0. EustSag1-

aw Railroad Co., 18 Mich. 233; Bird

°d‘-n- 9.

'\\An& _ \ ,

exist back of it.’

The word process is made use of in this rule in a very com-

‘ Cooley on Taxation, 559. 562.

‘ Parsons 0. Loyd, 3 Wils. 341; Ives

respects in accord with proper practice, and after the most
approved form; but what is intended is, that it shall apparently ·
be process lawfully issued, and such as the officer might lnwfully
serve. More precisely, that process may be said to be fair on its
fa<:e which proceeds from a court, magistrate, or body having
authority of law to issue process of that nature, and which is
legal in form, and on its face contains nothing to notifY or fairly
apprise the officer that it is issued without authority.' When
such appears to be the proc-ess, the officer is protC'cted in making
service, and he is not concerned with any illegalities that may
exist back ot" it.•
The word proeess is made use of in this rule in a very com-

o. Lucas, 1 C. & P. '7; Erskine o. Holin-

bach, 14 Wall. 613; Lott 0. Hubbard,

Cooley on Taxation, 51~9. 562.
s Parsons"· Loyd, 3 Wile. 841; I vee
tl. Luc:lll, 1 C. & P. 7; Erskine fl.IIohubach, 14 Wall. 618; Lott "· Hubbard,
44 Ala. 598; Grumon "· Raymond, 1
Conn. 40; Thames llauufg. Co. e.
Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550; W utson "·
W ateon, 9 Conn. 140 ; N eth "· Crofut,
80 Conn. 580; Brother "· C11nnon, 2
Ill. 200; Shaw e. Dennis, 10 Ill. 400;
Allen "· Scott, 13 Ill. 80; Hill "·
Figley, 25 Ill. 156; Gott "· Mitchell,
7 Blackf. 2i0; Noland "· Busby, 28
Ind. 154; Hrainard "· Head, 15 La.
Ann. 489; Ford "· Clou~rh, tJ ~I e.
884; Kellar "· Savage, 20 ~le. 199;
Tremont "· Clark, 33 ~I e. 482; State
e. McNally, 84 Me. 210; Caldwell "·
Hawkins, 40 )[e. 526; Judkins e.
Reed, 48 lie. 386; Hcthel "· Mason,
55 Me. 501; Nowell "· Tripp, 61 Me.
426; Seekins "· Goodale, 61 Me.
400; Colman "· Anderson, 10 Mass.
105; Holden "· E~~oton, 8 Pick. 436;
Sprague "· Bailey, 19 Pick. 436;
Upton"· Holden, 5 Met. 860; Aldrich
"· Aldrich, 8 )[et. 102; Lincoln "·
Worcester, 8 Cush. 55 ; Hayes "·
Drake, 6 Gray, 387; Howard "· Proc.
tor, 7 Gr11y, 128; Williamston "· Willie, 15 Gray, 427; Cheever tJ. :Merritt,
5 Allen, 563; Underwood"· Robinson,
106 Mass. 296; Le Roy "· East Sagi1

44 Ala. 593; Grumon v. Raymond, 1

Conn. 40; Thames Manufg. Co. o.
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Lathrop, '1 Conn. 550; Watson 0.

Watson, 9 Conn. 140; Neth v. Crofut,

80 Conn. 580; Brother o. Cannon, 2

Ill. 200; Shaw 0. Dennis, 10 Ill. 405;

Allen 0. Scott, 13 lll. 80; Hill 0.

Figley, 25 Ill. 156; Gott v. Mitchell,

7 Blackf. 2'70; Noland 1:. Busby, 28

Ind. 154; Brainard 0. Head, 15 La.

Ann. 489; Ford 0. Clouszh, 8 Me.

334; Kellar 0. Savage, 20 Me. 199;

Trelnont o. Clark, 33 Me. 482; State

0. McNally,34 Me. 210; Caldwell v.

Hawkins, 40 Me. 526; Jutlkins 0.

Reed, 48 Me. 386; Bethel o. Mason,

55 Me. 501; Nowell 0. Tripp, 61 Me.

426; Seekins o. Goodale, 61 Me.

400; Colman o. Anderson, 10 Mass.

105; Holden 0. Eaton, 8 Pick. 436;

Sprague 12. Bailey, 19 Pick. 436;

Upton 1: Holden,5 Met. 360; Aldrich

o. Aldrich, 8 Met. 102; Lincoln v.

Worcester, 8 Cush. 55; Hayes 0.

Drake, 6 Gray, 387; Howard o. Proc-

tor, 7 Gray, 128; Williamston o. Wil-

lis, 15 Gray, 427 ; Cheever 1:. Merritt,

5 Allen, 563; Underwood 0. Robinson,

Ow-/v---~\\+

o. Perkins. 83 Mich. 28; Wood v.

Thomas, 37 Mich. ; Turner 0.

Franklin, 29 Mo. 285; Glasgow u.

Rowse, 43 Mo. 479; St. Louis Build-

ing, etc., Assn. o Lightner, 47 Mo.

393; State v. Dulle, 48 Mo. 282: Wal-

den v. Dudley, 49 Mo. 419; Blanch-

ard 0. Goss, 2 N. H. 491; llenry 0.

Surgeant, 13 N. H. 321; State v. Weed,

21 N. H. 262; Rice v. \Vadsworth, 27

N. H. 104; Kenistnn 0. Little. 30 N

H. 318; Kelley 0. Noyes. 43 N. H. 209;

Beach o. Furmau, 9 Johns. 228; \Vu.r-

ner 0. Shed, 10 Johns. 138; Savacool

0. Boughton, 5 Wend. 1'71; Wilcox v.

Smith, 5 Wend. 231; McGuinty v. Her-

rick,5 Wend.2-10; Alexander c. Hoyt,

7 Wend. 89; Reynolds 0. Moore, 9

Wend. 35, 36; Coon 0. Congdon, 12

Wend. 496, 499; Webber o. Gay, 24

~ro:~;,~rd
'\~. sa.~'·

"· Perkins. 83 .Mich. 28; Wood "·
Thomas, 37 .Mich.
; Turner o.
Franklin, 23 Mu. 285; Gl:1:0gow e.
Rowse, 43 .Mo. 4i0; 1:\t. Louis lluild.
ing, etc., Assn. " Li!!htner. 47 ~ro.
393; State "· Dulle, 48 Mn. 282; W a}.
den "· Dudley, 49 Mo. -'19; Blanch.
ard e. Goss, 2 N. H. 491; Henry "·
S:1rgeant, 13 N. H 821; State D. Weed,
21 N.H. 262; Rice"· Wad~wortb, 27
N. H. 104; Keniston "· Little. 30 N
H.318; Kelley D. Noyes. 4.'3 N.H. 209;
Heach "·Furman, 9 Johns. 228; War.
ncr "· Shed, 10 Johns. 1:}8; Savacool
"· Bough tun, 5 Wend. 171; Wilcox"·
8mith, 5 Wend. 231; McOuinty l'. Herrick, 5 Wend. 240; Alexander 11. Hoyt,
7 Wend. 89; Rt•ynohle "· Moore, 9
Wend. 85, 36; Coon "· Congdon, 12
Wend. 406, 4!19; Webber "· Gay, 24
Wend. 485; People"· Warren, 5 Hill,
440; Cornell"· Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Ben.
nett e. Burch, 1 Denio, 141; Abbott"·
Yost, 2 Denio, 86; Dunl11p "·Hunt.
ing, 2 Denio, 6-13; Patchin "· Hitter,
27 Harb. 34; Sheldon tl. Van Hu,-kirk,
2 N.Y. 473; Chegaray "·Jenkins, 5
N. Y. 876; State t. Lutz, a:; N. C. 50:J;
Gore"· llartin, 66 N.C. 371; Loomis
"· 8pencer, 1 Ohio, (N. s.) 15a; lloore
"· Alleghany City, 18 Penn. St. 5:;;
Billings "· Russell, 23 Penn. St. 189;
Burton "· Fulton, 49 Penn. St. 151;
Cunningham"· Mitchell, 67 Penn. St.

WRONGS T0 PERSONAL PROPERTY. 461

1VRONGS TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.

prehensive sense, and will include any writ, warrant, order, or

461

other authority which purports to empower a ministerial oﬁicer

to arrest the person, or to seize or enter upon the property of an

individual, or to do any act in respect to such person or property

which, if not justiﬁed, would constitute a trespass.‘ Thus, a

eapias ad respondeml um, or any warrant of arrest, is process; '

so is a writ of possession;’ so is any execution which authorizes

a levy upon property;‘ and so is any authority which is issued

to a collector of taxes and which purports to empower him to

collect the tax by distress of goods.‘ These are only illustrations

of a class too numerous to be speciﬁed in detail.

But the writ being found to be a lawful one, it next becomes

necessary to the oﬁicer’s protection that he proceed upon it

according as the law directs. He cannot demand and secure the

protection of the law while disregarding the commands laid

upon him for the protection of the rights of others. By this is

not meant that he shall obey to the letter every direction of the

law, whether important or unimportant, and whether or not

beneﬁcial to any of the parties concerned. Many directions are

given in legal proceedings which do not have specially in view

the interests of parties; and where these fail of observance it is

generally said of them that they are merely directory, and that a
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78; State e. Jervey, 4 Strob. 304; Head, 15 La Ann. 489; State 0. Mc-

l\icLean r. Cook, 23 Wis. 364; Orr 0.

Box, 23 Minn. 485.

In Vermont an exception to this

rule seems to be made in tax cases, it

being held that the tax bill and war-

rant in due iorm do not constitute

protection to the collector without a

showing that the antecedent proceed-

ings were legal. Hathaway 0. Good-

prehemaive sense, and will inclnde any writ, w"rrant, order, or
other authority which purports to empower a ministerial officer
to arrest the person, or to seize or enter upon the property of an
individual, or to do any act in respect to such person or property
which, if not justified, would constitute a trespass. 1 Thus, a
capiM ad responderulum, or any warrant of arrest, is process; •
eo is a writ ot" pOSsession; • so is any execution which authorizes
a lovy upon property; • and so is any authority which is issued
to a co1lector of taxes and which purports to empower him to
collect the tax by distress of goods. • These are only illustrations
of a class too numerous to be specified in detail.
But the writ being found to be a lawful one, it next becomes
necessary to the officer's protection that he proceed upon it
according as the law directs. He cannot demand and secure the
protection of the law while disregarding the commands laid
upon him fot• the protection of the rights of others. By this is
not meant that he shall obey to the letter every direction of the
law, whether important or unimportant, and whether or not
beneficial to any of the parties concenu'<i.
.
Many directions are
given in legal proceedings which do not have specially in '·iew
the interests of parties; and where these fail o~ observance it is
~nerally said ot' them that the-y are merely directory, and that a

rich. 5 Vt. 65; Collamer c. Drury, 16

Vt. 574; Downing 0. Roberts, 21 Vt.

441; Spear v. Tilson, 24 Vt. 420; Shaw

v. Peckett. 25 Vt. 423; Whcelock 0.

Archer, 26 Vt. BSO.

' See McGuinly 2:. fienrich, 5 Wend.

240; Loomis v. Spencer, 1 Ohio, (N. s.)

153.

‘ Parsons 0. Lloyd. 3 Wils. 341;

Neth e. Crofut, 80 Conn. 580: Brother

0. Cannon, 2 Ill. 200; Brainard 0.

Nully, 34 Me. 210; State 1:. Weed, 21

N. H. 262; Warner 0. Shed, 10 Johns.

138; Underwood 0. Robinson, 106

Mass. 296.

' Lombard 0. Atwater, 48 Iowa, 599.

Or a writ of right. Colman v. An-

der—on, 10 Mama. 105.

‘ Thames Manuf. C0. 0. Lnthrop, 7

Conn. 550; Ives v. Lucas, 1 C. & P. 7;

Hill u. Figlcy. 25 lll. 156; Gott v.

Mitchell, '7 Blackf. 270; Watkins v.

Wallace. 10 Mich. 57.

‘Erskine 0. Ilohnbuch, 14 Willi.

613; Shaw u. Dennis, 10 lll.-105; No-

land v. Busby. 28 Ind. 154; Kelley 1:.

Savage, 20 Me. 199; Caldwell 0. Haw.

kins. 40 Me. 526; Nowell r. Tripp,

61 Me. 426; Clark o. Axfurd, 5 Mich.

182.

tl. lervey. 4 Strob. 804;
Mcl.t>RD "· Cook, 23 Wis. 864; Orr t>.
Box, 22 )linn. 4~.
In Vermont an exception to this
rule seems to be made in tax case•, It
being ht>ld that the tax bill and warrant in due form do not constitute
protection to the collector without a
showing that tho antecedent proceedIngs were h•gal. Hatb11way "· Goodrich. 6 VL M; CoJiamer "· Drury, 16
Vt. 574; Downing •· Roberts, 21 Vt.
·U1; Spear"· Tilson, 24 VL 420; Shaw
"· Peckett. 23 Vl 423; Wheelock •·
Archer, 26 Vl 880.
• See llcGuinty "· Henrich, 6 Wend.
240; Loomis •· Spenct'r, 1 Ohio, (N. a.)
163.
• Parsons "· Lloyd. 8 Wlls. 341;
N etb "· (,'rofut, 80 Conn. 680 ; Brother
"· Cannon, I Ill. 200; Braloard •·

78; State

Head, 16 La. Ann. 480; StAte r.. )feNally, 84 Me. 210; State "· Wet•d, 21
N. II. 2G2; Warner"· Shed, 10 Johns.
138; t;'ndcrwood e. Robinson, 106
llnss. 21J6.
• Lombard •· Atwater, 4a Iowa, 500.
Or a writ of righl ColmAn "· Andcr·on, 10 Mass. 106.

' Thames Mnnnf. Co. "· Lathrop, 7
Conn. 550; lvea t'. Lucas, 1 C. & P. 7;
Hi11 "· Figley, 23 Ill. 156; Gott e.
Mitchell, 7 Blackf. 270; Watkins "·
Wnllace, 19 )llch. 57.
• Er!jkinc "· llohnbach, 14 Wall.
613; Shaw tl. Dennis, 10 Ill. 40-l; No.
land "· Bo~by, 28 Ind. 1M; Kelley "·
Savagp, 20 Me. 109; Cald WC!Il r. Hawkins. 40 lle. 326; Nowell r. Tripp,
61 Me. 4*1; Chuk e. Axford, 5 Mich.
182.

462 THE LAW or TORTS.
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but an irregularity only. But provisions which are made for

the very purpose of protecting individual interests cannot be

disregarded with impunity. A suitable illustration is found in

the case of one distraining cattle damagcfeasant, and proceed-

ing to impound them before having his damages appraised.

“There the appraisement is made by the statute a necessary pre-

liminary to the impounding, and has in view a beneﬁt to the

owner of the beast, that he may know precisely what his liability

is, the failure to obtain it will render the distrainer a trespasser

ab1In2'ti0.‘ So, as notice oi the time and place of sale of chat-

tels on execution is of high importance to the parties, an oﬁicer

who fails to give it when the statute requires him to do so, and,

nevertheless, proceeds to a sale, becomes trespasser ab initio, for

the law will impute to him the indulgence of a purpose to sell

thus wrongfully at the time he made the levy.’ So the oﬁicer is

liable in like manner if he sells on his process more property

than is necessary to satisfy the demand;' or if he proceeds to

sell before the time when under the statute he is at liberty to do

so; ‘ or if he makes a levy on household goods by handling them

in a rough and improper manner, and then carries them away

exposed to a severe rain; " or if, having levied on the interest of
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one tenant in common, he proceeds to sell the whole title.“ or in

any manner misuses or misappropriates the property attached

by him.’

For a mere non-feasance an oﬁicer does not become a trespasser

' Pratt 0. Petrie, 2Johns. 191; Hop. Ash 0. Dnwnay, 8 Exch. 237; Play

kins 0. Hopkins, 10 Johns. 369; Sack-

rider 0. McDonald, 10 Johns. 252;

Merritt v. O'Neil, 13 Johns. 477;

Smith o. Gates, 21 Pick. 55.

‘Blake v. Johnson, 1 N. H. 91;

Purrington v. Loring, 7 Muss. 388.

“Williamson v. Dow, 32 Me. 559.

See Ross v. P_hilbrick, 39 Me. 29.

‘Wallis 0. Truesdell, 6 Pick. 455

See Smith o. Gates, 21 Pick. 55;

failure to comply with them does not constitute an invalidity,
but an irregularity only. But provisions which are made for
the very purpose of protecting individnal interests cannot be
disregarded with impunity. A suitable illustration is f(tnnd in
the case of one distraining cattle damtrgo feasant, and proteeding to impound them before having his damages appraised.
Where the appraisement is made by the statute a necessary preliminary to the impounding, and has in view a benefit to the
owner of the beast, that he may know precisely what his liability
is, the failure to obtain it will render the distt"Biner a trespas~er
alJ inUiiJ. 1 So, as notice ot the time and place of sale of chattels on execution is of high importance to the parties, an rJfticer
who fai1s to give it when the statnte requires him to do so, and,
nevertheless, pro<.-eeds to a sale, becomes trespasser ab initio, for
the law will impute to him the indulgence of a purpose to sell
thus wrongfully at the time he made the levy.~ So the officer is
liable in like manner if he sells on his pro<.-ess more property
than is necessary to satisfy the demand; • or if he proceeds to
sell before the time when under the statute he is at liberty to do
eo; 4 or if he makes a levy on household goods by handling them
in a rough and improper manner, and then carries them away
exposed to a severe rain; • or if, having levied on the interest of
one tenant in common, he proceeds to sell the whole title.' or in
any manner misuses or misappropriates the property attached
by him.'
}'or a mere non-feasance an officer does not become a trespasser

Knight v. Herrin, 48 Me. 533.

° Snydacker 1;. lirosse, 51 lll. 357.

° Melville v. Brown, 15 Mass. 81.

l Brackett '0. Vining, 49 Me. 356.

See Sawyer o. Wilson, 61 Me. 529;

fair 0. Mus;rove, 14 M. & W. 239;

Attach v. I3raiu\\'ell, 3 Best & S. 520,

and cases cited.

To render one :\ trespasser ab irulfo

the facts should warrunt the conclu-

sion that the oﬁlcer intended from the

ﬁrst to abuse his lawful authority.

Griel 0. Hunter, 40 Ala. 542, citing

Taylor v. Jones, 42 N. H. 25. But any

obviously unnecessary and oppressive

action may render the olllcer liable in

case, as where a collect ir of taxes

makes distress which is greatly and

obviously excessive. Jewell o. Swain,

57 N. H. 506.

I Pratt e. Petrie, 2 Johns. 191; Hop.
kins e. Hopkins, 10 Johns. 369; Sack.
rider e. McDonald, 10 Johns. 252;
Merritt "· O'Neil, 18 Johns. 477;
Smith "· Gates, 21 Pick. 55.
2 Blake "· Johnson, 1 N. H. 91;
Purrington "· Loring, 7 Mass. 3tl8.
1 Williamson 1:1. Dow, 32 Me. 559.
Bee Ross v. Philbrick. 89 Me. 29.
4 Wallis "· ·Truesdell, 6 Pick. 4:>5
See Smith "· Gates, 21 Pick. fi5;
Knight"· Herrin, 48 Me. 533.
• Snydacker "· .Hrosse, 51 Ill. !J57.
• Melville "· Brown, 15 Mass. 81.
, Brackett "· Vining, 49 1\Ie. 356.
Bee Sawyer "· Wilson, 61 Me. 529;

Ash •· Dawnay, 8 Exch. 237; Phly
fair e. !tlu-;;rnve, 14 M. & W. 239;
Attach"· Bramwell, 8 Best & S. 520,
and cases cited.
To render one a trespasst'r ab initl'o
the liiCts should warrant the conclu.
sion that the officer intended from the
Jlrst to abuse his lawful authority.
Grlel e. Hunter, 40 All\. 542, citing
Taylor e. Jones, 42 N.H. 25. But 1\ny
obviously unnecessary and opprl',;sive
action may render the officer liable in.
case, us where a collect lr of taxes
makes distress which Is gt·eatly and
obvinnsly excessive. Jewell e. Swain,

67 N.H. 606.
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ab 2m'tz'o. As where he fails to keep safely property taken in
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execution by him;' or to proceed to a sale as in duty bound to

do;’ or to restore property attached after the debt has been

satisﬁed.’ But in each of these cases he will be liable on the

special case; but not in trespass, because in none of his conduct

has there been any wrongful force.‘

Extent of the Protection. The protection the ofiicer receives

from the apparent validity of the process is personal to the ollicer

and those called in by him to assist in the service;’ that is to

say, it protects them against being made liable as trespa.-sers in

® tnitio. As where he fails to keep safely property tRken in
execution by him; • or to proceed to a sale as in duty bound to
do; • or to restore property attached after the debt has been
satisfied.• But in each of these cases he will be liable on the
S}~al case; bot not in trespass, because in none of his conduct
haa there been any wrongful force.•

obeying its command. But if the officer has taken property

under it, and the fact that he acquired a special property in the

Bs:tent

goods by the seizure comes in question; it is not suﬁit-ient for

him to show merely an apparently valid writ, but he must go

further and show that the writ had lawful authority for its issue.

Thus, if the writ was an execution, it must appear that there

was a valid judgment; and if an attachment, then that the

proper legal showing was made before its issue, for until this

appears, the sheriﬁ‘ has only a personal protection and no special

property.‘ Such is the case where the oflicer, for any reason,

ﬁnds himself under the necessity of bringing replevin for the

goods,’ or where he is sued for taking them by a third person
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who claims them by assignment from the defendant in the pro-

cess, and whose title would consequently be valid as against any

levy that could not be supported by valid anterior proceedings."

And here it may be well to say, what it may be nece.~"s-ary to

repeat hereafter, that mere irregularities in either the writ or

what precedes it are not fatal defects.

‘Waterbury v. Lockwood, 4 Day,

257; Stoughton v. Mott, 25 Vt. 668.

right to do the ﬁrst act. Gates v.

Lounsbury, 20 Johns. 427.

- * Bell ‘D. North, 4 Lit. (Ky.) 133.

' ‘Gardner e. Campbell, 15 Johns.

401. See Baker 0. Fales, 16 Mass.

147, 153; Hale c. Clark, 19 Wend.

498: Stoughton v. Mott, 25 Vt. 608.

‘ Where an act is lawfully done, it

cannot be made unlawful ab initio

unless by some positive act incom-

patible with thc exercise of the legal

‘ That whoever assists the oﬁlcer at

ot the Protection. The protection the officer recC'ives

from the apparent validity of the process is persom\l to the oflicer
and those called in by him to assist in the service;~ that is to
say, it protects them against being made liable as tre~pa~se1-s in
obeying its command. Bnt if the officer ha.s taken pro1x•rty
under it, and the fact that he acquired a special property in the
goods by the seizure comes in question; it is not suftit·ieut tor
him to show merely an apparently valid writ, but he must t-.ro
further and show that the writ had lawful authority fot· its i~sne.
Thus, if the writ was an execution, it mnst appear that there
waa a valid judgment; and if an attachment, then thut tl.e
proper legal showing was made before its is~ue, for until this
appears, the sheriff has only a perwnal protection nnd no special
property.4 Such is the case where the oflk-er, for any reason,
finds himself under the necessity of bringing replevin tor the
goods,' or where he is sned tor taking them by a third J>l'l'tson
who claims them by assi~·nment from the detendaut in the prOce88, aud whose title wunld CQnseqnently be valid as agninst any
levy that could not be supported by valid anterior pro<.'(.>edin~s."
And here it may be well to say, what it may be necl'r'tmry to
repeat hereafter, that mere irre~nl~rities in either tho writ or
what precedes it are not tatal dctt:cts.

his request is protected as he is. See

Payne v. Green, 18 Miss. 507; Kill-

patrick 1: Frost, 2 Grant, 168.

‘ Earl c. Camp, 16 Wend. 562.

" Spafford r. Beach. 2 Doug. (.\{ich.)

199; Leroy v. East Saginaw, 18 Mich.

233.

" Parker v. Walrod, 16 Wend. 514,

517, and cases cited.

1 Waterbury ~ Lockwood, f Day,
237; Stoughton tt. Mott, 25 VL 668.

Bell tt. North, 4 Lit. (Ky.) 183.
' • Gardner tl. Campbell, 16 Johns.
.rot. See BAker tt. F'al('S, 16 Mas.''·
147, U3; Hale "· Clark, 19 Wend.
498: Stoughton tt. Hott, 26 Vt. 66~.
• Where an act Is lawfully done, U
cannot be made unlawful ab initio
unless by some positive act incompatible with the exerclae of the legal
• t

right to do the first acl Ont~ "·
Lounsbury, 20 Johns. 427.
1 Th:tt whoever Rs!li!!t!l the officer at
his request Is prott'cted as b(' is. Bee
Payne e. Gret>n, 18 MIM. 007; Killpatrick t Fr<)lll, 2 Grant, li!H.
• Earl r. Camp, 16 Wend. 562.
, Spafford r. Beach. B Doug. (Mich.)
199; Leroy tt. East Saginaw, 18 Mich.
233.
• Parker "· Walrod, 16 Wend. 614,
617, and cases cited.
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What Process is not Fair on its Face. Some old cases made
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a distinction between process issuing from courts of general

jurisdiction and that issued by other and inferior tribunals, and

required an oﬁicer in the last case to take notice of whatever

might appear, or not appear, in all the proceedings on which the

right to issue the process might depend. But since the thorough

examination the whole subject received in Savacool v. Boughton,‘

it has been generally c0nceded_that the distinction is unwar-

ranted, so far as it concerns the personal protection of the oﬁicer.

It is not unimportant, however, as it may bear upon the form

of the process itself, for recitals may be suﬁicient in one case

and not in another. When a court of general jurisdiction

assumes authority to act there is a presumption of law that the

authority exists, and the oﬁicer need not inquire further; but

the inferior court must not only have authority in fact, but upon

the face of its records and of its process enough should appear

to show it. This is a general rule.

The following are illustrative instances of process not fair on

its face: A warrant of arrest issued by a justice in a case of

which its recitals showed he had no jurisdiction :, ’ a writ of /zabeas

corpus issued by and returnable before an oﬁicer not by law

having authority over that writ; “ a tax warrant the veriﬁcation
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to which was made prematurely;‘ a warrant for the collection

of a personal tax where one on real estate only could he 1evied;‘

an order made ‘by a commissioner in bankruptcy to detain a

debtor until he should pay certain costs. the law giving him no

authorityto make such an order;’ a conviction which showed

on its _face that the party had been convicted on default in

responding to a summons returnable less than ten days from

date, the statute requiring ten days “at least”; ' process of con-

tempt issued by a judge of a court when only the court as a

body had authority to issue it; ° process issued under an uncon-

‘ 5 Wend. 1'70. Van Renssclaer 1:. Witbeck, '7 N. Y.

’ Shcrgold v. Holloway. Stra. 1002; 517; Nat. Bunk of Chemung 1:. El-

Rosen 1:. Fischcl.-14 Conn. 871. mira, 53 N. Y. 49; Gale 'v. Mead, 1

‘ Cable 1:. Cooper, 15 Johns. 152. Hill, 109.

Sec Chalkcr 0. Ives, 55 Penn. St. 81; ' American Bank v. Mumford, 4 R.

Hilbisli '0. Hower, 58 Penn. St. 93. I. 478.

‘ Westfall 0. Preston, 49 N. Y. 349. ' Watson v. Bodell, 14 M. & W. 58.

For other illustrations in tax cases, " Mitchell v. Foster, 12 A. & E. 472.

see Eames 0. Johnson, 4 Allen, 382; ° Van Sandau v. Turner, 6 Q. B. 773.

_ - ---H4

What Prooeaa is not Pair on its Face. Sor.1e old cases made
a distinction between process issuing from courts of general
jurisdiction and that issued by other and inferior tribunals, and
required an officer in the last case to take notice of whatever
might appear, or not appear, in all the proceedings on which the
right to issue the process might depend. But since the thorough
examination the whole subject received in Savacool v. Boughton,'
it has been generally conceded .that the distinction is unwarranted, so far as it concerns the personal protection of the officer.
It is not unimportant, however, as it may bear upon the form
of the process itself~ for recitals may be sufficient in one case
and not in another. When a court of gener·al jnrisdiction
assumes authority to act there is a presumption of law that the
authority exists, .and the officer need not inquire further; but
the inferior conrt must not only have authority in fact, but upon
the face of its records and of its process enough should appear
to show it. This is e. general rule.
The following are illustrative instances of process not fair on
its face: A warrant of arrest issued by a justice in a <'ase of
which its recitals showed he had no jurisdiction;' a writ of halJe.a-8
corpus issued by and returnable before an officer not by law
having authority over that writ; • a tax warrant the verification
to which was made prematurely; • a warrant for the collection
of a personal tax where one on real e!iltate only conld be levied: •
an order made ·by a commissioner in bankruptcy to detain a
debtor until he should pay certain costs. the law gi\'ing him no
authority. to make such an order; • a conviction which showed
on its _face that the party had been convicted on default in
responding to a summons returnable less than ten days from
date, the statute req niring ten days "at least";' process of contempt issued by a judge of a court when only the court as a
body had authority to issue it; • process issued under an nncon1 5 Wend. 170.
'Shergold "'· Holloway, Stra. 1002;
Rosen "'· Fischel. 44 Conn. 371.
a Cable "'· Cooper, Hi Johns. 152.
Sec Chalker v. Ives, 55 Penn. St. 81;
Hilblsh v. Hower, 58 Penn. St. 93.
• Westfall "'· Preston, 49 N.Y. 349.
For ~tber illustrations in tax case11,
see Eames "· Johnson, 4 Allen, 382;

Van Rensselaer "· Witbeck, 7 N. Y.
517; Nat. Bank of Chemung tJ. Elmira, 53 N. Y. 49; Gale "· Mead, t
Hill, 109.
5 American Bank "· Mumford, 4 R.
I. 478.
• Watson tJ. Bodell, 14 :M. & W. 58.
' Mitchellv. Foster, 12 A. & E. 472.
' Van Sandau "· Turner, 6 Q. B. 773.
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of costs when the law allowed none; ' an order of a military oﬁicer

for the seizure of the property of a citizen not in the military

service;' a conviction by a military commission for an offense

only triable in the regular courts,‘ etc. In all these cases the

rule prevails that the oﬂicer who is called upon to execute the

orders of any tribunal is bound to take notice of the law and to

know that his process is bad if in fact the law will not uphold it.

\Vhether, where an oﬂicer knows that back of process fair on

its face are facts which render it void, he is nevertheless pro-

tected in serving it, is a point upon which the authorities are not

agreed. In Illinois there are dicta in a number of cases,“ fol-

lowed at length by an authoritative decision,‘ that where an oﬁicer

has notice of an excess or want of jurisdiction in the magistrate

or board from which his process emanates, he would render him-

self liable for acting under it. This doctrine is approved in

Wisconsin,’ but it has not met with general acceptance. It was

expressly denied in New York, in a case in which jurisdiction to

issue the particular process depended on the det'endant’s residence

within the jurisdiction of the court, and the otﬁcer knew him to

be a non-resident.’ In Massachusetts, also, it was decided that

an officer was not liable for serving process by the arrest of a
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person who had been discharged under the insolvent laws, though

he knew of the discharge.’ A case in Connecticut is very pointed

and clear. The oﬁicer was sued in trespass for executing a writ

of replevin issued for a horse as having been distrained or im-

pounded. Says Ilosnma, Ch. J.: “The writ was put in his hands.

as an oﬁicer, to serve, and he accordingly served the same by

replevying the before mentioned horse. The ﬁrst objection to

this act 01' his is founded on a fact proved at the trial of the

' Ely v. Thompson, 8 A. K. Marsh.

70; Kelly 0. Bemis, 4 Gray, 83. Pro-

cess from a State court in an admi-

ralty case would be of this sort.

Campbell v. Sherman. 35 Wis. 103.

' Clark 0. Woods, 2 Exch. 895.

' Mitchell o. Harmony, 13 How. 115.

‘ Milligan c. Hovey, 8 Biss. 13.

‘ Barnes 0. Barber, 6 Ill. 401; Guy-

er 0 Andrews, 11 Ill. 494; McDonald

I. Wilkie, 13 lll. 22.

‘ Leachman 0. Doughcrty, 81 Ill.

324.

" Sprague 0. Birchard, 1 Wis. 457,

stitutionallaw; 1 a warrant for taxes which directed the collection
of costs when the law allowed none; s an order of a mi1itary officer
for the seizure of the property of a citizen not in the military
service;' a com·iction by a military commission for an offense
only triable in the regnlar conrts: etc. In all these cases the
r1,1le prevails that the officer who is called upon to execute the
orders of any tribunal is bound to take notice of the law and to
know that his process is bad if in fact the law will not uphold it.
'Yhcther, where an oflk-er knows that back of process fair on
its face are facts whi~h render it void, he is ne1tertheless protected in serving it, is a point upon which the authorities are not
agreed. In Illinois the1·e are dicta in a number of eases,' fol.
lowe1l at length by an authoritative decision,' that where an officer
has notice of an excess or want of jurisdiction in the magistrate
or board from which his process e~anatcs, he would rend~r himself liable for acting under it. This doctrine is approved in
Wisconsin,' but it has not met with general acceptance. It was
expre~sly denied in .New York, in a case in which jurhsdiction to
issue the particular process depended on the defendant's residence
within the jurisdiction of the court, and the officer knew him to
be a non-resident.' In Ma~sachusetts, also, it was decided that
an officer was not liable tor serving process by the arrest of a
person who had been discharged under the insolvent laws, though
he knew of the discharge.• A case in Connecticut is very pointed
and clear. The officer was sned in trespass tor executing a writ
of replevin issued for a horse as having been distrained or impounded. Says Ilo8l1ER, Ch. J.: "The writ was put in his hands.
as an officer, to serve, and he accordingly served the same by
replevying the before mentioned horse. The first objection to
this act o,. his is fonnded on a fact }lroved at the trial of the

464; Grace 0. Mitchell, 81 Wis. 538,

539.

'Webber o. Gay, 24 Wend. 485.

See, also, People 0. Warren, 5 llill,

440.

' Wilmarth 0. Burl, 7 Met. 257. See

Twitchell o. Shaw, 10 Cush. 46.

30

1 Ely o. Thompson, 8 A. K. Marsh.
70; Kdly "·Bemis, 4 Gray, 88. Process from a State court in an admiralty cnse would be of this sort
Campbell "· Sherman, 35 Wis. 103.
'Clark"· Woods, 2 Exch. 89J.
• Mitchell zr. Htlrmony, llJ How. 1115.
'Milligan"· Hovey, 8 Biss. 13.
• Barnes "· Barber, 6 Ill. 401; Guyer " Andrews, 11 Ill. 494; McDonald
•· Wilkie, 13 lll. 22.

80

1

Leachman "· Dougherty, 81 Ill.

324.
' Sprague e. Birchard, 1 Wis. 457,
464; Grace "· Mitchell, 81 Wis. 538,
589.
• Webber e. Gay, M Wend. 485.
See, also, People "·Warren, 5 Hill,

440.
' Wilmarth"· Burt, 7 Mel 21S7.

Twitchell "· Shaw, 10 Cuah. 46.

See
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cause, to-wit: that he knew the said horse had not been dis-
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trained or impounded. From this the plaintiff infers that he

ought not to have served the replevin; and that in thus doing

he became a trespasser. I reply to this objection, that the

defendant, Phelps, being a legal oﬁicer, it became his duty, regard-

less of any knowledge or supposed knowledge of his own, that

there existed no cause of action, to serve the writ committed to

him promptly, unhesitatingly, and without restraint from the

above mentioned cause. This I consider so ﬁrmly established as

to render the proposition self evident. The facts on the face of

the writ constitute his justiﬁcation, because he was obliged to

obey its mandate; nor was it any part of his duty to determine

whether the allegations contained in the rcplevin were true. The

proof of these positions results, incontrovertibly, from his rela-

tive condition. He was an executive oﬁicer, whose sole duty it

was to execute, and not to decide on, the truth or suﬁiciency of

the process committed to him for service. He has no portion of

judicial authority, nor the means of inquiring into the causes of

action contained in the writs and declarations put into his hands

for service. Obedience to all precepts committed to him to be

served is the ﬁrst, second and third part of his duty; and hence,

if they issue from competent authority, and with legal regularity.
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and so appear on their face, he is justiﬁed for every action of his

within the scope of their command.”‘ “The ground of these

principles is simply this: That to the magistrate is conﬁded the

issuing of writs, and to the sheriff and other executive officers

is conﬁded the duty of serving them. It is easy to see what

widespread mischief might result from permitting an executive

oﬁicer to decide, on his own knowledge, that he ought not to

serve a precept or warrant put into his hands for service, and to

consider what justly must follow from such doctrine; that is, that

his return of the fact would be a justification for his omission.

In short, the executive oﬂicer must do his duty, which is to obey

all legal writs, and must not arrogate to himself the right of dis-

obeying the paramount commands of those to whose mandates

he by law is subjected.” '

‘ Citing Belk o. Broadbent, 3 T. R. ‘Watson v. Watson, 9 Conn. 140,

183,185; Gruinon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 146. See Cunningham 0. Mitchell, 67

40; Miller 11. Davis, Comyn, 590. Penn. St. 78.

can~e.

to-wit: that he knew the said horse had not been distrained or impounded. From this the plaintiff infers that he
ought not to have served the replevin; and that in thus doing
he became a trespasser. I reply to this objection, that the
defendant, Phelps, being a legal officer, it berame his duty, regardless of any knowledge or supposed knowledge of his own, that
there existed no cause of action, to serve the writ committed to
him promptly, unhesitatingly, and without restraint from the
above mentioned cause. This I considP.r so firmly established as
to rende1· the proposition self evident. The facts on the face of
the writ constitute his justification, be,cause he was obliged to
ohey its mandate; nor was it any part of his duty to determine
whether the allegations contained in the replevin were true. The
proof of these positions result~, incontrovertibly, from his relative condition. He was an executive officer, whose sole dntv it
was to execute, and not to decide on, the trnth or sufficiency of
the proress committed to him for service. He has no portion of
jndicial authority, nor the means of inquiring into the can~es of
action conta:ned in the writs and declarations put into his hands
for service. Obedience to all precepts committed to him to be
served is the first, second and third part of his dnty; and hence~
if they issue from competent authority, and with legal regularity,
and so appear on their face, he is justified for every action of his
within the scope of their command."' "The ground of these
principles is simply this: That to the magistrate is confided the
issning of writs, and to the sheriff and other executive officers
is eonfi<leJ the 1luty of serving them. It is easy to see what
widespread mischief might result from permitting an executive
officer to decide, on his own knnwlcdg.:>, that he ought not to
t>erve a preel'pt or warrant put into his hands for service, and to
conHider what justly must follow from snch doctrine; that is, that
his return of the fact would be a justification for his omission.
In short, the executive officer must do his dnty, which is to obey
all legal writs, and must not arrogate to himself the right of disobeying the paramount cvmmauds of those to whose mandates
he hy law is subjected." •
1 Citing Belk "· Broadbent, 8 T. R.
183, 18."J; Grumon u. Raymond, 1 Conn.
40; Miller"· Davis, Comyn, 500.

1 Watson tl. Watson, 9 Conn. 140,
146. See Cunningham"· Mitchell, 67
Penn. St. 78.
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WHO~AR TO PER~ONAL PROPERTY.

A doctrine precisely identical has been laid down in Louisiana ‘
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and in Michigan.’ The cases decided are specially signiﬁcant in

this: that in each ease the fact which made the process illegal

was within the orlicial knowledge of the oﬂicer claiming the pro-

tcction. It seems to us, therefore, that the weight of authority

and of reason is clearly in favor of the proposition, that the

ofiicer may safely obey all process fair on its face, and is not bound

to judge of it by facts within his knowledge which may he

supposed to invalidate it. But when it is settled that an officer

may safely execute process, though he may know of facts to

invalidate it, it does not of necessity follow that he cannot safely

refuse to do so. It is, indeed, intimated by Chief Justice Hos-

.\n:r:, in the citation above given, that duty requires him to pro-

ceed and serve the process; but the courts in New York have

held otherwise.’ And, indeed, it would seem an anomaly that a

plaintiff should be at liberty to hold an oflicer responsible for

refusing to serve a writ, the service of which would render the

plaintiff himself liable as a trespasser. Says \VAr.in;u, J.. in a

recent case: “ As a general rule, an ofiicer may justify, under a

writ regular on its face, whether the court had jurisdiction or not,

although the writ may be void. Or he may, if he chooses, refuse

to execute such a writ.” ‘
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Magistrate, when Liable. The rule ofudicial irresponsibility,

where the magistrate has acted within his jurisdiction, is given,

with the authorities which support it, in another place. The con-

verse of the rule is true, that if he acts without jurisdiction he

is liable, even though his process is perfectly valid on its face,

and he has acted with proper motive. The principle is illus-

trated by eases in which a justice of the peace proceeded to pun-

ish for an offense not committed within his jurisdiction; the liters

on which his jurisdiction depended being known to him." So

assessors are liable who impose taxes on persons not taxable

' Brainard v. Ilead, 15 La. Ann. Camp, 16 Wend. 562. St-e, llﬁ\\‘P\'t'l',

A doc-trine precisely identical hal' bPen laid down in Lomsiana'
ar1d in Mil'l1igan.' The Cfises decided are specially signiticaat in
this: that in each Cfil'e the fact which made the process ilh•gal
was within the official knowledge of the officer claiming tbe protC'ction. It seem~ to u~. therefore, that the weight of antho1·i ty
and of rt>:u•on i~ clearly in favor of tho proposition, that the
ofih·er nwy sn.tcly ohey all process fair on its face, and iFI not bound
to jndlrc of it by facts within his knowledge which rna.y he
snppos(•d to invalidate it. But when it is f:ettled that an otlh·er
may safely execute procesfl, though he may know of facts to
inmli<late it, it does not of necessity follow that he cannot Fafely
rcfn~e to do so. It is, indeed, intimated by Chief Justice llos:m:r., in the citation abo\'e given, that dnty requires him to pl"Oceed and serve the process; but the courts in New York h:H"e
held otherwise.' And, indeed, it would seem an anomaly that a
plaintiff should be at liberty to hold an otlicer responsible fcJr
refusing to serve a writ, the service of whiC'h would render the
plaintiff himsC'If liahlc as a trespas,.:er. Hays \\r AJ.Kto.:I~, J .. in a
re<'cnt case: "As a general rnle, an officer may ju:0tify, mulP:" a
writ regular on its face, whether the court had jurisrliction or n'ot,
although the writ may be void. Or he may, if he chooses, refuse
to execute such a writ." •

-189. Clearwater v. Brill, 11 N. Y. Sup. Ct.

' Wall 0. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228; (4 Iiun,) 728.

Bird 0. Perkins, 33 Mich. 2H. See. ‘Davis 0. Wilson, 61 Ill.

also, Richards v. Nye, 5 Oreg. J;-R2. See, also, Hill o. Wait, 5 Vt.

‘Horton o. lIendershot,1 Hill, 118; ' Miller v. Grice, 2 Rich. 27; Piper

Cornell v. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dunlap 0. Pearson, 2 Gray, 120.

0. Hunting, 2 Denio, 043; Earl 0.

‘T in
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:Magistrate, when Liable. The rule ofjudicial irresponsibility,
where the magistrate has acted within his jnri.,;~liction, jr;, gi,·en,
with the authorities which support it, in another plnC'c. The eonverse of the rule is true, that if he nets without juri~<li(·t.ion he
is linhle, e\'t:>n though his proeess is perfectly valid on its tiu~e,
and he has ncted with proper motive. The principle ii' illustrated by cn10es in which a ju:'tice of the pea<.-e proceeded to punish fur an uftEmse not committed within his juri:odiction; tl1e filets
on which his jurisdiction depended being known to him.' So
assesKol·s are liable who impose taxes on persons not taxable
1

Brainard

tl.

llcnd, liS La. Ann.
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'Wall "· Trurubull, 16 Mich. 228;
Bird t~. PPrk ins, :-J3 Mich. 2~. See,
also, Richards v. Xyc, 5 Ore){. :;H~.
• Horton o. Hendershot, 1 Hill, 1 tR;
Cornell-r. B1Lrnes, 7 llill, 35; Dunlap
e. Hunting, 2 Denio, U43; Eurl e.

Camp, 16 Wend. 5G2. St·e, ho\\'I'Wr,
Clearwater o. Brill, 11 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
(4 Hun,) 728.
• Davis "· Wilson, 61 Ill. 527, 529.
Bee, also, Hill o. Wuit, 5 Vt. 124.
' ~Iiller "· Grice, 2 Rich. 27; Piper
•· Pearson, 2 Gray, 120.
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within their districts, and issue process for their collection,‘ or
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spread upon the tax roll a sum never lawfully voted, or in excess

within their districts, and issue process for their eo11ection,' or
spread upon the tax roll a sum never lawfully voted, or in excess
of that which the law allows to be Je,·ied,s or a sum which has
been le\·ied ior an unauthorized purpo.-~c,• or issue a warrant for
the collection of sums which have not been properly reported to
them as allowed by the competent authority,' or alter the assessment after, by law, it has passed from their control, so that the
alteration is wholly an unofficial act.•

of that which the law allows to be levied,’ or a sum which has

been levied for an unauthorized purpose,“ or issue a warrant for

the collection of sums which have not been properly reported to

them as allowed by the competent authority,‘ or alter the assess-

ment after, by law, it has passed from their control, so that the

alteration is wholly an unotiicial act.‘

Liability of Party. The party is liable where he participates

in the unlawful action of either the magistrate or the ministerial

officer. He is, in general, responsible for setting the court or

magistrate in motion in a case where they have no authority to

act;° and perhaps to this rule there is no exception but this:

that if the jurisdiction depends upon the facts, and these are pre-

Liability of Party. The party is liable where he participatea
in the unlawful action of either the magistrate or the ministerial
officer. He is, in I!Cncra.I, responsible for setting the court or
mllgistrate in motion in a case where they have no authority to
act; • and perhaps to this rule there is no exception but this:
that if the jurisdiction depends upon the facts, and these are presented to a court having general jurisdiction of that cltlss of
cases, and the court decides that it has authority to act, and procee<ls to do so, this decision protects not the officer merelv, but
the party also.' But every party has a right to assume that the
officer will proceed to execute lawful process in a lawful manner,
and if, instead of doing so, the officer proceeds illegaUy, the party
is not responsible, unless he participated in or advised the abuse.•

sented to a court having general jurisdiction of that class of

cases, and the court decides that it has authority to act, and pro-

ceeds to do so, this decision protects not the oﬁicer merelv, but

the party also.’ But every party has a right to assume that the

oﬁicer will proceed to execute lawful process in a lawful manner,

and if, instead of doing so, the officer proceeds illegally, the party

is not responsible, unless he participated in or advised the abuse.‘

' Mygatt 1:. Wnshburn, 15 N. Y. 816;
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Bennett 1;. Buffalo, 1'7 N. Y. 383;

Clark 1». Norton. 49 N. Y. 243; Dor-

win v. Strickland, 57 N. Y. 492; Buy-

tlam 0. Keys, 13 Johns. 444; Marlin

1: Mansﬁeld, 3 Mass. 419; Agry 0.

Young, 11 Mass. 220; Gage v. Currier,

4 Pick. 399; Lyman 0. Fiskc, 17 Pick.

231; Fairbanks v. Kittredge, 24 Vt, 9;

liarriman 0. Stevens, 43 Me. 497;

\Vnre v. Percival, 61 Me. 391.

"Grafton Bank v. Kimball, 20N.

H. 107; Cooley on Taxation, 554, and

numerous cases cited.

3 Stetson 0. Kempton, 13 Mass. 271;

Drew 1:. Davis, 10 Vt. 506.

‘ Clark v. Axford, 5 Mich. 182.

5 Bristol Manuf. Co. v. Gridley, 28

Conn. 201; Fcrton o. Feller, 33 Mich.

199. See Garﬁeld v. Douglass, 22 Ill.

I00

' Stetson o. Goldsmith, 30 Ala. 602;

S. C. 31 Ala. 049.

" West o. Smallwood, 3 M. & W.

418. “Where a magistrate has a gen-

eral jurisdiction over the subject mat-

ter, and a party comes before him and

prefers a complaint, upon which the

magistrate makes a mistake in think-

ing it a case within his authority,

and grants a warrant which is not

justiﬁable in point of law, the party

complaining is not liable as a trespas-

ser, hut the only remedy against him

is by an action -upon the case, if he

has acted maliciously." Lord Anus-

GER, Ch. B. But it was agreed in the

same case that the party would have

been liable if he had participated

with the oiﬁcer in the service of the

warrant.

° Perrin 0. Claﬂin, 11 Mo. 13;

_ _ (M

<1

•

1 Mygatt o. Washbum,15 N.Y. 816;
B<>nnett "· Butl'lllo, 17 N. Y. 883;
Clnrk "· Norton. 49 N.Y. 24:1; Dor.
win 11. Strickland, 57 N. Y. 492; Suydam "· Keys, 18 Johns. 444; Martin
t'. ::'tlansfleld, 8 ~lass. 419; Agry 11.
Young, 11 Mass. 220; Gage"· Cnrrl('r,
4 Pick. 309; I,ymsn fl. Fiske, 17 Pick.
281; Fairbanks ~. Kittredge, 24 Vt, 9;
llllrriman 11. Stevens, 48 Me. 497;
Wure "·Percival, 61 Me. 391.
'Grafton Bank "· Kimball, 00 :N.
H. 10'7; Cooley on Taxation, M4, and
numerous casC's cited.
z Stt>tson o. Kempton, 18 Mass. 271;
Drew "· Davis, 10 Vt. 606.
• L'lark ». Axford, 5 Mich. 182.
' Bristol ltanaf. Co. 11. Gridley, 28
Conn. 201; Ferton "· Feller, 88 Mich.
100. See Garfield "· Douglass, 22 Ill.
100

• Stetson o. Goldsmith, 80 AlL 802;
B. C. 81 Ala. 649.
'West "· Smallwood, 8 H. & W.
418. "Where a magistrate baa a gen.
era] jurisdiction over the subject mat..
ter, and a party comes before him and
prefers a complaint, upon which the
magistrate makes a mistake in thinking It a case within his authority,
H.Dd grants a warrant which is not
ju11tifiable in point of law, the party
complaining is not liable as a trespasser, but the only reml!dy against him
is by an action .upon the case, if he
has acted maliciously." .Lord ABINOER, Ch. B. But it wu agreed In the
same case that the party would have
been liable if he had participated
With the omcer in the Set"Vice of the
warrant.
• Perrin •· Claflin, 11 Mo. 18;
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Protection of Purchaser under Execution. One who becomes
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purchaser of personal property at an execution sale is concerned

only with the judgment, the levy, the execution and the sale; if

these are apparently valid, he need look no further.‘ To say

that if the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction all

proceedings upon the execution are merely void, is stating a pro-

position that should be self evident.’ But the rule is the same if,

for any other reason, the judgment was void,’ or had been satis-

ﬁed,‘ or if, the judgment being valid, the execution for any rea-

son was void.‘ or was issued when none was allowed by law.‘

The sale would also be void if made privately, because the oﬁieer

has no authority to sell in that manner, and the purchaser must

take notice of such an illegality.’ The same would be true if the

property was not present, or within view of the bidders.’

The rule of protection, moreover, is not so broad when the

plaintiff in the process, or his attorney, or anyone fully cogni-

Princeton Bank v. Gihson, 20 N. J.

138; Snively r. Fuhnestock, 18 Md.

391; Averill 0. Williams, 1 Denio,-501;

Clay v. Sandefer, 12 B. Mon. 334.

' Wheaton 1:. Sexton, 4 Wheat. 503;

Leuox 1:. Clark, 52 Mo. 115.
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' Falkner o. Guild, 10 Wis. 563;

Wilson s. Arnold, 5 Mich. 98; Gray

Protection of Purchaser under Execution. One who becomes
purchaser of personal property at an execution sale is concerned
only with the judgment, the levy, the execution atHl the sale; if
the~>e are apparently valid, he need look no fn rther. • To say
that if the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction all
proC'eedings upon the execution are merely void, is stating a proposition that should be self evident.• Rut the rule is the same if,
tor any other reason, the judgment was void,• or had been satisfied,' or if, the judgment being valid, the execution tor any reason was void,' or wns issued when none was allowed by lnw.•
The sale would also be void if made privately, because the offiecr
bns no authority to sell in that manner, and the purchaser must
take notice of snch an ill('gality.' The same would be true if the
pr·opert.y was not pre~ent, or within view of the biddero.'
The rnle of protcdion, moreover, is not so broad when the
plaintiff in tho process, or his attorney, or anyone fully cogni-

0. Iiawes, 8 (Yul. 562; Miller 1:. Handy,

40 Ill. 448; Mulvey v. Carpenter, 78

Ill. 5-S0; Borders v. Murphy, 78 Ill.

81; Abbott 0. Sheppard, 4; 1l[o.2I3;

Clark r. Fowler, 5 Allen, 45.

‘Conrad v. McGee. 9 Yerg. 428;

Welch 1:. Butter, 24 Geo. 445; Hol-

lingsworth v. Bagley, 35 Tex. 315;

Harshcy v. Blackmarr, 20 Iowa, 161;

Sanders 0. Rains, 10 Mo. 770; Hig-

gins r. Peltzer, 49 Mo. 152.

‘ Jackson o. Morse, 18 Johns. 4-41;

Cameron o. Irwin, 5 Hill, 272; King

v. Goodwin, 16 Mass. 63; Loomis 0.

Storrs, 4 Conn. 440; Kennedy 0.

Duncklee, 1 Gray, 65; Laval o. Row-

ley, 17 Ind. 86.

' Woodcock o. Bennett, 1 Cow. 711;

Palmer v. Palmer, 2 Conn. 462; Boal's

Lessee v. King, 6 Ohio, 11; French v.

Eaton, 11 N. H. 337; Brern v. Jamie-

son, 70 N. C. 566.

‘ Sheetz v Wynkoop, '74 Penn. St.

198; Cadmus 0. Jackson, 52 Penn. St.

295. The case would of course be

still plainer, if possible, if no judg-

ment at all had been rendered. Craw-

ford v. Dalrymplc, 70 N. 0.156; Craft

0. Merrill, 14 N. Y. 456; Vastine 0.

Fury, 2 S. & R. 482.

" Ricketts 0. Unangst, 15 Penn. St.

90; Hutcliinson 0. Cassidy,46 Mo.-131.

‘Carson v. Stout, 17 Johns. 122;

Linentloll v. Dok. 14 Johns. 223; Ray

v. Harcourt, 19 Wend. 407; Lowry v.

Coulter, 9 Penn. St. 349; Carey 0.

Bright, 58 Penn. St. 70, 84; Kennedy 1;.

Clayton, 29 Ark. 270; Rowan v. Re-

feld, 31 Ark. 648; Winﬁeld v. Adams,

84 Mich. 437. In Missouri it seems

that such a sale is only voidable on

motion. Ends 0. Stephens, 03 Mo. 90.

In Mississippi a sale made after the

return day of the execution is void.

Williamson c. Williamson, 52 Miss.

Princeton Bunk "· Gibson, 20 N. J.
138; Snively r. Fahnestock, 18 Md.
3tH; Avel"ill "· Williams, 1 Denio, .')01;
Clay "· Sandefer, 12 .H. :Mon. 334.
1 'Vhenton "· Sexton, 4 Wheat. ;JO;J;
Lenox 1:. Clark, 52 llo. 115.
1 Falkner "· Guild, 10 Wis. 5G3;
Wilson tt. Arnold, 5 llich. 08; Gray
"·II awe<~, !:1 Cal. 5fi2; :Miller"· Handy,
40111. 4-18; Mulvey 1:'. Carpenter, 78
Ill. 580; Border,; "· :nurphy, 78 Ill.
81; Abbott 1:'. Sheppard, 4! lin. 273;
Clark r. Fowler, 5 Allen, 4:i.
• Conrad v. :McGee. !) Yerg. 428;
We!ch "· Butter, 24 Gen. 445; Hol.
1ingsworth "· Bagley, 35 Tex. 3-1.'>;
Harshey "· Hlackmurr, 20 Iowa, 161;
811ndeno "· Hains, 10 Mo. 770; Higgins 1". Peltzer, 49 .Mo. 152.
'Jackson 11. Morse, 18 Johns. 441;
Cameron "· Irwin, 5 Hill, 2n: King
"· Goodwin, 16 }(ass. 6a; Loomis e.
Storrs, 4 Conn. 440; Kennerly e.
Duncklce, 1 Oray, 65; Laval "·Howley, 17 Inrl. 36.
1 Woodcock"· Hennett, 1 Cow. 711;
Palmer r. Pnlmcr, 2 Uonn. 462; Bnal's
Lessee "· King, 6 Ohio, 11; French "·

Eaton, 11 N.H. 337; Hrcm "·Jamieson, 70 N.C. l'iGG.
• Sheetz " Wynkoop, 74 Penn. St.
198; Cadmus"· Jnckson, 52 Penn. St.
20.1. The case would of course be
still plainer, if possible, if no juc.Jg.
ment at Rll had been rendered. Craw.
ford"· D:1lrymple, 70 ~.C. 156; Craft
"· Merrill, 14 N. Y. 4.)6; Vastine"·
Fury, 2 B. & R. 432.
' Ricketts "· "Unangst, 15 Penn. St.
90; Hutchinson 11. Cassidy, 46 )lo. 431.
1 Var.•on "· Stout, 17 Johns. 122:
LinenJoll "· Dok, 14 Johns. 22:1; Hay
"· Harcourt, 19 Wend. 497; Lowry"·
Coulter, 9 Penn. St. 349; Carey "·
Bright, 58 Penn. St. 70,84; Kennedy"·
Clayton, 29 Ark. 270; Rowan "· Hefcld, 31 Ark. 648; Winfit'ltl "· Adams,
34 Mich. 437. In :Missouri it seems
that such a sale is only voidable on
motion. Ea.d~ "·Stephens. 63 llo. 90.
In Mississippi a sale malic allcr the
return day of tht• execution is void.
Williamson "· Williamson, 52 1\liss.
725. In othrr Stutes, however, this
will be fonnd provided for in many
cases.
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zant of all the pt‘o;'t-odin_'_[s, becomes purchaser, as it is when the
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purchaser is one teclmie.nll_y known as a purchaser in good faith;

that is to say, a purchaser who has paid the purchase price with-

out notice of defects in the proceedings. For example, if the

oiiicer sells without giving the proper notice of sale, the title of

a purchaser in good faith would not thereby be aﬁ'ected;‘ but

the plaintiff and his attorney must he supposed to have known

of the oﬂicer's (lct'uult, and a sale to either would be set aside on

motion. So a purchase by one in good faith would be protected.

even though the judgment under which it was made should sub-

sequently be set aside for e'rrors;’ but it would be otherwise if

the purcliase were made by one who had charge of the proceed-

ings, actually or by implication of law.“

Locality of Wrongs. It is a general rule that for the pur-

poses of redress it is immaterial where a wrong was committed;

in other Words, a wrong being personal, 1'ed|‘es<, may be sought

for it wherever the wrong-doer may he found. To this there are

a few exceptions, in which actions are said to be local, and must,

theret'ore, he brought not only within the country, but also

‘ Whittaker r. Sumner, '7 Pick. 551:

za.nt of all the pt·o~·l·edin~s, lleC<~mes purchaser, as it is when the
pm·chasm· is Olle te~hnieally known as a purchaser in guod titith;
that is to say, a pun·ha.ser who has paid the purchase pri~:e without notice of Jefect:i in the procec(lin,:;s. For example, it' the
o1Hccr sells without gidng the proper notiec of sale, the title of
a purclmst>I' in good faith would not thereby be affected;' hut
the plaintiff and his attorney must be supposed to have known
of the officer's dcf;mlt, ami a sale to either would be set asith· on
motion. 8o a pnreha,;e by one in ~ooll fi.tith would be JH'otl·c~ed.
e,·en tlwngh the jud~Jueut UJHlcr which it wa,; made should :-.uhsequently be set a,..ide for e'rrors; • but it would be otherwise if
the ptll'cha,;e were made by one who had charge of the proceeding8, actually or by implication of la.w."

White v. Cronkhite, 35 Ind. 483; Ho-

bcin 1-. Murphy, 20 Mo. 447 ; Curd v.
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Lnchlnnd, 4!) Mo. 451; llnnks v. Neal,

44 Miss. 212; Osgood v. Blnckmorc,

59 Ill. 261; Pollard '1‘. KinE, 63 Ill.

36; Wallace r. Trustees, 5'3 Geo 164;

VVade 1:. Saunders, 70 N. C. 270; Lee

v. Ilowes, 30 Up. Can. Q. B. 292.

’ (‘lurk v. Pinney, 6 (Tow. 297;

Locality of Wrongs. It is a general rule that for the purpose..; of redress it is immater·ial where a wrong was committed;
in other words, a wrollg' being personal, redreR'"' may he sought
for it whcrc,·er the \\'rong-d•ter 1na.r be found. To this theJ'e tLre
a few eXCCj•tions, in which actions are said to be local, and must,
thet·efur?, he brought not ouly within the cotmt1·y, but also

\\'oo<l<-ock '0. Bennett, 1 Cow. 711;

Dorsey 1:. Thompson, 37 Md. 25;

Yogler 0. Montgomery, 54 Mo. 577;

Stinson n. Ross, 51 Me. 556; Guitcau

v. \Visely, 47 Ill. 433; Goodwin '0.

Mix. 38 Ill. 115; Hubbcll 12. Broad-

wcll, S Ohio, 120.

“Corwith r. Stale Bunk, 15 Wis.

28$); S. U. 18 Wis. 560; Buchanan 1:.

Clarke, 10 Gratt. 164; Reynolds 0.

Harris, 14 (lal. 667; Huys e. Ca-"sell,

70 lll. 669; Holland '0. Adair, 55 Mo.

40; '1‘wogood r. Franklin, 27 Iowa,

239; Bank of U. S. v. Bank of Wash-

- - _ -. _ ___.._.-ml

ington, 6 Pet. 8. The general rule

that the purchaser bona ﬁdc is not

concerned with mere irregularities is

laid down in so many cases that no

attempt will be made to give them.

They are collected in Rorer on Judi-

cial Sales, with industry and dis-

crimination, and also in Freeman on

Executions. The following may be

mentioned: Hamilton 0. Shrcwsbury,

4 Hund. 427; Jackson av. Rosevelt-. 13

Johns. 97; Dowdell 1;. Neal, 10 Geo.

148; Dinglcdine 1:. Ilerslnnan, 53 Ill.

280; Boles -v. Johnston, 23 Cal. 226;

Sabin v. Austin, 19 Wis. 421; Cooper

0. Borrall, 10 Penn. St. 491; Reid 0.

Largeut, 4 Jones (N. C.) 454; Morde-

cai 0. Speight, 3 Dev. 428; Doe 0.

Myers. 9 Up. Can. Q. B. 465. If the

plaintitf’s assignee is purchaser, he

gets no better title than the plaintiff

would. McJilton Iv. Love, 13 Ill. 486;

Reynolds -v. Hosmer, 45 Cal. 616.

1 Whittaker r. Sumner, 7 Pick. 551:
White D. Cronkhitl', a5 Ind. 4tl:3; llo..
bcin r. 1\lurphy, 20 )lo 447; Curd ll.
Lnchlnn<l, 4!1 ~lo. 4.31; Hanks"· Neal,
44 Mis!'l. 212; Osgood "· Blackmore,
59 Ill. 2Gl ; Pollard -r. King, !i3 Ill.
3(i; 'Yallaee r. Trustees, .i2 Geo 164;
Watle v. 8nun<lers, 70 N.C. 2i0; Lee
v. Jlowl:'s, 30 Up. Can. Q. B. 2~12.
' <'lark "· Pinney. 6 Cow. 297;
"'n,dC'ock ·v. Bennett, 1 Cow. 711;
Do; ~cy v. Thompson, 37 1\ld. 2:) ;
Yngler "· ~lon:_gnmery, 54 ~lo. 577;
Slinson v. Hoss, 51 1\lc. 5;;6; Guile au
"· Wisely, 47 Ill. 433; Goodwin v.
Mix. 38 Ill. llfi; Hubbell "'· Broadwell. 8 Ohio, 120.
3 Corwith 1' State B:mk, 15 Wis.
28!); S. V. 18 Wis. 5GO; Buchanan "·
Clarke, 10 Gratt. 164; Reynolds "·
H anis, 14 Cal. 6G7; Hays v. Ca•sell,
70 Ill. 6fi9; Holland v. Adair, 55 Mo.
40; Twogood r. Franklin, 27 Iowa,
239; Bank of C. S. v. Bank of Wash.

ington, 6 Pet. 8. The genl:'ral rule
that the purchaser bona fide is not
conet•rned wilh mere irregularities is
laid down in so many CllSl's that no
attempt will be made tu gin! them.
They ure collected in H"rcr on Judicial s,LJes, with industry and discrimination, and also in Freeman on
Exccnlions. The f·•llowiug may be
mentioned: Ilamilton "· ShrewslJUry,
4 Hand. 427; J uckson "· Hosevelt. 1a
Johus. 97; Dowllcllv. Neal, lOGeo.
14S; DinglL·Lline "· Hershman, 53 III.
280; Boles ·v. Johnston, 2~ Cal. 226;
Sabin "· Austin, 19 Wis. 421; Cooper
"· Borrall, 10 Penn. St. 4!)1 ; Reid "·
Largent, 4 Jones (N.C.) 454; Mordecai c. Speight, 3 Dev. 428; Doe t-.
:Myers. 9 Up. Can. Q. B. 465. If the
plaintiff's nssi~nee is purchaser, be
gets no better title than the plaintiff
would. 1\lcJilton 'll. Love, 13 Ill. 486;
Reynolds "· Hosmer, 45 Cal. 616.
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within the very county where they arose. The distinction

between transitory and local actions is this: If the cause of

action is one that might have arisen anywhere, then it is transi-

tory; but if it eould only have arisen in one place, then it is

local. Therefore, while an action of trespass to the person or for

the conversion of goods is transitory, action for ﬂowing lauds is

local, because they can he ﬂooded only where they are. For the

most part tho.actions which are local are those brought for the

recovery of real estate, or for injuries thereto or to easements.

In the leading case of J1 ostyn v. Fabrigus, the governor of a

British colony was prosecuted in England, and a heavy judgment

recovered against him for an assault and imprisonment of the

plaintiif without authority of law in the colony.‘ In a later case

it is held to he unimportant whether the foreign tort was or was

not committed within territory subject to the British crown;'

but it is agreed that to support an action the act must have

been wrongful or punishable where it took place, and that what-

ever would be a good defense to the action, if brought there,

must be a good defense ever_v\vhere.‘

That actions for trespasses on lands in a foreign country can-

not be sustained, is the settled law in England‘ and in this

country. The decision of Chief Justice Maasuau. to that effect
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in the suit brought by Mr. Edward Livingston against Mr.

Jefferson, for having forcibly dispossessed him of the hatture in

New Orleans, has been often followed without question.’ But if

by means of the trespass anything is severed from the realty so

as to become personal property, and this is afterward converted

' .\‘l0styn 0. Fabrigas, Cowp. 161.

See Buron 1;. Denman, 2 Exch. 167.

’ Scott r. Lord St-_\'tnnnr, 1 II. 6: C.

210. In Wilson r. McKenzie, 7 Hill,

95, it was decided that an action

would lie against an oﬂleer of the

navy for illegally assaulting and im-

prisoniug one of his subordinates on

the high seas, though the act was

done under color of naval discipline.

NELSON, Ch. J., cites in his opinion,

among other cases, Warden r. Bailey,

within the very county where they a.roso. The dit?-tinction
betwct·n tmnsitory and loCRl actions is this: If the cause of
action is one that might have arisen anywhere, then it is transitory; Lut if it could only have arisen in one place, then it is
local. Thet·etore, while an action of trespass to the pert>oll or fur
the coH\'ersion of goods is transitory, action for flowing lands ia
local, bccau~e they can he flooded only where they are. :For the
most part the. actions which are local are those brought tor the
reco,·ct·y of real estate, or for injuries thereto or to easements.
In the leading case of Jlostyn v . .Fahrigas, the go\·ernor of' a
British colony was JII'OH'cuted in En~land, am..l a heavy judgment
reeoverc<l against i1i111 t(lr an assault and imprisonment of the
plaintiil' without authority of law in the colony.' In a later case
it it> held to be unimportant whether the foreign tort was or was
not <.·ommitted within territory snb,iect to the British crown; •
but it it! agree1l that to support an action the act mm1t ha\·e
been wrongful or punishable where it took place, aud that wha.te\·er woulll be a good tleti:mse to the action, if brought there,
must be a good defense e\·erywhere.'
That actions for tre,;passes on lands in a foreign country cannot he sustained, is the settled law in England • and in this
countrv. The decision of' Chief Justice MARSHALL to that eftect
in the suit brought hy Mt·. Edward Livin~ston against Mr.
Jeffcr:oon, for having forcibly dispossl't?-:;cd him of the batture in
New Orleans, has been often followed without question.• But if
by means of the trespass anything is severed ti·om the realty so
as to become personal property, and this is af~rward converted
ol

4 Tnunt. 67; S. C. 4 Maule & S. 400;

Hanneford v. Hunn, 2 C. & P. 148.

' Phillips 1:. Eyre, L. R. 4 Q. B. 225;

S. C. in Exch. Ch. L. R. 6 Q. B. 1;

The China, 7 Wall. 53, 64; Smith 0.

Condry, 1 How. 28; Stout o. Wood.

1 Blackl‘. 71 ; Wall 0. Iloskins, 5 Ired.

177; Mahler v. New York, etc., Trans.

Co., 85 N. Y. 352.

‘ Doulson 1-. Mathews, 4 T. R. 503,

overruling some early m'u' prim: cases.

‘ Livingston o. Jetferson, 1 Brock.

203. And see Watts’ Adm. 1:. Kinney,

23 Wend. 484; S. C. 6 Hill, 82; Cham-

pion v. Doughty, 18 N. J. 3; Ham 0.

Rogers, 6 Blackf. 559; Prichard 0.

Campbell, 5 Ind. 494; Chapman v.

Morgan, 2 Green (Iowa), 874.

1 ~[ostyn "· Fabrigns, Cowp. Hll.
Sec Duron t7. Denman, 2 Exch. 167.
f Scott r. Lord St·~·monr, 1 II. & C.
210. In Wilson r. ~I<"Kenzic, 7 Hill,
95, it was decided tlmt an action
would lit> against an officer of the
navy fo1· illegally assaulting anti im.
prisllning one of his subordinntcs on
the high seus, though the act was
done under color of naval discipline.
Nxr.soN, Ch. J., cites in his opinion,
amnng other ca."cs, \Varden r. Bailey,
4 T1mnt. 67; S.C. 4 )laule & 8. 400;
Hanncford r. Hunn, 2 C. & P. 148.
1 Phillips t'. Eyre, L. R. 4 Q. B. 2:!5;

B. C. in Exch. Ch. L. R. 6 Q. B. 1;
The China. 7 Wall. 53, 64; Rmith D.
Condry, 1 How. 28; Stout "· Wood,
1 Bla<"kf. 71 i Wall"· Hoskins, 5 Ired.
177; l\lnhlcr "· New York, etc., Trans.
Co., 3;) N. Y. 352.
• Dnulson r ..Mathews, 4 T. R 508,
O\'t'rrullng some curly ni1i priu1 Clll!Cs.
• Livin~rston "· Jefferson, 1 Brock.
203. Anti see Watts' Adm. tt. Kinney,
23 Wend. 484; B. C. 6 Hill, 82; Cham.
pion "·Doughty, 18 N.J. 8; Ham "·
Rogers, 6 Blackf. 550; Prichard "·
Campbell, IS Ind. 494; Chapman •·
Morgan, 2 Green (Iowa), 8'14.
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by the trespasser to his own use, it seems that for the conversion
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he may be sued anywhere.‘

It has been made a question whether, if by a wrongful act

committed in one State, real property is injured in another,

action may not be brought in the former for that injury; and in

one case Mr. Justice GRIER, at the circuit, held that it might.’

In New Hampshire, however, it is held that suit can be brought

only in the jurisdiction where the land lies.’

Where a new right of action is given by the statute for that

for which no action would lie at the common law, such action

can only be brought within the State or country whose statute

gives the right and for wrongs there suifered. This has often

been decided under those statutes which give an action for

causing death by wrongful act, neglect, or default.‘ And where

a further remedy is given for that which is an actionable wrong

at the common law, it can be enforced only by the courts of the

jurisdiction giving it, and for wrongs there suffered.‘

‘ Tyson o. McGuineas. 25 Wis. 656.

In Louisiana, actions for injuries to

real estate are transitory, and on that

ground an action for an injury to real

estate in Illinois was su~tained.
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Holmes v. Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 63.

‘Bundle 0. Del. & Rar. Canal, 1

Wall. Jr. 275. The conclusion of the

by the trespasser to his own use, it seems that for the conversion
he may be sued anywhere.'
It has been made a question whether, if by a wrongful act
committed in one State, real property is injured in another,
action may not be brought in the former for that injury; and in
one case Mr. Justice GRIER, at the circuit, held that it might.s
In New Hampshire, however, it is held that suit can be brought
only in the jurisdiction where the land lies.•
Where a new right of action is given by the statute for that
for which no action would lie at the common law, such action
can only be brought within the State or country whose statute
gives the right and for wrongs there sutl'ered. This has often
been decided under those statutes which gi,•e an action for
causing death by wrongful act, neglect, or detault. 4 And where
a further remedy is given for that which is an actionable wrong
at the common law, it can be enfor<'.ed only by the courts of the
jurisdiction giving it, and for wrongs there suffered.'

learned judge was that the plaintiff

might elect to sue in either jurisdic-

tion, the act done being in one and

the injury accomplished in the other.

In Ohio an action was sustained for

the diversion of water in Pennsylva-

nia to the injury of lands in the

former State. Thayer 0. Brooks, 17

Ohio, 489.

'Worster 0. Winnipiseogee Lake

Co., 25 N. H. 525. Compare Sutton 1:.

Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29; Thompson e.

Crockcr, 9 Pick. 59.

‘ Whitford '0. Panama R. R. Co., 23

N. Y. 465; Richardson v. N. Y. Cent.

R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 85; State v. Pitts-

burgh, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Md. 41;

Ncedham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 38

Vt. 294; Woodard 1:. Michigan, etc.,

R. R. Co., 10 Ohio, (21. s.), 121.

‘ One cannot sue in Massachusetts

under its statutes for an injury done

by a dog in New Hampshire, though

the dog is owned and kept in the

former State, and strayed away to

commit the injury. Le Forest v. Tol-

man, 117 Mass. 109.

1 Tyson "· 1\-lcGuineas. 25 Wis. 656.
In Louisiana, actions for injm·ies to
real estate nrc transitory, and on that
ground un action for an injury to real
estate in Illinois was su .. taincd.
Holmes"· Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 68.
• Rundle "· Del. & Rar. Canal, 1
Wall. Jr. 275. The conclusion of tho
. learued judge was that the plaintiff
might elect to sue in eithet· jurisdic.
tion, the act done being in one and
the injury accomplished in the other.
In Ohio an action was sustained for
the diversion of water in Pennsylv~
nia to the injury of lands in the
former State. Thayer "· Brooks, 17
Ohio, 480.
1 Worster 11. Winnipiseogee Lake

Co., 25 N.H. 52.5. Compare Sutton"·
Clarke, 6 Taunt. 211; fl'hompson "·
Crockc.-r, 9 Pick. 59.
• Whitford v. P.mama R. R. Co., 23
N. Y. 465; Richardson "· N. Y. Cent.
R. R Co., D8 Mass. ISIS; State v. Pittsbut·gh, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Md. 41;
Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 38
Yt. 294; Woodard "· Michigan, etc.,
R. R. Co., 10 Ohio, (N. s.). 121.
1 One cannot sue in Massachusetts
under its statutes for an injury done
by a dog in New Hampshire, though
the dog is owned and kept in the
former Stale, and strayed away to
commit the injm·y. Le Fore&t v. Tolman, 117 1\-lasa. 109.
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FRAUDS, on WRONGS aecom PLISHED BY DECEPTION.

The maxim which underlies the law of negligence is, as will

be more fully shown hereafter, that every man must so use and

enjoy his own as not to impede a corresponding use and enjoy-

ment of their own by others. This is the legal duty of every

man in respect to his neighbor, and this is the rule of good neigh-

borhood which the law prescribes. The rule of morals is higher,

and requires selﬁshness to be put aside, and every man to do by

others what he would have them do by him. The remark has

already been made that it would be futile for the law to attempt

the enforcement of such a rule,‘ and it must be content with the

CHAPTER XVI.

regulation of selﬁshness as the best that is practicable.

The remark has special application in the law of frauds. There

FRAUDS, OR WRONGS ACCOMPLISHED BY DECEPTION.

must be a legal standard by which the existence of actionable

frauds can be determined, and this must be one capable of being

practically applied, and by which the ordinary dealings of men

with each other can be judged for the purposes of legal redress.

Fraud is either actual or constructive. Constructive frauds,

or frauds by construction of law, are of two kinds: 1"ir.st, those,

the indirect effect of which is to deprive some person or persons

not a party to the transaction of some lawful right, or to hinder
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or embarrass him or them in the enforcement of such a right;

and Second, those which consist in accepting beneﬁts under cir-

cumstances where, as a general fact, it would be unconscionable

to do so, and where, for that reason, the law assumes the exist-

ence of fraud or overrc-aching. Of the ﬁrst class the following

are illustrations: Making a voluntary conveyance of so much of

one's property as to leave insuﬂicient for the payment of his

debts; or giving secret liens on property, the possession of which

is retained, and thereby misleading those dealing with the per-

‘ Ante, p. 3.

The maxim which underlies the law of negligence is, as will
be more fully shown hereafter, that every man must so usc and
enjoy his own as not to impede a corresponding use and enjoyment of their own hy others. This is the legal duty of every
man in respect to his neighbor, and this is the rule of good neighborhood which the law prescribes. The rule of morals is higher,
and rE-'qnircs selfishness to be put aside, and every man to do by
others what he would have tlunn do by him. The remark has
already been made that it would be futile for the law to attempt
the eutorccment of such a rule,' and it mnst be content with the
regulation of selfishness as the best that is practicable.
The remark has special application in the law of frauds. There
must be a legal standard by which the existence of actionable
thmds can be determined, and this must be one capable of being
practically applied, and by which the ordinary dealings of men
with each other can be judged for the purposes of legal redress.
Fraud is either actual or constructive. Constructive frands,
or frauds by construction of law, are of two kinds: .First, those,
the in!lirect effect of which is to deprive some person or persons
not a party to the transaction of some lawful right, or to hinder
or emharrass him or them in the enforcement of such a right;
and Sa·mu.l, those which consist in accepting benefits nndet· circumstances where, as a general fact, it would be unconscionable
to do so, and where, for that reason, the law assumes the existence of fraud or overreaching. Of the first class the following
are illustrations: Making a voluntary conveyance of so much of
one's property as to leave insufficient for the payment of his
debts; or giving secret liens on property, the possession of which
is retained, and thereby misleading those dealing with the per1

Ante, p.8.
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son giving them. These frauds are either redressed in equity. or

at law by the transfers being treated as void on the principle

that whatever fraud creates ustice will destroy.‘ Of the second

class, the chief illustrations are to be had in the dealings between

persons standing in conﬁdential relations, and they will be con-

sidered in the next chapter.

Actual or positive fraud consists in deception practiced in order

to induce another to part \vith property or to surrender some

legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed.’ The

‘See cases in illustration of this

maxim collected in Vreelnnd v. N. J.

Stone Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 183.

’ Sir John Romily, in Green v.

Nixon, 23 B:-av. 530. 535, says:

son gidng them. Thf'se frauds are either redressed in equity. o.at law by the tr-ansfers being treated as void on the prindple
that whatever· fraud creates justice will destroy.' Of the second
class, the chief illustrations are to be had in the dealings between
per,.;ons standing in confidential relations, and they will he consider·ed in the next chapter.
Actual or positive fraud consists in deception practiced in order
to induce another to part with property or to sttrrender some
legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed." The

“Fraud implies a willful act on the

part of one, whereby another is sought

to be deprived, by unjustifiable means,

of what he is entilled to.” “ Fraud,"

it is said in another case, “ consislsin

a person being induced to act to his

prejudice by untruthful statements

made by another, upon whom he had
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a right to rely, and whose duty it was

to state the case truly." Detroit v.

Weber, 26 Mich. 284, 288; Tong o.

Marvin, 15 Mich. 60. A fraud is some-

times said to be a gross fraud; but

this merely indicates how the trans-

action affects the moral sensibilities;

the epithet passes it into no new cate-

gory of legal wrongs, and gives for it

no additional remedy.

Whether or not the fraudulent actor

expected to make any personal gain

to himself in the transaction is of no

importance. Haycruft -0. Creasy, 2

East, 92. Fraud in equity, it is said,

"properly includes all acts, omissions

and concealments by which an undue

and unconscientious advantage is tu-

ken of another." Story Eq. Juris., §

187; l Fonb. Eq. b. 1, c. 263; Belcher

v. Belchcr, 10 Yerg. 121; Story v. Nor-

wich, etc., R. R. Co., 24 Conn. 94.

Still fraud, it is apprehended, is the

some at law and in equity, though

many frauds are redressed in the

courts of equity for which the legal

remedies are not adequate, or to which

they are not adapted.

A deﬁnition of fraud often metwith

in law books, is the following: The

unlawful appropriation of another's

property, with knowledge, by design,

and without criminal intent. This

deﬁnition is both inadequate and er-

roneous. In the ﬁrst place an appro-

1 See cnsc:l in illustration of this
maxim collectt·d in Vreeland t!. N. J.
Stone Co., 29 N.J. Eq. 18:-:1.
2 S1r John
Homily, in Hr~cn "·
Nixon, 2!1 Bt•uv. 530. 5:J.'i, sl\ys:
•• Fraud implies a willful act on the
part of one, whereby unolher is sought
to ue deprived, by unjnstitiabl'• means,
of wlwt he is entillcd to." "Fraud,"
it is said in another case, " conliists in
a person being induced lo act to his
prt-judice by untruthful statements
matle hy another, upon whom he had
a right to rely, and whose duty it was
to state the cnse truly." Detroit t!.
Weber, 26 :\lich. 234, 2&!; Tong t!.
llarvin, 15 :\Iich. 60. A fraud is sometimes said to be a gros1 fraud; but
this merely indicutcs how the trans.
aetion affects the moral sl'n!'i hil ities;
the epithl't passes it into no new category of legal wrongs, and gives for it
no ad<.litional rcmcuy.
"Whether or not the fraudulent actor
exp<·cted to make any personal gain
to him;;df in the transaction is of no
importance. Haycraft -D. Creasy, 2
East, 92. Fraud in equity, it is said,
''properly includes all acts, omis~ions
and concealments by which an undue
anti unconscicntious advantage is ta.
ken of another." Story Eq. Juris., §
187; 1 Fonb. Eq. b. 1, c. 263; Belcher
"· Belcher, 10 Y erg. 121; Story t~. Norwich, etc., R. R. C9., 24 Conn. 94.
Still fraud, it is apprehended, is the
snme 11t law and in equity, though
many frauds arc red1·esscd in the

priation of 0ue‘s property unlawfully,

with knowledge and by design, is not

always a fraud; it may be made open-

ly and without deception, and so be a

mere iI'(‘SpnSs or a conversion. The

deﬁnition does not at all distinguish

between an appropriation through

fraud and a conversion without fraud,

and therefore fails to indicate what it

assumes to deﬁne. In the second

place, fraud is not limited to cases in

which property is obtained. Every

•

courts of equity for which the legal
remedies are not adequate, or to which
they are not adapted.
A definition of fraud often met with
in law book!!, is the following: The
unlawful appropriation of another's
property, with knowledge, by design,
and without criminal intent. This
definition is both inadequate and erroneous. In the first place an appropriation of one's property unlawfully,
with knowlt>dge and by design, is not
always a fraud; it may be m·~de open.
ly and without dect>ption, and so be a
mere trcspasc; or a conversion. The
definition docs not at all distinguish
between an appropriation through
fraud and a conversion without fmud,
and therefore fails to indicate what. it
assumes to define. In the St'cond
place, fraud is not limited to ca..o;;cs in
which property is (lbtaiued. E,·ery
inYa.sion of the right of another by a.
fmudulcnt act or omission is a let;al
fraud, thongh to obtnin propt·rty be
not the object. In the third place,
the design to commit fraud is not cs..
sential in all cases, and it may be
accomplished sometimes, though the
party chargeable with it is ignomnt
that his statements or devices do uot
present the real facts. And in the
fourth place, deception, by whidl an
individual is wronged, is no less a
fraud because of its having been aecomplishe<l with criminal intent.
The criminal intent only adds a. new
characteristic, and makes that which
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deception must relate to facts then existing or which had pre-
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viously existed, and which were material to the dealings between

the parties in which the deception was employed. In order to

render it actionable, the following facts should appear: 1"¢'1'st,

that the representations were made as alleged. Set-0/.d, that

they were made in order to inﬂuence the plaintiff's conduct.

T/ti/vl, that, relying upon them, the plaintiff did enter into a

contract, or otherwise act as was desired. Fourth, that the rcp-

resentations were untrue. Fifi/4, that the plaintitf suffered dam-

age from the action he was induced to take; and Sale!/t, that this

damage followed proximately the deception.‘

Burden of Proof. Fraud is never presumed, and the party

alleging and relying upon it nmst prove it.’ This, however, is

one of those rules of law which is to be applied with caution and

eircumspection. “ So far as it goes, it is based on a principle

which has no more application to frauds than any other subject

ofjudicial inquiry. It amounts but to this, that a contract,

<lcecption must relate to facts then cxistin~ or which lta<l previously existed, and which wm·e material to the dealing,; between
the partie.; in whiclt the de~Jption W<ls employed. In order to
rendct· it actionable, tlte following facts should app~ar: .Fir~t,
that the rep1·e.~cntations were made as alleged. StJ('O~<d, that
they were made in ordm· to influence the plaintiff's conduct.
Tltinl, that, relying upon them, the plaintiff did enter into a
contract, or otherwise act as was dcsil·cd. .Fvw·tl~, that the rcprc,..l'lltatiuns were untrue. F~t'tlt, that the plaintiff suffered dama!{e troru the action he was imluced to take; and Si.ctlt, that this
damage followed proximately the deception.'

honest and lawful on its face, must be treated as such until it is

shown to be otherwise by evidence of some kind, either positive

or circumstantial/" Fraud is therefore as properly made out

by marshaling the circumstances surrounding the transaction,

and deducing therefrom the fraudulent purpose, when it mani-
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festly appears, as by presenting the more positive and direct testi-

mony of actual purpose to deeeive;‘ and, indeed, circumstantial

proof in most cases can alone bring the fraud to light, for fraud

is peculiarly a wrong of secrecy and circumvention, and is to be

traced not in the open proclamation of the wrong-doer‘s purpose,

but by the indications of covered tracks and studious conceal-

is a private wrong a public wrong

also. Tltcrefore the deﬁnition given

is faulty in every one of its particu-

lars.

' Sellar v. Clelland, 2 Colorado. 532,

544; Byard v. Holmes. 34 N. J. 296;

Lummis v. Stratton, 1 Pen. & W. 245;

Tryon v. Whitmarsh, 1 Met. 1.

' llill o. Rcifsnider, 46 Md. 555;

Tompkins 0. Nichols, 53 Ala 197;

Baldwin 0. Buckland,1l Mich. 389;

Bowdcn 0. Bowdcn, 75 Ill. 143; Far-

mer o. Calvert, 44 Ind. 209; London,

etc., Bunk o. Lempricre, L. R. 4 P. C.

Burden of Proof. Fraud is ne¥er presumed, and the party
allegiug and relying upon it muot proo;.-e it. 3 This, however, is
one of those rules of law which is to be applied with caution and
circnmt'pection. "So Jar as it goes, it is based on a principle
whicl1 has no more application to frauds than any other sul,ject
of juuicial in11Uiry. It amount8 but to this, that a contract,
holll'St and lawful on its fact>, must be treated as such until it is
shown to be utherwi:;e hy evidence of some kind, either po:-;iti\·e
or cireumstnntial." • Fraud is therefore as properly made out
by nuu·shaling the circumstances surrounding the tt'Rnsactiun,
and deducing therefrom the fraudulent purpose, when it manifestly appears, as OJ pretlcnting the lllOl'C positive and direct tcstilllUil,Y of aetna! purpose to dceci VC; ~ anJ, indeed, circumstantial
proof in most ca.ses can alone bring the fraud to light, for fraud
is pcculi:Lrly a wrong of secrecy and circumvention, and is to be
traced not in the open proclamation of the wrong-doer's purpose,
but by the indications of co\·erod tracks and studious conceal-

572; S. C. 5 Monk, 137.

“ Bmcx, Ch. J., in Kaine v. Weig.

ley, 22 Penn. St. 179, 182. See O’Don.

ncll r. Segar, 25 Mich. 367.

‘ Kaine u Weigley, 22 Penn.Bt.179;

Watkins o. Wallace, 19 Mich. 57;

McDaniel 0. Baca, 2 Cal. 326; Wad.

dingham 0. Lokcr, 44 Mo. 132; Bank

of Orange County 0. Fink, '7 Paige,

87.

is a private wrong a public wrong
nlso. Therefore the definition given
is faulty in every one of its particulars.
1 Sellar"· Clclland,2 Colorado, 532,
1>4-i; Byard "· Holmes, 34 N.J. 290;
Lummis "·Stratton, 1 Pen. & W. 2-M;
Tryon r. Whitmarsh, 1 Met. 1.
' Hill "· Rciti-lnider, 46 ~I d. 55!);
Tompkins "· Nichols, 5:1 AIR. 197;
Bnldwin "· Buckland, 11 ~Iich. &'!9;
Bowden "· Bowden, 75 Ill. 143; Far-

mer"· Calvert, 44 Ind. 209; London,
etc., Bnnk "· Lemprierc, L. R. 4 P. C.
572; S. C. 5 Moak, 137.
a B!.ACK, Ch. J., in Kaine 11. Weig.
ley, 22 Penn. St. 179, 182. See O'Don.
nell r. Segar, 25 llich. 867.
4 Kaine" Welgley,22 Pt'DD. 8t.l79;
Watkins "· Wallace, 19 Mich. 57;
llcDamel "· Baca, 2 Cal. 3241; Waddingham "· Loker, 44 llo. 132; Ba.nk
of Orange County •· l!'lnk, 7 Paige,
87.

476 THE LAW or TORTS.

ments.‘ And while it is often said that, to justify the imputa-

476

THE LAW OF TORTS.

tion of fraud, the facts must be such as are not explicable on any

other hypothesis,’ yet this can mean no more than this, that the

court or jury should be cautious in deducing the fraudulent pur-

pose; for whatever satisﬁes the mind and conscience that fraud

has been practiced is sufficient.’

What is not Deception. In ' general mere silence, a mere fail-

ure to apprise the party with Whom one is dealing of facts impor-

tant for him to know for the protection of his own interest in the

particular transaction, is no fraud. Caveat emptor is the motto

ments. 1 And while it is often said that, to justify the imputation of fraud, the facts must be snch as are not explicable on any
other hypothesis,• yet this can mean no more than this, that the
court or jury should be cautious in deducing the fraudnlent purpose; for whatever satisfies the mind and conscience that fraud
has been practiced is sufficient.•

of commercial law, and in other dealings, as well as in sales,

every person is expected to look after his own interest, and is not

at liberty to rely upon the other party to protect him against the

consequences of his own blunders or heedlessness. Therefore,’

where the sources of information are equally open to both parties

to any dealings, and the one obtains an advantage of the other

without resort to any trick or artiﬁce of concealment calculated

to throw the other oﬂ' his guard, or to any false presentation of

facts, the advantage he gains is deemed legitimate, and the losing

party must bear such loss as has resulted from his own want of

vigilance or prudence.‘ Nor is this the rule as regards merely the

‘ Hopkins v. Sievert, 58 Mo. 201;
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Vance o. Phillips. 6 llill, 433; Hen-

nequin v. Naylor, 24 N. Y. 139.

‘ The Alabama, etc., Co. v. Pettway,

24 Ala. 544; Buck 0. Sherman, 2

Doug. (Mich.) 176; McConnell v. Wil-

cox, 2 Ill. 343.

" Kaine 1;. Wt-igley, 22 Penn. St. 1'79:

Hildreth -v. Sands, 2 Johns. Ch. 35; S.

C. in error, 14 Johns. 493; Devoe 0.

Brandt, 53 N. Y. 462, 465.

What is not Deception. In· general mere silence, a mere failure to apprise the party with whom one is uealing of facts important for him to know for the protection of his own intm·est in the
particular transaction, is no fraud. Caveat emptor is the motto
of commercial Jaw, and in other dealings, as well as in sales,
every person is expected to look after his own interest, and is not
at liberty to rely upon the other party to protect him against the
con seq nences of his own blunders or heedlessness. Therefore,.
where the sources of information ilore equally open to both parties
to any dealings, anu the one obtains an advan~ooe of the other
without resort to any trick or artifice of concealment calculated
to throw the other off his guard, or to any false presentation of
facts, the advantage he gains is deemed legitimate, and the losing
party must bear such loss as has resulted from his own want of
vigilance or prudence.• Nor is this the rule as regards met·ely the

‘ Mooney 0. Miller, 102 Mass. 217;

Starr 0. Bennett, 5 Hill, 303; Brown u.

Leach, 107 Mass. 364; Hobbs v. Par-

ker, 31 Me. 143; Williams 0. Spurr,

24 Mich. 335; Law 1:. Grant, 37 Wis.

548; Mitchell v. McDougall, 62 Ill.

498. It is no fraud in a purchaser

to fail to disclose special circum-

stances giving great value to the land

he is buying, such as the existence of

amine, of which he knows the vendor

is ignorant. Harris v. Tyson, 24 Penn.

St. 347; Williams v. Bpurr, 24 Mich.

335.

In Missouri it is said that if there

is a defect not open to observation,

which the vendor knows, but the

vemlce does not, the former is bound

to disclose it. “Common honesty in

such a case requires a man to speak

out.” McAdams v. Oates, 24 Mo. 223.

See Barron '0. Alexander, 27 Mo. 530;

Cecil e. Spurger, 32 M0. 462. But

unless the defect is one which artiﬁce

has been employed to conceal, there

can be no such general rule. Artiﬁce,

with the concealment, may make out

fraud. Singleton o. Kennedy, 9 B.

Mon. 222. As to the general rule, see,

further, Smith o. Countryman, 30 N.

Y. 655; Hanson 0. Edgerly, 29 N. H.

_ _ _ 7 __ _ -__—-A-Wt

1 Hopkins 11. Sie\·crt, 58 Mo. 201;
Vance e. Phillips. 6 Ilill, 4;'33; Hen.
nequin "· Naylor, 24 N. Y. 139.
' The Alabama, elc., Co. "· Pettway,
24 Ala.. 544; Buck 1l. Sherman, 2
Doug. (Mich.) 176; :M:cConnell1l. Wilcox, 2 Ill. 348.
1 Kaine 1l. Wcigley, 22 Penn. St. 179:
Hildreth ·v. Sands, 2 Johns. Ch. 35; S.
C. in error, 14 Johns. 493; Devoe «1.
Brandt, 53 N.Y. 462, 465.
• Mooney "· Miller, 102 Mass. 217;
Starr "· Bennett, 5 Hill, 303; Brown t~.
Leach, 107 Mass. 364; Hobbs "· Par.
kcr, 31 Me. 143; Williams "· Spurr,
24 Mich. 335; Law v. Grant, 37 Wis.
5~; Mitchell "· McDougall, 62 Ill.
498. It is no fra.ud in a. purchaser
to fail to disclose specinl circumstances giving great value to the land
he is buying, such as the existence of

a mine, of which be knows the vendor
is ignorant. Harris"· Tyson, 24 Penn.
Bt. 347; Williams "· Spurr, 21 Mich.
335.
In Missouri it is said that if tllCre
is a ctefcct not open to obsen·ation,
which the vendor knows, but the
ventlcc does not, the former is bonnd
to disclose it. "Common honesty in
such a case requires a man to speak
out." McAdams"· Cates, 24 Mo. 223.
See Barron "· Alexander, 27 ~lo. 530;
Cecil "· Spurger, 32 Mo. 462. But
unless the defect is one which artitlce
has been employed to conceal, there
can be no suc.h general rule. Artifice,
with the concealment, may make out
fraud. Singleton o. Kennedy, 9 B.
:Mon. 222. As to the general rule, see,
further, Smith "· Countryman, 30 N.
Y. 655; Hanson tl. Edgerly, 29 N. H.
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it extends to all those facts and circumstances which would be

likely to inﬂuence the minds of the contracting party if they

were known to him when the contract was entered into. There-

fore, if one who is insolvent buys goods of another without dis-

closing his circumstances to his vendor, who is ignorant of them,

but makes no inquiries, and is not deceived by misrepresentation

or artiﬁce, there is in law no fraud, although the vendor when

he sold, fzlly believed the veudee to be responsible and entitled

to credit.’

What is Deception. In order to make out deception, it is not

esseiitial that false assertions should be made in words. A nod,

a wink, a shake of the head, or a smile artfully contrived to

induce the other party to believe in a non-existent fact which

might inﬂuence the negotiations may have all the effect of false

assertions, and be equally deceptive and fraudulent.’ So one may

cpmlity or value of that which is the subject of n£'gotintimt, but
it extends to all those facts and circumstances which \\"onld be
likely to iuflncnce the minds of the C<1ntracting party if they
were known to him when the contract was entered into. Therefore, if one who is insolvent buys goods of another without disclo~ing his cir(•umstanccs to his vendor, who is ignorant of them,
but makes no inquiries, and is not deceived by misrepret:'entntion
or artitiee~ there is in law no fraud, although the vendor when
he sold, r,Ily believed tho vendee to be re~:~ponsible and entitled
to creJit.•

accomplish a fraud by encouraging and taking advantage of a

delusion known to exist in the mind of the other, though nothing

is directly asserted which is calculated to keep it up.’ So it is a

gross deception and fraud to pass off a note as duly endorsed

upon a person who cannot read, when in fact the endorsement is

one made without recourse.‘ And a familiar case of fraud, often
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redresscd by means of the application of the doctrine of estoppel,

is where one keeps silence when he sees his own property sold

as the property of another, or property sold upon which he has

a lien, and fails in either case to disclose the facts.‘

343. A failure of the vendor to cor-

rect the vendee's erroneous views of

what he is buying is no fraud. Law

v. Grant, Z37 Wis. 548. Compare Wil-

liams 1:. Bcazley, 3 J. J. Marsh. 578.

But it is said if the vendor knows

a horse he is selling has an internal

and secret malady, rendering him

worthless, he must disclose it. Pad-

dock c. Strobridge, 29 Vt. 470. But,

sec Ilill v. Balls, 2 H. & N. 299.

' Nichols 1:. Pinner, 18 N. Y. 295;

What is Deception. In order to make out de<>eption, it is not
essential that false assm·tions should be made in words. A nod,
a wink, a shake of the head, or a smile artfully l'(mtrived to
induce the other pm·ty to believe in 8 non-existent f~tct which
might influence the neg-otiations may have all the effect of false
Rt:'sertions, and he equally deceptive and frandulent. 2 So one may
accomplish 8 framl hy eneonmging and taking advanta~e of a
delusion known to exist in the mimi of the other, though nothing
is directly asserted which is calculated to keep it up.• So it is a
gro~s de<>-eption and fraud to pass off a note as duly endorsed
upon a person who cannot read, when in fact the endorsement is
one made without recourse.• And a familiar case of fraud, often
redressed by means of the application of the doctr;ne of estoppel,
is where one ke£'ps silence when he sees his own property sold
as the property of another, or property sold upon which he hl\8
a lien, and tails in either ease to disclose the facts.•

Rodman o. Thalheimer, '75 Penn. St.

232; Cross v. Peters, 1 Me. 376.

' Walters 0. Morgan, 3 De G., F. &

J . 718.

' Hill e. Gray,1 Stark. 434; Trigg

Read, 5 Humph. 529.

‘ Decker 0. Iiardin, 5 N.J.-579. It

a mortgagee of goods which have

been attached by a creditor of the

mortgageortlctnands payment of his

mortgage, knowing that his claim is

false and fraudulent, and the attach-

ing creditor, supposing the claim

valid, releases his attachment, the

latter may recover of the mortgagee

the amounts of his debt thereby lost

in an aetion on the case. Brown v.

Castles, 11 Cush. 348.

‘ Tomlin 0. Den, 19 N. J. 76;

Aortson v. Ridgeway, 18 Ill. 23; Gray

8!3. A failure of tile vendor to correct the vt•m.lce's erroneous views of
what he is buying is no fraud. Law
"· Grant, :n Wis. ,j-!8. Compare \Vii.
Iiams c. Beuzley, 3 J. J. llnrsh. 578.
But it is said if the vendor knows
a hor!ic he is ~elliog has an internnl
and st•crct malady, rendering him
worthlc!'s, he must disclose iL Puddol'k "· !;trobridgc, 29 Vt. 470. But,
s<'<' Ilill "·Ball~. 2 H. & N. 29!>.
• Nichols "'· Pinner, 18 N. Y. 295;
Hmlman tl. Thalheimer, 7i'i Penn. St.
232; Cross tl. Peters, 1 Me. 376.
'Walters "· llorgan, S De G., F. &
J. 718.

1 Hill "· Gmy, 1 Stark. 434: Trigg
Read, 5 Humph . ."l29.
1 Deekcr 11. HarJin, 5 N .•J. 579. It
a mortgugce of goods which have
been nttached by a creditor of the
morl!!a~eor demands payment of his
mortgu.~e, knowing that his claim is
fal:,~C and fraudulent, and the attaching creditor, supposing the claim
valid, releases his attachment, the
latter may reeover of tl~e mortgugee
the amounts of his debt thereby lost
in 1\11 al·tion on the ciL!!e. Brown "·
Castles, 11 Cu~h. 348.
1 Tomlin "· Den, 19 N. J. 76;
Aortson "·Ridgeway, 18 Ill. 23; Gray
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which silence itself is fraudulent, because the silence amounts to

an aflirmation that a state of things exists which does not, and

the party is deceived to the same extent that he would have been

by positive assertion. Thus, one who sells goods on credit has a

right to suppose his vendee intends to pay for them; and

although an insolvent may lawfully buy on credit, even though

his insolvene_v is not known to the seller, yet if he makes the

purchase intending at the time to take advantage of his insol-

vency and not pay for them, the concealment of this intention is

a gross fraud, and the title to the goods will not pass.‘ A still

plainer case is where one makes a purchase of goods and gives

his own bank check in payment. The giving of a bank check is

universally understood in commercial circles as an aﬂirmatiou

that there are funds on deposit to meet it, and the payee receives

it on that understanding. But if in fact the cheek is drawn on

a bank where the drawer had no funds, and without any reasona-

ble expectations on his part that it will be paid, the fraud is

manifest.’ So if nevotiations are had on the basis of certain

9 C‘

0. Bartlett. 20 Pick. 186; Dann u. (‘ud-

ney, 13 Mich. 239. Where one, in the
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course of negotiations for a marriazc,

let the woman have money, in order

to make her fortune apparently equal

to what was insisted upon on the other

side, taking her obligation for pay-

mcn, this obligation was set aside for

When Silence is Fraudulent. There are a few other cases in
which t;ilcnee itself is fraudulent, because the silence amounts to
an atlirmation that a state of things exists which does not, an1l
the p:u·ty is decei vcd to the same extent that he would have hl'Cll
by pusiti,·e assertion. Thns, one who sells goods on credit ha~ a
right to snppm;c his vendee intends to pay for them; and
although an iusuh·ent may lawfully bny on credit, even thongh
his insoh·ctH.'.v is not known to the seller, yet if he makes the
purchas~ intending at the time to take advantage of his insolvency and not pay for them, the concealment of this intention is
a gro,;s fraud, at~d the title to the good:> will not pass.' A still
plainer case is where one makes a purchase of goods and gives
hit" own bank check in payment. The giving of a bank check is
universally understood in commercial circles a.s an affirmation
that there are funds on deposit to meet it, and the payee reeeives
it on that understanding. Rut if in titet the check is drawn on
a bank where the drawer had no fund~, and without any reasonable <.'xpectations on his patt that it will be paid, the fraud is
manifest." So, if neg-otiations are had on the basis of certain

fraud. Gale 0. Lindo, 1 Vern. 4'75.

So a creditor who, under like circum-

stances, conceals and denies the fact

ot in(lel)tedne.~'.~', may be enjoined from

enforcing it. Neville v. Wilkinson,

1 Bro. C. C. 543. And, see Bell 0.

Clarke, 25 Beav. 437.

‘ F1'r;ttsﬂIl v. Carrington, 9 B. & C.

59; Load 1». Green, 15 M. & ‘V. 216;

Er pm-to \\'hittakcr, L. R. 10 Ch. Ap.

446; S. C. 14 Moak, 723; Congers v.

Ennis, 2 )1-1r. 2156; Donaldson =0. Far-

well, S13 U. S. Rep. 631; Nichols 0.

Micliael. 23 N. Y 264; Ilennequin v.

Naylor, 24 N. Y. 139; l)cvoe 1». Brandt,

5%; N. Y. 462; Wright r. Brown, 67

N. Y. 1; Thompson v. Rose, 16 Conn.

'71; Ayres v. French, 41 Conn. 142;

Dow r. Smhorn, 3 Allen, 1S1; Stewart

o. Emerson, 52 N. H. 301; Bishop

v. Small, 63 Me. 12; Holbrook v. (Yon-

nor, U0 Me. 57$; Powell 0. Bradlee, 9

Gill & J. 220.

There are cases to the contrary.

Smith 1». Smith, 21 Penn. St. 367;

Bat-kentoss v. Speicher,3l Penn. St.

32l; Rodman 0. Thalheimcr, 75 Penn.

St. 232; Bell 1;. Ellis, 33 Cal. 620, 630.

’ llarner r. Fisher, 58 Penn. St. 4-33;

Mizner v. Russell, 20 Mich. 2'29; True

o. Thomas. 16 Me. 36; Earl of Bristol

0. Wilsmore, 1 B. & C. 514. It is a

fraud knowingly to make payment in

worthless bank bills, the other part-y

supposing them to be good; and an

understanding that the payment

should be conclusive unless the bills

were returned within a certain num-

ber of (lays, would not be binding

under such circumstances. Smith o.

Click, 4 Humph. 186.

"·Bartlett, 20 Pick. 18G; Dann "· C'mlney, 13 :Mich. 239. Where one, in the
course of ne~otintinns for a mRrria~e,
let the woman have money, in order
to make her fortune npparen tly t·q nal
to whRt was iusbted upon on the other
sidt•, t:1king- her obligation for pay.
men, thhl obligation was set nsitle for
fraud. Gale w. Lindo, 1 Vern. 4i5.
So a creditor who, under like eircumslancr~, conceals and dt•ait·~ the fact
of indl•bt('dnes~. may be cnjoitl!'d from
enforcing it. Nl•ville tl. Wilkinson,
1 Bro. C. C. 5-t.'l. And, see Bell "·
Clarke. 2.) lleav. 4:17.
1 Ft·r ..~usnn !l. Carring-ton, 9 Il & U.
5!1; Lo:td 11. GrPI'n, 15 ::\{. & W. 216;
B.r parte Whittaker, L. R 10 Ch. Ap.
44G; S. C. 14 }{oak, 72~; Congers "·
Enni~. 2 :\hr. 2:16; Donaldson 'V. Far\\"(' II, !l:l U. A. Hrp. 6:n; Nichols "·
Mic:hael. zaN. y 2G4; III'nn!'!Jllin '!).
N:;ylor, 24 X. Y. 139; Devoe 11. Brandt,
5<1 N. Y. 4fi2; Wright r. Brown, 67
N. Y. 1; Thompson"· Hose, 16 Conn.

71; Ayres w. French, 41 Conn. 142;
Dow r·. S:lllborn, 3 Allen, 181; Stewart
"· Emerson, !'i2 N. H. 301; Bishop
"· Small, 6:3 }I e. 12; Holbrook "· Connor, liO Me. 57S; Powell "· Bradlee, 9
Gill & ,J. 220.
Thl•re are cases to the contrary.
Smith "· Smith, 21 Penn. St. 3fi7;
Bnrkt•ntoss "· Hpeicher, 31 Penn. St.
llU; HodmHn "·Thalheimer, 75 P<>nn.
St. 2:l2; Bell '11. Ellis, :J3 Cal. 620, 630.
2 IIRrner r. Fishl'r, !'iS Penn. St. 4;>3;
Mizner 'V. Kns>'l'll, 29 :Mich. 229; True
"· Thomas. 16 Me. 86; Earl of Bristol
"· Wilsmore, 1 B. & C. 514. It is a
fraud kuowin~ly to make pr~yment in
worthies'! bank bills, the other plll"ty
supposing them to be good; and an
understanding thRt the payment
should be conclusive unless the bills
were returned within a certain number of days, would not be binding
under such circumstances. Smith ""
Click, 4 Humph. 100.
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facts known to the parties, but before they are concluded a
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change material to the negotiations takes place to the knowledge

of one party, but not of the other, the latter has a right to be

informed by the former of this change, and if he is not informed,

he is deceived and defrauded.‘ So, where one is making a pur-

chase for a speciﬁc purpose, which is disclosed to the seller. and

the latter knows that what he offers for sale is wholly unﬁt for

that purpose by reason of some defect not manifest, it is his

duty to make known to the purchaser that fact.’ Thus, if one

were to apply to a dealer for grain for seed, and should be shown

that which to all appearance was suitable, but the germinating

power of which the dealer knew had in some manner been

destroyed, and if the applicant were to be suffered to buy this,

supposing it was suitable for the purpose, the fraud would be as

gross, if no words were uttered, as, it would be if the sale were

accompanied by the most positive assertions of its adaptability

to the purchaser's wants.

A case of this sort is where one having diseased meats or

other unwholesome provisions, and knowing the fact, neverthe-

less exposes them for sale as provisions to those who will be

expected to take them for consumption into their o\vn house-

holds. The otfer of provisions to consumers is of itself a. war-
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ranty that they are ﬁt for consumption as such; ' but if the seller

"I‘raill 0. Baring, 4 DcG., J. & S.

318; Underhill I‘. Ilarwood, 10 Ves.

' It has always been held that while

there is no implied warranty that

223; Nichols 0. Pinner, IS N. Y. 295.

And see, for the same principle. Lan-

caster Co. Bank u. Albright, 21 Penn.

St. 228; Reynell v. Sprye, 1 DcG., M.

& G. 660, 679.

' As where a bull was bargained for

to put with cows, and the vendor

f~t.ds known to the parties, but before they are eonduded a
chango material to the negotiations takes pln~e to the knowletlge
of one party, but not of the other, the latter has a right to be
intomwd by the former of this change, and if he is not informed,
he is deceived and defrauded.' So, where one is making a purchase for a specific purpose, which is disclosed to the seller. and
the latter knows that what he otlers tor sale is wholly untit for
that purpose by reason of some defect not manife:~t, it is his
duty to make known to the purchaser that fact.' Thus, if one
were to npply to a dealer for grain tor seed, and should be shown
that which to all appearnm.-e was suitable, but the germinating
power of which the dealer knew had in some manner been
destt·oyed, and if the npplicant were to be suffered to buy this,
snppot;ing it was suitable tor the purpose, the fraud would be as
gross, if no words were uttered, as. it would be if the sale were
&<.-companied by the most positive assertions of its adaptability
to the purchaser's wants.
A case of this sort is where one having disea~C'd meats or
other unwholesome provisions, and knowing the tact, nevertheless exposes them for sale as pt·ovisions to those who will be
expected to take them for consumption into their own hou8ehol<.ls. The offer of pro\·isions to consumers is of itself a Wllrranty that they are fit for consumption as such; • but if the seller

knew that he was without power of

propagation. Maynard n. Maynard,

49 Vt. 297. See Paddock r. Strobridge,

29 Vt. 470: Van Bracklin v. Fonda,

12 Johns. 468; French n. Vining, 102

Mass.132. An insurance is void if

obtained when the applicant knows

that because of something which has

already occurred the event insured

against must happen. Bigelow on

Fraud, 39.

provisions disposed of by wholesale

dealers for resale are ﬁt for u-<-—-l*Itner-

son 0. Brigham, 10 Mass. 106; .\IItS[‘s

0. Mead, 1 Denio, 378; Hart e. \\'ri,-gltt,

1'7 Wend. 267; Goldrich v. Ryan, 3

E. D. Smith, 324; llyland r. Sher-

man, 2 E. D. Smith, 234; llargous v.

Stone, 5 N. Y. 73; Ryder v. Neitgc,

21 Minn. 70—yet that there was such

a warranty when they were sold by a

retail dealer for consumption. Van

Brocklin r. Fonda, 12 Johns. 4113;

Moses 0. Mead, 1 Denio, 378; Iloe 0.

Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552. And it is said

that a warranty arises whether the

vendor is a dealer or not, if he knows

the article is purchased for imme-

diate consumption. Hoover o. Peters,

• Traill "· Baring, 4 DeG., J. & 8.
:llR; Cndt>rhill r. Harwood, 10 Ves.
22-1; :Xirhols "·Pinner, 18 N.Y. 2!1.).
And S<'e, for the sam!' principii', L'lncaster Co. Bunk"· Albright, 21 Penn.
St. 228; Reynell "· Sprye, 1 DeG., M.
& G. 660, 679.
1 As whPre a. bull was bargained for
to put with cows, and the vendor
knew that he was without power of
pr.>pn_!rtltion. Maynard "· )laynard,
49 Yt. 297. See Pncltlork r. Strobridge,
29 Vt. 470: Van Bracklin "· Fonda,
12 Johns. 468; FrPnrh "·Vining, 102
lias,. 132. An insurance is void if
obtt1ined when t.he applicant knows
thut bccuuse of !'omcthlng which has
alrl'tllly occurred the event insured
against must happen. Bigelow on
Fraud, 39.

1 It hns always been hP!Il that while
there is no impliNl warranty that
provi11inns dispo~(·d of by wholt·sale
dealers for res: II!' are fit for U•(·-Em:>r.
son "· Brightlm. 10 )la~'l. lUtl; :\l"scs
tl.llead, 1 Denio, 378; Hart r. Wright,
17 Wend. 267; Goldrich tl. Ryan, S
E. D. Rm ith, 324; Hyland r. Slu•r.
man, 2 E. D. Smith, 234; Har.!!<>Us "·
Stone, 5 N. Y. 7:J; Hyder l'. ~eit~e,
21 )linn. 70- yet that there was such
a warranty when they were sold by a
retail dPnler for consumption. Yan
Brocklin "· Fonda, 12 Johns. 4fi8;
:Moses o. 1\lead, 1 D<'nio, Sit!; Hoe "·
Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552. And it is said
that a warranty arises whether the
vendor is a dealer or not. if he knows
the article is purchnsPd for inunedlatc consumption. Hoover v. Peters,
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knows they are unﬁt, it is a gross fraud to offer them, for pur-
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chasers are not expected to inquire; indeed, the inquiry of a

respectable dealer whether he did not know that the provisions

he was offering to his customers were poisonous or otherwise

unﬁt for use, might well be taken as an insult. The sale without

disclosing the facts is of itself a fraud, because the offer is of

itself a representation of suitablencss for use.‘

This doctrine has recently and with entire justice been applied

to the sale of food for domestic animals. The case was one of

/the sale of hay upon which a poisonous ﬂuid had been accident-

ally spilled. The hay was fed to a cow which was poisoned from

eating it. “It is perfectly well settled,” say the court, “that

there is an implied warranty in regard to manufactured articles

purchased for a particular use, which is made known at the time

of the sale to the vendor, that they are reasonably ﬁt for the use

for which they are purchased. It may, perhaps, be more accurate

to say that, independently of any express and formal stipulation,

the relation of the buyer to the seller may be of such a character

as to impose a duty upon the seller differing very little from a

warranty. The circumstances attending the sale may be equiva-

lent to a distinct aﬂirmation on his part as to the quality of the

thing sold. A grocer, for instance, who sells at retail may be
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presumed to have some general notion of the uses which his

customers will probably make of the articles which they buy of

him. If they purchase ﬂour or sugar, or other articles of daily

domestic use for their families, or grain or meal for their cattle,

the act of selling to them under such circumstances is equivalent

to an aﬁirmation that the things are at least wholesome and

reasonably ﬁt for use; and proof that he knew, at the time of

the sale, that they were not wholesome and reasonably ﬁt for

nse, would be enough to sustain an action against him for deceit,

if he had not disclosed the true state of the facts. The buyer

has a right to suppose that the thing which he buys under such

circumstances is what it appears to be, and such purchases are

usually made with a reliance upon the supposed skill or actual

18 Mich. 51. As to which see Goad

0. Johnson, 6 Heisk. 340; Burnby 0.

Bollett, 16 M. & W. 644.

‘Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass.

196; Peckham o. Holman, 11 Pick.

484; Van Brocklin 0. Fonda, 12

Johns. 468; Devine 0. Metlormick,

50 Barb. 116. And see Winsor 0.

Lombard, 18 Pick. 57, 62.

F _ _ _ H. _ _i__-_...s

knows they are unfit, it is a gross fraud to offer them, for purchasers arc not expected to inquire; indeed, the inquiry of a
respectable dealer whether he did not know that the provisions
he was offering to his customers were poisonous or otherwise
unfit for use, might well be taken as an insult. The sale without
disclosing the facts is of itself a fraud, because the offer is of
itself a representation of suitableness for use.'
This doctrine has recently and with entire justice been applied
to the sale of food for domestic animals. The case was one of
;the sale of hay upon which a poisonous fluid had been accidentally spilled. The hay was fed to a cow which was poi&oned from
eating it. "It is perfectly well settled," say the court, "that
there is an implied warranty in regard to manufactured articles
purchased for a parti~nlar use, which is made known at the time
of the sale to the vendor, that they are reasonably fit for the use
for which they are purchased. It may, perhaps, be more accurate
to say that, independently of any express and formal stipulation,
the relation of the buyer to the seller may be of such a character
as to imvos~ a duty upon the seller differing very little from a
warmnty. The circnmstn.nces attending the sale may be equivalent to a distinct affirmation on his part as to the quality of the
thing sold. A grocer, for instauce, who sells at retail may be
presumed to have some general notion of the uses which his
customers will probabl.Y make of the articles which they buy of
him. If they purchase flour or sugar, or other articles of daily
domestic use for their families, or grain or meal for their cattle,
the act of selling to them under snch circumstances is equivalent
to an affirmation that the things arc at least wholesome and
reasonably fit for use; and proof that he knew, at the time of
the sale, that they were not wholesome and reasonably fit for
use, would be enough to sustain an action against him for deceit,
if he had not disclosed the true state of the facts. The buyer
has a right to suppose that the thing which he buys under such
circmustances is what it appears to be, and such purchases are
usually made with a reliance upon the supposed skill or actual
18 :Mich. 51. A2. to which see Goad
"· Johnson, 6 Hcisk. 340; Burnby "·
Bollctt, 16 M. & W. 644.
1 Emerson t~. Brigham, 10 Mass.
196; Peckham "· Holman, 11 Pick.

484 ; Van Brocklin "· Fonda, 12
Johns. 468; Devine "· :McCormick,
50 Barb. 116. And see Winsor "·
Lombard, 18 Pick. 67, 62.
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knowledge of the vendor. In the case at bar the plaintiff

481

bought the hay in small quantities and the defendant must be

considered as knowing, generally, the kind of use to which it

was to be applied. The act of sale, under such circumstances,

was equivalent to an express assurance that the hay was suitable

for such use. If he knew that the hay had a defect about it, or

had met with an accident that rendered it not only unsuitable

for that use, but dangerous or poisonous, it would plainly be a

violation of good faith and an illegal act to sell it to the plaintiff

without disclosing its condition. Silence in such a case would

be deceit.” '

On the same reasons it would seem that the sale of animals

which the seller knows, but the purchaser does not, have a eon-

tagious disease, should be regarded as a fraud when the fact ot

disease is not disclosed; and so it has been held in New York.’

So infecting the grass and other herbage of a ﬁeld by one in

possession as mere licensee, and allowing the owner to turn in his

beasts without informing him of the fact, is a gross fraud.’ And

it would seem that the fraud would not only be more censurable,

but more clearly actionable, if that which is exposed to injury

by the concealment is the health—perhaps the life—of human

beings, as might be the case if one were to induce another to
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receive into his family as a boarder a person who had been

exposed to some contagious disease, and should fail to communi-

cate that fact.

' Auras, J., in French 1:. Vining, 102

Mass. 132; S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 440, citing

Langridge 0. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519;

Thomas 0. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397;

McDonald o. Snelling, 14 Allen, 290,

295.

' Jetfery 0. Bigelow, 13 Wend. 518.

A ditlerent view was taken in Hill 0.

Balls, 2 H. & N. 299. It was there

said that as the law docs not require

the vendor of a horse who is guilty

of no fraud or deception, and makes

knowleclge of the vendor. In the ease at bar the plaintiff
bought the hay in small quantities and the defendant mnst he
considered as knowing, generally, the kind of use to which it
was to be applied. The act of sale, nnder such circumstances,
was equivalent to an express assurance that the hay was suitable
tor such use. If he knew that the hay had a detect about it, or
had met with an accident that rendered it not only unsuitable
for that use, but dangerous or poisonous, it would plainly be a
vioht.tion of good faith and an illegal act to sell it to the plaintiff
without disclosing its <.'On<litiou. Silence in such a case woul?
be deceit."'
On the same reasons it would seem that the sale of animals
which the seller knows, bnt the purchaser does not, have a con.
tagions disease, should be regarded as a fraud when the fact ot
disease is not disclosed; and so it has been held in New York.'
So infecting the grass and ot\ler herbage of a field by oue in
possession as mere licensee, and allowing the owner to tnrn in his
beasts without informing him ot' the fact, is a gross fraud.' And
it would seem that the fraud would not only be more censurable,
but more clearly actionable, if that which is exposed to injury
by the concealment is the health-perhaps the life-of human
beings~ as might be the case if one were to induce another to
receive into his family as a boarder a person who had been
exposed to some contngio~s disease, and should fail to communicate that fact.

no warranty, to disclose defects, if he

sells a diseased horse without inform-

ing the purchaser of the facts, the

subsequent communication of the

disease to other animals will not con-

vert the lawful sale into a tort The

conclusion certainly follows if the

sale is lawful, but it‘ the sale is fraud-

ulent, the seller will be responsible

for all consequences. Mullett 1:. .\la-

son, L. R. 1 C. P. 550; Fultz v. Wycotf,

25 Ind. 321.

In Illinois there is a statute making

persons responsible for the eounnu-

nieation of disease by Texas cattle

brought into the State by them. See

Frazee 0. Milk, 56 Ill. 435; Yeazel 0.

Alexander, 58 Ill. 254; Somerville 0.

Marks, 58 Ill. 371; Sangamon, etc.,

Co. 1:. Young, 77 Ill. 197.

5 Eaton 0. Winnie, 20 Mich. 156.

31

I AllES, J., in French "· Vining, 102
Mass. 132; B. (1, 8 Am. Rep. 440, citing
Langridge "· Levy, 2 ll. & W. 519;
Thomas "· Winchester. 6 N. Y. 897;
McDonald •· Snelling, 14 Allt>n, 200,

295.
1 Jcfft>ry •· Bigelow. 13 Wend. :518.
A dlflercnt view wa.'l taken in Hill "·
Balls, 2 H. & N. 299. It was there
said that as the law does not require
the vendor of 8 horse who is guilty
of no fraud or deception, and makes
no warranty, to disclose defects, if he
sells a diseased liorse without inform.
lng the purchaser of the facts, the
subsequent communication of the
disease &o other animals will not con-

31

vert the lawful sale into a tort The
conclusion certainly follows if the
sale is lawful, but if the sale is fraudulent, the seller will be responsible
for nll con~equenCL'S. Mullett "· )[a.
son, L. R. 1 C. P. MD; Fultz"· Wycoff,
~Ind.

821.

In Illinois tht>re is a statute making
persons responsible for the com1nu.
nication of disen~e by Texas cuttle
brought into I he State by them. Sec
Frazee"· Milk, 56 Ill. 4:J;i; Yeazel "·
Alexander, 58 Ill. 254; Somerville "·
Marks, 58 Ill. 871; Sangamon, etc.,
Co. "· Young, 77 Ill. 197.
a Eaton'· Winnie, 20 llich. l:iG.
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Cases not different in principle sometimes arise in the law of
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suretyship, where the’ surety is induced to assume his obligation

by the concealment of facts which, under the circumstances, he

had a right to have disclosed to him by the ohligor or creditor.

A surety, it may generally be supposed, is the friend of his prin-

cipal rather than of the party the principal proposes to secure,

and he is expected to apply to his principal for the facts likely

to affect his liability, or to inquire them out independently.

Therefore the creditor, or party to be secured, is not in general

under any obligation to disclose the facts within his knowledge,

but he may deal with the principal exclusively, and accept and

rely upon such security as the latter brings him. But there may

be circumstances under which his duty to speak would be very

plain. Thus, where a bank was in good credit, and its published

reports showed it to be well managed, when, in fuct, its cashier

was a default/er, and the fact should have been known to the

directors, and might have been known to them by the exercise

of very slight care, it was very properly held that if one, under

these circumstances, became surety to the bank on the oﬁieial

bond of the mshier, without the dcfalcation being made known

to him, the bond was tainted with fraud and could not be

enforced.‘ What facts the directors knew, or by the exercise of
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ordinary care ought to have known, in the dealings of the cashier

with the corporation, and which were not accessible except

through the corporation itself, it was their duty to make known.’

So, if a creditor, knowing that his debtor is in‘ failing circum-

stances, after obtaining from him for a part of his claim a inert-

gage substantially covering all his property, induces the debtor to

obtain the endorsement of a third person for another part, without

revealing the fact of the mortgage, this is such a fraud upon the

endorser as relieves him from liability.’ So if the husband

induces his wife to give a mortgage on her property to enable

him to purchase goods and continue in business, the mortgagee

knowing the purpose, but by a secret arrangement not disclosed

to the wife a part of the consideration of the mortgage is to be

old indebtedness of the husband, this secret arrangement is a

‘ Graves 0. Lebanon Nat. Bank, 10 Mahbett, 18 Wis. 667; State c. Bates,

Bush, 23; S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 50. See, 36 Vt. 387.

also, Lee 0. Jones, 17 C. B. (rt. s.) 386. ‘ Lancaster Co. Bunk 0. Alhright,

‘ Ibid. See 1Etna Fire Ins. Co. 0. 21 Penn. St. 228.

Q

Cases not different in principle sometimes arise in the law of
suretyship, where the' surety is induced to assume his oblibration
hy the concealment of facts which, under the circumstances, he
hatl a right to have di~clnsed to him by the obligor or creditor.
A flurety, it may generally be supposed, is the friend of his principal rather than l)f the party the principal proposes to secure,
ar11l he is expected to apply to his principal for the facts likely
to nflcct his liability, or to inquire them ont independently.
Tbcrefurc the creditor, or party to he secured, is not in general
under any obligation to disclose the facts within his knowledge,
hut he may deal with the principal exclusively, and accept and
rely upon such security as the latter brings him. Bnt there may
be circumstances under which his duty to speak would be very
plain. Thus, where a bank was in good credit, and its published
reports showed it to be well managed, when, in fi1ct, its cashier
was n. dctimlter, and the tact should have been known to the
din·<:tors, and might have been known to them by the exercise
of very slight care, it was Yery propcl'ly held that if one, under
these drcumstant'cs, became surety to the bank on the official
bond of the cashier, without the defalcation being made known
to him, the bond was tainted with fraud and could not be
euforced. 1 What facts the direetors knew, or by the exercise of
ordinary care ought to have known, in the dealings of the cashier
with the corporation, and which wer·e not accessible except
through the corporation itself, it was tlwir duty to make known.•
So, if a creditor, knowing that his debtor is in· tailing circum.
stances, after obtaining from him for a vart of his claim a mort.
gage substantially covering all his propert.r, induces the debtor to
obtain the endorsement of a third per:-:on for another part, without
revealing the fact of the mortgage, this is such a fraud upon the
endorser as relieves him from liability.• So if the hu:>hand
induees his wife to give a mortgage on her property to enable
him to purchase goods and continue in hnniness, the mortgagee
knowing the purpose, but by a secret arrangement not rlisclot:ed
to the wife a part of the consideration of the mortgage is to bo
old indebtedness of the husband, this secret arrangement it: a
1 Graves "· Lebanon Nnt. Bank, 10
Bush, 23; S.C. 1{) Am. Rep. 50. See,
also, Lee "· J onc!l, 17 C. B. (N. s.) :186.
• Ibid. See .2EI.na Fire Ins. Co. tl.

lfnbbett, 18 Wis. 667; State "· Bates,
86 Vt. 887.
1 Lanca.qter Co. Bank o. Albright,
21 Pt•nn. St. 228.
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fraud, and the mortgage, to that extent, inoperative.‘ And so

483

wherever the creditor has any secret arrangement with his debtor

which would increase the surety’s liability, or which, if known,

would be likely to prevent one assuming the obligation of sure-

tyship, the accepting of the surety’s obligation without disclosure

is a fraud.’ These were cases in which the ordinary rule which

requires every man to protect his interests by his own inquiries

had no application; for the facts were such as suspicion would

not be likely to seize upon or prudence look for, and on the face

of the transaction a state of things was assumed which was

directly the opposite of the real facts.

Matters of Opinion. Mere expressions of matters of opinion,

however strongly or positively made, though they are false, are

no fraud, because, as is said in one case, these are matters in

respect to which many men will be of many minds, and judg-

ments are often governed by whim and caprice.' Therefore, for

a vendor to assert that the lands he is negotiating to sell are of a

f1·and. and the mortgage, to that extent, inoperative.' And so
wherever the creditor has any secret arrangement with his debtor
wl1ich would increase the surety's liability, or which, if known,
would be likely to prevent one assuming the obligation of suretyship, the accepting of the surety's obligation without disclosure
is a fraud.• 'fhese were cases in which the ordinary role which
reqnirl's every man to protect his inter·ests by his own inquiries
had no application; for the facts were such as suspicion would
not IJc likely to seize upon or prudence look for, and on the face
of the transaction a state of things was assumed which was
directly the opposite of the real facts.

particular value, greatly above their real worth, or to exaggerate

their good qualities and productiveness. is no fraud.‘ Neither is

' Smith 1:. Osborn, 83 Mich. 410.

_ ‘Booth 12. Storrs, 75 Ill.-138. See

Franklin Bank r. Cooper, 36 Me. 179.
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3 Paslcy 1:. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51. See

Ross r. Estates Investment Co., L R.

8 Eq. 122; Payne e. Smith, 20 Geo.

654: Fish 1:. Cleland, 83 Ill. 238; Leh-

man r. Shackleford, 50 Ala. 437; Reed

0. Sidener, 32 Ind. 373; Ellis 0. An-

drews, 56 N. Y. 83; S. C. 15 Am. Rep.

:Matters of Opinion. Mere expressions of matters of opimon,
however strongly or positively made, though they aro false, are
no fraud, be<.'fluse, as is said in one case, these are matters in
respect to which many moo .will be of many minds, and judgments are often governed by whim and caprice.' Therefore, for
a vendor to assert that the lands he is negotiating to sell are of a
particular valne. greatly above their real worth, or to exaggerate
their guod qualities and productiveness. is no fraud.• Neither is

879; Bristol 0. Braidwood, 28 Mich.

191; Fulton v. Hood, 34 Penn. St.

365; Tuck 0. Downing, '76 Ill. 71. In

Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 East, 92, it is

said that the assertions must be con-

sidered in the light of the subject-

matter, and that a statement that un-

other is entitled to credit upon one’s

own knowledge, is to be understood

as being only a strong expression of

0nc's belief on the subject. See, fur-

ther, Fenton n. Browne, 14 Ves. 144;

White 0. Cuddon, 8 Cl. & Fin. 766;

Colby 0. Gadsden, 34 Beav. 416. If

the vendor of a tenement represents

the rent of it to he £30 when it is

only £20, this is a fraud. Dimmoek

0. Ilallctt, L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 21.

‘ Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 217;

Manning v. Albee, 11 Allen, 520;

Gordon v. Parmelee, 2 Allen, 212;

Sherwood v. Salmon, 2 Day, 128;

Credle 0. Swindcll, 03 N. C. 305.

Compare Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y.

298; S. C. 13 Am. Rep. 523; Wise 0.

Fuller, 29 N. J. Eq. 257: Ilolbrook

0. Connor, 60 Me. 578. It is no fraud

to aver strongly that the purchaser

would make a good and proﬁtable pur-

chase by the trade. Sievcking v. Litz-

ler, 31 Ind. 13. It might be otherwise

if the parties stood to each other in

conﬁdential relations. Fisher 0. Bud-

long, 10 R. I. 525. Or if in connection

with the expression of opinion there

were false assertions of fact calculated,

if trite, to give a basis for the opinion.

MeAleer 0. Horsey, B5 Md. 439.

Smith t'. Osbom, 88 .Mich. 410.
Booth "· Storl'll, 75 Ill. 488. See
Franklin Bank r. Cooper, 86 Me. 179.
• Pasley "· FreemAn, 8 T. R 61. Sec
Ross t'. F~tatt>s Investmt>nt Co.• L R
8 Eq. 122; PMyne "· Smith, 20 Geo.
6M; Fit~b "·Cleland, 83lll. 238; Leh.
man r. Shackleford, 50 Ala. 43'7; Reed
•· Hidcner, 32 Ind. 873; Ellis •· An.
drcws, 56 N. Y. 83; S. C. 16 Am. Rep.
879; Bristol "· Braidwood, 28 Mich.
191 ; F.llton •· Hood, 34 Penn. Sl
3M; Tuck •· Downing, 76Ill. 71. In
Haycraft "· Creasy, 2 East, 92, i& is
aattl that the assertions most be con.
aldered in the light of the subject.
matter, and that a statement that an.
other ls enUtled to credit upon one's
own knowledge, Is to be nnderstood
as being only a strong expresaion of
one's belief on &he subject. See, fur.
tber, Fenton "· Browne, 14: Ves. 144;
White •· Cuddon, 8 Cl. & Fin. 766;
Colby •· Gadsden, M Beav. 416. U
1

•

1

the vendor of a tenement representa
the rent of U to be .£30 when it is
only £20, this Is a fraud. Dlmmoek
•· Hallett, L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 21.
4 Mooney 11. Miller, 102 }lass. 217;
Manning "· Albee, 11 Allen. 620;
Gordon "· Parmel~, 2 Allen, 212;
Sherwood "· SAlmon, 2 Day, 128;
Credle •· Swindell, 68 N. C. 803.
Compare Simar •· Canaday, 63 N. Y.
298; S.C. 13 Am. Rep. 523; Wise •·
Fuller, 29 N. J. Eq. 257; Dol brook
•· Connor, 60 )(e. G78. I& is no fraud
to aver strongly that the pul'('hascr
would make a good and profttablc purchase by the trade. Sievcking "· Lltz.
ler, 81 Ind. 18. It might be otherwiae
If the parties stood to t>ach other ln
conddential relations. Fisher •· Bud.
long, 10 R. I. 62G. Or If in connection
with the expression of opininn &here
were false RSSertions of fact calculated,
lf true, to give a basis for the opinion.
McAleer "· Horsey, 85 Md. 439.
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it a fraud to assert that shares in an incorporated company
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which the party is selling are worth a certain sum, when, in fact,

they are worth very much less,‘ or to make exaggerated state-

ments of the proﬁts and prospects of the company,‘ nor, it

seems, to assert that the vendor paid more for what he is selling

than he actually did;’ but upon this point there are cases to the

contrary.‘

There are some cases, however, in which even a false assertion

of opinion will amount to a fraud, the reason being that. under

the circumstances, the other party has a right to rely upon it

without bringing his own judgment to bear. Such is the case

where one is purchasing goods, the value of which can only be

known to experts, and is relying upon the vendor, who is a

dealer in such goods, to give him accurate information concern-

ing them.‘ The same rule has been applied where a dealer in

patent rights sold certain territory to one who was ignorant of

its value, representing it to be very valuable, when he knew it

' Ellis 0. Andrews, 56 N. Y. 83; S.

C. 15 Am. Rep. 379. See Cronk 0.

Cole, 10 Ind. 485. But if f-ilS0 quota-

tions of value in a newspaper are ex-

hibited at the same time, this is a
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plain fraud. Manning v. Albee, 11

Allen, 520. And see McAleer 0.

Horsey, 35 Md. 439.

it a fraud to assert that shares in an incorporated company
which the party is selling are worth a certain sum, when, in fact,
they are worth very much less,' or to make exaggerated statements of the profits and prospects of the company; 1 nor, it
seems, to assert that the vendor paid more for what he is selling
than he actually did; 1 but upon this point there are cases to the
I
contrary.•
There arc some cases, however, in which even a false assertion
of opinion will amount to a fraud, the reason being that. under
the circumstan(.-es, the other party has a right to rely upon it
without bringing his own jnrlgment to bear. Such is the case
where one is purchasing goods, the value of which can only be
known to experts, and is relying upon the vendor, who is a
dealer in such goods, to give him accurate information concerning them! The same rule hns been applied where a. dealer in
patent rights sold certain territory to one who was ignorant of
its value, representing it to be very valuable, when he knew it

‘New Brunswick R. C0. e. Cony-

beare, 9 H. L. Cas. 711; Kisch 0. R.

Co., 3 DeG., J. & S. 122. So, an ex-

aggerated estimate of the value of a

patented invention is no fraud. Hun-

ter 0. McLaughlin, 43 Ind. 38. Or of

the value of lands, or probable proﬁts

of a proposed railroad. Walker 0.

Mobile, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Miss. 245.

' Holbrook 0. Conner, 60 Me. 578;

S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 212; Cooper 0.

Lovering, 106 Mass. 7'7; Hemmer e.

Cooper, 8 Allen, 834; Medbury 0.

Watson, 6 Met. 246, 260; Mooney 0.

Miller, 102 Mass. 217; Bishop 0.

Small, 63 Me. 12. This last case holds

that an action for deceit will not lie

upon false representations either as to

what a patent right cost the vendor,

or was sold for by him; or as to oﬂ'ers

made for it; or proﬁts that could he

derivt-.l from it; or for any mere ex-

pressions of opinion of any kind

about the property sold. PETERS, J. :_

“None of them are representations

of facts affecting the quality of the

article sold, known to the vendor, but

unknown to the vendee, and such as

a vendee using common care would

be deceived by. They are only ‘deal-

er’s talk.’ This is the well settled

doctrine in this State and Massachu-

setts. Long 0. W oodmau, 58 Me. 49;

Holbrook 0. Connor, 60 Me. 5'78.“

See, further, Tuck o. Downing, 76 Ill.

71; Banta v. Palmer, 47 Ill. 09.

‘ lves e. Carter, 24 Conn. 392;

Bomers e. Richards, 46 Vt. 170; Green

o. Bryant. 2 Kelly, 66; Van Epps e.

Harrison, 5 Hill, 63; McFadden 0.

Robison, 35 Ind. 24; Me.-tleer e. Hor-

sey, 35 Md. 439.

'Picard u. McCormick, 11 Mich.

68; Kost v. Bender, 25 Mich. 515;

1 Ellis tl. Andrews, 56 N. Y. 88; 8.
C. 15 Am. Rep. 879. Sec Cronk tl.
Cole, 10 Ind. 485. But if f.,lsc quota.
tlons of value in a newspaper arc ex.
hibited at the same time, this is a
plain fraud. liaoning "· Albee, 11
Allen, 520. And see .McAleer "·
Horsey, 35 l\Id. 489.
• New Brunswick R. Co. "· Conybeare, 9 H. L. Cas. 711; Kisch "· R.
Co., 8 DeG., J. & B. 122. So, an exaggerated estimate of the value of a
patented invention is no fraud. Hun.
ter "'· McLaughlin, 43 Ind. 88. Or of
the value of lands, or probable profits
of a proposed railroad. Walker "·
Mobile, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Miss. 245.
1 Holbrook il. Conner, 60 Me. 578;
B. C. 11 Am. Rep. 212; Cooper t~.
Lovering, 106 Mass. 77; Hemmer "'·
Cooper, 8 Allen, 834; Meubury "·
Watson, 6 Met. 2-16, 260; Mooney "·
Miller, 102 1\lass. 217; Bishop tl.
Small, 63 Me. 12. This last case holds
that an action for deceit will not lie
upon false representations either as to
what a patent right cost the vendor,

or was sold for by him; or as to offers
made for it; or profits that could be
deri\'(·.1 from it; or for any mere ex.
prcssions of opinion of any kind
about the property sold. PKTERS, .T.:
"None of them arc representations·
of facts affecting the quality of the
article soll.l, known to the vendor, but
unknown to the vendee, and such as
a vendee using common care would
be deceived by. They arc only 'deal.
er's talk.' Thill is the well settled
doctrine in this State and 1\lussacbu.
setts. J..on~ "·Woodman, 58 .MP. 49;
Holbrook "· Connor, 60 Me. 578.''
See, further, Tuck D. Downin.~. 76 IlL
71; Banta D. Palmer, 47 Ill. 09.
• I ves v. Carter, 24 Conn. 39'2;
Some1·s "'· Hichurtls, 46 Vt. liO; Green
"· B1·yaut. 2 Kl'ily, 66; Van Epps "·
Harrison, 5 Hill, 63; McFadden "·
Uobison, 35 Ind. 24; McAleer "· Hor.
scy, 35 ~ld. 439.
• Pic11rd "· 1\lcCormick, 11 .M.ich.
68; Kost tl. Bender, 25 Mich. 515;
Pike "· Fay, 101 llass. 134.
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was not: ' and, also, to a vendor of a saltpetre cave making false
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assertions as to the quantity of saltpetre which a certain quantity

485

of nitrous earth would produce.’ So, it is held the vendee of

lands has a right to rely upon the representations of his vendor

respecting the quantity of land contained in a parcel he is buy-

ing,‘ and respecting its boundaries.‘

Matters ofLaw. Misrepresentation as to the legal effect or

consequence of a proposed transaction or contract cannot, in gen-

eral, be looked upon as a cheat. Thus, where the agent procur-

ing subscriptions to the stock of a corporation represented that

the subscribers would only be liable to a certain percentage, when

was not;' and, also, to a vendor of a saltpetre CR\'e making false
assertions as to the quantity ot' saltpetre which a certain quantity
of nitrous earth would produce.' So, it is held the vendee of
lands has a right to rely upon the representations of his vendor
respecting the quantity of land contained in a. parcel he is buying,• and respecting its boundaries}

the law made them responsible for the whole amount, a sub-

scriber was held not entitled to defend a suit upon his subscrip-

tion on the ground of fraud. Says Mr. Justice HUNT: “There

was here no error, mistake, or misrepresentation of any fact. The

‘Allen 0. Hart, 72 Ill. 104. The

purchaser of a mill who is ignorant

of the business has a right to rely

upon the positive assertions of the

seller as to the business the mill is

capable of performing. Faribault 0.

Sater, 13 Minn. 223. See Wise v.
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Fuller, 29 N. J. Eq. 257.

’ Perkins o. Rice, Lit. Scl. Cas. 218.

Matters of Law.

:Misrepresentation as to the legal effect or
consequence of a pr·oposed transaction or contract cannot, in general, be looked upon a~ a cheat. Thus, where the a~ent procuring subscriptions to the stock of a corporation rcpt-esented that
the subscribers would only he liable to a certain percentage, when
the law made them responsible for the whole amount, a subscl'ibcr was held not entitled to defend a suit upo:1 his subscription on the ground of fraud. Says Mr. Justice HuNT: "There
was here no error, mistake, or misrep~esentation of any tact. The

Bee, as to representations of the value

of oil lands, Kost r. Bender, 25 Mich.

515; Holbrook 0. Connor, 60 Me. 578.

' Pringle n. Samuel, l Litt. 44; Earl

0. Bryan, Phill. Eq. (X. s.) 278: Cul-

lum 0. Branch Bank, 4 Ala. 21; Whit-

ney '0. Allaire, 1 N. Y. 305; Beards-

ley v. Duntley, 69 N. Y. 577; Stark-

weather 1:. Benjamin, 82 Mich. 305;

Hill v. Brower, '76 N C. 124; Coon v.

Atwell, 46 N. H. 510; Snngster 0.

Prather, 34 Ind. 504. In Gordon 0.

Parmelee, 2 Allen, 212, 214, it is held

that an action will not lie on such

representations. “The vendors point-

ed out to the veudees the true blund-

aries of the land which they sold.

The defendants had, therefore, the

means of ascertaining the precise

quantity of land included in the

boundaries. They omitted to measure

it or to cause it to be surveyed. By

the use of ordinary vigilance and at-

tention they might have ascertained

that the statement concerning the

number of acres, on which they

placed reliance, was false. They can-

not now seek a remedy for placing

conﬁdence in aﬂirmations which, at

the time they were made, they had

the means and opportunity to verify

or disprove." Brosnow, Ch. J.

In general, it is probably true that

s statement by the vendor that the

piece of land he is selling contains

so many acres. would not be relied

upon as a statement of exact fact.

Most deeds of land are given as so

many acres, “ more or less,” and state-

ments of quantity are regarded as

approximations only. And where

land is sold for a gross sum, and not

by quantity. the statement that it con-

tains so much is not even a warranty.

Johnson v. Taber, 10 N. Y. 319; Mar-

1 Allen tl. Hart, 72 Ill. 104. The
· purcha:wr of a mill who ls ignorant
of the business hilS a right to rely
upon the positive assertions of the
seller as to tlJC business the mill is
capable of performing. Furibault tl.
Sater, 13 Minn. 223. See Wise tl.
Fuller, 29 N. J. Eq. 257.
1 Perkins tl. Rice\ Lit. Sci. Cas. 218.
Bee, as to rep1·esentations of the value
,,f oil lands, Kost r. Bender, 25 :Mich.
515; Holbrook "· Connor, 60 Me. 578.
• Pringle !l. Samuel, 1 Lilt 44; Earl
e. Bryan, Ph ill. Eq. (N. s.) 278: Cullum "· Branch Bank, 4 Ala. 21 ; Whit.
ney "· Allaire, 1 N. Y. 305; Beardsley tl. Duntley, 69 N. Y. 577; Stark.
weather ~. Benjamin, 82 .Mich. 30.3;
Hill tl. BJ"Ower, 76 N C. 124; Coon"·
Atwell, 46 N. H. 510; Sangster tl.
Prather, 34 Ind. 504. In Gordon "·
Parmelee, 2 Allen, 212, 214, it is held
that an action will not lie on such
representations. "The vendors pointed out to the vendees the true b .undaries of the land which they sold.
The defendants bad, therefore, the
mea'ls of ascertaining the precise
quantity of land included in the

boundaries. They omitted to measure
it or to cause it to be surveyed. By
the usc of ordinary vigilance ani) at.
tention they might huve ascertained
thut the statement concerning the
number of 1u:r<·s, on which they
placed reliance, was false. They can.
not now seek a remedy for placing
confidence in affirmations which, at
the time they were made, they h11.d
the means and opportunity to verify
or disprove." BIGELOW, Ch. J.
In Jreneral, it is probably true that
a statement by the vendor that the
piece of l110d he is selling contains
so many acn·s. would not be relied
upon as a statement of exnct fuel.
Most deeds of land are given as so
many acres," more or less," and statements of quantity are regarded u
approximations only. And where
land is sold for a gross sum, and not
by quantity. the statement that it contains so much is not even a warrnnty.
Johnson"· Taber, 10 N.Y. 819; Martin "· Hamlin, 18 l\lich. 854.
4 Clark "· Baird. 9 N. Y. 188;
Weatherford "· Fishback, 4 Ill. 170;
Sandford tl. Handy, 23 Wend. 260.
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defendant made the subscription he intended to make, and received
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the certiﬁcate he had stipulated for; * * but in law the defend-

ant incurred a larger liability than he anticipated." '

Fraudulent Promises. If deceit, in order to be actionable,

must relate to existing or past facts, it is evident that the tact

that a promise, made in the course of negotiations, is never per-

defendant made the subscription he intended to make, and received
the certificate he had stipulAted for; * * but in law the defendant incurred a larger liability than he anticipated." 1

formed, is not of itself either a fraud, or the evidence of a fraud.’

' Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. Rep.

45, 49. See, to the same effect, Rash-

dall v. Ford, L. R. 2 Eq. 750; Starr v.

Bennett. 5 Hill, 303; Lewis v. Jones,

4 B. & C. 506; Rashdall '0. Ford, L. R.

2 Eq. 750; Steamboat Belfast o. Boon

Fraudulent Promises. If deceit, in order to be actionable,
must relate to existing or past tacts, it is evident that the fact
that a promise, made in the course of negotiations, is never performed, is not of itself either a fraud, or the evidence of a fraud.'

Co., 41 Ala. 50; Cowles 1:. Townsend,

37Mla. '77; Townsend v. Cowlcs, 31

Ala. 428; Clem 1:. Newcastle, etc., R.

R. Co., 9 Ind. 488; Russell v. Bran-

ham, 8 Blackf. 2'77; People 1;. Super-

visors’ of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 655;

Rogers 0. Place, 29 Ind. 577. A rep-

resentation of what the law will or

will not permit to be done is one upon
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which the party to whom it is made

has no right to rely; and if he does

so, it is his own folly, and he cannot

ask the law to relieve him from the

consequences. The truth or falsehood

of such a representation can be tested

by ordinary vigilance and attention.

It is an opinion in regard to the law,

and is always understood as such.

Fish 0. Clcland, 33 Ill. 238. But

when the heir-at-law of a shareholder

in a company, the shares in which

were personal estate, being ignorant

of that circumstance, and supposing

himself to be liable in respect of the

ancestor’s shares, executed a deed of

indemnity to the trustees of aco|n-

pany, held, that he was entitled in

equity to have his execution of the

deed cancelled, as having been ob-

tained under a mistake of law and

fact. Broughton v. Hutt, 3 De Gex &

Jones, 501. So there is deceit in both

fact and law, if the holder of a note,

the remedy upon which is barred by

the statute, goes to the administrator

of one of the two makers, and, by

representing it to be unpaid, and val-

id, and in full force in the law, pro-

cures a bond for the payment of ouc-

half thereof. Brown 0. Rice's Admr.,

26 Grat. 467.

So a party has been held entitled to

relief who had been induced to exe-

cute bills of exchange on the misrep-

resentation that they were ordinary

promissory notes. Ross v. Drinkard‘s

Admr,. 35 Ala. 434; and in the case

the following citation from Townsend

e. Cowles, 81 Ala. 428, is approved:

“lf the dcfenzlant was in fact igno-

rant of the law, and the other party,

knowing him to be so and knowing

the law, took advantage of such ig-

norance to mislead him by a false

statement of the law, it would consti-

tule a fraud."

1 Upton "· Tribilcock, 91 U. B. Rep.
4lS, 49. See, to the same effect, Rashdall "· Ford, L. R 2 Eq. 750; Starr "·
Bennett. 5 Hill, 8C8; Lewis "· Jones,
4 B. & C. 506; Rashdall "·Ford, L. R.
2 Eq. 750; Steamboat Belfut "·.Boon
Co., 41 Ala. 50; Cowle<J "· Townsend,
S'f\A.Ia. 77; Townsend "· Cowles, 81
Ala. 428; Clem "· Newcastle, etc., R
R. Co., 9 Ind. 488; Russell "· Branham, 8 Black f. 277; People "· Supervisors· of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 655 ;
Rogers "· Place, 29 Ind. 577. A representation of what the law will or
will not permit to be done is one upon
which the party to whom It is mac.lo
has no right to rely; and if he does
so, it is his own folly, and he cannot
ask the law to relieve him from the
consequences. The truth or falsehood
of such a representation can be tested
by ordinary vigilance and attention.
It is an opinion in regard to the law,
and is always understood aa such.
Fish "· Cleland, 88 Ill. 238. But
when the heir-at-law of a shareholder
in a company, the shares in which
were pe1·sonal estate, being ignorant
of that circumstance, and supposing
himself to be liable in respect of the
ancestor's shares, txecuted a deed of
indemnity to the trustees of a company, held, that he was entitled in
equity to have his execution of the
deed cancelled, as having been obtained under a mistake of law and
fact. Broughton 11. Hutt, 8 De Gex &
Jones, 001. So there is deceit in both
fact and law, if the holder of a note,

the remedy upon which is barred by
the statute, goes to the administrator
of one of the two makers. and, by
representing it to be unpaid, and valid, and in full force in the law, p~
cures a bond for the payment or onehalf thereof. Brown"· Rice's Admr.,
26 Grat. 467.
So a party hu been held entitled to
relief who had been induced to execute bills of exchan~c on the misrcp.
resent.tion that they we.-e o.-tlinary ·
promissory notes. Ross"· Drinkard's
Admr,. 85 Ala. 484; and in the case
the following citation from Townsend
t:. Cowles, 81 Ala. 428, is appro,·ed:
"If the defen:lant wu in fact igno..
rant of the law, and the other party,
knowing him to be 110 and knowing
the law, took advantage of such ignorance to m:slead him by a false
statement of the law, it would constitute a fraull."
t Fenwick t~. Grimes, 5 Cranch, C.
C. 489; Farrar fl. Bridges, 8 Humph.
566; Murray "· Beckwith, 48 Ill. 391;
Bjcveking fl. Litzler, 81 Ind.18; Long
t~. Woodmnn, 1)8 lie. 49; Jordan fl.
Money, 5 H. L. Cus. 185. .A. warranty
docs not become a fraud by being
broken. Loupe"· Wood, 51 Cal. 586.
A lease docs not become void by reaaon of the lessee putting the premisl's to a differe11t use from that which
he represented he was about to carry
on when he obt!Hned i l Ferct fl.
Hill, liS C. B. 207. It is not a fraud
in law that one obtains a release of a
recognizance on a promise to pay the
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Nevertheless, a promise is sometimes the very device resorted to
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for the purpose of accomplishing the fraud, and the most apt and

effectual means to that end. Such is the case already mentioned

of the purchase of goods with an intention not to pay for them.

It is the fraudulent promise to pay that accomplishes the wrong.

So if one promises to take up encumbrances on the title of

another, and, by means of the promise, throws the promisee off

his guard while he secures the title for himself, it would be a

singular defense for him to make that he had only failed to per-

form his promise. The promise was merely his false token, by

means of which he effected his cheat.‘ So if the beneﬁciary in a

will, when the maker thereof is on his deathbed, and is about to

make a codicil to give a certain beneﬁt to another, shall say to

him he need not trouble himself, for he, the beneﬁciary, will

make conveyance according to the wishes expressed, he may be

held to this promise as a fraud if he did not intend to perform it.‘

Duty of Self-protection. Where ordinary care and prudence

are suﬁieient for full protection, it is the duty of the party to

make use of them. Therefore, if false representations are made

regarding matters of fact, and the means of knowledge are at

hand and equally available to both parties, and the party, instead

of resorting to them, sees ﬁt to trust himself in the hands of one
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whose interest it is to mislead him, the law, in general, will leave

him where he has been placed by his own imprudent conﬁdence.‘

Nevertheless, a promise is sometimes the very device resorted to
for the purpose ot' accomplishing the fraud, and tho most apt and
effectual means to that end. Snch is the case already mentioned
of the purchase of goods with an intention not to pay for them.
It is the fraudulent promise to pay that accomplishes tho wrong.
So if one promises to take up encumbrances on the title of
anotl1er, and, by means of tho promie.e, throws the promit~ce off
his guard while he secu1·es the title tor bhnselt~ it would be a
singular defense for him to make that he had only failed to perform llis promise. The promise was merely his falso token, by
means of which he effected his cheat.' So if the beneflci:try in a
will, when the maker thereof is on his deathbed, and is about to
make a codicil to give a certain benefit to another, shall say to
him h~ need not trouble himself, for he, the beneficiary, will
make conveyance according to the wishes expressed, he may be
held to this promise as a fraud if he did not intend to perform it.'

It is for this reason that redress is often refused where fraud is

alleged in the sale of property which was at hand, and might

have been inspected, and where the alleged defect was one which

ordinary prudence would have disclosed.‘ The ease of the pur-

amount shortly, which he fails to do.

Commonwealth 0. Brenucman, 1

‘Dowel 0. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197.

See, further, Kinard v. Hiers, 3 Rich.

Rawle, 311. So if one gives a note

on a purchase of land, relying on the

vendor's oral promise to make a cer-

tain improvement which would in-

crease the value of the land, he can-

not make the failure to keep this

promise a defense to the note. Miller

0. Howell, 2 Ill. 499. See, further,

E2 parts Fisher, 18 Wend. 603.

‘Wilson v. Egglcston, 27 Mich. 257;

Duty of Self-protection. Where ordinary care and prudence
are sufficient for full protection, it is the duty of the party to
make use of them. Therefore, if false representations are made
regarding matters of fact, and the means of knowledge are at
hand and equally available to both parties, and the party, in8tead
1>f resorting to them, sees fit to trust himself in the hands of one
whose interest it is to mislead him, the law, in general, willleavo
him where he has been placed by his own imprudent confidence.•
It is for this reason that redress is often refusud where fraud i~
alleged in the sale of property which was at hand, and might
have been inspected, and \\'here the alleged detect was one which
ordinary prudence would have dioclosed.• The case of the pur-

Laing 0. McKee, 13 Mich. 124.

Er]. 433; Thynn 0. Thynn, 1 Vern,

296; Richardson 0. Adams. 10 Ycrg.

273; Gross 0. McKee, 53 .\liss. 536.

3 Slaughter c. Gcrson, 13 Wall. 879;

Rockufcllow 0. Baker, 41 Penn. St.

319; Hobbs 1;. Parker. 31 Me. 143

Brown 1». Leach. 107 Mass. 364.

‘ Sec Lon: v. Warr--n. (58 N. Y. 426.

(‘ase of n. S'tlU of lands near at hand.

Compare Harris 0. Mcliurray, 23

Ind. 9.

amount shortly, which he fails to do.
Commonwealth •· Brennemau, 1
Rawlc, 811. So if one gives a note
on a purchase of land, relying on the
vendor's oral promi~te to make a cer.
taln improvement which would in.
crease t.he nluc of the land, he can.
not mate the failure to keep thie
promise a defense to the note. )I iller
"· Howe11, 3 Ill. 499. &e, further,
E;o pnrl4 Fisher, 18 Wend. 60.".
1 Wilson "· Eggleston. 27 :\1 ich. 257;
Laing •• :McKee, 13 llich. 124.

1 Dowd •· Tucker, 41 Conn. 197.
See, further, Kinard r. Hiers, a Hi<"h.
Eq. 4!3; Thynn "· Thynn, 1 Vern.
296; Rlchartlson "· Ad11ms, 10 Yerg.
273; Gross "· McKee, 53 lliss. 686.
1 Slaughter e. Gerson, 18 Wall. 879;
Rockuft'llow "· &ter, 41 Penn. SL
310; Hobbs "· Parker. 81 Mo. 148;
Brown r. L<•I\Cb, 107 :&lass. 864.
4 See Lon~.r "· WRrr··n. fi8 N.Y. 426.
Cn.st• of a s·tle of lunds near at baud.
Compare llarria •· .Mcllurray, 23

Ind. 8.
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chase of property at a distance involves very diﬁ'erent considera-
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tions, for there a degree of trust is not only usual, but often ima-

voidable. In the leading case of Smith v. Rwluzrds, it was held

that whenever a sale is made of property not present, but at a

remote distance, which the purchaser knows the seller has never

seen, but which he buys upon the representation of the seller.

relying on its truth, such representation, in effect, must he

deemed to amount to a warranty; at least, that the seller is l(‘gall_\'

bound to make it good.‘ The ease was one of asale inade iii

New York of lands in Virginia, represented as containing a val-

uable mine, and the decision has often been followed." Ypoii

similar reasons to those which support this ease, it has been held

that when one buys lands which at the time are covered with

snow, rendering an examination of the soil impracticable, he is

entitled to rely upon the representations of the vendor respecting

its productiveness.’

Representations which Diaarm Vigilance. Redress has often

been refused to a party who claimed to have been induced by

fraud to sign a contract or other paper whose contents were mis-

read or misrepresented to him. The reasons for refusing relief

in such cases are, First, that it invites peijury and suboi-nation of

perjury, if parties are allowed to set aside their contracts on parol
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evidence of having been misled into signing them. Second, it

encourages negligence when relief is given against that which

ordinary prudence would have protected against at the outset.

Tlierefore, when one complains that he has been defrauded into

signing acoiitract without reading it, and on the representation

respecting its contents of the party whose interests were antago-

nistic to his own, the court is likely to say to him that what he

complains of is his own folly, and against this the law cannot

protect him.‘ But there is no inﬂexible rule to this effect and

‘ Smith In. Richards, 13 Pet. 26, 42.

See Maggart '0. Freeman, 27 Ind. 531 ;

Lester 1:. Malian, 25 Ala. 445. It has

been held that the purchaser may even

be entitled to hold the seller upon his

assertions as to value in such cases,

if the latter persuaded the purchaser

not to go and see for liiniself. Harris

v. McMurray, 23 Ind. 9.

’ Fulton‘s Exrs. 0. Roosevelt, 5

3

Johns. Ch. 174; Bean v, Ht-rriel-r,12

Me. 262; Webster v. Bailey, 31 Mich.

36. '

' Martin 1:. Jordan, 60 Me. 531.

‘ M:iinc,cte., Ins. Co. o. Hodgkins,

66 Me. 109. New Albany, etc. R. R.

Co. v. Fields, 10 Ind. 187; Hawkins

9. Hawkins, 50 Cal. 558; Taylor 0.

Atehison, 54 Ill. 196; Elliott 0. Lev-

ins, 54 Ill. 213.

chase of property at a distance involves very different cone:idei'1ltions, tor there a degree of trust is not only usual, but often UIH\voidable. In the leading case of Smith v. Rwhards, !twas lac!d
that whenever a sale is made of property not present, bi.1t ut a
remote distance, which the purchaser knows the seller ha:; ncn:·r·
seen, but which he buys upon the representation of the scllt•!-,
relying on its truth, snch representation, in effect, must be
deemed to amount to a. warranty; at least, that the seller is leg-all)·
bound to make it good.' The case was one of a sale made iu
·New York of lands in Virginia, represented as containing a ,·:duable mine, and the decision has often been followed! r pun
similar reasons to those which support this case, it has been helJ
that '"'hen one buys lands which at the time are covered with
snow, rendering an examination of the soil impracticable, he is
entitled to rely upon the representations of the vendor respecting
its productiveness.•
Representations whioh Disarm Vigilan~e. Redress has often
been refused to a party who claimed to ha\·e been induced by
fraud to sign a contract or other paper whose contents were misread or misrepresented to him. The reasons tor refusing relief
in such cases are, First, that it invites pe1jury and subornation of
perjury, if parties arc allowe1l to set Hside their contracts on pnrol
evidence of having been misled into si~ning them. Second, it
encourages negligence when relief is given against that which
ordinary prudence would have protected against at the outl'et.
Therefore, when one complains that he has Lecn defrauded into
signing a. contract without reading it, and on the representation
respecting its contents of the party whose interests were antagonistic to his own, the court is likely to say to him tlwt what he
complains of is his own folly, and a~ainst tlds the law cannot
protect him.• But there is no inflexible rule to this eftect, and
•
1 Rmith "· Richards, 13 Pet. 26, 42.
Sec :Mag-gart 'll. Freeman, 27 Ind. oat ;
Lester "'· Mahan, 20 Ala. 445. It hns
been held that the purchasl'r mny even
be entitled to hold the seller upon his
nsscrtions as to value in such cas<>s,
if the Iutter persuaded the purchaser
not to go and see for himself. Harris
11. McMurray, 23 Ind. 9.
• Fulton's Exrs. "· Roosevelt, IS

Johns. Ch. 174; Bean"· Hrrrick, 12
Me. 2G2; Webster"· l.Suiley, 31 ::mcu.
36.
1 1\Iartin r. Jordan, 60 Me. 531.
• )Iaine, etc., Ins. Co. "· Hodgkins,
6G 1\lc. 100. New Alhuny, etc. R. R.
Co. "· Fields, 10 Ind. 18'1; Hawkins
fl, Hawkins, 50 Cui. 558; Taylor "·
Atchison, 54 Ill. 196; Elliott tl. Lev.
ins, 54 Ill. 213.

wnorros BY DECICPTION. 489

it would be a reproach to the law if there were. The ways of
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fraud are inﬁnite in their diversity, and if into any one of them

all the law refuses to follow for the rescue of victims, it will be

in the direction of that one that fraudulent devices will specially

tend. It can never be either wise or safe to mark out speciﬁc

boundaries within which deceits shall be dealt with, but beyond

which they shall have impunity; but each ease must be consid-

ered on its own facts, and every case will have peculiarities of its

own, by which it may be judged.

\Vhen the complaint is of the nature above indicated, the

question, to a large extent, is one of negligence, and a man

grossly negligent may sometimes be justly refused relief. Espe-

cially if that to which his signature'was procured was negotiable

paper, which has passed into the hands ‘of a bona ﬁde holder

before maturity, so that if he escapes respousiblity a perfectly

innocent party must suffer, it may be reasonable and just to

refuse to give him relief. It is entirely reasonable, that if the situ-

ation is such that one of two innocent parties must suffer from a

fraud, and the negligence of one has enabled the fraud to be com-

mitted, he who is chargeable with the negligence shall bear the loss.

In Douglass v. Jllatting, recently decided in Iowa, it was held

that if one, “ through his own culpable carelessness, while deal-
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ing with a stranger,” allows himself to be deceived into signing

a negotiable note, which he believes is something entirely differ-

ent, he can make no defense to it in the hands of a Lona ﬁrle

holder.‘ So in New York, it has been held that if one is defrauded

into signing negotiable paper, which he is made to believe is

something else, he has no defense as against a bona ﬁde holder,

provided he was chargeable with negligence in not ascertaining

the character of the paper.‘ On the other hand, it is held, in

Michigan, that if the party whose signature was procured under

such circumstances was guilty of no negligence, the paper is

void for all purposes;' and the same conclusion is reached in

several other States.‘ These cases are not antagonistic, as they

1 Douglass o. Matting, 29 Iowa, 498; C. 11 Am. Rep. 445; Walker o. Ebert,

S. C. 4 Arn. Rep. 238. 29 Wis. 194: Kellogg o. Steiner, 29

' Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137; Wis. 626; Butler 0. Cnrus, 87 Wis.

S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 401. 61; Taylor o. Atchison, 54 111.106; S.

‘Gibbs 0. Linabury, 22 Mich. 479; C. 5 Am. Rep. 118. See Foster 0.

S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 675. McKinnon, L. R. 4 C. P. 704.

‘ Briggs 0. Ewart, 51 Mo. 245; S.

it would be a reproach to the law if there were. The ways of
fraud are infinite iu their diversity, and it' into any one of them
all the law refuses to follow tor the rescue of victims, it will be
in the direction ot' that one that fraudulent devices will specially
tend. It can never be either wise or sate to mark out specific
boundaries within which doc-eits shall be dealt with, but beyond
which they sha11 have impunity; but each case most be considered on its own foots, and every case will have peculiarities of' its
own, by which it may be judged.
'Vhen the complaint is of the nature above indicated, the
question, to a large extent, is oue of negligence, and a man
grossly negligent may sometimes be justly refused relief. Especially if that to which his signature-was procured was negotiable
paper, which has J>assed into the hanJs ·of a bona fid6 holdt.•r
before maturity, so that if be escapes rcsponsiblity a perfectly
innocent party must suffer, it may be reasonable and just to
refuse to give him relief. It is entirely reasonable, that if the situation is such that one of two innocent parties must ~>nffer from a
fraud, and the negligence of one has enabled the fraud to be committed, he who is chargeable with the negligence shall bear the loss.
In Dougla88 v. .Matting, recently decided in Iowa, it was held
that if one, '' throngh his own culpable carelessness, while dealiug with a stranger," aJJows himself to be deceived into signing
a negotiable note, which he believes is something entirely different, he can make no defense to it in the hands of a hoTUJ, fidtJ
ho1der. 1 So in New York, it has been held that if one is defrauded
into signing negotiable paper, which be is made to believe is
something else, he has no defense as agaiust a bona fid~J holder,
provided he was chargeable with negligence in not ascertaining
the character of the paper.' On tho other hand, it is held, in
::Michigan, that if the party whose signature was procnred under
such circumstances was guilty of no negligence, the paper is
void for all pnrposes;' and the same conclusion is reached in
several other States.' These eases are not antagonistic, as they
• Douglass "· Matting, 29 Iowa, 498;
8. C. 4 Am. Rep. 288.
• Chapman "· Rose, H N.Y. 187;
8. C. 13 Am. Rep. .(01.
I Gibbs e. Llnabory, n Mich. 479 i
8. C. 7 Am. Rep. 675.
• Briggs •· Ewart, Gl :Mo. MIS; S.

C.ll Am. Rep.44S; Walker e. Ebert,
29 Wls. 194: Kellog~ e. Steiner, 29
Wis. 626; BuUer e. Cams, 87 Wis.
81; Taylor e. Atchison, 54 Ill. 196; S.
C. lJ Am. Rep. 118. See Foster c.
McKinnon, L. R. • 0. P. 704.
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recognize the maxim regarding the responsibility for negligence

which is given above.‘ There can be no doubt, we suppose, that

contracts in general are void as to all parties, and even negotiable

paper is void as to all but bona ﬁde holders, where the signature

is obtained by trick or artiﬁce, and the part_y supposes he is sign-

ing something different.‘ It is diflicult to understand how, except

upon the ground of such negligence as should estop the party

from making the defense of invalidity, such contracts could have

any more force than if the party’s signature, written in blank,

had been taken without authority, and a contract written over it.‘

But negligence is always an important consideration, even when

the question arises as between the parties of the contract; for no

doubt that rule is safest, as a general fact, which refuses relief to

parties who have seen ﬁt not to protect themselves by observing

ordinary prudence. But ordinary prudence does not always pro-

tect, even against the simplest devices, when strong and plausible

protestations have captured conﬁdence, especially as the very

facility of detection will of itself do something to disarm vigi-

lance by making it seem incredible that one would attempt fraud

under the circumstances. And even where property is sold which

is present and may be examined, if false assertions are made to
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prevent examination, and which are calculated to have that effect,

and do have it, the purchaser has a right to rely upon them, and

to hold the seller responsible if they turn out to be false and

fraudulent.‘

' See Foster 0. McKinnon, L. R. 4

C. P. 704; Gibbs 0. Linabury, 22

‘ See, further, as to this rule, Craig

c. Hobbs, 44 Ind. 363; McDonald 0.

Muscatine Bank, 27 Iowa, 319;

Holmes 0. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427;

Shirts 12. Ovcrjohn, 60 Mo. 305; Clarke

o.Johnson,54 lll. 296; Leach o. Nich-

ols, 55 Ill. 278; Mead v. Munson, 60

Ill. 49; Putnam 0. Sullivan, 4 Mass.

45; Brahan o. Ragland, 3 Stew. 247.

As to when the alteration of a note.

have sometimes been assumed to be, and they may all be said to
recognize the maxim regarding the responsibility for negligence
which is given above! There can be no doubt, we suppose, that
contracts in general are void as to all parties, and even negotiable
paper is void as to all but bona fide holders, where the signature
is obtained by trick or artifice, and the party supposes he is signing something different.' It is difficult to understand how, except
upon the ground of such negligence as should estop the party
from making the defense of invalidity, such contracts could ha\·e
any more force than if the party's signature, written in blank,
had been taken without authority, and a contract written over it.•
But negligence is always an important consideration, even when
the question arises as between the parties of the contract; for no
doubt that rule is safet\t, as a general fact, which refuses relief to
parties who have seen fit not to protect themselves by ob8Cr\·ing
ordinary prudence. But ordinary prudence does not always protect, even against the simplest devices, when strong and plausible
protestations have captured confidence, especialJy as the very
facility of detection will of itself do something tu disarm vigilance by making it seem incredible that one would attempt fraud
under the circumstances. And even where property is sold which
is present and may be examined, if false assertions are made to
pre\'ent examination, and which are calculated to have that effect,
and do have it, the J>Urchaser has a right to rely upon them, and
to hold the seller responsible if they turn out to be false and
fraudulent.•

by ﬁlling a blank carelessly left

therein, will avoid it in the hand of

a bona ﬁde holder, see Ivory v. Mich-

all, 33 Mo. 398; Washington Savings

Bank 0. Ecky, 51 Mo. 272; Raiubolt

0. Eddy, 34 Iowa, 440; S. C. 11 Am.

Rep. 152, and cases cited.

Mich. 479; Anderson o. Walter, 34

Mich. 113; Sims o. Bice, 67 Ill, 88;

Munson 0. Nichols, 62 Ill. 111; Byers

o.Daugher1y, 40 Ind. 198; Laidla 0.

Loveless, 40 Ind. 211; Lonchheim 0.

Gill, 17 Ind. 139; Martin v. Smylee,

55 Mo. 577; Corby 0. Weddle, 5'7 Mo.

452; Jones v. Austin, 17 Ark. 498.

3 Nance 0. Lary, 5 Ala. 370; Stacy

0. Ross, 27 Tex. 3. -

‘ Chamberlain 0. Rankin, 49 Vt. 133,

a sale of wool rolled in ﬂeeces, and

represented to be ordinary ﬂeece wool,

when in fact there was pulled wool,

taglocks, etc., rolled inside.

a St>e, further, as to this rule, Craig
e. Hobbs, 44 Ind. 868; .McDonald e.
Muscatine Bank, 27 Iowa, 819;
Holmes tl. Trumpcr, 22 Mich. 427;
Shirts tl. Ovcrjohn, 60 Mo. 805; Clarke
tl. J obnson, M Ill. 296; Leach tl. Nich.
ols, 55 Ill. 278; Mead 11. Munson, 60
Ill. 49; Putnam tl. Sullivan, 4 Ma..s.
45; Brahan "· Uagland, 8 Stew. 247.
As to when the alteration of a note,
by filling a blank carelessly let\
therein, will avoid it in the hand of
a bona fide holder, see Ivory tl. Mich·
all, 33 Mo. 398; Washington Savings
Bank tl. Ecky, 51 Mo. 272; Rainbolt
"· Eddy, 84 Iowa, 440; S. C. 11 Am.
Rep. 152, and cases cited.

• See Foster e. .McKinnon. L R. 4
C. P. 704: Gibbs e. Linabnry, 22
Mich. 479; Anderson "· Walter, M
)licb. 113; Sims "· Bice, 67 Ill. 88;
Munson "· Nichols, 6211J. 111; Byers
"· Daugherty, 40 Ind. 198; Laidla "·
Loveless, 40 Ind. 211; Lonchbeim e.
Gill, 17 Ind. 139; Martin fl. Smylee,
55 Mo. 577; Corby "· Weddle, 57 Mo.
4li2; Jones "· Austin, 17 Ark. 498.
1 Nance "· Lary, 5 Ala. 870; Stacy
e. Ros!l, 27 Tex. 8.
'ChiUilberlain "· Rnnkin, 49 VL 1:i3,
a sale of wool rolled in fieeces, and
represented to be ordinary fleece wool,
when in fact there was pulled wool.
Uglocka, etc.. rolled inside.

wnones BY DECEPTION. 491

The very strong assertion has been made in one case that
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“ every’ contracting party has an absolute right to rely on the

express statement of an existing fact, the truth of which is known

to the opposite party, and unknown to him, as the basis of a

mutual engagement; and he is under no obligation to investigate

and verify statements, to the truth of which the other party to the

contract, with full means of knowledge, has deliberately pledged

his faith.’ ln the case then under consideration the parties seek-

ing relief had entered into a compromise of an unfounded claim,

induced thereto by the fraudulent assertion that papers previously

executed by themselves contained a certain provision, which they

did not. The want of vigilance here was very manifest and very

gross, but it would be still more so if a blind person, or one who

could not read, were to sign a paper presented for the purpose

by the party having an antagonistic interest, without calling in

a disinterested party to read it for him. Yet relief has often

been given where illiterate persons have been deceived into sign-

ing contracts which were misread or misrepresented to them by

the other contracting party.‘ Like any other case involving a

It is no defense to paper which a

bank has been induced to discount as

business paper, when it was not, that
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the oﬂlcers might, by careful and

minute inquiries, have ascertained the

real facts. Bank of North America

0. Sturdy, 7 R. I. 109, citing Brown 0.

Castles, 11 Cush. 848. And, see Rob-

erts o. Plaisted, 63 Me. 335.

' Poaricn, J., in Mearl 0. Bunn, 32

The very strong assertion has been made in one case that
"every- contracting party has an absolute right to rely on the
express statement of an existing fact, the truth of which is known
to the opposite party, and unknown to him, as the basis of a
mutual engngement; and he is under no obligation to investigate
and verify statements, to the truth of which the other party to the
oontmct, with full means of knowledge, has deliberately pledged
his faith.• Jn the case then under consideration the parties seeking relief had entered into a compromise of an unfounded claim,
induced thereto by the fraudulent assertion that papers pre,·ionsly
executed by themselves contained a certain provision, which they
did not. The want of vigilance here was very manifest and very
gross, but it would be still more so if a blind person, or one who
could not read, were to sign a paper presented for the purpose
by the party having an antagonistic interest, without calling in
a disintt•rested party to read it for him. Yet relief has often
been given where illiterate persons have been deceived into signing <.'ontracts which were misread or misrepresented to them by
the other contracting party.• Like any other case involving a

N. Y. 275, 280. In Eaton v. Winnie,

20 Mich. 156, 160, the same idea is

expressed as follows: “ Where one as-

sumes to have knowledge upon a sub-

ject of which another may well be

ignorant, and knowingly makes false

statements regarding it, upon which

the other relies, to his injury we do

not think it lies with him to say that

the party who took his word and re-

lied upon it as that of an honest and

truthful man, was L'uilty of negligence

in so doing, so as to be precluded from

recovering compensation for the in-

jury which was inﬂicted upon him

under cover of the falsehood. It‘ a

party's own wrongful act has brought

another into peril, he is not at liberty

to inipnte the consequences of his

act to a want ot' vigilance in the in-

jnr-d party, when his own conduct

and untruthful assertions hnve de-

prived the other of that quality, and

produced a false sense of security."

Citing Penn. R. R. Co. c. Ogh-r,35

Penn. St. 72; Gordon v. Grand St. R.

R. Co., 40 Barb. 550; Ernst r. Hudson

Riv. R. R. C0 , 35 N. Y. 28. See, also,

Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C.233: Oswztltl

I7. McGchee, 28 Miss. 3-10; Mc(.‘h-llan

0. Scott, 24 Wis. 81; Stnrkweather '0.

Benjamin, 32 Mich. 305.

'Selden 0. Myers, 20 How. 506;

Sims v. Bice, 67 Ill. 88; Keller n.

Equitable Ins. Co , 28 Ind. 170; Rock.

ford, etc., R. R. Co. e. Shunick, 6-‘) Ill.

223; Richardson r. SCllll'lZ.59 lll. 313;

Jones o. Austin, 17 Ark. 49$; Stacy v.

Ross, 27 Tex. 8; Hobbs r. Solis. 37

Mich. 857. The evidence of fraud

ft Is DO defen&e to paper whieh &
bank has been induced to discount u
business paper, when It was not, that
the officers mighc, by careful and
minute inquiries. have ascertained the
real ftl<'ts. Bank of North America
e. Sturdy, 7 R I. 109, citing Brown tl.
Castles, 11 Cush. 848. And, eee Roberts tl. Plaisted, 63 .Me. 835.
1 PoRTER, J., in :Mea:l tl. Bonn, 89
N. Y. 21:5, 280. In Eaton tl. Winnie,
00 .Mich. 136, 166, the same idea Ia
exprt>ss£'d as follows: " Where one as..
aumes to have knowledge upon a subject of which another may well be
Ignorant, and knowingly makes false
statenwnts rep:arding it, upon which
the other rclit•a, to his injury we do
not think it lies with him to say that
the party who took his word and re.
lied upon it as that of an honest and
truthful mao, was ~uilty of negligence
In so doing, so as to be precluded t'rom
recovering compensation for the inJury which was inflicted upon him

under cover of the falsehood. If a
party's own wrongful act has brought
another into peril, be Is not. at liberty
to impute the Consequences of his
act to a want of vigilance in the lnjur. d party, when his own conduct
and untruthful as<Jt'rtions have de.
prived the other of that quality, and
produced a false senee of JWcurity."
Citing Penn. R. R Co. e. Ogit·r, 3:S
Penn. St. 72; Gordon "· Grand St. R.
R. Co., 40 Barb. 3M; Em11t r.llnd!lon
Riv. R R. Co, 85 N.Y. 28. &•t•, also,
Walsh tt. Hall, 66 N. C.233: Oswllld
11. McGcbl'e, ~ llis~. 3-lO; llcCit·llan
"· Scutt, 24 Wis. 81; Starkwt·athcr 11.
Benjamin, 32 llicb. 30.).
t Selden e. llyers, 20 lluw. 506;
Sims tl. Bice, 67 Ill. 88: Kl'llt•r "·
Equitable Ins. Co, 281nd.170; Uockford, etc., R. R. Co. e. Sbunick, a.; Ill.
223; Ricbard>10n r. Scbirtz,59111. 313;
Jonest~. Austin, 17 Ark. 498; Stat•y tl.
Ross, 21 Tex. 8; Hobbs t'. B·•lis, 87
:Mich. M'l. The evidence of fraud
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question of negligence, such a case is to be considered on all its
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facts; it cannot be disposed of on a consideration of one fact

alone, and very great apparent negligence may be excused where

prudence has been overcome by new, peculiar, or very gross frauds.

Representations as to Title. In Monell v. Golden it was

decided that one who has been induced to make a purchase of

land on a false representation by the vendor, that if he bought

question of negligence, such a case is to be considered on all its
facts; it cannot be disposed of on a consideration of one fact
alone, and very great apparent negligence may be excused where
prudence has been overcome by new, peculiar, or very gross frauds.

it he would be entitled to obtain from the State certain adjoining

lands under water, the vendor knowing that the State had pre-

viously conveyed them, might maintain an action for the fraud.

“ If,” said the court, “no representation had been made on the

subject by the defendant, both parties would have been equally

chargeable with a knowledge of the law and the public records

of the State. But according to the declaration the defendant

knowingly and falsely misrepresented the fact with respect to

the situation of the land under the water, and if so, he is

chargeable with all the damages resulting from such false repre-

sentation.”' The obvious answer to any such action is suggested

by this decision, namely, that the records are open to public

inspection and are notice of what the real title is; and it is the

party’s own folly if instead of inspecting them he chooses to

accept and rely upon the word of the vendor. But where that
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answer was made in a recent case, in which a vendee had asserted

that the title to the lands he was selling had been looked up by

him and found to be all right, and the purchaser had said he

would take the vendor’s word for it, the court declared that,

under such a state of facts, there was a relation of trust and

conﬁdence between the parties, and the seller was bound to

exhibit the truth of the case as it stood.‘ It is to be noted that

here were positive and distinct assertions of matters of fact as

within his own knowledge, made by the one who of all persons

should be very clear. Estes 0. Fur-

long, 59 Ill. 298. As to what is suffi-

cient proof of, see Taylor 0. Atchison,

54Ill.196; Woods 1:. Hynes, 2 Ill. 103;

Mulfortl 1;. Shepard, 2 Ill. 583.

In Seldon 0. Myers, 20 How. 506,

508, it is said, by Tamer, Ch. J ., that

a person relying upon papers which

he has procured to be executed by one

who cannot rend, is bound to show,

“ past doubt, that he fully understood

the object and import ofthe writings.”

‘ Mnncll 12. Coldcn, 13 Johns. 395,

402, per Tnonrson, J .

’ Tnonrsorz, Ch. J .. in Babcnck 0.

Representations u to Title. In XoMll v. Colden it was
decided that one who has been induced to make a purchase of
land on a false representation by the vendor, that if he bought
it he would be entitled to obtain from the State certain adjoining
lands under water, the vendor knowing that the State had previously conveyed them, might maintain an action for the fraud.
"If," said the court, "no representation had been made on the
subject by the defendant, both parties would have been equally
chargeable with a knowledge of the law and the public l'el.'Ords
of the State. But &e<."'rding to the declaration the defendant
knowingly and falsely misrepresented the fact with respect to
the situation of the land under the water, and if so, he is
chargeable with all the damages resulting from such false representation." 1 The obvious answer to any such action is suggested
by this decision, namely, that the records are open to public
inspection and arc notice of what the real title is; and it is the
party's own folly if instead of inspecting them he chooses to
accept and rely upon the word of the vendor. But where that
answer was made in a recent case, in which a vendee had asserted
that the title to the lands he was selling had been looked up by
him and fonnd to be all right, and the purchaser had said he
would take the vendor's word for it, the court declared that,
under such a state of facts, there was a relation of trust and
confidence between the parties, and the seller was bound to
exhibit the truth of the case as it stood.' It is to be noted that
here were positive and distinct assertions of matters of fact aa
within his own knowledge, made by the one who of all persons

Case, 61 Penn. St. 427, 430. Compare

Hume o. Pocock, L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 379,

385.

should be very clear. Estes e. Fur.
long, 59 Ill. 298. As to what is sufftcient proof of, see Taylor 11. Atchison,
54 Ill. 196; Woods"· Hynes, 2 Ill. 103;
llulford v. Shepard, 2 Ill. 683.
In Seldon "· Myers, 20 How. 006,
lroS, it is said, by TARBY, Ch. J., that
a person relying upon papers which
be bas procured to be executed by one

who cannot read, is bound to show,
"past doubt, that he fully understoocl
the object and import of the writings."
I Monell t!. Colden, 18 Johns. 300,
402, per TnoJIII'80N, J.
• TnoKl'SON, Ch. J., in Babcock •·
Case, 61 Penn. SL 427, 430. Compare
Hume e. Pocock, L. R.l Ch. Ap. 379,

885.

waoxos BY DECEPTION. 493

should know what the real facts were, and relied upon by the

WRONGS BY DECEPTION.

498

other as undoubtedly correct. It has been said elsewhere that

where one seeks authority that should be the best upon the

particular subject, to ascertain the real facts, and is there misled,

the person misleading him is not to be allowed to support rights

by insisting that his assertions ought to have been veriﬁed from

other sources.‘ False representations of the sort are very differ-

ent from mere silence respecting defects known to the vendor,

and which it is very properly held he is under no obligation to

disclose.’

The doctrine of Jllonell v. Colrlen has been followed in other

cases noted in the margin.‘ And these authorities hold that an

action will lie for the fraud notwithstanding the deed of convey-

ance contains covenants of title.‘

Who may rely upon the Misrepresentations. No one has a

right to accept and rely upon the representations of others but

those to inﬂuence whose action they were made. If everyone

might take up and act u‘pon any assertion he heard made or saw

in print as one made for him to act upon, and the truth of which

was warranted by the assertor, the ordinary conversation of

business and of society would become unsafe, and the customary

should know what the real facts were, and relied upon by the
other as undoubtedly correct. It has been said elsewhere that
where one seeks authority that shonld be the best upon the
particular subject, to ascertain the real facts, and is there misled,
the person misleading him is not to be allowed to support rights
by insisting that his assertions onght to have been verified from
other sources! False representations of the sort are very different from mere silence respecting defects known to the vendor,
and which it is very properly held be is under no obligation to
disclose.•
The doctrine of .Monell v. OoUkn. has been followed in other
cases noted in the margin.• And these authorities hold that an
action will lie for the fraud notwithstanding the deed of conveyance contains covenants of title.'

publication of current news, or supposed news, would only be
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made under the most serious pecuniary responsibility. \Vhen

statements are made for the express purpose of inﬂuencing the

action of another, it is to be assumed they are made deliberately

and after due inquiry, and it is no hardship to hold the party

making them to their truth. But he is morally accountable to

no person whomsoever but the very person he seeks to inﬂuence,

‘Converse 0. Blumrlch, 14 Mich.

109, 121. See Eaton 0. Winnie, 20_

Mich. 156, 166.

' Kerr o. Kitchen, '7 Penn. St. 486;

Kiutzing v. McElrath, 5 Penn. St. 467.

“ Wardcll v. Fosdick, 13 Johns. 325;

Culver 0. Avery, '7 Wend. 380; Ward

0. Wiman, 17 Wend. 198; Updike v.

Abel, 60 Barb. 15; Eames 1:. Morgan,

37 Ill. 260; Watson v. Atwood, 25

Conn. 313; Claggett v. Crall, 12 Kan.

393; Bristol 0. Braidwood,28 Mit h.

191; Wade 0. Thurman, 2 Bibb, 583;

Upshaw v. Debow, '7 Bush. 442; Hays

Who ma.y rely upon the Jliarepreeentationa. No one has a
right to accept and rely upon the representations of others but
those to inftoence whose action they were made. If everyone
might take up and act apon any assertion he heard made or saw
in print as one made for him to act upon, and the truth of which
was warranted by the assertor, the ordinary conversation of
business and of society would become unsafe, and the customary
publication of current news, or supposed news, wonld only be
made under the most serious pecuniary respocsibility. 'Vhen
statements are made tor the express pnrpose of influencing the
action of another, it is to be assumed they are made deliberately
and after due inquiry, and it is no hardship to hold the party
making them to their truth. But he is morally accountable to
no person whomsoever bnt tho very person he seeks to infinenc.:e,

1.1. Bonner, 14 Tex. 629; Rhode s.

Alley, 27 Tex. 443; Moreland v. At-

chison, 19 Tex.‘ 303; Holland v. An-

derson. 88 Mo. 55; Bailey r. Smock,

61 Mo. 213; Kiefer e. Rogers, 19 Minn.

32; Parham v. Randolph, 5 Miss.42l5;

Gilpin 0. Smith, 19 Miss. 109.

‘ To represent that there are no in-

cumbrances. so far as the party knows,

is no fraud, if he really knows ot‘

none. Bristol 1:. Braidwood, 28 Mich.

191.

1 Convene e. Blomrlch, 14 Mich.
109, 121. See Eaton o. Winnie, 20
Mich. 156, 166.
•
1 Kerr e. Kitchen, '7 Penn. St. 486;
Klotzing o. McElrath, 6 Penn. Mt. 467.
• Wardell"· Fosdick, 13 Johns. 32lS;
Colver e. Avery, 7 Wend. 880; Ward
•· Wiman, 17 Wend. 198; l:pdlke •·
Abel, 60 Barb. 11i ; Eames "· Morg~m,
87 111. 200; Watsun "· Atwood, 23
Conn. 313; Cl~geu e. Crall, 12 Kan.
893; Bristol e. Braidwood, 28 lli• b.
191; Wade •· Thurman, I Bibb, IS83;

Upshaw e. Debow, 7 Bu!'h, 442; Hays

e. Bonner, 14 Tex. 6'19; Hhod" "·
Alley, 17 Tex. 4"3; ){oreland "· Atchison, 19 Tex: 303; Hnlland "· Anderson, 88 lfo. M; Bailt>y e. l:lmO<'k,
61l[o. 918; Kiefer e. Rogt>l'!l, 19 Minn.
82; Parham"· Rantlolph,li Mi~s. 435;
Gilpin"· Smith, 19 lliss. 109.
• To represen' that tht>re are no lo..
cumbraDces, so far as the party knows,
is DO (rand, it he really knows of
noDe. Bristol"· Braidwood, 28 Mtch.
191.
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upon them can reasonably set up no claim to having been

defrauded if they prove false. Fraud implies a wrongful actor

and one wrongfully acted upon; but in the case supposed there

is no privity whatever. Therefore, one may even be the person

to whom the false representations are made, and yet be entitled

to no remedy, if they were made to him as agent for another and

to affect the action of the other, and were not intended to inﬂu-

ence his own action.‘

But some representations are made for the express purpose of

inﬂuencing the mind of the public, and of inducing individuals

of the public to act upon them; and whoever, in fact, does

receive, rely and act upon these in the manner intended, has a

right to regard them as made to him, and to treat them as frauds

upon him if in fact he was deceived to his damage. Gases of

the sort are those in which the projectors of corporate under-

takings publish prospectuses containing misrepresentations cal-

culated to inﬂuence others to invest moneys in their project.

The cases are numerous in which the courts——sometimes of

equity and sometimes of law—have given relief to parties

defrauded by such misrepresentations.’ So, if after a corpora-

tion is formed the managers make false reports, declare ﬁctitious
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' Wells 0. Cook, 16 Ohio. (N. s.) 67.

In this case an agent bought for his

principal some diseased sheep under

false representations by the vendor

that they were sound. He afterward

purchased them of his principal and

suffered damage in consequence of

the spread of the disease. Held, en-

titled to no redress against the ﬁrst

vendor. See Longineid 0. Holliday, 6

and whoever may overhear the statements and go away and act
upon them can reasonably set up no claim to having been
defrauded if they prove talse. Fraud implies a wrongful actor
and one wrongfully acted upon; but in the case supposed there
is no privity whatever. Therefore, one may even be the person
to whom the false representations are made, and yet be entitled
to no remedy, if they were made to him as agent for another and
to affect the action of the other, and were not intended to influence his own action. 1
But e.ome representations are made for the express purpose of
influencing the mind of the public, and of inducing individuals
of the public to act upon them; and whoever, in fact, does
receive, rely and act upon these in the manner intended, has a
right to regard them as made to him, and to treat them as frauds
upon him if in tact he was deceived to his dam!\,~· Cases of
the sort are those in which the projectors of corporate undertakings publish prospectuses containing misrepresentations calcnlaterl to influence others to invest moneys in their project.
The cases are nnmeroue in which the courts- sometimes of
equity and sometimes of Jaw- have given relief to parties
defrauded by such misrepresentations.' So, if after a corpor-ation is f(n·med the managel's make false reports, declare fictitious

Exch. 761. If a letter of recommenda-

tion is addressed to one person, but

presented to and relied upon by an-

other, the latter has no redress against

the writer. M’(Jracken 1;. West, 17

Ohio, 16.

’ See Johnson 0. Goslett, 3

(N. s.) 569; Clarke o. Dickson, 6

(N. s.) 453; Gerhard v. Bates, 2

Bl. 476; Taylor n. Ashton, 11

WV. 401; HCD(l0PsODlS Case, L.

wsﬁcp

cn&°Q“Fli5°

Eq. 249; Kent e. Freehold, etc., Co.,

L. R. 4 Eq. 588; reversed, L. R. 3 Ch.

Ap. 493; Reese River, etc., Co. e.

Smith, L. R. 4 E. & I. Ap. 64; Central

R. Co. 0. Kisch, L. R. 2 E. & I. Ap.

99; Oakes v. Turquand, L. R. 2 E 86

I. A0. 325; Peek 0. Gurney, L. R. 13

Eq. Gas. 79; S. C. 1 Monk, 567; L. R.

2 Ch. Ap. 412; Terwilliger 0. Gt.

West. Tel. Co., 59 Ill. 249; Booth ads.

Wonderley, 36 N. J. 2-30. One who is

induced by false and fraudulent re-

presentations made by the promoters

of a proposed corporation to pay

money for shares may recover dam-

ages for the deceit against the persons

by whom it was practiced, nolwith-'

standing they did not convert the

money to their 0\\'n use. Paddock 0.

Fletcher, 42 Vt. 389.

_?___ _ __ _ _ --ix-1'9‘

1 Wells "· Cook, 16 Ohio, (N. 8.) 67.
Eq. 249; Kent e. Freehold, etc., Co.,
In this case an agent bought for his L. R. 4 Eq. 588; reversed, L. R 3 Ch.
principnl some diseased sheep under Ap. 4!)3; Reese River, etc., Co. "·
false representations by the vendor Smith, L. R. 4 E. & I. Ap. 64; Central
thnt they were sound. He afterward R. Co. "· Kisch, L. R. 2 E. & I. Ap.
purchnl!ed them of his princip:1l o.nd 99: Oakes e. Turquand, L. R 2 E &
suffered damage in consequence of I. Ao. 325; Pl·ek "· Gurney, L. R 13
the spread of the diseMe. Held, en- Eq. Cas. 79; 8. C. l?tlnak, 567; L. R
titled to no redress against the first 2 Ch. Ap. 412; Terwilliger "· Gt.
vcmlor. See Longm.eid "· Holliday, 6 West. Tel. Co., 59 Ill. 249; Booth ad1.
Exch. 761. If a letter of recommenda. 'Wonderley. 36 N.J. 2.30. One who is
tion is addressed to one pe~on, but induced by fnlse and fraudulent represented to and relied upon by an- presentations made by the promoters
other, the latter has no redress against of a proposed corporation to pay
the writer. }l'Cracken "· West, 17 money for slunes, may recover dam.
Ohio, lG.
ages for the deceit against the persons
by whom it was practiced, notwith~
' See Johnson "· Goslett, 8 C. B.
stl\nding they did not convert the
(N. s.) 56!); Clarke "· Dickson, 6 C. B.
(N. s.) 453; Gerhard e. Bntes, 2 El. &
money to their own use. Paddock"·
Fletcher, 42 Vt. 389.
Bl. 476; Tnylor "· Ashton, 11 M. &
,V. 401; Hendcr:soo 's Case, L. R. 5
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dividends, or resort to any fraudulent devices whatever, whereby

they induce individuals to take stock in the corporation, they are

liable to the parties thus defrauded in an action for the deceit.‘

So the oﬁicer of an insurance company who issued a. false pros-

dh·idends, or resort to any fraudulent devices wlmtever, whereby
they induce individual" to take stock in the corporation, they are
liable to the parties thus defrauded in an action for the deceit.•
So the officer of an insurance company who issued a false pros-

‘ Huntingford v. Massey. 1 Fost. &

Fin. 600; Morgan v. Skiddy, 62 N. Y.

319; Cross v. Sackett, 6 Abb. Pr. 247;

Clarke v. Dickson,6C. B. (N.s.) 453. It

is suﬁlcient that the false statement

was one of the inducements to invest-

ing money in the concern; it need

not be the sole inducement. Morgan

1:. Skiddy, 62 N. Y. 319. Cases where

subscribers recovered hack in equity

money they were deceived into pay-

ing in for stock. Colt v. Woollaston,

2 P. Wins. 153; Green 1*. Barrett, 1

Sim. 45. The president and cashier

of a bank, in making and publishing
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the quarterly report of resources and

liabilities, made false statements un-

der oath, knowing them to he false.

Plaintiff, relying upon the statements,

pUl‘t2lH\.\c(l. shares of the stock of the

bank at par value, when. in fact, the

capital of the bank was impaired

and the stock worth thirty per cent.

only. The ofliccrs held personally

liahle to the plaintitf. Morse v. Swits,

19 llow. Pr. 275.

The company may, also, in proper

cases, be held liable for the fraudu-

lcnt tcports of its oﬂict-rs. Thus,

where one was led by the false reports

of the managers, showing the com-

pany to be in a ﬂourishing condition,

when. in fact, it was insolvent, to bor-

row money from the company and

invest it in buying shares of its stock,

the fraud was held a defense to a suit

for the money loaned. Nat. Ex. C0.

v. Drew, 32 Eng. L. & Eq. 1. So

where there is a fraudulent overissue

of stock by a corporation otﬂcer, to

whom the business of issuing certiﬁ-

cates of stock is entrusted by the cor-

poration, the parties defrauded by

purchasing it have their remedy

against the corporation. N. Y., etc.,

R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 80;

Brulf 0. Mali, 36 N. Y. 200; Cazeaux

0. Mali, 25 Barb. 578; Shotwell v.

Mali, 38 Barb. 445. Their t1s.~\i*_'l1ct'S,

however, have no such remedy. Scizer

0. Mali, 32 Barb. 76. To an action by

a company against a shareholder for

calls, the defendant pleaded that he

was induced to become a shareholder

by the fraud of plaintiffs; that he

had never recognized, since notice of

the fraud, any rights or liabilities as

t-ihareholdcr, nor received any ht-nt-tits

from shares, and had repudiated the

shares and given plaintiffs notice.

Held, a good plea. Bwlcli-y-Plwm

Lead Mining Co. 0. Haynes. L. R. 2

1 Huntingford "· Massey. 1 Fost. &
Fin. GOO; :Morgan"· Skiddy, 62 N.Y.
819; Cros~ "· Sackett., 6 Abb. Pr. 247;
Clarke"· Dickson, 6 C. Il (:!i. B.)~- It
is sufficient that the false statement
was one of the inducements to invest..
lng money In the cnncern; it need
not be the sole inducement. .Morgan
"· Skiddy, 62 N. Y. StD. Cast's where
subscribers recovered back in equity
money they were dcceiw~d Into P"Ying in for stnck. Colt"· \Voollnston,
2 P. Wms. 153; Green !'. Harrett, 1
Sim. 4.'5. Tho prcsidPnt and cashier
of a hank, in mRking nnd publishing
the quarterly report of resonn:cs and
Jinbilitie!!, made false stntcments under oath, knowing- them to ht• false.
Plaintiff, relying upon the statt•mt•nts,
pureha~t·d share!! of the stock of the
bunk nt par value, when. in fact, the
cnpital of the bank wns impaired
and the ~tnck worth thirty per ct•nt.
only. Tho oiHt·eJ'll held pt>r~onally
linhle to the plaintiff. llorsc "· Swita,
11) How. Pr. 27.3.
The company may, also, In proper
CR!Ies, be hehl liable for the fraudu.
l('nt C"Pport.'l of its officer~. Thus,
wlwre one was led by the fnlsc reports
of the managers, Nhowing the company to he In a flnnrbhing condition,
when, in fact, it was insolvPnt, to borrow money from the company and
inve,;t it in buyin~ shares of its stock,
the frnutl was held a defense to a suit
for the money loaned. Nat. Ex. Co.
"· Dre~v. 82 Eng. L. & Eq. 1. So
where tht•J·e is a fraudulent overissue
of stock hy a corporation officer, to
whom the uusines!! or issuing certificates of stock is entrusted by the cor.
poration, the parties defrauded by
purchasing It have their remedy

against the corporation. N. Y., etc.,
R R Co. 1:1. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30;
Bruff "· Mali, 86 N. Y. 200; Cuzcaux
"· Mall, 2~ Barb. 578; Shotwdl "·
Mali, 88 Barb. 445. Their ns>~i~nePs,
however, have no such remedy. Seizer
e. ~IIlli, 32 Barb. 76. To an action by
a company against a shareholder for
calls, the defendant pleaded that ho
was induced to become a shareholder
by the fraud of plaintiffs; that he
had never recognized, since notice of
the frnud. any rights or liabilities as
RhRreholdt•r, nor recl'ived any ht•Jwftts
from shnres, and had rcpudiutt·d the
share~ and given plainti 11!1 not ice.
lleld, a good plea. Bwlch-y.Plwm
~nd )lining Co. "· BRyne:!. I•. R 2
Exch. 324; llcCreight "· ~Ieven!!, 1
H. & C. 454. See, also, !Wll's f'IL~~". 22
B('nv. 3;3; Durnnty's ('nsc, 26 J~·av.
268; Ayre's C'nsc, :?5 Beav. l:il:J. The
rule of 8tock Exchnn!,!e requin·~l that
not lt•ss than two-thirds of the llt'J'ip or
a company should be paid np and the
subscription li:st be full, exct•pt spe.
cial rest•rvntions, lll'forc the company
could be inserted in the official lisl
Deft>nuant, a director, and othtrs of a
mining company fraudulently canst•d
repr!'sentations to be made tn n com.
mittec of Stock Ex!'hnn~e. so that the
shares were quoted. Pl!tintitt' know.
ing the rules and seeing the company
in the list, bought ~h:1res. The shares
turned out to he valuPil'!IS and the defend~tnt \\"llS held liui.Jle for the f1·aud.
Bt•(lford t'. lln~~hllW, 4 II. & ~ . :J38.
Sec BnJ:shaw tl. Seymour, 4 C. H.
(N. 8.) 873.
· A director in a corporation is not
so far chargeable with notice of the
con<Jition of its affairs RS to be preclllded from complaining of a fraud
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pectus whereby one was induced to take out insurance in the

496

THE LAW OF TORTS.

company has been held liable for this fraud to the person so

insuring.‘ So the president of a corporation who pretends to

assist a shareholder in selling his shares, and advises a particular

sale at a certain price, which is in fact a sale made to a third

person for himself, commits a fraud on the shareholder for which

an action on the ease will lie.‘

Materiality of Representations. “ If false and fraudulent rep-

resentation be alleged as the groundwork for avoiding a bargain,

it must be shown that, like poison, it entered into it, tainted and

destroyed it. That must be proved by a just inference from

pectus whereby one was induced to take out insurance in tl1e
company has been held liable for this fra.nd to the person so
insuring! So the president of a corporation who pretends to
assist a shareholder in selling his shares, and advises a particn1ar
sale at a certain price, which is in fact a sale made to a third
person for himself, commits a fraud on the shareholder for which
an action on the case will lie. •

what took place at or about the time of contracting, and is not

to be supplied by snrmises or things so equivocal in themselves

as to be proof or not, as the fancy might dictate.” ‘ The repre-

sentations must be of a decided and apparently reliable character,

holding out inducements to make the contract calculated to mis-

lead the purchaser and induce him to buy on the faith and conﬁ-

dence of such representations, and in the absence of the means

of information to be derived from his own observation and

inspection, and from which he could draw conclusions to guide

him in making the contract, independent of the representations.‘

“ Fraud does not consist in mere intention, but in intention car-
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ried out by hurtful acts. It consists of conduct that operates

pre_]'ndicially on the rights of others.” '

To determine whether the representations were material, every

case is to be examined on its own facts. A slight difference in

the circumstances may arrange cases apparently alike under

different principles. Thus. though a false assertion of an opinion

is no fraud, yet to assert that acertain piece of land, bordering

‘Tnoxrson. J., in Clark» o. Ever-

hart, 63 Penn. St. 347, 349.

practiced upon him by one of the

oﬂicers in selling him its shares.

Lefever v. Lefever, 30 N. Y. 27.

But a I)0ﬂ/L ﬁrle sale of stock that

has a speculative value cannot be set

aside, because the oﬁlcers had been

guilty of a fraudulent deception which

aﬂceled the price, the seller being in

no way privy to it Moﬂ'at 0. \Vius-

low, '7 Paige, 124.

‘ Pontifex 11. Bignold, 3 M. & G. 63.

' Fisher o. Budlong, 10 R. I. 525.

:Materiality of Representations. "If ti1lse and fraudulent representation be alleged as the groundwork tor a\·oiding s bargain,
it must be shown that, like poison, it entered into it, tainted and
destroyed it. That must be proved by a just inference from
what took place at or about the time of contracting, and is not
to be supplied by surmises or things so equivocal in themselves
as to be proof or not, as the timcy might dictate." • The representations must be of a decided and apparently reliable character,
holding out inducements to make the contract calculated to mislead the purchaser and induce him to buy on the faith and confidence of such representations, and in the absence of the means
of information to be derived from his own observation and
inspection, and. from which he could dt-aw conclusions to guide
him in making the contract, i11depcndcnt of the rl'pre8cntations. 4
"Fraud does not consist in mere intention, but in intention carried ont by hurtful acts. It consists of conduct that operates
prejudicially on the rights of others." •
To determine whether the representations were material, every
case is to be examined on its own facts. A slight difi'erence in
the circumstances may arrange cases apparently alike under
different principles. Thus. thongh a false a~:;:;ertion of an opinion
is no ft·and, yet to assert that a· certain piece of land, bordering

‘ Yeates v. Pryor, 11 Ark. 58; Hill 1:.

Bush. 19 Ark. 522.

' Wn.Lr.urs, J., in “Tilliums 17. Da-

vis, 69 Penn. St. 21, 2S,citing Bunn 1:.

Ah], ‘.29 Penn. St. 390. And, see Ful-

ler v. Hodgdon, 25 Me. 243; Sieveking

0. Litzler, 31 Ind. 13; Halls iJ.Tl1OII)p.

snn,10 Miss 443; Ayrs v. Mitchell, 11

Miss. 683; Coon 1:. Atwcll, 46 N. H.

510.

practiced upon him by one of the
officers in selling him its shares.
Lefever"· Lefever, 80 N.Y. 27.
But a bonrt fide sale of stock that
has a spcculntivc value cannot be set
aside, because the officers had 'Leen
guilty of a fraudulent deception which
a!l'ectcd the price, the seller being in
no way privy to it. Moffat v. Winslow, 7 Paige, 124.
1 Poutifcx v. Bignold, 3 1\[. & G. 63.
1 Fisher "· Budlong, 10 R I. 525.

"TnoMPSON. J., in Clarlw "· Ever.
hart, 63 Penn. St. 347, 8411.
'Yeates v. Pryor, 11 Ark. 58; Hill"·
Bush. 19 Ark 522.
• Wn.LI.nrs, J., in Williams "· Da.
vis, fi9 Penn. 8t. 21, 28, citin~ Bunn "·
Ahl, 2!J Penn. St. 390. And, sec Fuller v. Hodgdon, 23 1\le. 24!3; Sicveking
"· Litzler, 31 Ind.13; Halls 'll. Thomp.
son, 10 :Miss 443; Ayrst~. ~litclwll, 11
Miss. 683; Coon tJ. Atwell, 46 N. H.
510.
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on or near a river, when a certain levee was repaired would be
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free from overflow, except that in very high and long continued

ﬂoods a few acres of the lowest land would be ovci-ﬂowed, may

be a fraud, if made to a stranger by one whose familiarity with

the lands in former seasons must have convinced him that the

opinion he was expressing was baseless.‘ So to misrepresent the

crops raised the previous year on a farm which is sold,’ or the

amount of business done at a certain stand,‘ is material, as these

facts have a bearing on the question of value.

Deceiving Third Persons. An action cannot, in general, be

maintained for inducing a third person to break his contract with

the plaintiff; the consequence. after all, being only a broken con-

tract, for which the party to the contract may have his remedy

by suing upon _it.‘ But if the third person was induced to break

his contract by deception, it may be different. If, for example,

on or near a river, wl1en a certain levee was repaired wonld he
free from overflow, except that in very high and long continued
floods a few acres of the lowest land would be overflowed, may
be a fraud, if made to a stranger by one whose familiarity with
the lands in former seasons must have convinced him that the
opinion he was expressing was baseless.• So to misrepresent the
crops raised the previous year on a fann which is sold/ or the
amount of business done at a certain stand,' is material, as these
facts have a bearing on the question of value.

one were to personate a vendee of goods, and receive and pay for

them as on a sale to himself, the vendee would have his action

against the vendor; but he might also pursue the party who, by

deceiving one, had defrauded both.‘ And where the performance

of a contract is prevented by deceiving the party about to imke

it, it is immaterial that the contract was not binding under the

Statute of Frauds, because not in writing; the defect being one
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the party had a right to waive.‘

Knowledge by the Wrong-doer of the Falsity. It is often

said that, in order to render false representations fraudulent in

law, it must be made to appear that the party making them knew

' Estell 0. Myers, 54 Miss. 174; a

valuable case.

' Martin v. Jordan, 60 Me. 531.

' Taylor v. Green, 8 C. 85 P. 316.

' Kimball 0. Harman, 84 Md.407;

S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 340.

‘ Where one was induced to break

his contract for the delivery of cer-

tain property to the plaintiff, by the

An action cannot, in ~neral, be
maintained for inducing a third person to break his contract with
the plaintiff; the conse(1nencc. after all, being only a broken con·
tract, for which the varty to the contract may have his remedy
by suing upon ,it.• nut if the third person was induced to break
his contract by deception, it may be different. If, for example,
one were to personate a ven,iee of goods, and receive and pay for
them as on a sale to himselt~ the vendee would have hi~; action
against the vendor; but he might also pursue the party who, by
deceiving one, had defrauded both.' And where the performance
of a contract is prevented by deceiving the party about to 1mke
it, it is immaterial that the contract was not binding nnder the
Statute of Frauds, because not in writing; the detect being one
the party bad a right to waive.•
Deoeiving Third Persona.

false and malicious setting up by dc-

fendant of an unfounded lien thereon.

an action was sustained for this (le-

ception. Green 1:. Button, 2 C. M. &

R. 707. But for merely setting up a

Knowledge by the Wrong-doer of tbe Falsity. It is often
said that, in order to render fahse representations fraudulent in
law, it must be made to appear that the party making them knew

false claim against the plaintiff's

debtor, or making a fraudulent levy

on his property, no action will lie.

Smith 0. Blake, 1 Day, 258; Green 0.

Kimble, 6 Blackf. 552.

‘Benton r. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385;

Rice ~v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82; S. C.

23 Am. Rep. 30. This case distin.

guishes Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494,

in which it was held that no action

would lie against one who, falsely

pretending authority as agent, in-

duced another to accept a void lease

from him.

32

Estell •· Myers, M Miss. 174; a
valuKhle case.
1 Martin"· Jordan, 60 Me. 1581.
• Taylor "· Green, 8 C. & P. 318.
• Kimball"· Harman, 84 :Md. 407;
8. C. 6 Am. Rep. 840.
• Where one was induced to break
his contract for the delivery of cer.
' tain property to the plaintiff, by the
false and malicious setting up by de.
fendant of an unfounderl lien thereon.
an action was sustained for this de.
ception. Green "· Bolton, 2 C. M. &
R 707. But for merely scUI.ng up a
1
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false claim Rgainst the plaintiff's
debtor, or making a fraudulent levy
on his property, no action will lie.
Smith 11. Blake, 1 Day, 2J8; Green "·
Kimble, 6 Blackf. M2.
• Benton r. Pratt, 9 Wend. 385;
Rice "· }fanley, 66 N. Y. 82; S. C.
28 Am. Rl•p. 30. Thl~ case distinguishes Dung o. Parker, 62 N.Y. 494,
In which it was held that no action
would lie against one who, falst'ly
pretending authority as agent, induced another to accept a void lease
from him.
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at the time that they were untrue. But this rule has so many
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exceptions that it is ditﬁcult to atﬁrm, with any conﬁdence, that

it is a general rule at all. It is certain that courts of equity do

not limit their action to it in giving relief, when representations

prove to be untrue in fact. Says Mr. Justice S'roRY: “ VVhether

the party thus misrepresenting a material fact knew it to be false,

or made the assertion without knowing whether it were true or

false, is wholly immaterial; for the aﬂirmation of what one does

not know or believe to be true is equally. in morals and law, as

unjustiﬁable as the aﬁirmation of what is known to be positively

false; and even if the party innocently misrepresents a material

fact by mistake, it is equally conclusive, for it operates as a sur-

prise and imposition upon the other party.” ‘ Accordingly,

where either of the two parties to a negotiation for the purchase

of property makes material representations of matters which he

avers or assumes to be within his own knowledge, with intent

that the other party shall act upon them, and these representa-

tions are actually relied upon by the other party in completing

the negotiation, and they prove to be false, to his injury, a court

of equity will treat the case as one of fraud, and give the proper

relief, although the party making the representations was not

aware at the time of their falsitv.“
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No doubt, however, there is some difference in the aspect

' Story Eq. Juris. § 193.

' Thompson 0. Lee,3l Ala. 292; In-

ﬁlled in, in relation to a material

mutter constituting an inducement or

diapolis, etc., R. R. Co 1;. Tyng, 63

N. Y. 653; Foard r. McComh, 12 Bush,

723; Elder 1:. Allison, 45 Geo. 13;

Bankhead 0. Alloway, 6 Cold. 56;

Converse 0. Blumrick, 14 Mich. 109;

Bristol '0. Braidwood, 28 Mieh.191;

at the time tl1at they were untrue. Bnt this rule has so many
exceptions that it is difficult to affirm, with any confidence, that
it is a general rule at all. It is certain that courts of equity do
not limit their action to it in giving relief, when representations
prove to be untrue in fact. &ys Mr. Justice SroRY: "'Vhether
the pa;ty thus misrepresenting H. material fact knew it to be f.'l.lse,
or made the assertion without knowing whether it were true or
false, is wholly immaterial; for the affirmation of what one d~
not know or believe to be true is equally. in morals and law, as
unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively
false; and even if the party innocently misrl•presents a material
fact hy mistake, it is equally conclusive, for it operates as a surprise and imposition upon the other party."' ~\ecordingly,
whe1·e either of the two parties to a negotiation tor the purchase
of property makes material repre~Pntations of matters which he
avers or assumes to be within hi:; own knowledge, with intent
that the other party shall act upon them, aud these representations are actually relied upon by the other party in completing
the negotiation, and they pro,·c to be false, to his injury, a court
of equit.v will treat th~ case as one of fraud, and gi,·e the proper
relief, although the party making the repret'eutatious was not
aware at the time of their falsity.•
.No doubt, however, there is some difference in the aspect

Wilcox v. Iowa Wes. Univ., 32 Iowa,

367; Twitchell v. Bridge, 42Vt 63;

Frenzcl v. Miller, 37 Ind. 1.

Where the repi'¢,-seutntions relate to

facts which must be supposed within

defendant's knowledge, proof of their

falsity is a suiticient showing of his

knowledge that they were false.

Morse o. Dearborn, 109 Muss. 593;

Morgan '0. Skiddy, 62 N. Y. 319.

Any misrepresentation, not an ex-

pression of opinion, by a person con-

'1-

motive to the act of another, by which

an undue advantage is taken of him.

though innocently made, and in le-

lief of its truth, is regarded as a

fraud. relievahle in equity. Davis 0.

Ileard, 44‘ Miss. 50; Rimer 0. Dugan,

39 Miss. 477.

A party selling property is pre-

sumed to know whether the represen-

tations he makes of it are true or

false; if he know it to be false, it isa

positive fraud. If he does not know

it to be true, it is culpable negligence,

which in equity amounts to fraud.

Miner '0. Medbury, 6 Wis. 295; Smith

v. Richards, 13 Peters, 26; McFcrran

o. Taylor, 3 Cranch, 270; Glasscock 0.

Minor, 11 Mo. 655.

1 Story Eq. Juris. § 193.
' Thompson ~- Lee, 81 Ala. 292; Indiapolis, etc., R. H.. Co "· Tyng, 63
N.Y. U:i;J; Foard r. llcComh. 12 Bush,
723; Elder "· Allison, 45 Geo. 13;
Bankhead "· Alloway, 6 Cold. 56:
Converse. "· Blumrick, 14 Mich. 100;
Bristol 11. Braid wood, 28 Mich. 191;
Wilcox"· Iowa Wes. Univ., :J2 Iowa,
367; Twitchell v. Bridge, 42 Vt 63;
Frenzel tl. Miller, 37 Ind. 1.
Where the reprp,;entn.tions relate to
facts which must be supposed within
defendant's knowledge, proof of their
falsity is a sufllcient showing of his
knowledge that they were false.
llorse "· Dearborn, 109 :Mnss. 1>93;
Morgan 11. Skiddy, 62 N.Y. 319.
Any misrepresentation, not an ellpression of opinion, by a person con-

tl<led in, in relation to a matc.>ri:ll
mntrer constituting an inducement nr
motive to the act of another, by which
an undue advantage is taken of him,
though innoC'ently mn<le, and in I elief of its truth, is regartletl ns a
frnud. relievable in equity. Davis"·
Il<•nrd, 4-i 1\lil's. 50; Hi mer "· Dugan,
30 Miss. 4i7.
A party selling property is presumed to know whl'lher the repn•sC'ntathns he mnkes of it are true or
fulse; if he know it to be false. it is a
positive frnud. If he does not know
it to be true, it is culpable negligence,
which in equity amounts to fraud.
Miner v. Medbnry, 6 Wis. 295: Smith
"· Richards, 18 Peteri\, 26; l\h.Ferran
"· T1lylor, 3 Crane h. 270; Glasscock "·
Minor, 11 Mo. 655.
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which such a case presents in a court of equity and in a court of
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law, growing out of the diﬁl-rence in jurisdiction in the two

courts and in the modes of giving relief. A court of equity

gives relief from unconscionable contracts on the ground of mis-

take as well as of fraud, and if the facts are set out which are sup-

posed to show fraud, it may happen that, though they do not

fully establish this, they at least show that the complainant has

acted to his prejudice under such a mistake of fact as shall justify

the court in giving him relief. In a court of law, on the other

hand, when the plaintiff counts upon a fraud, he must establish

it by his evidence; and if he tails in doing so, he must go out

of court, even though it is manifest that upon the facts he is

entitled to substantial redress in another forum.

\Vhere one, in selling personal property, makes positive repre-

sentations of material facts, upon which the other relies, the

vendor is held to the truth of these representations, in a suit at

law, as much as he would have been in a suit in equity. llut

this is upon the ground that they constitute a warranty. It is

familiar law, that no particular form of words is necessary to

charge a vendor with a warranty. The word warrant, or any

equivalent expressibn, need not be used. It is enough that there

be a positive assertion respecting something that affects the value
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of that which is sold, and which is not intended asa mere expres-

sion or statement of opinion. but as an aﬂirmation upon which

the purchaser may rely, and upon which he does rely.‘ ()n the

other hand, if what is asserted be matter of opinion or fancy

merely. such as the value of a horse, or the relative convenience

and usefulness ot' competing articles of machinery, or the like.

there is no warranty,’ unless the vendor assumed the peculiar

knowledge of an 0.\'p:'rt, which enabled him to judge of such

matters when the other could not.‘ But such a warranty,

although the facts prove to be different from what they were

1 Carondelct Iron works o. Moore,

78 Ill. 65; Wheeler v. Reed, 86 Ill. 81;

Hawkins 0. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198;

Chapman 1:. Murch, 1!) Johns. 200;

Dutfec u. Mason, 8 Cow. 25; Hillman

0, Wilcox. 30 )Ie.170; Morrill 17. Wal-

lace, 9 N. II. 111; Beebe 0. Knapp, 28

Mich. 58; Stone c. Covell, 29 Mich.

859; Richardson 0. Mason, 53 Barb.

601; Burge 0. Strobe-rg, 42 Ga. R8;

Tewkesbury u. Bennett, 31 Iowa. N21;

Ill-nslmw 0. Rollins, 9 Met. 83; Mc-

Grt-gor c. Penn. 9 Yerz. '74.

‘Reed 0. Hastings, 61 Ill, 266;

which such a case prc::cnts in a court of equity and in a court of
law, growing out of the difft•re11ce in juristliction in the two
courts and in the modes of giving relief. A court of equity
gives relief from unconscion11.ble contracts on the ground of mistake as well as of fraud, and if the facts are ~et out which are supposeq to show fraud, it may happen that, though they do not
fully establish this, they at least show that the complainant has
acted to his prejudice under such a mistake of fact as shall justify
the court in giving him relief. In a court of law, on the other
hand, when the plaintiff counts upon a fraud, he mnst e!:'tal,li;;h
it by his e\·idence; and if he fails in doing so, he mn"t go ont
of court, e,·en though it is manifest that upon the fact:> he i~
entitled to substantial rcdre~s in another forum.
'Vhere one, in selling per;;,mal propm·ty, makes positive representations of material facts, upon which the other reli<'~. the
vendor is held to the truth of the:;e repres~ntations, in a suit at
Jaw, as much as he would have been in a snit in equity. Bnt
this is upon the ground that they constitute a warranty. It is
familiar law, that no particular form of wor1ls is ne,·e,.:sary to
charge a vendor with a warranty. The word warrant, or allJ
equivalent expresston, need not be u~ed. It is enough that there
be a pnsitive assertion respecting something that affects the Yalne
of that which is sold, and which is not intended as a me1·e Pxpr<'l'sion or statement of opinion, but as an affirmation upon which
the purchaser may rely, and upon which he docs rely.' On the
other hand, if what i'> a:-scrted be matter of opinion or fancy
merely. snch as the \'altte of a lwr::e, or the rPlati \"C ('om·enience
and usefulness of com pC'ting mticles of mac!lincry, or the like,
there is no warranty,' unless the vendor assumed the pecnlhr
knowled~ of an cxp:·rt, which enabled him to judge of t'nch
matters when the other could not.• But such a warmnty,
although the facts prove to be different from what they were

Hawkins c. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198.

'Picard 0. Mc(.'ormick, 11 Mich.

68.

• Carondelet Iron works "· Moore,
78 Ill. 65; Wheeler 11. Reed, 86 Ill. 81;
Hawkins "· Pemberton, lH N.Y. 198;
Chapm:m t:. Murch, 1!1 Johns. 2DO;
Dntfce "· :Mnson, 8 Cnw. 2.3: Hillman
e. Wilcox. 30 ~le.liO: Morrill"· Wallace, 9 N. II. 111; Beebe r. Knapp.~
Mich. 58; Stone 1:. Covell, 2!J :'\lich.
859; Richa1'dson e. Mason, 53 Barb.

601 ; Burge "· Stroberg, 42 Gn. S..'i:
e. Bennett, 81 I own. 1-q;
Ill'nshnw !'. Rnhins, !l ~lel 83; ~Ic
Gn·.~or 1:'. Penn, D Yen~. 74.
' Ikctl "· Hnstin!!s, 61 Ill, 2611;
Hawkins t'. PcmiK•rton, iJl N. Y. 1!18.
• Picard t1. ltlcCormick, 11 .Mich.
68.
Tewke~bury

500 THE LAW or TORTS.

500

THE LAW OF TORTS.

asserted to be, is not necessarily a fraud, any more than is a war-

ranty in a conveyance of lands, which proves to be broken as soon

as made. Indeed, there is no necessary assumption, when one

takes a warranty for his own protection, that the facts are as the

covenant or promise of warranty asserts. He takes it on the

understanding merely that, if they are otherwise, the warrantor

will protect him. Therefore, on a broken warranty, the action is

on the contract, and does not assume a tort has been committed.

Nevertheless, a warranty may be a fraud, because it may be

made with knowledge that the facts asserted are untrue, and with

intent to deceive by the false statement. Therefore, if one sells

a horse which he avers is sound, when it is not. there is upon

these facts only a warranty; but if he knows the horse is unsound.

and nevertheless sells it with the like positive assertion that it is

sound, this is a false warranty, and the scienter makes it a fraud.‘

There is no doubt that an action on the case will lie, founded

on representations made by the defendant, whenever it can be

made to appear that he believed or llftll reason to believe the rep-

resentations were false, and that the plaintiff relied upon them,

to his injury.’ But the question is, whether this remedy is con-

ﬁned to cases in which the defendant knew or had reason to believe

he was deceiving by untruths; and it is certain, we think, that it
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is not. There are numerous cases in which it has been held that

if a person makes a material representation in relation to a mat-

ter susceptible of knowledge, in such a manner as to import pos-

itive knowledge, but conscious that he has no knowledge of its

truth or falsity, with intent that another should rely upon such

representation, this is suﬁicient to establish against him a legal

fraud, if the other does rely upon it and it proves un true.’ The

‘Cunningham 1;. Smith, 10 Grat.

255; Frenzcl o. Miller, 37 Ind. 1;

Still r. Little, 63 N. Y. 4'27; Brown '0.

Ca.~'tl<.*s, 11 Cush. 348; Stone 0. Covell,

29 Mich. 360.

'I’usley '0. Freeman, 8 T. R. 51;

Tr_von Iv. Whitinursh, 1 Mel. 1; Med-

bury v. Watson, 6 Met. 246; Hartford

Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 102 Mass. 221;

Cross 1'. Peters, 1 Me. 378; ()berlan-

dvr 1'. Spicss, 45 N. Y. 1'75; Griswold

2‘. Sabine, 51 N. H. l67; S. C. 12 Am.

asserted to be, is not necessarily a fraud, any more than is a warranty in a conveyance of lands, which proves to be broken as soon
as made. Indeed, there is no ner.cssa.ry assumption, when one
take~ a warranty for his own protection, that the facts are as the
covenant or promise of warranty asserts. He takes it on the
nndm·standing merely that, if they are otherwise, the warrantor
will protect him. Therefore, on a broken warranty, the action is
on the contract, and does not assnme a tort has been committed.
Nevertheless, a warranty may be a fraud, because it may be
made with knowledge that the filets asserted are untrue, and with
intent to deceive by the false statement. Therefore, if one sells
a horse which he avers is sound, when it is not, there is upon
these facts only a warranty; bnt if he knows the ho1·8e is unsound.
and nevertheless sells it with the like positive assertion that it is
sound, this is a false warranty, and the scienter makes it a fraud.'
There is no doubt that an actiou on the case will lie, founded
on representations made by the defendant, whenever it can be
made to appear that he belic\•cd or had reason to belie,·e the representations were false, and that the plaintiff relied upon them,
to his injury.' But the question is, whether this remedy is confined to cases in which the deltmdant knew or lui.tl reason t{) believe
he was deceiving by untruths; anti it is certain, we think, that it
is not. There arc numerous cases in which it hn.s been held that
if a person makes a material reprco.cn tat ion i 11 relation to a matter susceptible of knowledge, in such a manner as to import positive knowledge, but cou,;cious that he has no knowledge of its
truth ot· falsity, with intent that anothet· should rely upon such
repre.~eutation, this is sufficient to establish against him a legal
fraud, if the other does rely upon it and it proves untrue.• The

Rep. 76 _

' Monroe 0. Pritchett, 16 Ala. ‘T85;

Hazard v. Irwin. 18 Pick. 95; Page v.

Bent, 2 Met. 371; Stone 1:. Denny, 4

Met. 151; Fisher o. Mellon, 103 Muss.

5113; Litchﬁcld v. Hutchinson, 117

Mass. 195; Bennett 0. Judson, 21 N.

Y. 2238; Meyer v. Amidon, 45 N. Y.

169; Wukcnian 1:. Dalley. 51 N. Y.

2'7; McDonald v. Trafton, 15 Me. 225;

Hannnatt 1:. Emerson, 27 Me. 308;

Frenzel 1:. Miller, 37 Ind. 1.

Cunningham "· Smith, 10 GraL
25!'i; Frenzel " · Miller, 37 Ind. 1;
Still r. Little, 63 N.Y. 4:!7; Bmwn "·
Castles, 11 CtJt;h. 348; Stone"· Covell,
2ll l\lich. aoo.
2 Pasley v. Freeman, 8 T. R. 51:
Tryon ·v. Whitmur!!h, 1 1\let. 1; ?tlcdbu ry o. Watson, 6 )[ct. 246; Hartford
Ins. Co. 11. l\latthcws, 102 Mass. 221;
Cross r. Peters, 1 !lc. 378; Ol!crlsndl•r r. Spic:ls, 45 N. Y. 175; Grbl\vold
~., :-huine, 51 N. H. 107; S. C. 12 Am.
Rep. 70
J

•

:Monroe "· Pritchett, 16 Ala. 785;
llaznrd "· Irwin, 18 Pick. 95; Page "·
Bent, 2 l\let. 371; Stone "· DL'Illl}', 4
Met. 151; Fisher"· Ml'llen, 10:3 ll:1ss.
5ll3; Litchfield "· llutchinson, 117
:Mas..<~. 195; Bennett "· .Judson, 21 N.
Y. 2:18; }leyer "· Amidon, 4.5 N. Y.
169; Wakeman "· Dalll'Y· 51 N.Y.
27; l\lcDonuld "· Trafton, 15 X c. 225;
Hammatt 'V. Eme1-son, 27 Me. 308;
Frenzel11. ~Iiller, 37 Ind. 1.
1
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fraud here consists in the reckless assertion that that is true of
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which the party knows nothing, and in deceiving the other party

501

the1eby;‘ and even the actual belief of the party in the truth of

what he asserts is immaterial,’ unless he had some apparently

good reason for his belief, such, for example, as the positive state-

ments of others in whom he conﬁded, and was innocent of any

intent to mislead,‘ or unless his representations related to mat-

ters of opinion.‘ It would seem, therefore, that it must be sulﬁ-

cient in an action for the fraud to allege that the representations

were not true, and that the defendant made them with intent to

deceive, having no knowledge respecting the facts, and no reason

to believe them to be true;° and that the same facts would be

suﬁicient to make out a defense when the defendant was the

party defrauded.‘

It seems from the foregoing, that one who has been induced,

by misrepresentations of material facts, to cuter into a contract,

may have redress as for a fraud-

1. \Vhen the representations were made by the other party,

with knowledge of their falsity, and with intent to deceive.

2. “Then the party making them had no knowledge and no

belief on the subject, and recklessly made them with the like

intent.
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3. When the party supposed his representations to be true, but

had no reason for any such belief, and nevertheless made them

positively as of known facts, and induced the other to act upon

them.

The ground of recovery is substantially the same in each oi

these cases, and consists in the impression produced on the mind

of one party that certain non-existent facts do exist to the

knowledge of the other.

‘ Taylor 1:. Ashton, 11 M. & VV. 401;

Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich. 53, 76; In-

dianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Tyng, 63

N. Y. 653.

‘ Allen v. Hart, 72 Ill.104; Cabot 0.

Christie, 42 Vt. 121.; Fisher v. Mel-

len, 103 Mass. 503; Litchﬁcld o.

Hutchinson, 117 .\Iass. 195.

'Haycraft 0. Creasy, 2 East. 92;

Omrod v Hurth,14 M. & W. 652; Tay-

lor s. Ashton, 11 M. & W. 401; Lord

0. Goddard, 13 How. 198; Sone 0.

Denny, 4 Met. 151; Marsh o. Falker_

4!) N. Y. 562; Hubbard v Briggs, 31

fraud here consists in the reckless assertion that that is true of
which the party knows nothing, and in deceh·ing the other party
thereby; 1 and even the actual belief of the pa1·ty in the truth of
what he n!'serts is immnterial,2 unless he had some apparently
good reason for his helief, such, for example, as the positi\·e ~:;tate
ments of others in whom he confided, and was innocent of any
intent to mislead,S or unless his representations related to matters of opinion.' It wonld seem, therefore, that it must be sufficient in an action for the fraud to all~ge that the representations
were not true, and that the defendant made them with intent to
deceive, h!Lving no knowledge respecting the facts, and no rca;;on
to believe them to be true; & and that the ,.;ame facts would be
sufficient to make out a defense when the defendant was the
party defrauded. e
It seem,; from the foregoing, that one who has been induced,
by misrepresentations of lJJ;tt.erial facts, to enter into a contract,
may have re1lress as for a frand1. ".,.hen the representations were made by the other party,
' with knowledge of their titlsity, and with intent to deceh·e.
2. 'Vhen the party making them had no knowledge nnd no
belief on the subject, and recklessly made them with the like
intent.
3. When the party snpposed his rcp1-e~entations to be true, but
had nu reaeon for nny snch belief, and ue\·ertheless made them
positively as of known fact:;, and induced the oti1er to act upon
them.
The ground of rcc,Jver,v is 8nbstantially the same in each ot
these cases, and consii'tl'\ in the impre~sion produced on the mind
of one party that certain non-existent facts do exist to the
knowledge of the other.

N. Y. 513; Chester 0. Comstoek, -l0

N. Y. 575.

‘ Page o. Bent. 2 Met. 371; Marsh 0.

Fulkcr, 40 N. Y. 562.

° Omrod v. Ilurth, 14 M. & W. 652;

Hammett 1:. Emerson, 27 .\[e. 3.0%;

\Ve<-d r. Case. 55 Barb. 534.

“ See Graves r. Lebanon Nut. Bank,

10 Bush, 23; S. (J. 19 Am. Rep. 50.

1 TRy lor r. Ashton, 11 )[. & \V. 401;
Beebe 11. Knapp, 2tl :Mich. 53, 76; Intlisnapolis, etc., R. R. Co. tr. Tyng, 63

DPnny, 4 Met. 151; 1\lllrsh tJ. Falker.
4!1 ~- Y. 562; Hubbard "' Bri!!g.;, 31
N. Y. 518; Chester tJ, Comst•>ck, 40

N.Y. 6!)3.

N.Y. 575.

w Allen 11.

IlRrt, 72 Jll. 104; Cubot tr.
Christie, 42 Vt. 121.; Fisher 11. }[ellen, 103 Mass. 50:J; Litchfield 11.
Hutchinson, 117 llass. 195.
• HRycraft tJ. Crea..<1y, 2 East. 92;
Omrod 11 Hurth, 14M. & W. fl5·~; Taylors. Ashton, 11 :\1. & W. 401; Lord
•· Goddard, 18 How. 1U8; 8one •·

~ P1\ge "· Bt'nt. 2 ~let. 371 ; l\larsb tJ.
Fulkcr, 40 N. Y. iili:.!.
1 Omrod 11. Ilurth, 14M. & W. 6:i2;
Hammett r. Emerl!lon, 27 )[c. :.o~;
'VePcl r. Ca..,c. 55 B:trb. :>34.
• :::.t•t• Grnvcs r. l..<>bunon NaL BRnk,
10 Bush, 23; 8. C. 19 Am. Hcp. 50.
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Bentations are acted on, the deception has not accomplisheii its

purpose, and an action will not lie. It is not essential, liowe\'e.".

that they should have formed the sole inducement to a contract;

it is enough that they formed a material inducement.‘ If, on

the other hand, it appears that the defendant did not at all rely

upon the representations, either because he did not believe them.

or because he chose to investigate and act upon his o\vn ju<l_;-

ment, it is plain that no action can be maintained.’ So, though

the representations may have been trusted at ﬁrst, yet if before

the negotiations were completed the party ascertained their

falsity, or if after they were completed he aflirmcd the bargain

unconditionally with full knowledge of the facts, the bargain

must be treated in the same nnnmer as though it was originally

made under the same state of knowledge.’ “ A misrepresenta-

tion can be of no avail unless it serves to deceive the party at

the time he becomes ﬁxed by the treaty. and he cannot claim to

have conﬁded in a statement as true which at the same time

he knew to be false. Hence, however fraudulent and wicked a

statement may be, if the innocent party, before being tied and

while in a situation to retreat without prejudice, in any manner

becomes acquainted with the truth, the misrepresentation will
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not be a ground of defense against the contract."‘ And it can

certainly be no fraud if the party, instead of believing the repre-

sentations, believed directly thc opposite.’

‘Mathews '0. Bliss, 22 Pick. 43;

Snﬂbrd o. Grout, 120 Mass. 20; Shaw

0. Stine, 8 Bosw. 151'; Addington 0.

Allen, 11 Wend. 374; Winter c. Ban-

Hodgden, 25 Me. 243; Abbey 0. Dc\\'e_\',

25 Pa. 413.

' Pratt v. Philbrook, 41 Me. 132. Sec

Tu-"k u. l)owning_ 76 lll. 71; \Vhiting

(lel, 30 Ark. 362; Clarke v. Dickson, 6

C. B. (N. s.) 453.

' Ilagce v. Grossmnn, 31 Ind. 223;

Representations must have been acted on. Unless the rc·:'r :sentatious are acted on, the deeeption has not acC'omplishe.i i~::
purpo;;e, and an action will not lie. It is not essentiai, bowen·:·.
that they should ha,·e formed the sole inducement to a contr;u:t;
it is enough that they forrnerl a material inducement.' If, on
the other hand, it appears that the defendant did not at all rely
upon the representations, either because he did not believe them.
or because he chose to investi~ate and net upon his own jud~
ment, it is plain that no action ean be maintained." So, though
the represP:1tntions may have bt•en trusted at first, yet if bef.,re
the negotiations were completed the party ascertained their
falsity~ or if after they were completed he affirmed the bar~rain
unconditionally with full knowledge of the facts, the bar~nin
must be t.reated in the same manner as though it was originally
made under the same state of knuwlcdge.' "A miHcpreseutation can be of no avail unless it t;ern'n to dec·eive the party at
the time he bcc<Hm!s fixe(l hy the t1·caty. and he cannot claim to
have confided in a statement as true which at the same time
he knew to be false. lienee, however frandnlent and wicked a •
statement may oe, if the innocent party, before bci ng tied and
wl1ile in a situation to rct1·eat without prejudice, in any manner
becomes accptain ted with the truth, the mii>representation will
not be a ground of deti:mse against the contract.''' And it can
certainly he no fraud if the party, instead of helie\·ing the representations, believed directfy the opposite.•

Nye ‘ll 1\Icrri:nn, 35 Vt. 438. There

must be both deception and £lIllllItIO.

Freeman 1:. McDaniel, 23 Geo. 334;

Bowman '0. (Yurithcrs, 40 Ind. $10;

Byard v. Holmes. 34 N. J. 296; Ely

u. Stewart, 2 Md. 408: Anderson v.

Burnett, 6 Miss.165; Selma,etc., R. R.

C0. v. Anderson, 51 Miss. 829; Boyce

0. Watson, 20 Geo. 517; Jennings 0.

Brougliton, 5 D. G., M. & G.126; (lar-

row 1:. Davis, 15 How. 272; Fuller o.

v. llill, 2:3 Mich. 399.

‘ Gnavas, J., in Whiting 0. Hill. 23

Mich. 899, 405, citing Irvine v. Kirk-

patrick, 8 Eng. L. & Eq. 17; S. C. 17

L. T. Rep. 32; Vccrol 11. Vcernl, 6;}

N. Y. 43; Fulton n. Hood, 31 Penn.

St. 365; Halls v. Thompson. 1 S. ti: )1.

443; Ely v. Stewart. 2 Md. -108.

‘ Bowman o. Carithers, 40 Incl. 90.

And see Stitt c. Little, 63 N. Y. 427.

A false statement of a. very material

fact will not overthrow a bargain un-

less it was the means of procuring it

Phipps 0. Buckman, 30 Penn. St. 401.

--1.1

1 Mathews "'· Bliss. 22 Pick. 4':!;
Snlford ll. Grout, 120 Mas~. 20; Shaw
"· Stine, 8 Bosw. 157; Addington "·
Allen, 11 Wcnrl. 374; Winter t'. Ban.
del, 3U Ark. 3U2; Clarke "· Dickson, 6
C. B. (N. s.) 453.
1 Hagee v. Grossman, 31 Inrl. 2:!:1;
Nye ·n. )fpJ·riam, 35 Vt. 438. TlJ('re
must be both deception an(l dnmagc.
Freeman v. 'McDaniel, 23 Geo. :l:i4;
Bowman "· Carithers, 40 Inrl. !lO;
Byard "· HolmPs, 34 N. J. 2!Jii; Ely
"· Stewart, 2 Md. 408; Andl'r><on "·
Burnett, 6 )Iiss 1(15; Selma, etc., H. R.
Co. "'· Anderson, 51 J\1 iss. 829; Boyco
tl. Watson, 20 Geo. 517; Jennings"·
Broughton, 5 D. G., ll. & G. 126; Harrow 11. Davis, 15 How. 272; Fuller e.

Hol1~den,25Me.243; Abbey". Dew<')',
25 Pa. 413.
• Pratt ll. Philbrook, 41 Me. 132. Sl'l'
Tur·k t•. Downing, 76 Ill. 71; \Vhiting
"· Hill, 2:J )Iich. 3\19.
4 GruVER, J., in Whiting"· Hill. 23
Mich. :mo. 40ii, citing Irvine v. Kirkpatrick, 8 Eng. I.. & Eq. 17; S. C. 1i
L. T. Rep. 32; y eerol tl. v ct•r.•l, oa
N. Y. 41; Fulton tl. Hood, 31 Pl'nn.
St. 31i!i; II ails v. Thompson. 1 S. & ~I.
443; Ely tl. Stewart. 2 ~ld. 408.
• Bowman "· Carithers, 40 Ind. 90.
And see ~titt v. Little, 68 N. Y. 42-;'.
A fal~e statt•ment of a very material
fnct will not overthrow a bargain unless it wns the means of procurin~ it.
• Phipps"· Buckman, 30 Penn. St. 401.
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Wliere a purchaser, electing not to rely upon the representa-
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tions of the vendor, proceeds to an investigation in person or by

agents, there is no deception even though he fails to discover

important facts, provided the vendor interposes no obstacles to a.

full investigation, and does nothing to mislead while it is in

progress.‘ Even in such a case, however, he might possibly be

entitled to relief, if the subject-matter of the representation

respected some quality of the thing sold which was not suscepti-

ble of being accurately determined except by experts, and the

investigation made was not by persons competent to develop

the facts.’

If the representations have brought about a contract, and a

ne\\' one is substituted for this before their falsity is discovered,-

the second contract, as well as the ﬁrst, is supposed to have been

induced by them.’

Beseinding Contract for Fraud. It is a general rule that a

party defrauded in a bargain may, on discovering the fraud,

either rescind the contract and demand back what has been

received under it, or he may aﬂirm the bargain and sue and

recover damages for the fraud. If he elects the former course,

he must not sleep on his rights, but must move promptly.‘ X0

rule is better settled than this, that equity will refuse relief

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:42 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

where the delay in seeking redress has been so considerable that

Where " purchaser, electing not to rely upon the rep•·csentations of the vendor, proc-eeds to an in\"esti~"Rt.ion in person or by
agents, there is no deception even though he fails to disco\"cr
important facts, provided the vendor interposes no obstacles to a
full in•;estigation, and does nothing to mislead while it i8 in
progress. 1 E\•en in such a case, howe\·er, he might possiLly be
entitled to relief, if the subject-matter of the repre:;cn tation
respected some quality of the thing sold which was not ~;nscepti
ble of being accurately determined except by experts, and the
investigation made wa1:1 not by persons t'Ompctcnt to develop
the facts.'
If the representations have brought about a contract, and a
new one is substituteJ tor this before their falsity is discovered,
the second contract, as well as the fi1·st, is supposed to lun·e been
induced uy them .•

laches is fairly imputable,‘ and

1 Halls v. Thompson, 1 S. & M. 443.

As w what amounts to a device to

mislead, see Roseman 0. Canovan, 43

Cal. 110; Webster 9. Bailey, 31 Mich.

36.

' Perkins 0. Rice, Lit. Sel. Cas. 218.

‘Davis v. Henry, 4 W. Va. 571.

Acts of conﬁrmation of a contract

by the defrauded party will not bind

him, unless he was fully apprised of

the fraud and of his rights. Shackt-l.

ford v. Handley, 1 A. K. Marsh. 495;

Rescinding Contract for Fraud.

It is a general rule that a
party defmuded in a hnr.~in may, on disco\·ering the fraud,
either rescind the contract and demand back what has l>€'en
received under it, or he may affirm the bargain and sue aud
recover damages for the fraud. If he elects the former course,
he must not sleep on his rights, hut mnst move promptly.• Xo
rule is better :;ettlcd than this, that eqnity will refuse relief
where the delay in seeking redress has been so considerable that
laches is fairly imputaple,' and both at law and in equity long

Johnson v. Johnson, 5 Ala. 90;

Crowe v. Ballard, 1 Ves. 215. He

may rescind, though he alﬁrmed after

the fraud was disclosed to him in

part, if afterwards he discovers the

falsity of other material representa-

both at law and in equity long

tions. Pierce 0. Wilstin, 34 Ala. 596.

‘ Masson v. Bovcl, 1 Dcnio, 69; Pear-

soll v. Clmpln, 44 Penn. St. 9; Ilcrrin

0. Libl\<-_v, 36 Me. 350; Cook v. Gil-

man. 34 N. H. 556; Wright 0 Peer, 36

Mich. 213; llannnond v. Stanton, 4

R. I. 65.

'Hcrcy 0. Diuwoody, 2 V1-s 87;

Jones v. Turberville, 2 Yes. 11; Lup.

ton v. Jnnncy, 13 Pet. 381; McKnight

v- T=\_\l"l'. 1 How. lfll; Bmlger v.

Bud_-_'er, 2 Wall. 87; McLean 2. Bar-

ton, llnr. Ch. 2'29; Banks c. Jud;|li, 8

(‘onn. 145 ; Purlurd v. Mar in, 1

Smedes & .\I. 126; Hawlcy v. Crmnor,

4 (‘ow. 717; Coleman v. Lyne, 4 Rand.

454; Graham 0. Davidson, 2 Dev. &

Bat. Eq. 155.

I Halls"· Thompson, 1 S. & I'll. 443.
As to what amounts to a device to
mislt•ad, see Roseman "· Canovan, 43
Cal. 110; Webster !1. Bailey, 31 llich.
36.
• Perkins "· Rice, Lit. Bel. Cas. 218.
• Davis "· Henry, 4 W. Va. 571.
Acts of conflrmatiou of a contract
by the defrauded party will not bind
him, unless he Wl\8 fully apprised of
the fraud and of his rights. Bhack£'1for•l "· Handley, 1 A. K. llarsh. 4U:i;
Johnson "· .Johnson, 5 Ala. IJO;
Crowe "· Ballard, 1 Vcs. 211}. He
may rescind, though he affirmed after
the fraud wllll disclosed to him in
part, if afterwards he discovers the
falsity of ot.hcr material reprcscuta.

tions. Pierce "· Wilson, 84 Ala. 506.
• )[:lJ'.son "· Bovc), I Denio, 6U; Pcursoll c. Chapin, 44 Penn. St. 0; Herrin
"· Liblll'y, 36 ~I e. ;no; Cook "· Gilman. 34 N. H. :i56; Wright" Peet, :16
Mich. 213; Hammond 1). Hlanton, 4

R.I. 65.
1 Hercy tl. Din woody, 2 VI's 87;
,Jont·s "· Turberville, 2 Ves. 11; LuPton t: .•Janney, 13 Pet. 381; )lcKnight
"· Tn~ lor, 1 How. lfll; B:nl.!,!"er "·
Bull;:er, 2 Wall. 87; }I cLean c. Bar.
ton, Hur. Ch. 2';9; Bunks fl. ,J udall, 8
Conn. 145 ; Purlard c. 1br iu, 1
Smcdcs & ~[. 126; Hawley"· Cmuwr,
4 Cow. 7li; Coleman c. Lync, 4 Hnnd.
454; Graham tl. Daviuson, 2 Dcv. &
But. Eq. 15.1.
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acquiescence with full knowledge of the fraud will be deemed a
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waiver of the right to rescind.‘ Even a gift presumably obtained

by undue inﬂuence operating upon overweening conﬁdence may

be affirmed by great delay in rescinding the transaction; such a

delay as under the circumstances is unreasonable.‘ So, dealing

with what has been acquired by the contract in a manner incon-

sistent with an intention to rescind will be deemed a waiver of

the right; as where corporation shares which the party ﬁnds

have been fraudulently sold to him, are afterward put by him

upon the market.‘

The party electing to rescind must also place the other party

as nearly as possible in statu guo. To do this, if he has received

anything under the contract, whether it be property or securities,

he must restore it.‘ To this general rule there may be an excep-

tion of the case where that which was received was absolutely

‘Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503;

Randall v. Errington, 10 Ves. 423;

Spackman's Case, 84 L. J. Ch. 329;

Stewart‘s Case, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 512;

Campbell v. Fleming, 1 Ad. & El.

40; R. R. Co. v. Row, 24 Wend. 74;

Qanger 0. Wood, 8 Johns. Ch. 416;

acquiescence with full knowledge of the fraud will be deemed a
waiver of the right to rescind. 1 Even a gift presumably obtained
by undue influence operating upon o\·erwee11ing contideuce may
be affirmed by great delay in rescinding the transaction; such a
delay a.s under the circumstances is unrea.sonaiJle.' So, dealing
with what has been acquired by the contract in a manner inconsistent with an intention to rescind will be deemed a waiver of
the right; a.s where corporation shares which the party finds
ha\'e been fraudulently soid to him, are afterward put IJy him
upon the market.•
The party electing to rescind must also place the oth.er party
a.s nearly as possible in statu quo. To do this, if he has re<:ei ,.ed
anything under the contract. whether it be property or securities,
he mnst restore it.' To this general rule there may be an exception of the case where that which was received was absolutely
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McCulloeh o. Scott, 13 B. Mon. 172;

Collier e. Thompson, 4 T. B. Mon. 81;

Finley 0. Lynch, 2 Bibb, 566; Dill 0.

Camp, 22 Ala. 249; De Armand 0.

Phillips, Wal. Ch. 186; Crawley '0.

Timberlake, 2 Ire. Eq. 460; (Jampuu

0. Van Dyke, 15 Mich. 371; \Vright av.

Peet, 36 Mich. 213.

’ Turner '0. Collins, L. R. '7 Ch. Ap.

329; S. C. 2 Monk, 290. For acase

in which relief was given after great

lapse of time, see Hatch 1:. Hatch, 9

Ves. 292.

' E1: parts Briggs, L. R. 1 liq. Cas.

483.

‘ Byard v. Homes, 33 N. J. 120;

Babcock 0. (Jase, 61 Penn. St. 427;

Thayer 0. Turner, 8 Met. 550; Cush-

ing v. Wyman, 38 Me. 589; Goelth v.

White, 35 Barb. 76; \'Vl1eaton e. Ba-

ker, 14 Barb. 594; Meyer 0. Shoe-

mackcr, 5 Barb. 319; Voorhecs v. Earl,

2 Hill, 258; Jcwctt v. Pctit, 4 Mich.

508; Wilbur 0. Flood, 16 Mich. 40;

Coghill v. Boring, 15 Cal 213; Downer

a. Smith, 32 Vt. 1. In equity it would

not be necessary to make restoration

before bringingsuit. Marlinr Martin,

35 Ala. 560; Abbott v. Allen, 2 Johns.

Ch. 519. And at law, if what he re-

ceived was only the other party's

obligations, which he has not dis-

posed of, it will be suiliciciit to tender

them back at the trial. Coghill 0.

Boring, 15 Cal. 213: Thurston 0.

J Michoud "· Girod, 4 How. 503;
Randall "· Errington, 10 Yes. 423;
Spackman's Ca.'!e, 34 L. J. Ch. 329;
Stewart's Case, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 512;
Campbell "· Fleming, 1 Ad. & El.
40; R. R. Co."· How, 24 Wend. 74;
'.;anger "· Wood, 8 Johns. Ch. 416;
l\IcCulloch "· Scott, ta B. }{on. 172;
Collier"· Thompson, 4 T. B. )Jon. 81;
Fin ley "· Lynch, 2 Bibb, 506; Dill "·
Camp, 22 Ala. 249; De Armand "·
Phillips, Wul. Ch. 186; Crawley tl.
Timberlake, 2 Ire. Eq. 460; Campau
"· Vun Dyke, 15 ~lich. 371; Wright"·
Peet, 36 )lich. 213.
'Turner "· Collins, L. R. 7 Cb. Ap.
320; 8. C. 2 Mo mk, 290. For a case
in which relief wn.s given after great
lapse of time, see Hatch "· Hatch, 9
Ves. 292.
1 E.x parte Brig~s, L. H. 1 Eq. Cas.

483.

• Byard "· Homes, 33 N. J. 120;
Babcock tl. Case, 61 Penn. St. 427;
Thayer tl. Tunwr, 8 ~let. 5::i0; Cush.
ing "·Wyman, 38 Me. i'it!O; Goelth D.
White, 35 Barb. 76; Whl·aton "· Ba..
ker, 14 Barb. 594; :Moyer "· Shoemackel", 5 Bnrb. 319; Voorhees"· Earl,
2 Hill, 2tl8; J ewctt "· Petit, 4 .Mich.

Blanchard, 22 Pick. 18; Nichols 0.

Michael, 23 N. Y. :26-1; Fraschieris o.

Ilenriques, 36 Barb. 276; Pequeno 0.

Taylor, 158 Barb. 375. As against a

third person, to whom a fraudulent

veudec has transferred the property,

it would not be essential to make an

otfcr to return the \'endee’s paper re-

ceived on the sale, [J!‘()VlLl0(l the vendor

makes no claim under it. Kinney 0.

Kiernan, 49 N. Y. 164.

Where one has received money

-..

_

508; Wilhur "· Flood, 16 llich. 40;
Coghiil !!. Horing, 15 Cal 213; Downer
"· Smith, 32 Vt. 1. In equity it would
not be nccl'SStLry to JUilke restoration
before hringin~ suit. !lm·tin r -:\I art in,
85 Aln.. 560; Abllott tl Allen, 2 Johns.
Ch. 51!). And at law, if what he receiwd wns only the other party's
oblig-ations, which he has not dis.
posed of, it will be ~uffieicnL to tender
them back at the trial. Coghill "·
Boring, 15 Cal. 213: Thur.;t.on •·
Blanchard, 22 Pick. 18; Nichols "'
}lichacl, 23 N. Y. :264; Fraschieris "·
lleuriqul•s, 36 Barb. 276; Pequeno "·
Taylor, ;J8 Barb. 375. ~ against a
third person, to whom a fmudulen\
vendee has transferred the p•·uperty,
it would not be cs!'-ential to make an
offer to return the vendee's paper re.
ceived on thl' sale, proviued the vendor
makes no claim under it. Kinney "Kiernan, 49 N. Y. 1M.
When~ one has received money
under a cnmpromise which he claims
was fraudulent, he cannot bring suit
on this basis without returning the
money. Potter"· Monmouth Ina. Co.,
63 Me. 440.
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\'v'Ul'tl|lCSS; but the burden to show this would be on the party

who had failed to restore it.‘

More conclusive than mere delay against the right to rescind is

the fact that the defrauded party has so dealt with the subject-

mattcr of the contract that it has become impossible to put the

other in etatu qua. Except in very peculiar cases, a suit at law

for damages will then be found to be the sole remedy.’

Afﬂrming the Contract. The fraud may also be waived by an

express aﬂirmance of the contract. Where an aﬂirmanee is relied

Y;orti.Icss; bnt the burden to show this would be on the party
who had failed to restore it.'
More conclusive than mere delay against the right to rescind is
the fact that the defrauded party has so dealt with the subjectmatter of the contract that it has become impossible to put the
other in stat~ quo. Except in very peculiar cases, a suit at law
for damages will then be found to be the sole remedy.•

upon it should appear that the party having a right to complain

of the fraud had freely, and with full knowledge of his rights,

in some form, clearly manifested his intention to abide by the

contract, and waive any remedy he might have had for the

deception.‘

If the contract is rescinded and the party guilty of the fraud

refuses to restore on demand what he has fraudulently obtained,

the other, at his option, may treat the detention as a conversion.

Indirect §uppression of Fraud. One method of suppressing

fraud is by denying relief to one of two culpable parties when the
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other has defrauded him. If they are in pari delicto the court

will not listen to their complaints. Therefore, if in attempting

a fraud on a third person one of them obtains an advantage,

relief will be refused.‘ But this rule will not be enforced against

Affirming the Contract.

The fraud may also be waived by an
express affirmance of the contrliCt. Where an uffirmance is relied
upon it should appear that the party having a right to complain
of the fraud had freely, and with full knowledge of his rights,
in some form, clearly manifested his intention to abide by the
contract, and waive any remedy he might have had for the
deception.•
If the contract is rescinded and the party guilty of the fraud
refn:;es to restore on demand what he has fraudulently obtained,
the other, at his option, may treat the detention as a conversion.

' Babcock o. Case. 61 Penn. St. 427;

Smith 0. Smith, 30 Vt. 139.

67 Penn. St. 217; Cumberland Coal

Co. o. Sherman, 20 Md. 117; Holfman

' Downer o. Smith, 32 Vt. 1; Poor

v. Woodburn, 25 Vt. 234; Kinney u.

Kiernan, 2 Lans. 492; McCormick 0.

Malin, 5 Blackf 509; Buchenau 0.

Horney, 12 Ill. 336; Blen v. Bear

Indirect J!luppression of Fraud. One method of suppre$!;ing
fraud is by denying relief to one of two culpable parties when the
other has defrauded him. If they are in pari delido the court
will not listen to their complaints. The1·efore, if in attempting
a frnud on a third person one of them obtains an ad\'anta~c,
relief will be refused. • But this rule will not be enforced against

River Co., 20 Cal. 602; Jemison 1:.

Woodrutf, 34 Ala. 143; Pierce o. Wil-

son. 34 Ala. 506; Shaw v. Bamhart,

17 Ind. 183; Clarke 0. Dickson, El.

Bl. & El. 148. Sec Miller o. Barber,

66 N. Y. 558; Freeman v. Reagan, 26

Ark. 373. _

' Bradley 0. Chase, 22 Me. 511; Kin-

ney o. Kiernau, 2 Lans. 492; Parson

0. Hughes, 9 Paige, 591; Roberts 0.

Barrow, 53 Geo. 315; Pearsoll v. Cha-

pin, 44 Penn. 9; Negley v. Lindsay,

Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal

Co., 16 Md. 456; Butler 0. Haskell, 4

Dessaus. 651; Lyon 0. Waldo, 36

Mich. 845: Williams c. Reed, 3 Ma-

son, 405; Edwards v. Roberts, 7 Sm.

& Mar. 544; Cherry v. New.~mn, 3

Yerg. 369; Broddus v. Call, 8 McCall,

412; Boyd 0. Hawkins, 2 Dev. Eq.

195; Cann 0. Cann, 1 P. Wms.'723;

Colc 0. Gibbons, 8 P. WIIIS. 290;

Moxon 0. Payne. 7 Mnak, 442; Lind-

say Petroleum (*0. v. Hurd, 8 Monk,

180; Ez parts Briggs, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas.

483.

‘ N1.-llis 0 Clark,4 Hill, 424; Roman

9. Mali, 42 Md. 518.

1 Babcock "· Case, 61 Penn. St. 427;
Sruith "· Smith, 30 Vt. 139.
1 Downer "· Smith, 82 Vt. 1; Poor
"· Wonc.lhurn, 2.'.i Vt. 234; Kinney 11.
Kiernan, 2 Lans. 492; lfcCormick "·
Malin, 5 Blackf. M!J; Buchen au "·
Horney, 12 Ill. 3:.16; Bll•n "· Bear
River Co., 20 Cui. 002; Jemison 11.
Woodruff, 84 Ala. 143; Pierce"· Wilson, 3·1 Ala. 596; Sha&w "· Barnhart,
17 Ind. 183; Clarke "· Dickson, El.
Bl. & El. 148. Sec Miller "· Barber,
66 N.Y. 558; Freeman 11. Reagan, 26
Ark. 3i3.
1 Bra1llcy 11. Clutse, 22lle. 511; Kinney "· Kiernan, 2 Lans. 492; Parson
"· Hughe11, 9 Paige, 591; Roberts 11.
BRrrow, 5a Geo. 815; Pearson "· Ch~
pin, 44 Penn. 0; ~eglcy "· Lindsay,

67 Penn. St. 217; Cumberland Coal
Co. "· Sherman, 20 Md. 117; Hoffman
Steam Coni Co. "· Cumberland Coal
Co., 16 ~ld. 450; Butler "· liRSke11, 4
Dessaus. 651; Lyon "· Waldo, 36
)[ich. 845: Will isms "· Reed, 8 )[~
s'.>n, 405; E..Jwards 11. Roberts, 7 Sm.
& liar. 5!4: Cherry "· N ew~<m, 8
Ycrg. 369; Broddus "·Call, 8 llcCnll,
4i2; R>yd "· Hawkins, 2 Dev. Eq.
195; Cann "· Cann, 1 P. Wms. 723;
Cole 11. Gibbons, S P. Wms. 290;
Moxon 11. Payne. 7 )Ioak, 4!2; Lindsay Petroleum C'o. 11. Ilurd, 8 )[oak,
180; Ez part~ Briggs, L. R 1 Eq. Cas.
48a.
4 Nellis" Clark,4 H111,424; Roman
"·Mali, 4.2 Md. 518.
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a party actually or presumably under the inﬂuence of the other,
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and who was induced to engage in the illegal or dishonest trans-

action by means of this inﬂuence. Thus, if an attorney leads

his client into a fraud, in order to make use of it for his own

purposes, the court will take notice where the blame properly

rests and give relief against the attorney as t_he party chieﬂy

responsible.‘

Duress is a species of fraud in which compulsion, in some

form, takes the place of deception in accomplishing the injury.

Duress is either of the person or of the goods of the party,

and the former is either by imprisonment, by threats, or by an

a party actually or presnmably under the inflnenc.c of tl1e other,
and who was induced to engage in the illegal or dishonest transaction by means of this influence. Thus, if an attorney leads
his client into a fraud, in order to make use of it for his own
purposes, the court will take notice where the blame properly
rests and give relief against the attorney as t_he party chiefly
responsible.'

exhibition of force that apparently cannot be resisted.

If one is arrested, though for a just cause, if it be without

lawful authority, the arrest constitutes duress. and whatever is

obtained by means of it is obtained wrongfully.’ But. it is

equally duress if the arrest is by lawful authority, but with the

purpose to make use of it to compel the defendant to surrender

to the plaintiff something to which the writ does not lawfully

entitle him.’ Threats constitute duress where they cause rea-

sonable apprehension of loss of life, or of seine great bodily

harm,‘ or of imprisonment.“ And the order of a military coni-

‘ Ford 0. Harrington, 16 N. Y. 235;
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Freclove v. Cole, 41 Barb. 318; Barnes

0. Brown, 82 Mich. 146.

If the parties have mutually de-

frauded each othcr, the trade will be

left to stand. Price 0. Polluek, 37

N. J . 44.

If one is defrauded in a trade ille-

gal because made on Sunday, an ac-

tion will not lie. Plaisted v. Palmer,

63 Me. 576; Robeson 1:. French, 12

Duress is a species of fraud in which compulsion, in some
form, takes the place of deception in accomplishing the injury.

Duress is either of the person or of the goods of the party,
and the former is either Ly imprisonment, by threats, or by an
exhibition of force that apparently cannot be resisted.
If one is arrested, though for a just cause, if it be without
lawful authority, the arrest constitutes duress. and whatc\·er is
obtained by means of it is obtained wrongfully.' Hu t it is
equally duress if the arrest is t>y lawful authority, but with the
pnrpose to make use of it to compel the defeutlant to surrender
to the plaintitf' something to which the writ Joes uot lawfully
entitle him.' Threats constitute duress where they cause reasonable apprehension of loss of life, or of some ~reat bodily
harm,• or of imprisonment.' And the o1·der of a military com-

Met. 24; Cardoze v. Swift, 113 Mass.

250.

' Thompson c. Lockwood, 15 Johns.

256; Foshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill, 154;

Richards v. Vanderpoel,1 Duly, 71;

Strong Grannis, 26 Barb. 122;

Eadie 0. Slimmon, 26 N.Y. 9; Osborn

l Ford "· Harrington, 16 N . Y. 235;
Freelove "'· Cole, 41 Barb. 318; Barnes
"· Brown, 82 Mich. 146.
If the parties havo mutually defrauded each other, the trsde will be
left to stand. Price 11. Polluck, 87

0. Robbins, 36 N. Y. 365; Bane 1:. De-

trick, 52 Ill. 19; Belote 0. Henderson,

6 (Jold. 471; Durr v. Howard, 6 Ark.

461; Bassett c. Bassett, 9 Bush, 696.

‘Richardson 0. Duncan, 3 N. H.

508; Severance v. Kimball, S N. II.

386; Brock v. Blancliard, 22 N. H.

30.3; Watkins v. lluird, 6 Muss. 506;

Fisher 0. Shaltuck, 17 Pick. 2-52;

\Vhitcﬁcld v. Longfellow, 13 Me. 146;

Eddy v. Hcrriu, 17 Me. 3:38; B-\\\'l{9l‘

o. Lowell, 49 110.429; Phelps r. Zusch-

lag, 34 Tex. 371; Thurman v Burt, 53

Ill. 129; Sloutfer v. Latsliaw. 2 Watts,

165; Meek v. Atkinson. 1 Bailey, 8-1;

Taylor zr. Blake, 11 .\1inn. 255; \\'ork's

Appeal, 59 Penn. St. 444.

4 Baker 1;. Morton, 12 Wall. 150.

See Bosley 1:. Shanncr, 26 Ark. 280;

Bogle 0. Ilammons, 2 llcisk. 136.

° Clinton v. Strong. 9 Johns. 370;

Harmon v. Harmon, 61 Me. ‘Z27; S. C.

14 Am. Rep 556; Feller v. Green, 26

Mich. '70; Bane v. Detrich. 52 Ill. 19.

If the threats fail to cause apprehen-

sion of harm there is no duress. Har-

N.J.«.
If one is defrauded in a trade ille.
gal because made on Sunday, an nc.
tion will not lie. Plaisted 11. Palmer,
63 Me. 576; Robeson "· French, 12
:Met. 24; Cardoze "· Swill;, 113 ::\[ass.
230.
• Thompson"· Lockwood, 15 Johns.
256; Foshay "· Ferguson, 5 Hill, 154;
Richards "· Vanderpoel, 1 Daly, 71;
Strong ~- Grannis, 26 Barb. 122;
Eadie 11. Rlimmon, 26 N.Y. 9; Osborn
"· Robbins, 36 N. Y. 865; Hane "'· Detrick, 52 Ill. HI; Belote 1>. Henderson,
5 Cold. 471; Durr "· Hownrd, 6 At·k.
461 ; Bassett "· Bassett, 9 .liu~h, 696.

1 Richardson "· DunC'an, 3 N . fl.
508; &•verance "· Kimlmll. 8 N . II.
3t!O ; Brc•c·k r . lilanch:ml, 22 X. H.
30J; Wntkins "· fjaird, 6 )lass. ;)()6;
Fbher v. ~hattuek, 17 Pi!'k. 252;
Whitefield v. Longfellow, 1a )Ic. 146;
Eddy "· Herrin, 17 )[e. 3:38; B ,,,·ker
"· Low(•ll, 49 )[e 429; Plwl ps r. Znseb.
lag, 3-! 1't>X. 371; Thurman tJ Burt, ;;a
Ill. 129 ; Stouffer r. Latshaw. 2 Watts,
lOa; ;\leek "·Atkinson. 1 Bailey, 8-l;
Tnylnn,. Hlakl',ll )linn.2J5; Work's
Appeal, 59 Pl'nn. St. 444.
• Bnkt•r "'· Mort.m, 12 Wall. 1.30.
8ee llosl••y r. Shnnner, 26 Ark. 280;
lloJ,!'le " · II:~.muwns, 2 Hcisk. 136.
6 Clinton "· Strong. 9. Johns. 370;
Harmon v. Harmon, 61 1\Ie. 227; S. C.
14 Am. Hcp 556; F<'ller r. G n:cn, 26
Mich. 70; Bane 11. Detrich. 5:! Ill. 19.
If the threatg fail to cause apprehension of harm t!wre is no duress. ll11r-
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mander, where martial law prevails, requiring an act to be per-
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formed by the citizen which is contrary to his inclination,

establishes a condition of duress, though no demonstrations of

violence or threats are employed; the command itself being an

exhibition of force apparently irresistible.‘ Duress of goods

consists in seizing by force or withholding from the party enti-

tled to it the possession of personal property, and extorting

something as the condition for its release,’ or in demanding and

taking personal property under color of legal authority, which,

in fact, is either void or for some other reason does not justify

the demand.‘ ‘

Extortion, or the exaction of illegal or excessive fees for legal

services, is also a species of fraud; and the party from whom

the exaction is made is entitled to the same remedies as in other

cases where his property has been taken from him wrongfully.‘

mon o. Harmon, 61 Me. 227; S. C. 14

Am. Rep. 556; State 1:. Sluder, 70 N.

C. 55; Feller v. Green, 26 Mich. 70.

' Olivari rn. Monger, 39 Tex. 76.

‘Crawford 1:. Cato, 22 Geo. 594;

Spaids v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289; S. C. 11

Am. Rep. 10; Tutt v. Ide, 3 Blntch.
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249; Sasportas 0. Jennings, 1 Bay,

mander, where martial law prevails, requiring an act to be performed by the citizen which is cont.r-ary to his inclination,
establishes a condition of duress, though no demonstrations of
violence or threats are employed; the command it:>elf being an
exhibition of fore.c apparently irresistible.' Dur·e:;s of ~'"'ds
consists in seizing by force or withholding from the party entitled to it the possession of personal proper·ty, and extorting
something as the condition for· its release,• or in demanding and
taking per~onal property under color of legal authority, which,
in fact, is either \'oid or tor sume other reason does not justify
the demand.•
I
Extortion, or the exaction of illegal or excessive fees for legal
services, is also a species of fraud; ai1d the party from whom
the exaction is made is entitled to the same remedies as in other
cases where his property has been taken from him wrongfully.•

470; Collins iv. Westbury, 2 Bay. 211;

Nelson v. Suddarth, 1 II. & M. 350;

Wliite v. H1-ylman, 34 Penn. St. 142;

Radick 1:. Hutchins, 95 U. S. Rep.

210; Chandler '0. Sanger, 114 Mass.

864; S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 367; Shaw 0.

Woodcock, 7 B. & C. 73.

‘First Nat. Bank v. Watkins, 21

Mich. 483; Beckwith '0. F!‘i>l)l(', 32

Vt. 559; Adams v. Reeves, 68 N. C.

134; S. C. 12 Am. Rep. 627. A threat

to attach property for a demand not

yet due is not duress. Lehman 0.

Sh--<-kleford, 50 Ala. 437.

‘ It‘ by the process the party only

obtains what he is lawfully entitled

to, an action will not lie to recover it

back, though it might lie for any dis-

tinct wrongful act under the process.

Skeate I. Beale, 11 Ad. & El. 983.

mon "· llurnton, 61 Me. 227; S. C. 14
Am. Rt>p. 556; State 1). Simler, 70 N.
C. 55; I<'ellcr "· Green, 26 Mich. 70.
' Olivari o. .Menger, 39 Tex. 76.
1 Crawford "· Cato, 22 Geo. 594;
Spaid~ e. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289; S. C. 11
Am. Rep. 10; Tutt "· Ide, 8 Bl:1tch.
249; Sllsportas "· Jennings, 1 Bay,
4i0; Collins o. Westbury, 2 Bay. 211;
Nelson r. 8uddarth, 1 II. & ll. 850;
White 11. H<'ylmtUJ, 34 Penn. St. H2;
Radick "· Hutchins, 95 U. S. Rep.
210; Chandler r. Sanger, 114 1tlass.
864; B. C. 19 A.m. Rep. 867; Shaw e.
Woodcock, 7 B. & C. 73.

• First Nnt. Bank "'· Wntkins, 21
:Mich. 48.1; ll<'ck with "· Fri~ui<', 32
Vt. 5:;9; Adams 11. Reeves, 68 N. C.
134; 8. C. 12 Am. Hep. 627. A tbrcnt
to attnch property for a demand not
yt>t clue is nnt duress. Lcbm1w "·
8l• :·c-kleford, 50 Ala. 437.
• If by the procc!'ls the party only
obtains what be is lawfully entitled
to, an action will not lie to reco\'t•r it
oock, though it might lie for any dis.
tinct wron.~ful act under the procesa.
Skeate •· Beale, 11 Ad. & El. 983.
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wnones IN CONFIDENTIAL nsmrtons.

By conﬁdential relations are here meant those relations formed

by convention or by acquiescence, in which one party trusts his

pecuniary or other interests to the ﬁdelity and integrity of

another, by whom, either alone, or in conjunction \vith himself,

he expects them to be guarded and protected. Such relations

exist between agent and principal, between partner and partner,

between corporator and otlicer of the corporation, and between

cestui qua trust and trustee. They may also exist between parent

and child, where circumstances raise an implication of trust or

agency, and between husband and wife in the same way, and

CHAPTER XVII.

sometimes by contract. In case of the domestic relations there

is likely to be, in addition to the conﬁdence springing from inti-

WRONGS IN CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS.

mate business trust, a further trust, born of affection and great

personal intimacy, that may easily grow into or pave the way for

undue inﬂuence. This is the chief coadjutor of fraud in all these

relations.

By undue inﬂuence is meant that control which one obtains

over another, whereby the other is made to do in important

affairs what of his free will he would not do. It differs wholly

from persuasion in which falsehood does not mingle, for that
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merely leads the will, while undue inﬂuence eoerces it.‘ The

manner in which the control is obtained is not important.

Husband and Wife. The most conﬁdential of all the relations

of life is that of husband and wife. For reasons which are inter-

woven with the whole framework of civilized society, the law is

specially careful and vigilant in guarding and protecting the con-

ﬁdence which this relation invites and inspires. It will not

'“It must be a control intention- latter of the free agency of option."

ally exercised by one mind over the BUTLER, J ., in Martin 0. Teague, 2

will of another, so as to deprive the Speers, 260.

By confidential relations are here meant those relations t'brmed
by convention or by acquiescence, in which one party trusts his
pecuniary or other interests to the fidelity and integrity of
another, by whom, either alone, or in conjunction with him~clf,
he expects them to be guarded and protected. Such relations
exist between agent and principal, between partner and partner,
between corporator and officer of the corporation, and between
cestui que t1·W1t and trustee. They may also exist bet~veeu parent
and child, where circumsta.nces raise an implication of trust or
agency, and between husband and wife in the same way, and
sometimes by contract. In case of the domestic relations there
is likely to be, in addition to the confidence springing from intimate business trust~ a. further trust, born of affection aud great
personal intimacy, that may ea~ily grow into or pave the way for
undue influence. This is the chief coadjutor of ti·aud in all these
relations.
Bv undue influence is meant that control which one obtains
"
over another, whereby the other is made to do in important
affairs what of his free will he wonl<l not do. It differs wholly
from persuasion in which falsehood does not mingle, tor that
merely leads the will, while undne influence coerces it.• The
manner in which the control is obtained is not important.
Husband and Wife. The most confidential of all the relations
of life is that of husband and wife. For reasons which are interwoven with the whole framework of civilized society, the law is
specially careful and vigilant in guarding and protecting the confidence which this relation invites and inspires. It will not
1 "It must be a control intentionally exercised by one mind over the
will of another, so as to deprive the

latter of the free agency of option."
BUTI.ER, J., in :Martin tl. 'feague, 2
Speers, 260.
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suffer this conﬁdence to be invaded and exposed, even though the
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facts which might thereby be brought to light should be supposed

important to the interests of others. In general, where the stat-

ute law has cut away all barriers to the giving of evidence, and

allowed even the party accused of crime to testify in his own

behalf, it has not gone so far as to permit either husband or wife

to testify against the other, except by mutual consent, deeming

it better that usticc should sometimes fail for want of evidence,

than that the family conﬁdences should be laid bare to the public,

or the conscience of the spouse be exposed to the temptation to

conceal or prevaricate where the truth might be damaging. Nev-

ertheless, the law does not undertake to enforce the observance

of the marital conﬁdence as between the parties themselves, but

trusts it to their own sense of what is decent and proper. If this

does not in all cases afford protection against the exposure to

public gaze and derision of those contidences which should be

held sacred, no legal redress is possible that would not introduce

greater evils than it could cure.

The common law supposed the wife to be largely under the

coercion of the husband; and though this, so far as her property

interests are concerned, is no longer a legal presumption, still the

existence of some degree of marital inﬂuence may always be sup-
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posed; and if the husband is inclined to deal unfairly with his

wife, this inﬂuence, and the conﬁdence begotten of the relation,

will give him special facilities for the purpose. This relation is

consequently of high importance when fraud or unfair dealing

by the husband with the wife's interests is alleged, and may

justly call upon the courts to criticise closely their negotiations.’

“The law certainly does not prevent persons in this conﬁdential

relation from doing, without urgency, of their own accord, and

under the natural impulses of kindness and aﬁ'ection, such gen-

erous acts as arc the results of mutual conﬁdence and good will.

But the same principle which encourages conﬁdence protects it

by preventing any proﬁt to be gained from abusing it. The law

recognizes the fact that a married woman is easily subjected to a

species of coercion, very much more effectual than any ordinary

operation of fear or fraud from strangers. It has always been

' “ They will not be upheld where or undue inﬂuence." Reagan's Admr.

there is even slight evidence of fraud 0. Holliman, 34 Tex. 403, 410.

suffer this confidence to be invaded and exposed, even though the
facts which might thereby be brought to light should be suppo:\Cd
important to the interests of others. In general, where the statute law has cut away all barriers to the giving of evidence, and
allowed even the party accused of crime to testify in his own
behalf, it has not gone so far as to permit either husband or wife
to testify against the other, eicept by mutual consent, deeming
it better that justice should sometimes fail for want of e\·iderwe,
than that the family confidences shonld be laid bare to the public,
or the conscience of the spouse be exposed to the temptation to
conceal or prevaricate where the truth might be damaging. N evertheless, the law docs not undertake to enforce the observance
of the marital confidence as between the parties themselves, but
trusts it to their own sense of what is decent and proper. If this
does not in all cases afford protection against tho exposure to
public gaze and derision of those confidences which should be
held sacred, no legal redress is pos8ible that would not introduce
greater evils tnan it could cure.
The common law supposed the wife to be largely under the
coercion of the husband; and though this, so far as her property
interests are concerned, is no longer a legal presumption, still the
existem:e of some degree of marital influence may always be supposed; and if the husband is inclined to deal on fairly with his
wife, this influence, and the confidence beg.)tten of the relation,
will give him Rpecial facilities for the purpose. This rciation is
consequently of hi~h importance when fraud or untair dealing
by the husband with the wife's interm1ts is allegL>d, and may
justly call upon the courts to criticise closely their negotiations.•
"The law certainly does not prevent persons in this confidential
relation from doing, without urgency, ot' their own accord, and
onder the natural impulses of kindnc~s and affection, such generous acts as arc the results of mutual confidence and brood wilJ.
But the same principle which encont-agcs confidence prott.-cts it
by preventing any profit to be gained from abusing it. The law
recognizes the fact that a married womau is easily subjected to a
species of coercion, very mnch more effectual than any ordinary
operation of fear or fraud f'rorn strangers. It has always been
1 "They wtll not be npbeld where
there is even sllgbl endence of fraud

•

or undue influence." ReAgan's Admr.
•· Holliman, 84 Tex. .OS, 410.
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found necessary to examine jealously into all transactions whereby
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the husband gets an advantage over his wife, not plainly sponta-

neous on her part. Any undue advantage gained by the use of

the marital relation is a legal fraud on the wife, which courts of

equity will not allow to stand to her prejudic-e."‘ And where

the statutes permit the wife to bring suit at law against the hus-

band, she may seek a remedy in that forum when the facts will

justify it. But as the remedy in equity would commonly be

more complete and suitable. we need say only, what has been said

in another connection, that when the wife sues her husband for

an injury to her property, she makes out her right of action on

the principles which would support one against any other person,

and the relation is important only as it has furnished the facili-

ties for accomplishing the wrong complained of.’ It often hap-

pens that the husband, by the acquiescence, rather than by the

express employment, of the \vife, becomes her agent for the

management of her property, and he acquires a knowledge of its

condition, circumstances and value greater than she is likely to

possess, and which in many cases he might easily use for his own

advantage if dishonestly inclined. Such a case is one where he

may justly be held under strictest obligation not to abuse the

conﬁdence reposed.
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Parties Engaged to Marry. The contract of marriage estab-

lishes a conﬁdential relation between the parties but little less

intimate than that of marriage itself, and almost equally suscep-

tible of being taken advantage of for the pllrposes of fraud

The most serious fraud accomplished in this relation is that of

seduction. In llorfon v. Fenn it was urged, before Lord Mass-

FIELD, that the woman was entitled to no redress for this wrong,

because the parties were in pari (1'eZict~_,- but he very justly said

that if the woman’s consent was obtained by means of the promise

of marriage, which the man did not intend to fulﬁll. “this was

found necessary to examine jealously into a1l transactions whereby
the husband gets an advantage over his wife, not plainly spontaneous on her part. Any undue admntage gained by the use of
the marital relation is a legal frand on the wife, whieh con1·ts of
equity will not allow to ~tand to her prejudice.''' And where
the statutes permit the wile tu b1·ing suit at law against the hushand, she may seek a. remedy in that forum when the fH.ctg will
justi(y it. But as the remedy in equity would commonly be
more complete and suitable, we need say only, what has heen said
in another connection, that when the wife snes her husband for
an injury to her property, she makes ont her right of action on
the principles which would support one against any other person,
and the relation is important only a.s it ha~ furnished the titt!ilities for accomplishing the wrong complained of.' It often happens that the husband, by the acquiescence, rather than by the
express employment, of the wife, yecomes her agent tor the
man~aement of her property, and he a<'quires a knowledge of its
condition, circumstance;; and V"alue greater than she is likely to
posses:-;, and which in many cases he might easily use tor his own
advantage if dishonestly inclined. Snch a case is one wht•re he
may justly be held under strictest obligation not to abuse the
confidence reposed.

a cheat on the part of the man.”' So it was said in an early

‘Witbeck 0. Witbcck, 25 Mich. an apprehension that they will be

439, 442. In Taplcy 40. Tapley, 10 carried inloeltcct.

Minn. 448, it was held that thrcnts by ’ Shoul. Dom. Rel. 2-S6; 2 Bishop,

the husband to separate from his wife, Law of Married W'omen, Ch. 35.

accompanied by general abusive treat ‘Morton 0. Fenn, 3 Doug‘. 211.

ment, constitute such duress as will There was no decision of the case

avoid a deed executed by her under by the court in bank.

4 ;_..ii; g __ﬁ

Parties Engaged to Marry. The contract of marl"ia::re establishes a conti<lential rebtion between the partie's but little less
intimate than that of marria.~e it:;e)f, and almost equally susceptible of being taken advantage of for the plll'pn,.es of fraud
The most serious frand aeromplished in this relation is that of
seduction. In .Mm·ton v.Ji'enn it was m·g-ed, befo1·e Lord ~[Axs
FIELD, that the woman was entitled to no redress fi.>r this wrong,
because the parties w·cre -in pari dtdicto; but he very justly said
that if the woman's consent wa<; obtained by rneanfl of the promise
of marriage, which the man did not intend to fnltill. "this was
a cheat on the part of the man." • So it was said in an early
1 Witbeck "- Witbeck, 25
Mich.
439, 442. In Tapley t>. Tnplcy, 10
:Minn. 4-!8, it was belu that threat~ by
the husband to separate from his wife,
accompanied by general abusive treatment, constitute such duress as will
avoid a deed executed by her under

an apprehen!>ion that they will be
carried into cfl'ect.
t Shout. Dom. He I. 2.86; 2 llishop,
Law of ~larried Women, Ch. 3:l.
• ~lorton "· Fenn, 3 Dnu;,!'. 211.
There was no decision of the case
by the court in bank.
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case by Chief Justice Pansoxs, that “damages are recoverable

511

for breach of a promise of marriage, and if seduction has been

practiced under color of that promise, the jury will undoubtedly

consider it as an aggravation of the dan1ages.”' The same doc-

trine has since been more authoritatively declared in that State,

and also in several others.’

Says CAMPBELL, J.: "The seduction which is allowed to be

proven in these cases is brought about in reliance upon the con-

tract, and is itself in no very indirect way a breach of its implied

conditions. Such an engagement brings the parties necessarily into

very intimate and conﬁdential relations, and the advantage taken

of those relations by the seducer is asiplain a breach of trust in

all its essential features as any advantage gained by a trustee or

guardian or conﬁdential adviser, who cheats a confidiug ward or

beneﬁciary or client into a losing bargain. It only diﬂ'ers from

ordinary breaches of trust in being more heinous. A subsequent

refusal to marry the person whose confidence has been thus

deceived cannot fail to be aggravated in fact by the seduction.

The contract is twice broken. The result of an ordinary breach

of promise is the loss of the alliance and the inortilication and

pain consequent on the rejection. But in the case of seduction

there is added to this the loss of character and social position,
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and not only a deeper shame and sorrow, but a darkened future.

All of these spring directly and naturally from the broken obli-

gation. The contract involves protection and respect, as well as

aﬁ'ection, and is violated by the seduction. as it is by the refusal

to marry. A subsequent marriage coudones the ﬁrst wrong. but

a refusal to marry makes the seduction a very grievous element

of injury that cannot be lost sight of in any view of jllStice.”'

In Kentucky and Pennsylvania this doctrine has not found

favor, and the w0man’s complaint of the seduction is put aside

' Tau] 0. Frazier, 3 Mass. 71, 73. See

Boynton 1:. Kellogg, 3 Mass. 189;

Sherman r. Raws n, 102 Mass. 395.

' Kelly 0. Riley, 106 Muss. 339; S.

C. 8 Am. Rep. 336; Conn v. Wilson,

2 Ovc-rlon, 233; Goodall v. Thurman,

1 Head, 209; Whalen v. Layman, 2

Blackf. 194; King v. Kt-rscy, 2 Ind.

402; Wiltls v. Hogan, 57 Ind. 483;

Green 0. Spencer, 3 Mo. 225; Mat.

thews 0. Cribbett. 11 Ohio, (N. s.)

3110; Wells v. Padgett. 8 Barb. 323;

Slit-ahan v. Barry, 27 Mich. 217. The

case by Chief Justice P A.Rsoss, that "dama;..~s are recoverable
for breach of a promise of marriage, and if ~eclnction has heen
practiced under color of that promise, the jury will undoubtedly
consider it as an aggravation of the dt&mages." • The same doctrine has since been more authoritatively declared in that State,
and also in several others.'
Says 0AllPDEI,L, J.: ''The eednction which is a1lowecl to he
proven in these cases is brought nhont in reliance upon the contract, and is itself in no very indirect way a breach of its implied
conditions. Such an engagement bring:i the parties ll['cessa.rily into
very intimate and confi<lential relation>~, and the ad vantnge takl'n
of those relations by the seducer is as ·plain a breach of trust in
all its essential featnres as any nd \·antage gained by a trni!tcc or
guardian or confidential adviser, who cheats a conficling ward or
beneficiary or client into a losing bargain. It only differs from
ordinary breaches of trust in being more heinou:-. A su\J,.:pqneut
refusal to marry the person whose contideuce hns been thus
deceived cannot fail to be aggra\"ated in t~1ct by tlte Heduction.
The contract is twice broken. The result of au ordinary hreach
of promise is the loss of the alliance and tht mortification and
pain consequent on the rejection. But in the case of seclnction
there is added to this the loss of character and social position,
and not only a deeper shame and sorrow, but a darkened fntnre.
All of these spring directly and naturally from the broken obligation. The contract invol\'cs prot(·ctiun and respect, as well as
affection, and is ,·iolatPcl by the seduction, as it i8 by the refu:"nl
to marry. A subsequent marriage condones the first wrong. but
a refusal to marry makes the seduction a very grie,·ons element
of injury that cannot be lost sight of in any ''iew of jm.tiee."•
In Kentucky and Pennsylvania this doctrine has not found
favor, and the woman\~ complaiut <•f the seduction is put aoic.lc

action will lie, though the defendant,

the plainliﬂ‘ not knowing the fact,

was murrled at the time. Kelly 0.

Riley, supra.

‘ .\'lic-ahnn o. Barry, 2'7 Mich. 217,

2'30.

I

raul

f).

Fra7.iC'r, 3 )lass. 71, 73. Bee

Boynton t. Kt·lln~g. 3 )[ass. 189;
Shermnn r. Rnw:; n, 102 )[a.o.s. !195.
t Kelly tJ. Riley, 100 :\lass. !'139; B.
C. 8 Am. Rep. 3:.lG; Conn "· Wilson,
2 Owrlon, 2:3:-J; Goodall "· Thurnum,
1 Head, 209; Wlu\lcn ». Layman, 2
Black f. 19-l; King r. K<'rsey, 2 ln1l.
402; Wilds t'. Bogan, 5i Ind. 483;
G r<'en •· Spencer, 3 :\[o. 2'>..5; llat.

thews "· Cribhclt, 11 Ohio, (~. s.)
n::o; Wells "· Pad~ctt. 8 Burb. 323;
Sht•ull:m r. Barry, 27 )licit. 217. The
action will lie, though the defendant,
tlll" plaintiff not knowing the fact,
was mnrrled a& the time. Kelly "Rilry, supra.
• Sh!'ahnn "· Barry, 2"1 l[ich. 217,
2:!0.
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on the ground that she was in pm-i delictof “Illicit inter-
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course,” it is said, “is an act of mutual iinprudence, and the law

makes no distinction between the sexes as to the comparative

inﬁrmity of their common nature. A woman is not seduced

against her consent, lowever basely it be obtained, and the maxim

volenti non ﬁt injuria is as applicable to her as to a husband,

whose consent to his own dishonor bars his action for criminal

conversation.” ' But between the case of a husband consenting

to the dishonor of his bed and that of a woman cheated by a

deceptive engagement to marry into a surrender of her chastity

there does not seem to be_any such analogy as to make the legal

rules which should govern the one throw light upon the other.

The one instinctively excites disgust, and the other compassion.

One party assents from motives that can only be low and vile,

the other is the victim of pcrﬁdy. It is true there is consent,

but so there is in other cases ot fraud; for it is by obtaining

consent that frauds are accomplished.‘

The confidence of this relation may also be abused through

such secret conveyances of one of the parties as would materially

diminish the rights in property which the other had reason to

expect he or she would acquire by the marriage. \Vhile neither

of the parties has any claim to have all the business transactions
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of the other made known, they are both entitled to a fair dis-

closure of such dealings as are expressly designed to affect their

own interests. The rule of law on the subject may be stated as

follows: Wliere either party to the contract of marriage secretly

conveys away his or her property, or any considerable portion

thereof, with intent to defraud the other of such rights therein

as, but for the conveyance, would be acquired by the marriage,

this, if not discovered until after the marriage takes place, will

1 Burks v. Shain, 2 Bibb, 341; Wea-

ver 'v. Bachert, 2 Penn. St. 80.

9 Grnsox, Ch. J., in Weaver v. Bach-

ert, 2 Penn. St. S0. And,see Baldy '0.

St-ratton, 11 Penn. St. 316.

' The bad character of the plain-

tiff, following the seduction in such a

case, is no defense, either total or par-

tial. Boynton v. Kellogg, 3 Mass. 189;

Conn 1:. Wilson. 2 Overt. 233.

Where the statute gives the woman

an action for the seduction, she can.

not give this in evidence in an action

on the ground that she was in pari delicto.• "Illicit intercourse," it is said, "is an act of mutual impruden<:e, and the law
makes no distinction between the sexes as to the comparative
infirmity of their common nature. A woman is not seduced
against herconsent,lowever basely it be obtained, and the maxim
'VOlenti non fit injuria is as applicable to her as to a husband,
whose consent to his own dishonor bars his action for criminal
conversation." • But between the case of a husband consenting
to the dishonor of his bed and that of a woman cheated by a
deceptive engagement to marry into a surrender of her chastity
there does not seem to be.any such analogy as to make the legal
rules which should govern the one throw light upon the other.
The one instinctively excites disgnst, and the other compassion.
One party assents from moth·es that can only be low and vile,
the other i~ the victim of perfidy. It is true there is consent,
but so there is in other cases ot fraud; for it is by obtaining
consent that frauds are accomplished.•
The confidence of this relation may also be abnsed through
such secret conveyances of one of the parties as would materially
diminish the rights in property which the other had reason to
expect he or she would acquire by the marriage. While neither
of the parties has any claim to have all the busine~;s transactions
of the other made known, they are both entitled to a fair disclosure of snch dealings as are expressly desigqed to affect their
own interests. The rule of law on the subject may be stated as
follows: Where either party to the contract of marria~re secretly
conveys away bis or her property, o1· any considerable portion
thereof, with intent to defraud the other of snch rights therein
as, but for the conveyance, wouhl be acquired by the marriage,
this, if not discovered until after the marringe takes place, will

for breach of promise to marry, un.

less it is set up in the declaration.

Cates v. McKinney, 48 Ind. 562; Per-

kins v. Hersey, 1 R. I. 493.

If the seduction preceded the prom.

ise of marriage, instead of following

it, it cannot be given in evidence by

way of aggravation. Espy 0. Jones.

37 Ala. 379.

_ ___<_,q-qw

I Burks t~. Shain, 2 Bibb, 341; Wea.
ver "· Buchert, 2 Penn. St. 80.
• Grnt~ON, Ch. J., in Weaven. Bachert. 2 Penn. St. 80. And, see Baldy t~."
Stratton, 11 Penn. St. 816.
• The bad character of the plain.
tiff, following the seduction In such a
case, is no defense, either total or partial. Boynton t~. Kellogg, 8 Jrlass. 189;
Conn "· Wilson, 2 Overt. 283.
Where the statute gives the womi\Il

an action for the seduction, she Cllllnot give thi~ In evidence in an action
for breach of promise to marry, unJcs'i it is st't up in tho declaration.
C~ttes 11. JrlcKinney, 48 Ind. 562; Per.
kios o. Hersey, 1 R. I. 493.
If the seduction prreedcd the promi&c of marriage, instead of following
it. it cannot be given in evidence by
way of aggravation. Espy o. Jone~
87 Ala. 879.
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be treated in equity as a fraud upon the other, and such relief
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will be given as the circumstances of the case will admit of, and

as may be found suitable.‘ The suitable relief will be that which

gives to the party defrauded an equivalent for that which is lost; '

but this must vary as the cases diﬂ'er. If, however the intended

deceit is discovered before the marriage takes place, the party is

be treated in equity as a fraud upon the other, and such relief
will be given as the circumstances of the case will admit of, and
may be found suitable.' The suitable relief will be that which
gives to the party defrauded an equivalent for that which is lost; •
but this must vary as the cases differ. If, however the intended
deceit is discovered before the marrittge takes place, the party is
put to an election, either to withdraw from the engagemt!nt
because of the fraudulent change in circumstances, or to consummate the marriage, thereby waiving the objection.• There can, of
course, be no fraud if the ti\cts are discovered in season to withdraw from the contemplated relation.•
'
Another fraud, by no means eo uncommon as to make its mention unnecessary, is where one of the parties mahs ntSe ot' the
confidence and affection of the relation to obtain the other's
property, empluying some plausible but fraudulent pretense for
the purpose. What has been said regarding the facility for fraud
which the marriage relation affords will apply with great force
here, with this difference: that whel'eas, after marriage, the
woman's interest needs specially to be guarded, before marriage
one party is perhaps as liable to be betrayed by O\'er <:onlidcnce
88 the other.
88

put to an election, either to withdraw from the engagement

because of the fraudulent change in circumstances, or to consum-

mate the marriage, thereby waiving the objection.‘ There can, of

course, be no fraud if the facts are discovered in season to with-

draw from the contemplated relation.‘ '

Another fraud, by no means so uncommon as to make its men-

tion unueeessary, is where one of the parties makes use of the

conﬁdence and affection of the relation to obtain the other’s

property, employing some plausible but fraudulent pretense for

the purpose. \Vhat has been said regarding the facility for fraud

which the marriage relation affords will apply with great force

here, with this diiference: that whereas, after marriage, the

woman’s interest needs specially to be guarded, before marriage

one party is perhaps as liable to be betrayed by over contidence

as the other.

‘England 0. Downs, 2 Beav. 522;
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Strathmore v. Bowes. 1 Ves. 22; Lin-

ker o. Smith, 4 Wash. C. C. 224;

Tucker o. Andrews, 13 Me. 124; Lo-

gan 0. Simmons, 3 Ired. Eq. 487;

Johnson 1:. Peterson, 6 Jones‘ Eq. 12;

Poston 0. Gillespie, 5 Jones’ Eq. 2-">8;

Spencer v. Spencer, 8 Jones’ Eq. 40-1;

Duncan’s Appeal, 43 Penn. St. 67;

Robinson o. Buck, 71 Penn. St. 386;

Ramsay o. Joyce, 1 Meblul. liq. 236;

Manes o. Durant. 2 Rich. Eq. 404;

Waller 1:. Armistead, 2 L4.-igli, 11;

Hobbs. 0. Bland ford, 7 T. B. Mon. 461);

Leach 0. Duvull. 8 Bush, 201; Wil-

liams 0. Carlc, 2 Stock. Ch. 543: Mc-

Afee 0. Ferguson, 9 B. Mon. 475.

' See Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 258.

' SL George 0. Wake, 1 My]. & K.

610.

‘ St. George v. wllkﬁ, 1 Myl & K.

610; Fletcher v. Ashley, 6 Grat. 332;

Cheshire u. Payne, 16 B. Mon. 618;

McClure v. Miller. Bailey Eq. 104;

Terry v. Hopkins, Hill Eq.l; Jordan

0. Black, Mcigs, 142. If the con-

veyance had been madc before the

engagement to marry, though then

unknown, it would be no frau-.l.

Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 Ves. 22. Nor

would it be a fraud in any case if

what was conveyed was property in

which, by the marriage, the other

party would have acquired no interest,

present or contingent. Nor if what

was conveyed away was only a rea-

sonable provision for the children of

a former marriage, or for others hav-

ing a claim upon the party for a sup-

port. See Tucker r. Andrews. 13 Me.

124; Green v. Goodall. 1 Coldw. 404;

Blanchet v. Foster, 2 Ves. Sr. 264.

Every case must stand on its own

facts. Richards v. Lewis, 11 C. B.

1035; Terry v. Hopkins, 1 Hill, Ch.

(S. C.) 1; Taylor 0. Pugh,1 Hare, 608.

33

1 England e. Downs, 9 Beav. 522:
Strathmore "·Bowes, 1 Ves. 22: Linker "· Smith, 4 Wash. 0. C. 2-.M;
Tucker"· Andrews, 18 ~le. 124; Logan "· Simmons, 3 Irell. Eq. 487;
Johnson"· Peterson, 6 Jones' Eq. 12;
Poston e. Gillespie, 6 Jones' Eq. 2.18;
Spencer 11. Spencer, 8 Jones' Eq. 404;
Duncan's Appeal, 48 Penn. St. 67;
Robinson "· Buck, 71 Pl'nn. St. 886;
Ramsay "·Joyce, 1 :Mcllul. Eq. 236;
Manes "· Durant. 2 Rich. Eq. 404;
Waller "· Armistead, 2 Leigh, 11;
Dobbs. "· Blandford, 7 T. B. :Moo. 469;
Lellch "· Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 ; Williams "· Carle, 9 Stock. Ch. M!J; ~[c
.Afee "· Ferguson, 9 B. llon. 47G.
1 See Smith e. Hines, 10 Fla. 258.
1 SL George "·Wake, 1 llyl. & K.
610.
• Sl George e. Wilke, 1 Hyl & K.
610; Fletcher "·Ashley, 6 Grat. 832;
Chnblre "· Payne, 16 B. Mon. 618;

83

:McClure e. Miller. B'\lley F.q. 104;
Terry e. Hopkins, Hill Eq.l; Jortlan
"· Bht.ck, .Meigs. 142. It tbe conveyance had been made before the
engagement to marry, though thl·n
unknown, U would be no frau:l.
Strathmore "· Bowel', 1 Vea. 22. Nor
would it be a fraud in any case it
what was conveyed was property in
which, by the marriage, tho other
party would have acquired no interest,
prt'~ot or contingent. Nor if wba&
was conveyed away was only a rea.
sonable provision for the childr<'n of
a former marriage, or for othl'ra having a claim upon the party for " 11up.
porL See Tucker r. Andrew~. 18 Me.
124; Green"· Go<xhdl, 1 Voldw. ((M;
Blanchet "· Foster, 2 Vtos. Hr. :!liol.
Every cue must stand on its own
facts. Richards "· Lewis, 11 C. B.
1035; Terry "· Hopkins, 1 llill, Ch.
(8. C.) 1; Taylor •· Pugh, 1 Hare, 608.
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514

TilE LAW OF TOUTS.

conveyance of property has been obtained as a gift or for an

inadequate consideration, the donee or grantee refuses to complete

the marriage.‘

Parent and Child. This relation is peculiarly exposed to undue

inﬂuence, at ﬁrst on the part of the parent over the child, and

afterwards, possibly, on the part of the child over the parent.

It is a strong, if not conclusive, badge of fraud if, after a
conveyar.H:e of property has been obtained as a gift or for an
inadequate consideration, the donee or grantee refuses to complete
the marriage. 1

During the period of minority the parent is the natural guardian

of the child’s person. with aut.horitv to require and enforce obedi-

ence. and this authority, coupled with the natural aﬂieetion, may

be expected, in a great degree, to subordinate the child’s will to

the parent’s while the period of minority continues. Moreover,

if the child has an independent estate, it often happens that its

management is allowed to be taken charge of by the parent, and

though this is irregular, unless he is legally appointed guardian

of the estate, it may nevertheless answer all purpo=es when no

one raises questions. \Vhere this irregular or quasi guardian-

ship exists, it is likely still further to increase the parental

inﬂuence.’

If the parent is disposed to take any undue advantage of this

inﬂuence, he will be likely to do so soon after the child comes of

age, While the inﬂuence is still unimpaired, and before the child
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has become accustomed to independent management. There is

no legal impediment to an adult child making gifts to his parent at

that or any other period, but all dealings which then take place

are justly looked upon with some degree of jealousy, and if they

are gifts, the donee would be required to show that they were

spontaneous acts of the child, made with full understanding of

what, in respect to the property, were his position and rights.‘

' (loulson 0. Allison. 2 De G., F. & Anstrnthvr. 2 Scotch App. ‘Z23; S. C.

J. 521; Rockafellow 0. Newcomb, 57

lli. 186.

’ llevett '0. Hawvey, 1 Sim. & S.

502; Findley v. Patterson, 2 B. Mon.

'76; Sears 1». Sliafer, 1 Barb. 408; S. C.

6 N. Y. 268.

“ Turner 0. Collins, '7 L. R. Ch. Ap.

329; S. C. 2 Moak, 290: Saveryv.

King, 5 H. L. (Jas. 626; Wright 1:.

Vanderplank, 2 Kay & J. 1; S. C. 8

De G., M. & G. 133; Cuninghame 0.

3 “oak, 169: 'l‘:|ylor v. Taylor. S How.

1813. The tlot'tt'in0 is not conﬁned to

Parent and Child. This rel11tion is peculiarly exposed to undue
influence, at first on the part of the parent o\·er the child, and
afterwards, possibly, on tl1e part of the child o\·er the parent.
Dnrin.z the period of minority the parent is the naturnl ~uardian
of the child's pen;on. with authority to require and enforce obedience. and this authority, c~upled with the natnrnl afii~ction, may
be expected, in a great degree, to subor1linate the child'~; will to
the parent's while the period of minority continues. :\Io1·eover,
if the child has an independent estate, it often happens that its
management is allowed to be tnken charge of by the parent, an~
though this is irregular, unless he is legally appointed guardian
of the estate, it may nevertheless answe1· all pnrpo~es when no
one raises questions. 'Vhere this i1·1'egnlar or qufl.rti gmu·dianship exists, it is likely still further to increase the parental
influence.•
If the parent is disposed to take any undue ad,·antage of this
influence, he will be likely to do so soon after the child comes of
age, while the influence is still unimpai1·cd, and beto1'c the child
has beeome accustomed to indeprndent manag-ement. There is
no legal impediment to an adult child making ~ifts to his parent at
that or any other period, lmt all dealings which then take place
are justly looked upon with some degree of jealousy, and if they
are gifts, the donee would be reqnimd to show that they were
spontaneous acts of the child, made with fnll unrlerstanding of
what, in respect to the prope1-ty, ''rere his position and rights.•

parents strictly. Thus, where the

uncle of a yt-ling man who was es.

tranged from his father. and greatly

pressed by debts, took from him, for

£7,000, a conveyance \\'lllCll he had

ﬁrst ascertained was worth £20000,

the conveyance was set aside on the

same reasons above given. Tale 0.

Williamson, L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 56.

___ ..-.__.

I

Coulson"· A11ison. 2 De G., F. &

J. 521: Rockafellow "· Newcomb, 57
111. 186.
• Hevett "· Hnwvey, 1 Sim. & S.
502; Findley"· Patterson, 2 B. )Inn.
76; &oars "· Shafer, 1 Barb. 408; 8. C.
6 N.Y. 268.
3 Turner"· Collins, 7 L. R. Ch. Ap.
829; S. C. 2 1\Ioak, 2!JO: Savery "·
King, 5 H. L. Cas. li:W: W1·ight "·
Vanderplank, 2 Kay & J. 1; 8. C. 8
De G., M. & G. 183; Cuninghame "·

A nstmt lu•r. 2 Scotch App. 22:1; S. C.
3 ~foak. lf)!): Taylor"· Tnylor. 8 How.
tH:l. The rlortrlnc is not confined to
parents stl·ictly. Thus, where the
uncle of a y .. ung man who was C.."'tranged from his father. and greatly
pre~sed by debts, took from him, for
£i,OOO, a con,·cyancc which he had
flrst n1<certnincd was wol'th £20,000,
the conveyance was set o.side on the
same reasons above ~ivcn. Tale "Williamson, L. H. 2 Ch. Ap. 56.
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But family arrangements, not unfairly brought about, and which

from their nature do not suggest undue inﬂuence, will not be

disturbed.‘

There is no occasion for any corresponding jealousy for the

protection of the parent’s interests against the overreaching ot'

the child, unless the parent, from the imbecility of extreme old

age or other cause, has come to be dependent, in some degree at

least, upon the child, for guidance and direction. So long as he

is in the full possession of his mental powers, a gift to his child

suggests nothing but the ordinary promptings of affection.‘ But

when the child's becomes the guiding mind, and the parent is the

dependent, all dealings which are specially to the advantage of

the child he may justly be required to support by satisfactory

evidence that his own conduct in the transaction was above

reproach.‘

Illegal Sexual Relations. Where a transaction is brought

about while the parties are living in illegal sexual relations. it is

always open to suspicion of fraud or undue inﬂuence; and if it

is a gift, or a sale for an inadequate consideration, or if it is
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specially beneﬁcial to one party rather than to the other, tl|9

Dut family arrangements, not unfairly brought about, and which
from their nature do not suggest undue inflncnce, will not be
disturbed.'
There is no occasion for any corresponding jealousy for the
protection of the parent's interests agains~ the overreaching of
the child, unless the parent, from the imbecility of extreme old
age or other C!LUS•l, has come to be dependent, in some degree at
least, upon the child, for guidance and dire:·tion. So long as he
is in the fnll possession of his mental po"·~rs, a gift to his child
suggests nothing bnt the ordinary promptings of affection.• But
when the dtild's becomes the guiding mind, and the pnrent is the
dependent, all dealings which are specially to the acivantngc of
the child he may juotly be required to support by satis!iwtory
evidence that hi.s own conduct in the transaction was above
reproach.'

party beneﬁted by it will be under the necessity of showing that

no advantage was taken, and that it was the result of free

volition.‘

Persons of Weak Intellect. Wliile the contracts of persons

not idiotic and not mentally diseased are not void because of

weakness of understanding, yet when one i1ll(lOl't:tl(*‘S to deal

with such a person, he is very justly held to be under more

than the usual obligation to abstain from deception. \\'hat

might not be deception if practised on a person of average intel-

lcct, may he fraud in such a case, because it is calculated to accom-

plish a fraudulent purpose.‘ It has been said of gifts by such

nlegnl Sexual Relations.

Where a transaetion is bronght
a,bout wh~lc the parties are living in illegR.l ~;cxnal relations. it is
always open to suspicion of fraud or undue inftncnce; and if it
is a gift, or a sR.le for an inadequate consideration, or if it is
specially beneficial to one party rather than to the other, ti,e
party benefited by it will be onder the neces,;ity of showing- that
no ad\·antage was taken, and that it was the result of free
volition.'

' Taylor '0. Taylor, 8 How. 183.

' Millican v. Millican, 24 Tex. 426;

Beanland v. Bradley, 3 Sm. & G. 339.

i‘ Especially where the wish of the

child had become the will of the pa-

rent. Highbcrger 2:. Stiﬂ'lcr, 21 Md.

33$, 353; \Vhite 1:. Smith, 51 Ala. 405.

The doctrine applied ‘o the case of a

niece. Gore 0. Somersall, 5 T. B.

Mon. 504; Griﬂlths 0. Robins, 3

Madd. 191.

‘ Dean v. Negley, 41 Penn. SL1‘-12;

Persons of Weak Intellect. While the con tracts of p<>rsons
not idiotic and not mentally diseased are not voi<l becan,;e of
weakness of understanding, yet when one nn(lert:\k••s to deal
with such a person, he is very justly held to be under more
than the usual obligation to abstain from deception. "That
mi~ht not be deception if practised on a per:;on of ti\·era.l..re intellect, may he fraud in such a case, because it is cnlenlatcd to nct·omplish a fratulnlent purpose.' It has been said of gifts by sm·h

Coulson 0. Allison, 2 De G., F. & J.

521: }'Iar_;'rcave r. Everard, 6 Ir. Ch.

1

Tnylor "· Taylor, 8 How. 18.'1.

278. Sec, :-lso. Farmer e. Farmer, 1

H. L. Cas. 724; llayliss 0. \\'illinms.

6 Cold. 440.

‘ Baker 0. Monk, 4 De G.. J. & S.

t ~I iII ican

"· :Mill icn.n, 24 T<>x. 42G;
Bennlnnd "· Brudley, S Sm. & G. 330.
a E~pecially where the wish of the
child had l.lecnm? the will of the pa.
rent. Hi~hbt·rger ~. Stiffter, 21 ~ld.
3:38, 3.13; White "·Smith, 51 Ala. 40.'i.
Tbe doctrine appliecl !o the cmw of a
niece. Goro "· Sumert;ull, 5 T. B.

Mon. 504; Gritftths e. Rollin~. 3
Madel 191.
• Dean"· Negley, 41 P<>nn. Rt. !112;
Coulson "· Allison, 2 De G ., F. & J.
521: Ilargrt•nve r . E\'!·rar,J, 6 lr. Cb.
278. See, :-!so. Farmer "· Fnrnwr, 1
H. L. Clls. 7~4; Bayliss "· Will ium$,
6 Cold. 440.
• Baker e. Monk, 4 De G., J. & S.
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persons, that “ when a gift is disportionate to the means of the
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giver, and the giver is a person of weak mind, of easy temper,

yielding disposition, liable to be imposed upon, the court will

look upon such a gift with a jealous eye, and strictly examine

the conduct and behavior of the person in whose favor it is made;

and if it can discover that any acts or stratagems, or any undue

means have been used to procure such gilt, if it can see the least

speck of imposition, or that the donor is in such a situation in

respect to the donee as may naturally give him an undue inﬂu-

ence over him; in a word, if there be the least scintilla of fraud,

a court of equity will interpose.” '

The court would be less strict in requiring satisfactory show-

ing if a consideration had been paid, because the presumption

of fraud would weaken in proportion as the transaction was

found to be equal.’

\Vhoever takes advantage of a state of intoxication to deal

with another, must do so with a presumption against his good

faith proportioned to the depth of mental obscurity caused by

the condition.‘ And the presumption is greatly strengthened if

he himself brought about or encouraged the intoxication.‘

Corporate Oﬁcers. The oﬁicer of a corporation is its agent

within the scope of the powers conferred upon him, and the
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rules of liability which are applicable to agents he also comes

under. As such agent he stands in conﬁdential relations to all

the stockholders; he holds a place of trust, and by accepting it,

obligates himself to execute it with ﬁdelity, not for his own

388; Seldon 0. Myers, 20 How. 506;

Spraguc v. Duel. Clark's Ch. 90; Wiest

12. Garman, 4 Houst. 119; Set-ley 0.

persons, that "when a gift is disportionate to the means of the
giver, and the giver is a person of weak mind, of easy temper,
yielding disposition, liable to be imposed upon, the court will
look upon such a gift with a jealous eye, and strictly examine
the conduct and behavior of the person in whose favor it is made;
and if it can discover that any acts or stratagems, or any nndue
means have been used to procure such gift, if it can see the lea;;t
speck of imposition, or that the donor is in such a situation in
respect to the donee as may natut·ally give him an unuue influence over him; in a word, if there be the least scintilla of fraud,
a court of equity will interpose." 1
The court would be less strict in requiring satisfactory showing if a consideration had been paid, because the presumption
of fraud would weaken in proportion as the transaction was
found to be equal.'
'Vhoever takes advantage of a state of intox:cation to deal
with another, must do so with a presumption against his good
faith proportioned to the depth of mental obscurity caused by
the condition.• And the presumption is greatly strengthened if
he himself brought about or encouraged the intoxication!

Price, 14 Mich. 541; Wartvmherg 0.

Spicgcl, 31 Mich. 400; Perkins v.

Scott, 23 Iowa, 237; Ellis 1:. Mathews,

19 Tex. 390; Tally '0. Smith, 1 Cold.

290; (Yadwall:|(le1'o.Wesl, 48 Mo. 483;

}Il'l11l0I‘SOIl v. McGregor. 30 Wis. '78.

' Sears o. Shafer, 1 Barb. 408, 413,

per BARCULO. J. See Gartsidc 1;. Isher-

wood. 1 Bro. C.C.5-58; Bennett v.Vade,

2 Ark. 324; Lewis 12. Pead, 1 Vcs. 19;

Corporate Oftloers. The officer of a corporation is its agent
within the scope of the powers conferred upon him, and the
rules of liability which are applicable to agents he also comes
under. As such agent he stands in confidential rchtions to all
the stockholders; he holds a place of trust, and by R<:cepting it,
obligates himself to execute it with fidelity, not for his own

Harding v Handy. 11 Wlicat. 103.125;

Brooke v. Berry, 2 Gill. 83; Baker 0.

Monk, 4 De G., J. 8: S. 383.

' Brooke v. Berry, 2 Gill, 83; Free-

love 0. Cole, 41 Barb. 318.

' Peck 0. Cary, 27 N. Y.9; Hutch-

inson c. Brown, Clarke, Ch. 408;

Burns u. O'Rourke, 5 Rob. 649; Free-

man v. Dwiggins, 2 Jones‘ Eq.162;

Mansﬁeld 1n. Watson,2 Iowa, 111.

‘ Johnson o. Meddlicott, 3 P. Wins.

130, note a; Say v. Barwiek, 1 Ves. 8: B.

195; Cooke o. Clayworth, 18 Vcs. 12;

Curtis v. Hall, 4 N. J. 861 ; Whitesides

0. Greenlee, 2 Dev. Eq. 152; Dunn v.

Amos, 14 Wis. 106; Mansﬁeld 0. Wat-

son, 2 Iowa, 111.

888; Seldon e. Myers, 20 How. 506;
Sprague "·Duel, Clark's Ch. 90; Wiest
e. G11rman, 4: Houst. 119; IScdey "·
Price, 14 llich. 541; Warl<'mbcrg "·
S1'iegel, 81 Mich. 400; Perkins v.
Scott, 28 Iowa, 287; Ellis tl. Mathews,
19 Tex. 390; Tlllly "· Smith, 1 Cold.
290; Cadw111lnder "·West, 48 Mo. 483;
Ht•n•lerson "· llcGregor. 80 Wis. '78.
1 Scsrs "· Shafer, 1 Barb. 408, 4:13,
pt>r BARCULO, J. Sec Uartslde "· Isher.
wood.l Bro. C.C.558; Bennett-o.Vade,
9 Atk. 324: Lewis e. Pead, 1 Vcs. 19;
Hanlingv llandy.tt Wheal10:J.125;
Brooke "· Berry, 2 Gill. 83; Bnker e.
Monk, 4: De G., J. & 8. 888.

• Brooke e. Berry, 2 Gill, 83; Freelove "· Cole, 41 Harb. 818.
1 Peck e. Cary, 27 N.Y. 9; Hutchinson "· Brown, Clarke, Ch. 408;
Burns e. O'Rourke, 5 Rob. 649; Freeman e. Dwi~rgins, 2 Jones' Eq. 162;
Mansfield e. Watson,2 Iowa, ttl.
4 Johnson"· lleddlicott, S P. Wms.
180, note a,· Say"· Barwick, 1 Ves. & B.
195; Cooke e. Clayworth, 18 Ves. 12;
Curtis"· Hall, 4 N.J. 861: Whitesides
"· Greenlee, 2 Dev. Eq. 152; Dunn e.
Amos, 14 Wis. 106; Mansfield t1.. Watson, 2 Iowa, 111.
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beneﬁt, but for the common beneﬁt of his associates.’ The fol-
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lowing may be said to be the duties he assumes:

1. In his own action to conﬁne his operations within the

limits of the corporate authority.

2. To furnish to the associates truthfully such in formation as

it may belong to his position to give, and to atford them such

facilities as are proper for obtaining information by their own

investigations.

3. To take no advantage of his own position to the prejudice

of his associates.

4. To give no advantage to one associate over another; and

5. To employ his efforts faithfully in advancing the common

interest.

Of the wrongs which may result from a disregard of any ot'

these obligations, it is to be said generally that where they affect

the body of the corporators alike they cannot be treated as

wrongs to the members severally. Thus, if the managing oth-

cers are guilty of an intentional abuse of corporate powers. by

exercising powers not within the scope of their charter, this is

such a violation of good faith to their associates as in a proper

case might charge the oﬁicers personally with all the conse-

quences. It is to be observed, however, that as the manage-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:42 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ment of the corporate business is intrusted to their judgment,

a mere error in deciding upon their powers could not justly he

made the ground of legal liability. As was forcibly stated in

one case, “ \Vhile directors are personally liable to stockholders

for any losses resulting from fraud, embezzlement or willful

misconduct or breach of trust, for their own beneﬁt and not for

the beneﬁt of the stockholders, for gross iuattention and negli-

gence by which such fraud or misconduct has been perpetrated

by agents, oﬁicers or co-directors. yet they are not liable for

mistakes of judgment, even though they may be so gross as to

appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest,

‘ Charitable Corporation 0. Sutton,

2 Atk. 400; Great Luxembourg R. Co.

0. (‘umhcrland Coal. etc., Co.. 16 Md.

456; .\larch r. Eautern R. R. Co.,43

0. Magnay. 25 Beav. 556; Koehlcr 0.

Black River, etc.. Co., 2 Black, 715;

Jackson o. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616;

Bcdford Railroad C0. 0. Bowser. 48

Penn. St. 29: Austin v. Daniels, 4

Denio, 299; Hoﬂhian Steam Coal C0.

N. ll. 515; Bliss 0. Mattoson. 45 N.

Y. 22; European, etc., It. R. Co. o.

Poor, 59 .\lc. 2'77; Gratz r. Redd, 4 B.

Mon. 1'78; Paine r. Lake Erie, etc.,

R. R.Co.. 31 Ind. 233; Hodges 0. N. E.

benefit, bnt for the common benefit of his associates. 1 The following may be said to be the duties he assumes:
1. In his own action to confine his operations within the
limits of the corporate authority.
2. To furnish to the associates truthfully such information as
it may belong to his position to give, and to afford them sueh
facilities as are proper for obtaining information by their own
in ve~tigations.
3. To take no ad,•antage of his own position to the prejudice
of his a:-;sociates.
4. To give no advantage to one as;sociatc over another; and
5. To employ his eftorts faithfully in alhancing the common
interest.
Of the wrongs which may result from a disregard of any of
the~e obligations, it is to be said !,renerally that where they affect
the body of the corporators alike they cannot be treated as
wrongs to the mPmbers severally. Thus, if the managing offioors are guilty of an intentional abuse of corporate powers~ by
exercising powers not within the scope of their charter, this is
such a violation of good fi1ith to their associates as in a proper
ca~>e might charge the officers personally with all the conseqn£>nces. It is to be obsen·ed, however, that as the manat,rement of the corporate business is intrusted to their jtulgment,
a mere error in deciding upon their powers <:onld not jnl'ltl.v he
ma1le the ground of }(•gal liability. As was forcibly stated in
one case, "\\rhile directors are pPrsonally liable to stockholders
for any lo:lses resulting from fraud, embezzlement or willful
misconduct or breaeh of trust, for their own benefit and not for
the bc:1ctit of the stot•kholders, tor gross inattention and negligence by which such fraud or mi.ocondnct has been perpetrated
by a~ents, officers or co-directors. yet they are not liable for
mistakes of judgment, even thon~h they may be so gross as to
appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest,

Screw Co., 1 K I. 812.

1

Charitable Corporation "· Sutton,

2 Atk. 400; Great LuxPmlJourg H. Co.

e. 1tlagnny. 25 Beav. 5::!0; Koehler o.
Blnck Hiver, etc., Co., 2 Black, 715;
•Tackson "· Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616;
Bedford Hnilron•l Co. e. Bows!'r, 48
Penn. St. 2!1: Austin tt. Daniel:;, '
Denio, !!U:l; .Huffmau t:5tcarn Coal Co.

o. ("mnhcrland Coal. etc., Co.. 16 )[d.
4.ili; ~lurch r. E:l!llCI"n H. R. Co., 4a
N. II. 515; Blills "· }[ att!'~on. 45 N.
Y. 22; European, etc., H. R. Co. "·
Poor, ii9 ll£'. 277; Gratz r. Ht•thl, 4 B.
~lon. lit!; Plliuc r. Lake Erie, etc.,
H. H. Co., 31 Ind. 2~3; Hodges o. N. E.
Screw Co., 1 H. I. 312.
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and provided they are fairly within the scope of the powers and
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discretion conﬁded to the managing body.”‘ This is only

applying to these otlicers the rules generally applied where

discretionary powers are to be exercised.

.The wrong committed by the oﬁieer of a corporation which

affects the stockholders generally, through their intere.—:ts in the

corporation, is not a wrong to them as individuals, but to the

corporate entity. To illustrate this, the ease may be instant-ed

of the treasurer of a corporation embezzling its funds. IIere

every shareholder may suffer, but one of them individually can-

not sue, for the money was not his; it belonged to the corpora-

tion. The interest the shareholder had which was affected was

not in the money itself, but it consisted in a right to an account-

ing by the corporation in respect to it, and nothing could come

to him from it except through the corporation, and as dividends,

or by division on the ﬁnal winding up of the corporate concerns.

The case mentioned in the note was an action in case by a stock-

holder in a printing and publishing corporation against perstms

who were alleged to have conspired with two of its directors to

suspend and destroy the business and francliises of the company,

and to have induced such directors to suspend the publication

of their daily and weekly newspapers for the beneﬁt. of a rival
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establishment, thereby rendering the plaintifl"s interest. in the

corporation valueless. The conclusive answer to this claim was

that the wrong alleged was a corporate wrong, in which all the

stockholders were proportionally interested; and the corporation

should represent all for the purposes of legal rem -d_\'." There

is a want of legal privity between the stockholder and the direc-

tors whose action is complained of; the latter are not his agents

and bailecs, but the agents and builees of the body politic whose

oﬂicers they are.‘ It is true that this principle may sometimes

prove embarrassing, when the otlicers charged with wrong are

the governing board of the corporation, and the very parties

who should represent its interests in the redress of its wrongs;

‘ Sp('l‘lIlg's Appeal, 71 Penn. St. 11,

20; Wntt‘s Appeal, 78 Penn. St. 370.

‘Talbot 1;. S:-ripps, 31 Mich. 268.

See Robinson r. Smith, 3 Paige, ‘222;

Hodges '0. N. E. Screw Co., 1 111.312.

The point is forcibly and clearly dis-

cussed and presented in the leading

case of Smith v. llurd, 12 Met. 371.

And, sue Craig r. Gl'e;.;g, S3 Penn, St.

19.

' Smith r. Hurd, 12 Met. 371; Gor.

ham r. Gilson, 28 Cal. 479; llults 0.

Wutid, 37 N. Y. 317; Abbott 0. Met-

riam, 8 (lush. 588.

<-11$!

and provided they are fairly within the scope of' the powers aud
discretion confided to the managing body." 1 This is only
applying to the"e officers the rules generally applied where
di~w1·etiunary powers are to be exercised .
. The wrong committed by the officer of a corporation which
affects the stoekholders generally, tlu·uugh their intere.~ts in the
corporation, is not a wrong to them as inJi,·idnals, Lut to the
corpomte entity. To illustrate this, the case may be install<"ed
of the treasurer of a eo1·poration embezzling its funds. Here
e,·ery shareholder may sntfer, hut one of them individually ca.nnot sue, tor the money was not his; it Lelon~ed to the corporation. The interest the shareholder had whit·h was afl',·ded was
not in the money it,.Plf, but it consisted in a right to un accounting by the corpomtion in respect to it, and nothing could come
to him from it except through the corporation, and as dividends,
or Ly di,·ision on the final winding np of the eorporate concerns.
The case meutioneJ in the note Wl:l.'-' an action in <.·ase Ly a stockholder in a printing and publishing corpomtion against persQilS
who were alleged to have conspired with two of its directors to
sn:;pend and destroy the bu,;iness and fran<'hi~t>:; of the company,
and to have induced such directors to snspcml the publication
of their daily and weekly newspapers for the ht>uetit. of a rh-al
e:;tahlishmcut, thereby rendering the plaintifl"s interest in the
co1·poration valueless. The conelnsive answer to thi~ claim was
that the wron~ alleged was a corporate wrong, in which all the
stockholders were J>I'Oportionally intcJ'csted; n.nd the coq)lJ1'ation
slwuld represent all fur the purposes of legal rem ·dy." There
is a want of legal privity between the stockholder and the din·ctors whose action is complained frf; the latter are not his agents
awl bailees, but the agents and hailees of the hu<ly poiitic whvse
officers they are.• It is true that this }H'inciple may sometimes
prove embarrassing, when the otlicer·s cha1·~ed with wrong are
the govel'lling board of the COl'porntion, and the very parties
who should repre~ent its interests in the red1·e:;s of its wrongs;
1 Spc·rin ~·~ Appeal, 71 Penn. St. 11,
20; Watt's AJlJlcnl, '78 Penn. St. :r:o.
• Ttl! bot 11. :::kri )lp>~, 31 :!\lieh . ~W8.
Ste Hobinsnn r. 8milh, 3 Paige, 222;
Hml.~es 11. N. E. ~("rew Co., 1 H. I. 312.
The point is forcibly and clearly dis.
cussed ami presented in the leuding

case of Smith v. IIurd, 12 :Met. 3it.
And, Sl'C Craig ~. Grl';..;g, ~;J Penn. Sl
19.
• Smith 1'. Ihmi, 12 l\lct. 371; Gor.
ham r. G il~on, :!8 Cal. 479; Butts "·
Wuou, 37 N.Y. 317; AIJIJott"' Mer.
riiWl, 8 CUl!h. 588.

WRONGS IN CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS. 519

but the remedies in equity are ample for such a case, and a

WRONGS IN CO.NFIDE.NTI.A.L RELATIONS.

519

single shareholder may there bring to account the delinquent

or ti-andulent oﬁicer, or obtain redress from others who have

wronged the corporation, but against whom the directors refuse

to proceed.‘ Such a suit, however, is instituted not on behalf

of the complainant alone, but of all other stockholders, and

stands as a substitute for a suit by the corporation itself.’

Recurring to the duties which it has been said above, the oili-

cers owe to the stockholders, some illustrations may be given of

the acts which constitute breaches thereof:

1. If the managers of a corporation knowingly exceed the

corporate powers, this is a species of fraud upon the corporators

for which the latter may have the appropriate relief in equity.

No doubt they might be enjoined from persistence in such

action, on the application of individual corporators, and be

called to account for what had already been done. So an indi-

vidu_al corporator might perhaps obtain relief from his obliga-

tions to the company, and pertni:=si0n t.o Withdraw, where powers

were exercised which when he came in he had no reason to

understand the corporation was to assume.’

2. The obligation to furnish accurate information is partic-

ularly forcible. as it applies to the regular reports which are

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

required of the managing board and perhaps of other principal

otlicers. These are supposed to state facts upon which not only

may the associates act in their corporate meetings, but also in

individual transactions; and a statement of important facts, pur-

posely made untrue, is a fraud when acted upon.‘ But the cases

‘Hodges 1:. New England Screw

Co., 1 R. I. 31?; 3 R. I. 9; Brown 0.

VanDyke, 4 Ilalst. Ch. 795; Taylor v.

Miami, etc., Co., 5 Ohio 162; Pratt 0.

Pratt, 33 Conn. 446; Butts 0. Wood,

37 N. Y. 317; March 0. Eastern

R. R. Co., 43 N. ll. 515; Rogers

v. Lafayette Ag. \Vorks, 53 Ind. 296;

Watts‘ Appeal, 78 Penn. St. 370;

Peabody 1:. Flint, 6 Allen, 52; Brew-

er v. Boston Theater, 104 Mass. 378;

Allen 1:. (Iurtis, 26 Conn. 456; Wright

but the remedies in equity are ample for such a case, and a
single slmreholuer may there bring to account tho dcliuY.uent
or fbudulent officer, or obtain redress from others who have
wronged the corporation, but against whom the directors refuse
to proceed., Such a suit, however, is instituted not on b(;half
of the complainant alone, but of all other stockholders, and
stands as a substitute tor a suit by the corporation itself:1
Recurring to the duties which it has been said aLovc, the officers owe to the stocklwlJcrs, some illustrations may be gi vcn of
the acts wllich constitute breaches thereof:
1. If the managers of a corporation knowiugly exceed the
corporate powers, this is a species of fraud upon the corporators
for which the latter may have the appropriate relief in equity.
No doubt they might be enjoined from per,.isteuce in ~>uch
action, on the application of indiviJual corporators, and be
called to acco\lllt for what had already been dunE.. So an individt~al corpo1·ator might perhaps obiain re:ief fi'Om his obligations to the company, and permi:~sion to withdraw, whm·e powefb
were exercised which when he came in he had no reason to
understand the corporation was to assume."
2. The obligation to furnish accurate information is particularly forcible. as it applies to the regular reports whid1 are
required of the managing board and perhaps of othc1· principal
officers. These are suppu~cd to state fact8 t•pon wlaid1 not only
111ay the associates act in their corporate mt."Ctiug::;, but also in
individual transactions; and a statement of important facts, purposely made untrue, is a fraud when acted upon.• llut the cases

v.0rovillc, etc., Co.,-10 Cal. 20; Good-

in v. Cincinnati. etc., Co., 18 Ohio.

(R. s.) 169, Dodge I. Woolsey, 18

~i

How. 331; Bronson u. La(,‘rosse R.

Co, 2 \\"all. 2151}; Memphis 0. Dean.

8 W'all. (A. See LaGrange 0 State

Treasurer, 24 Mich. 46-'5; Blain 0.

Agar, 1 Sim. 37; lliehens v. Con-

grcve, 4 Russ. 532.

‘ Robinson r. Smith, 3 Paige. 222;

Dodge 1:. Vfooisey, 18 How. 331;

Ileath c. Eric It. R. Co., 8 Biatch. 347.

' Ship’ Case, 2 De G.. J. & S. -">44.

‘ When false reports of the ﬁnan-

cial condition of a corporation are

published, it will not be presumed

for the purpose of charging a dirc<>

tor with fraud that he had knowledge

1 Hodges "· New England Screw
Co., 1 R I. 812; 8 R I. II; Brown e.
VanDyke, 4 llulst. Ch. 7!!3: Tnylor c.
~liiUUi, etc., Co., 5 Ohio 1112; Prl\tt e.
Pratt, 33 Conn. 446; Butts c. Wood,
87 N. Y. 317; .Murch "· Eastern
R. R. Co., 48 N. II. 515; Ro~ers
"· Lafayette Ag. Works, 5~ Ind. 296;
Walt:!' Appell), 78 Penn. 8t. 870;
Peabody tl. Flint, 6 Allen, 52; Brew.
er c. Boll ton Theater, 104 :Mass. 378;
Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456; Wright
"·Oroville, etc., Co., 40 Cui. 20; Good.
in v. Cincinnati. etc., Cu., 18 Ohio.
(ll. a.) 16tl, Dodge •· Woolsey, 18

How. 811 ; Bronson 11. LaCrosse R
L'o, 2 Wull. :?ttl; llemphis "· Dean,
8 Wall. 64. S··c LaGrun.!{e c :ituw
Treusurer, 24 )I ich. 46~; Hlain "·
Agar, 1 Sim. 37; llichcllB "· Congreve, 4 Huss. 5:i2.
1 H11hinson r. :::imith, 3 Pnige. 222;
Dod:zc c. Woo bey, H! How. 3al;
Ilcatll "· Eric H. H. Co., 8 Blatch. a.l7.
a Ship' Case, 2 De G .. J. & 8. ;>44.
' When false reports of the tlnu.n.
ci11l condition of a corporation arc
published, it will not be presumed
for the purpose of char~ing a director with fraud that hl! had knowledge
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the directors personally that it can hardly be useful to undertake

to suggest what facts might suffice to render them liable.

A corporator at all reasonable times is entitled to an inspec-

tion of the books of the corporation, and if this is denied him,

he may, by mandamus, obtain it. But as this proceeding might

not be speedy enough to make the inspection accomplish the

intended purpose. the corporator should also be entitled to

redress in a special action on the case against the custodian of

the books, or, if the refusal was under corporate orders, against

the corporation itself. And here the right which is denied is

plainly an individual right, and does not in a legal sense con-

cern other corporators.

3. Under the third head of duties above stated, the general

principle is that whatever a corporate oﬁicer does ofﬁcially it is

his duty to do with judicial fairness as regards his own interests

and those of his associates, and whatever advantage he takes of

his own position for his individual beneﬁt to the pre_]'udi'ce of

the others is a fraud. Therefore where directors of a corpora-

tion instructed their treasurer to purchase of a certain ferry

company a steamboat owned by it, at the cost of the boat and

repairs, and it turned out that the directors constituted the ferry
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company, and that the price that company demanded and re-

ceived for the steamboat was a sum much above the cost of the

boat and repairs, this was adjudged a fraud for which the pur-

chasing company might hold them responsible.‘ So if the

directors of an embarrassed railroad company proceed under

proper authority to sell the road, but do so in a way calculated

not to produce its value, and become purchasers ‘hemselves, the

sale is a fraud upon their trust, and may be vacated on that

ground.’ So where shares in a corporation are placed in the

hands of directors to sell for the company, and they are enabled

to sell at a premium, this premium belongs to the corporation,

and it is a fraud in them to appropriate it.“ So if a director of

of all the affairs of the company, but

there must be evidence that he knew

the report was false or had reason to

believe it was. Wakemau 0. Dalley,

51 N. Y. 27.

1 Parker o. Nickersou, 112 Mass. 195.

’ Jackson o. Ludeling, 21 Wall.

616. See the general subject fully

and carefully examined in Hoffman,

etc., Co. ~v. Cumberland, etc., Co., 16

Md. 456, where a like conclusion is

reached.

‘York, etc., R. Co. 0. Hudson, 16

Beav. 485.

u

must be so peculiar that would gi ,.e rise to an action to charge
the directors personally that it can hardly be useful to undertake
to suggest what facts might suffice to render them liahle.
A corporator at all reasonable times is entitled to an inspection of the books of the corporation, and if this is denied him,
he may, by mandamus, obtain it. But as this proceediug might
not be speedy enough to make the inspection aecomplish the
intended purpose, the corporator should also he entitled to
redress in a special action on the case against the custodian of
the books, or, if the refusal was under corporate orders, against
the corporation itself. And here the right which is denied is
plainly an individual right, and does not in a legal sense concern other corporators.
3. Under the third head of duties above stated, the general
principle is that whatever a corporate officer does officially it is
his duty to do with judicial fairness as regards his own interests
and those of hit> associates, and whatever advantage he takes of
his own position for his individual benefit to tho prejudice of
the others is a fraud. Therefore where directors of a corporation instructed their treasurer to purchase of a certain ferry
company a steamboat owned by it, at the cost of the boat and
repairs, and it turned out that the directors constituted the ferry
company, and that the price that company demanded and received for the steamboat was a sum much aho,·e the cost of the
boat and repairs, this was adjudged a fraud tor which the purchasing company might hold them responsible.' So if the
directors of an embarrassed railroad company proceed under
proper authority to sell the road, but do so in a way calculated
uot to produce its value, and become purchasers •hemselves, the
sale is a fraud upon their trust, and may be vacated on that
ground! So where shares in a corporation are placl'd in the
hands of directors to ::ell tor the company, and they are enabled
to sell at a premium, this prem i nm bt\]ongs to the corporation,
and it is a fraud in them to appropriate it.• So if a director of
of all the affairs of the company, but
thca·c must be evidence thl\t he knew
the report was false or had renson to
believe it was. Wakeman 'll. Dalley,
51 N.Y. 27.
I Parker fl. Nickerson,l12 Mass.195.
• Jackson "· Ludeling, 21 Wall.

616. See the general subject fully
and carefully examined in Hoffman,
etc., Co. "· Cumberland, etc., Co., 16
:Md. 45B, where a like conclusion is
reached.
1 York, etc., R. Co. "· Hudson, 16
Bcav. 485.
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road, any pecuniary advantage derived from the contract belongs

to the company.‘ So it is not competent for a director in a

railway company to become contractor with the company for

constructing the road; the two positions he would occupy as

member of the board of directors letting the contract, and as

contractor taking it, being inconsistent.’ Nor does it make any

difference that no actual fraud was intended in the ‘transaction,

or that it can be shown that the corporation suffered no loss; the

policy of the law will not permit the integrity of the trustee to

be put to the trial of transactions where duty to his cestuis que

trust would stand opposed to interest.’ So directors will not be

permitted to avail themselves of a mortgage which they cause to

be made by the corporation to themselves, and by which they

obtain an undue advantage.‘ So payments made by the directors

to the company, in property at more than its value. will not be

suﬁ'ered to stand.‘ These cases illustrate the general principle.’

Nevertheless there is nothing in the relation of managing

oﬁicer and stockholder that shall preclude the former dealing

with the latter in respect to his shares and becoming purchaser

thereof. provided that in their negotiations there is no decep-

tion aud no concealment of facts which the purchaser has a right
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to know. Nor would the oﬂicer be under obligation, in such

dealings, to put before the stockholder the facts within his

knowledge which might inﬂuence the negotiation, any further

than would be required of his position by his duty to the stock-

holders generally, irrespective of the negotiation. His duty

may require of him regular reports, but further information

which a stockholder may desire he will be expected to call for.

No doubt a director has the same right as other persons to buy

and sell stock in market, and in New York it has been decided

‘See Benson 0. Heathorn, 1 Y. &

Coll. 326.

' Flint. etc., R. R. Co. o. Dewey, 14

Mich. 477; European, etc., R. Co. o.

Poor, 59 Me. 277.

* Flint, etc., R. B. Co. 0. Dewey, 14

Mich. 477. A member of a board of

directors who presents a bill on his

own behalf for extra compensation

cannot act as director on the question

\

~i

of its allowance. Butts 1:. w()()(l, 8'7

a railway company <.'Ontract in his own name for iron for the
road, any pecuniary advantage derived from the contract belongs
to the company! So it is not competent for a director in a
railway company to become contractor with the company for
constructing the road; the two positions he would occupy as
member of the board of' directors letting the contract, ami as
contractor taking it, being inconsistent.' Nor does it make any
difference that no actual fraud was intended in the transaction,
or that it can be shown that the corporation suffered no loss; the
policy of the law will not permit the integrity of' the trustee to
be put to the trial of transactions where duty to his cestuis que
tru8t would stand opposed to inte1·est! So directors will not be
permitted to avail themseh·es of a mortgage which they cause to
be made by the corporation to themselves, and by which they
obtain an undue advantage.' So vayments made by the directors
to the company, in property at more than its value, will not be
suffered to stand.' These cases illustrate the geueral principle.•
Nevertheless there is nothing in the relation of managing
officer and stockholder that shall preclude the former dealing
with the latter in respect to his shares and becoming purchaser
thereof. provided thn.t in their negotiations there is no deception and no concealment of facts which the purchaser has a right
to know. Nor would the officer be under obligation, in such
dealings, to put before the stockholder the facts within his
knowledge which might influence the neg-otiation, any further
than would be required of his position by his duty to the stuckholders generally, irrespective of the negotiation. IIi:> duty
may require of him r('gnlar report,, bnt further information
which a stockholder may desire he will be expected to call tor.
No donbt a director has the same right as other persons to buy
and sell stock in market, and in New York it has been decided

N. Y.3l7. See Gilman R. R. Co. 0.

Kelly, 77 Ill. 4'26.

‘ Koeliler u. Black River Falls Iron

Co., 2 Black, 7l5.

° Osgootl v. King, 42 Iowa, 478.

' See, also, for other illustrations,

Bartholomew v. lientlcy, 15 Ohio,

659; S. C. 1 Ohio, (24. s.) 37.

I See Benson 11. H~athorn, 1 Y. &
Coli. 326.
1 Flint. etc., R. R. Co. "· Dewey, 14
Mich. 4i7; European, etc., R. Co. "·
Poor, 59 :Me. 2i7.
a I<'Jinr, etc., R. 11. Co. "· Dewey, 14
Mich. 477. A member of a board of
directors who presents a bill on his
own behalf for extra compcn~atlon
cannot act as director on the question

of its al1owance. Butts c. Wood, 87
N.Y. 317. Sec Gilml\n R. R. Co."·
Kelly, 77 Ill. 420.
4 Kol'hler c. Blark River Falls Iron
Co., 2 Blnek, 715.
6 Os_:;ood r. King, 42 Iowa, 478.
' See, also, for othPr lllustrnt inns,
Bartholomew "· B:.>nth-y, 15 Ohio,
6.'>9; S. C. 1 Ohio, (N. s.) 37.
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that a director may buy of a stockholder his shares without any

such obligation to disclose important facts as would rest upon

an agent dealing with his principal. The director, it was said,

was not trustee for the sale of the shareholder’s stock. This

stock was not the subject of trust between them, nor had the

trust relation between them any connection with the vendor‘s

stock, except so far as the good or bad management of the gen-

eral affairs of the corporation by its directors indirectly affects

the value of its stock.‘ A like decision has been made in

Indiana.’

4. Where directors or managing ofﬁcers perpetrate frauds on

the associates by allowing advantages to one or more over the

rest, the proper remedy is usually found in compelling the

favored stockholder to surrender what he has thereby fraudu-

lently gained. Thus, where under a secret arrangement made

prior to his subscription a stockholder is permitted by the

directors to surrender his stock and withdraw what he has paid

upon it, this being in fraud of the other stockholders, they or
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any of them may, by bill in equity, have the money thus with-

drawn refunded.’ So an agreement by which a subscription is

to be colorable merely, to induce others to subscribe, is fraudu-

lent and void, and the subscription may be enforced.‘

5. It has been decided in Alabama that if the managers of a

bank allow the stockholders to withdraw its funds to the amount

of their subscriptions, and to use them without security. such

conduct is a fraud upon the creditors of the bank and renders

the directors liable in equity for the amount withdrawn." lt

would no doubt also be a fraud on any stockholder not privy to

the unlawful arrangement. So, where the president of a bank

makes loans of the bank funds to irresponsible persons without

security, having a private interest of his own to advance thereby,

the bank may charge him personally with the loans and recover

‘ Carpenter 0. Danforth, 52 Barb. and cannot constitute a (l('ft'll$8 to the

581. subscription. Foy tr. Blackstone, 31

‘Tippecanoe Co. 0. Reynolds, 44 Ill. 538. See New London lust. v.

Ind. 509. Prescott, 40 N. H. 330.

ll Melvin 1:. Lamar Ins. Co., 80 Ill. ‘ New Albany, etc., R. R. Co. v.

446. A secret arrangement with one Fields, 10 Ind. 187.

subscriber, that in certain conl.ingcu- ° Bank of St. Mary’s v. St. John, 25

cies he need not pay his subscription, Ala. 566.

being in fraud of the others, is void

— <-z‘1‘lP§f

that a director may buy of a stockholder his shares without any
such obligation to disclose important facts as would rest npon
an agent dealing with his principal. The director, it was said,
was not trustee for the sale of the shareholder's stuck. This
stock was not the subject of trust between them, nor had the
trust relation between them any connection with the vendor's
stock, except so far as the gout.l or b:ul mana;;emcnt of the general affairs of the corporation by its directors indirectly aftects
the value of its stock.' A like decision has bceu made in
Inuiana.•
4. ·where directors or managing officers perpetrate frauds on
the associates by allowing advantages to one or more over the
rest, the proper remedy is usmdly found in compelliug the
favored stockholder to surrender what he has thereby fmndnlently gained. Thus, where nuder a secret arrangement made
prior to his subscription a stockholder is permitted by the
directors to surrender his stock and withdraw what he has paid
upon it, this being in fraud of the other stockholders, they or
any of them may, Ly bill in equit,,·, ha,·e the money thus withdrawn refunded.' So· an agreement by which a subscription is
to be colorable merely, to induce others to subscriue, is ii·audulent and void, and the subscription may be enforced.•
5. It has been decided in Alabama that if the managt•rs of &
bank allow the stockholders to withtlmw its funds to the amount
of their subscriptions, and to use them without security, such
conduct is a fraud upon the creditors of the bank and reudcrs
the directors liable in equity for the amount withdmwn.• It
would no doubt also be a fraud on any stockholder not privy to
the unlawful arrangement. So, where the pt·c:;iuent of a bank
makes loans of the bank funds to irre::;pomible pet·son:-; without
security, having a private interest of his own to ad,·ance thl'reby,
the bank may charge him per:;onally with the loans and recover
1

Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb.

581.

'Tippecanoe Co. "· Reynolds, 44
Ind. 509.
1 :Melvin "· Lamar Ins. Co., 80 Ill.
446. A secret arrangement wiU1 one
subscriber, that in certain conLingc:J..
cies he need not pay his subscription,
being in fraud of the others, is void

and cannot constitute 11. rh·f•·nse to tbe
subscription. Foy ·r. Bluckstc•ne, at
Ill. 53K See New Lmiuon lnst. "·
Presc•ott, 40 N.H. :mo.
• New Albany, pte., R R. C'o. "·
Fields, 10 Ind. 187.
6 llank of St. !lary's v. St. J olm, 25
Ala.. 566.
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the amount in a. suit at law.‘ So, for any fi-.unlnlent sale of the

corporate property by the directors, they may be called to

account by stockholders.’

the 11.monnt in a suit at law! &, fo1· an.r fr;L:Hl111ent ~ale of the
corporate property by the directo1·s, tlwy may be calk'<.! to
acconut by stockholders.~

Trustees. The case of a trustee is the representative illustra-

tion of those in which the law demands the utmost good faith

because of conﬁdential relations. However the trustee may be

appointed—whethcr by the party himself, by some donor for

his beneﬁt, or by judicial action—-he is chosen because of the

conﬁdence felt and the trust reposed; and while the otlice con-

tinues the beneﬁciary has usually no choice but to leave his

interests where they have been conﬁded. unless such dishonesty

or unﬁtness is disclosed as will justify proceedings to have the

trustee removed. Under these circumstances the law imposes

upoif the trustee the obligation of perfect ﬁdelity to the trust

and integrity in its performance; and he must discharge the

trust without suffering his own interest in any manner to dis-

tract his attention.

It is a fundamental rule that a trustee shall not deal in the

trust fund for his own interest. The cestui Que trust may or
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may not be a person in law suijzzris,‘ if he is, there is no abso-

lute impediment to dealings between himself and the trustee in

respect to the trust property, or to the trustee’s duties; and if

for the time being, by fair understanding between thern, the

character of trustee is laid aside, :md they deal with each other

as strangers might, it is not impossible for their bargains to be

upheld. But in all such cases the trustee will be likely to be

possessed of decided advantages in the negotiations, not only

because he will Inost'pr0bal>ly have more complete information

than the other will possess, but also because it will be diﬂicult,

if not impossible, for the cestui qua trust to relieve llimsclf

entirely from the inﬂuence of the trustee, so as to deal with him

on an equal footing. Such cases, therefore, must always afford

unusual facilities for deception and fraud.

It has been said that to sustain a. purchase by trustee from

‘ First Nat. Bk. of Sturgis 0. Reed, 383; Crook r. J ewett, 12 How. Pr. 19;

30 hlicl1.263, citing Austin r. Daniels. Talbot v. Scripps, 31 .\licli. 268. See

4 D1-nio, 299; Commercial Bunk 0. Attornt-yGcncrul v.Fishmonger's Co.,

Tcu Eyck, 48 N. Y. 305. 1 Cr. & Pb. 1.

' Gray o. Steamship Co., 8 Hun,

Trustees. The case of a trustee is the rcpre~cutnth·e illustration of those in which the law demands the utmo!"t good faith
because of confidential relations. However the trustee may be
appointed- whether by the party hims(•lt~ by some donur f't,r
his benefit, or b.Y judicial action-he is clw::Pn be<·ause of the
confidence felt and the tmst reposed; and while the otlice continues the benetieiary ha.:; usually no choice hut to leave his
interests where they ha.ve been confided. nnle:;s ~uch ditihonesty
or unfitness is disclosed as will justitY proc~{·dings to han! the
trnsteu removed. Under thc:;c circnmstancl'S the law imposes
up011 the trustee the obligation of perlect fhlelity to the trust
and integrity in its perturmaucc; and he must discharge the
trust without suffering his own interest in any manner to distract his at ten tiou.
It is a fundamental rule that a trustee shall not deal in the
trust fund for his own interei't. The cestui que truflt may or
Ill!\)' not be a person in law su.i juris/ 'if he is, there is no abi'olute impediment to dealin~.; between hinu;p]f and the trustee in
rt·SJ)('Ct to the trust property, or to the tmst<>c's duties; and if
for the time being, by fair nnder,.tiLmling between them, the
charn<'t<'r of trustee is laid aside, and they deal with ench other
as t<trangers might, it is not impo . . sible tor their ha1·g·ains to be
11pheld. But in all snch cases the trustee will be likely to be
pos~Pi'::ed of decided ad\·antages in the negotiations, not only
bccanse he will most, prohn.hly have more complete int'tmnation
than the other will possess, Lnt also because it will be difficult,
it' not impossible, for the ce~tai que trust to rclic,·e himst·lf
entirely from the influence of the trustee, so us to deul with him
on an equal footin~. Such <'ases, theret(Jre, must always afford
unusual f~lcilities tor deception and fraud.
It has been said that to sustain a purchase by trustee from
' First Nat. Bk. of Sturgis "·Reed,
30 Mich. 2fJ3, citing Am•tin r. Daniels.
4 Dl·nio, 299; Commerciul U1mk 11.
TenEyck, 48 N.Y. :105.
1

Gray

11.

Steamship Co., 8 IIun.

883; Crook r. Jewett, 12 How. Pr.19;
Talbot r. Sc-t·ipps, lH )I ich. 268. See
Attorney General ~. Fi:~hmonger'a Co.,
1 Cr. & Ph. L
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ceatui qua trust “the trustee must have acted in entire good

faith. He must show that he made to the cestui gm: trust the

fullest disclosure of all he knew in regard to the subject-matter,

and that the price he paid was adequate.”‘ Presumptions are

against such dealings, and if the trustee ventures upon them, he

takes upon himself the burden of showing that he dealt fairly,

and after putting the other party on a footing of equality in

respect to the property.‘ But where the trustee himself makes

sale of the trust property under the authority rested in him as

such—whether the sale be made under judicial direction or

otherwise—if he becomes the purchaser liiinself, either directly

or through a third person, the purchase is by construction of

law fraudulent, and no showing of good faith or of the payment

of a full consideration can sustain it, against the objection of the

cestui Que trust, so long as the property remains in his hands or

in the hands of any one who takes it with knowledge or notice

of the facts.’ The rule in such cases is, that the cestui Que trust,

‘Spencer and Newbold's Appeal,

80 Penn. St. 317. See Gibson v. Jeyes,
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6 Ves. 266, where a rule nearly the

same is laid down; Todd o. Grove, 33

Md. 188.

Y Coles 0. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234;

cutui lJ1U trwlt "the trustee must have acted in entire good
faith. He must show that he made to the cestui que trust the
fullest disclosure of all he knew in regard to the subject-matter,
and that the price he paid was adequate." 1 Presumptions are
against such dealings, and if the trustee ventures upon them, he
takes upon himself the borden of showing that he dealt fairly,
and after potting the other party on a footing of equality in
respect to the property.' But where the ta·nstec himself makes
sale of the trust property under the anthority \"eti:t.>d iu him as
such- whether the sale be made under jnciic~ial direction or
otherwise-if he becomes the purchaser him~eit: either directly
or through a third person, the purchase is Ly construction of
law fraudulent, and no showing of good faith or of the payment
of a full consideration can sustain it, against the o~iection of the
cestui que trust, so long as the property remains in his hands or
in the hands of any one who takes it wW1 knowledge or notice
of the facts.• The rule in such cases is, tlu&t the cestui que trmt,

McCants 1;. Bee, 1 McCord Eq. 386;

Pugh 1;. Bell, 1 J. J. Marsh. 3199;

Richardson 0. Spencer, 18 B. Mon.

450; Schwarz 0. Wendell, Wal. Ch.

267; Farnam 0. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212;

Brown 0. Cowell, 116 Mass. 461;

Jones 0. Smith, 33 Miss. 215; Sallee

0. Chandler, 26 Mo. 124; Marshall v.

Stephens, 8 Humph. 159; Graves '0.

Waterman, 63 N. Y. 657; Parshall‘s

Appeal, 65 Penn. St. 224.

‘ Lowther 0. Lowther, 13 Ves. 95;

Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. 355; Wl1elp-

dale 0. Cookson, 1 Vessr. 9; Campbell

0. Walker, 5 Ves. 678; E2: parts

Lacey, 6 Ves. 625; E1: parte Hughes,

6 Ves. 617; Ea: parts James, 8 Ves.

337; Oolcs 1:. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234;

E2 pane Bennett, 10 Ves. 381; Fox 0.

Maekreth, 2 Bro. C. C. 400; Downes

0. Grazebrook, 3 Meriv. 200; Michnud

0. Girod, 4 }Iow. 503: Campbell o.

Penn. L. Ins. Co., 2 Whart. 53; Boyd

0. Hawkins, 2 Dev. Eq. 329; Davis

0. Simpson, 5 Harr. & J. 147; Perry

0. Dixon, 4 Dessaus. Eq. 504, n.; But-

lers v. Haskill, 2 Dessaus. Eq. 651;

Bracken:-idge v. Holland, 2 Blackf.

377; Wade v. Pettibone, 11 Ohio, 57;

Mills 1:. Goodscll, 5 Conn. 475; Lovell

0. Briggs. 2 N. H. 216; Currier v.

Spencer and Newbold's Appeal,
80 Penn. St. 817. Sec Gibson"· Jeycs,
6 Vea. 266, where a rule nearly the
11ame is laid down; Todd "· Grove, 88
Md.188.
'Coles "· Trecothlck, 9 Ves. 234;
McCants "· Bee, 1 McCord Eq. 383;
Pugh "· Bell, 1 J. J. Marsh. 8:19;
Richardson "· Spencer, 18 B. Mon.
450; Schwarz e. Wendell, Wal. Ch.
267; Farnam "· Hrooka, 9 Pick. 212;
Brown "· Cowell, 116 Mass. 461;
Jones "· Smith, 88 Miss. 215; Sallee
"· Chandler, 26 Mo. 12i; Marshall "·
Stephens, 8 Humph. 159; Grlives "·
Waterman, 68 N.Y. 657; Parshall's
Appeal, 65 Penn. St. 224.
• Lowther "· Lowther, 13 Ves. 95;
Morse "· Royal, 12 Vea. 355; Whelp.
dale"· Cookson, 1 Vessr. 9; Campbell
"· Walker, 5 Ves. 678; E:e part~
Lacey, 6 Vcs. 625; E:e pam Hughes,
6 VP.S. 617; Ez pam James, 8 Ves.
887; Coles "· Trecothick, 9 Vea. 234;
Ez part8 Bennett, 10 Vea. 881; Fox"·
Mackreth, 2 Bro. C. 0. 400; Downes
"· Grazebrook, 8 Meriv. 000; Michaud
1

Green, 2 N. H. 225; Farnam 0. Brooks,

9 Pick. 212; Saeger 0. Wilson, 4

Watts & S. 501; Davoue o. Fanning,

2 Johns. Ch. 252; Rogers o. Rogers, 3

VVend. 503; Torrey v. Bank of Or-

leans, 9 Paige, 649; Terwilliger v.

Brown, 44 N. Y. 237; Beaubien 0.

Poupard, Hnr. Ch. 203; Dwight 0.

Blackmar, 2 Mich. 330: Moore 0.

Mandlebaum, 8 Mich. 433; She.-ldon

o. Rice, 30 Mich 296; Nor. Ball.

As-s'n o. Caldwell, 25 Md. 420;

•

"· Girod, 4 How. 503; Campbell ""
Penn. L. Ins. Uo., 2 Whart. 58; Boyd
"· Hawkins, 2 Dev. Eq. 329; Davis
e. tsimpson, 5 Hurr. & J. 147; Perry
•· Dixon. 4 DessiLUS. Eq. 504, n.; But.
lers "· Haskill, 2 Dessaus. Eq. 651;
Brackenridge tl. Hnlland, 2 Blackf.
377; Wade "·Pettibone, 11 Ohio, 57;
Mills "· Goodsell, 5 Conn. 475; Lovell
"· Briggs. 2 N. H. 218; CurrU!r "·
Ureeu, 2 N.H. 225; Farnam"· Brooks,
9 Pick. 212; Saebrcr "· Wilson, 4:
Watts & S. 501; Davoue "·Fanning,
2 Johns. Ch. 252; Rogers "· Rogers, 8
Wend. 503; Torrey o. Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige, 6-!9; Terwilliger ""
Brown, 44 N. Y. 237; Beaubien "·
Poupard, Har. Ch. 203; Dwight e.
Blackmar, 2 Mich. 330: Moore "·
Mandlebaum, 8 Mich. 4.''13; Shddon
"· Rice, 80 Mich 296; Nor. Balt.
Ass'n "· Caldwell, 25 Md. 420;
Brothc•rs "·Brothers, 7 Ired. Eq. 150;
Freeman "· Harwood, 49 Me. 195;
Ogden "· Larrabee, 57 Ill. 389; H8J11.
mood o. Stanton, 4 R. I. 65.
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when the facts come to his knowledge, may either afﬁrm the sale or

repudiate it, and if he chooses the latter course, he may call upon

the trustee to restore the property, or if that has become impos-

sible, to account for whatever beneﬁt he has received from the

purchase. Long acquiescence in the sale, however, with full

knowledge of the facts, may of itself amount to an aﬁirmanee.'

If a trustee has occasion to make purchases for the purposes

of the trust, he can no more buy of himself than he could sell

to himself. The same reasons apply to both cases.‘

The above rules apply to executors and administrators, guard-

ians, assignees in bankruptcy or insolvency, partners, agents

for the sale of property, and all other persons occupying similar

relations. Wherever the reason of the rule applies, there the

rule is in full force. It therefore applies to the case of an

agent empowered to sell property for his principal: he cannot

become purchaser dircctly'_ nor by indirection through another.‘

“This is a rule of public policy, necessary to preserve honesty

and ﬁdelity in the administration of trusts, and is too well

settled to be departed from.”‘ So a trustee is liable as for a
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fraud if he knowingly sells trust property for less than it would

bring in the market, even though such a sale is within a minimum

ﬁxed by his instructions.‘

Where the inﬂuence ofa conﬁdential 1'('l'lllOI] has once existed,

it will not be presumed that it passes away immediately on the

relation terminating; and dealings within a short time thereafter

will be scrutinized closely, and mayi be set aside as fraudulent,

especially if no independent advice was taken before entering

into them.’

' Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. I78;

Miles v. Wheeler, 48 Ill. 124. See

Campau 1:. Van Dyke, 15 Mich. 371.

' If a partner sells his own goods

to the partnership without the knowl-

edge of his associates, he must ac-

count to them for the proﬁts. Bentley

v. Craven, 18 Beav. 75. See Kimber

0. Barber. L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 56.

when the facts come. to his knowledge, may either affirm the sale or
rcpmliate it, and if he chooses the latter course, he muy call upon
the trustee to restore the p1·operty, or if that has become impossible, to account for whatever benefit he has received from the
purchaile. Long acquiescenl"C in the sale, howe,·er, with full
knowledge of the facts, may of it8elf amount to an affirmance. •
If a trustee has occasion to make purchases for the purposes
of the trust, he can no more buy of himself than ho coulJ sell
to him!>elt: The same reasons apply to both cases.~
The above roles apply to executors and administrators, guardian~, assignees in bankruptcy or insuh·cncy, partners, ng·ents
for the sale of property, and all otht>r persons occupying similar
relations. Wherever the reason of the rule applies, there the
rule is in full force. It therefore applies to the case of an
ahrcnt empowered to sell property for his principal: he cannot
be<:ome purchaser directly •. nor Ly indirection through another!
"This is a rule of public policy, ncce::;sary to presm·\·e honesty
and fidelity in the administration of trusts, and is too well
settled to be departed from.''' So a trustee is HaLle as for a
fraud if he knowingly sells trust pmpl'rty fo1· less than it wonl<l
bring in the market, even though such a sale is within a minimum
fixccl by his instructions. •
Where the intlnence of a confidential l'('htion has once existed,
it will not be presumed that it passes aw::y immediately on the
relation terminating; and dealint--"8 within a short time thereafter
will be scrutinized closel.v, and ma)\ be set aside as fraiHlulcnt,
e~pf'cially if' no independent advice was taken before entering
into them.'

' Brooke v. Berry, 2 Gill, 83; Doh-

son u. Racey, 8 N. Y. 216: Ames v.

Port Huron, etc., Co., 11 Mich. 139;

KL‘1'fO0i.‘U. Hyman, 52 Ill. 512.

‘ Story on Agency, §§ 210, 211;

~

Dwi‘-_'ht 0. Blnrkmar, 2 Mich. 830.

’ Fisher's Appeal, B4 Penn. St. 29,

31; Most-ley‘s Admrs. 1:. Buck. 3

Munf. 232; Furnnni v. Brooks, 9 Pick.

212; Casey 0. Casey, 14 Ill. 112;

Moore n. Mnndlehaum, S Mich. 433;

Hunter 0. llunter. 50 Mo. 445; Con-

dit 0. Blackwell, 22 N. J. Eq. 481;

Norris r. 'l‘a_vlor_ 49 Ill. 18.

‘ Price 0. K1-yrs. 62 N. Y. 373; Mer-

ryman 0. David, 31 Ill. 404.

"R1-vett 0. llurve_\', 1 Sim. & Stu.

502; Hatch o. Hatch, 9 Yes. 292.

A guardian will not be sutlered to

1 Marsh 11. Whitmore. 21 Wall. 178;
llilt•s "· Wheeler, 48 Ill. 124. See
Campau 11. Van Dyke, 15 llich. 371.
t If a partner sells his own goods
to the partnership without the knowled~e of his IL'!sociak's, be must account to them for the profits. B.·ntlcy
11. Cravc•n, 18 Bcav. 7:». &.-e Kimber
11. B1Lrhc1". L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 56.
• B;·nn!te "· Berry, 2 Gill, 83; Do b.
son 11. Hacey, 8 N. Y. 216: Ames 11.
Port Huron, etc., Co., 11 .Mich. 1:10;
K1·rfoot 11. Hyman, 52 Ill. IH2.
4 Story on Agency, §§ 210, 211 ;

Dwi;!ht e. Blnrkmar, 2 :Mich. 830.
~ J.'ishcr's Appc·RI, 34 P.:nn. St. 29.
31; Mosl'ley's Ad mrs. "· Buck. S
Munf. 232; Farnam ·1). Brook!!, 9 Pick.
212; Cnscy 11. Cl\..-.ey, 14 Ill. 112;
lloore "· }[amlleltaum. 8 1\lich. 4:!3;
Hunter "· Hunter. 50 llo. 4-t5; Condit 11. Blackwell, 22 ~- J. Eq. 4tH;
Norris r. 'J';tylor. 49 Ill. 18.
1 Price 11. Kt·)T:-1. G-3 ~. Y . 378; :Merryman 11. Dtn-itl, a l Ill. 40-i.
1 Hc•vett "· llnn·cy, 1 Sim. & Stu.
002; Hatch 11. Hatch, 9 Vt•s. 292.
A guudlsn will not be sutl'ered to

'
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by trustees, the ground of agency has to a certain extent been

covered. The agent owes to his principal the like ﬁdelity which

the trustee owes to the cestui qua trust. There is this impor-

tant diﬂ'erence in the cases; that as the supervision of trusts

belongs to equity, wrongs by trustees must generally be re-

dressed in that court, while wrongs by agents will be redressed

at law, unless the case is such that some peculiar relief which

only equity can give is required. Thus, if an agent eniployed

to investigate a title by one proposing to buy, should takc advan-

tage of the information thereby acquired to purchase for himself,

the principal might doubtless call him to account, either by suit

in equity to take the beneﬁt of the purchase, or by suit at law

for recovery of damages.‘

The principal and agent also assume towards each other cer-

tain duties of due care. The agent must not be negligent in the

performance of his trust, and the principal must not negligently

lead the agent into danger. As an example, the principal no

doubt assumes the obligation to warn the agent of any risks in

his business of which the agent would not be likely to be aware,

and which would not be open to observation; such as dangerous

defects in buildings or machinery, peculiar exposures to disease,
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etc. For a consideration of such cases we must refer to the

discussion of negligence in another place, only remarking that

as the rclation imposes the obligation, conduct may sometimes

be negligence in the ease of a principal which would not be in

the case of a third party not charged with any similar duty.’

Duty is the measure of the required care, as is stated elsewhere.

Partners are agents for each other within the scope of the

partnership business, and are charged with all the obligations

acquire advantages for himself in

dealings with the ward soon after

the relation has terminated. Shoul.

Dom. Rel. 515, 516; 3 Rt-ill‘. on V\'ills.

2d Ed. 443; Story Eq. Juris. §§ 316-

820. Nor to procure from the ward

conveyances for third persons; his

inﬂuence being supposed still too

great for equal dealing. Ranken 0.

Patton, 65 Mo. 373, 413.

' See Reid v. Stanley, 6 Watts & S.

-- -rs-Hi

369; Kimber 0. Barber. L. R. 8 Ch.

Principal and Agent. In p::>inting out what may be wrongs
by trustees, the ground of agency has to a e.ertain extent been
covered. The agent owes to his principal the like fidelity which
the trnfitee owes to the cestui que trust. There is this important difference in the (oases; that as the Rnpcrvi~ion of trusts
l1elongs to eqnity, wront.r!'l by trustees must generally be redressed in that court, while wrongs by agents will be redressed
at law, unless the case is such that some pC'culiar relief which
only equity can give is required. Thus, if an agent employed
to invE>stigate a title by one proposing to buy, should take admntage of the information thereby acqnir<.'<i to purehase for himself,
the principal might doubtless call him to account, either b_y suit
in equity to take the benefit of the purchase, or by snit at law
for recovery of damages.'
The principal and agent also asBume towards ench other certain duties of dne care. The agent must not be negligent in the
performance of his trust, and the principal must not negligently
lead the agent into danger. As an example, the principal no
doubt assumes the obligation to warn the &f.-rent of any risks in
his business of which the agent would not be likely to be aware,
and which would not be open to observation; such as dan~erons
defects in buildings or machinery, peculiar exposures to disease,
etc. For a consideration of such cases we must refer to the
discussion of neglig-ence in another place, only remarking that
as the relation imposes the obligation, conduct may sometimes
be negligence in the ease t!f a principal which would not be in
the case of a third party not charged with any similar dnty!
Duty is the measure of the required care, as is stated ehicwhere.
Partners a1-e agents for each other within the scope of the
partnership business, and are charged with all the obligations

Ap. 56. See l\lc.\Iahon 0. McGraw,

26 W'is. 61-1; Ely r. Ilanford, 65 Ill.

267; Moore v. Mandlebaum, 8 Mich.

433.

’ As to the right of the agent to in-

demnity for liabilities incurred in the

principal’s service. see Adamson v.

Jarvis, 4 Bins. 66: D’Arc_v o. Lyle, 5

Binn. 441; Yeatman 0. Cordcr, 38 Mo.

337; ante, 145-147.

. ,..

- tﬂ‘

acquire advanta)!CS for himself in
dealings with the ward soon after
the relation ha..~ te1·m innl<'ll. Shoul.
Dom. Rei. 515, IHG; 3 Hedr. on Wills,
2d Ell. 443; Story Eq. Juris. ~~ :·HG820. Nor to procure from the ward
conv1•y:mccs for third persons; his
influence being supposed still too
great for equal dealing. Rnnken .,.
Patton, 65 Mo. 37~, 413.
1 Bee Heid "· Stanley, 6 Watts & 8.

3fJ9; Kimbcr "· B:1rher. L. R. 8 Ch.
Ap. 5~. See J\Jc)Iahon v. :\'kGraw,
26 Wis. GH; Ely r. Hanford, 6.') Ill.
2G7; Moore "· ~Iundlcbaum, 8 Mich.
433.
1 As to the ri~tht of the agent to in.
demnity for liabilities incurred in the
principal's service. sec Adamson "·
Jarvis, 4 Bin~. 60: D'Ar('v "· Lyle 5
Binn. 441; YPatm11n "· Cor.der,
837; ante, 14.}-147.
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of good faith which rest upon other agents. They are also in

a certain sense trustees for each other, and will not be suffered

to make secret gains at the expense of the copartnership.' Their

duty embraces a full disclosure to each other of all facts relating

to their joint dealings; and it is a fraud for one to withhold

this, even when they are proceeding to close up their affairs by

arbitration.‘

Attorney and Client. Elsewhere the obligation the attorney,

of good faith which rest upon other agents. They are also in
a certain sense trustees for each other, and will not be suffeted
to make secret gains at the expense of the copartncr:;hip.' Their
duty embraces a full disclosure to each other of all facts relating
to their joint dealings; and it is a fraud for one to witi.J10ld
this, even when they are proceeding to close np their aff1tirs hy
arbitration.'

solicitor, proctor or counsel assumes towards his client is spoken

of, and his liability for negligence in performing it is stated. It

has been held that if the attorney by unwarrantable acts shall

render himself liable to third persons, and shall exact and obtain

from his client indemnity therefor, the in(lcmnit_v will be set

aside for the presumed undue influence. “It is the policy of

the law to scrutinize gifts, conveyances. and secu ritics, given by

a client to his attorney pending the relation, more especially

when they are connected with the subject matter of litigation;

as then the necessities of the client, and the conﬁdence repo.-ed,

place the client most in the power of his attorney. The relation,
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and the conﬁdence it implies. which conﬁdence is absolutely

necessary, in some cases, to promote the prosecution or defense

of a suit, are frequently not so much matter of choice with the

client, as of necessity. Hence the reason and justice of the rule

of law, that will not permit them to be turned to the proﬁt of the

attorney. at the expense of the client.”’ So close is the conﬁ-

dence which this relation demands‘ that the client is expected

and invited by the law to lay open to his adviser all that he may

know, believe or suspcct—all. in fact, that may be in his mind-

‘ Getty v. Devlin, 54 N. Y. 403.

’ Beam v. Macomber, 33 Mich. 127.

See Maddeford v. Austwick, 1 Sim.

89; King o. Wise, 43 Cal. 629.

‘Gray v. Emmons, 7 Mich. 583.

“Where a solicitor purchases or ob-

tains a beneﬁt from a client. a court

of equity expects him to be able to

show that he has taker: no advauta_;c

of his professional position; that the

Attorney and Client. Elsewhere the obli~atwn the attorney,
solicitor, proctor or counsel assumes towards his client is spoken
ot: and his liability for negligcn(."C in performing it iR stated. It
has been held that if the attorney hy unwarrantable acts shall
render himself liable to third persons, nnd shall exac>t and obtain
from his client imlemnity therefor, the indemnity will l>e set
aside for the presumed undue inflnem.-e. " It is the policy of
the Jaw to scrutinize gifts, conveyances, and securities, g-inm by
a client to his attorney pending the relation, more cspe!·ially
when they are connected with the suhjcct matter of litigation;
as then the necessities of the client, and the confidence repo!'ed,
place the client most in the power of his attorney. The relation,
and the confidence it implie8, which confidence is ab!'olntl"ly
neccs!"ary, in some <'ases, to promote the pro~e<·ution or def(•nfle
of a suit, are frequently not so much matter of t·Ju,i<·e with tlte
client, as of nece~sity. Hence the rea~on and justice of the rule
of law, that will not permit them to be turned to the profit of the
attorney. at the expense of the client."" So l'lo!-le is the rontidence which this relation demands' tllat the clil'nt is expedcd
and invited hy the law to lay open to his advi,:er all that he may
lmow, believe or susp<'ct- all. in fact, that may be in his mind-

client was so dealing with him as to

be free from the intlucnce which a

solicitor must necessarily p0sst:s's;

and that the solicitor has done as

much to protect his cllt.'l|t‘s interest

as he would have done in the case

of a client dealing with a stran 141'."

Lord (.'R.\.\'W()R'l‘H in Savery r. King,

5 ll. L. Cas. 655. And see l‘isani 0.

Attorney General, L. R. 5 P. C. (fas.

516; S. C. 10 Monk, 78.

‘The attorney cannot act profes-

sionally for the other party even in

procuring a compromise, and dc-

tnand compensation tin-rcfor. IIer-

rick 0. Catlcy, 1 Daly, 512.

Getty v. Devlin, 54 N. Y. 403.
' Bcum "· )lacomber, 33 :\lich. 127.
Sec )laddeford v. Austwick, 1 Sirn.
89; King v. Wise, 48 Cui. 629.
1 Gray "· Emmons, 7 :Mich. 588.
"Wlwre a solicitor purchases or obtains a benefit from a client. a court
of equity expects him to be nblc to
show that he hus taken no ad\'nnta.l!e
of his pr11ft·s~ional position; thut the
client wns 'IO dealin~r with him as to
be free from the iutllwnce which a
solicitor must neccs,arily possess;
1

and that the solicitor has donr. as
mud1 to protert his client's

intcrc:~t

as he would hnve done in till' ease
of B client dealing with n ~;tranc:-•·r."
Lord CnAXWORTH in Savery r. King,
5 II. L. Ca.>~. 65.3. And Sl'e l'i,;ani "·
Attorney Grncml, L. U. 5 P. C. Cu.
516; 8. C. 10 ~[ouk, 78.
' The attorney <'nnnot act profcs.
sionally for the other party cvrn in
pt·oeariug a compromi:-~(•, nat! demaml compen~ation tlwn•for. Herrick v. Culley, 1 Daly, 512.
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which it can possibly be important for the adviser to know in

order to prepare him to render valuable services; and the conti-

dence thus invited the law protects, and it will not permit the

adviser to disclose what has been communicated to him, not even

as a witness in judicial proceedings, without his employer’s eon-

sent.' Still less will the law justify him in a voluntary disclo-

sure. It was said by Lord Chief J ustioe TXNDALL in one case,

that a member of the legal profession was “ to consider his lips

sealed with a sacred silence”;’ and it is said in Comyn that

“if a inan, being intrusted in his profession, deceive him who

intrusted him, * * or discover [disclose] the evidence or

secrets of the cause,” he is liable in an action on the case.‘ This

is good sense and should be good law. The courts have the

power, and no doubt would exercise it, to deal with such a case

summarily when it should arise, but this would not preclude

private actions. The courts may also take notice, even without

their attention being specially called to it by parties concerned,

of the failure to observe professional faith when it concerns pro-

ceediugs before them. Thus, if an attorney, while employed by

one party, contracts to render assistance to the other, for a

consideration to be paid him, the courts, when the contract is

brought to their attention, will treat is as a nullity.‘
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The rules above stated are applicable to one who assumes to

be legal adviser, even though not a licensed attorney. Wliat is

‘ 1 Green]. Ev.§ 287; Whart. Ev. §

576; Cromack v. IIeatl1cotc,2 B. & B.

4; Chant 0. Brown, 9 Hare, 790;

Greenough n. Gaskell, 1 Myl. & K.

98; Jenkinson 0. State, 5 Blackf.

465; Scranton 0. Stewart, 52 Ind. 68;

lllaxhain r. Place, 46 Vt. 434; Wil-

liams v. Fitch, 18 N. Y. 546; Bl'ill.0I1

v. Lorenz, 45 N. Y. 51; Chahoon 0.

Commonwealth, 21 Grat. 822; Sar-

which it can possibly be important for the adviser to lmow in
order to prepare him to render valuable ser,·k-es; and the oontidence thus invited the law I•roteets, and it will not permit the
adviser to disclose what bas been eommnnicated to him, not e\·en
as a witness in judicial proceedings, without his emJlloyer's consent.• Still less will the law justify him in a voluntary disel~
sure. It was said by Lord Chief Justice TnmALL in one case,
that a rnem her of the legal profess:on was " to consider his lips
sealed with a sacred silence"; • and it is said in Comyn that
"if a inan, being intrusted in his profesaion, deeeive him who
intrusted him, * * or discover [disclose] the evidence or
secrets of the canse," he is liable in an action on the case.• This
is good sense and should be good law. The courts have the
power, and no doubt would exercise it, to deal with such a caee
summarily when it should arise, but this wonld not preclude
private actions. The courts may also take notiC(', e\·en without
their attention being specially called to it by parties concerned,
of the failure to observe profes~!onal f:1ith when it concerns proceedings before them. Thus, if an attorney, while employed by
one party, contracts to render assistance to the other, for a
consideration to be paid him, the courts, when the contract is
brought to their attention, will trPat is as a nullity.4
The rules above stated are applicable to one who assumes to
be leb1'8l adviser, even though not a licensed attorney. What is

geant 1;. Hampdeu, 38 Me. 581; State

0. Hazleton, 15 La. Ann. 72; Higbee v.

Dresser, 103 Mass. 523; Orton 0. Mc-

Cord, 33 Wis. 205; Alderman '0. Peo-

ple, 4 Mich. 414.

' Taylor '0. Blacklow, 3 Bing. (N. C.)

235.

' Com. Dig. Action upon the case

for a Deceipt, 5.

‘ Valentine v. Stewart, 15 Cal. 387.

As to frauds by attorneys upon cli-

ents, by mcans of which property

is obtained or sold, sec Matter of

Woods, 36 Mich. 299; Ford o. Har-

rington, 16 N. Y. 285; Evans v. Ellis,

5 Dcnio. 640; Ellis v. Messervie,1l

Paige, 467; Howell v. Ransom, 11

Paige, 538; Poillon 0. Martin, 1 Sandf.

Ch. 569; Edwards 0. Mcyrick, 2 Hare,

60; Newman 1:. Payne, 2 Ves. 199;

Gresley e. Mousley, 4 De G. 8:, J. 78;

Lyddon 0. Moss, 4 De G. & J. 104:

1 1 Greenl. Ev. § 287; Whart. Ev. §
1576; Cromack "· Heathcote, 2 B. & B.
4; Chant "· Hrown, 9 Hare, 700;
Greenough "· Gaskell, 1 Myl. & K.
98; Jenkinson "· State, 15 Blackf.
465; Scranton "· Stewart, 152 Ind. 68;
:Maxhnm r. Place, 46 Yt. 434; Williams"· Fitch, 18 N.Y. M6; Britton
"· Lorenz, 45 N. Y. 51; Chaboon "·
Commonwealth, 21 Grat. 822; Sargeant"· Hampden, S8 Me. :181; State
"· Hazleton, 15 La. Ann. 72; Higbee e.
Dres~cr, 10.1 Mass. 528; Orton "· McCord, 83 Wis. 205; Alderman e. Peo. pie, 4 :Mich. 414.
'Taylor"· Blacklow, 8 Bing. (N. 0.)
285.
• Oom. Dig. Action upon tbe case
for a Deceipt. 5.

Hohnan '0. Loynes, 4 De G., M. & G.

2'70; Carter v. Palmer, 8 Cl. 85 Fin.

657; Charter 0. Trcvelyan, 11 Cl. &

Fin. 714; Gibson 0. Jeyes,6 Vcs 266;

Pisaui o. Attorney General, L. R. 6

P. Q. 516: S. C. 10 Moak, 78.

,

• Valentine"· Stewart, 115 Cal. 887.
As to frauds by attnrneys upon clients. by means of which property
is obblined or sold, see Matter of
Woods, 86 Mich. 299; Ford "· Harrln~rton, 16 N.Y. 285; Evans"· Ellis.
5 Denio. 640; Ellis e. Xesservie, 11
Paige, 467; Howell tl. Ransom. 11
Paige, 5a8; Poillon e. :Martin, 1 Sandt.
Cb. 569; Ed wards 1:1. M~yrick, 2 Hare.
60; Newman "· Payne, 2 V cs. 199;
G•·csley "·Mousley, 4 De 6. & J. 78;
Lyddon e. ~loss, 4 De G. & J. 104:;
Holman e. Loynes, 4 De G., M. & G.
270; Carter "· Palmer, 8 Cl. & Fla.
657 ; Chart-er e. Trevelyan, 11 Cl. &
Fin. 714; Gihson e. Jeyes, 6 Vl'S 266;
Pisani "· Alt·•rnt'y General, L. R. 6
P. q. 516; 8. C. 10 Moak, 78.
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'10

guarded against is not so much the abuse of’ an attorney’s priv-

ilege as the abuse of a conﬁdence which has been bestowed upon

him.‘

guarded against is not so mnch the abuse of an attoml~y's privilege as the abuse of a confidence which has beeu bestowed upon
him.'

Scrivener-s. When one trusts another with the drawing of

contracts between them —as is sometimes done when attorneys

have dealings of bargain and sale with other persons—the

draftsman accepts obligations which are even more strict than

those which spring from the ordinary professional relations.

IIere the draftsman undertakes to act with entire impartiality

for two parties,’ one of whom is himself; and he is hound not

simply to good faith, but to make sure that his interest does not

mislead his judgment to the prejudice of the other party. This

principle is applicable to insurance agents who draw contracts

of indemnity. It is a fami iar rule of law that their principal

shall not take advantage of their errors or mistakes to the

prejudice of those they have undertaken to insure. The doe-

trine of estoppel is often applied in those cases where the insur-

ers undertake to claim the advantage of something omitted from

the contract, but which should have been inserted.‘
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Physicians and Clergymen. The common law did not extend

to the conﬁdence which one might bestow upon his‘ physician

or his spiritual adviser the same protection which it gives in

the case of the legal counsellor.‘ Yet the reasons in support of

it are largely the san1e.'and ought to have been recognized as

suﬁicieut. The disclosure made to any of the three may in a

l Story Eq. Juris. §§ 307-309; Free-

Scriveners. When one trusts another with the drawing of
contracts between them -as is sometimes done when attorneys
have dealings of bargain and sale with other persons- the
draftsman accepts obligations which are even more strict than
those which spring from the ordinary professional ~lations.
IIere the draftsman undertakes to act with entire impartiality
for two parties,' one of whom is himself; and he is honnd not
simply to good faith, but to make sure that his interest does uot
mislead l.is judgment to the prejudice of the other J>&rty. This
principle is applicable to insurance agents who dl'l\w contracts
of indemnity. It is a fami iar rule of law that their principal
shall not take advantage of their errors or mistakes to the
prejudice of those they have undertaken to insure. The doctrine of estoppel is often applied in those cases where the insurers undertake to claim the advantage of something omitted from
the contract, but which should have been inserted.'

love v. Cole, 41 Barb. 318: Scars 0.

' Bidwell 9. Northwestern Ins. Co.,

M N. Y. 302; Clark v. Union, etc.,

Shafcr, 1 Barb. 408; S. O. 6 N. Y. 268;

Ladd v. Rice, 57 N. H. 374.

' One who drafts a will under which

he is to be a beneﬁciary does so under

suspicions which he must remove by

proof of entire fairness, and that the

Phyaioums and Clergymen.

The common law did not extend
to the confidence which one might bestow upon his' physician
or his spiritual adviser the same protection which it gi,·cs in
the case of the legal connse11or.• Yet the reasons in support of
it are largely the same;and ought to have oc>en recognized as
sufficient. The disclosure made to any of the three may in a

testator fully understood the instru-

ment prepared for him. Breed o.

Pratt, 18 Pick. 115; Downey v. Mur-

phey, 1 Dev. & Bat. 82; Duﬂield 0.

Robeson, 2 Harr. 875; Hill n. Baye,

12 Ala. 687; Adair v. Adair, 80 Geo.

102.

~-

lns. Co., 40 N. H. 333; Howard Fire

Ins. Co. v. Bruner, 23 Penn. 50; Hart-

ford, etc., Ins. Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio.

(N. s.) 452; Peoria, etc., Ins. Co. v.

Hall, 12 Mich. 202.

‘ Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20

State Trials. 573; Rex r. Gibbons, 1

C. & P. 07; Wilson 0. Rastall, 4 T. R.

753; Anonymous, 2 Skin. 404; Rex

0. Gilliam, Ry. & M. 165; State 0.

Bostick, 4 Iiarr. 564; Simon e. Gratz,

2 Pt-n. & Watts. 412; Commonwealth

0. Drake, 15 Mass. 161.
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• Story Eq. Jori!l. §~ 807-.100; Freelove "· Cole, 41 Barb. 818; Sears e.
Shafer, 1 Barb.40~; B. 0. 6 ~. Y. 268;
Ladd "·Rice, 57 N.H. 374.
s One who 1lrafls a will under which
be Is to be a beneftciary does sn under
suspicions which be must remove by
proof of entire fairness, and that the
testator fully understnod the instrument prepared for him. Breed "·
Pratt, 18 Pick. 111J; Downey"· Xnrphey, 1 Dev. & Bat. 82; Duftleld "·
Robeson, 2 Barr. 8'73; Hlll "· Baye,
12 Ala. 687; Adair "· Adair, 80 Geo.
102.

• Bidwell e. Northwestern Ins. Co.,
94 N. Y. 302; Clark "· Union, etc.,
Ins. Co., 40 N. H. 833; Howard Fire
Ins. Co."· Bruner, 23 Penn. 50; IIRrtford, etc., Ins. Co. r. Harmer, 2 Ohio,
(N. 8.) 452; Peoria, etc., Ina. Co. "·
Hall, 12 Mich. 202.
• Duchess of Kingston's f'a~~e, 20
State Trials. 578; Rex "· Gibbons, 1
C. &: P. 97; Wilson "· Rastall, 4 T. R.
753; Anonymous, 2 Skin. 404; Rex
"· Gilham, Ry. & :M. 16l'S; State e.
Bostick, 4 llarr. 564; Simon e. Grat"&,
2 Pen. & Watts, 412; Commonwealth
e. Drake, l!S Mus. 161.
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measure be compulsory, and what is extorted can never right-
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fully be made use of except for the very purpose for which it is

obtained. The competent physician does not undertake to make

cures where he knows nothing of causes; and he may need to

know the history of an ailment before he is able to determine

the family to which it belongs, or the remedies likely to be

available for its cure. He demands this; and in the mind oi

the patient the alternative to disclosure may be, that he will be

wrongly and prejudicially treated. But the disclosure that may

be useful for treatment may be damaging otherwise if placed

before the public, and if the lips of the physician are not sealed,

the patient may elect to deceive him, rather than to have his

body cured at the expense of his liberty or his reputation. Nor

in the case of spiritual advisers is it believed that any public

interest would be prejudiced by the adoption of a rule which

should render strictly conﬁdential in all cases, whatever a man

might communicate in order to obtain spiritual assistance and

counsel. Especially if the usages and discipline of a church

require or even counsel full conﬁdence in this relation, it should

be regarded as a part of the religious freedom of its members

to be at liberty to indulge it with safety and under legal pro-

tection. In some of the States the legislature has recognized
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the propriety of such protection, not only in the case of religious

advisers, but of physicians also.

The law takes notice of the inﬂuence likely to be acquired by

the physician over his patient, and scrutinizes with jealousy

their dealings while the relation continues.‘ As the control of

spiritual advisers is likely to be even greater and more eon-

trolling, especially in the last illness. the reasons for such jeal-

ousy are powerful in proportion, and they should be able to

show that any advantage obtained for themselves or their church

or denomination was the result of free and voluntary action, and

not obtained by practicing in any manner upon the fears or the

hopes, or by taking advantage of spiritual or bodily weakness.’

' See Ashwell o. Lomi, L. R. Q. P. 273; In 1-e Welsh, 1 Retlf‘. Sur. Rep.

& D. 4'77; S. C. 4 Moak, 700; Billage 288; Lyon 0. Home, L. R. 6 Eq. Cas.

v. Southee, 9 Hare, 5134. 655; Dent 0. Bennett, 4 .\Iyl. 8.: Cr.

' See Huguenin 0. Baseley, 14 Ves. 269, 277.

measure be compulsory, and what is extorted "Can never rightfully be made usc of except for the very purpose for which it is
obtained. The competent physician does not undertake to make
cures where he knows nothing of cames; and he mR.y need til
know the history of an ailment before he is able to determine
the family to which it belongs, or the remedies likeJy to be
available for its cure. He demands this; and in the mind of
the patient the alternative to disclosure may be, that he will be
wrougly and prejudicially tr-eated. But the disclosure that may
be useful for treatment may be damaging otherwise if placed
before the public, and if the lips of the physician are not sealed,
the patient may elect to det-eive him, rather than to have his
body cured at the expense of his liberty or his reputation. :X or
in the case of spiritual advisers is it belie,·ed that any public
interest would be pr£>judiced by the adoption of a rule which
shou!d render strictly confidential in all cases, whate,·er a man
might communicate in order to obtain spiritual Msistauce and
counsel. Especially if the usages and discipline of a church
require or even counsel full contiden('e in this relation, it should
be regarded as a part of the religious freedom of its members
to be at liberty to indulge it with s:1fety and under lc~..-al protection. In some of the States the legislature has recognized
the propriety of such proteetion, not only in the case of religious
advisers, but of physicians also.
The law takes notice of the influence likely to be acquired by
the physician over hie vatient, and scrutinizes with jealousy
their dealings while the relation continues.' As the l'ontrol of
spiritual advisers ·is likely to he even greater and more <.-ontrolling, especially in the last illness. the reasons for such jealOU~'Y are powerful in proportion, and they should be able to
show that any advantage obtained for tltem~clves or their church
or denomination was the result of free and voluntary action, and
not obtained by practicing in any manner upon the fears or the
hopes, or by taking advantage of spiritual or bodily weakn~s."
1

See Ashwell

~.

Lomi, L. R Q. P.

& D. 477; S.C. 4 Moak, 700; Billage

"· Southee, 9 Hare, 5:)4.
• See Huguenin~. Baseley, 14 Vea.

273; In re Welsh, 1 Redf. Sur. Rep.
238; Lyon tl. Home, L. R 6 Eq. Cas.
655; Dent tl. Bennett, 4 Myl. & ~~.
269,277.
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CHAPTER XVIII.
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RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MASTER FOR THE WRONGS DONE

OR SUFFERED BY PERSONS IN HIS EMPLOYMENT.

In a. previous chapter it has been shown that when several

persons participate in wrongful and injurious action, they are

jointly and severally responsible for all legal consequences, and

the extent of their participation, or the degree of fault attribut-

able to each, is immaterial. The rules regulating the responsi-

bility of the husband for the torts of the wife have also been

given, and it has been seen that the law supposes her to be under

his control, and does not suffer him to exonerate himself from

responsibility by showing the contrary. The rule of presump-

CHAPTER X VIII.

tion is adopted for this case, because it is believed the well-

being of society is best subserved thereby. It has also been

seen that while a corporation is responsible for its torts, those

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE llASTER FOR THE WRONGS DON&
OR SUFFERED BY PEHSONS IN HlM EllPLOYMENT.

who act for it in committing them may, at the election of the

party injured, be held to accountability, either as the principals

or as joint wrong-doers.

Attention is now directed to a class of cases in which the law

holds one party responsible for the wrongs done or suffered by

another, often with no regard to his personal fault. and in many

cases refusing to permit his actual fault _to be disproved. The
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cases embraced in this class are those in which one person occupies

toward another the relation of master to servant,

Who is a Servant. A preliminary remark is essential regard-

ing the employment, in the law, of the words master and servant.

The common understanding of the words and the legal under-

stand is not the same; the latter is broader, and comprehcnds

some cases in which the parties are master and servant only in a

peculiar sense, and for certain purposes; perhaps only for a

single purpose. In strictness, a servant is one who, for a valu-

able consideration, engages in the service of another, and under-

In a previous chapter it has Leen shown that when sevet"Sl
persons participate in wrongful and injurious action, they are
jointly and se\·erally responsible for all legal consequences, and
the extent of their participation, or the degree of tault attributable to each, is immaterial. The rules regnlating the responsibility of the husband for the torts of the wife have also been
gh·en, and it has been seen that .the law supposes her to be under
his control, and does not suffer him to exonerate himself from
responsibility by showing the cont1·ary. The rule of p•·esumption is adopted for this case, bccam.e it is helie\·ed the wellbeing of society is best snbserved thereby. It has also heen
seen that while a corporation is responsible for its to1·ts, those
who act for it in committing them may, at the election of the
party injured, bo held to accountn.bility, either as the principals
or as joint wrong-doers.
Attention is now directed to a class of cases in whid1 the law
holds one party re.,ponsible for the wrongs done or suffered by
another, often with no regard to his personal fault, 1md in mnny
cases refusin~ to permit his ll('tual fault .to be disproved. The
cases embraced in this class are those in which one person occupies
towa1-d another the relation of master to servant.
Who is a Servant. A preliminary remark is e5'sential re,zarding the employment, in the law, of the words master and SCI'\·ant.
The common understanding of the words and the legal unclcr.
stand is not the same; the latter is broader, and comprc]l('nds
some cases in which the parties are master and sen·ant only in a
peculiar ~:~cnsc, and for certain pm·poses; pt'l'haps only for a
single pnrpuse. In strictness, a ser\·ant is one who, tor a minable consideration, engages in the service of auothcr, and under-
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takes to observe his directions in some lawful business. -The
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relation is purely one of contract, and the contract may contem-

plate or stipulate for any services and any conditions of service

not absolutely unlawful. The case of an apprentice may be

embraced under this head; for although he does not always bar-

gain in respect to the service on his own behalf. some one whom

the law authorizes to speak for him does so. and the relation

established is strictly one resting on an agreement for services in

return for a consideration of some sort which the master is to

render.

But only as between the two parties to it does the contract

establish their relation and determine their rights. Whatever

obligations the relation might impose on either as respects third

pul's0I1S, could not depend on the nature of the stipulations, but

must spring from the relation itself. If one is injured by the

servant of another, and the injury is in any manner connected

with the fact of service, it would be immaterial to the injured

party what the contract of service was, how long it was to con-

tinue, what compensation was to be paid for it, or what mutual

covenants the parties had for their own protection. The liability

of the master, if any, cannot depend upon circumstances with

which the public has no concern; it must come from the fact

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

that one person has placed himself under another’s direction

and control, in a manner that should impose on the latter the

obligation to protect third persons against injuries from the acts

or omissions of his subordinate. It could not at all depend on

whether the master was to pay anything, nor whether the service

was permanent or temporary. His control of the action of the

other is the important circumstance, and the particulars of his

arrangement are immaterial.

Accordingly, it has been determined that when one person, for

the time being, places himself in a position of subordination to

another in the business of the latter, and by what he may do in

that condition of subordination a third person is injured, such

third person has a right to regard him as occupying the position

of a servant, and is entitled to such remedies against the superior

as he would have if the contract of service in fact existed.‘ For

‘Hill 0. Morey, 26 Vt. 178; Potter one had directed his servant to rn.

oi Faulkner, 1 B. & Smith. 80 '. In m -ve snow and ice from the root‘ of

Allhorf 1:. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355, where his house, and another person went

takes to observe his directions in some lawfn: buPiness. ·The
relation is purely one of contract, and the contract may contemplate or stipulate for any services and any conditions of service
not abaolutely nnlawful. The case of an apprentice may be
embraced under this head; for although he does not always bargain in respect to the service on his own behalf. ~me one whom
the law authorizes to speak for him does so. and the relation
established is strictly one resting on an agreement tor services in
return for a consideration of some sort which the master is to
render.
But only as between the two parties to it does the contract
establish their relation and determine their rights. Whatever
ohligat.ions the relation might impose on eithe1· as respecttl third
t•cl·sons, conld not depend on the nature of the stipulations, but
must spring from the relation itself. If one is injured by the
servant of another, and the injury is in any manner connected
with the fact of service, it wonld be immaterial to the injured
party what the contract of service was, how long it was to continue, what compensation was to be paid fnr it, or what mutual
covenants the parties had for their own protection. The liability
of the master, if any, <;annot depend upon circumstances with
which the public has no concern; it must come from the fact
that one person has placed himst:lf under another's direction
and control, in a manner that should impose on the httter the
obligation to protect third persons against injnries from the acts
or ornistsio11s of his subordinate. It could not at all depend on
whether the master was to pay anything, nor whether the service
was pennanent or temporary. His control of the action of the
other is the important circumstance, and the particulars of his
arrangement are immaterial.
Accordingly, it has been determined that when one person, for
'the time being, place.q him.-elf in a position of subordination to
another in the business of the latter, and by what he may do in
that condition of subordination a third person is injured, sneh
third person has a right to regard him as occupying the position
of a servant, and is entitled to such remt>dics against the superior
as he would have if the contract of service in fact existed.1 For
1

Hill o. Morey, 26 Vt. 178; Potter

o. Faulkner, 1 B. & Smith. 80 ·. In
.A.lthorfe. Wolfe, 22 N.Y.

a;;;5,

where

one had directed his servant to rr.
nml ice frum tho roof of
his house, aad another person went

m •Ve snow
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convenience, rather than because anything depends on an actual
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contract of service, he is called a servant, when the remedy of the

third person is being pursued. So as a child is by the law placed

under the dominion of the parent, he is, while employed by the

latter about his aﬁ'airs, to be regarded as a servant; and so is a

mere volunteer.‘ And it follows, from what has been said above,

that the agent in one’s business, whether general or special, is in

law a servant, and so is the oﬁicer of aprivate corporation.’ The

otliccr of a public corporation in the discharge of the proper

duties of his oﬁice, is not, in general, to be deemed the servant

of the corporation; neither is any person who is employed in

any capacity in the execution of its police regulations.‘ But in

the management of its own property a public corporation comes

under the same rules with all others, and its agents are its

servants.

The Master's Liability in General. Wlien the relation is

found to exist, the question of the master-‘s liability next pre-

sents itself. And it will readily occur to every mind that the

master cannot, in reason, be held responsible geuerall y for what-

ever wrongful conduct the servant may be guilty of. A liability

so extensive would make him guarantor of'the servant’s good

conduct, and would put him under a responsibility which prudent
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men would hesitate to assume. except under the stress of neces-

conveuience, rather than because anything depend:3 on an actual •
contract of service, he is called a servant, when the rcmeuy of the
third person is being punmed. So as a child iH by the law placed
under the dominion of the parent, he is, while employed by tho
latter abont his affairs, to be regarded as a sen·ant; and so is a
mere ,·olunteer.' Anu it follows, from what has been said above,
that the agent in one's business, whether general or speeial, is in
law a ser\·ant, and so is the officer of a private corporation.' The
officer of a public corporatiOn iu the diHchar·ge of the prope1·
duties of his office, is not, in general, to be ucemed the I'CrVant
of the corporation; neither is any person who is employed in
any capacity in the execution of its police regulations.• llut in
the management of its own property a public corporation comes
under the same rules with all others, and itH agents are itil
servants.

sity. Even the parent is not made chargeable generally for the

torts of his child; and if he cannot justly be held responsible for

the conduct of one whom the law submits to his general direction

and discipline, much less could another be held liable, generally,

for the acts of a servant over whom his control is comparatively

slight, and who is not submitted to his disciplinary authority.

The maxim applied here is the familiar one: Qui fat-it per

up with the servant as a volunteer to

assist him, and, by the carelessness

of the latter in throwing the snow and

ice into the street, a pl\~'§lfI'-by was in-

jured, the master was held responsi-

ble. Sce, also, Booth o. Mister, 7 U.

& P. 66.

‘Shnuler, Dom. Rel. 544-5; Shearm.

and Retlf. on Neg. § 100.

’ A purely charitable society, hav-

ing no capital stock. nor provision for

making dividends or proﬁts, is not

responsible to one of its patients for

the negligence of a servant selvvtetl

with due care, nor for the nnnuthor.

The Master's Liability in General.

When the relation is
found to exist, the question of the master's liabilit.\" next presents itself. And it will r·eadily occur to e\·ery mind that th.-.:
master cannot, in reason, be held responsible generally for whate,·er wrongful conduct the sermnt may be guilty of. A liability
so extensive would make him guarantor of"the servant'i; good
conduct, and would put him under a responsiLility which prudent
men would hesitate to assume. exC'<'pt under the stretls of necessity. Even the parent is not made chargeable g"enerally for the
torts of his child; and if he cannot justly be held rcsponsihle f()r
the conduct of one whom the law snhmits to his ~eueral direction
and discipline, much less could another be held liable, ;.,renernlly,
for the acts of a sen·ant o\·er whom his control is comparatively
slight, and who is not submitted to his disciplinary authority.
The maxim applied here is the fi\miliar one: Qui facit per

ized assumption of an attendant to

act as surgeon. McDonald v. Mass.

Gen. Hospital. 120 Mass. 432; S. C.

21 Am. Rep. 529.

' See post, p. 621.

up with the servant as & volunteer to
assist him, and, by the carelessneBS
of the latter iu throwing the snow and
ice mto the slrt-et, a ptl-<l'cr-hy Wli..'l injured, the master was held re:~pon!!i
ble. See, also, Booth 11. llistcr, 7 C.
&P.66.
' Shou ler, Dom. Rei. 544-.'S; Shearm.
and He<lf. on N ('g. ~ 106.
• A purely charitable society, hav-

lng no cupital stock, nor provision for
making dividends or profit."~, is not
responsible to one of its patients for
the nP!o!ligcnce of a servant sch·1·fed
with due care, nor for the nnaulhur.
ized assumption of an attendant t,.,
act 1\11 sur~rPnn. Me Donald 11. ll1L.'It!.
G('n. Hnspil!ll, 120 llliSII. 432; 8. C.
21 Am. Rep. 529.
1 See pust, p. 621.
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aliumfacit per se. That which the superior has put the inferior
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in motion to do must be regarded as done by the superior him-

self, and his responsibility is the same as if he had done it in

person. The maxim covers acts of omission as well as of com-

mission, aud ‘embraces all .cases in which the failure of the ser-

vant to observe the rights of others in the conduct of the master's

business has been injurious. It is not, therefore, limited to the

cases in which the injurious conduct was directed by the master

himself; for so restricted it would be of little moment. A tort

which one directs or advises another to commit he is al\\'a_vs

responsible for, jointly with the guilty agent, and his liability

does not depend upon the subordination of the agent, but upon

the direct connection of the adviser with the wrong. A master

I_nust be responsible further, or the relation would be immaterial

in the law of legal wrongs. In brief, the rules of his liability

are as stated in the following pages. >

1. Intentional Acts. The master is liable for the acts of his

servant, not only when they are directed by him, but also when

the scope of his employment or trust is such that he has been

left at liberty to do, while pursuing or attempting to discharge

it, the injurious act complained of. It is not merely for the

wrongful acts he was directed to do. but the wrongful acts he
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was suffered to do, that the master must respond. \\'hen, there-

fore, a merchant places a clerk in his store to sell his goods, and

• alium.facit per se. That which tlie superior has put the inferior
in motion to do must be regat·ded as done by the supe1·ior himself, and his re~;ponsibility is the same as if he had done it in
person. The maxim covers acts of omission as well as of commission, and 'embraces all .cases in which the failure of the servant to observe the rights of others in the conduct of the mastea··s
business has been injurious. It is not, the1·efore, limited to the
ca~es in which the injurious conduct was directed by the master
himl'elf; for so restricted it would be of little moment. A tort
which one di1·ects or advises another to commit he is alwavs
responsible for,jointly with the guilty agent, and his liability
does not depend upon the subordination of the agent, but upon
the di1·ect counection of the adviser with the wrong. A. ma,;ter
:rpust be responsible further, or the relation would be immaterial
in the law of leg-al wrongs. In brief, the rules of his liability
are as stated in the following pages.

..

the clerk disposes of them with false representations of their

qualities, the purchaser who bi'i|1gs suit for the fraud need not

concern himself with the question whether the fraud was directed

or not. His injury does not depend upon that, and it neither

affects his equity to compensation, nor the moral obli_=_ration of

the merchant to respond.‘ So when a railway company puts a

conductor in charge of its train, and he purposely and wrong-

fully ejects a passenger from the cars, the railway company must

bear the blame and pay the damages. In this case the coiuyauy

chooses its servant and puts him in charge of its business. and

the injury is done while pe|'ibi'ii1iiig it, and in the exercise of thc

power conferred. If the corporate authorities did not direct tho:

act to be done, they nevertheless put a person of their own selec-

tion in a position requiring the exercise of discretionary authority,

‘ Griswold 0. Haven, 25 N. Y. 595

— -—-£1‘

1. Intentional Acts. The master is liable for the acts of his
not only when they are directed by him, but also when
the l'cope of his employment or trust is such that he has been
left at liberty to do, while pursuing or attempting to discharge
it, the injurious act complained of. It is not merely for the
wrongful acts he was directed to do. but the wron~fnl acts he
was suft'ered to do, that the master must reE-pond. W'hen, theref(m~, a merchant places a clm·k in his store to sell his goods, and
the clerk disposes of them with false represe!1tations of their
qualities, the purchaser who b1·in~s suit for the fraud need not
~oncern ldmsclf with the qne:'tion whether the f.-and was directed
or not. Ilig inj nry does uot depend upon tht1t~ and it neither
affects his equity to compensation, nor the moral obli~tation of
the merchant to respond.' So when a 1·ailway company puts a
conductor in charge of its train, nnd he purposely and wrongfully ejects a pat'senger from the c1u·s, the railway company mnst
bear the blame and vay the darrmgeB. In this case the (~OillJ'ally
choose!' its servant a11d puts him in charge of its business. and
the injury is done while performing- it, and in the exercise of the
power contea·red. If the corporate autlwrities did not direct the
act to be done, they nevertheless put a person of their own selection in a position requiring the exercise of discretionary authority 1
~;;ervant,

• Griswold"· Ihven, 25 N.Y. 595

RESPONSIBILITY or THE MASTER. 535

and by entrusting him with the authority and with the means of
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doing the injury, have, through his agency, caused it to be done.

As between the company and the passenger, the right of the

latter to compensation is unquestionable.’

2. Intentional Acts; When Master not Liable. But the lia-

bility of the master for intentional acts which constitute legal

wrongs can only arise when that which is done is within the real

or apparent scope of the master’s business. It does not arise

and by entrusting him with the authority and with the menus of
doing the injury, have, through his agenc)·, caused it to be done.
As between the company and the passenger, the right of the
latter to compensation is unquestionable.'

where the servant has stepped aside from his employment to com-

mit a tort which the master neither directed in fact, nor could be

supposed, from the nature of his employment, to have authorized

or expected the servant to do. To illustrate again with the ease

of the merchant: While he may justly be held responsible for a

fraudulent sale by his clerk of the merchandise entrusted to him

for sale, there could be neither reason nor justice in compelling

the merchant to respond if the fraud were practiced by the clerk in

' Eastern Counties R. Co. 0. Broom,

6 Exch. 314, 327; Gotf v. Great Nor. R.

R. Co., 8 E. & E. 612; Seymour 0.

Greenwood, 7 II. & N. 355; Buyley 0.

M. S.& L. R Co., L. R. 7 C. R415; S.

C. on Appeal, L. R. 8 C. P148; Moore
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0. Met. R. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 36; Phila-

delphia. & Reading R. R. Co. v. Der-

by, 14 How. 468; Chamberlain 0.

2. Intentional Acts; When Kaster not Liable. Bnt the Jia.
bility of the mastm· for intentional acts which constitute legal
wrongs can only ariRe when that which is done is within the real
or appat·ent scope of the master's business. It does not arise)
where the scn·nnt has stepped aside from his employment to commit a tort which the master neither directed in fact, nor could be
snppn~Pd, ft·om the nature of his empl<1yment, to have authorized
or expected the servant to do. To illustrate a~in with the case
of the merchant: While he may justly he held responsible for a
fraudulent sale by his clerk of the met·chandit>e entrusted to him
for sale, th_~re could be neither reason nor justice in compelling
the merchant to l'c;;pond if the fraud were practiced by the clerk in

Chandler, 3 Mason, 242; Baltimore,

etc., R. R. Co. u. Ulocher, 27 Md. 277;

Goddard v. Grand Trunk R~ R. Co.,

57 110.202; S. C. 3 Am. Rep. 39; Moore

c. Fitehburg R. R. Co., 4 Gray, 465;

Ramsden v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co.,

104 Mass. 117; S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 200;

Drew u. Sixth Ave. R. R. Co.. 26 N.

Y. 49; Passenger R. R. Co. e. Young,

21 Ohio, (N. s.) 518; S. C. 8 Am. Rep.

'78; Penn. R. R. Co. 0. Vandiver, 42

Penn. St. 365; Pittsburgh, etc.. R. Co.

v. Donahue, 70 Penn. St. 119; llealey

v. City R. R. Co., 28 Ohio, (N. s.) 28.

In Townsend 0. N. Y. Central, etc., R.

R. Co., 56 N. Y. 295; S. C.15Am.

Rep. 419, following Hamilton u. Third

Ave. R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 25, it is de-

cided that when the conductor, acting

in the line of what he believes his

duty, removes from the carsa man

who ret'u.~:es to pay his fare or to show

his ticket, the company cannot be

held responsible for more than the

actual dznnages. And, see Hagan v.

Providence, etc., R. R. Co., 3 R. I. 88;

Frederick r. Marquette, etc.. R. R. Co.,

37 Mich. 312. A trespass done or suf-

fered by a servant on the land of a

third person, without the master's au-

thoxily, cannot render the master lia-

ble, though the servant, in what he

did, had in view the master's interest,

and supposed he was furthering it.

Horner e. Lawrence. 37 N. J. 46.

A railroad company is liable for

the acts of its conductor in ejecting

with excessive force an intruder on

the car. Iiiggins 0. Watervliet, etc.,

('0 , 46 N. Y. 23; S. C. 7Am. Rep. ‘Z93;

Sanford o. Eighth Av. R. R. (‘o., ‘.313

N. Y. 3-lil; C- leman 0. New York etc ,

R R. Co , 106 Mass. 160; Seymour p_

Greenwood, 7 II. & N. 354 See Kan.

1 Eastern Counties R. Co. tl. Rroom,
6 Exch. 314, 327; Uoff "· Gn:nt Nor. R.
R. Co., 8 E. & E. 662; St•ymour tl.
G!"e(•nwood, 7 H. & N. :ti5; Buy ley tt.
M.S.&L.H Cu.,L.R.7C.P.415; S.
C. on Appe11.l, L. R. 8 C. P. 148; :Mooro
t~. :Met. R. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. :i6; Ph iladelphin & Rending R. H.. Co. v. Der.
by, 14 How. 4fiH; Chnml>'~rlain •·
Chandler, 8 llason, 242; Baltimore,
etc., H.. H. Co. v. lllocher, 27 ~l<.l. 277;
Goddard "· Grand Trunk R. R. Co.,
57 llc. 202; S.C. 2 Am. H.cp. 39; 1\loore
t'. I<~ itch burg R. R. C'o., 4 Hruy, 46.>;
Rllmsden "· Boston, Elc., R R. Co.,
104 ~lass. 117 ; 8. C. 6 Am. 1\(• p. 200;
Drew tl. Sixth Ave. R. R. Co .. 26 N.
Y. 4!l; Pnssrnger R. R. Co."· Young,
21 Ohio, (:s. s.) 518; S.C. 8 Am. Hep.
78; Penn. R. H. Co. tl. V~andiver, 42
Penn. bt. 3GS; Pittsbur~h. etc., R. Co.
tl. Donahue, 70 Penn. St. 119; Healey
t~. City R. H. Co., 28 Ohio, (N. 8.) 23.
In Towust'nd "· N.Y. Central, etc., R.
R. Co., 5ll N. Y. 295; S. C. 15 Am.
lll•p. 419, following Hamilton"· Third
Ave. R. R. Co., 58 N.Y. 2ii. it is d~
cided th11t when the conductor, acting

in the line of what he believes his
duty, removes from the cars a man
whu refn:;es to pay his fare or to show
hi~ lick('t, th'! compnny CD.nnot be
held rl'sponsible for more than the
nctull.l damages. And, sec H:1g-an "·
Providl·ncl·, etc., R R. Co., 3 R. I. 88;
Frederick r. ~larquette, etc .. R. R. Co.,
87 ~lich. St2. A trespass done or tmffered by a servant on the lund of a
third person, without the master's autho! ity, cannot render the ma>~ter lia..
Lie, though the servant, in what he
did, hnd in view the master's inte~·e>~t,
and supposed he was furthe1·ing it.
llol'ller "· Lawrence. 37 N.J. 46.
A railroad compuny is liable for
the nets of its conductor in t•jf•cting
"'ith exct>ssh·e force an intrudt•r on
the car. Ili~.!.!ins tl. Wntervliet, etc.,
('o. 40 N. Y. 2a; S.C. 7 .\m. Rt·p. 293;
8nnford "· Ei~hth Av. R. R. Co., ~:}
N.Y. 34!1; c. Ieman tl. New York etc,
R R. Co , 106 Mnss. 160; St•ymnur r.
Greenwond. 7 II. & N. 854 Sl•c Kansas PnC'itic R. R. Co. G. Ke~>sler, 18
Ko.n. 523.
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a sale, not of the merchandise, but of his own horse or watch. So
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if the conductor of a train of cars leaves his train to beat a personal

enemy, or from mere wantonness to inﬂict any injury, the differ-

ence between his case and that in which the passenger is removed

from the cars is obvious. The one trespass is the individual tres-

pass of the conductor, which he has stepped aside from his

employment to commit; the other is a trespass committed in the

course of the employment, in the execution of orders the master

has given, and apparently has the sanction of the master, and

contemplates the furtherance of his interests.‘ In determining

whether or not the master shall be held responsible, the motive

of the servant in committing the act is important; forif he sup-

poses he is acting in furtherance of the master’s interest under a

discretionary authority, which the master has conferred upon him,

the case will generally have an aspect quite different from what

it would present if it were manifest that malice were being

indulged, irrespective of the master’s interest. But the motive

is not conclusive. A man may purposely defraud another in

selling his master‘s goods, that he may gratify his pri\'ate malice

against the purchaser; but if the master had empowered him to

make the sale, he must take the responsibility of any wrong com-

mitted in making it. The test of the master’s responsibility is
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not the motive of the servant, but whether that which he did was

something his employment contemplated, and something which,

if he should do it lawfully, he might do in the employer’s name.’

‘ In Orocker 0. New London, etc.,

R. R. Co., 24 Conn. 249, the servant

of the defendant, after a person had

been put oﬂ'-the cars, kicked him in

the face when he attempted to get on

again. Held, to be the tort of the

servant only. See, also, Evansville,

cte.. R. R. Co. o Baum, 26 Ind. 70.

In Wright '0. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343,

the master was held not liable where

the servant willfully drove over an-

a sale, not of the merchandise, bnt or his own horse or watch. So
if the conductor of a train of cars leaves his train to beat a persona]
enemy, or from mere wantonness to inflict auy injnry, the difference between his cue and that in which the passenger is removed
from the cars is obvious. The one trespass is the in~ividnal trespas.q of the conductor, which he has stepped aside from his
employment to commit; the other is a trespass committed in the
course of the employment, in the execution of orders the mas~cr
has given, and appa1·ently has the sanction of the master, and
contemplates the furtherance of his interests.' In determining
whether or not the master shall be held responsible, the motive
of the servant in committing the act is important; for if he supposes he is acting in furtheran<.-e of the master's interest under a
discretionary authority, which the master has conferred upon him,
the case will generally have an aspect quite different from what
it would present if it were manifest that malice were being
indulged, irre:>pcctive of the waster's interest. But the motive
is not concln~;ive. A man may purposely defraud another in
selling his master's ~oods, that he may gratify his prh·ate malice
against the purchaser; but if the master had empowered him to
make the sale, he m nst take the responsibility of any wrong committed in making it. The test of the master's responsibility is
( not the motive of the servant, but whether that which he did was
something his employment contemplated, and something which,
if he should do it lawfully, he might do in the employer's name.•

other person and injured him. This

doctrine was applied in Richmond

Turnpike C0. '0. Vanderbilt, 1 Hill,

480; S. C. in error, 2 N. Y. 479, to a

ease where the master of a vessel pur-

posely ran into and injured another,

and in Illinois Cent. R. R. 00.0. Dow-

ney, 18 Ill. 259, to one where the eon-

ductor 'of a train of cars purposely

increased his speed to run into stock

on the track. But compare Toledo,

etc., R. R. Co. o. Harmon, 47 Ill. 298;

Chicago, etc., R R. Co. 1:. Dickson,

63 Ill. 151; S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 114-;

Howe v. Newmurch; 12 Allen, 49;

Duggins v. Watson. 15 Ark. 118.

' “It” one of the defentlants, while

engaged in the prosecution of the

business of the other, carelessly or

negligently set ﬁre to the prairie, or

even purposely, with a view to bene-

ﬁt or protect the interests of the em-

ployer, the latter would he liable for

the consequences." Tm-:,\'r. Ch. J., in

Johnson 0. Barber, 10 Ill. 425. A boy

'——-221?"!

1 In Crocker •· New Lonrlon, etc.,
R. R Co., 24 Conn. 249, the servant
of the defend~mt, after a person had
lx'en put off ·tho cars, kicked him in
the face when he attempted to get on
again. Held, to be the tort of the
servant only. See, also, Evansville.•,
etc. R. R. Co. Cl Raum, 26 Ind. 70.
In Wright "· Wilcox, 19 Wend. 843,
the master was held not Hable where
the setvant wl11fu11y drove over an.
other p<'t·son and injured him. This
doctrine was applied in Richmond
Tumpike Co. tt. Vanderbilt, 1 Hill,
480; 8. C. in error, 2 N.Y. 479, to a
case where the mfUitcr of a vcs~el purposely ran into and injured anuther,
and in lllinois CenL R. R. Co. tt. Dow-

ney, 18 111. 1M9, to one where the conductor 'Of a tJ·aln of cars purposely
increased his s1wed to run into stock
on the track. But compRre Toledo,
etc., R. R. Co. e. Harmon, 47 Ill. 298;
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. fl. Dickson,
68 Ill. trit ; S. C. 14: Am. Rep. 114-;
Howe "· Newmnrch; 12 Allen, 49;
Duggins "· Watson, 1~ Ark. 118.
1 " If one or the defendants, while
engaged in the prosecution of the
business or the other, carelessly or
negligc:ntly set tire to the prairie, or
even purposely, with a view to bene.
ftt or protect. the interests of the em.
ployer, the latter would be liable for
the consequences." TREAT, Ch.J.• in
Johnson"· Barber, 10 Ill. 42J. A bo7

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MASTER.

RESPON8IBILI1.'Y OF THE KASTER.

Says Ho.-ta, J.: “ If the servant, wholly for a purpose of his

587

own, disregarding the object for which he is employed, and not

intending by his act to execute it, does an injury to another not

within the scope of his employment, the master is not liable.” '

willfully struck by a car driver can-

not recover of the railway company

for the injury. Pittsburgh, etc., R.

R. C0. e. Donahue, 70 Penn. St. 119.

Bay~ IToA.R, J.: "If the servant, wholly for a purpose of his
own, dist'L'garuing the object for which he is employt.'<l, and not
intending by his act to execute it, does an injury to another not
within the scope of his employment, the master is not liable." 1

A bank is not liable for a theft by the

cashier of moneys left in his charge.

Foster c. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479,

-510. Sec Isaacs 0. Third Ave. R. R.

Co., 47 N. Y. 122; J!\('l(.~0:| v. Second

Ave. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 274; S. C. 7

Am. Rep. 4-48; Moore 0. Sanborne, S

Mich. 520. It‘ a baggage man, in the

execution of his orders to keep intrud-

ers out of his car. throws an intruder

oil‘, the company is primafrzcie liable;

but if he acts willfully and mali-

ciously in doing so, outside and in

excess of his duty. he alone is respon-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

sible. Rounds n. Delaware, etc., R. R.

Co., 64 N. Y. 129; S. C. 21 Am. Rep.

597.

‘ Howe e. Newmarch, 12 Allen, 49,

57. See Little Miami R R. (lo. 0.

Wetmore, 19 Ohio, (rt. s.) 110; S. C. 2

Am. Rep. 373; Evansville, etc., R. R.

Co. 0. Baum. 26 Ind. 70; Fraser 0.

Freeman, 43 N. Y. 566; S. C 3 Am.

Rep. T40. In Mali v. Lord. 3!) N. Y.

331, a merchant was sued for the

wrongful act of his superintendent

in having the plaintitf arrested and

searched on a charge of stealing goods

from the merchant. It was held that

the merchant was not liable, and the

general doctrine is stated that the

master is not liable for acts of the

servant not directed by him, and

which the master himself, if present,

would not be authorized to do. But

this rule is a little vague, and cannot

always be true. No one is author-

ized, in the exercise of his ri_;l|I.s, to

employ unnccc-isary force; but in

Rounds e. Delaware, etc., R.R.Co.,

MN. Y. 129: S. C. 81 Am. Rep. 597,

it was held that the master was liable

where the servant, in pursuance of a

general authority, made use of unne-

cessary force to eject a trespasser.

Compare liibbard 1:. N. Y. & Erie R.

R. Co., 15 N. Y. 456. It is, as is said

in the leading case of Me.\[anus 0.

Crickett, 1 East, 106, “ where a ser-

vant quits sight of the object for

which he was employed, and without

having in view his master's orders,

pursues that which his own malice

suggests," that the master will not be

liable for his acts. See Southwick 0.

Estes, 7 Cush. 385; Higgins o. Water-

vliet, etc., Co.. 46 N. Y. 28; Philadel-

phia, etc., R. R Co. v. Derby. 14 Ilow.

468. In ltedding 0. Sou. Car. R. R.

Co., 8 S. 0., (x. s.) 1; S. O. 16 Am.

Rep. G91, the defendant was held re-

willfully struck by a car driver caanot rt.'<'over of &be railway company
for the injury. Pittaburgb, etc., R.
R. Co. e. I>nnabne, 70 Penn. BL 119.
A bank is not liable for R then by the
cn11hler of mont'ys left in his charge.
Foster c. Essex Bank, 17 llnl'B. 47D,
~10. 8ro Isaacs e. Third Ave. R. R
Co., 47 N.Y. 122; Ja<"kt-Oa o. Second
Ave. R. R Co., 47 N. Y. 274; 8. C. '1
Am. Rep. «8; lloure •· Ban borne, I
Mich. 520. If a bag!lage man, in &be
executiun of his ora en to keep intrud.
ers out of his car, Uarows an lnlnlder
off, the cumpany is primafae;e liable;
but if he acta willfully .and maliciously In doing so, outside and in
exct>88 of his duty. be alone Is respon.
siblc. Huunds "· Delaware. etc., R. R.
Co., 64 N. Y. 129; 8. C. 21 Am. Rep.
5ll7.

'Howe e. Nt-wmarcb, 12 Allen, 49,
Mce Little lliaml R. R. Co. e.
Wetmore, 19 Ohio, (N. B.) 110; 8. C. 2
Am. lwp. 878; Emnsvilll', etc .• R. R
Co. •· Baum. 26 Ind. 70; Frnser •·
Freeman, 43 N.Y. 666; S. C 8 Am.
Rep. i-10. In Mali ~'·Lord, 89 N.Y.
&:11, a merchant was sued for the
wrongful act of his supcrintt>ndent
in having tho plaintiff arreawd and
searcht-d on a chtU"ge of stealing ,;ooc.ls
from the merchant. It wu held that
&be merchant was not liable, and the
general doctrine is staf.t.'(] tluat the
D181'tcr Is not liable for acts of the
servant not dil't'<'tetl by him, and
which the ma.11ter himst>lf, if prt.'Ben'would not be authorized to dn. But
U1is rult' Is a little vague, aml cannot
al w!lys be true. No one is author.
ized, in the ext•l't"ille of his rights, &o
cmt)loy unnt>l'l''ls1ny force; but In
IWund.s e. Delaware, e&c., R R. Co.,
57.

M N. Y.129: 8. 0. 11 Am. Rep.rw7,
it was held that the master waa liable
where the servant, in pursuance or a
general authority, made usc of unneCf'BSHry (ol't"e to eje<>t a tr~p&.i..,Cr.
Compare Hibbard e. N.Y. & Erie R.
R. Co., 13 N.Y. 468. It is. as Ia aald
In the le.u.ling ca.<,e of :Mc)[anus e.
Crickett, 1 East, 106, .. where a ser.
vant quits eight of the object for
which be was cmplorcd. and without
havln~t in view hia muter's ordcra,
pursues tliRt which his own malice
au~rgests," that tbe muter will not be
liable for his acts. See Southwi<'k e.
Estes, 7 Cut~h. 385: lligginae. Water.
vliet, etc., Co.• 46 N.Y. 23; Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. e. Derby,14 How.
468. In Hc11ding e. 8ou. Car. R. R.
Co., 8 R. C., (K. e.) 1; 8. 0. 16 Am.
Rep. AAI, the derendant wu held reeponsiiJil' fur an assault upon a pussengt•r committed by a llt'rvant without any warrant In hia Instruction&
therefor. In T. ·ledo, etc., R R. Co.
•· Harmon, 47 Ill. 298. a railroad com.
pany w1111 made to pay damages for
the lawlt>ss act of an engineer l11
frlgllteniog horses by blowing off
steam. Ttl the asmt> elfe,•t is C'hicugo,
etc., R. R. Co. "· Dick~on, 63 lll. 1:i1;
S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 114. It requirea
eome care and caution to distinguish
tht> three ca.'les lRSl mentioned from
Wright r. Wilcox, 19 \\'end. 843, and
other cases which have followed it.
Persons who sent servants to the
bouse of anotht>r to remove ct>rtaln
chattels If a sum duo &hem was not
paid, were h£•ld liable for willful ll.Bsnult.s of th«• sPrvanta., It "PJ)Cariog that
'' sut·h ll..~uulta were committed in the
execution ol' the authority given them
by the defendants, and for tho purpoee
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that he gave to the servant an authority, or made it his duty to

act in respect to the business in which he was engaged, when the

wrong was committed, and that the act complained of was done

in the course of his employment. The master, in that case will

be deemed to have consented to and authorized the act of the

servant, and he will not be excused from liability, although the

servant abused his authority, or was reckless in the performance

of his duty, or inﬂicted an unnecessary injury in executing his

n1aster’s orders. The master who puts the servant in a place of

trust or responsibility, or commits to him the management of

his business or the care of his property, is justly held responsible

when the servant, through lack of judgment or discretion, or

from inﬁrmity of temper, or under the inﬂuence of passion

aroused by the circumstances and the occasion, goes beyond the

strict line of his duty or authority, and inﬂicts an unjustiﬂable

injury upon another.” ‘

3. Unintentional Wrongs. The wrong for which the master

shall respond need not be an intentional wrong; indeed, the

liability is commonly all the plainer if it is not. \Vhen the

servant, in the course of his employment, so negligently or with

such want of skill conducts himself in or manages the business
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that an injury to some third person results in consequence, the

master is respo_nsible for this negligence or want of skill. Every

man owes to every other the duty of due care to avoid injury;

But" it is in general sufficient to make the master responsible
that he gave to the servant an authority, or made it his duty to
act in respect to the business in which he was engaged, when the
wrong was committed, and that the act complai11ed of was dune
in the c.:ourso of his employment. The maste•·, in that ca:';e will
be deemed to have consented to and authorized the act of the
servant, and he will uot be excused from liability, although the
servant abused his authority, or was reckles.i in the periormance
of hi10 duty, or inflicted an unnecessary inju•·y in executing his
master's orders. The master who puts the servant in a place of
trust OJ' J'esponsihility, or commits to him the manaf.,rement of
his business or the caro of his property, is justly held rE-sponsible
when the servant, through lack of judgment or discretion, or
from infinnity of temper, or under the influence of passion
aroused by the circumstances and the occasion, goes beyond the
strict line of his duty or authority, and inflicts au unjustifiable
injury upon another." 1

and whether he manages his business in person or entrusts it to

others, he must, at his peril, see that this obligation is observed.

If another has suffered an injury through the negligent or im-

proper management of the business, the right of action arises

irrespective of the agency by which the business was conducted.’

and as a means of carrying out their

orders.” Levi r. Brooks, 121 Muss.

501. And, see Croft 0. Alison, 4 B.

& Ald. 590. Compaie Oxford 0. Pe-

ter, 28 Ill. 434; Ramsden 11. Boston,

etc., R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 117; B. C. 6

Am. Rep. 200.

‘Rounds 0. Delaware, etc., RR.

Co., 64 N. Y. 129, 134; S. 0.21 Am.

Rep. 597. Compare Horner o. Law-

— ~ e 1!?‘

rcuce, 87 N. J . 46. See, also, Cohen

0. Dry Dock. elc.. Co., 69 N. Y. 170.

'Shcarm. & ltcdl‘. on Neg". § 59;

~. Unintentional Wrongs.

The wron~ for which the master
shall respond need not be an in ten tiona! w•·uug; indeed, the
liahility is commonly all the plainer if it is not. 'Vhcn the
servant, in the course of his employment, so negligently or with
such want of skill conducts himself in or mana~er,~ the busine~s
that an injury to some third person results in consequence, the
master is re~po,nsil>le for this negligence or want of skill. E,·cry
man owes to every other the duty of due care to a\'oitl injury;
and whether he manag-es his busine~t~ in per::on or entru~ts it to
others, he must, at his peril, see that this obligation is ohsen·rtL
If another has suffered an injury through the negligent or improper management of the business, the ri~ht of action al'il'es
irrespective of the agency by which the business was conducted.•

()‘Conncll -r.‘ Slrong, Dudley, 265;

Purycar 0. Thompson. 5 1iuu1ph.39T;

Lutlrell 1:. Hazcn, 3 Sneed. 20; Camp-

bell a. Staiert, 2 Murph. 389; llarriss 0.

Mabry, 1 Ired. 240; llrushcr o. Ken-

nedy, 10 B. Mon. 28; Morgan v. Bow-

man, 22 Mo. 538; Brackctt '0. Lubke,

and as a means of carrying out their
orders." Levi t'. llrooks, 121 Muss.
501. And, see Croft "· Alison, 4 B.
& Ald. 500. Compme Oxford"· Peter, 28 Ill. 484; Ramsden "· J~nston,
etc., H.. R. Co., 104 Mass. 117; S. C. 6
Am. Rep. 200.
• Round:~ "· Delaware, etc., R R.
Co., 64 N.Y. 129, 134; 8. C. 21 Am.
Rep. 097. Compare Horner e. Law.

renee, 87 N. J. oW. See, also, Cohen
e. Dry D•'ck, ete., Co., GO N.Y. 170.
1 Shcarm. & Hetlf. on :Xeg. § 59;
O'Connell -r: Strong, Dudley, 265;
Puryear"· Thompson,.) Humph. 3!!7;
Luttrell v. Hazen, 3 SnePd, 20; Camp.
bl'llv. Staiert, 2 Mur·ph. 3::!9; Harriss"·
Mabry, 1 Ired. 240; Brasher "· Ken.
nedy, 10 B. lion. 28; ~l'lrgau t:. Bow.
man, 22 llo. 538; Brackett "· LuiJke,
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meaning ‘to business in the ordinary sense, but embraces every-

thing the servant may do for the master, with his express or

implied sanction.

4. Disobedience ot'Q1-dera. It is immaterial to the master's

responsibility that the servant at the time was neglecting some

rule of caution which the master had prescribed, or was exceed-

The term business, as here employed, is not re~tricted in its
rceaning to bnsine~s in the ordinary sense, bnt embraces e\'erything the servant may do for the master, with his expre~s or
implied sanction.

ing his master’s instructions, or was disregarding them in some

particular, and that the injury which actually resulted is attribu-

table to the servant’s failure to observe the directions given him.

In other words, it is not suﬂicient for the master to give proper

directions; he must also see that they are obeyed.‘

Recurring once more to the case of the conductor of a rail-

way train: Let it be supposed that the company has given the

most careful and exact directions for a cautious management,

and that, amongst other things, it has directed that no train

shall leave a station until orders to that effect are received by

telegraph from the managing oﬁice; but that, notwitlistanding

these directions, the conductor, conﬁdent of his ability to reach

the next station without injury, puts his train in motion, and a

collision occurs. The case supposed is one in which no moral

wrong is attributable to the managing otiicers; but the fact
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4 Allen, 138; McDonald o. Snelling,

14 Allen, 290; Andrus 0. Howard, 86

Vt. 2&8; Tucl 0. West<)n, 47 Vt. 634;

Sanford 0. Eighth Ave. It R. Co, 23

N. Y. 343; Toledo, etc, R. R. C0. 0.

Harmon, 4'7 Ill. 29$; Hays n. Miller,

'77 Penn. St. 238; S. C. 18 Am Rep.

445; Smith v. Webster, 23 Mich. 298;

Corrigan 0. Union Sugar ltcﬁncry, 98

Mass. 5'77; Reynolds 0. Iianrahan,

100 Mass. 318; Pickcns 0. Dieckcr. 21

4. Disobedience of Orders. It is immaterial to the mnster's
responsibility that the sen·ant at the time was neglecting some
rule of caution which the master had preseribed, or was exceed.
ing his master's instructions, or was disr·cgarding them in some
particular, and that the injury which actually resulted is attributable to the servant's failure to observe the directions given him.
In other words, it is not sufficient for the mRster to gin· proper
di1-ections; he must also see tl1at they are obeyed.'
llecurr:ng once more to the case of the conductor of a rail.
way train: Let it be sup}JOsed that the company has given the
most careful and exact directions for a cautions management,
and that, amongst other things, it has dil'ected that no train
shall leave a station until orders to that effect are received by
telegraph from the ma1mging office; but that, notwithstanding
these directions, the conductor, confident of his ahility to reach
the next station without injury, puts his train in motion, and a
eolli~ion occurs. The case supposed is one in which no moral
wrong is attributable to the managing officers; but the fact

Ohio, (11. s.) 212; S. C. 8 Am. Rep.

55; Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. o.

Smith, 22 Ohio, (N. s.) 227; S. C. 10

Am. Rep. 729; Evansville, etc., R. R.

Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind. 70; Evansville,

etc., R. R. Co. 0. Duncan, 28 lnd.4~11;

Mahoney 0. Mahoney, 51 Cal. 118.

The negligence must arise in the

course of the employment. If the

ii}

servant depart from the employment

for purposes of his own, the mus'er

is not responsible for his n(';.§li_1cl1Ce,

even though he may at the time be

making use of the master's imple-

ments or vcliir-lcs which have been

entrusted to him in the business. Sec

Mitchell 0. Crasswcller, 18 C. B. 237;

Aycrigg o. New York & Eric R. R.

Co., 80 N. J. 460; Bard 0. Yohn, 26

Penn. St. 482.

' Philadelphia, etc., R. R. 0. Derby,

14 Iiow. 468; Dugzins 0. Watson, 15

Ark. 118; Southwick 1:. Estes, 7 Cush.

885; Garretzen v. Duenckcl, 50 Mo.

104; S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 405; Higgins

0. Watervliet P. R. C0.. 46 N. Y. 23;

B. C. 7 Am. Rep. 293; Pauhnier 0.

Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. 151.

4 Allrn, 1~8; McDonald tl. Bne11ing,
14 Allen, 290; Andrus e. Howard, 86
Vt. 248; Tuel "· Weston, 47 Vt. 6:W;
S1lnforu tl. Ei~hth Ave. R R. Co, 23
N. Y. :W3; Toll'do, etc, R R Co. "·
Harmon, 47 Ill. 298; Hays ~- ]\!iller,
77 Penn. St. 238; R. C. 18 Am Rep.
445; Smith"· Wehster, 2.1 Mich. 298;
Cnrrigno "· U nlon Sugar Ht·flncry, 98
Mnl'ls 577; Reynolds tl. Ilanrnhan,
100 Mass. 318; Pickens"· Diccker, 21
Ohio, (:rt. s.) 212; B. C. 8 Am. Rep.
55; Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. "·
Smith, 22 Ohio, (N 11.) 227; S. C. 10
Am. Ht'p. 729; Evansville, etc., R. R.
Co. "· Baum, 26 Ind. 70; Ennsville,
etc., R. R. Co."· Duncan, 28 Ind. 441;
:Muhoney "· Mahoney, 51 Cal. 118.
The neg! igence must arise In the
course of Ule employment. If Ule

servant depart from the employment
for purpnscs of his own, tht• mns'er
is not responsible for hi!! m·gligence,
even though he may at the time be
making use of the master's impJc.
mcnts or vehides which have ht•f•n
enlrustcd to him in the lmsiness. St•c
~tit.ehell e. Crass weller, 18 C. B. 2:.17;
AycriJ!g "· New York & Eric R. H.
Co., 80 N.J. 460; Bard "· Yohn, 26
Penn. St. 4!:!2.
1 Philadelphia, etc., R R. e. Derby,
14 How. ~; Dug~rins "·Watson. 15
Ark. 118; Southwick "· E!!tes, 7 Cusb.
885; Garretzen "· Duenckl'l, 60 1\lo.
104; B. C.ll Am. Hep. 400; llig-gins
e. Watervliet P. R. Co., 46 X. Y. 23;
8. C. 7 Am. Rep. 298; Paulmier e.
Erie R. Co., 34 N.J. 151.
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agents an injury has been inﬂicted on others. That they trusted

a servant who has ventured to disobey instructions is their mis-

fortune, but it ought not also to be the misfortune of others

who had no voice in his selection, and who had no concern in the

question who should manage the company’s business beyond the

common concern of all the public that it should not be managed

to their injury.‘

The negligence of a farm servant may afford another apt illus-

tration. The farmer directs his servant to burn over his fallow,

but to do so when the wind is in the east, because the adjoining

premises on the east would be specially exposed to damage if

any other time were chosen. The servant thoughtlessly or reck-

lessly sets the ﬁre when the wind is blowing from the west, and

the calamity the farmer had intended to guard against befalls

the neighbor. The disobedience is culpable in‘ the servant, and

the master, having taken those precautions which, if observed,

would have prevented the injury, is free from fault, but, never-

theless, his duty to his neighbor to so use his own as not to

injure the neighbor has failed in performance, and the law leaves

him to bear the consequences.’ It would be equally preposterous

on the one hand to hold the master responsible whose servant
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should purposely set ﬁre to a neighbor’s house and thereby

destroy it, and on the other to excuse him from the consequences

of a ﬁre which he had directed, because the agent he employed

was not as careful as he had instructed him to be.

The foregoing rules seem to be just and require support

from no reasoning, except such as would readily suggest itself to

any thoughtful mind. Proceeding further with our subject we

encounter questions which are more diﬁicult, and rules a concur-

rence in which is by no means universal. They will be found,

‘Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Derby, 14 How. 468. Sec Powell o.

10 Am. Rep. 361; Rounds v. Dela-

ware, ctc., R. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 129;

Dcveney, 3 Cush. 300; Weed 1:. Pan-

ama R. R. Co., 17 N. Y. 362; Luttrell

12. Hazcn, 3 Sneetl, 20.

’ The following, among a great

number of cases, illustrate this gen-

eral rule: Moir 0. Hopkins, 16 Ill.

31:5; Keedy v. Howe, 72 Ill. 133; Cos-

grove v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255; S. C.

21 Am. Rep. 597; Kreiter o. Nichols,

28 Mich. 496; Burden u. Felch, 109

remains that in the management of their own business through
agents an injury has been iutlicted on others. That they trusted
a servant who has ventured to disobey instructions is their misfortune, but it ought not also to be the misfortune of othere
who had no voice in his selection, and who had no concern in the
question who should manage the company's business beyond the
common concern of all the public that it should not be managed
to their injury. 1
The negligence of a farm servant may afford another apt illustration. The farmer dir.:ct:> his servant to hurn over hi:> fallow,
but to do so when the wind is in the east, because the adjoining
premises on the east would be 8pecially cxp11se& to damage if
any other time were chosen. The ser,·ant thoughtlessly or recklessly sets the fire when the wind is blowing from the west, and
the calamity the farmec had intended to guard against befa1ls
the nei~hbor. The disobedience is culpable in· the servant, and
the master, having taken those precautions which, if obsern.>d,
would have prevented the injury, is free from fault, but, nevertheless, his duty to his neighbor to so use his own as not to
injure the neighbor has failed in performance, and the law leaves
him to bear the consequences! It would be equally preposterous
on the one hand to hold the master responsible whose sC'r\·a.nt
should purposely set fire to a neighbor's house and thereby
destroy it, and on the other to excuse him from the consequences
of a fire which he had directed, because the agent he employed
was not as careful as he had instructed him to be.
The foregoing rules seem to be just and require support
from no reasoning, except such as would readily suggest itself to
any thoughtful mind. Proceeding further with our Sllbject we
encounter questions which are more difiicnlt, and rules a concurrence in which is by no means universal. They will be found,

Mass. 154; Coleman e. New York,

etc., R. ll. Co., 106 Mass. 160; Garret-

zen ~v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104; S. C. 11

Am. Rep. 405; Redding o. S. C. R. R.

Co., 3 Sou. Car. (N. s.) 1; S. C. 16 Am.

Rep. 681

—~

I Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. e.
Derby, 14 How. 468. See Powell e.
Deveney, 3 Cush. 800; Weed "· Panama R. R. Co., 17 N.Y. 862; Luttrell
"· Hazeu, 8 Sneed, 20.
t The foilowing, among a great
number of cues, illustrate this gen.
eral rule: Moir e. Hopkins, 16 Ill.
813; Keedy "· Howe, 72 Ill. 138; Coagrove e. Ogden, 49 N.Y. ~5; B. C.

10 Am. Rep. 861; Rounds e. Del a.
ware, etc., R. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 129;
21 Am. Rep.597; Kreiter t~. Nichols,
28 :Mich. 400; Barden e. F('lch, 109
M~s. 164; Coll'man t~. New York,
etc., R. R Co., 106 MIISS. 160; Garret.
zen t'. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104; 8. C.ll
Am. Rep. 403; Redding "· B. C. R R.
Co., 8 Sou. Car. (:&. a.) 1 ; 8. C. 16 Am.
Rep. 681
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however, to be rules ﬁrmly grounded in authority, and they

probably subserve the general interest better than any which

could be substituted in their place. The rules here referred to

relate to the liability of the master to the servant himself, where

the latter has been injured in his service.

General Rule: Master not liable to Servant. The rule is now

well settled that, in general, when a servant, in the execution of

his master’s business, receives an injury, which befalls him from

however, to be rules firmly gronnrled in authority, and they
probably snbserve the general interest better than any which
could be substituted in their pla<.oe. The rules here referred to
relate to the liability of the master to the servant himself, where
the latter has been injured in his service.

one of the risks incident to the business, he cannot hold the

master responsible, but must bear the consequences liimseif.

The reason most generally assigned for this rule is that the

servant, when he engages in the employment, docs so in view of

all the incidental hazards, and that he and his employer, when

making their negotiations, ﬁxing the terms and agreeing upon

the compensation that shall be paid to him, must have contem-

plated these as having an important bearing on their stipula-

tions. As the servant then knows that he will be exposed to the

incidental risk, “he must be supposed to have contracted that,

as between himself and the master, he would run this risk.”'

\Vhether this reason would be suﬂicient for all cases, if it

were a matter of indiﬂerence to the general public whether the

servant should have redress or not, may be matter of doubt; but
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it is supplemented by another which considers the case from the

standpoint of public interest. That reason is this: that the

Opposite doctrine would be unwise, not only because it would

subject employers to unreasonable and often ruinous respon-

sibiiities, thereby embarrassing all branches of business, but also

because it “ would be an encouragement to the servant to omit

that diligence and caution which he is in duty bound to exercise

on behalf of his master, to protect him against the misconduct

or negligence of others who serve him, and which diligence and

caution, while they protect the master, are a much better security

against any injury the servant may sustain, by the negligence of

others engaged under the same master, than any recourse against

the master for damages could possibly aﬂ'ord.”’ The rule is,

'Ai.nr:nsoN, B., in Hutchinson 0. Ill. 20. 215; Lawler v. Audroscoggin

Ruil\\':|_\' Co., 5 Exch. 343, 351. R. R. Co., 62 Me. 463; S. C. 16 Am.

' Anmolm, Ch. 13., in Priestly v. Rep. 492; llanralhy 0. Nor. Cent.

Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 6; Bnsssa. J., R. R. Co., 46 Md. 280.

in Illinois Cent. R. R. C0. 0. Cox, 21

General Rule: Master not liable to Servant. The rule is now
well !'Cttled that, in general, when a F-ervant, in the execution of
his master's busines~, receive;:. an injury, which bctalls him from
one of the risks incident to the hnsine.-s, he cannot hold the
master re.-pon=-ible, but mnst bea1· the consequences him.-eJf.
The rea;:.on most ~enernlly a..;:-;igned for this rule is thnt the
sen·ant, when he engages in the employment, docs so in view of
all the incidental hazard;:., nnd that he and his employer, when
making their negotiations, fixing the terms and agreeing upon
the compensation that Rhall be paid to him, must have contemplated thel'le as having an important bearing on their stipulations. As the servant then knows that he will be exposed to the
ineidcntal risk, "he must be supposed to have contracted that.,
as between himself and the master, he would run this risk." •
'Vhether this reason would be snfficieut for all cases, if it
were a matter of indifference to the general public whether the
"er\"ant should have redress or not, mny he matter of doubt; but
it is :;npplementcd by another which conside1·s the case from the
standpoint of public interest. That reason is this: that the
oppo=-ite doctrine would be unwit;e, not onlv he<-.m~e it wonlcl
subjeet emplo)·ers to nnrea;:.onable and oft~n ruinous rc~pon
sibi.ities, thereby cmbarr,tssing all brnnches of business, but also
he<'anf'e it "would be an encouragement to the servant to omit
that dili~ence and caution which he is in dnt;y bound to exf.'reise
on behalf of hit! master, to protect him against the mi~rnndnct
or negligence of others who serve him, and which dili~c1u-e and
<'R.ntion, while they protect the master, are n. much better r'Celll·ity
ag-ainst any injury the scr\"Hnt may sn!"tain, by the negligence of
others engaged under the same master, than any recourse ngainst
tho master for damages could po3sibly afford." 1 The rule is,
I

AJ.l>EOSON,

Rnilwuy Co.,

n..

in Hutchinson ..

ts Exch. 3-18, a.u.

I ABINUKR, Ch. n., in Priestly "·
Fowler, 3 :\l. & W. 1, 6; BREESE. J.,
in Illinois Cent. R R. Co. e. Cox, 21

Ill. 20. 2•1; Lawler "· Androscog-,~in
R. R. Co., 62 llc. 463; 8. C. 16 Am.
Hcp. 492; Ilum·athy •· Nor. Cent
R. R. Co., 46 lid. 2W.

•
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therefore, one of general public policy, and there are grounds of

public interest which make it of high importance. In many

employments the public are compelled to rely upon the caution

and diligence of servants as the chief protection against acci-

dents Whieh may prove destructive of life or limb; and any rule

of law which would give the servant a remedy against the master

for any injury resulting to himself from such an accident, instead

of compelling him to rely for his protection upon his own vigi-

lance, must necessarily tend in the direction of an abatement of

his vigilance, and in the same degree to increase the hazards to

others. The case of carriers of persons is the most common and

most forcible illustration of this remark. It is of the highest

importance in that employment that every one who has a duty

or service to perform upon which the safety of others may

depend, whether in the capacity of master or servant, should be

under all reasonable inducements to discharge or perform it with

ﬁdelity and prudence, and that no one should be tempted to

imperfect vigilance by any promise the law might make to com-

pensate him for injuries against which his own caution might,

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

perhaps, have protected not himself alone, but others also. The

inducement to vigilance is sutliciently furnished, in the ease of

the master, by compelling him to respond to third persons for

all injuries, whether caused by his o\vn negligence or by that of

his servants; but in the case of servants it is supplied mainly

by this rule, which, by denying him the remedy that is allowed

to third persons, makes it his special interest to protect others,

since it is only in doing so that he protects himself.‘

Injuries by Negligence of Fellow Servants. The rule which

exempts the master from responsibility for injuries to his ser-

vants, proceeding from risks incidental to the employment,

extends to cases where the injury results from the negligence

of other servants in the same employment. YVhatever contro-

versy there may for a time have been on this point may now be

said. by an overwhelming Weight of authority. to have been

thoroughly quieted and settled.’ Some disputes still remain

‘ The servant assumes not only the 449; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 552; Balti-

therefore, one of general public polic,v, and there are gronn<Js of
public interest which make it of high importance. In many
employments the pnblic are compelled to rely npon the caution
and diligence of servants as the chief protection against accidents which may prove destructive of lite or limb; and any rule
of law which would give the servant a remedy again:,;t the m~ter
tor any injury resulting to him:;elf from such an accident, instead
of compelling him to rely for his protection upon his own vigilance, must necessarily tend in the direction of an ahatement of
his \•igilance, and in the same degree to increase the hazards to
others. The case of carriers of persons is the mo,;t common and
most forcible illustration of this remark. It is of the highest
importance in that employment that every one who has a duty
or service to perform upon which the t;afety of others may
depend, whether in the capacity of master or sen·ant, should be
under all reasonable inducements to discharge or perform it with
fidelity and prudence, and that no one should be tempted to
imperfect vigilance by any promise the law might make to compensate him for injuries against which his own caution might,
perhaps, have protected not himself alone, bnt others also. The
inducement to vigilance is suHicicntly furnished, in the ca:-;e of
the master, by compelling him to respond to third persons tor
all injuries, whether can:-;cd by his own negligence or by that of
his servants; but in the case of servants it is supplied mainly
by this rnle, which, by denying him the remedy that is allowed
to third persons, makes it his special inte1·est tv protect others,
since it is only in doing so that he protects himself. 1

usual risks and perils of the service. more & Ohio R. R. Co. 0. State. 41

but also such others as are apparent Md. 268.

to ordinary observation. Gibson o. * The following eases, with numer-

New York & Erie R. R. Co., 63 N. Y. ous others, sustain the text: Bartons

’ &-<-r‘1Pl'.

Injuries by Negligence of Fellow Servants. The rnle which
exempts the master from responsibility for injuries to his servants, pro<.-eeding from risks incidental to the employment,
extends to cases where the injury results from the neg-ligence
of other servants in the same employment. Whatever contro,·ersy there may for a time h~tve been on this point may now be
said. by an overwhelming weight of authority. to have been
thoi'Oughly quieted and settled.2 Some disputes still remain
• The servant as~umes not only the
usual risks and perils of the service,
but nlso such othl.'rs RS are apparent
to ord inury oiJilervation. Gibson "·
New York & Erie R.. R.. Co., 63 N.Y.

449; B. C. 20 Am. Rep. 552; Balti.
more & Ohio R. R. Co. "· Slate, 41
Md. 268.
il The following cases, with numer.
ous others, sustain the text: Barton&-
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which concern the proper limits of the doctrine. and what and

how many are the exceptional eases. In some quarters a strong

disposition has been manifested to hold the rule not applicable

to the case of aservant who, at the time of the injury, was

under the general direction and control of another, who was

entrusted with duties of a higher grade, and from Whose negli-

gence the injury resulted.‘ But it cannot be disputed that the

kill Coal Co. 0. R1.-id,8 Macq., H. L.

266; Same 5. McGuire, Id. 300;

Hutchinson 0. Railway Co., 5 Exch.

348; Morgan c. Railway Co., L. R. 1 Q.

which concern the proper limits of the doctrine. an<l wl1:1t an.d
how nu:my are the exceptional <"ases. In some quarters a f:trong
dispo~;ition has been manifested to hold the rule not applicable
to the case of a· servant who, at the time of the injury, was
under the ~Emera] direction and control of another, who was
entrusted with duties of a higher grade, and from who;:.c negligence the injury resulted.• But it cannot be disputed that the

B. 149; Brown v. Cotton Co., 8 II. &

C. 511. South Carolina.‘ Murray 0.

R. R. Co., 1 McMullen, 385. Mnem-

chzmtta : Farwell 1:. Boston, etc., R.

R. Co.,4 Met. 49; O'Connor o. Rob-

erts, 120 Mass. 227. Penna]/lvrlnia:

Caldwell v. llrown. 53 Penn. St. 453;

Hays o. Miller, 77 Penn. St. 238: S. C.

18 Am. Rep. 445. MirIn'_/Jan : Davis

0. Detroit, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Mich.

105; S. C. 4 Am. Rep. 364; Michigan
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Central R. R. Co. o. Dolan, 32 Mich.

510. New York: Sherman 0. Roch-

ester, etc., R. R. Co., 17 N. Y. 153;

Hofnugle r N Y. C. & H. R. R Co.,

35 N Y. 60$. Illinois .' lllinois (‘en-

tral R. R (,‘o.e. (,‘o.\', 21 Ill. 20; To-

ledo, Wabasli & Western R. R. Co. 0.

Durkin, Admx., 76 Ill. 395. Imﬁaruz:

Columbus, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Arnold,

31 Ind. 174. Connrclz'cut.' Hayden 0

Smithville Maul". (‘o., 29 Conn. 54$;

Burke v. Norwich & Worcester R. R.

Co., 34 Conn. 474. lllaiue: Lawlcr 0.

Androseogziu R. R. Co., 6'3 Me. 463;

S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 492. Imna : Sulli-

van r. Railroad Co., 11 Iowa 421. Mis-

.muri: Harper o. Indianapolis, etc.,

ll. R. Co., 47 Mo. 567; S. C. 4 Am.

Rep. 353; Lee r. Detroit Bridge &

Iron Works, 62 Mo. 565. C'uh_fornz'a .'

Hogan 1'. Central Paciﬁc R. R. Co.,

49 Cal. 129. K nnma : Kansas Paciﬁc

R. R. Co. s. Salmon. ll Kan. R3. (Min:

Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Cliit-ago R.

R. Co. 0. Devinney, 17 Ohio St. 197.

North Carolina .' Ponton v. Wilming-

ton, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Jones (N. C.) L.

215. Alabama: Walker o. Bolling, 22

Ala. 294. Gan-_r/la: Shields v.Yonge,

15 Ga. 349. Jlinneaota : Foster v. Min-

nesota R. R. (‘o., 14 Minn. 360. New

Jersey: Harrison r. (‘mural R. R. Co.,

31 N. J. 293. .lliaaz'u:'ppi: Howd 0.

Miss. Cent. R. R. (‘o., 50 .\liss. 178.

Jllurylumi : Wonders. llaltimore,elc.,

R. R. Co, 32 Md. 411; s. 0. 3 Am.

Rep. 14!); Hanrnthy v. Nor. ('ent. R.

R. Co., 46 Md. 2-5'0. Teune.v.vr»' : Fox

v. Sandford, 4 Sneed, 36. ll"/a~~1zs|‘n :

Anderson 0. Milwaukee R. R. Co., 37

Wis. 321. Vermont: Hard v. Ver-

mont, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Vt. 473. Col-

orado : Summerhays v. Kansas Pac.

Ry. (‘o., 2 ('olorado, 481. United

Sums : Dillon r. Union Par". R. Co.,

8 Dill. 319; Kiclley r. Belclicr Silver

Co., 3 Sawyer, 437, 500 ; Halverson o.

kill Coal Co. "· Reid, 8 Macq., H. L.
2116; Same "· }[cGuire, I d. 800;
Hutchinson"· Hailway Co., 5 Exch.
34a; llorglln t!. lt!tilway Co., L. R. 1 Q.
B. 140; Brown "· Cotton Co., 8 II. &
C. 511. Sordh Carolina: llurray e.
R. R. Co., 1 llcllullen, SH5. ,t/wmz.
dut~tUII : Furwell e. Boston, etc., R.
R. Co., 4: 1\~Pt. 49; O'Connor fl. Robcrt~, 120 )Ia.~.;. 227.
Penn~!JliJtrn.iiJ:
Caldwell "· Brown. 58 Penn. St. 453;
H~&ys e. ?tl illar, 77 Penn. St. 238: 8. C.
18 Am. Rep. 4:15. Hidtig!lll.: Davis
•· Detroit, c·tc., R. R. Co., 20 llich.
10!~; S.C. 4: Am. lkp. 364; llichij!.'&n
Central H. R. Co. e. Dolan, 82 1\llcb.
510. Nt'UJ Y!irk: Sherman "· Roebest<•r, etc., R. R. Co., 17 ~- Y. 153;
Hofnag-h• r N Y. C. & H. H. R Co.,
;).') N Y. 60R llliltol'll: Illinois Central R. R Co. tl. Cox, 21 Ill. 20; TOledo, Waba!lh & Western R. R. Co. e.
Durkin, Admx:., 70 Ill. :.195. Imlilln.l:
Columbu!l, etc., R. H. Co."· Arnold,
31 Ind. 174. Conltt'clicltt: Hnyden"
Smithville llRnf. <'o., 29 Conn. li48;
Burke"· ~orwicb & Worcester R R.
Co., 84: Conn. 474. ,f/ai,,e: Lawler"·
Androsco~dn R. R. Co., 6~ lie. 468;
8. C. 16 Am. RPp. 402. Imr:11: Sullivan r. Railrnnd Co., 11 Iowa 4:21. ,Hi&IW!lri: llllrpcr e. lndiannpolis, etc.,
U. R Co., 47 llo. 567: S. C. 4 Am.
Rep. :J,'i!J; Lee r. l>!·troit Brhl~e &
Iron Works, 6~ }[o. 565. Callfi•mia:
llogun r. C<>ntral Pacific R U. Co.,
49 Cal. 120. KanRntl: Kansi\S Pacific
R. H. Co. t'. !:-lnlmon, 11 K,m, ~:J. 0/u'o:
Pittsburgh, Jo't. W:tynP &. Chicugo R.
R. Co. 11. Devinney, 17 Ohio St. 107.

North Cnrolin~~: Ponton "· Wilmln~
ton, etc., R R. Co., 6 Jones (S'. C.) L.
215. Alabrrma: Wnlkt•r "·Bolling, 22
Ala. 294. GMrgia: Shields r. Ynnge,
l!i Ga. 349. Jlinnuota: Fo!!t<'r "· llinnesota R. R. Co., 14 )linn. :!00. Xt'UJ
Jer~~y: IIHrrison r. C'entral R. R. Co.,
81 N.J. 293. Jli~lli111ippi: Howd "·
Miss. Cent. R. H. t 'o., 50 ll isoJ. 178.
Jfaryl!md: Womlere. BRitimore, etc.,
R. R. Co, 32 )[d. 411; S. C. B Am.
Rep. 14:;: Hanrathy "·Nor. !'ent. l l
R. Co., 46 lid. 2."!0. Te1wt.~•r··: Fox
e. Sandford, 4 Rnet>d, 36. WiH·'olltJin:
Anderson IJ. llilwaukee R. H. Co., 37
Wis. 321. Vermont: Hard "· Vermont, etc., R. R. Co., 82 Vt. 473. ColO'I'!ldo: SummPrbays "· Kunsas Pac.
Ry. l'o., 2 ('olorado, !l:H. United
St11t•·s: Dillon r. l'nion Pa<'. R. Co.,
8 Dill. 31!) : Kielley r. Ikll'hcr Silver
Co., 8 8nWJl'r, 437, 500 ; Hal\'cr!lon 11.
N ;st·n, 8 Sawyer. 462. Sec Hailroud
Co. "· l<'ort, 17 Wnll. 55:J, The rule
h11s no appliention to a common employment nwrl'ly. where the 11\a!lter
ill not the same. s,·euson r .•\llantlc,
etc., Co., :3:-l X. Y. ~up. Ct. 27i.
J LilllL• ~[inmi R. R. Co. r. Stt•\'l.'ns,
20 Ohio, 415; C'leve!Hnd, I.'IC., H. ll
Co. "· Keary, 8 Ohio, IN. B.) 201. &-e
these Clises exp!Rined in Pitt!!hllr!{h,
etc., H. R Co."· Dt•,·innl.'y, 17 Ohio,
(N. s.) 197. 8('(!, also, Loui~vllle, etc.,
R. R. ('o.ll. Collins, 2 Duv.114; ~ame
e. Robinson, 4 Bush, 507; Toledo, etc.,
R. ll Co. " O'ConneJ''s, Atlmx, 77
Ill. :Jill. If the maste1· hlm!!elf works
with hi-1 scrv.mts and injnrc'!l nne of
them by his negligence, he is liable
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THE LAW OF TORTS.

negligence of a servant of one grade is as much one of the risks

of the business as the negligence of a servant of any other; and

it seems impossible, therefore, to hold that the servant contracts

to run the risks of negligent acts or omissions on the part of

one class of servants and not those of another class. Nor on

grounds of public policy could the distinction be admitted,

whether we consider the consequences to the parties to the rela-

tion exclusively, or those which affect the public who, in their

dealings with the employer, may be subjected to risks. Sound

policy seems to require that the law should make it for the

interest of the servant that he should take care not only that he

be not himself negligent, but also that any negligence of others

in the same employment be properly guarded against by him,

so far as he may ﬁnd it reasonably practicable, and be reported

to his employer, if needful. And in this regard it can make

little difference what is the grade of servant who is found to be

negligent, except as superior authority may render the negli-

gence more dangerous, and consequently increase at least the

moral responsibility of any other servant who, being aware of

the negligence, should fail to report it.‘

therefor, and if he has partners in the

business, they are liable also. Ash-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

worth '0. Stadwix, 3 El. & El. 701.

See Mellors v. Shaw, 1 Best & S. 437.

' Persons are fellow servants where

they are engaged in the same com-

mon pursuit under the same general

control. “ A foreman is a servant, as

negligence of a servant of one grade is as mnch one of the risks
of the business as the negligence ot' a servant of any oth~r; and
it seems impossible, theretore. to hold that the servant contraete
to run the risks of negligent acts or omiBBions on the part of
one class of servants and not those of another class. ~or on
grounds of public policy could the distinction be admitted,
whether we (.•<maider the conseqneuces to the parties to the relation exclusively, or those which affect the public who, in their
dealings with the employer, may be subjected to risks. Sound
policy seems to require that the law should make it for the
interest of the servant that he should take care not only that he
be not himself negligent, but also that any negligence of others
in the same employment be properly guarded against by him.
so far as he may find it reasonably practicable, aud be reported
to his employer, if needful. And in this regard it can make
little difference what is the grade of servant who is fonud to be
negligent, except as superior authority may render the negligence more dangerous, and couscquently increase at least the
moral responsibility of any other servant who, being aware ot
the negligence, should tail to report it.'

much as any other servant whose

work he superintcnds." Wn.m;s, J.,

in Gallagher 0. Piper. 16 C. B. (N. s.)

669, 694. The same doctrine was de-

clared in Wigmore 0. Jay, 5 Exch.

354; Feltham v. England, L. R. 2 Q.

B. 33: Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mur-

phy, 53 Ill. 336; S. C. 5 Am. Rep. 48;

Summersctt -v. Fish, 117 Mass. 312;

and O'Connor 0. Roberts, 120 Mass.

227; Zeigler 0. Day, 123 Mass. 152.

In this country it has oﬂcn been de-

clared that the grade of service of the

two servants is unimportant "pro-

vided the services of each in his par-

ticular sphere and department are

dlrected to the accomplishment of

the same general end " BACnN, J.,

in Warner 0. Erie R R. Co.. 49 N. Y.

468, 470. See Coon v. Syracuse, ctc.,

R. R. Co., 5 N. Y. 492; Columbus,

etc., R. R. Co. r. Arnold. 31 Ind. 174;

Hayes v. Western R. R. Corp., 3 Cush.

270; Hard v Vermont, etc., R. R. Co.,

32 Vt. 473; O'Connell 0. B. & O. ‘R.

R. Co., 20 Md. 212; Sherman u. Roch-

ester, etc., R. R. Co.. 17 N. Y. 153:

Ryan 0. Cumberland, etc., R. R. Co.,

23 Penn. St. 384; Chicago, etc., R. R

Co. v. Keefe, 47 Ill. 10$ ; Pittsburgh.

etc., R. R. Co. v. Dcvinney, 17 Ohio.

(N. s.) 197; Wood 0. New Redford

Coal Co., 121 Mass. 252; St. Louis

ctc., R. R. Co. v. Britz, 72 Ill. 256:

Malone r. Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 5; S.

C. 21 Am. Rep 573. “No member

of an establishment can maintain an

action against the master for an in-

jury done to him by another member

of that establishment, in respect of

therefor, and if he has parl.llers in the
business, they are liable also. A ..b.
worth "· Stadwix, 8 El. & El. 701.
See Mellors "· Shaw, 1 Best & S. 437.
1 Persons are fellow servllnlll where
they are engaged ln thu ttame common pursuit under the same general
control. "A foreman Ia a servant, aa
much aa any other servant whose
work he superintends." WILLES, J.,
in GaliRgher "· Piper. 16 C. B. \N. 8.)
669, 6114. The same doctrine was de.
clared iu Wigmore t~. Jay, 3 Exch.
854; Felt ham t~. England, L. R. 2 Q.
B. 33; Chicago, etc., H. R. Co."· Murphy, 53 111. 836; 8. C. 5 Am. Rep. 48;
Summersctt '0. Flsh, 117 Mass. 812 ;
and O'Connor t~. Roberts. 120 Mass.
227; Zeigler "· Day, 12:J ~~as~. 152.
In this country it bas often been declared that the grade of service of the
two t-<·rvants la unimportant ·• pro.
vided the services of each in hie par.
ticular sphere and department are

directed to the accomplisltmPnt of
the same guneral end " BACUN, J.,
In Warner"· Erie R R Co., ;,g :S. Y.
468, 470. See Coon tJ. Syracuse, etc.,
R R. Co., 5 X. Y. 402; Columbus,
etc.• R R. Co. r. Arnold. 31 Ind. 174;
Hayes 11. Western R. R Corp., 8 Cusb.
2i0; Hard t~ Vermont, etc., R R. Co.,
82 Vt. 478; O'Connell "· B. & 0. R.
R. Co., 20 Md. 212; Sherman"· Rocb.
(•ster, etc., R R Co., 17 N. Y. ISS:
Ryan "· Cumberland. etc., R R. Co..
23 Penn. St. 884 ; Chicagn, etc., R. R
Co. "· Keefe, 47 Ill. lOS ; Piltsburgb.
etc., R R. Co. "· Devinnl'y, 1i Ohio.
(N. 8.) 197; Wood "· New lkdford
Coal Co., 121 llass. 2li2; St. Louis,
etc., R. R. Co. t~. Britz, 72 Ill. 256:
Mnlonc f'. Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 5; S.
C. 21 Am. Hep 573. •• No membel
of an e11tablishment can maintain an
action against the master for an in.
jury done to him by another member
of that establishment, in respect of
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RESPONSIBILITY 0.1!' TilE KASTER.
It has also sometimes been insisted that the law should

545

exclude from the scope of the general rule the case of a servant

injured by the negligence of another who, though employed in

the same general business, had his service in some distinct branch

of it; as in the case of a laborer on the track of a railroad in-

jured by the carelessness of an engine driver;' a carpenter

employed on buildings injured by the negligence of a yard-

master in making up trains; and the like. But in the main

the authorities agree that the general rule must apply to such

cases, and that, on the reasons on which the rule is rested, they

cannot be distinguished from those in which the service of both

persons was in the same line.’

which, it‘ it had been by a stranger, he

might have had a right of action."

Ponnocx, C. B., in Abraham v. Rey-

nolds, 5 H. & N. 143. See Conway v.

Belfast. etc., R R. Co., 11 Irish L. T.

Rep. 115; S. C. 4 Law &Eq. Rep.451.

It has also sometimes been insisted that the law should
exclude from the scope of the general rule the case of a servant
injured by the negligence of another who, though employed in
the same general business, had his service in some distinct branch
of it; as in the case of a laborer on the track of a railroad injured by the carelessness of an engine driver; 1 a carpenter
employed on buildings injured by the negligence of a yardmaster in making up trains; and the like. llut in the main
the authorities agree that the general rule must apply to such
cases, and that, on the reasons on which the rule is rested, they
cannot be distinguished from those in which the service of both
persons was in the same line.•

‘See Nashville, etc., R. R. C0. 0.

Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347; Ryan 1|. Chi-

cage, etc., R. R. Co., 60 Ill. 171; S. C.

14 Am. Rep. 32; Toledo, etc., R. R.
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Co. o. Moore, '77 Ill. 217.

’ It wns held in Morgan v. Railway

Co., L. R. 1 Q. B. 149, that a railway

company was not liable to a carpen-

ter emplnyed to work at his trade on

its line, who was injured by the neg-

ligence of its porters in shifting an

engine on its turn-table close by the

shed on which the carpenter was

working. “The plaintiﬂ' and the

porters were engaged in one com-

mon employment, and were doing

work for the common object of their

masters, viz., ﬁtting the line for traf-

fic." E.\at., Ch. J., p. 154. “If a

carpenter's employment is to be dis-

tinguished from that of porters em-

ployed by the same company, it will

be sought to split up the employees

in every large establishment into

different departments of service, al-

though the common object of their

service, however diﬂerent, is but the

furtherance of the business of the

master; yet it might be said with

truth that no two had a common i|n-

mediate object." Ponnocx, C. B., p.

155. And. see, Feltham ~v. England,

L. R. 2Q. B. 83. It is held in Mas-

achuseus that a railroad company is

not responsible to a person employed

by it to repair its cars, for a personal

injury arising from the negligence

of a swltchlnun, in failing properly

to adjust a switch on the track over

which he is curried by the company

to his place of work, unless negli-

gence in the employment of the

man is made out. Giltnan u. Eas-

tern li R. Corp., 10 Allen, 233. See

Hodgkins v. Eastern R. R. Co, 111)

Mass. 419; Lawler o. Androscoggin

R. R. Co., 62 Me. 463; S. C. 16 Am.

Rep. 492; Wonder v. Baltimore &

Ohio R. R. Co., 32 Md. 411; S. C.

3 Am Rep. 148. In Albro o. Aga-

wam Canal Co., 6 Cush. 75, it was

wllicb, if it bad been by a strang<'r, he
might have had a right of action."
POLLOCK, C. B., in Ahraham ,, Heyooids, 5 H. & N. 143. Sec Conwl\y ,,
Belfast. etc., R R. Co., 11 Irish L. T.
Rep.ll.'>; S.C. 4 Law&Eq. Rep.451.
' See N llllhville, etc., R R. Co. "·
Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347; Ryan tt. Chicago, etc., R. R Co., 60 Ill. 171 ; 8. C.
14 Am. Rep. 32; Toledo, etc., R. R.
Co. ,, :Moore, 77 III. 217.
1 It w11s held In Morgan"· Railway
Co.• L. R 1 Q. B. 140, that a railway
company Will! not liable to a. carpenter emplcoycd to work at his trade on
its line, who WliS injured by the negligence of its porters in shining an
engine on its turn-table close by the
shed on which the carpenter was
working. "The plaintitf and the
porters were engaged in one common employment, and were doing
work for the common object of their
masters. viz., fitting the line for traffic." E .\RI.., Ch. J., p. 154. "If a
carpenter's employment is to be distinguished from that of porters employed by the same comp!lny, it will
be sought to split up the employees
in every large establishment into
dltfercnt departments of service, although the common object of their
service, however ditferent, is but the
furtherance of the business of the

85

mMtcr; yet it might be said with
truth that no two had a common im.
mt•<hate object." PoLI.OCK, C. B., p.
155. And, see, Feltham ,, England,
L. R. 2 Q. B. 33. It is held in Ma...._
sachusclts that a railrotW. company is
not responsible to a p<'r~on employed
by It to repair its cars, for a personal
injury arising from the negligence
of a swltcbmun, in fail~ng properly
to adjust a switch on the track over
which be is curried by the company
to his place of work., unless neglig<·nce in the employment of the
man is made out. Gilman "· Eas.
tern R R. Corp., 10 Allen, 238. See
Hodgkins "· Enstcrn H. R. Co, 11:J
}lass. 410; Lawler "· Androscoggin
R R. Co., 62 Me. 463; B. C. 16 Am.
Hep. 402; Wonder l'. Baltimore &
Ohio R R. Co., 82 Md. 411; S. C.
8 Am Rep. 143. In Albro e. Aga.
warn Can~! Co., 6 Cusb. 75, it was
decided that a manufacturing com.
pany was not liRblc to one of its operatives for an injury occasioned by
the negligence of the superintendent.
Ami, sec Columhus, etc., R. R Co. "·
Arnold, 31 Ind. 174; Lou isvill c, etc.,
R. R. Co. ,, Cavens, 9 Bush, 5.)!) ; Weger , , Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 53
Penn. ~t. 460. The rule of exemp.
tion extends to "every member of an
establishment." POLLQCE, C. B., in

~•~...
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he

Independent Contractors. It has also been decided in England

that the master is not liable for an injury, caused by the negli-

gence of one of his servants, to the servant of a sub-contractor

who is engaged in the performance of a part of the same work.

If the two servants were at the time engaged in doing the com-

mon Work of the employer, they must be considered as for this

purpose the servants of such employer while doing his work,

“each directing and limiting his attention to the particular work

necessary to the completion of the whole work.” notwithstanding

the one was employed by and responsible to the employer directly,

and the other to one employed by him.‘ But this rule can only

apply where the sub-contractor. is under the direction and con-

trol of his employer, so that his position as contractor diti'ers

Abraham 0. Reynolds, 5 H. 8: N. 143.

In the case of railway companies it

is said there is no good reason to

Independent Contractors. It has also been decided in England
that the master is not liable for an injury, caused by the uegligenee of one of his servants, to the servant of a sub-contractor
who is en~ooed in the performance of' a part of the same work.
If the two servants were at the time engaged in doing the common work of the employer, they must be considered as for this
purpose the servants of such employer while doing his work,
"each directing and limiting his attention to the particular work
neces8ary to the completion of the whole work," notwitllf;tanding
the one was employed by and responsible to the employer directly,
and the other to one employed by him.' But this rule can only
apply where the sub-contractor. is under the direction and control of his employer, so that his position as contractor ditrcrs

limit the rule tocases where the ser-

vants are in the same department of
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a general employment. It can make

no difference whether the brakeman

is injured by the carelessness of an-

other brakemau, or by that of the

engineer or conductor, nor whether

the ﬁreman is injured by the engi-

neer, or by a machinist charged with

ﬁtting the engine for the road. The

rule should be the same for all cases.

Mobile. etc., R. R. Co. e. Thomas, 42

Ala. 672. In Maryland it is said that

fellow servant includes all who serve

the same master, work under the

same control, deriving authority and

compensation from the same source,

and are engaged in the same general

business, though in different grades

and departments of it. Wonder 0.

Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 82 Md. 411;

S. O. 8 Am. Rep. 143. Bays WILLIAMS,

J.: “Servants, it is said, are engaged

in a common employment when each

of them is occupied in service of

such a kind that all the others, in the

exercise of ordinary sagacity ought

to be able to foresee, when accepting

their employment, that it may prob-

ably expose them to the risk of in-

—— —-nnill

jury in case he is negligent. That

this is the proper test is evident from

the reason assigned for the exemp-

tion of masters from liability to their

servants, viz.: that the servant takes

the risk into account when ﬁxing

his wages. He cannot take into ac-

count a risk which he has no reason

to anticipate, and he does take into

account the risks, which the average

experience of his fellows has led him.

as a class, to anticipate.“ Baird 0.

Pettit, 70 Penn. SL 477, 432. But in

Illinois a day laborer on a railroad

track has been allowed to recover

against the railway company for an

injury resulting from the negligence

of an engine driver. Toledo_ etc., R.

Abraham "· Reynolds, IS H. & N. 148.
In the case of railway companies it
is said there is no good reason to
limit the rule to cases where the st>r.
vants are in the same department of
a general cmplnyment. It can make
no diO"erence whether the brakeman
is injured by the carelessness of another brakeman, or by that of the
.engineer or conductor, nor whether
the fireman is injured by the en~i
neer, or by a machinist charged with
fitting the engine for the road. The
rule should be the same for all CllSCB.
Mobile, etc., R R Co. "· Thomas, 42
Ala. 672. In Maryland it is said that
fellow servant inclucles all who serve
the same mastt>r, work under the
same control, deriving authority and
compensation from the same source,
Rod are engRp;ed in the same general
business, though in different grR<les
and departments of it. Wonder "·
Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Md. 411;
S.C. 8 Am. Rep. 143. Says WrLLrAHS,
,J.: " Servants, it is said, are engaged
in a common employment when each
of them ia occupied in set'Vice of
such a kind that all the others, in the
exercise of ordinary sagacity ought
to be able tc- foresee, when accepting
their employment, that it may probably expose them to the risk of in-

jury in case he is negligent. That
this is the proper test is evident from
the reason assigned for the cxemp.
tion of masters from liRbilaty to their
servants, viz. : that the servant takes
the risk into account when ftxin~
his wages. He t'aonot take into account a risk which he bas no rcas••n
to anticipate, 11nd he does take into
account the risks, which the average
experience of his fellows ha.s led him,
as a class, to antit'iprltl'." Bttird "·
Pettit, 70 Penn. St. 477, 482. But in
Illinois a day lnborer on a railroad
track bas been allowccl to rccnver
a~alnst the railway company for an
injury resulting from the negli~nce
of an en.~ine driver. Toledo, etc., R
R. Co. "· O'Connor, 77 Ill. 391. And
see Toledo, etc., R R. Co. "· M•)OJ"e,
77 Ill. 217; RyRn "· ChiCAgo, etc.. R.
R Co., 60 Ill. 171; S. V. 14 Am. Ikp.
82; N ashYille, etc., R. R. Co. " · Car.
roll, 6 Heisk. 347; McKni~ht r. The
Iowa, etc., R R. Co., 43 Iowa, 4~
The subject is largely considered in
Wonder"· Baltimore & Ohio R. R
Co., 82 lid. 411; S. C. 3 Am. Rep.
143. and the cases are carefully eJ:.
amlned.
• Wig~ett "· Fox, 86 E. L. & Eq.
486; M. C. 11 Exch. 832. Sec Bcb wal1z
•· Gilmore, 4lS Ill. 455.

xmsronsrnrtrrv or THE in/tsri-zn. 547

RESPONSIDILITY OF THE HARTER.

from that of the other servants only in this: that he has some

547

particular part of the work to do under a special arrangement,

while the others work generally in the employment as directed.‘

In general, it is entirely competent for one having any particular

work to be performed, to enter into agreement with an inde-

pendent contractor to take charge of and do the whole work,

employing his own assistants, and being responsible only for the

completion of the work as agreed. The exceptions to this state-

ment are the following: He must not contract for that the neces-

sary or probable effect of which would be to injure others, and

he cannot, by any contract, relieve himself ofdutics resting upon

him as owner of real estate, not to do or suffer to be done upon

it that which will constituteanuisance, and therefore an invasion

of'the rights of others.’ Observing these rules, he may make

contracts, under which the contractor, for the time being, becomes

an independant principal, whose servants are exclusively his. and

not those of the employer he contracts with; and the contractor

is in no such sense the servant of his employer as to give to

others rights against the employer growing out of the contract-

or's negligence.‘ In one case the following rules have been laid

' Chicago 1:. Joney, 60 Ill. 388, 887.

See Corbin 0. American Mills, 27
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Conn. 274,278; Eaton v.Europ un,etc.,

R.R.Co.,69 Me. 520; Blake v. Ferris,

5 N. Y. 48. Workmen of a contractor

are servants of his principal, where

the latter has a right to select and

control them. Burke 0. Norwich, etc.,

R. R. Co., 34 Conn. 474; Lowell 0.

Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Pick. 24;

from that of the other servants only in this: that he has some
particular part of the work to do under a special arrangement,
while the others work generally in the employment as directed:
In general, it is entirely competent for one having any pat·ticular
work to be perf01·med, to enter into agreement with an iudependent contractor to take charge of and do the whole work,
employin6 his own assistants, and being r~sponsible only fo1· the
completion of the work as agreed. The exceptions to this statement are the following: He must not contract tor that the necessary or probable effect of which would be to injure others, and
he cannot, by any contract, relieve himself of duties resting upon
him as owner of real estate, not to do or suffer to be done npnn
it that which will constitute a nuisance, and therefore an invasion
of•the rights of others! Observing these rules, he may make
contracts, under which the contractor, for the time being, becomes
an independant principal, whose servants are exclnsi\•ely his. and
not those of' the employer he contracts with; and the contractor
is in no such sense the servant of his employer as to give to
others rights against the employer growing out of the contractors negligence.1 In one case the following rules have heen laid

DuPratt 0. Lick, 38 Cal. 691; Deford 0.

State, 30 Md. 1'79; Reed v. Allegheny

City, 79 Penn. St. 800; Hale 0. John-

son, 80 Ill. 185.

‘ Cliicngo 0. Robbins, 2 Black, 418;

Clark 1:. Fry, 8 Ohio, (x. s.) 358.

-‘- Cincinnati u. Stone, 5 Ohio, (11. s.)

38, 41; McGuire o. Grant, 25 N. J.

356; Hale v.Johnson,S0 lll. I85; Me-

Cufferty o. Spuyten Duyvil, etc., R. R.

Co., 61 N. Y. 178; S. C. 19 Am. Rep.

267; King 1:. New York, etc., R. R.

Co, 66 N. Y. 181; S. C. 28 Am. Rep.

87. In Scammon 0. Chicago, 2511].

424, 488. WALKER,"J., says: “The res.

son why the muster is rendered liable

for the negligent acts of his servant,

resulting in injury to others, is be-

cause the servant. while he is engaged

in the business of the master. is sup-

posed to he acting under and in con-

formity to his directions, and to hold

him to the employment of skillful and

prudent servants. The presumption

is one of law, and hence cannot be

rebutted. But in this case the reason

fails, and the presumption must also

fail. These contractors. as we have

seen, were not working under the di-

rections or control oi appellants, but

under their contract, and were in no

sense their servants." That the em-

ployer of an independent contractor

is not master of the contractor's scr.

vants, see Hilliard 0. Riclmrdson, 3

Gray, 349; Boswell 0. Laird, 8 (‘=|l.

469; Kellogg c. Payne, 21 Iowa, 575;

Allen O. Willard, 57 Penn. St. 374:

1

Chicago 11. Joney, 60 Ill. 883, 887.
8l'C Corhin "· American :Mills, 27
Conn. 274,278; Eaton tJ. Eu roi' nn,etc..
R. R. Co., 59 Me. 520; Blake tJ. Ferrill,
liN. Y. 48. Workmen of a. cnntt·acior
a.re servants of his prlncipRl, where
the latter ha.s a right tn select and
control them. Burket!. Norwich, etc.,
R. R. Co., 84 Coon. 474; Lowell "Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Pick. 24;
Du Pratt"· Lick,llS CRI. 6111 ; Deford e.
~ta.te, SO Md. 179; Reed v. Allegheny
City, 79 Penn. Bl 800; Ible 11. JohnBOD, 80 Ill. 185.
'Chicago"· Robbins, 2 mack, 418;
Clark"· Fry, 8 Ohio, (N. s.) 358.
=Cincinnati tJ. Stone, 5 Ohio, (N. B.)
88, 41; McGuire !!. Grant, 25 N. J.
856; Hale r.Johnson,80 lll.185; Me,..
Cafferty o. Apuyten Duyvil, etc., R. R.
Co., 61 N.Y. 178; 8. C. 19 Am. Rep.
267; King "· New York, etc., R. R
Co., 66 N. Y. 181; 8. C. 23 Am. Ucp.
8'7. In Scammon e. Chicago, 25111

424, 488, WALKBB,·J., sa.ys: ''The rea..
son why the muster is rend('r('d liKhlc
for the negligent acts of hill servunt,
resulting in injury to others, ill be.
cause the s!'rvant. while he Is cngRged
1n the business of the master, is sup.
posed to he acting under und in conformity to his directions, and to hold
him to the employment of skillfulnn.l
prudent servants. The presumption
Ia one of law, and bene~ Cllnnot be
rebutted. But in this cllse the r('>!Sno
fa.lls, and the presumptiun mu!lt nlso
fail. These contructC'r&, a.s we luwe
seen, were not working under the dl.
rcctitJns or control 01 appellants, but
undt>r their contract, and were In no
sense their servantl." Th1't the employer of a.n independcr.t contractor
Ia not ma.ster of the contractor's IK'r.
va.nts, see llillilmJ 11. Hichardson, 8
Gray, 349; Boswell !!. J,airrl, 8 ('al.
469; Kellogg t. Payne, 21 luwn, a7~:
Allen e. Willard, 57 Penn. SL. 37 4:
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down: “ 1. If a contractor faithfully performs his contract, and a
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third person is injured by the contractor in the course of its due

performance, or by its result, the employer is liable. for he causes

the precise act to be done which occasions the injury; but for

the negligence of the contractor not done under the contract,

but in violation of it, the employer is in general not liable. * *

2. If I employ a contractor to do a job of work for rue which, in

the progress of its execution, obviously exposes others to unusual

perils, I ought, I think, to be responsible on the same principle

as in the last case, for I cause acts to be done which naturally

expose others to injury. * * 3. If I employ as eontractora

person incompetent or untrustworthy, I may be lia‘..le for inju-

ries done to third persons by his carelessness in the execution of

his contract. * * 4. The employer may be guilty of personal

neglect, connecting itself with the negligence of the contractor

in such manner as to render both liable.” ‘ But where the con-

tract is for something that may lawfully be done, and is proper

in its terms, and there has been no negligence in selecting a snit-

able person to contract with in respect to it, and no general con-

trol reserved either as respects the manner of doing the work or the

agents to be employed in doing it,’ and the person for whom the

Hunt o. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,
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51 Penn. St. 475; Clark 0. Vermont,

etc., R. R. Co., 28 Vt. 103; West r. St.

Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 63 lll. 545;

Schwartz v. Gilmore, 45 lll. 455; Kel-

ly v. New York, ll N. Y. 432; Blake

0. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48; Robinson 0.

Webb, 11 Bush, 464. There is a care-

ful examination of the whole subject

in Eaton o. European, etc., R. R. Co.,

down: "1. If a contractor faithfn1ly performs his contract, anlla
third person is injured by the contractor in the cour~ of its due
performance, or by its result, the employer is liable. for he c."luses
the precise act to be done which occasions the injury; but for
the negligence of the contractor not done under the contract,
bot in violation of it, the employer is in genea-al not liable. * *
2. If I employ a contractor to do a job of work for me which; in.
the progress of its execution, obviously exposes others to unusual
perils, I ou~ht, I think, to be responsible on the same principle
as in th~ lfU!t case, for I cause acts to be done which naturally
expose others to injury. * * 3. If I employ as contrRctor a
person incompetent or untrustworthy, I may be lia!.lE- for injuries done to third persona by his carelessness in the execution of
his contract. * * 4. The employer may be guilty of personal
neglect, connecting itself with the negligence of the contractor
in such manner as to render both liahle." 1 But where the contract is for something that may lawfully be done, and is prnper
in its terms, and there has been no negligence in selecring a snitable person to contract with in respect to it, and no general control reser\'eu eit~1er as respects the manner of doing the w:ork or the
agents to be employed in doing it,• and the person for whom the

59 Me. 520; S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 430. in

which a railroad company was held

not responsible for negligent ﬁres set

by contractors for building its road.

l S1-:YMouR,J., in Lawrence o. Ship_

man, 39 Conn. 586, 589. And. see re-

marks by C1.n=-roan, J., in Water Co.

v. Ware, 16 Wall. 566, 576; also, Clark

'0. Fry, 8 Ohio, (N. s.) 358; Chicago v.

Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Railroad Co.

o.IIanning,15 Wa1ll.649; Cuflv. New-

ark. etc., R. It. Co 35 N. J. 17; S. O.

10 Am. Rep. 205. where the authori-

ties are collated and examined. De-

ford 0. State, 30 Md. 179; Tibbetts

0. Knox, etc., R. R Co.. 62 Me. 437;

Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., 1

C. P. Div. 556.

‘As to the right of supervision

which will render the employer lia-

ble as master ot‘ the contractor. com-

pare Pack 0. New York, 8 N. Y. 222;

Kelly v. New York. 11 N. Y. 432;

Eaton v. European, etc., R. R. Co.. 59

Me. 520; Allen 0. Willard, 57 P- nu.

St. 374, with Sadler v. Henlock, 4 E.

& B. 570; Lowell v. Boston, etc., R. R.

Co., 23 Pick. 24; Schwartz v. Gilmore,

45 Ill. 455; Morgan o. Bowman, 22

Mo. 538; St. Paul o. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297;

Callahan r. Burlington, etc., R. R. Co.,

23 Iowa, 562; Cincinnati r. Stout.-,5

Ohio, (N. B.) 38; Brown v. Wcrt|¢'r. 40

Md. 15. The fact that the employer

pays the cont|'ar'tor's servants docs not

conclusively determine that he is to

__-an-wl

Hunt e. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,
IU Penn. St. 475; Clark fl. Vermont,
etc., R. R. Co.., 28 Vt. 103; Wcsl r. St
Louie, etc., R. R. Co., 68 Ill. 545;
Schwartz fl. Gilmore, 4.') Ill. 45:S; Kel.
lye. New York, 11 N.Y. 432; Blake
fl. Ferris, lS N. Y. 48; Robinson e.
Webb, 11 Bush, 464. There is a careful examination of the whole subject
in Eaton fl. European, etc., ft. R. Co.,
:S9 Me. lS20; S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 430, in
which a railroad comJlllDY wns held
not rrsponslble for negligent fires set
by contractors for building its rol\d.
1 BEYKOUR, J., in Lawrence fl. Ship.
man, 39 Conn. lS86, li89. And. see remarks by CLIFFORD, J., in Water Co.
e. Ware, 16 Wall. 566, 576; also, Clnrk
fl. Fry, 8 Ohio, (N. B.) 358; Chi<'ago fl.
Robbins, 2 Black, 418; R!lilrolld Co.
fl. liaoning, Vi Wall. 649; Cuff fl. Newark, etc., R. R. Co 35 N.J. 17; 8. C.
10 Am. Rep. 200. where the auUlori-

ties are collated and examined. Dt>ford fl. State, 80 Md. 179; Tibbetts
e. Knox, etc., R. R Co.. 62 Me. -4.87;
Rdurke fl. White Moss Colliery Co., 1
C. P. Div. 556.
• As to the right of supenision
which will render the emplc1ycr lia.
ble as master of the contractor, com.
pare Pack"· New York, 8 N. Y. 222;
Kt•lly t1. New York. 11 N.Y. 432;
Eaton e. Enropean, etc., R. R Co., 59
Me. 520; Alll•n e. Willaru, 57 P . no.
Bt. 874, with Sadler fl. Hen lock. 4 E.
& B.lS70; Lowell "· Boston, etc., R. R.
Co., 23 Pick. 24: Schwartz 11. Gil mono,
4.'i III. 4;;5; Morgan fl. Bowman, 22
Mo.IJ38; St.. Pant e. Seitz, 8 Minn. 29i;
Callahan tl. Burlington, etc., R. R. U>.,
28 Iowa, 562; Cincinnati "· Stone, 5
Ohio, (N. s.) 88; Brown fl. Wcrnt·r. 40
Md. 15. The f:tct that th~ cmplnyer
pays the cnnlrnctnr's servant& does nut
conclusively d1•lcrmine thu he ill to
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work is to be done is interested only in the ultimate result of the

RESPONSIBILITY OF TlJE KASTER.

549

work, and not in the several steps as it progresses, the latter is

neither liable to third persons for the negligence of the contractor

as his master, nor is he master of the persons employed by the

contractor, so as to be responsible to third persons for their

negligence.‘

The term contractor is applicable to all pecsons following a

regular independent employment, in the course of which they

offer their services to the public to accept orders and execute

commissions for all who may employ them in a certain line of

duty, using their own means for the purpose, and being account-

able only for ﬁnal perforinance. A common carrier is such a

contractor, and so is a drayman,’ and so is the master ot' a tug-

boat.‘

Master Responsible for his own Negligence. Undouhted as

the general rule is, thereis nevertheless an exception to it, resting

on reasons as conclusive as those which support the rule it.-elf.

The exception is this: That if the injury results from the negli-

gence of the master himself. he is responsible on the same rea-

sons which would render him responsible if the relation did not

exist. Under this head the following speciﬁcation of negligent

work is to be done is interested only in the ultimate result of tl1e
work, and not in the several steps as it progrcs"es, the latter is
neither liable to third persons for the negligence of the contractor
as his master, nor is he tn&Rtcr of the pt•rsons employed hy the
contractor, so as to be responsible to third persons for their
neglibrence. 1
The term contractor is applicable to aU pe.·,;ons following a
regular independent employment, in the course of which they
offer their services to the public to accept orders and execute
commit::sions tor all who may employ them in a cortain line of
duty, using their own means tor the purpose, and being accountable only tor tinnl pcrtorrnauce. A common cnrrier is snch a
contractor, and so is a drayman,s and so is the master of a tugboat.•

conduct may be of service:
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1. The master’s negligence may consist in subjecting the ser-

vant to the dangers of unsafe buildings or machinery, or to other

perils on his own premises, which the servant neither knew of

nor had reason to anticipate or to provide against when he

entered the employment, or subsequently.

The general rule is, that while the owner of real estate is not

bound to provide safeguards for wrong-doers, he is bound to take

care that those who come upon his premises by his express or

implied invitation be protected against injury resulting from the

unsafe condition of the premises. or from other perils, the exist-

ence of which the invited party had no reason to look for.

be regarded as their master. Rourke ' Sproul v. Hemmingway, 14 Pick. 1.

u. White Moss Colliery Co., 1 C. P. See Milligan c.W<-<lgc,12 Ad. 6: El.

Div. 556. 737. A pilot, whom the master of a

‘Slim-arm. & Redf. on Neg. § 73; vessel is compelled bylaw to nu-opt,

Schouler, Dom. Rel. 644-5. is nul his servant. Sn-ani Nav. (‘o. 0.

' De Forrest v. Wriglit, 2 .\1ich.368; llrilisli, etc., Nuv. Co., L. R. 3 Exrh.

Mcllullcn v. Hoyt, 2 Duly, 271. 330.

Kaster Responsible for his own Negligence. Undonhted as
the ~neral rule is, there is ne,·ertheles" an exception to it, resting
on reasons as conclusi\·e as thol'e which support the rule it . . elt.
The exception is this: That if the injury results from the negligence of the ma~ter himself. he is n·..;ponsible on the same rea·sons which would render him responsible if the rl'lation did not
exist. Under this head the following specification of negligent
conduct may be of service:
1. The master's neg-ligence may consist in snhjocting the ~cr
vant to the dangers of unsafe bnildiu~s or machinery, or to other
perils on his own premises, which the sen·ant neither knew of
nor had reason to anticipate or to provide against when he
entered the employmcut, or snh~"cqut>ntly.
The general rule is, that while the owner of real estate is not
bound to provide safegnards for wrong-doers, he is bound to take
care that those who come upon his premises by his expre::;s or
implied invitation be protected against injur.y resulting from the
nusafe condition of the premises, or from other perils, tlw existence of which the invited party had no reason to look tor.
be re~arded as their master. Rourke
e. White lluss Colliery Co., 1 C. P.
Div. 556.
J ~lwnrm. & Redf. on NPg. § 78;

1 Sproul"· llemmingway, 14 Pic-k. 1.
t:Jet> ::\Iilllgan c. W(·d.!!e, 12 Ad. & El.

Bchnnler, Dom. Rl'l. 644~.
1 De Fnrrtst "· Wri!!ht, 2 ~~ ich. 868;

A pilot, whom the ma~tcr of a
i!'l C'nmpellcd hy lnw to IU'('t•pt,
is nut his Kervnnt. ~tP:IIU Nav. f'o. •l!l'ilish, ole., Nav. Co., L. H. 8 Exc·h.

HcMullcn e. Hoyt, 2 Daly, 271.

3;;().

737.
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Many cases in illustration of this rule are collected in another
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place,‘ but it is sufficient here tomention the general rule, with

some instances of its application to this particular class of

persons.’

The invitation to come upon dangerous premises without

apprising him of the danger is just as culpable, and an injury

resulting from it,is just as deserving of compensation in the case

of a servant as in any other case. Moreover, no reason of public

policy, and none to be deduced from the contract of the parties,

can be suggested, which should relieve the culpable master from

responsibility. A man cannot be understood as contracting to

take upon himself risks which he neither knows nor suspects, nor

has reason to look for; and it would be more reasonable to imply

a contract on the part of the master not to invite the servant into

unlmown dangers, than one on the part of the servant to run the

risk of them. But the question of contract may be put entirely

aside from the case, and the responsibility of the master may be

planted on the same ground which would render him responsible

if the relation had not existed. \Vhetherinvited upon his prem-

ises by the contract of service, or by the calls of business, or by

direct request, is immaterial; the party extending the invitation

owes a duty to the party accepting it to see that at least ordinary
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care and prudence is exercised to protect him against dan_9;ers

not within his knowledge, and not open to observation. It is a

rule of ustice and right which compels the master to respond

for a failure to exercise this care and prudence.’

' See post, p. 605-607.

’ The servant is entitled to the pro-

tection of this rule, though he is leav-

ing his work without cause or excuse.

Marshall 0. Stewart, 33 Eng. L. &

Eq. 1.

" Marshall v. Stewart, 2 Macq. H. L.

20; S. 0.33 Eng. L. & Eq. 1; Indor-

maur o. Dames, L. R. 2 C. P. 311;

Ryan 1:. Fowler, 21 N. Y. 410; C->n<_:h-

try v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N. Y. 124;

S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 387; Strnhlendorf

Many cases in illustration of this rule are collected in anotiH·t·
place,• but it is sufficient here to·mention the genc1·al rnle, with
some instances of ita application to this particular c~ass of
pel'SOll 8,1
The invitation to come upon dangerons premises without
apprising him of the danger is just as culpable, and an injury
resulting from itJs just aa deaserving of' compensation in the case
of a servant as in any other case. Moreover, no reason ot' public
policy, and none to be dedutoed from the contract of the partit.'S,
can be suggested, which should relieve the culpable master from
J"Cllponsibility. A man cannot be understood as contracting to
take upon himself risks which he neither knows nor suspects, nor
has reason to look for; and it would be tnl)re reasonable to imply
a contract on the part of the master not to invite the servant into
unknown dangers, than one on the part of the servant to run the
risk of them. Bnt the question of <.·on tract may be put entirely
aside from the case, and the responsibility of the master may be
planted on the same ground which would render him responsible
if the relation had not existed. Whether invited npon his premises by the contract of servk-e, or by the calls of business, or by
direct request, is immaterial; the party extending the invitation
owes a duty to the party accepting it to see that at least ordinary
care and prudence is exerci~ed to protect him against dangers
not within his knowledge, and not open to observation. It i~ a
rule of jnstice and right which compels the master to l"Cbpond
for a failure to exercise this care and prudence.'

1:. Rosenthal. 30 Wis. (374; Perry 0.

Marsh, 25 Ala. 659: Schooner Nor-

way v. Jensen, 52 Ill. 373; Walsh '0.

Peet Valve Co., 110 Mass. 23; Alter-

— 1 _—-Lﬂ'1'¢§

son v. D unison, 117 Mass. 407; Hor-

ncr 0. Nicholson, 56 Mo. 220; Baxter

v. Roberts, 44 Cal. 187; Holmes 0.

Northeastern Railway Co., L. R. 4

Exch. 254; S. C. allirmed, L. R 6.

Exch. 123; Mellors r. Shaw, 1 Best &

S. 437; Roberts v. Smith, 2 H. & N.

213.

The rule has been applied against

railroad companies in the case of in-

juries to their servants in consequence

of the road bed being out of repair.

See Snow 0. Housatonic R. R. Co, 8

Allen 441; Paulniicr 0. Erie R Co.,

34 N. J. 151 ; Lewis v St. I.ouis_ em,

R. R. Co., 59 1:10.495; S. C. 21 Am.

See post, p. 606-007.
' The servant is entitled to the pro.
tection of this rule, though be is leav.
lng his work wiU10ut cau!lc ur excuse.
l\ln1-shall "· Stewart, U3 Eng. L. &
Eq.l.
• l\lnrshall "·Stewart, 2 Macq. H. L.
20; S.C. 88 Eng. L. & Eq. 1; lndermaur "· Dames, L. R. 2 C. P. 811;
Ryan"· Fawler, 2l N.Y. 410: C·•ll!Ih·
try ll. Globe Woolen Co.. 56 N. Y.124;
8. C. 16 Am. Hcp. 887; t\trahleodorf
11. Rosenthal, 80 Wis. 074; Perry "·
)Iarsh, 26 Ala. 659: Schooner Nor.
wuy "· Jensen, ii2 Ill. 873; Walsh "·
PeeL Valve Co., 110 .Haas. 23; A.ker.
1

aon "· D nnlson, 117 Mass. 407; Horner"· Nicholson, 50 Mo. 220: B:lxter
"· Roberts, « Cal. 187; Holruca "·
Northeastern R1,ilway Co., L. R. 4
Exch. 2M; B. C. amrmed, L. R 6.
Exch. 128; l\lt>llors e. Shaw, 1 Best &
S. 437; Uoberts 11. Smith, 2 H. & N.
213.
The rule bu been applied against
railroad companies in the cue of injuries to their servants in conaeqo('ncc
or the road bed being out of repair.
See Snow "· Housatonic R. R. Cu, 8
Allen 441: Paulmicr "· Erie R. ('o.,
l.l4N.J.151; Lewis" St.I..ouia,ete.,
R. R. Co., 59 Mo. 485; S. C. 21 A.m.
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The terms in which the proposition has been stated will exempt
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the master from responsibility in all cases where the risks were

apparent, and were voluntarily assumed by a person capable of

understanding and appreciating them. No employer, by any

implied contract, undertakes that his buildings are safe beyond a

contingency, or even that they are as safe as those of his neighbors,

or that accidents shall not result to those in his service from risks

which perhaps others would guard against more eﬁectually than

it is done by him. Neither can a duty rest upon any one which

can bind him to so extensive a responsibility. There are degrees

of safety in buildings which differ in age, construction and state

of repair, as there are also in the different methods of conducting

business; and these, not the servant only, but any person doing-

business with the proprietor, is supposed to inform himself about

and keep in mind when he enters upon the premises. Negli-

gence does not consist in not putting one’s buildings or machinery

in the safest possible condition, or in not conducting one’s busi-

ness in the safest way; but there is negligence in not exercising

ordinary care that the buildings and machinery, such as they are,

shall not cause injury, and that the business, as conducted, shall

not inﬂict damage upon those who themselves are guilty of no

neglect of prudence.
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The principle is well stated by the Supreme Court of Connec-

ticut, in a case where the injury the servant complained of was

caused by his coming accidentally in contact with machinery

which, it was claimed, ought to have been covered so as to pro-

tect ngainst such an accident. “ The employee here was acquainted

with the hazards of the business in which he was engaged, and

with the kind of machinery made use of in carrying on the busi-

I

Rep. 385. “There is no rule better

settled than this, that it is the duty

of railroad companies to keep their

road and works, and all portions of

the track, in such repair and so

watched and tended, as to insure the

safety of all who may lawfully be

upon them, whether passengers, or

servants, or others. They are bound

to furnish a safe road, and suﬁicient

and safe machinery and cars.”

Bum-zsr, Ch. J., in Chicago, etc., R.

The terms in which the proposition has been stated will exempt
the master from responsibility in all cases where the risks were
apparent, and were voluntarily assumed by a person capable of
understanding and appreciating them. No employer, by any
implied contract, undertakes that his buildings are safe beyond a
contingency, or even that they are as safe as those of his neighbors,
or that accidents shall not result to those in his serviec from risks
which perhaps others would guard against more effectually than
it is done by him. Neither can a duty rest upon nny one which
can Lind him to so extensive a responsibility. There are degrees
of safety in buildings which differ in age, construction and state
·of repair, as there are also in the different methods of conducting
business; and these, not the servant only, hut any person doing
business with the proprietor, is supposed to inform him~:~elf about
and keep in mind when he enters upon the premises. Negligence dol'S not cons-ist in not putting one's buildings or machinery
in the safest possible condition, or in not conducting one's business in the safest way; but there is negligence in not exercising
ordinary care that the buildings and machinery, such as they are,
shall not cause injury, and that the business, as condnctt>d, shall
not inflict damage upon those who themselves are guilty of no
neglect of prudence.
The principle is well stated by the Supreme Court of ConneCticut, in a case where the injury the ~ervant complained of was
caused by his coming accidentally in contact with machinery
which, it Wt\S claimed, onght to hn.ve been covered so as to protect n,gainst such an accident. "The employee here was acquainted
with the hazards of the business in which he was engag-Pd, and
with the kind of machinery matle use of in carrying on the bnsi-

R. Co. o. Swctt, 45 Ill. 197, 208. But

a railroad company is not liable to

one of its employees for an injury oc-

casioned by a latent defect in one of

its bridges, where the company em-

ployed competent persons to super-

vise and inspect the bridge, by whom

the defect was not discovered. War-

ner : Erie Railway Co., 89 N. Y. 468.

See Ladd r..New Bedford, etc., R. R.

Co., 119 Mass. 112; S. C. 20 Am. Rep.

831; Cooper v. Hamilton Manuf. Co.

14 Allen, 193.

I

Rt·p. 385. ·• There is no rule better
settled than this, that it is the duty
of railroad compnnie!l to kN·p their
road and works, and all portions of
the trn~k. in such repair and ao
watc~ed and tended, as to Insure the
Sllfcty of all who may lawfully be
upon them, \VIu•ther pas!'engt>rs, or
servants, or others. They are bound
to furni:<h n safe road, and t~uffici£'nt
and safe machinery and cars."
Bn&EsF, Ch. J., in Chicago, etc., R.
R. Co. 11. Swett, 45 111. 197, 208. But

a railroad company is not linule to
one of its employees for an injury oc.
casioned by a latent defect in one of
its bridges, where the company em.
ploycd competent persons to super.
vise and inspect the bridge. by whom
U1c dcft·ct WIUI not discoverctl. Wnr.
ner 1 Eric Railway Co., 39 N.Y. 468.
Sec L:llld r.,Nt>w B~·df.. rd. t>:c., R R.
Co., 119 Mass. 112: 8. C. 20 Am. Rt•p.
831; Cooper "· Hamilton llaouf. C.>.
14 Allen, 193.
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ness. He must be held to have understood the ordinary hazards

attending his employment, and therefore to have voluntarily

taken upon himself this hazard when he entered into the defend-

ant’s service. Every manufacturer has a right to choose the

machinery to be used in his business, and to control that busi-

ness in the manner most agreeable to himself, provided he does

not thereby violate the law of the land. He may select his appli-

ances, and run his mill with old or new machinery, just as he

may ride in an old or new carriage, navigate an old or new ves-

sel, occupy an old or new house, as he pleases. The employee

having knowledge of the circumstances on entering his service

for the stipulated reward, cannot complain of the peculiar taste

and habits of his employer, nor sue him for damages sustained

in and resulting from that peculiar service.” '

1 Hayden 1:. Smit-hville Manf. C0..

29 Conn. 548, 558, pt-r ELLSWORTH, J.,

who, in citing authorities, refers,

among others, to what is said by

BR.\.\[WELL, B., in Williams v. Clough,

8 H.&N.258, 260. See, also, Priestley 0.

Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1; Dyncn n. Leach,

ness. He must be held to have understood the ordinary hazards
attending his employment, and therefore to have voluntarily
taken upon himself this hazard when he entered into the defendant's service. Every manufacturer has a right to choose the
machinery to be used in his business, and to control that business in the manner most agreeable to himself, provided be does
not thereby violate the law of the land. lie may at:lect his appliances, and run his mill with old or new machinery, just as he
may ride in an old or new carriage, navigate an old or new vessel, occupy an old or new house, as he pleases. The employee
having knowledge of the circumstances on entering his service
for the stipulated reward, cannot complain of the peculiar taste
and habits of his employer, nor sue him for damages sustained
in and resulting from that peculiar service."'

26 L. J. Exch. 221; S. C. 40 Eng. L.
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& Eq. 491; Seymour v. Maddox, 16

Q. B. 326 This last case was thought

by the Court of Appeals of New

York to have gone too far. See Ry-

nan v. Fowler, 24 N. Y. 410. A rail-

way company is not bound to change

its machinery in order to apply every

new improvement or supposed im-

provement in appliances; and an em-

ployee who consents to operate the

machinery already provided by the

company, knowing its defects, does

so at his own risk. Wonder 1:. B. &

O.R. R Co., 32 Md. 411. The case

of Coombs s. New Bedford Cordage

Co., 103 Mass. 572; S. C. 3 Am Rep.

506, was very similar in many respects

to that of Hayden o. Smithville Mani‘.

Co., supra, and the same general prin-

ciple was laid down. The failure to

employ suﬂicient assistance does not

render the employer liable to a ser-

vant who, knowing the facts, had con-

tinued in the business wilhnllt objec-

tion. Skipp 0. Eastern Counties R. R.

Co., 9 Exch. 223; S. C. 24 Eng. L. &

Eq. 396. In Woodley v. Metropolitan

R. R. Co., decided by the English

Court of Appeals (1877,) and to be

found in 4 Am. Law Times Rep.

452, it is said by COCKBURN, Ch. -1.:

“It is competent to an employer,

at least so far as civil consequences

are concerned, to invite persons

to work for him under circum-

stances of danger caused or aggra-

vated by want of due precautions

on the part of the employer. If a

man chooses to accept the employ-

ment, or to continue in it, with a full

knowledge of the danger, he must

abide the consequences. so far 86

any claim to compensation against

the employer is concerned." Again:

“That which would be negligence in

a company, with reference to the

state of their premises, or the manner

J Hayden "· Smithville Hanf. Co.,
29 Coon. 548,558, p(•r ELLSWORTH, J.,
who, In citing authorities, refers,
among others, to what is said by
BRAMWELL. B., In Williams"· Clough,
8 H.&N. 258, :MO. See, also, Priestley "·
Fowler, 8 M. & W. 1; Dynen "· Leach,
26 L. J. Ex<' h. 221; B. C. 40 Eng. L.
& Eq. 491; Seymour "· Maddox, 16
Q. B. 326 Thislaat cue waa thought
by the Court of Appeals of New
York to have gone too far. See Ry.
nan v. Fowler, 24 N. Y. 410. A railwuy <>ompaoy Is not bound to change
irs machinery In order to apply every
new improvement or supposed Improvement In appliance!!; and an em.
ployec who consents to operate the
machinery already provided by the
compnny, knowing its defe!'ls, does
so at his own risk. Wonder "·B. &
0. R. R. Co.• 32 Md. 411. The case
of Coombs "· New Bl'dford Cordage
Co., 10J Mass. 572; B. C. 8 Am Rep.
506, was very similar in many respects
to tlmt of Hayden ~- Smithville lbnf.
Co., supra, and the same general principle was laid down. The failure to
employ sumcient assbtance does not
render the employer liable to a servant who, knowing the facts, had con-

tinned In tbe busin('Ss wilhout objection. flkipp ~. Eastern Counties R. R.
Co., 9 Exch. 223; B. C. 24 Eng. L. &
F.q. 896. In WoodlE"y ~. MetroiJOlitan
R. R. Co., decided by the English
Court of Appeals (1877.,~) aod to be
found In 4 Am. Law Times Rep.
4:52, it is said by COCKBUJUII', Ch. J.:
·• It Ia competent to an employer,
at least 'IO far aa civil consequences
are concerned, to invite persons
to work for him under circumstances of danger caused or aggra..
vated by want of due prt'cautions
on the part of tlu.• employer. If a
man chooses to accept the employment, or to continue in It, with a full
knowledge of the danger, he must
abide the consequences, 90 far •
any claim to compensation against
the employer is concerned." Again:
"That which would be negligl•oce in
a company, with reference to the
state of tbeu premises, or the manner
of conducting their business, so as to
give a right to compensation for an
injury resulting therefrom to a
stranger lawfully rcsorling to their
premises, in ignorance of the exist.ence of the danger, will give no such
right to one who, being aware of the
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2. The master may also be guilty of actionable negligence in

exposing persons to perils in his service which, though open to

observation, they, by reason of their youth or inexperience, do

not fully understand and appreciate, and are injured in cou-

sequence. Such cases occur most frequently in the employment

of infants. It has been repeatedly held that the ease of an

infant is no exception to the general rule which exempts the

master from responsibility for injuries arising from the hazards

of his service.‘ But while this is unquestionably true as a rule,

it would be gross injustice, not to say absurdity. to apply in the

case of infants the same tests of the mastcr’s culpable negligence

which are applied in the case of persons of maturity and expe-

rience. It may be ordinary caution in one case to apprise the

servant of the danger he must guard against, while in the case

of another, not yet beyond the years of thoughtless childhood, it

would be gross and most culpable, if not criminal, carelessness

for the master to content himself with pointing out dangers

which were not likely to be appreciated, or if appreciated, not

likely to be kept with suflicient distinctness and caution in
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mind, and against which, therefore, eﬁectual protections ought

to he provided. The duty of the employer to take special pre-

cautions in such cases, has sometimes been very emphatically

asserted by the courts.’ The Supreme Court of Massachusetts

danger, voluntarily encounters it, and

fails to take the extra care necessary

for avoiding it." See, further, Fort

Wayne. etc., R. R. (,0. v. Gilderslcevc,

83 Mich. 133; Ladd v. New Bctlford.

etc., R. R. Co., 119 Mass.-112; S. C. 20

Am. Rep. 331; Gibson o. Erie R. Co.,

63 N. Y. 449; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 552;

2. The master may also be guilty of ac'tionable negligence in
exposing pers..Jns to perils in his service which, though open to
observation, they, by reason of their youth or inexperience, do
not fully ondt"rstand and appreciate, and •re injured in consequence. Such cases occur most frequently in the employment
of infants. It has been repeatedly held that the case of an
infant is no exception to the general rule which exempts the
ma~ter from responsibility for injuries arising from the hazards
of his service! But while this is unquestionably true as a rule,
it wonld be gross injustice, not to say absurdity, to apply in the
case of infants the same tests of the master's culpable negligence
which are applied in the case of persons of maturity and experience. It may be ordinary caution in one case to apprise the
servant of the damger be mnst guard against, while in the case
of another, not yet beyond the years of thoughtless childhood, it
would be gross and most culpable, if not criminal, careles~ness
for the master to content himself with pointing out dangers
which were not likely to be appreciated, or if appreciated, not
likely to be kept with sufficient distinctness and cautio~ in
mind, and against which, therefore, effectual protecttons onght
to be pro\·ided. The duty of the employer to take special precautions in such cases, has sometimes been very emphatically
asserted by the courts.' The Supreme Court of Massachusetts

Belair 1:. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 43

Iowa, 662; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co.

o. Britz, 72 Ill. 256. Master held re-

sponsible for L'Xpt)sllII_J servant to poi-

sonous exhalations. West». St. Louis,

etc., R. R. Co., 03 Ill. 545.

‘ King 0. Boston, etc., R R. Co.. 9

Cush. 112; Gartland r. Toledo, etc.,

R R Co., 67 Ill. 49$. See a hard

case in Murphy 0. Smith, 19 C. B.

(N. s.) 861.

' Grizzle v. Frost, 3 Fost. & F. 622;

Coomhs 0. New Bedford Cordage Co.,

102 Mass. 572; S. C. 3 Am. Rep. 506;

O’Connor 1:. Adams. 120 Mass. 427.

In Bartonskill Coal Co. 0. Mt.-Guirc,

3 Macq. H. L. 300, 311. Lord CttE1.us-

roan, in speaking of an injury to a

young girl frotn exposure to 1111\-

chincry in the building where she

was employed, says: “ It might. wcll

be considered that, by employing

such a helpless and ignorant child,

the master contracted to keep her out

of harm's way in assigning to her

any work to be perforiued." One

who put a boy of ﬂftec-i in charge of

a wild and fractious horse in a place

where trains of cars. moved by steam,

were approaching in opp -site direc-

tions, was held liable for an injury to

the boy in consequence of the horse

danger, voluntarily encounters It, and
fails lo take the extra cure necessary
for avoiding it." Sec, further, Fort
Wayne, etc., R. R. {,o, "·Gildersleeve,
33 Mich. 133; Lac!d "· New Bedford.
etc., R. n. Co., 119 l[a.~s. 412; s. c. 20
Am. Rep. 331; Gib~on 11. Erie R. Co.,
63 N. Y. 449; ~. C. 20 Am. I!Pp. 532;
Belair 11. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 43
Iowa, 662; SL Louis, etc., R. R. Co.
"· Britz, 72 Ill. 236. MMter held re.
sponsible for expo>~in~ servant to poisonous exhalations. West o. BL Louis,
etc., R. R. Co., 63 Ill. 645.
1 King "· &>~ton, etc., R. H. Co., t
(.'usb. 112; Gartland r. Toledo, etc.,
R R. Co., 67 Ill. 49~. Bee a 'lard
case in Murphy fl. Smith, 19 C. B.
(N. 8.) 861.

• Orizzle

11.

Frost, 3 Foat. & F. 622;

Coombs"· New Bedford Cordage Co.,
102 Ma.:ts. 572; S.C. 3 Am. Rt·p. 506;
O'Connor fl. Adams, 120 Ma.,.s. 427.
In Bartonskill Coal Co. fl. llcOnirc,
8 Macq. H. L. 300,311, Vud CnELXS.
J'ORD, in speaking of an ~njury lo a
young girl from expo~urc to ma.
chinery lo the building where she
was employed, says: "h might well
be consltlcred that, by employing
such a helpless and l~ornorant child,
the maswr contracted to ket>p her out
of harm's way in &.'-qigning to her
any work to be performed." One
who put a boy of ftflce·t in charge of
a wild and fractious horse In a place
where trains of cars, moved by steam,
were approaching in opp •site directions, was held liable for &D IDjury to
the boy in consequence of the hol'88
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has very properly said, in a case in which defendants relied for
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their protection upon a notice of danger which they had given

to the party injured: “ The notice which the defendants were

bound to give the plaintiff of the nature of the risks incident to

the service which he undertook, must be such as to enable a

person of his youth and inexperience in the business intelli-

gently to appreciate the nature of the danger attending its per-

formance. The question, indeed, on this branch of the case is

not of due care on the part of the plaintiff, but whether the

cause of the injury was one of which, by reason of his incapacity

to understand and appreciate its dangerous character, or the

neglect of the defendants to take due precautions to effectually

inform him thereof, the defendants were bound to indemnity

him against the consequences. But in determining this question

it is proper and necessary to take into consideration not only

the plaintiff ’s youth and inexperience, but also the nature of the

service which he was to perform, and the degree to which his

attention, while at work, would need to he devoted to its per-

formance. The obligation of the defendants would not neces-

sarily be discharged by merely informing the boy that the

employment itself, or a particular place or machine in the build-

ing or room in which he was set to work, was dangerous. Mere
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representation in advance that the service generally, or a partic-

ular thing connected with it, was dangerous, might give him no

adequate notice or understanding of the kind and degree of the

danger which would necessarily attend the actual performance

of his work.”‘ This is not a rule which in its application is

conﬁned exclusively to infants: the principle is _a general one,

which requires good faith and reasonable prudence on the part

being frightened and becoming un-

manageable. Hill :1. Gust, 55 Ind. 45.

A similar requirement of extra cau-

tion aud care in the case of small

The general obligation of the master

to give information to one who, from

immaturity or otherwise, would not

be likely to understand and appre-

ciate it, is aﬁirined in Sullivan /0.

India Mnnuf. Co., 113 Mass. 396.

though it is said it would be surﬁ-

cient if the servant hail the proper

information from some other source.

ha.s very properly said, in a case in which defendants relied for
their protection upon a notice of danger which they had given
to the party injured: "The notice which the defendants were
bound to give the plaintiff of the nature of the risks incident to
the service which he undertook, must be snch as to enable a
person of' his youth and inexperience in the business intelligently to appreciate the nature of the danger attending its performance. The question, indeed, on this branch of the case is
not of due care ou the part of the plaintiff, but whether the
cause of the injury was one of which, by reason of his incapacit)·
to understand and appreciate its dangerous character, or the
neglect of the defendants to take due precautions to ett't'Ctually
inform him thereof, the defendants were bound to iudemni(y
him against the consequences. But in d~termiuing this question
it is proper and necessary to take into considemtion ll(lt only
the plaintiff's youth and inexperience, but also the nn.ture of the
service which he wa.s to perform, and the degree to which his
attention, while at work, would need to be devoted to its performance. The obligation of the defendants would not necessarily be otlischarged by merely informing the boy that the
employment itself, or a particular place or machine in the bnilt1ing or room in which he was set to work, was dangerous. ..Mere
representation in advance that the service geneni.lly, or a particular thing connected with it, wa.s dangerous, might gi,,e llim no
adequate notice or understanding of the kind and degree of the
danger which would necetisarily attend the actnal performance
of his work."' This is not a rule which in its application is
confined exclmlively to intimts: the principle is .a general one,
which requires good faith and reasonable prudence on the part

1 GRAY, J., in Coombs v. New Bed-

ford Cordage 00., 102 Mass. 572, 596.

children received by carriers without

attendants, was laid down in East

Saginaw City Railway Co. o. Bohu,

27 Mich. 5013. And see the wcll reas-

oned case of Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17

Wall. 553, in which the obligation to

give to iininature persons information

of unknown or unappreciatctl perils

is considered and insisted upon in an

opinion by DAVIE, J.

__ _...-unit

being frightened and becoming un.
manageable. Hill '!'. Gust, 55 Ind. 4S.
The general obligation of the master
to give infllrmation to one who, from
immaturity or otherwise, would not
be likAly to understand and appre.
elate it, is affirmed in Sullivan "·
Iodin Manuf. Co., 113 l\l!LSS. 306.
though it is said it would be sufficient if the s!'rvant hall the proper
information from some other source.
1 GRAY, J., in Coombs c:. New Bed.
ford Cordage Oo., 102 Mass. 572, 596.

A similar requirement of extra cuution and care in the case of small
children received by ca•·ricrs without
attendants, was laid down in East
Saginaw City Hailwny Co. 11. B()hn,
27 Mich. 50:J. And see the well re&:~
oned case of Railroad Co. 11. Fort, 17
Wall. 553, in which the obli:!:llion to
give to immature persons information
of unknown or unappreciatc1l perils
is considered and insisted upon in an
opinion by DAVIS, J .
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of the employer, under the special circumstances of the partic-

ular case; of which infancy, if it exists, may be a very important

one, but possibly not more so than some others.’

3. The master may also be negligent in commanding the

servant to go into exceptionally dangerous places, or to subject

himself to risks which, though he may be aware of the danger,

are not such as he had reason to expect, or to consider as being

within the employment.

It has been ot'ten—and very justlyéremarked that a man

may decline any exceptionally dangerous employment, but if he

voluntarily engages in it he should not complain because it is

dangerous.’ Nevertheless, where one has entered upon the em-

ployment and assumed the incidental risks, it is not reasonable

to hold that other risks which he is directed by the master to

assume, are to be left to rest upon his shoulders, merely because

he did not take upon himself the responsibility of throwing up

the employment instead of obeying the order. Many considera-

tions might reasonably induce the servant to hesitate under such

circumstances. In many eases the consequences might be very
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serious should he refuse to obey a lawful command 0i“the master;

and any command may not be clearly and manifestly unlawful

which directs the doing of nothing beyond the general scope of

the business. The servant who refuses to obey must consequently

expect to take upon himself the burden of showing a suﬁicient

' See Chicago, etc., R. R Co. 0. Bay-

ﬂeld. 37 Mich. 205; Patterson 0. Pitts-

burgh, etc., R. R. Co., 76 Penn. St.

389; S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 412.

* “A master cannot be held liable

for an accident to his servant while

using machinery in his employment,

simply because the master knows

of the employer, under the special drcnmstanccs of the partie.
ular case; of which infancy, if it exists, may be a very important
one, bnt possibly not more so than some others.'
3. The master may also be negligent in (-ommanding the
servant to go into exceptionally dangerous places, or to subject
himself to risks which, though he may be aware of the danger,
are not such as he had reason to expect, or to consider as being
within the employment.
It has boon often -and very justly-· remarked that a man
may decline any exceptionally dangerous employment, bot if he
voluntarily engages in it be should not complain becauac it is
danh"'Crous.' N evcrthelese, where one has entered upon the employment and assumed the incidental risks, it is not reasonable
to hold that other risks which bo is diJ'\.•ded by the master to
assnme, are to be left to rest npon his shoulders, me1·cly because
he did not take upon himself the responsibility of throwing up
the employment instead of obeying the order. Many oonsi<.lerations might reasonably induce the servant to hebitate under such
circumstances. In many cases the consequences might be very
serious sbonld he refuse to obey a lawful oornmand of"tho master;
and any command may not be clearly and manifestly unlawful
which directs tho doing of nothing beyond the general scope of
the business. The servant who refuses to obey mu~t consequently
ex1>00t to take upon himself the burden of showing a sufficient

that such machinery is unsafe, if the

servant has the same means of knowl-

edge as the master.” BRAMWELL, B.,

in Williams v. Clough, 3 II. & N.

238, 260. See Mad River, etc., R. R.

Co. e. Barber, 5 Ohio, (N. s.) 541. An

employee injured by the falling of a

hoisting apparatus sued his em-

ployer. Held, that the liability of

the defendant depended on three

facts: 1. The defective and unsafe

condition of the apparatus and that

the injury proceeded therefrom. 2.

That defendant knew or ought to

have known of the defect 8. That

plaintiif did not know of it and had

not equal means of knowledge. Ma-

lone v. H.iwley, 4-6 Cal. 409. See

McGlynn o. Brodie, 31 Cal. 376; Bai-

timorc, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Woodward,

41 Md. 268. Of extrinsic and extra-

ordinary risks it is the duty of the

lIll\.~IOI' to notify the servant. Perry

o. Marsh, 25 Ala. 659; Baxter v. Rob-

erts. 44 (‘al. 187; S. ('. 1:! Am. Rep.

160; Strnhlendorf r. Rosenthal, 30

Wis. 674; West v. St. Louis, etc., R. R

Co., 63 Ill. 585; Paulinier 0. Erie

Railway, B4 N. J. 151.

1

1 Sec Chicago, etc., R. R Co. e. Bay.
1leld. 87 Mich. 203; Patterson e. PiUs.
burgh, etc., R R Co., 76 Penn. St.

889; S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 419.
t .. A master cannot be held liable
for an accident to his servant while
naing machinery in his employment,
simply because the mu~er knowa
that such machinery Is unaafe, if tbe
eervaut hu tho same means of knowledge as the master." BJUIIWELL, B.,
in Will iama "· Clough, 8 H. & N.
2:>8, 260. See Mad River, etc.• R. R.
Co. e. Barber, G Ohio, (K. s.) 541. An
employee injured by the fa111ng of a
hoitJtlng apparatus sued hia em.
ployer. Held, tba& the liability of
tho defendant depended on three
facta: 1. The defective and unaate

condition of tho apparatus and that
the injury proceeded therefrom. 2.
That defendant knew or ought to
have known of the defect. 8. That
pluintUf did not know of It aod bad
no& equal means of knowledge. lla.
lone "· H .awley, 46 Cut. 400. See
McGlynn"· Brodie, 31 Clll. 8'76; .Bal·
tlmore, etc., R. R. Co. t~. Woodward,
41 ~ld. 268. Of extrinsic and extraordinary risks it Ia the duty of the
ma,ter to notifY the servant. Perry
e. Marsh, 26 Ala. 839; Baxter t~. Hob.
erta. 44 C'al. 181; 8. ('. t:J Am. Rep.
160; Strahleodorr r. Ro!!t•nthtd, 80
Wis. 614; W('8t "·St. Louis, etc., R. R.
Co., 88 Ill. IH3; Paulmler •· Erie
Raihn.y, 84 N. l. 151.
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cause for the refusal. However clear the case might be to him,

it might not be easy to make a showing satisfactory to third

partie=, who would naturally assume that the order was given in

good faith, and that the master understood better than another

the risks to be encountered in his business. The servant, also,

it may reasonably be assumed, would, to some extent, have his

fears allaycd by the commands of a master, whose duty it would

be not to send him into danger, and who might, therefore, be

supposed to know, when he gave the command, that the dangers

were not such or so great as the servant had apprehended.‘ In

these cases, also, the age and immaturity of the child are of the

highest importance; for a child, inexperienced in affairs and

ignorant of the law, might well believe the obligation to obey

was implicit, and might do so, consequently, under a species of

coercion to which the will \vas wholly subjected.’

4. The master may also be negligent in not exercising ordinary

care to provide suitable and safe machinery or appliances, or in

making use of those which he knows have become defective, but

the defects in which he does not explain to the servant, or in
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continuing ignorantly to make use of those which are defective,

where his ignorance is due to a neglect to use ordinary prudence

and diligence to discover defects. .

1 A boy hired for one service and

sent upon another much more dan-

gerous, was held entitled to recover

for an injury sutiered in the latter.

Railroad Co. 0. Fort, 17 “fall. 553.

And see Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v.

Bnyﬁcld, 87 Mich. 205.

cause for the refnsal. However clear the case might be to him,
it might not be en,gy to make a showing satisfactory to third
partie~, who would uaturally assume that the order was given in
goOll faith, and that the master understood better than another
the risks to be encountered in his business. The servant, aleo,
it may reasonably be assumed, would, to some extent, have his
fears allay<-'<i by the commands of' a master, whose <;luty it would
be not to send him into danger, and who might, therefore, be
supposed to know, when he gn,·e the command, that the dangers
wc1·c not such or so great as the servant had apprehended.) In
these cas('s, also, the age and immaturity of' the child are of the
highe~>t importance; for a child, inexperienced in affairs and
ignorant of the law, might well beJie,·e the obligation to obey
was implicit, and might do so, consequently, under a species of
coercion to which the will was wholly subjected.'
4. The master may also be negligent in not exercising ordinary
care to provide suitable and safe machinery or appliances, or in
making use of tho:;e which he knows have become defective, but
the defects in which he docs not explain to the servant, or in
continuing ignorantly to make use of those which are defective,
where his ignorance is due to a neglect to use ordinary prudence
and diligen<.:e to discover defects.

In Lalor 0. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.,

52 lll. 401; S. C. 4 Arn. Rep. 616, the

declaration averred an employment

of the plainti1I"s intestate as acom-

mon laborer in the business of load-

ing and unloading ears, and for no

other purpose; and that while he was

engaged in loading a freight car with

iron, the deceased was ordered by the

superintendent or foreman of the com-

pany, employed to manage, direct

and superintend the business of the

company about the depot, to couple

and connect a freight car with other

cars, contrary to the special engage-

ment of the deceased, etc., in doing

which he was crushed to death. This

was held to set out a good cause of

action. “ The company was con-

structively present, by and through

this oﬂiccr, and must be charged ae-

cordingly. It was, then, by the direct

command of the company the de-

ceased was exposed to this peril, and

one out of the line of the business he

had contracted to perform. He was

killed by the negligence of the driver

in charge of the locomotive while

thus exposed. The law would be

lamentably deﬁcient did it furnish

no remedy in such a case." BREESE,

Ch. J., p. 404. See. also, Indianapolis,

etc., R. R. Co. 0. Love, 10 Ind. 554.

' Fort 0. Railway Co., 2 Dill. 259;

Railroad C0. 0. Fort, 17 Wall. 553.

• A boy hired for one service and
sent upon annthcr much more dan.
gerous, was held entitled to recover
for an injury suffered in the h1tter.
Hailroad Co. "· Fort, 17 Wall. 553.
And see Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Bayfield, 87 Mich. 205.
In Lalor"· Chicago, etc., R. R Co.,
52 Ill. 401; B. C. 4 Am. Rep. 616, the
dednratiun averred an employment
of the plaintiff's intestate as a common laborer in the husiness of loading un!l unloading cars, and for no
other purpose; and that while he was
engaged in loading a freight car with
iron, the dcc(•ased was ordered by the
superintendent or foreman of the company, employed to manage, direct
and superintend the business of the
company about the depot, to couple
and connect a freight car with other

cars, contrary to t.be special engage..
ment of the deceased, etc., in doing
which he was crll8hed to death. This
was held to set out a good cause or
action. "The company was constructively present, by and through
this officer, and must be charged accordingly. It was, then, by the direct
command of the company the deceased was exposed to this peril, and
one out of tho line of the business he
had contracted to perform. He was
killed by the negligence of the driver
in charge of the locomotive while
thus exposed. The law would be
lamentably deficient did it furnish
no remedy in such a ease." BB&ESB,
Cb. J., p. 404. See. also, Indianapolis,
etc., R. R. Co. "· Love, 10 Ind. 554.
1 Fort "· Railway Co., 2 Dill. ~9;
Railroad Co. •· Fort, 17 Wall. MS.
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The point here is, not that the master warrants the strength
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or safety of his machinery or appliances, but that he is person-

ally negligent in not taking proper precautions to see that they

are reasonably strong and safe. The law does not require him

to guaranty the prudence, skill or ﬁdelity of those from whom

he obtains his tools or machinery, or the strength or ﬁtness of

the materials they make use of. If he employs such reasonable

care and prudence in selecting or ordering what he requires in

his business, such as every prudent man is expected to employ

in providing himself with the conveniences of his occupation,

this is all that can be required of him;‘ but this at his peril he

must employ, and the duty is not one he can delegate so as to

relieve himself from the contingent liability in case of failure in

performance.’ If, therefore, an injury results to the servant,

from a failure to exercise reasonable care and prudence in this

regard, the master may be and ought to be held responsible.’

‘ It has been so often aﬁrmed, and

is so well established, that the master

is not guarantor oi‘ the safety of ma-

chinery which he puts into the hands

of his servants, and is responsible

only where he has failed to employ
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reasonable care and skill in its selec-

tion, that we content ourselves here

The point here is, not that the master warrants the strength
or aafcty ot' his machinery or appliances, bot that he is personally negligent in not taking proper preeantions to see that they
are reasonably strong and &afe. The law does not require bim
to gnaranty the prudence, skill or fidelity of those from whom
be obtains his tools or machinery, or the t~trcngth or fitnel's of
the materials they make use of. If he employs snch reasonable
care and prndent.-e in selecting or ordering what he requires in
his business, such as every prudent man is expected to emJ>loy
in providing himself with the conveniences of his oecupation,
this is all that can be required of him; • but this at his peril he
must employ, and the duty i~ not one he can delegate so as to
relie\'C himself from the contingent liability in case of failure in
performance.' If, therefore, an injury results to the servant,
from a failure to exercise reasonable care and prudence in this
regard, the master may be and ought to be held responsible.'

with a reference to a few recent cases

recognizing the principle: Rcadhcad

0. Midland R. Co., 2 Q. B. 412; S. C.

in Exch. Chamber, L. R. 4 Q. B. 379;

Ladd v. New Bcdford R. R. Co., 119

Mass. 412; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 831;

Ford r. Fitchburg R. R. Co.,110 Mass.

240; S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 598; Indian-

apolis, ctc., R. R. Co. o. Love, 10 Ind.

554; Fort Wayne, etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Gildersleeve, 33 Mich. 131; 'l‘olcd'),

etc., R. R. Co. u. Fredericks, 71 Ill. ‘.294;

Camp Point Manut‘. Co. v. Bu lou, 71

Ill. 417; Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co.

v. F'ani_;an, 77 Ill. 365; Columbus.

etc., R. R. C0. 1;. Troesch, 68 1ll.545; S.

C. 18 Am. Rep. 578; Mobile, etc., R. R.

Co. v. Thomas, 4'3 Ala. 672; Patterson

0. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., '76 Penn.

St. 389; S. C. 18 Am. 4i2; Gibson v.

Paciﬁc R. R. Co., 46 Mo. 163; Lewis

0. St. Louis, etc., R R Co., 59 Mo.

495; Flike v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co.,

53 N. Y. 549: Kelley v. Norcross. 121

Mass. 508; Shnnny 0. Androscoggin

Mill, 66 Me. 420.

' See post, p. 560.

'Kcegan v. Western R. R. Co., 8

N. Y. 175, is a leading case. The in-

jury occurred from continuing to use

a defective and dangerous locomotive

after notice to the company of its

dangerous condition. And see Mc-

Gt\'I'iCi{ v. Wason, 4 Ohio, (N. s.) 566;

Cayzer 0. Taylor, 10 Gray, 274; Co-

lumbus, etc., R. R Co. 0. Arnold, 31

Ind. 174; Lewis v. St. Louis, etc., R. R.

Co., 59 Mo. 495; S. C. 21 Am. Rt-p.

885; Long v. Paciﬁc R. R. Co., 6-S Mo.

225; Wedgcwood o. Chicago, etc., R.

R. Co., 41 Wis. 47$; Harper v. In.

dianapolis, etc., R. R Co., 47 Mo. 567;

S. C. 4 Am. 353; Chicago, etc., R. R.

Co. v. Taylor, 69 lll. 461; S. C. 18

Am. Rep. 626; lliulinn v. Philadel-

1 It bas been so often aftlrmed, and
is ao well established, that the master
is not guArantor of the safety of machinery which he puts Into the banda
of his servant&, and is reeponsible
only where he has failed to employ
reasonable care and skill In its selection, that we content ourselves here
with a reference to a few recent cases
!'('cognizing the principle: Read head
e. Midhmd R. Co., 9 Q. B. 412; R. C.
In Exch. <'hamber, L. R. 4 Q. B. 879;
Ladd "·New Bedford R. R. Co., 110
Masa. 412: B. C. 20 Am. !Wp. 881;
Ford e. Fitchburg R. R. Co.,llO Masa.
240: S. 0. 14 Am. Rep. liDS; Indinn.
apol i~. etc., R. R. Co. •· Love, 10 Ind.
M4 : Fort Wayne, t'tc., R. R. C'o. e.
Gildersleeve. 83 :Mich. 13-l; 1'o1Pd'>,
etc., R. R. Co. e. Fredericks, 71 Ill. 20-i;
Camp Point llanuf. Co. "· na lou. 71
Ill. 417; Indianapolis, Pte., R. R. Co.
e. F 'anlgao, 77 Ill. 3M; Columbus.
etc., R. R. Co."· Trooscb, 68 111. 646; t:J.
C. 18 Am. Rt>p. ~78; Mobile, etc., R. R.
Co. "· Thomas, 4'l Ala. 672; Patterson
e. Pittsburgh, etc., R R. c.,., 76 Penn.
t:Jt 389; 8. C. 18 Am. 412; Gibson "·
Paciftc R. R Co., j6 Mo. 168; Lewis

•· 8l Louie, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Mo.
400; Flike 11. Boston, etc., R. R. Co.,
53 N.Y. 549: Kelley 11. Norcros.,'l, 121
Ma.IIS. IS08; Bhrmny e. Androscoggin
Mill, 66 Me. 42U.
I See post, p. 560.
• Keegan e. W eetern R. R. Co., 8
N.Y. 175, ie a leRdlng CRSe. The ln.
jury occurn-d from continuln11: to usc
a defective and dangerous locomotive
after notice to the company of ita
dangerous condition. And see :Mo.
Ga•rick "·Wason, 4 Ohio, (N. s.) M6;
Cayzer e. Taylor, 10 Gray, 274; Co.
lumbua, etc., R. R. Co. e. Arnold. 31
Iod.17-i; Lewlst~.&. Louis, etc., R. R.
Co., 59 Mo. 4M; 8. C. 21 Am. HC>p.
88lS; Long "· Paciftc R. R. Co., G.'l lio.
121l; Wt.-dgewood e. Chicago, etc., R.
R. Co., ·U Wis. 47~; Harper "· In.
dlaoapolls, etc.• R R. Co., 47 llo. 567;
8. C. 4 Am. 358; Chicajl(), etc., R R.
Co. "· Taylor, 60 Ill. 461; S. C. 18
Am. Rep. 626; )(ullan "· Pblladel.
pbia, Pte., U. R. Co., iS Peou. t:Jt. 25;
8. C. 21 Am. Rep 2; Wonder s. Bal.
timore, etc., R R. Co., 82 lld. 411;
8 C. 8 Am. Rep. 143. In Noyes •·
Smith, 28 Vt. 511, a decluaUon wu
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5. The master’s negligence may also consist in employing

servants who are wanting in the requisite care, skill or prudence

for the business entrusted to them, or in continuing such per-

sons in his employ after their unﬁtness has become known to

him, or when, by the exercise of ordinary care, it would have

been known. “The servant when he engages to run the risks

of the service, including those arising from the negligence of

fellow servants, has a right to understand that the master has

taken reasonable care to protect him from such risks, by asso-

ciating him only with persons of ordinary skill and care.” ‘

The obligation to employ suitable servants is precisely the

same as that to provide suitable machinery and appliances for

the business. It has been thus stated in a railroad case: “A

sustained which charged the defend-

ants with negligence in putting the

plaintiﬂ', their servant, in charge of

5. The master's negligence may also consist in emplo~·ing
servants who are wanting in the requisite care, ~;kill or prudence
for the business entrusted to them, or in continuin~ such persons in his employ after their unfitness has become known to
him, or when, by the exercise of ordinary care, it would have
been known. "The servant when he engages to run the risks
of the service, including those arising from the negligence of
fellow servants, has a right to understand that the master hns
taken reasonable care to protect him from such risks, hy nssociating him only with persons of ordinary skill and care."'
The obligation to employ suitable servants is precisely the
same as that to provide suitable machinery and appliam:es for
the business. It has been thus stated in a railroad ease: "A

an insuﬂlcient engine, whose insuffi-

ciency was unknown to the plaintiff,

and but for the want of care and dili-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

gence would have been known to the

defendants. A similar doctrine is de-

clared in Snow o. Housatonic R. R.

Co., 8 Allen, 441; Seaver u. Boston,

etc., R. R. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Hackett

'0. Middlesex Manuf. Co.. 101 Mass.

101; Laning v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co.,

49 N. Y. 521; Louisville, etc., R. R.

Co. 0. Caven, 9 Bush, 559: S. O. 15

Am. Rep. 740; Shanny 0. Androscog-

gin Mills, 66 Me. 420; and Illinois

Central R. R. Co. 0. Wclch, 52 Ill. 183.

The peril in the case last cited was

the projecting awning of the station

house, which was liable to strike a

passing car. Say the court: “The

evidence shows that the peril had

long before been observed by other

employees, and the attention of both

the division superintendent and divi-

sion engineer called to it. This cir-

cumstanee takes away all excuse from

the company, and brings the case

within the legal proposition of ap-

pellant’s counsel, since it was a peril

known to the employer and not reveal-

edto the employee." The ruleltas been

applied to the case of a railroad com-

pany which was charged with negli-

gence in permitting its road to

become blocked with snow and ice,

and a car to be out of repair, by

means whereof the plaintiff was in-

jured. Fitield 0. Nortlrern R. R. Co.,

42 N. H. 225. Compare Waller u. S.

E. Railway Co., 2 H. & (3. 102; Colum-

bus, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Wt-lib, 12 Ohio,

(N. s.) 475; Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v.

Conroy, 61 Ill. 162; Toledo, etc., R. R.

Co. 0. Ingraham,'77 Ill. 309. Of course

if the case rests upon a want of due

care, the fact that the employer had

no actual knowledge of the defect is

no excuse.

'ALm-mson, B, in Hutchinson 0.

Railway Co., 5 Exch. 343. See Ala-

bama, etc., R. R. Co. v. Waller. 48

'Sustained which charged the defendants with negligence in putting the
plaintiff, their servant, in charge of
an insufficient engine, whose insuffi.
ciency waa unknown to the plaintiff,
and but for the want of CIU"e and diJi.
gence would have been known to the
defendants. .!. similar doctrine ill de.
clared in Snow tJ. Housatonic H. R.
Co., 8 Allen, 441 ; Seaver tJ. Boston,
etc., R. R. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Hackett
tJ. }[iddlesex llanuf. Co., 101 Mass.
101; Laning "· N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co.,
49 N.Y. 521; Louisville, etc., R. R.
Co. tJ. Caven, 9 Bush, 559: S. C. 15
Am. Hep. 740; Shanny tJ. Androscog.
gin 1\lills, 66 Me. 420; and Illinois
Centml R. R. Ct>. tJ. Welch, 52 Ill. 183.
The peril in the ca~e last cited waa
the projecting awning of the station
house, which wns liable to strike a
passing cl\1". Say the court: "The
evidence shows that the peril had
long before been observed by other
employees, and the attention of both
the division superintendent nnd division engineer called to it. This circumstance takes away all excuse from
the company, and brings the case
within the legal proposition of ap.
pellant's counsel, since it was a peril
known to the employer and not reveal.

ed to the employee." The rule hns been
applied to the case of a railroad com.
pany which waa charged with negligence in permitting its road to
become blo('ked with snow and ice,
and a car to be out of n·pair, by
means whe•·eof the plaintiff wns injured. Fifield "· Nortlrern R. R. Co.,
42 N. H. 225. Compare Waller tJ. S.
E. Railway Co., 2 H. & C.l0'2; Columbus, etc., R. R. Co. tJ. Wt-hll, 12 Ohio,
lN. s.) 475; Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. e.
Conroy, 61 Ill. 162: Toledo, etc., R. R.
Co. tJ. Ingraham, 77 Ill. 809. Of course
if the caae rests upon a want of due
care, the f~~oct that the employer hnd
no actunl knowh.'llge of the defect is
no excu~e.
1 ALDERSON, B, in Hutchinson e.
Railway Co., 5 Exch. 843. See Alabnma, etc., R. R. Co. "· Waller, 48
Ala. 459; New Orleans, t'lc., R R.
Co. tJ. Hughes, 49 Miss. 258; Moss e.
Pacific R. H. Cn.. 49 llo. 167; 8. <..:. 8
Am. Rep. 120: Mich. Cent. R. R. Co.
"· Dolnn, 32 Mich. 510; Columbus.
etc., R H. Co. tJ. Troesch, 68 Ill. 54.'5;
S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 578; Hog~tn tJ. CenL
Pacific R. H. Co., 49 Cal. 128: :\fcm.
phis, etc., R. R. Co. "· Thomas, ol
Miss. 637
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and equipment, and proper servants. It must do this through

appropriate oﬂicers. If acting through appropriate oﬁicers it

knowingly and negligently employs incompetent servants, it is

liable for an injury occasioned to a fellow servant by their incom-

petency. If it continues in its employment an incolnpetent

servant after his incompetency is known to its oﬂicers, or is so

manifest that its oﬂicers, using due care, would have known it,

such continuance in employment is as much a breach of duty

and a ground of liability as the original employment of an

incompetent servant.”‘

6. It is also negligence for which the master may be held

responsible, if knowing of any peril which is known to the ser-

vant also, he fails to remove it in accordance with assurances

made by him to the servant that he will do so. This (31158 may

also be planted on contract, but it is by no means essential

to do so. If the servant, having a right to abandon the service

because it is dangerous, refrains from doing so in consequence

of assurances that the danger shall be removed, the duty to

remove the danger is manifest and imperative, and the master

is not in the exercise of ordinary care unless or until he makes

his assurances good. Moreover the assurances remove all ground
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for the argument that the servant, by continuing the employ-

ment, engages to asume its risks. So far as the particular peril

is concerned the implication of law is rebutted by the giving

and accepting of the assurance; for nothing is plaincr or more

reasonable than that parties may and should. where practicable,

come to an understanding between themselves regarding matters

of this nature.’

' GRAY, J., in Gilmau 0. Eastern R.

R Co., 11lAllcn, 433. The same point

is strongly put by Fomaa, J ., in Lan-

ing 0. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y.

521, 533. See, also, Tarrant o. Webb,

18 C. B. 797; S. 0.87 E. L. & Eq. 281;

Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Jewell, 46

Ill. 99; Harper o. Indianapolis, etc.,

R R Co., 47 Mo. 567. and cases cited;

Moss 0. Paciﬁc R. R Co., 49 Mo. 167;

Pittsburgh, etc., R. R C0. v. Ruby, 38

Ind. 294; Davis 0. Detroit. etc., It. R.

Co., 20 Mich. 105; McMahon 0. Da-

railroad corporation is bound to provide proper road, machinery
and equipment, and proper servants. It must do this throngh
appropriate officers. If acting through appropriate offic-ers it
knowingly and negligently employs incompetent servants, it is
liable for an injury occasioned to a fellow ser·vant hy their in<'ompctency. If it continues in its employment an incompetent
servant after his incompetency is known to its officers, or is so
manitest that its officers, using due care, would have known it,
such continuance in employment is as much a breach of duty
and a ground of liability as the original employment of an
incompetent servant." 1
6. It is also negligence for which the master may be held
responsible, if knowing of any peril which is known to the servant also, he fails to remove it in accordance with assnrances
made by him to the servant that he will do so. This c.'lse may
also be planted on contract, but it is by no mellns essential
to do so. If the sen·ant, having a right to abandon the ser\·ice
because it is da11gerons, refrains from doing so in cousequence
of assurances that the danger shall be removed, the duty to
remove the danger is manifest and imperative, and the master
is not in the exercise of ordinary care unless or until he makes
his assurances good. Moreover the assuraoc'CS remove all ground
for the argument that the servant, by continuing the employment, engnges to assume its risks. So far att the particular peril
is <-orwerned the implication of law is rebutted by the giving
and aceepting of the assurance; for nothing is plainer or more
reasonable than that parties may and shonld. where practicable,
come to an understanding between themselves regarding matters
of this nature.•

vidson, 12 Minn. 857; Wcgcr e. Penn-

sylvania R. R. Co., 55 Penn. St. 460;

Huntingdon. etc., R. R. Co. v. Decker,

82 Penn. St. 119; S. C. 84 Pcnn. St.

419; Chapman e. Erie R. Co., 55 N.

Y. 579. As to the degree of care re-

quired in the selection of servants,

see Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Thomas,

42 Ala. 672, 715: Alabama, etc., R R.

Co. e. Waller, 48 Ala. 459.

' See Patterson v. Wallace, 1 Macq.

H. L. 748; S. C. 23 Eng. L & liq.-18;

Laning 0. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co, 49

1 GRAY, J., In Gilman e. ERStcm R.
R. Co., t;J Allen, 4.33. The B8me point
Is strongly put by FoLOEB, J., in Laning"· N. Y. Cent R. R. Co., 49 N. Y.
~21, 533. See, also, Tarrant e. Webb,
18 C. B. 707; S. C.S7E. L. & Eq. 281;
Illlnoii Cent. R. R Co. e. Jewell, 46
Ill. 99; Harper"· Indianapolis, etc.,
R R. Co., 47 Mo.li67. and CRSCS cited;
Moss "· Pacific R. R. Co., 49 Mo. 167;
Pittsbnrgh, etc., R. R. Co. "· Ru hy. !18
Ind. 294; D.L\'is e. Detroit. etc., H. R.
Co., 20 Mich. 100; :McMahon e. Da.

vidson, 12 Mint;~. 857: WeA'er ~- Pennsylvanil\ R. R. Co., 55 Penn. St. 400;
Huntingdon. etc., H. R. Co. l'. Deck<•r,
82 Penn. St. 119; 8. C. 84 P(·nn. St.
419; Chapman "· Erie It Co., 55 N.
Y. 579. As to the degree of cure re.
quired In lhc acl<'Ction of servnnts,
see Mobile, etc., R R. Co. e. Thomas,
42 Ala. 072, 715: .\labama, etc., R It
Co. e. Waller, 48 Ala. 45!J.
1 Ser Pnttrrson "·Wallace, 1 llncq.
ll. L. 748; 8. C. 28 Eng. L & Eq. 48;
Laning "· N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co, 49
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7. If a servant is injured by the negligence of a. fellow servant

and that of the master combined, he may recover of the master

for the injury,‘ for the master is at least one of two joint wrong-

doers in such a case, and as such is responsible under rules

heretofore given.

8. As the servant only undertakes to assume the hazards of

his own employment, it-must follow that if the master carries

on another and wholly distinct business, an injury occasioned

by the negligence of a servant in such other business, not being

within the contemplation of the employment, will give ground

for an action under the same circumstances which would render

liable any stranger who might have been the employer of the

negligent servant.

Liability where the Master delegates his Superintendenee.

The foregoing enumeration of eases is sufﬁcient to show that

the master is liable in all eases where the injury has resulted

from his own negligence, and not from any of the customary

risks of the employment.’ But there still remains the very

serious diﬁiculty of determining what, in particular cases, is

7. If a ~:~ervant is injured by the negligence of a fellow servant
and that of the master combined, he may recover of the master
for the injury, 1 for the roaster is at least one of two joint wrongdoers in such a case, and as such is responsible under rules
heretofore given.
8. As the servant only undertakes to assume the hazards of
his own employment, it.must follow that if the master carries
on another and wholly distinct business, an injury occasioned
by the negligence of a servant in such other business, not being
within the contemplation of the employment, wi1l gi\'"e ground
for an action under the same circumstances which would render
liable any stranger who might have been the employer of the
negligent servant.

fairly imputable to the master as a neglect of personal duty, or

on the other hand, is to be regarded as neglect on the part of

one of his subordinates, who, though vested with a special
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authority in the case, and therefore representing the master

N. Y. 521; Patterson o. Pittsburgh,

etc., R. R. Co., '76 Penn. St. 389; S. C.

18 Am. Rep. 412. If in the partic-

ular cusc the business of the master

is entrusted to another, his assurance

must be taken as that of the master

himself, but the assurance of any sub-

ordinate servant could not be so taken.

Fort Wayne, etc., R. R. Co. v. Glider-

slecve, 33 Mich. 133.

1 Pauhneiser 0. Erie R. Co., 84 N. J.

151.

Liability where the Master delegates his Superintendence.
The foregoing enumeration of cases is sufficient to show that
the master is liable in all cases where the injury has resulted
from his own negligence, and not from any of the customary
risks of the employment.• But there still remains the very
serious difficulty of determining what, in particular cases, is
fairly imputable to the master as a neglect of personal duty, or
on the other hand, is to be rc~:u-ded as neglect on the part of
one of his subordinates, who, though vested with a special
authority in the case, and therefore representing the master

' For this general rule the follow-

ing additional cases may be cited:

Roberts '0. Smith, 2 H.& N.2l3; Mel-

lors r. Shaw, 1 Best & S. 437; Ash-

worth v. Stunwix, 3 El. & El. B. 701;

Columbus, etc , R. R. Co. v. Webb, 12

Ohio, (N. s.) 475; O’Donnell 0. Alle-

gheny Valley R. R. Co., 59 Penn. St

239; Johnson 0. Bruuer, 61 Id. 58:

Harrison 1». Central R. R. Co., 31 N.

J. 293; Paulmier 0. Erie R. R. Co.,

34 N. J. 151; Chicago, etc., R R. C0.

v. Harney, 28 Ind, 28; McGlynn 1:.

Brodie, 81 Cal. 376; Chicago, etc., R.

R. Co. o. Jackson 55 Ill. 492; Hud-

dlcston 12. Lowell Machine Shop, 106

Muss. 282. In Flike n. Boston, etc.,

R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 549. a railroad

company was held liable as for its own

negligence for the act of a subordi-

nate in sending out u train insuffi-

ciently supplied with brakemen. But

compare Mad River, etc., R. R. Co.r.

Barber, 5 Ohio, (N. s.) 541; Skipp 0.

Eastern Counties R., 9 Exeh. 223.

— -=wv1;~:.

N. Y. 521; Patterson "· Plttslmrgh,
etc., R. R. Co., 76 Penn. St. 38!1; S. C.
18 Am. Rep. 412. If in the particular case the business of the master
is entrusted to another, his a!lsuruoce
must he taken as that of the ma!lter
himself. but the assurance of any subordinate servant could not be so taken.
Fort Wayne, etc., R. R. Co. "· Gildersleeve, 33 'Mich. 188.
1 Paulmeiser "· Erie R. Co., 84 N. J.
151.
t For this general rule the follow.
ing additional cases may be cited:
Roberts u. Smith, 2 H. & N. 213; ~lel
lors r. Shaw, 1 Best & S. 437; Ashworth 11. Stan wix, 3 El. & El. Q. B. 701;
Columbus, etc, R. R. Uo. "·Webb, 12
Ohio, (N. s.) 475; O'Donnell .,. Aile-

gheny \'alley R. R. Co., 59 Penn. St
239; Johnson "· Bruner, 61 ld. 58:
Harrison tl. Central R. R. Co., 81 N.
J. 293; Paulmier "· Ede H.. R. Co.,
34 N.J. 151; Uhic:1go, etc., R R Co.
"· Hnrney, 28 Ind, 28: :McGlynn t:.
Brodie, 81 Cal. 376; Chicago, etc., R
R. Co. "· Jackson 55 Ill. 492; Hud.
dleston "· Lowell Machine Shop, 106
Mass. 282. In Flike "· Boston, etc.,
R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. fJ40. n railroad
company was held liable as for its own
negligence for the act of a subordinate in sending out o. train insufficiently supplied with brakemen. But
comp;ue lind River, etc., R. R. Co.t-.
Barbt•r, 5 Ohio, (N. s.) 541; Skipp "·
Enstern Counties R., 9 Exch. 223.
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more directly and specially than do servants generally, is still,

561

for all the purposes of the rules so far given, to be looked upon

only as a servant whose negligence is within the ordinary risks

of other servants in the same general employment.

\Ve have seen that in some cases the master is charged with a

duty to those serving him of which he cannot divest himself by

any delegation to others. He is charged with such a duty as

regards the safety of his premises, the snitableness of the tools,

implements, machinery or materials he proeures or employs, and

the servants he engages or makes use of. Whoever is permitted

to exercise the master’s authority in respect to these matters is

charged with the master's duty, and the latter is responsible for

a want of proper caution on the part of the agent, as for his

own personal negligence.‘

But these are not the only cases in which the master is to be

considered as represented by an agent, who for the time being is

charged with his duty. A corporation can only manage its

affairs through ofiicers and agents, and if it is to be held respon-

sible to its servants for negligence in any case, it must be

because some of these are negligent. But whose negligence

shall be imputed to the corporation as the negligence of the

principal itself? Certainly not that of all its oiiicers and agents,
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for this would be to abolish wholly. in its application to the ease

of corporations, a rule alike reasonable and of high importance.

So far as the corporate directors are concerned, no question

can be made that for any such purpose they represent the cor-

poration, and their acts, as a board, are the acts of a principal.

They constitute the highest and most authoritative expression

of corporate volition, and the corporate duties are duties to be

performed by the board. But such a board holds only period-

‘ Ford v. Fitehburg R. R. Co., 110

llass. 240: Wright r. N. Y. Cent. R.

R. Co., 23 N. Y. 562; Laning 1:. N. Y.

Cent. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 521; Chi-

cago, etc., R. R. Co. e. Jackson, 55

lll. 492. “As to acts which a master

or principal is bound as such to per-

form toward his employes, if he del-

egates the performance of them to

an agent, the agent occupies the

place of the master, and the latter

is deemed present and liable for the

manner in which they are perform-

more dir('ctly and specially than do servants generally, is still,
tor all the purposes of the roles so far given, to be looked upon
only as a scn·ant whose negligence is within the ordinary risks
of other ser\·ants in the same general employment.
'Ve have seen that in some cases the master is charged with a
duty to those serving him of which he <.-annot tiivcst himself by
any delegation to others. lie is charged \vith snch a duty as
regards the safety of his premises, the suitableness of the tools,
imp~cmcnts, machinery or materials he procut·.~s or employs, and
the sen·ants he engages or mnkes use of. Whoever is permitted
to exerci:ie the master's authority in respect to these mattct·s is
charged with the master's dnty, and the latter is re~ponsible for
a want of proper caution on the part of the agent, as tor his
own personalnegligcnce. 1
But these are not the only cases in which the master is to be
com~idered as represented by an agent, who filr the time being is
charged with his dnty. A corporation CP.n only manage itB
aff1Lirs through officers and a:.,JOents, and if it is to be held respunsible to its ser\·ants for negli~cnco in any case, it must be·
because some of the~e 11re negligent. Rut whose negligence
shall be imputed to the corporation as the negligence of the
priucipal it~cln Certainly not that of all its officers R.nd R.gcnts,
for tllis would be to abolish wholly. in its application to the case
of corporations, a rnlc alike reasonable and of high importance.
So tar as the corporate directors are concerned, no question
can be made that for any snch purpose they represent the cornorntion,
. . and their acts, as a board, are the nets of a principal.
They constitute the highest and most authoritati\'o expreP.sion
of corporate volition, and the corporat~ duties are duties to be
performed by the board. But such a board holds only period-

ed." (‘orcoran 0. Holbrook, 59 N.

Y. 517, 520, per liaranno, J .; S. C.

17 Am. Rep. 869. This applied to

the case Oi‘ employment of servants

by superintendent. Gormly 1:. Vul-

can Iron Works, 61 Mo. 492; Brah-

bits v. Chicago. etc., R. R Co., R8

Wis. 289. And, see Stoddard u. St.

Louis, etc. R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 514.

36

I

Ford "· Fitch hurg R. R. Co., 110

:"\T Rl-~. 2-!0: Wright r. N. Y. Cent. R.

R. Co., z; N. Y.562; T.aningt~. N.Y.
Cent. R. R. Co., 49 N.Y. 521; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. t'. Jacks,Jn, 55
Ill. 492. ·• As to nets which a ma.c1ter
or principal is hound as such t.o per.
form toward his employes, if he ddl'gates th'.! performance of them to
an ftgent, the agt>nt c!Ccupies the
place of the master, and the latter

36

Is deemed present and liable for the
manner in which they are performed." Corcoran "· Holl)mok, 59 N.
Y. 517, 520, per HAPALLo, J.: S. C.
17 Am. Rep. 869. This npplil'd to
the ci\Se df employment of Sllrvanta
by superintendent. Gormly r. Vul.
can Iron Works, 61 l\lo. 492; Drabbits "· Chicago. etc., R. H. Co, :~s
Wis. 289. And, sec !:'toddnrrl "· St.
Louta, etc. R. R. Co., 6S Mo. 514:.
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ical meetings, and at other times the powers of the corporation

are ‘usually expected to be, and actually are, exercised by some

oﬂieer or general superintendent with large discretionary powers.

Unless such oﬁicer or superintendent is to be considered as occu-

pying, for all the purposes of the rule now under consideration,

the position of the principal itself, it is obvious that there must

be assumed in the case of corporations, and indeed in other cases

where the whole charge of the business is delegated to another,

some risks which the servant does not assume where the master

himself takes general charge in person.

It has been seen that the superior position of the negligent

servant, as that of a foreman, conductor, etc., is not regarded as

affecting the ease. But a foreman is not necessarily, or usually

perhaps, entrusted with any large share of the master’s discre-

tionary authority. Neither is the conductor of a train of cars,

except as to the partidular duty of taking it safely to its desti-

nation. His duty may be and probably is less responsible than

that of the telegraph operator who directs his movements and

those of others in charge of trains on the line; and if the con-

ductor is to be regarded as principal for some purposes, so should

the operator be for others. But this would suggest questions

and distinctions that could only be confusing, and would pre-
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clude the possibility of any settled rule whatsoever. It would

seem that the law could go no further than to hold the corpora-

tion liable for the acts and neglects of the otﬁcer exercising the

powers and authority of general superintendent; but that for

these it ought to respond to its servants, as for its own acts or

neglects. As is said in one case: “ W'hen the servant by whose

negligence or want of skill other servants of the common em-

ployer have received injury is the ‘alter ego’ of the master. to

whom the employer has left everything, then the iniddlem::n's

negligence is the negligence of the employer, for which thc

latter is liable. The servant in such case represents the master,

and is charged with the master’s duty. Wlien the middleman

or superior servant employs and discharges the subalterns, and

the principal withdraws from the management of the business,

or the business is of such a nature that it is necessarily com-

mitted to agents as in the case of corporations, the principal is

liable for the neglects and omissions of the one charged with

the selection of other servants in employing and selecting such

_

ical meetings, and at other times the powers of the corporation
are ·usnally expected to be, and actually are, exercised by some
officer or general superintendent with large discretionary powers.
Unless such officer or superintendent is to be considered as occupying, for all the purposes of the rule now under consideration,
the position of the principal itself; it is obvious that there must
be assumed in the case of corporations, and indeed in other cases
where the whole charge of the business is delegated to another,
some risks which the servaut does not assnrue where the master
himself takes general charge in person.
It has been seen that the superior position of the negligent
servant, as that of a foreman, conductor, etc., is not regarded as
affecting the case. But a foreman is not necessarily, or usually
perhaps, entrusted with any large share of the master's discretionary authority. Neither is the conductor of a train of cars,
ex<.oept as to the particular duty of taking it safely to its destination. His duty may be and probably is less re:;ponsiblo than
that of the telegraph operator who directs his mo\·ements and
those of others in charge of trains on the line; and if the conductor is to be regarded as principal for some purposes, so should
the operator be tor others. Bnt this would suggest questions
and distinctions that conld only be confusing, and would preclude the possibility of any settled rule whatsoever. It would
seem that the law could go no further than to hold the corporation liable for the acts and neglects of the ofikoer exercising the
poJo\'Crs and authority of general superintendent; but that for
these it ought to respond to its servants, as for its own acts or
neglects. As is said in one case: "'Vhen the sen·ant by whose
nf1gligence or want of skill other servants of the commo:' employer have re<.oeh·ed injury is the 'alter ego' of' the mnstcr. to
whom the em}lloyer has left everything, then the middlem;:n"s
negligence is the negligence of the employer, for which the
latter is liable. The servant in such case represent~ the master,
and is charged with the master's duty. When the middleman
or superior servant employs and discharges the snbulterns, aud
the principal withdraws from the management of the business,
or the business is of such a nature that it is neces~arily committed to agents as in the case of corporations, the principal is
liable for the neglects and omissions of the one charged with
the selection of other servants in employing and selecting such
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servants, and in the general conduct of the business committed
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to his care.”' It is the personal duty of the master to see that

suitable servants are employed, that his tools, machinery, etc., are

reasonably safe, or at least, to see that there is no negligence in em-

ploying or procuring them; and the delegate to whom he entrusts

the duty, stands, in respect thereto, in the master’s place.

It is also, as has been shown, the duty of the master not to

send the servant upon dangerous service which he has not

undertaken for; and if he places the servant under the orders

of another who requires him to perform such dangerous service,

whereby he is injured, the wrongful act is properly attributable

to the master himself.’

Contributory Negligence. "Where the master is sued by his

servant for an injury which it is claimed has been occasioned by

his negligence, it is very properly and justly held that the

plaintiff is not to recover if his own negligence contributed with

that of the plaintiff in producing the injury." The rules here

are the same that are applied in other eases of contributory neg-

,

servants, ancl in the general couduct of the business committed
to his care.'' 1 It is the pel"8onal duty of the master to see that
suitable servants are employed, that his tools, machinery, etc., are
reasonably safe, or at least, to see that there is no negligence in employing or procuring them; and the dele;.,'Rte to whom he entrusts
the duty, stands, in respect thereto, in the master's place.
It is ah;o, as has been shown, the duty of the master not to
S('nd the servant upon dang~rous service which he has not
undertaken for; and if he places the St."rvant under the onlNti
of another who requires him to perform ~uch dangerous serdcc,
whereby he is injured, the wrongful act is pro1)erly attributnhle
to th4l master himself.'

ligence; and all that is special in their application springs from

'Am.r:rz. J., in Malone r. Hatha.

way, 64 N. Y. 5, 9; S. C. 21 Am. Rep.

5'73. Where a railroad company gave
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to the foreman in the repair shops

general charge of the repair of switch

engines. and required reports of de-

fects to be made to hiln, and a det'ec-

tivc switch engine was reported ac-

cordingly, but was not attended to,

and a brakcman was injured in con-

ContributoJ7 !fegligenoe. Where the master is sned by his
servant for an injury which it is claimed has heen occasiont.'(l by
his negligence, it is very properly and justly held that the
plaintiff is not to recover if hi& own negligL•nce contributed with
that of the plaintiff in producing the injury.~ The rules here
are the same that are applied in other cat!e:> of contributory negligence; and all that is special in their application sprin~s f'rom

sequence: hzld, that notice to the fore-

man was notice to the company and

his neglect the neglect of the com-

pany. Brahbits v. Chicago, etc., R.

R. Co., 38 Wis. 289. If lhc master

places the entire charge of his busi-

ness, or a distinct branch of it, in the

hands of an agent, exercising no dis-

cretion and no oversight, the neglect

by the agent of ordinary care in sup-

plying proper machinery. is a breach

of duty for which the ll\I\$il'l‘ is lia-

ble. Mullan 0. Philadelphia. etc.. R.

R. Co., 78 Penn. St. 25; S (1. 21 Am.

Rep. 2. See Malone 0. Hathaway, 64

N. Y. 5; S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 573; Hof-

naglc v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co, 55 N.

Y. 608.

’ This ls well shown by Po'r'ri-:n,

J., in Mann o. Oriental Print Works,

11 R. I. 152. And, see Chicago, etc.,

R. R. (Jo. v. Baytield. 87 Mich. 205;

Frandsen v. Chicago, etc., R. R (‘o.,

86 Io\va,372. Comp ire Allen v. New

Gas Co., 1 Exch. Div. 2-31.

‘ Thompson r. Central R. R. Co..-"ii

Geo. 509; Johnson v. Western, etc,

R. R. Co., 55 Geo. 133; Western, etc.,

R. R Co. 1;. Adams. 5-3 Geo. 279; Hay-

den o. Smithville Manuf. Co., 29 (‘onn.

548; Mulhcrrin v. Delaware, etc., R.

R. Un., 81 Penn St. 366; Lyon n. l)e-

troit. etc.. R. R. Co., 31 Mich. 429;

Chicago. etc., R. R. Co. v. Donahue,

75 Ill. 106; Illinois ('ent. R R. Co.o.

Patterson, 69 Ill. 650; Burns v. Bos-

ton, etc., R. R. Co., 101 Mass. 50;

Vicksburgh. etc. R. R. ‘Jo. v. Wil-

kins, 47 Miss. 404.

1 ALI.F.N, J., In ){alone "· Hatha.
way, 64 N. Y. 3, 9: S. C. 21 Am. Rep.
673. Whf're a railroad company gave
to the filreman In the repair shops
general charge of the ~pair of swltch
englnrs, and reqnired reports of de.
fects to be mncle to him, and a dl'fe('tive switch engine WM rt'ported ac.
cordingly, but was no\ attendl'd to,
and a brakeman was injured in conacquenrc: lvld, that notice to the fore.
man was nutlce to the company and
ht. neglect the neglec\ of \he eom.
paoy. Br1thbita fl. Chicago, e\c., R
R. Co., ~ Wis. 28D. If the m:tster
plact>s the entire charge of his business, or a distinct branch of It, In the
haotl!l of an agent, exeJTislng no dis.
cretion and no overaight, the neglect
by the agt•nt of ordinary care in 11up.
plying proper machinery, is a breach
of duty for which the ma!ltPr i11 lia.
ble. Mullan fl. Philadelphia. etc.. R
R. Co., '78 Penn. St. 2.'~: S G. 21 Am.
Rep. 2. Bee Malone •· Hathaway, M

N.Y. 3: S.C. 21 Am. Rep. 373; ll'lf.
nagle "· N. Y. CcnL R R. Co, M Y.

Y.608.
1

This is well shown by Po'M'KR,

J., In Mann"· Orit'ntnl Print Works,
11 R. I. 1:;2. And, lWt• l'blcng••. etc.,
R. R. Co. tl. Bayfield. 3i Mich. 20;;;
Frands~:n fl. Chicago, etc., R. R ('o.•
86 lowa,:J72. Comp 1re Allen"· New
Gus Co., 1 Excb. Div. 2-il.
1 Thomp.;(lD r. Cl!ntral R R. Co.. IH
Geo. ~; Juhn"'nn o. Western, f'IC,
R. R. Co., M Geo. t:J3; Wl>stf'm, Nc.,
R R Co. "· Ad11ms. 5;; Geo. 2iD; lillY·
den 11. 8mithvllle ::Manuf. Co., 29 Conn.
MS; Mulherrln fl. Delaware, t'tc., ll
R. Cu., 81 Peon St. 866; Lyon o. De.
trolt, etc., R R Co., 81 Mich. 429;
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. o. Dnnahne,
76 Ill. 106: llllnois ('ent. R H. Ccl. t.
Patwrson, 69 Ill. GW; Burns"· Bn~
ton, etc., R. R l.'o., IOl M1111~. ~0;
Vlcksbnrgh. etc. R R. fro. 11. WU.
kina. -47 .:Miss. 404.
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the obligation that may, under some circumstances, rest upon

the servant to report dangers to the master. It has often been

held that if a servant sues the master for an injury which has

resulted from a peril which had come to the knowledge of the

plaintiff and ought to have been known to the master, it may

justly be held to be contributory negligence on the plaintiii"s

part if he failed to report it.‘

It may also be remarked that in all.cases where the servant

claims to recover on the ground of the master’s negligence, the

burden of proof will be upon him, not only because as a plain-

tiff he must make out his case, but also because all presumptions

will favor the proper performance of duty.’

General Summary. Perhaps this whole subject may be accu-

rately summed up in a single sentence as follows: The rule that

the master is responsible to persons who are injured by the neg-

the ob1igation that may, under some circumstances, rest upon
the servant to report dangers to the master. It has often been
held that if a servant sues the master for an injury w·hich has
resulted from a peril which had come to the knowledge of the
plaintiff and ought to have been known to the master, it may
justly be held to be contributory negligence on the plain titf 's
part if he failed to report it.'
It may also be remarked that in all. cases where the sen·ant
rlaims to recover on the ground of the master's negligence, the
burden of proof will be upon him, not only because as a plaintiff he must make out his case, but also beCl:luse all presumptions
will favor the proper performance of dutr.•

ligence of those in his service, is subject to this general excep-

tion: that he is not responsible to one person in his employ for

an injury occasioned by the negligence of another in the same

service, unless generally or in respect of the particular duty then
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resting upon the negligent employee, the latter so far occupied

the position of his principal as to render the principal chargeable

for his negligence as for personal fault.

' Ladd 1:. New Bedford, etc., R. R.

Co., 119 Mass. 412; S. C. 20 Am. Rep.

331; LeClair 0. St. Paul, etc., R. R.

Co., 20 Minn. 9; Sullivan v. Louis-

ville Bridge Co., 9 Bush, 81; Patter-

son 'v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R Co., 76

Penn. St. 389 ; S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 412;

Malone 1:. Hawley, 46 Cal. 409; Dil-

General Summary. Perhaps this whole subject may be accn.
rately summed up in a single sentence as follows: The rule that
the master is respon::;ible to persons who are injured by the negligence of those in his service, is snqicct to this general exception: that he is not responsible to one p~1·;;on in his employ for
an injury occasioned by the negligence of another in the same
service, unless generally or in respect of tl1e particular duty then
resting upon the negli~ent employee, the latter so far occupied
the position of his principal as to render the principal chargeable
for his negligence as for personal fault.

ion 1:. Union Paciﬁc R. R. Co., 3 Dill.

319; Bclair '0. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.,

43 Iowa. 662; Davis 0. Detroit, etc., R.

R. Co., 20 Mich. 105; Mad River, etc.,

R. R. Co. v. Barber. 5 Ohio, (N. s.)

541; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Britz,72 Ill. 256. It has been held

that an instruction that a railroad

company would not be liable not-

withstanding the unsafe condition of

the track if plaintitl, a servant, knew,

or could by ordinary diligence have

known, the state of the track.was

properly refused. That it was not

the business of the servant to ascer-

tain whether the machinery and

structure of the road are defective;

but that the duty of the company is

to keep them in a safe condition, and

it is responsible for a failure to do

so. Porter o. Hannibal. etc., R. R.

Co., 60 Mo. 160. But if the servant

has full knowledge and makes no

report or objection, he takes the

risks. Kroy 0. Chicago, etc., R. R.

Co., 32 Iowa, 357; McGlynn 1:. Bro-

die, 31 ‘Bel. 376.

" Sec Gilman n. Eastern R. R. Co.,

10 Allen 233; Wriglit v. N. Y. Cen.

tral R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 562: [Iii le.

brand 0. Toledo, etc., R. R. Co, 47

Ind. 399.

ZI

• Ladd "'·New Bedford, etc., R. R
Co., 119 Mass. 412; S.C. 20 Am. Rep.
li31; LeClair e. St. Paul, etc., R. R
Co., 20 Minn. 9; Sullivan "· Louisville Bridg-e Co., 9 Bush, 81; Pullerson r. Pittsburgh, etc .• R. R Co., 70
Penn. St. 389 ; S.C. 18 Am. Rep. 412;
:Malone v. Hawley, 46 Cal. 409; Dil.
Ion r. Cninn Pacific R. R. Co., 3 Dill.
3HI; Belair v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co ..
43 Iowa, 662; Davis"· Detroit, etc., R.
R. Co., 20 llich.lO.'l; Mad River, etc.,
R. R. Co. "'· Barber. 5 Ohio, (N. s.)
ii41: St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Britz, 72 Ill. 256. It has been held
that an Instruction that a railroad
company would not be liable notwithstll.nding the unsafe condition of
the track if plaintiff, a servant, knew,
or could by ordinary diligence have

known, the state of the track, was
properly refused. That it was not
the business of the scn·~~.nt to ascer.
tain whether the mnchinery and
sh·ucture of the road are defective;
but that the duty of th~: company is
to keep them in a safe condition, and
it is responsible for a failure to do
so. Porter v. Hannibal, etc., R. R.
Co., 60 }lo. 160. But if the servant
has full knowledge and makes no
report or objection, he takes the
risks. Kroy "· Chirago, etc., R H.
Co., 32 Iowa, 337; licGlynn "· Bro.
die, 31 0al. 376.
• Sec Gilman "· Eastern R. R Vo.,
10 Allen 233; Wright u. N.Y. Cen.
tral H. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 562: Hil !e.
branfl "· Toledo, etc., R. R. e,,, 47
Ind. 300.
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In the Commentaries of Mr. Justice BLACKSTONE a. nuisance is

deﬁned as being anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the

lands, tenements or hereditaments of another.‘ By lmrt or

annoyance here is meant, not a physical injury necessarily, but

an injury to the owner or possessor thereof, as respects his deal-

ing with, possessing or enjoying them. Strictly construed the

deﬁnition would include those injuries done by the direct applica-

tion of force, and which are known in the law as trespasses; but

tlu-so were not meant to be embraced. although some of them

CHAPTER XIX.

may be treated either as trespasses or nuisances, at the option of

the party injured. For example, to keep a vicious animal after

notice of his vicious propensity, is to maintain a nuisance;‘ but

NUISANCES.

when the vicious beast attacks and injures an individual, the

party injured may treat this violence as the unlawful violence of

the owner and bring suit in trespass.’

It should be observed also that a nuisance which will support

a private action may consist in such interference with a public

easement or with any other public right as specially annoys or

injures an individual; such, for instance, as the blocking up

of a public way of any sort when one is endeavoring to make
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use of it. In these cases the public nuisance becomes a private

nuisance also, and any suﬁicient deﬁnition must include cases of

this nature. An actionable nuisance may, therefore, be said to

be anything wrongfully done or permitted which injures or

annoys another in the enjoyment of his legal rights.

' 3 Bl. Com. 215. ' Van Leuven 0. Lyke, 1 N. Y. 515.

’ Brown 0. Hoburger, 52 Barb. 15; 516; Wales 0. Ford. 8 N. J. 267;

Mihnun 1:. Shockley, 1 Houst. 444; Dolph v. Ferris, 7 W. & S. 867; Morse

M1-ihus r. Dodge, 88 Wis. 300; S. C. o. Nixon, 6 Jones, (N. C.) 293; Cogg~s-

20 Am. Rep. 6. well v. Baldwin, 15 Vt. 404..

In the Commentaries of Mr. Justice BucK!ITONE a nuisance is
defined as being anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the
lnnds, tenements or hereditaments of anoti.er.' By hurt or
annoyance here is meant, not a physical injury necessarily, but
an injury to the owner or JlOssessor thereof: RS respects his dealing with, pos~t>~sing or enjoying- them. Strictly construed the
(h•finitiou would include those injuries done by the direct application of fot·cc, and which are known in the law as trespasses; but
tlw:oe were not meant to be embraced, although sonl'e of them
may be treated either as trespa&scs or nuisances, at the option of
the party injured. For example, to keep a vicious animal after
notiec of his vicious propensity, is to maintain a nuisance;' but
when the \·icious beast attacks and injures an individual, the
party injm·ed may treat this violence as the unlawful \'iolenee of
the owner and bring suit in treP~pass.•
It should be observed also that a nuisance which will support
a private action may consist in such interference with a puhlic
eal'elllent or with any other public right as specially annoys or
injures an individual; such, tor instance, as the blocking up
of a public way of any sort when one is endeavoring to make
use of it. In these cases the public nuisance becomes a pri\·atc
nuitmnec also, and any sufficient definition must include cases of
this nature. An actionable nuisauec may, therefore, be said to
be anything wrongfully done or permitted which InJUres or
annoys another in the enjoyment of his legal rights.
1

8 Bl. Com. 215.

'Brown "· Hoburger, 52 Barb. 15;
Milnum "· ~hockley, 1 Hnnst. 444;
Mt•ibus r. Dodge, 88 Wis. 300; B. C.
20 Am. Rep. 6.

Vnn Leuven "· Lyke, 1 N. Y. 15t:S,
1516; Willes "· Ford, 8 N. J. 267;
Dolph v. l.t"'erris, 7 W. & B. 867; Morse
"· N 1xon, 6 Jones, (N. C.) 298; Coggswcll1). Baldwin, 115 VL 404.
1
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Annoyances without Fault. As the deﬁnition assumes the
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existence of wrong, those things which may be annoying and

damaging, but for which no one is in fault, are not to he deemed

nuisances, though all the ordinary consequences of nuisances

may ﬂow from them. For example, the swamps and marshes

that, from their exhalations, prove injurious to the health of

those living near them, are not nuisances provided they exist

only as they were by nature, and the hand of man has done

nothing to increase them or vary their deleterioliseﬁbcts. X0

authority in the State to compel their owners to abate them by

drainage is recognized, though the State may doubtless assume

the duty and provide for it by special levies.‘ But the moment

anything is done by the owner upon or in respect to the lauds

which increases the deleterious eﬁects, or sensibly renders his

lands offensive in a new or different way, he becomes responsible.

There is then a nuisance on his own land, which exists by his

wrong, and it is his duty to abate it.’

Classiﬁcation of Nuisances. Recurring to the deﬁnition of a

nuisance it will be perceived that it must embrace a very large

proportion of those injuries that are c0'nmonly redressed in

special actions on the case. A 1 attempt to classify nuisances is,

therefore, almost equivalent to an attempt to classify the inﬁnite
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variety of ways in which one may be annoyed or impeded in the

enjoyment of his rights. It is very seldom, indeed, that even a

deﬁnition of a nuisance has been attempted, for the reason that,

to make it suﬁiciently comprehensive. it is necessary to make it

Annoyances without Fault. As the definition a!;snmC's tl1e
existence of wron~, those things which may be annoying and
damaging, but for which no one is in fitnlt, ate not to he deemc1l
nui~auces, thongh all the ordinar·y consequences of nuisances
may flow from them. For example, the swamps and marshes
that, t'1·om their exhalations, prove injurious to the health <•f
thoi'c living near them, are not nnh;ances provided they exist
only as they were by nature, and the hand of man has done
nothing to increase them or val'.)' their deleterion!t effects. X o
authority in the State to compel their owucr8 to abate them by
drainage is recognized, though the State may donbtlc8s assume
the duty and pro\'ide for it by special levies.' But the momeut
anything is done by the owner upon or in respect to the lauds
which increases the deleterious eff(~cts, or sensibly renders his
lands offensive in a new Ol' different way, he becomes responsible.
There is then a nuisance on his own land, which exists by his
wrong, and it is his duty to abate it.2

so general it is likely to deﬁne nothing. .A classiﬁcation would

be equally diﬂicult. because it must either be greatly extended

or it must omit many 02.585. Indeed, new and peculiar cases are

arising constantly. In this brief summary of the law of nui-

‘ See Reeves '0. Treasurer, etc., 8

Ohio, (N. s.) 333. and cases collected

in Cooley on Taxation, pp. 510-511.

When. ho\vever, the right of the State

to make special levies on the owners

for drainage is recognized, it would

seem to be gOi|1g hut a step further to

compel them to drain by way of abat-

ing a nuisance. But the one step is

nevertheless u doubtful step. -

\

* See Woodruif 1-. Fisher, 17 Barb.

224; Hartwell 1-. Armstrong. 19 Barb.

166. The obstruction of u running

stream occasioned by the washing

Classiftoation of Nuisances. Rectll'ring to the ddi.nition of a
nuisance it will be perceived that it must embraee a very lar6"e
proportion of those injuries that are co•nnwnly redressed in
speeial actions on the case. A 1 attempt to classi(r nuisancc8 is,
the1·etore, almust equh·alent to an attempt to cla:-~si(y the infinite
variety of ways in which one may be annoyed Ol' impeded in the
enjoyment of his rights. It is w·ry seldom, indeed, that even a
definition of a nuisance has been attempted, for the l'east•n that,
to make it sufficiently compl·ehensi,·e. it is necessary to 111ake it
so general it is likely to define nothiug. .A classification would
be eqna.lly difficult, because it must either be gl'eatl,v extended
or it must omit maii,Y Ci.I"CS. IndeL•d, new and peculiar cases are
ari!:!ing constantly. In this brief snmma1·y of the law of nui-

down of its banks does not, in law,

constitute a nuisance, unless the ob-

struetion is attributable to the acts or

agency of man. Mohr v. Gault, 10

Wis. 513.

_ -I

1 Sec Reeves '~'· Treru:urer, etc., 8
Ohio, (N. s.) a:m. and Cll!'es collected
in Cooley on Taxation, pp. 510-511.
WhPn. howc\'er, tlw right of the State
to m:1ke ~pccial levies on the ow1wrs
for drainage is recognized, it would
seem to be going hut 11 step further to
compel them to drain by way of abating a nuisance. But the one step is
ncn~rthclcss 11. doubtful step.

'

1 See Woodruff r. Fisher, 17 Barb.
224; Hartwell t. Armstrong. 19 Barb.
166. The obstruction of u. running
stream occasioned by the washin;;
down of its banks uoes not, in lnw,
t•onstitutc a nuisance, unless the ob.
struction is attributable to the !lets or
n~(·ncy of man.
llohr D. Gault, 10
Wis. 513.

NUISANCES. 567

NUISANCES.

sauce a few of the most important will be noticed, and the
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principles applicable to them may be applied generally.

Nuisances which injure the Realty. Of these some may

cause only a technical injury, but if they interfere with the

enjoyment in its entirety of any distinct legal right, such inter-

sanre a fe\v of the most important will he noticccl, and the
principles applicable to them may be applied generally.

ference is sutiicient to make them actionable. Thus, if any part

of one's building, though it be only an upper bay window or

some similar projection above the ground, extends over the

nei_-_rhhor’s line, this is a nuisance, even though no damage is

suﬁ'ei-ed or even anticipated from it, for it constitutes an intru-

sion on the owner’s freehold in its extension upwards.‘ So it is a

nuisance if the branches of one’s trees extend over the premises

of another, and the latter may abate it by sawing them off.’ The

same rule applies here as in trespass; the insigniﬁcance of the

injury goes to the extent of the recovery and not to the right of

action. More serious cases are mentioned below.’

Filthy Pereolations. It is said in an early case that where

one has ﬁlthy deposits on his premises, he whose dirt it is must

keep it that it may not trespass.‘ Therefore, if ﬁlthy matter

from a privy or other place of deposit percolates through the

soil of the adjacent premises, or breaks through into the neigh-

bor’s cellar, or ﬁnds its way into his well, this is a nuisance.‘
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‘Meyer o. Metzler, 51 Cal. 142;

Codman u. Evans, 5 Allen, 308; Cherry

o. Sn-in, 11 Md. 1; $k.nner v. Wilder,

Nuisances which injure the Realty. Ot' these some may
cause only a technical injury, but if the}· interfe1-e with the
enjoyment in its entirety of any distinct legal right, such interfel-euce is 8ufficient to make them actionahlc. Thus, if any part
of one's building-, though it be only an upper bay window or
some similar projection above the ~mnnd, extends over the
nei;.!hbor's line, this is a nuisance, even though no dama,..,ooe is
sutlered or even anticipated from it, for it constitutes an intrusion on the owner's freehold in its e.xtemion upwards.' So it is a
nuisance it' the branches of one's tree~ rxtend over the pr.•m ises
of another, and the latter may abate it by tmwin~ tlu.•m off.' The
same rule applies here as in trespnt"to.; the insignificance of the
injury goes to the extent of the reco\·e•·y and not to the right of
action. 1\Iore serious cases are mentioned below.'

38 Vt. 115; Grove 12. Fort Wayne, 45

Ind. 429; S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 262.

° Earl oi‘ Lonsdale 0. Nelson. 2 B.

8: C. 302, 311. There is a dispute eon-

eerning the ownership of trees on the

line of adjoining estates, or so near

them as to draw sustenance from

both. 'I‘he rule, however, seems to be

that if the tree is on the line, it is

owned in common by the two. Du-

It is said in an early case that where
one has filthy depot"its on his premisl's, he whose dirt. it is must
keep it that it may not trcspa!'s.• Therefore, if tilth)· matter
from a privy or other place of deposit percolates through the
soil of the adjacent premi~es, or breaks through into the neighbor's cellar, or finds its way into his well, this is a nuisance.•
Filthy Percolations.

bois 0. Beaver, 25 N. Y. 123; Lyman

0. Hale, 11 Conn. 177. If it stands

on one side the line, it is owned, with

its fruits, by the proprietor on that

side. Masters r. Pollie, 2 Roll. R.

141; Holder e. (Joules, 1 Mood. & M.

112; Waterman o. Soper, 1 Ld. Raym.

737. But, see, as to this, Gritﬂn 0.

Bixby, 12 N. H. 454.

‘For a ease of a cooking range

held to be a nuisance to the occupant

on the other side the partition wall,

see Grady v. Wolsuer, 46 Ala. 381.

‘Tenant v. Goldwin, 1 Salk. 360;

S. Q 6 Mod. 311.

"Tenant r. Goldwin, 1 Salk. 360;

Ball 0. Nye, 99 Mass 582; Columbus

Gas (Jo. v. Freeland, 12 Ohio, (K s.)

392; St. [lelens Clieinical Co. r. St.

Ilelens, L. R. 1 Exch. Div. 196; Mar-

shall v. Cohen, 44 Geo. 489; S. C. 9

Am. Rep. 170; Pottstown Gas Co. 0.

Murphy, 39 Penn. St. 257; Tate v.

Parrish. '7 T. B. Mon. 825; Greene 0.

Nunnemacher, 38 Wis. 50.

1 Mryer "· Mrtzler, 51 Cal. 142;
Cod man"· Evans, 5 Allen, 808; Cherry
"· l5tt'i n, 11 Md. 1 ; Sk .nner "· Wildl'r,
38 Vt. 115; Grove ~. Fort Wayne, 45
Ind. 429; S. C. 1.5 Am. Rep. 262.
g Enrl of Lonsdale "· X rison, 2 B.
& C. a02. 311. There is a dispute ('(JO.
cerning the ownership of trees on the
line of adjoining estates, or so near
them as to dmw sustenance from
both. The ruiP, however, seems to be
Utat if the tree is on the line, it is
nwned in common by the two. Dubois "· Beaver, 25 N. Y. 123: Lyman
"· Hair, 11 Conn. 177. If It stand!'
on one side the line, it is ownell, with
its fruits, by the proprietor on that
side. Masters r. Pollie, 2 Roll. R.
141; Holdor "· Coutes, 1 Mood. & M.

112; Waterman"· Soper, I Ld. Rnym.
737. But., sc(•, ns to this, Gri1Hn "·
Bixby, 12 N. H. 454.
3 For n case of a cooking range
hchl to be a nuisllncc to the occupunt
on the othPr side tlw partition wall,
see Grady ~. Wolsner, 46 .\.Ia. 381.
4 Tenant "· Goldwin, 1 Balk. 860;
B. Q 6 .Mod. 811.
6 T1•nant r. Goldwin, 1 Salk. 360;
Ball "· NyP, D9 1\lass 582; Columbus
Gns Co. r. Freeland, 12 Ohio, (N !1.)
802; St Helens l'hcmicnl Co. r. Ht.
Helens, L. R 1 E:cch. Div. 196; liar.
shl\11 "· Cohen, 44 Gt'o. 4~0; 8. C. 9
Am. Rep. 170; Pottstown Gas Co. "·
Murphy, 89 Penn. St. 2;)7; Tnte "·
Pnrrish, 7 T. B. Mon. 82.'>; Greene e.
Nnnnemacbcr, 36 Wis. 50.
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Nor where this is the natural result of the deposit is the ques-
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tion of liability one depending on degrees of care to prevent it.

Says F OSTER, J .: “ To suffer ﬁlthy water from a vault to percolate

or ﬁlter through the soil into the land of a contiguous proprietor,

to the injury of his well or cellar, where it is done habitually

and within the knowledge of the party who maintains the vault,

whether it passes above ground or below, is of itself an actiona-

ble tort. Under such circumstances the reasonable precaution

which the law requires, is effectually to exclude the ﬁlth from

the neighbor’s land; and not to do so is of itself negligence.”

Only sudden and unavoidable accident, which could not have

been foreseen by due care could be an excuse in such a case.‘

Injury to realty by percolating waters. The soil of a man's

estate may be rendered cold and unproductive, or the walls of

his buildings weakened, or made damp and unhealthy, and in

various other ways his property injured for use or occupation

by the percolation of waters beneath the surface, caused by some

wrongful act of another. The wrongful act may, perhaps, be

Nor where this is the natural result of the deposit is the question of liability one depending on degrees of care to prevent it.
Says FosTER, J.: "To suffer filthy water from a vault to percolate
or filter through the soil into the land of a contiguous proprietor,
to the injury of his well or <:ellar, where it is done habitually
and within the knowledge of the party who maintains the van!t,
whether it pa::~ses above ground or below, is of itself an actionable tort. Under such circnmstanees the rea~>onahle precaution
which the law requires, is effectually to exclude the filth from
the neighbor's land; and not to do so is of itself negligence."
Only ~:~udden aud unavoidable accident, which could not have
been foreseen by due care could be an excuse in such a case!

throwing waters from one’s roof so near the boundary line that

they must escape upon the adjacent premises;’ or gathering

water in reservoirs not suﬁiciently protected against such eon-

sequence;’ or damming up the stream below and thus compel-
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ling the water to assume a higher level. In the ﬁrst two of

these cases, the question may be one of negligence; in the third

the only question is one of fact. If the water is so raised that

by percolation the land of another is injured, the party raising

it is responsible, not because he has unreasonably, negligently,

intentionally or unexpectedly ﬂowed the land of another for

his own beneﬁt, but because he has done it in fact.‘ The right

of one to be secure against the undermining of his buildings b_v

water, or the destruction of his crops, or the poisoning of the

air by the stealthyiattaelts of an unseen element, is as complete

as his right to he protected against open personal assaults or the

1 Ball u. Nye, 99 Mass. 582; Hodg- ‘ PEcKn.\M.J,, in Pixley v. Clark, 35

kinson 1:. Ennor, 4 Best & S. 229. N. Y. 520, -331. See Gray 0. Harris,

’ Bellows ‘I7. Sackett, 15 Barb. 96; 107 Mass. 492; Shipley v. Fifty As-

Underwood o.Waldrou,33 Mich.232. sociates, 106 Mass. 194; Brown 0.

5M0nsm1, etc., Co. 1~. Fuller, 15 Boweu,30 N. Y. 519; Fuller 0. Chico-

Pick. 554; Wilson v. New Bedford, pee Manuf. C0. 16 Gray, 46.

108 Mass. 261.

a ——4.1!9‘Qﬂ

Injury to realty by percolating waters.

The soil of a man ·s
estate may be rendered cold and unproductive, or the walls of
his buildin~ weakened, or made damp and unhealthy, and in
various other ways his p1·ope1·ty injnred for use or o-.·cnpation
by the pereolation of waters beneath the smface, caused by some
wrongful act of another. The wrongful act may, perhaps, be
throwing waters from one's roof so near the boundary line that
they must escape upon the adjacent premises; • or gathe1·ing
water in reservoirs not sufficiently protected against such consequence; • or damming up the stream below and thus eornpelling the water to asRnme a higher level. In the first two of
these cases, the question may be one of negligeuce; in the third
the only question is one of tiwt. If the water is so raised that
by percolation the land of another is injured, the party raising
it is responsible, not because he has unreasonably, negligently,
intentionally or unexpectedly flowed the land of another tor
his own benefit, but because he has done it in tact. 4 The right
of one to be secure againiit the undermining of his Luilding8 by
water, or the destrnetion of his crops, or the poisoning of the
air by the stealthy· attacks of an unseen element., is as eomplete
as his right to he protected against open personal assaults or the
1 Ball "· Nyc, 99 Mass. 582: Hodgkinson "· Ennor, 4 Best & S. 229.
' Bellows "· Sackett, 15 Bnrb. 96;
Underwood "· Wahlron, 33 :Mich. 232.
' Monson, etc., Co. r. Fuller, 15
Pick. 554; Wilson v. New Bedford,

108 !lass. 261.

• PECKR.-\X, J., in Pixley"· Clark, 35
N.Y. 520, .531. See Grlly "· Harris,
107 Mass. 492; Shipley "· Fifty As.
sociates, 106 Mass. 194; Brown "·
Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519; Full<>r "·Chicopee Manuf. Co. 16 Gruy, 46.
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more demonstrative, but not more destructive, trespasses of
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animals.‘ ,

Deposits upon Land. For one without license to step upon

another-‘s estate has been seen to be a trespass; for one to do any

act oﬁ' the estate which shall cause anything to be carried or

more demonstrative, but not more destructive, trespasses of
animuls.'

thrown upon it, is a nuisance. It is, therefore, a nuisance if the

highway authorities shall open drains by the side of the roads

which must and do carry earth and other materials and deposit

them upon adjacent lands.’ Their liability here rests upon the

same ground as that of any other persons committing a like

nuisance; indeed. it is because in what they do they exceed their

authority as oﬁicers and lose the oiiicial protection, that they

become liable at all. So it is a nuisance if a riparian proprietor

shall east into the stream earth, sand. the refuse of his business,

or other things, which by the ﬂowing water are carried and

deposited upon the land of a proprietor below. The tort here

consists in the act of committing the rubbish to the stream; the

deposit upon the land below is only the consequence from which

a. cause of action in favor ofa particular individual arises.“ Such

an occupation of the land is a taking of property as much as

would be an actual pe/Zia possvsﬂo, and an exclusion of the

owner altogether.‘ And it is immaterial where on the plaintiﬁ“s
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land the deposit is made, whether under water, or, in times of

ﬂood, upon land usually dry; it is enough that the plaintiﬁ"s

land is to some extent occupied by that which, by the wrongful

act of another, is placed there.‘

' See Tlroder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. Div.

692; S. (‘. 17 Monk, 693; Cooper 0.

Barber, 3 Tnunt. 99; Smith 9. Ken-

rick, 7 C. B. 515.

"Pumpelly 0. Green Bay Co., 13

Wall. 166; Xevins v. Peoria, 41 Ill.

502; Aurora v. Gillelt, 56 lll. 132;

Aurora e. Reed. 57 lll. 30; Alton n.

Hope, 6-3 Ill. 167; Jacksonville 0.

Lambert, 62 Ill. 519; Petﬁgrew 0.

Evansville, 25 Wis. 223; Moran 0.

Mc(?le:\rns, 63 Barb. 1-*5. See Mosier

v. Vincent, 34 Iowa. -178. 494; Marvin

Deposits upon Land. For one without license to step upon
another's estate has been seen to be a trespass; for one to do any
act ott' the e~tate which shall cause anything to be carried or
thrown upon it, is a nui~ance. 1t is, therelo•·e, a nuisance if the
highway anthoritie5 shall open drains by the side of the roads
which must and do carry earth and other materials and deposit
them upon adjacent lands.~ Their liability here ret;ts upon the
same ground as that of any other per5ons committing a like
nuisance; indeed, it is because in what they do they ex<..'Cf!d their
authority as officers and lose the official protection, that they
Leeome liable at all. So it is a nuisance it' a riparian proprietor
shall cast into the stream eal'th, sand. the refuse of his business,
or other things, which by the flowing water are carried and
depo~>iteJ upon the land of a pl'Oprietor below. The tort here
consists in the act of committing the rubbish to the stream; the
depo5it upon the land below· is oul.v the consequence from whh·h
a cause of action in favor of a particular intli vidual arises. • Such
an occupation of the land is a takin~ of property as much as
would he an actual pedis poslu'sxio, and an exclusion of the
owne1· nltog-ether.• And it is immaterial where on tho plaintiff's
land the deposit is made. whether nndet· water, or, in time~ of
flood, upon land usuallj dry; it is Cllttllgh that the plRintiff's
land is to some extent occnpieu by that which, by the wrongful
act of another, is placed there. •

v. Pardee, 64 Barb. 3511; Rowe v.

Portsmouth, 56 N. H. 291; S. C. 22

Am. Rep. 46-L, Adams u. Richardson,

43 N. H. 212; Walllron 0. Berry, 51

N. II. 136; Proprietors, etc., 1' Lowell,

7 Gray, 223; Woodward v. Worcester,

121 Mass. 215; Ashley v. Port Huron,

35 .\lich. 296; S. C. 20 .-\m. Rep. 623 /4.;

Rochester White Lead Co. 0. Roches-

ter. 3 N. Y. 463.

‘ Little Schuylkill, etc., Co. v. Rich-

ards, 57 Penn. St. 142, 146.

‘ Mll.1.l-ZR,-1., in Pumpelly r. Green

Bay C0.,15 “hill. 166, I77; Eaton 0.

Boston, etc., R. R. (‘0., 51 N. II. 501.

5 Little Schuylkill, etc., Co r. Rich-

ards, 57 Penn. St. 142, H6; Robinson

0. Black, etc., Co.. 50 Cal. 400.

St•e llroch·r 1l. Snillard, 2 Ch. Div.
~. l'. 17 :Monk, 003; Coopl'r ~.
B1ubcr, a T1mnt. 99; Smith e. Kl'D·
rick, 7 C. B. 515.
'Pumpclly D. Gret'n Bay Co., 18
WalL 161); Xcvins v. Peoria, 41 Ill.
502; Aurora fl. Gillt•lt, 56 Ill. 1~2;
Aurora ~. Reed. u7 Ill. 30; Alton "·
Hope, 68 Ill. 167; Jacksonville "·
Lambert, 02 Ill. 519; Pctt'grew "·
EvKnsvillc, 25 Wi~. 223; ~loran ~
llcCiearus, 63 lbrb. 1:-5. Bee }Iosier
"· Vinl·cnt, :H Iowa. 478, 494; Marvin
tJ. Pllrllct~. 64 Barb. 35:!; Rowe r.
Portsmouth, 5G N. H. 291; S. C. 22
Am. Rep. 464, Adams "· Richardson,
1

6!12;

-4:1 N. II. 212; Wal•lron tJ. Berry, 51
N. II. 136; ProJlrietors, etc., r. Lowell,
7 Grny, 223; Woodwnrd r. \Vorc'l'lltcr,
121 llllss. 2-w; Ashley"· Port Hurtm,
85 ~I ich. 2!)fi; S. C. 20 Am. Hcp. 628 n.;
Rochester White Le:&d Co. "· Rochester. 3 'X. Y. 46:1.
• LittiP Schuylkill, ek, Co. "·Richants, !17 Pt.'nn. St. 142, 146.
':nu.u:n, J., in PnmJlelly r. Green
Bny Co.. t.'j Wall. HI(), 177; Eaton "·
Boston, C'tc., R. R. Co., al N. II. itOl.
6 Littl1~ 8chu)'lki11, etc., Co r. Hicllanl~, ;;7 Penn. St. 142, HO; Hobinson
e ..HIBCk, etc., Co., 50 Cal. 400.
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Leakage from Water Pipes, ate. Where one is lawfully
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making use of water pipes upon his own premises, or in pursu-

ance 0t' a license or easement on the lands of another, if injuries

are caused by the bursting of the pipes, or by leakage from

other cause, the question of liability is dependent upon the

observance or neglect of care. If the proprietor of the pipes is

guilty of negligence, which causes the leakage, or fails to observe

due care in protecting against it, he is responsible, otherwise not.‘

Injuries by the Bursting of Reservoirs. It is lawful to gather

water on one’s premises for useful and ornamental purposes, sub-

ject to the obligation to construct reservoirs with suﬁicient

strength to retain the water under all contingencies which can

reasonably be anticipated, and afterwards to preserve and guard

Leakage from Water Pipes, eto. Where one is lawfully
making use of water pipes upon his own premibes, or in pn~u
ance of a license or easement on the lands of another, if iujnries
arc cau:;ed by the bursting of the pipes, or by leakage from
other cause, the question of liability is dependent upon the
observan<.oe or neglect of care. If the proprietor of the pi pes is
guilty of negligence, which causes the leakage, or f:\i!s to observe
due care in protecting against it, he is responsible, otherwise not. 1

it with due care. For any negligence, either in construction or

in subsequent attention, from which injury results, parties main-

taining such reservoirs must be responsible.‘ We say nothing

now of injuries arising from the ﬂooding of lauds by reservoirs,

which, by raising the water, must and do have that eilbct, but

conﬁning our attention to the case of reservoirs which cause

injuries to the lower proprietors only as they break away, the

American decisions seem to plant the liability on the ground of

negligence, and the party constructing or maintaining the reser-
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voir is held liable, not at all events, but as he might be if he had

negligently constructed a honsd‘/which fell down, or invited

another into a dangerous place, without warning. How far the

English doctrine is different may be learned from certain recent

cases. In the leading case of R_:/lands v.1"Zc!¢-/oer it was held

that the party maintaining a reservoir of water, which injures

another by breaking away, in consequence of original defects, of

which he was ignorant, is responsible for the injury, though

chargeable with no negligence. Says Mr. Justice BLACKBURN,

' Carstairs 1:. Taylor, L. R. 6 Exch.

217; Blyth v. Proprietors, etc., 11

Exch. 781; Ortmayer o. Johnson, 45

Ill. 469; Killion 0. Power, 51 Penn.

St. 429; Moore v. Goede], 7 Bosw. 591;

S. C. 34 N. Y. 527.

’ New Y--rk 1:. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433;

Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520; Mon-

son Manuf. Co. 0. Fuller, 15 Pick.

554; Wendell 0. Pratt, 12 Allen, 461;

Fuller v. Chicnpee Manuf. Co., 16

Gray, 46; Wilson 1». New Bcdforil,

108 Mass. 261; Ipswich v. County

Commissioners, 108 Mass. 363; China

0. Soulhwick, 12 Me. 233; Lnpham -v.

Injuries by the Bursting of Reservoirs. It is lawful to gather
water on one's premises for nsefnl and ornamental purposes, subject to the obligation to construct reser\·oirs with sufficient
strength to retain the water onder all contingencies which can
rea~onahly be anticip:~.ted, and afterwat·ds to preset·ve and guard
it with due care. For any ne,;ligcnee, either in constrnetion or
in subsequent attention, ft·om which injury results, parties maint.'lining such reservoirs must be respont'ible.• We say nothing
now of injuries arising from the flooding of lauds by rcsen·oirs,
which, by raising the water, mnst and do l1ave that e(f,·ct, but
confining our attention to the case of reservoirs whieh cause
injuries to the lowe•· prup1·ietors only as they break away, the
American deci,;ions seem to plant the lia.hility on the ground of
nPgligence, and the party constl'llcting or maintaining the re..;ervoir is held liable, not at all C\'ents, hut as he might be if he had
negligently constl'llcted a hous~which fell down, or invited
another into a dangerous place, without waming. ~ow fi1.r the
Eng-li~h doctrine is different may be learned from certain recent
ca,;es. In the leading case of Rylands v. .Fletd1er it was held
that the party maintaining a reservoir of water, which injnres
another by breaking away, in consequence of' original Jefects, of
which he was ignorant, is responsible for the injury, thongh
chat·geable with no negligence. Says Mr. Justice BLACKUl:RN,

Curtis, 5 Vt 371; Everett v. Hydraulic

Co., 26 Cal. 225.

_-mm

1 CarstR.irs "· Taylor, IJ. R. 6 Exch.
217; Blyth "· Proprietors, t>tc., 11
Exch. 781; Ortmayer "· Johnson, 45
Ill. 4t:l9; Killion "· Power, 51 Penn.
St. -121); ~Ionre "· Goellel, 7 Bosw. 591;
B. C. 34 N . Y. 527.
il New Y"rk v. B:tiley, 2 Denio, 438;
Pixley "· Clark, 35 N. Y. 520; Mon.
son 'Manuf. Co. •· Fuller, 15 Pick.

51i4; Wendell "· Pratt, 12 Allen, 46l;
Fuller "· Chicopee 1\lanuf. Co., 16
Gray, 46; Wilson "· N<'w B!'dford,
108 :Mass. 261; Ipswich "· County
Commissioner~, 108 ~Ia"" · 36:3; China
"· Southwick, 12 lie. 2:1~; Lapham 1).
Curtis, 5 Vt 371 ; Evllrt:tt 1l.llydraulic
Co., 26 Cal. 22.>.
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with the approval of the House of Lords, “We think that the
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true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes,

brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anythinglikely to

do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he

does not do so, is prima fucie answerable for all the damage

which is the natural consequence of its escape. IIe can excuse

himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiﬁ"s

default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vie

major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort exists here,

it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be snﬂicient. The

general rule, as above stated, seems on prineiplejust. The per-

son whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of

his neighbor, or whose mine is ﬂooded by the water from his

neighbor’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the ﬁlth from

his neighbor’s privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by

the fumes and noisome vapors of his neighbor's alkali works, is

damniﬁed without any fault of his own; and it seems but rea-

sonable and just that the neighbor who has brought something

on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to

others, so long as it is conﬁned to his own property, but which he

knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor’s, should be

obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not
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succeed in conﬁning it to his own property. But for his bringing

it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that

he should, at his peril, keep it there, so that no mischief may

accrue, or. answer for the natural and anticipated consequences.

And upon authority this, we think, is established to be the law,

whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or ﬁlth, or

stenches.” '

Precisely what is meant by “ via major, or the act of God,” in

this opinion we may, perhaps, learn by subsequent decisions.

The recent case of Nichols v. lllarsland to some extent appears

to explain it. In that case a reservoir, in the construction and

maintenance of which there was no negligence, was broken away

by a rainfall greater and more violent than any during the mem-

ory of witnesses. An action being brought for injury thereby

done, Lord Ch. J. OOCKBURN held the defendant liable, but in the

' Fletcher o. Rylands, L. R. 1 Exch. -Smith 0. Fletcher, L. R. 7 Exch. 305;

265, aﬂlrmed in llouse of Lords, L. S. C. L. R. 9 Exch. 64. Compare

R 8 I1. L. Can. 830, 339. See, also, Smith o. Kenrick, 7 O. B. 515.

with the apJ>roval of tl1e House of Lords, "We think that the
true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own pnrpoli'es~
brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to
do mischief if it escapes, must keep it h1 at his peril; nnd it' he
docs not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damf\ge
which is the natural consequence of its est•,upe. lie can excuse
himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's
default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis
major, or the act of Gud; but as nothing of this sort exiot8 here,
it is unneeessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. The
geueml rule, as uboYe stated, seems on principle just. The persun whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of
his neighbor, or whose mine is flontlcd by the water from his
neighbor's reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the tilth fl'olO
his neighbor's pri,·y, or \\"hose habittltion is made unhealthy by
the fumes and noisome vap•.lrB of his neighhor't; alkali works, is
damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbor who has brought something
on his o\vn JH"operty which was not naturally there, harmlt·ss to
others, so long as it is e.ontined to his own property, but which he
knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighb01·'s, Bhould be
obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not
sueeeed in confining it to his own property. But for his bringing
it there no mischief conld have accrued, and it seems but just that
he should, at his pet·il, keep it there, so that no mischief may
accrue, or. answer tor the natural and anticipated consequences.
And upon authority thii!, we think, is e~tablished to be the law,
whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or
stenches."'
Precisely what is meant by "vis major, or tl1e act of God," in
this opinion we ma_v, perhaps, learn by snbi'ocquent decisions.
The recent case of Nichols v. Marsland to some extent appeurs
to explain it. In that case a reset·vuir, in the con8ta·nction and
maintcnam,"e of whit"11 there was no negligence, was broken away
by a raintall greatet· and more violent than any during the memory of witnesses. An action being brought for injury thereby
dune, Lord Ch. J. CocKBUR~ held the defendant liable, but in the
' Fletcher "· Rylands, L. R 1 Exch.
26::i, affirmed in House of Lords, L.
R. 3 ll. L Cas. 330, 839. See, also,

·Smith o. Flct<'bcr, L. R. 7 Exch. SOlS;

S. C. L. R. 9 Exch. 64. Compare
Smith •· Kenrick, 7 0. B. lU5.
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Exchequer Chamber, the judgment was reversed. Says Baron
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BRAMWELL, “ \Vl1at has the defendant done wrong? Wliat right

of the plaintiff has she infringed? She has done nothing wrong.

She has infringed no right. It is not the defendant who let loose

the water and sent it to destroy the bridges. She did, indeed,

store it, and store it in such quantities that if it was let loose it

would do, as it did, mischief. But suppose a stranger let it loose,

would the defendant be liable? If so, then, if a mischievous boy

bored a hole in a cistern in any London house, and the water did

mischief to a neighbor, the occupier of the house would be liable.

That cannot be. Then why is the defendant liable, if some

agent, over which she has no control, lets the" water out? \Vhat

is the difference between a reservoir and a stack of chimneys for

such a question as this? Here the defendant stored a lot of water

for her own purposes; in the case of chimneys some one has put

a ton of bricks ﬁfty feet high for his own purposes; both

equally harmless if they stay where placed. and equally mis-

chievous if they do not. The water is no more a wild or savage

animal than the bricks, while at rest, nor more so when in motion.

Both have the same common property of obeying the law of

gravitation. Could it be said that no one could have a stack of

chimneys except on the terms of being liable for any damage

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

done by their being overthrown by a hurricane or an earthquake?

If so, it would be dangerous to have a tree, for a wind might

come so strong as to blow it out of the ground into a neighbor’s

land, and cause it to do damage; or a ﬁeld of ripe wheat, which

might be ﬁred by lightning, and do mischief. I admit that it is

not a question of negligence. A man may use all care to keep

the water in, or the stack of chimneys standing, but would be

liable if, through any defect, though latent, the water escaped or

the bricks fell. But here the act is that of an agent he cannot

control.

“This case differs wholly from‘ Fletcﬁer v. R3/lands. There

the defendant poured the water into the plaintiﬁ"s mine. He did

not know he was doing so, but he did as much as though he

had poured it into an open channel which led to the mine with-

out his knowing it. Here the defendant merely brought it to a

place whence another agent let it loose. I am by no means sure

that the likeness of a wild animal is exact. I am by no means

sure that if a man kept a tiger, and lightning broke his chain,

_.- --111“

Excheqner Ch"mber. the judgment was reversed. Says Baron
What has the defendant done wrongW What right
of the plaintiff has she infringed 1 She has done nothing wrong.
She has infringed no right. It is not the det(mdant who let loose
the water and sent it to destroy the bridges. She did, indeed,
store it, and store it in such qna.ntities that if it was let loose it
would do, as it did, mischief. But suppose a stranger let it loose,
would the defendant be liable¥ If so, then, if a mischievous boy
bored a hole in a cistern in any London house, and the water did
mischief to a neighbor, the occupier of the house would be liable.
That cannot be. Then why is the dct(mdaut liable, if some
agent, over which she has no control, lets the water out1 'Vhat
is the difference between a reservoir and a stack of chimneys tor
such a question as this1 Here the def(.•ndant stored a lot of water
for her own purposes; in the case of chimneys some one has pnt
a ton of bricks fifty feet high for his own purposes; both
equally harmless if they stay where placed. and equally mischievous if they do not. The water is no mol'e a wild or savage
animal than the bricks, while at rest, nor more so when in motion.
Both have the same common property of obeying the law of
gravitation. Could it be said that no one could ha\·e a stack of
chimneys except on the terms of being liable for any damage
done by their being overthrown by a hurricane or an ea.rthqna.keW
It' so, it would be dangerous to have a tree, for a wind might
come so strong as to blow it out of the ground into a neighbor's
land, and cause it to do damage; or a tield of ripe wheat, which
might be :fired by lightning, and do mischiet: I admit that it is
not a question of negligence. A man may nse all care to keep
the water in, or the stack of chimneys stamliug, but would l1a
liable if, through any defect, though latent, the water escaped or •
the bricks tell. But here the act is that of an agent he cannot
control.
"This case differs wholly from. Fletcher v. Rylands. There
the defendant poured the water into the plaintiff's mine. He did
not know he was doing so, but he did as much as though he
had poured it into an open channel which led to the mine without his knowing it. Here the defendant merely brought it to a
place whence anot.her agent let it loose. I am by uo meaus sure
that the likeness of a wild animal is exact. I am by no means
sure that if a man kept a tiger, and lightning broke his chain,
BRAMWELL,"
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and he got loose and did mischief, that the man who kept him

would not be liable. But this case and the case I put of the

chimneys are not cases of keeping a dangerous beast for amuse-

ment, but of a reasonable use of property in a way beneﬁcial to

the community. I think this analogy has made some of the

difficulty in this case. Water stored in a reservoir may be the

only practicable mode of supplying a district, and so adapting it

for habitation.” ‘

A comparison of these cases seems toshow the English rule to

be as follows: Whoever gathers water into a reservoir, where its

escape would be injurious to others, must, at his peril, make sure

that the reservoir is suiiicient toretain the water which is gath-

cred into it. But if thus sutlicient in construction, the liability

for the subsequent escape of the water becomes a question of

negligence. The proprietor is not liable if the water escapes

because of the wrongful act of a third party, or from vis major,

or from any other cause consistent with the observance of due

and reasonable care by him. Due care must of course be a

degree of care proportioned to the danger of injury from the

est-ape;" but it is not very clear that the English rule, as thus

explained, differs from that of this country.‘

‘Nichols 0. Marsland, L. R. 10
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Exch. 255; S. C. 14 Moak. 538, 542.

See, also, Madras R. Co. 0. The Zemin-

dar, L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 364; S. (J. 9

Monk, 280; Crompton o. Lea, L. R.

19 Eq. Cns. 115; S. C. 11 Monk, 719.

And see Mr. Bigelow’s comments on

Rylands v. Fletcher, Lead. Cas. on

Torts, 492 ct seq.

and he got loose and did mischief, that the man who kept him
would not be liable. But this case and the case I put of the
chimneys are not cases of keeping a dangerous bei\St f'nr amusement, but of a reasonahle use of property in a way beneficial to
the community. I think this analogy has made F.ome of the
diffi<·ulty in this case. Water stored in a reservoir may be the
only practicable mode of supplying a district, and so adapting it
for habitation." 1
A comparison of these cases seems to.ahow the English rnle to
be as follows: Whoever gathers water into a reser,·oir, where its
£>scape would be injurious to others, mn:-:t, at his peril, make sure
that the reservoir is sufficient to· retain the water which is gathered into it. But if thus sufficient in constrnction, the liability
for the subsequent escape of the water becomes a question of
n<'gligcnce. The proprietor is not li:\hlc if the water escapes
because of the wrongful act of a third party, or from vis 7111tjor,
or from any other cause consistent with the obser\•anee of due
and reasonable care by him. Due care mn::.t of' course be a
deg-ree of care proportioned to the danger of injury ft·om the
eseape;' bnt it is not ,·ery clear that the English rnle, as thus
explained, differs from that of this country. •

' It has been held in this country

that if a dam is constructed on a

stream subject to extraordinary fresh-

cts, these must be anticipated in

building it, though they occur only

once in many years. Gray 0. Harris,

107 Mass. 492; New York 1:. Bailey,

2 l)L'lli0, -[$3.

“ In Shipley v. Fifty Associatcs,106

Mass. 194, in which panties were held

liable for an injury occasioned by the

sliding of ice and snow from the

roof, the court, in approval of Ry-

lands v. Fletcher, say that “one must,

at his peril, keep the ice or snow that

collects upon his own roof within

his own limits," but they add-and

this is the pith of the (let-is-ion—tliat

he “ is responsible for all damages if

the shape of his root‘ is such as to

throw them upon his neighbor's land,

in the same manner as he would be

if he threw them there him<clt'."

This is perfectly just, but the case

seems far removed from Fletcher v.

Ryland, for here the injury results as

a natural and necessary consequence

of the defendant's act. and must have

been or should have been anticipated

by him. Just as in llay v. Cohoes

Co., 2 N. Y. 159, the defendant must

or should have anticipated that the

fragments of stone that were being

blasted would fall within the plain-

titf’s enclosure. (‘ahill v. Eastman,

18 Minn. 324, is decided on the au-

thority and reasoning of Fletcher 1:.

1 Nichols 1l.
Marsland, L. R. 10
Exch. 2a:>; 8. C. 14 Mouk. 538, 542.
Sec, also, llndras R. Co."· The Zemin.
dnr, L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 864; B. C. 9
?tloak, 2!:10; Crompton " · Lea, L. R.
19 Eq. Cas. 115; B. C. 11 Moak, 719.
And M'l' Mr. Bigelow':~ com1ueuts on
Rylands "· Fletcher, Lead. Cas. on
Tort:~, 402 et seq.
~ It has been held in this country
thnt if a dam is constructed on a
• stream subject to extraordinary fresh.
ets, these must be anticipated in
building it, though they occur only
once in many years. Gray"· Harris,
lOi )lass. 492; New York. "· Bailey,
2 I>~·ll i o, ·133.
3 In Shipley"· Finy Associatcs,l06
:!\Ia.~~. Hit, in which pat tit's were held
liable for an injury occasioned by the
slidin~ of ice and snow from the
roof, lhe court, in approval of Rylnmls u. Fletcher, suy that" one must,

at his peril, keep the ice or snow that
collect.'l upon his own roof within
his own limits;" bot they add-nod
this is the pith of the dceb<ion-th:\t
he" Is respon~ihle for all damn~es if
the &hape of his roof is such as to
throw them upon his neighbor's land,
in the same manner as he woultl be
if he threw them tlwre him•elf."
This is pl'rfectly just, hut the <"a~e
seems far removed from Fll·tclwr "·
Ryland, for ht>re the injury results us
a nnturnl and D<'C{·~sary consequence
of the defendant"s act, and must have
been or should have bN•n anticipated
by him. Jusl as in Hay 1l. C11hoes
Co., 2 :N.Y. 159, the lh•ft'ndant must
or should ha\'t' anticipatl'~l thnt the
fra.!!;tncots of stone thnt wl'rc being
blasted would full within the plain.
tiff's cocln~url·. ('ah ill o. Eastman,
18 Minn. 824, is decided on the R~
thority and reasoning of Fletcher 1l.
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Falling Waters and Snows. Every man has a clear legal right

to protect his premises against the fall of rain or snow, even

quence. In the case of urban property, he may, in erecting build-

ings and making improvements, ﬁnd it needful to do this, even

to the extent of preventing altogether the fall of rain or snow

upon his grounds, and the limitation upon his right to do so is

to be found only in the duty which every proprietor of lands

owes to those about him -to so use his own as not unreasonably to

restrict the enjoyment by others of corresponding rights. Still

this duty only obliges him to use all due care and prudence to

protect his neighbor, and does not require that he shall. at all

events and under all circumstances, protect him; and any injury

that may result, notwithstanding the observance of proper pre-

caution, must be deemed incident to the ownership of town

property, and can give no right of action. If one constructs his

buildings so as to cast water therefroui upon the land of his

neighbor, he commits an actionable wrong-;‘ but if he puts

proper eave troughs or gutters upon his building for leading off

the water upon his own ground, and keeps them in proper order,

and is guilty of no negligence in this regard, an adjoining pro-

prietor can have no legal complaint against him for injuries

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Rylnnds. It was a case where de-

fendant had untlt-rtnken to cut a

owner of a steam engine, purchased

of makers of good reputation and

channel for water through rock, and

before its completion the water had

burst through the sides of the tunnel,

and rushed through and washed out

land on which the plaintiff had a

right ofa way and u mill. Held, that

Every man has a cleaT legal right
to protect his premises against the fa]) of rain or snow, e\·en
though incidental injury may result to his neighbor in consequenc_-e. In the case of urban property, he may, in erecting buildings and making improvements, find it Medfnl to do thi~, e\·en
to the extent of preventing altogether the tall of raia or snow
upon llis grounds, and the limitation npon his right to do so is
to be found only in the duty which every proprietor of lands
owes to those about him~ so usc his own as not unreasonably to
restrict the enjoyment by others of corresponding rights. Still
this duty only obliges him to use all due care and p1·udence to
protect his neighbor, and does not require that he shall. at all
events and nuder a11 circumstances, protect him; and any injury
that may result, notwithstanding the observan<..-e of proper precaution, must be deemed incident to the ownership of town
property, and can give no right of action. If one constructs his
buildings so as to cast water therefrom upon the land of his
neighbor, he commits an actionable wrong; • bot if he puts
proper eave troughs or gutters upon his building for leading off
the water upon his own gronnd, anll keeps them in proper order,
and is guilty of no negligence in this re~-rard, an adjoining proprietor can have no legal complaint against him for injuries
Falling Waters and Snows.

though incidental injury may result to his neighbor in conse-

•

defendant was responsible irrespec-

tive of any question of negligence.

Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159, was

cited with approval in what it says

that the right of every man to make

use of his own as he pleases is not an

absolute right, but qualiﬁed and

limited by the higher right of others

to the lawful possession of their prop-

erty. To this possession the law pro-

hibits all direct injury, without regard

to its extent or the motives of the

aggressor. On the other hand, the

handled with care, is not bound

to anticipate that it will explode-~

Lost-e v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476;

Marshall 0. Welwood. 38 N. J. 339—

any more than he is that a domestic

animal which has all his life been

gentle and harmless will suddenly

become vicious and inﬂict upon the

ﬁrst person who comes near him

great bodily injury. And see Grand

Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Huntley, 38

Mich.

l Baker's Case, 9 Co. 53b; Jackson

Pesketl,1 M. & S. 234; Tucker v. New-

man,l1 Ad. & El. 40; Fay 0. Pren-

tice, 1 M. G. & S. 828; Ashley r. Ash.

ley. 6 Cush. '70; Aiken v. Benedict,

80 Barb. 400; Shipley 0. Fifty Asso-

ciates, 106 Mass. 194.

\

-ﬂslwl

Rylnnds. It waot a case where d~
fendnnl had um!Prtaken to cut a
channel for water through rock, and
before its completion the water had
burst through the sides of the tunnel,
and rushed through and washt>d out
land on which the plaintiff bad a
right of a way and a mill. Held, tha&
defendant was rc11ponsible im:'!lpec.
tive of any que~>tion of negligence.
Hay "· Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159, was
cited with approval in what it says
that the right of every man to make
use of his own as he pleases Is not an
absolute right, but qualified and
limited by the higher right of others
to the lawful po:;sl'~sion of their prop.
erty. To this po:~sl•s:non the law pro.
hi bits all direct injury, without regard
to its extent or the motives of the
aggressor. On the other hand, the

owner of a steam engine, purchaecd
of makers of good rt·putation and
handled with care, h1 not bound
to anticipate that it will explodeLosee "· Buchanan, lit N. Y. 476;
l\larsh:tll "· Wclwood, 88 N.J. 339any more than he is that a domestic
animal which has all his life been
gentle and harmless will suddenly
become vicious and inftict upon the
ftrst person who comes near him
great bodily injury. And sec Grand
Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. "· Huntley, 88
Mich.
1 Baker's Ca..'le, 9 Co. 53b; J R<'kson
Pes ked, 1M. & 8. 284; Tucker"· New.
mao, 11 Ad. & El. 40; Fay e. Pren.
tice, 1 M. G. & S. 828; Ashley "· Ashley. 8 Cush. 70; Aiken tt. Benedict,
89 Barb. 400; Shipley e. Fifty Asso.
elates, 106 Kaaa. 194.
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resulting from extraordinary or accidental circumstances, for

which no one is in fault; and such injuries must be left to be

borne by those on whom they fall.‘

Drawing oﬂ' Surface Water. The drawing oﬁ' of surface water

may affect adjoining estates either as it deprives them of the

resulting from extraordinary or accidental circmn!'tances, for
which no one is in fault; and such injuries must be left to be
borne by those on whom they fall.'

beneﬁts of the ordinary ﬂow in natural water courses, or as it

increases the ordinary ﬂow in such water courses, or as it casts

water through ditches upon adjoining lands. or so near to them

that the water, percolating through the soil, causes the adjoining

land to he wet, and unsuited to cultivation, or unproductive. In

the ﬁrst case, that is, where the lower proprietor is deprived of

the beneﬁt of the natural ﬂow of mere surface water, or of some

portion thereof, we suppose he can have no remedy. As has

been forcibly said, one party cannot insist upon another main-

taining his ﬁeld as a mere water table for the other‘s beneﬁt.‘

On the other hand, it is equally well settled that. one may law-

fully drain his lands into a natural water course, even though a

lower proprietor is injured by the increased ﬂow. “ For the sake

of agriculture, agri colendi causa, a man may drain his ground

which is too moist, and, discharging the water according to its

natural channel, may cover up and conceal tlie drains through his

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

lands; may use running streams to irrigate his ﬁelds, though

he thereby diminishes, not unreasonably. the supply of his

neighbors below; and may clear out impediments in the natural

channel of his streams, though the ﬂow of waterupon his neigh-

bor be thereby increased. * * It is not more agreeable to the

laws of nature that water should descend, than it is that lands

should be farmed and mined; but in many cases they cannot be,

if an increased volume of water may not be discharged through

' Underwood v. Waldron, 33 Mich.

282.

' Rawstron 0. Taylor, 11 Exch. 369.

383. To the same effect is Brondbent

r. Rumsbotliam. 11 Exch. 602, in

which it is said (p. 615) that “ the wa-

ter belongs absolutely to the defend-

ant, on whose land it falls.” See,

also, Curtiss 0. Ayrault, 47 N. Y. 78;

Livingston 1:. McDonald, 21 Iowa,

160; Wheatlcy v. Baugh, 25 Penn. St.

528.

The drawin~ off of snrface water
may affect adjoining estates either as it deprives them of the
benefits of the ordinary flow in natm"Sl water courses, or as it
increases the ordinary flow in such water conr~es. or as it casts
water through ditches upon adjoining lands. or so near to them
that the water, percolating through the soil, causes the adjoining
land to he wet, and unsuited to cultivation, or nnprodncti,·e. In
the first case, that is, where the lower proprietor is depri,·cd of
the benefit of the natural flow of mere surtaee water, or of some
portion thereof, we suppo~e he ean have no remedy. As has
been torcibly said, one party cannot insist upon another maintaining his field as a mere water table for the other's benefit.'
On the other hand, it is equally well settled that. one may lawfully drain his lands into a natural water course~ even tJ.(,ng-h a
lower proprietor is injured by the increat:cd flow. ".For the sake
of agriculture, agri colendi causa, a man may d1-ain his ground
which is too moist, and, discharging the water ac<>ordin.g to its
nntn:rnl channel, may cover up and conceal the drains through his
lands; may use running streams to irrigate his fields, though
he thereby diminishes, not unre:u;onably. the supply of his
neighbors below; and may clear ont impediments in the Hatnral
channel of his streams, though the flow of water upon hi;; nei.ghbor be thereby increased. * * It is not more :t;_!l"Peable to the
laws of nature that water should des<~end. than it is that lands
should be farmed and mined: bnt in many cases they cannot be,
if an increased volume of water may not be discharged through
Drawing oft' SUI'ftace Water.

The rule prevailing elsewhere is

not accepted in New Hampshire,

where the doctrine st" ms to be, as re.

spects water percolating through the

soil, and also mere surface water not

gathered into astream, " that the land

owner's right to obstruct or divert it

is limited to what is necessary in the

re -sonable use of his own laud."

Ba sett 1:. Salisbury Manet‘. (Jo. 43 N.

H. 569; Swctt 0. (Jutts, 50 N H. 439.

'C'ndcrwood o. Waldron, 88 Mich.
232.
' Rawstron "· Taylor, 11 Exch. 369.
883. To the same effect is Broadbent
r. Ramsbolham. 11 Exch. 602, in
which it is s:1id (p. 615) thnt "the wa..
tt>r heloni;B ubsolutely to the defendant, on whose land it fnlls."
See,
lll~o. Curtiss "· Aymult, 47 N. Y. iS;
Livingston "· McDonald, 21 Iowa,
160; Wheatley"· B:~ngh, 25 Penn. St.
528.
1

The rule pre,·niling el11ewhcre Is
not ace!'ptcd in ~ew Hampshire,
where the doctrinl' Sl" ms to be, as respects water pcrcolatin.~ through the
soil, ancl nlso mere surfacl• Willer not
gathered into a stream," thnt lhc land
owner's right to obstruct or divert it
Is I imited to what is m•cessary in the
rl.' ·sonRble use of his own laud."
Ba sctt "· Salisbury :\lannf. Co. 4.'i N.
H. 569; Swett "· Cutts, 5:> N H. 439.
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natural channels and outlets. The principle, therefore, should be

maintained, but it should be prudently applied;”' and it will

not preclude the lower proprietor erecting any such protections

as may be needful to guard his lands against the additional ﬂow,

provided they do not intercept the passage of water which would

naturally pass on to his land. In Massachusetts it has been

decided that one may erect barriers to prevent surface water

which has accumulated elsewhere from coming upon his land,

even though it is thereby made to ﬂow upon the land of another, to

his loss. “The right of an owner of land to occupy and improve

it in such manner and for such purpose as he may see ﬁt, either

by changing the surface or the erection of buildings or other

structures thereon, is not restricted or modiﬁed by the fact that

his own land is so situated with reference to that of adjoining

owners that an alteration in the mode of its improvement or

occupation, in any portion of it, will cause water which‘ may

accumulate thereon by rains and snows falling upon its surface, or

ﬂowing on to it over the surface of adjacent lands, to pass into

and o\'er the same in greater quantities or in othei-directions than

they were accustomed to ﬂow.’ The point of these decisions is, that

where there is no Water course, by grant or prescription, and no

stipulation exists between contcrminous proprietors of land con-
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cerning the mode in which their respective parcels shall he occupied

and improved, no right to regulate or control the surface drainage

of water can be asserted by the owner of one lot over that of his

neighbor. Uujus est solmn, ejus est usque ad cazlum is a gen-

eral rule applicable to the use and enjoyment of real property,

and the right of a party to the free and unfettered control of his

own land, above, upon, or beneath the surface, cannot be inter-

fered with or restrained by any considerations of injury to others

which may be occasioned by the ﬂow of mere surface water in

consequence of the lawful appropriation of land by its owner to

a particular use or mode of enjoyment. Nor is it at all mate-

rial, in the application of this principle of the law, whether a

party obstructs or changes the direction and ﬂow of surface

water by preventing it from coming within the limits of his land.

or by erecting barriers or changing the level of the soil, so as to

'WoonwAnn, J., in Kautfman 0. 9 Cush. 171; Flagg v. Worcester. 13

Gricsclner, 26 Penn. St. 407, 414. Gray, 601; Dickinson v. Worcester,

‘ Citing Luther '0. Wiunisimmet Co., 7 Allen, 19.

natnral channels and outlets. The principle, therefore, sl10uld be
maintained, but it should be prudently applied;" 1 and it will
not preclude the lower proprietor erecting any such protections
as may be needful to guard his lands against the additional flow,
provided they do not intercept the passage of water which wonld
naturally pass on to his land. In Massachusetts it has been
decided that one may erect barriers to prevent surface water
which has accumulated elsewhere from coming upon his land,
even though it is thereby made to flow upon the land of another, to
his loss. ''The right of an owner of land to oecupy and improve
it in snch manner and for such purpose as he may E>ee fit, either
by changing the snrface or the erection of hnildin.~s or other
strnctnres thereon, is not restricted or modified by the fitct that
his own land is so situated with reference to that of adjoining
owners that an alteration in the moue uf its improvement or
occupation, in any portion of it, will cause water whieh· may
accumulate thereon by rains and snows falling upon its surface, or
flowing on to it over the surface of adjacent lands, to pass into
and o,·er the same in greater quantities or in othc1· directions than
they were acenstomed to flow., The point of these decisions is, that
where there is no water course, by grant or prescription, and no
stipulation exists between conterminous proprietors of land con .
cerning the mode in which their re~pective var<:els shall he oc<:npied
and impro,·ed, no right to regulate or control the sul'lace drainage
of water can be asserted by the owner of one lot over that of his
neighbor. Oujus est solum, ejus est 'Usque ad r:wlum is a general rule applicable to the use and enjoyment of real property,
and the right of a party to the free and unfettered control of his
own land, above, upon, or beneath the snrtace, cannot be interfered with or restraiued by any ('Onsiderations of injury to others
which may be occasioned by the flow of mere snrfac-e water in
consrqnence of the lawful appropriation of land hy its owner to
a particular use or mode of enjoyment. Not· is it nt all material, in the application of this principle of the law, whether a
party obstrncts or changes the direction and flow of surface
water by preventing it from coming within the limits of his land.
or by erecting barriers or changing the level of the soil, so as to
1 WooDWARD, .T., in Kauffman •·
Griesemt>r, 2£1 Penn. St. 407, 414.
• Citing Luthero. Winnisimmet Co.,

9 Cush. 171; Fla!!"g tl. Worcester. 18
Gray, 601; Dickin:~on o. Worcester,
7 Allen, 19.
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turn it off in a new course after it has come within his bounda-

577

ries. The obstruction of surface water, or an alteration in the

ﬂow of it, affords no cause of action in behalf of a. person who

may suffer loss or detriment therefrom against one who docs no

act inconsistent with the due exercise of dominion over his own

soil.”‘

The doctrine of this case is fully approved in several States.

In others. the rule of the civil law has been adopted and followed,

that the lower estate is charged with a servitude for the beneﬁt

of the upper estate to permit the surface water to ﬂow off over it

as it had been accustomed to do.’ No doubt all the States would

recognize an exception in favor of the owner of a town lot, who

must be at liberty to cut off drainage across it, or his lot would

be worthless for many purposes.‘ In respect to agricultural

lauds, strong reasons may he given for either view, and it is

probable that each will continue to ﬁnd supporters hereafter as

heretofore.

The question of liability, where one improves his lauds by

artiﬁcial drains, which cast water upon a lower proprietor, is

equally difficult with that just mentioned. No doubt he may

improve them by ﬁlling up low and wet places, without incurring

liability to a lower proprietor, upon whom the ﬂow would be
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increased,‘ just as the public may lawfully improve streets and

public grounds, though the ilnprovemeut may have the eﬁ'ect to

cast the falling or surface water upon adjoining grounds.‘ A

natural water course must not be stopped up, and the water

turned back upon the lands of another proprietor.’ But “ the

‘Bret-:i.ow, Ch. J., in Gannon 0.

Htt1‘f_':\tlun, 10 Aliﬂl. 106.

' .\it)l"1'ls<\I1 v. Bucksport, 67 Me. 353;

Grant r Allr-n, 41 (‘onn. 156; Bowls-

by 0. Spcer, 31 N. J. 351; Swctt v.

(‘utts, 50 N. H. 439; S. C. 9 Am. Rep.

276. See Bangor 0. Lausil, 51 Me.

521.

' See Delnhoussaye o. Judice, 13 La.

Ann. 587; Butler o. Peck, 16 Ohio, (N.

s.) 334 ; Tootle v. Cliﬂon, 22 0hio,(u. s.)

247; Laumier v. Francis, 23 Mo. 181;

turn it off in a new course after it bas come witllin his honnda.
ries. The ohF.truction of surface water, or an alteratio'l in the
flow of it, afi'ords no canse of action in behalf of a person who
may snffer loss or detriment therefrom against one who docs no
act inconsh;tent with the due exercise of dominion ovet· his own
soiJ.H'
The doctrine of this case is fully approved in SC\'f'ra.l States.'
In other:;, the rule ot' the civil law hBS been auopted and ti)llowed,
that the lower et"tate is charged with a servitude fur the benefit
of the upper e;;tatc to permit the surface water to flow off over it
as it had hPen accustomed to do.• No doubt all the States would
recognize an exception in favor of the owner of a town lot, who
must be at liberty to cnt off drainage across it, or his lot would
be worthll':-1:> for many pnrpo~es.' In respect to agricultural
lands, stl'ong reasons may be given for either view, and it is
probable that each will continue to find supporters hereafter as
heretofore.
The question of liability, whet·e one impt·ovcs his lands by
artificial drains, which cast water upon a lower proprietor, is
equally difficult with that just mentioned. .No doubt he may
improve them by filling up low and wet places, without incurring
liability to a lower proprietor, upon whom the flow would be
inm·caseo,• just as the public may lawfully irnprr)\'e streets awl
pnbl ic ~rounds, though the i m pro\·cment may have the effect to
cast the falling or surface water upon adjoining grounds." A
natural water course must not be stopped up, and the water
turned back upon the lands of another proprietor.' llut "the

Beard r. Murphy, 37 Vt. 99; Ogburn

0. Connor, 46 Cal. 346; S. (‘. 13 Am.

Rep. 213; Gillham 0. Madison Co. R.

R. Co.. 49 Ill. 484; Gormloy 0. San-

ford. 52 lll. 15$.

‘ See Vanderwiele 9. Taylor, 65 N.

Y. 341.

‘Goodale o. Tattle, 29 N. Y. 459,

467; Flag; r. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601 ;

Hoyt 0. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656; Bangor

0. Lansil, 51 Me. 521.

‘ Martin v. Riddle, 26 Penn. SL415;

Luther r. Winuisimmset Co., 9 Cush.

171; Greeley 0. Maine Cent. R. R. Co.,

53 Me. 200.

' Parks 0. Newburyport, 10 Gray,

28; Flagg u. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601;

Dickinson 0. Worcester 7 Allen 19-

IP1

37

I

Bm1-:r.ow, Ch. J., In Gannon e.

10 AIIE'n, 106.
• :\lorrisnn "· Buckspurt, 67 1\le. 353;
Grant r A ll!'n, 41 f'onn . 156; Bowlsby 1l. RpPer, 31 N. J. 351: Swett "·
('utts, ;i!l ~. H. 4.'19; S. C. 9 Am. Rep.
276. SPe Bangor "· Lnnsil, 51 1\le.
521.
a Bee Delahoussaye 1l. Judice, 13 La.
Ann. 58i; Buller"· Peck, 16 Ohio, (K.
s.) 334; Tootlett. Cliflon, 22 Oblo,(:K. s.)
247; Laumit>r 1l. Francis, 23 Mo. 181;
Beard t'. ~lnrphy, 87 VL 99; O.gburn
"· Connor, 46 Cal. 346; 8. (". l:l .\ m.
Rep. 218: Gillham "· Madison Co. R.
Hnr~:ulnn.

37

R Co.. (9 Ill. 484 ; Gorm Icy •· San.
ford. 52 Ill. 15~.
4 Sec Vandcrwielc e. TRylor, 65 N.
Y. 341.
1 Goodale "· Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 459,
467; Flll!!.g r. Worec... ter, 13 Gray, 601:
Hoyt 11. HtHlsou, 27 Wis. 656; Bungor
tl. Lansil, 51 Me. 521.
• Mnrtin "· Riddle, 26 Penn. St. 415;
Luther r. Winnisimmsr·t Co., 0 Cusb.
171; Greeley "·Maine Vent. R R. Co.,
53 lie. 200.
' Parks 1l. Newburyport, 10 Gray,
28; Flagg"· Worcester, 13 Gray, 601;
Dickinson t. Worcester, 'l Allen, 19;

578 THE LAW or TORTS.

578

THE LAW OF TORTS.

true water course is well deﬁned. There must be a stream usually

ﬂowing in a particular direction, though it need not ﬂow contin-

ally. It may sometimes be dry. It must ﬂow in a deﬁnite

channel, having a bed, sides or banks, and usually discharge

itself into some other stream or body of water. It must be

something more than a mere surface drainage over the entire

face of a tract of land, occasioned by unusual freshets or other

extraordinary causes. It does not include the water ﬂowing into

the hollows or ravines in land, which is the mere surface water

from rain or melting snow, and is discharged through them from

a higher to a lower level, but Which, at other times, are destitute of

water. Such hollows or ravines are not, in legal contemplation,

water courses.” '

Turner o. Dartmouth, 18 Allen, 291;

Emery v. Lowell, 104 Mass.13; Im-

lcr 0. Springﬁeld, 55 Mo. 119. It is

held, in Franklin 1:. Fisk, 13 Allen,

211, that if a proprietor of lands pro-

tects them against suiface water by

true water course is well defined. There must be a st1·eam mually
flowing in a particular direction, though it need not flow eontinally. It may sometimes be dry. It must flow in a definite
channel, having a bed, sides or banks, and usually diseharge
itself into some other stream or hody of water. It must be
something more than a mere surface d1-ainage O\'er the entire
face of a tract of land, occasioned by nnusnal f1·e-;hets or other
extraordinary causes. It does not include the water iluwiug into
the hollows or ravines in land, which is the mere surfat.-e water
from rain or melting snow, and is discharged through them from
a higher to a lower le\'el, but which, at other times, are destitute of
w~o~.ter. Such hollows or ravines are not, in leb"8.l contemplation,
water courses." 1

an embankment, which throws the

water back into the road, the public

have no cause of complaint. On the
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other hand, an action will not lie

against a town for failing to keep

open adrain across a highway, unless

it can be shown that an obligation to

construct the drain was imposed,

either hy' the common law or by the

statute. Estes 0. China, 56 Me. 407.

' DIXON, Ch. J., in Iloytv. Hudson,

27 Wis. 656, 661. In this case an in-

timation in Bowlsby 0. Speer, 31 N.

J. 351, that there may possibly be nn

exce| lion to this proposition in the

case of gorges and narrow passit-_:cs

in hills or mountainous regions is re-

peated. As bearing on the question,

sec Eulrich '0. Richter, 37 Wis. 226,

and 41 Wis. 318. And compare Gill-

hum v. Madison, etc., R. R. Co., 49 Ill.

484; Barnes 0. Sabron, 10 Nev. 217;

Wagner 0. Long Island R.R. Co.,2

Hun. 633. Says BIGELOW. Ch. .l., in

Ashley u. Wolcott, 11 Cush. 192, 195,

“ To maintain the right to a water

course or a brook, it must be made to

appear that the water usually ﬂows

in a certain direction, and hy a regu-

lar channel, with banks or sides. It

need not be shown to ﬂow continually;

it may be dry at times. but it must

have a well deﬁned and substantial

existence. Angeli on Water Courses,

§ 4; Shields r. Arndt, 3 Green Ch. R.

234, 246; Luther r. Winnisimmct Co.,

9Cush. 171. In Earl v. De Hart. 12 N.

J. 280, 283. the chancellor gives a dc-

ﬂnition of a water course. “A water

course is deﬁned to be ‘achannel or

a canal for the conveyance of water,

particularly in draining lands.’ It

may be natural, as when it is made

by the natural - ﬂow of the water,

caused by the general supcrticies of

the surrounding land from which the

water is collected into one channel,

or it may be artiﬁcial, as in case of

a ditch, or other artiﬁcial means

used to divert the wntcl‘ from its nat-

Turner"· Dartmouth, 18 Allen, 291;
Emery "· Lowt!ll, 104 Mass. 13; Imler e. Sprin~~:fteld. 55 !lo. 119. It is
ht•lll, in Franklin "· Fisk, 18 Allen,
211, that if a proprietor of lands protects them against SUI ftLce water by
an embankment, which throws tbe
water back into the road, the public
have no rause of complnint. On the
other hand, an action will not lie
against a town for failing to keep
open a drain across a highway, unless
it can be shown that an obligation to
construct the drain was imposed,
either hy· the common law or by the
statute. Estes"· Chinn. 56 Me. 407.
1 DrxoN, Ch. J ., in Hoyt t:. Hudson,
27 Wis. 6[)(1, 661. In this cnsc an intimation in Bowlsby "· Spel'r, 31 N .
J. !351, that there may pos~illly be un
exce1 lion to this proposition in the
case of gorges and narrow t>nSSI\I!<'S
in hills or mountainous regions ill repeated. As lwnring on the question,
see Eulrich "· Hichtt-r, 87 Wis. 226,
and 41 Wis. 318. And compare Gillbam"· Madison, et~.• R. R. Co., 49 Ill.
484; Barnes"· Sabron, 10 Nev. 217;
Wagner "· Long Island R. R. Co., 2
Hun. 633. Says BIGELOW, Ch. ,J ., in
Ashley"· Wolcott, 11 Cush. 192, 195,
" To maintain the right to a water
course or a brook, it must be made to

appear that the wnter usually flows
in a certain dircrtiun. ancl by a regttlar channel, with banks or sides. It
need not be shown to flow Cflnt inually;
it may be dry at times. but it must
ha¥e a well defined and substantial
existl'nce. Angell on Water Courses,
~ 4; Shiehls r. Arndt, 3 Green Ch. R
234, 24G; Luther r. Winnisimmct Co.,
9 Cu!!ll. 171. In Earl "·De Hart. 12 ~J. 200, 283 the chancellor givt•s a definition of a water course. "A W!th.-r
course is defined to be • a channel or
a canRl for the conveynn(~e of water,
particularly in draining lan:~s.' It
may be natm·al, as when it is made
by the natural . flow of the wa1er,
caused by 1he gent'ral superficies of •
the surrounding land from which the
watel' is collected into one ch~tnne-1.
or It may be artificil\1, as in case of
a 11itch, or otlu•J' al'tificial means
used tn divert the water from its nat..
uml channel, or to c:m·y it from low
lan1ls, from which it will n t flow, in
consequence of the natuml formation
of the surface of the surrou.tding
land. It is an ancient wnter course.
if the channel through which it naturally runs has existed from time im11\1'11\0rial. Whether it is entitled to
be calll'd an ancient water course,
and, as such, legal rights can be ac-
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Tn lowa, in a carefully considered case, it was held that if a

difch made by the defendant for the purpose of draining his

lands, and which terminated within sixty feet of the line of the

plaintiff's, had the effect to increase the quantity of water on

the plaintiff's land to his injury, or, without increasing it, threw

the water upon the land in a tlifferent manner from what the

same would naturally have ﬂowed upon it, to his injury, the

defendant would he liable for the injury, even though the ditch

was CoIlstI‘ll(:i.e(l by the defendant in the course of the ordinary

use and improvement of his farm.‘ So in \‘Viseonsin it has been

decided that the owner of land on which there is a pond or res-

ervoir of surface water cannot lawfully discharge it through an

:trtiﬁci:il channel upon the land of another, or so near it that it

will ﬂow over upon such land to its injury.‘ A ease in Ohio

somewhat similar was decided in the same way. In that case a

part of the water which the defendant. discharged upon the land

of the plaintiff would naturally have found its way there had

the drain not been cut.‘ These cases seem to conﬁne the obli-

quired and lost in it, does not depend
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upon the qtnmtity of water it dis

0l|:\t‘_1(*s. Many ancient streams of

water, which, if dammed up, would

inundate a large region of country,

are dry for a great portion of the

In Iowa, in a <":.refnlly con~i«lercd case! it was held that if a
di~ch m:ule hy the defendant for the purpose of <h·aiuiug his
h:l(ls, and wldch tl'rminated within sixty ti.·ct of the line of the
plaintiff's, ha,l the ctfed to increase the quantity of water on
the plaintiff's land to his injury, or, without increasing it, threw
tltc water upon the land in a ditlcrcnt manner fmm what the
:-:ante would natumlly luwe fl,l\n.J npou it, to hi's injury, the
ddi·ndant would be liable for the injury, e\·en though the <•itch
was constructed hy the dPft•tHlant in the conroe of the ordinary
n~e and impt'O\'ement of his t:mu.' So in 'Viseonsin it has been
dl'ci«lc:l that tho owner of land on which there is a pond or rcsermir of snrfaee water cannot lawfully discharge it through an
artifit~inl c~mnnel upon the land of another, or so near it that it
will flow O\'Pr upon Sll('h land to its injury.' A case in Ohio
~oHH'what simihu· wns decided in the same way. In that case a
pat·t of the water which the defendant. diRcharg-~:>d upon the land
of the plaintiff would naturally have found its way there had
the drain not been cut." These case~ ~cem to confine the obli-

year. If the face of the country is

such as neet-ssurily collects in one

body so large a quantity of Water,

aflcr heavy rains and melting of

large bodies of snow, as to require

an outlet to some common reservoir,

and if such water is rc1nl:\r|_v dis-

charged through a well deﬁnetl chan-

nel, which the force of the water has

made for itself, and which is the ac-

customed channel through which it

ﬂows, and has ﬂowed from time im-

memorial, such channel is an ancient

water course.”

See, further, on this subject. Mar-

tin v. Riddle, in note to Kauﬂiuan 0.

Griescmer, 26 Penn St. 467, 415.

' Livingston v. .\lcl)onald, 21 Iowa,

I60. See Reynolds o. Clark, Ld.

Raym.1399; Lam-_v r. Jasper, 99 lll.

46. The Cusc of Adams 0. Walker,

84 Conn. 466, the facts of which are

somewhat imperfectly stated in the

report, lays down the same doctrine,

perhaps going somewhat further. In

New Hampshire, apparently, the

question would be one of reason-

able use. Swetl v. Cutts, 50 N. H.

439. Says DI-ZNIO, Ch. J., in Goodale

e. Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 4-‘>9, 467: “ ln re-

spect to the running oil‘ of surface

water, caused by rain or snow, I know

of no principle which will prevent

the o\vncr of land from ﬁlling up the

wet and marshy places on his own

soil for its amelioration and his own

advantage, because his nei_;hbor’s

land is so situated as to be incom-

moded by it. Such a doctrine would

militate against the well settled rule

that the owner of land has lull do-

minion ovcr the whole space above

1p1 i rctl and lost In it, does not depend
upon tile quantity of Wr\t<:r lt dis
l'lwr;:<'s. l\lany ancient str(•ams of
wah'r, which, if dammc•l up, would
inundr\te a larg(• rc~ion of country,
are dry for a ~r(·Rt portion of the
year. If the face of the country is
snd1 us necl'~~arily collcrts in one
body so l:tr.!!;e n qurmlity of wntt•r,
aOt•r heavy rnins and melting of
lar~e bodies of snow, llS to require
• an outlet to some l'omm•m re!'>ervoir,
and if such watt•r is r•·!!nl:lrly discharErcd throu.~h a wt·ll <h·t\:lcd rlu\nncl, which thP tilrcc of the wnlCI' has
mnde ti1r itst·lf, nml which is the accu~tomed <'h:mnel throu~h which it.
flows. nnd h.•s thwcd from time immrmorial, sul'lt chrmnel is an o.ucicnt
wat<'r cour~t!."
Sec, further, on this subject. Martin tl. Riddlt>, In note to Krntffman e.
Grit"WlllPr, 26 Penn St 407, 415.
1 Livin,1~ston "· .Me Donald, 21 Iowa,
Hill. &.oe Reynolds "· Clark, Ld.
Hnym. 1399; Lnnl'y r. JnRpPr, H9 Ill.
46. The casu of .A.dnms "· Walker,

8.& Conn. ~6. the facts of which arc
somewhat imperfectly stated in the
report. luys down the snme doctrine.
p<'rhapR going somewhat further. In
New Hamp11hire, apparently, the
question would be one of ret\Sonable use. Swett "· Cutts, 50 N. H.
489. Says DENIO, Ch .•J., in Goo1lale
"· Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 411), 467: "In respect to the running off of 11urface
water, cau!!ed by rain or snow, I know
of no principle which will prewnt
the owner of land from filling up the
wet and marshy places on his own
wil for Ita amelioratiun a01t his own
advnnln~c. bec:mse hi:t nri.::hhnr's
land is so situ!lled as to he incom.
moded by it. Such a doctrin<' wnuld
militate against the well settled rule
ihat the owner of land hllll full do.
minion over the whole space above
and below the aurface."
' Pettig-rew e. Evansville, 2!) "'ts.,
223. And, see Proctor "· Jennings.
6 Nev. 83.
: Hutter l'. Peck, 16 Ohio, (N. B.) ~:J l.
CoiUpare Curtiss t1. Ayrault, 47 N. Y.
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ﬂowing from the upper estate, to “ waters which ﬂow naturally

without the art of man; those which come from springs, or

from rain falling directly on the heritage, or even by the natural

depressions of the place.”' The conclusion seems to be that

where the surface waters are collected and cast in a body upon

the proprietor below, unless into a natural watercourse, the lower

proprietor sustains a legal injury, and may have his action there-

ior. This is the rule that has been applied against municipal

corporations: \Vhile they are not bound to construct sewers or

drains to protect adjoining owners against the ﬂow of surface

water from the public ways, yet it' they actually construct such

as must carry water upon the adjacent lands, they are liable as

much as they would be if they had invaded such lands by send-

ing in their servants or otherwise.’

Subterranean Waters. If one by an excavation on his own

land draws oﬁ' the subterraneous waters from the land of his

neighbor to the prejudice of the latter, no action will lie for the

consequent damage. This is fully settled in England by the

leading case of Acton v. Blumlell,’ and in a later case it is

decided that prescriptive rights cannot be gained in subterra-

ncous waters, which will preclude such excavations on adjoining

gation of the owner of the lower estate to receive the water
flowing from the upper estate, to "waters which flow naturally
without the art of man; those which come from sprillgs, or
from rain falling directly on the heritab-re, or even by the natnrnl
depre,;sions of the place." 1 The conclusion seems to be that
where the surfa<.oe waters are collected and cast in a body upon
the proprietor below, unless into a natural watercourse, the lower
proprietor sustains a legal injury, aiH.! may have his action therefor. This is the rule that has been applied against municipal
corp•)rations: '\Vhile they are not bound to construct sewers or
drains to protect adjoining ownet·s against the flow of surface
water from the public ways, yet if they actually construct such
as must carry water upon the adjacent lands, they are liable as
much as they would be if they had invaded such lands by sending in their servants or otherwise.'
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grounds as may draw them oﬁ'.‘ These decisions have been

generally followed in this country, and it may be considered

settled law that if the well dug by one man ruins the well or

spring of his neighbor by drawing otI' its \vater, it is damnum

'78. And, see Wheeler 0. Worcester,

10 Allen, 591.

' Kuulllnan 0. Griesemer, 26 Penn.

St. 407. 413. See Martin v.Jett, 12

La. 504. And, compare Bowlsby 0.

Spoor, Bl N. J. 3-")1.

' Nevins v. Iicoria, 41 Ill. 502; Au-

rora 11 Gi lett, 56 Ill. 132; Aurora 1:.

Reed, 57 Ill. 30; Alton v. Hope, 68

Ill. 167; Petligrcw 11. Evansville, 25

Wis. 2'23; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35

Mich. 296 and cases cited. Gould 0.

Subterranean Waters. If one by an exeavation on his own
land draws off the snbterraneous watet·s from the land of his
neighbor to the prejudice of the latter, no .action will lie for the
consequent damage. This is fully settled in England by the
leading case of Acton v. Blundell,' and in a later case it is
decided that pre,;criptive rights cannot he gainerl in snhterraneons waters, which will )ll'(•clndc such excavations on adjoining
gronnds as may draw them off.' Theso deci,;ious have been
generally followed in this country, and it may be considered
settled law that if the l\'ell dng by one man ruins the well or
spring of his neighbor by drawing off its water, it is damnum

liooth. 64$ N. Y. 62. And, see Pum-

pelly 1:. Green Buy Co., 13 Wzill. 166.

Upon the right of an upper pro-

prietor to have natural passages for

the surface water kept open for his

drainage, though they are not water

courses. see Franklin r. Fisk, 13 Al-

len, 211; Goodale 0. Tuttle. 29 N. Y.

459; Tootle v. (‘lit'ton, 22 Ohio, (K. 8.)

2&7; E1: parts Marlin, 13 Ark. 19$.

' Acton v. Blundell, 12 .\1. &W.3‘24.

‘ (‘-haseinore v. Richards, 7 H. L.

Cas. 349; S. (J. in Ex. Ch. 2 H. & N.

163. See, also, New River Co. 1:.

Johnson, 2 El & El. 435; Hammond

0. Hall, 10 Sim. 551; Smith r. Ken-

rick, 7 C. B. 515; The Queen 0. Me-

tropolitan Board of llforks, 3 B. & S.

710; Popplcwell 0. llodkinsou, L. R.

4 Exch. 248.

r —--~~——-warm

73. And, see Wheeler tJ, Worcestt'r,
10 Allen. !i!ll.
1 Kauffman tl. Griesemer, 26 Penn.
St. 4!>7. 413. Sec :Martin v. Jett, 12
La. W4. And, compare Bowlsby "·
t:ip<·<·r. st N. J. n:n.
1 .Nc,·hts "· Peoria, 41 Ill. 502; Aurora 1l Gi lett, i;o III. 132; Aurora "·
Rred, 57 Ill. 30; Alton "· Hope, 68
Ill. 167; PdtigrPW 1l. Evansville, 25
Wi~. 223; Ashley "· Port Hul'On, 35
:Mich. 2!)6 anti cases cited. Gould "·
Booth. Gil N. Y. 62. And, sec Pum.
pelly v. Green nay Co., 13 Wall. 166.
Upnn the right of an upper prl).
prietor to have nntural passages fur

the surface water kept open for his
drainage, though they nn• not water
courses. see Franklin r. Fi:~k, 13 AlIen, 211; Gnodale "· Tuttle. 29 N.Y.
45!l; Tootle"· ('lirton, 22 Ohio, (N. 8.)
2H; Ez parte :Martin, 13 At·k. 19::1.
• Acton "· Blundell, 12 ll. & W. 324.
4 Chn!<t•more "· Richards, 7 H. L.
Cas. 349; 8. C. in Ex. Ch. 2 H. & N.
169. See, nlso, New Hi-rer Co. "·
Johnson, 2 El & El. 485; Hammond
"· Hull, 10 Sim. 551; Smith -r. Ken.
rick, 7 C. B. 515; The Queen r. )[e.
tr•>politan Board of Works, 3 B. & S.
710; Popplewell tl. Hodkinson, L. H.
4 Exch. 248.

•
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absque iwzjuria.’ Probably if the subterraneons water were a

stream ﬂowing in a well-known course it would be different,

and one through whose land it ﬁowﬂwould be protected against

its being drawn away from him.’( nt one claiming rights in

such a stream would be under the necessity of proving its

existence and tracing it; not an easy task in any case.‘

Nuisances in the Use of Water Courses. Certain principles

control the utilization of water in the running streams of the

country, the violation of which may constitute a nuisance.

These principles apply equally to navigable and non-mu-i_';al>le

ab.<u.JU6 injuria. 1 Probably if the subterrancons water were a
stream flowing in a well-known conroe it would he different,
and one through whose land it flow~ would be protected against
its being drawn away from him.{~ut one claiming ri~hts in
such a stream would be onder the nece~sity of proviug its
existence and tracing it; not an easy task in any case.•

waters, and in general they are not aﬁected by the fact that one

riparian proprietor has ﬁrst appropriated the waters to his own

use. It is well settled that at the common law no superior

rights can be acquired by one over the other by such prior

appropriation.‘ The rule is modiﬁed in the mining States,

' Greenleafo. Francis. 18 Pick. 117;

Wheatley 17. Baugh, 25 Penn. St. 528;

Haldcman v. Bruckhurt, 45 Penn St

514; Frazier 0. Brown, 12 Ohio, (n.s.)

294; Routh 0. Drisnoll. 20 Conn. 533;

Bliss v. Greeley, 45 N. Y. 671; New
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Albany, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Peterson, 14

Ind. 112; Chatﬁeld a. Wilson, 28 Vt.

:Nuisances in the Use of Water Courses. Ce.rtain principles
control the utilization of water in the running streams of the
country, the violation of which may constitute a nuisance.
These principles apply equally to navigable and non-na,·i:.;ahle
waters, and in general they are not affectt->d by the fact that one
ri}'arian proprietor has tirst appropriated the waters to his own
use. It is well settled that at the common lllw no superior
rights can be acquired by one over the other by such prior
appropriation! The rule is modified in the mining State,.,

49 ; Clark 0 C0nroe,38Vt. 469; Chase

1:. Silverstone, 62 Me. 175: Morrison

0. But-ksport, etc., R. R. Co., 67 Me.

353; (‘ommonwealth v. Richter, 1

Penn. St. 467. Compare Ba_~sett 0.

Salisbury Manuf. Co., 43 N. II. 569;

Swett v. Cults, 50 N. II. -139; Parker

0. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Cush.

107; Buﬂ'um 0. Harris, 5 R. I. 243.

It is said in some cases that if this

is done not for his o\vn beneﬁt but

to injure his D('l_'_'l1l)Ol‘, the neighbor

may recover damages. Thurston 0.

Hancock, 12 Mass. 221; Panton 0.

Holland, 17 Johns. 92; Greenleaf v.

Francis, 18 Pick. 117. The decision

in (fhatﬂeld 0. Wilson, 28 Vt 49, is

directly to the contrary, but some of

the other cases here cited avoid the

point.

’ See Dickinson 0. Grand Junction

Canal Co., 7 Exch. 282, 300; Dudden

0. Guardians, etc, 1 H. & N. 627;

Chase-more v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas.

349, 373; Smith e. Adams, 6 Paige,

435; Wheatley e. Baugh, 25 Penn. St.

528; Whetstone o. Bowscr, 29 Penn.

St. 59; Cole Silver Mining Co. 0. Vir.

ginia, ctc.. Water (;o., 1 Sawyer, 470.

‘ Sec Ilanson v. hIc(Jue, 42 (‘al. 303;

Mosivr r. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363.

‘ \\'1-ighto. Ho\\'-ml, 1 Sim. & Rm.

190; Mason 0. Ilill,1l B. 8: Ad. 304;

Martin 0. Bigelow. 2 Aik. 184; I)u.

mont 0. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420: Plait

v. Johnson, 15 Johns. 213: Tyler 0.

Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397; Gilman o.

Tillon, 5 N. H. 231; (‘owles r. Kill-

der, 24 N. ll. 364; lloy v Sh-r|'t-tl, 9

Watts, 327; llarlzall 0. Sill, 12 Penn.

St. 218; Kt-eney & Wood .\lanuf. (‘o.

v. Union Illanuf. Co., 39 (‘onn. 576;

Parker 1-. liotchkis=, 25 (‘onn. 321;

Heath v. Williams, 25 Me. 209; Snow

0. Parsons. 23 Vt. 459 ; llli~s 0. Ken-

Greenlcah. Francis.18 Pick. 117;
W1watley "· Baugh, 2.'5 Penn. Bt. o28;
Haldeman 11. Bruckhurt, 45 Penn St.
514; Fmzier "· Brown, 12 Ohio, (N. s.)
2!>4; Routh"· Driscoll, 20 Conn. ;);j!J;
Bliss "· Greeley, 43 N.Y. 671; New
.Albany, etc., R R Co. t~. Peterson, 14
Ind. 112; Chatfield "·Wilson, 28 Vt.
49 ; Clark " Conroe, 88 Vt. 40!); Chase
t:. SilvcJ'slone, 62 llc. 175: llnrrison
"· Buc·ksport, etc., H. R. Co.. 67 Me.
8:13; Commonwealth 11. Richter, 1
Penn. St. 4G7. Compare Ha~sett "·
S111isbury Munuf. Co., 43 N. II. 569;
Sw(•tt 11. Cutts, 50 N. H. 4:19; Parker
"· Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Cnsh.
107; Buffum "· Harris, 5 R. I. 243.
It is said in some cases that if this
is done not for hIs own benefl t but
to iujnrc his nei!!hbnr, the nei~huor
may recover damagt•s. Thurston "·
Hancock, 12 }lass. 221; P1mton •·
Hollnnd, 17 Johns. 112; Greenleaf"·
Francis, 18 Pick. 117. The decision
in Chatfield "· Wilson, 28 Vt 49, is
directly to the contrlll'.l", but some of
the flther cases here cited avoid tho
point.
'Boo Dickinson 11. Grand Junction
1

Cnnal Co., 7 Excb. 282, 800; Dmldl'n
"· Guardians, etc, 1 H. & N. 627;
Chasemorc "· Riclutrds, 7 H. L. Cas.
349, 373; Smith to. Auams. 6 P:tir.-e,
435; Wheatley t'. Baugh, 2.i Pt'nn. St.
528; Whetstone "· Bowser, 29 Penn.
St. 5!); Cole Sil\'(~r Minim~ Co. "· Vir•
ginia, etc., Water (;o., 1 S~&wyer, 471).
• Sec llunsnn 11. llcCue, 42 Cal. 303;
Mosi«'r r. (.'aldwell, 7 N cv. 36:t
'Wri~ht "· HO\nr«l, 1 Sim. & ~tu.
100; l\11~on "· Hill, a B. & A1L a~;
llartin 1:'. Bigelow, 2 Alk. 1~4; I>u.
Dlllnt "· Kellogg, 29 }[ich. 420: Platt
"· Johnson, 15 Johns. 213: Tyler"·
Wilkinson, 4 Ma•on, 8!)7; Gilman"·
Tilton, 5 N. H. 2:H: Cowll's r. Kid.
iter, 24 N. IT. 3 64; Hoy " 8tt·rn·tt, 9
Watt~. 327; llartzall to. 8ill, 12 Penn.
St. 2cl8; K1·cncy & Wood :'tlunuf. ('n.
tl. Union llanuf. Co., :i9 Conn. 576;
Parker r. llntchkis•, 2.'i Conn. 321;
Ht•ath "·Williams, 25 Me. 209; Snow
tl. Pur>~nns, 28 Vt 4!19; BJi,s "· Kcu.
nc><ly, 43 Ill. 07: W1H1d r. Edt's, 2 Allen, 57~: Thurlwr r;, llartin. 2 Gray,
3!1-!; Gould e. Boston Duck Co., 18
Gray, 442.
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where the use of water upon the public domain is allowed to

be appropriated to private use, independent of any owner.-liip

in the soil; and there the right of the ﬁrst appropriator is

re(-tigiiizeml as the superior right.‘ It is also modiﬁed by those

statutes which in some States allow a riparian proprietor to

ﬂow the lands of those above him, for manufacturing purposes,

on making compensation. “ The priority of ﬁrst po

necessarily arises from the nature of the appropriation; where

two or more have an equal right to appropriate, and where the

actual appropriation by one necessarily excludes all others, the

ﬁrst in time is the ﬁrst in right.”’

Questions may arise as between the adjacent proprietors on

the opposite sides of the water course, or between the upper and

lower proprietors. No one of them has a right to the water

itself, but each of them has a right to the use of the water as it

passes by his estate. And where the water course divides two

estates, each proprietor has a right to the use, not of one-half

merely, but of the whole bulk of the stream;\that is, he is enti-

tled to such advanta_'_;e as it can be to him to have the whole
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stream ﬂow past his estate; and neither can carry off or divert

any part of it without the consent of the other.’ The advan-

tage mi_<_-'ht be very great where the stream is used for moving

machinery, though it is obvious that, in order to obtain power

by means of dams, the consent of the two proprietors would also

be essential, since neither could go upon the land of the other

for the purpose without permission.

The general principle is that every proprietor of land on a

water course is entitled to the enjoyment and use ‘of the stream

substantially according to its natural ﬂow, subject only to such

inti-rruption as is necessary and unavoidable in its reasonable

and proper use by other proprietors. The proprietors above

have no right to divert, or unreasonably to retard the natural

U1

FD

(‘D

Fl:

FI1

C

S7

1 Atchison 0. Peterson, ‘Z0 Wall 507;

Kelly 1:. Nutoniu Water Co., 6 Cal.

105; Butte Canal. etc., Co. n. Vaughn,

ll Cal. 143; Nevada Water Co. 1:.

where the use of water upon the public domain is allowPd tf,
be npprop1·iated to private u~e. independent of any O\\'ner,.:aip
in the soil; and there the right of the first appropriator is
re('o~nized as the supe1·ior right.'
It is a1so modified by those
statutes which in some States allow a riparian proprietor to
:flow the lands of those abo\'e him, for manufacturing purpose.-,
on making conapensation. "The 1lrio1·ity of first possession
necessarily arises from the nature of the appropriation; where
two or more have an equal right to appropriate, and where the
actual appropriatilln by one neC'e8sal'ily excludes all others, the
firt~t in time is the first in right." •
Qnestions may arise as between the adjaeent pmprietors on
the opposite sides of the water conrse, or between the upper nnd
lower proprietors. No one of them has a right to the wnter
itself, but each of them has a right to the U:'c of the water as it
passes by his estate. And where the water course divides two
estates, each proprietor has a right to the use, not of one-half
merely, bnt of the whole hulk of the stream;, that is, he is entitled to such advanta.~e as it can bu to him to ha,·e the whole
stream flow past his e~ta.te; and neither can carry off or divert
any part of it without the con~t~nt of the other." The advantage mi~ht be very great where tiiC stream is nsed f~1J' mo,·ing
machinery~ though it is obvious that, in or,ler to obtain power
by means of dams, the cousent of the two p1·oprictors would also
be essential, since neither could go uptJn the land of tl1c othm·
for the purpose without pcnni.,sion.
Tl1e general principle is that e\·ery proprietor of land on a
water course is eutitled to the enjoyment and u~e 'of the stream
substantially accorJing to its natural flow, subject only to stH:h
iu t.Pl'l'll ption as is necessa1·y and unavoidable in its rea~"nal .Je
and proper use by other proprietors. The proprietors above
have no right to divert, or unreasonably to reta1·d the natural

Powell, 34 Cal. 109; Lobdcll 0. Simp-

son, 2 Nev. 274; Opliir S. M. Co. 1.1.

Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534; Bnrncs 0. Sab-

rou, 10 Nev. 217.

‘Gould e. Boston Duck Co., 13

_H

Gray, 442, 451; Fuller 1:. Chicopec

Manuf. Co., 16 Gray, 43; Lincoin r.

Cliudbouriic, 56 Me. 197.

3 Blanchard -0. Baker, 8 Me. 253:

Vaudenburgh v.Van Bergen, 13 Johns.

212; Pratt 11. Lamson, 2 Allen, 275;

Cunnl Tru.~"Iecs 0. Haven, 11 Ill. 554;

Harding 0. Water Co. 41 Conn. 87.

1 Atchison 11. Peterson, 20 Wall 507;
K!'lly v. Natonm Water Co., 6 Cnl.
105; Butte Can Ill. etc., Co. 11. Vaughn,
11 Cal. 143; Nevada Water Co. v.
Powell, 34 Cal. 109; Lobdell 11. Simpson, 2 Nev. 274; Ophir S. 111. Co. 11.
Caqwnter, 4 Nev. 534; Barnes 11. Sab.
ron, 10 Nc\'. 217.
t Gould 11. Boston Duck Co., 13

Gray, 442, 451; Fuller t'. Chicopee
Mann f. Co., 16 Gray. -l3; Lim·oln ~.
Chadbourne, 56 Me. 197.
a Blanchard fl. Bakel', 8 ?tie. 253;
Vanden bu rgll tl. Van Bergen, 13 Johns.
212; Pratt 1'. Lamson, 2 Allen, 275;
C:mal Trustee!! o. H:wen, 11 Ill. 55!;
lbruing 11. Water Co. 41 Conn. 87.
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ﬂow of the water to the proprietors below, and the proprietors
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below have no right to retard it or turn it back upon the pro-

prietors above to their prejudice.‘ The use may be for mills,

for irrigation or other agricultural purposes; in short for any

purpose whatsoever, within the limits of what is reasonable.

Diversion. The upper proprietor is at liberty to divert the

water irom its natural channel on his own estate at will, pro-

vided he returns it again before it leaves his land, and allows

it to pass as it naturally would to those entitled to its use below

:flow of the water to the proprietors below, and the proprietors
below have no right to retard it or turn it back upon the proprietors above to their prejudice.• The use may be tor mills,
tor inigntion or other agricultural pnrpo,;e~; in short for any
purpose whatsoev~r, within the limits of what is reasonable.

him.’ But he has no right to divert it without thus returning

it; and to turn any portion of it into a new channel would be

an actionable injury.‘ He may not divert the Water even for the

purposes of repair of machinery; though a mere detention of

the water for that purpose would be lawful, if not under the

circumstances unreasonable.‘

A town or city cannot by purchase of an upper proprietor,

or even by legislation, acquire the right to appropriate a water

course for municipal purposes, without the consent of the pro-

prietors below, or without ﬁrst appropriating their interests

under the eminent domain.‘

I

Reasonable Use. The reasonableness of the use depends
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upon the nature and size of the stream, the business or pur-

poses to which it is made subservient, and on the ever-varying

' Wriuht 0. Howard. 1 Sim. & Stu. 1; Porter 0. Durham, 74 N. C. 767;

190; ‘Vt-hh v. Portland .\lanuf'. Co., 3

Sum. 1&9; Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me.

253 ; Thurber a. Martin, 2 Gray, SSH;

Chandler v. Ilowland, 7 Gray, 3l8;

Gould r. Boston Duck (‘o., 13 Gray,

442; Miller 0. Miller. 9 Penn. St. 74;

Diversion. The upper proprietor is at lilwrty to divert the
water irom its natural channel on his own estate at will, provided he returns it again before it leaves his land, and allows
it to pa!'s as it natmally would to tlwse entitled to ite. u~e below
him.• But he has no right to di\'ert it without thus returning
it; and to turn any po1·tion of it into a new chRnnel would be
an actionahle injury.• He may not din~rt the water even for the
pu rp"se,; of r<'pair of machit1ery; though a mere dctl'ntion of
the water for that purpose would be lawful, if nut under the
circumstances unrea:<onable.•
A town or city cannot by purchase of an upper proprietor,
or en·11 hy lPgislation, acquire the right to appropriate a water
couri'e f(lr 111 uuici pnl pnrpo,.:t'"· without the con,;cn t of the pro.
pri(!tors below, or without first appropriating their interc~:~ts
under the eminent domain.•

Pool 0. Lewis, 41 Geo. 162; S. C. 5

Am. Rep. 526; Arnold o. Foot, 12

Went]. 21230.

‘Tulle r. Correth, 31 Tex. 362;

Gould v. Boston Duck Co., 18 Gray,

Reasonable Use. Tho rC'n~onnblr!ne~s of the use depends
npon the nature and size of the t'trenm, the bn:::ine~s or purposes to which it is made sub~ervient, and on the en~r-varying

442; Dilling 0. Murray. 6 Ind. 3'34;

Van Hoesen 0. Coventry, 10 Barb.

518; Sackritler r. Beers, 10 Johns. 241;

Merritt c. Brinkerhotf, 17 Johns. 306;

Oregon Iron C0. 0. Trullinger, 3 Ore.

Blanchard 0. Baker, S Me. ‘Z53.

‘ Webb 1:. Portland Manuf. Co., 3

Sum. 189; Parker 0. Griswold, 17

Conn. 28?; Harding v. Stalnfonl Wa-

ter Co., 41 Conn. 8?; Ncwhall c. Ire-

son, 8 Cush. 595; Pratt r. Lmuson, 2

Allen, 275; Anthony v. Laph rm, 5

Pick. 1'75 ; Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me.

2-‘>3: Vandenburgh 1:. Van Bergen, 13

Johns. ‘.312.

‘ Davis n. Getehell, 50 Me. (F02;

Van lloesen v. Coventry, 10 Barb. 518.

See Angell on Water c., § 90 a.

' Wills, etc., Canal Co. e. Swimlon

Water Works Co., L. R. 9 Ch. Ap.

451; S. C. L. R. 7 H. L. 697; Gard.

ner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.

' Wri!:rht "· Hownrd. t Aim. & Atu.
100; Wt•hh "· Portland )farm f. Co., 3
Sum. 1t-1); lllunchard "· B:1ker, 8 ~I c.
2.'i3; Thurber o. llartin, 2 Gray, ::!H;
Chandler c. Howland, 7 Gray, 31l:!;
Gouhl r. Bo:o~ton Duck Co., 13 Oray,
4-t2; ~lilh·r r. l\lilier. 9 Penn. 81. 74;
Pool "· Lewis, 41 Gco. 16~; S. C. t)
Am. Hep. 526 ; Arnold "· Foot, 12
Wend. :;;lO.
t TolJe r. ('orreth, 81 Tex. :lfi2;
Gould "· But-ton Duck Co., 18 Gray,
442; DiJling "· llurrlly. 6 Ind. :!:!4;
Van Hot•st•n fl. Cm·entry, 10 Barb.
518; Sackrlderr. Bct·rs. lOJohnA. 241;
:M•·rritt t. Brinkerhoff, 17 John~. :!06;
Oregon Iwn Co. "· TruJlingcr, 3 Ore.

l ; Pnrtcr "· Durham, 74 N. C. 707;
lllllnl"lmrd "· Rakl'f, 8 :\[('. 2:>!1.
1 Webb "· Porllanll ~lllnuf. Co., 8
Sam. 1H9; Psrker "· Grbwoltl, 17
Conn. 2Hi; Hanlin~ "· ~1Rmfnr1l Wa.
tcr Co., 41 Conn. Si; Ncwh:dl r. Ire.
son, 8 Cusla. 595; Pratt r. Lnmsnn, 2
Allen, 275; Anthony r. Lsph 'Ill. 3
Pick. 17;) ; Blanchard"· llakcr, 8 )lc.
2;):l: Vandenburgh"· Van Bt·rgt·n, 18
Johns. 212.
• l>n,·is "· Gctdtcll, 50 lie. (j()'~;
Van llnc·~en 11. ('oventry, 10 B:aru. 51~.
SeP Angell on Water c . ,~ 99 tJ.
• Wilt:~, Nc., Clln&l Co. t'. Swindnn
Water Works Co., L. R. 9 Ch. Ap.
4.'lt; S. C. L. R. 7 H. L. 69i; Gnrd.
ner ,. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
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circumstances of each particular case. Each case must there-
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fore stand upon its own lacts, and can be a guide in other cases

only as it may illustrate the application of general principles.‘

It has been well said that in determining upon the reasonable-

ness of the use, it is necessary to take into account not only the

general customs of the country, but also any local customs along

the stream; and that such general rule should be laid down as

appears best calculated to secure the entire water of the stream

to useful purposes.’

Detention of the Water. The general rule is that each ripa-

rian proprietor is entitled to the steady ﬂow of the stream,

according to its natural course. But to apply this rule strictly

would be to preclude the best use of ﬂowing waters in most

cases; and where power is desired, the rule must yield to the

circnmstanoes of each particular case. Each case must therefore stand upon its own facts, and can be a guide in other eases
only aa it may illustrate the application of general principles.'
It has been well said that in determining upon the reasonableness of the use, it is necessary to take into account not only the
general customs of the country, but also any local customs along
the stream; and that such general rule should be lnid do\nl as
appears best calculated to secure the entire water of the stream
to useful purposes.•

necessity of gathering the water into reservoirs. It is lawful

to do this where it is done in good faith,’ for a useful purpose,

and with as little interference with the rights of other propri-

etors as is reasonably practicable under the circumstancc.<.' It

is an unreasonable detention of the water to gather it into reser-

voirs for future use in a dry season, or for the purpose of obtain-

ing a greater supply than the stream aﬁ'ords by its natural ﬂow in

ordinary stages,’ or in order that, by letting it off occasionally a
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‘ Hetrich o. Deuohlc-r, 6 Penn. St. 156; Gould v. Boston Duck Co., 13

32; Davis v. Winslow, 51 Me. 264;

Tyler 0. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397;

Davis v. Getchell, 50 Me. 602 ; Hayes

v. Waldron, 44 N. H. 530; Holden v.

Lake Co., 53 N. H. 552; Parker 0.

Ilolchkiss, 25 Conn. H21; Pool o.

Lewis. 41 Geo. 162; S. C. 5 Am. Rep.

526; Honsce o. Hammond, 39 Barb.

89; Dilliug v. Murray, 6 Ind. 324;

Gould u. Boston Duck Co, 13 Gray,

Detention of the Water. The general rule is that ea<'h riparian proprietor is entitled to the steady flow of the stream,
according to its natural course. But to apply this rule strictly
would be to preclude the best use of flowing watel'B in most
cast>s; and where power is desi1-ed, the rule must yield to the
necessity of gathering the water into reservoirs. It is lawful
to do this where it is done in good faith,' tor a usefnl purpose,
and with as little interference with the rights of other proprietors as is reasonably practicable under the circumstall<~e,;.' It
is an unreasonable detention of the water to gather it into reservoirs tor future use in a dry sea.--on, or for the purpose of obtaining a greater supply than the stream affords by its natural flow in
ordinary stages,' or in order that, by letting it off oecasionally a

442; Timm v. Bear, 29 Wis. 254;

Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459; Du-

mout -v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420; Em-

brcy v. Owcn, 6 Exch. 352; Chase-

more v. Richards, 2 H. & N. 168.

* Kccney, etc., Manuf. Co. v. Union

Manuf. Co., 39 Conn. 576.

' Hoy v. Sterrctt, 2 Watts, 327.

‘ Pitts o. Lancaster Mills, 13 Met.

Gray, 442; Wood 0. Edcs, 2 Allen,

578; City of Springﬁeld v. Harris, 4

Allen, 494; Helrich v. Deachler, 6

|Penn. St. 32; llarlzall o. Sill, 12 Penn.

St. 248; Hoy v. Slerrett, 2 Walls, 3'27;

Plutt o. Johnson, 15 Johns. 213; Van

Hoesen -v. Coventry. 10 Barb. 518;

Clinton 0. Myers, 46 N. Y, 511; S. C.

7Am Rep 373; Mable v. llalteson,

1'7 Wis. 1; Davis 1:. Gelchell, 50 Me.

602; Parker o. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn.

321; Pool v. Lewis. 41 Ga. 162; S. C.

5 Am. Rep. 526; Oregon Iron C0. 0.

Trullingur, 3 Ore. 1.

‘ Clinton v. Myers, 46 N. Y. 511 ; S.

O. 7 Am. Rep. 3'73; Brace r. Yale. 10

Allen, 441; Timm o. Bear, 29 Wis.

254.

é —-—€

1 Hetrich .,. DeRchlrr, 6 Penn. St.
82; Davis "· WinMiow, 51 Me. 264;
Tyler "· Wilkinson, 4 }IRson, 397 ;
Davis tl. Getchell, 50 Me. 602 ; Hayes
o. Waldron, 44 N. H. 5~0; Holden"·
Lake Co., 58 N . H. 552; Parker .,.
Ilotc:hkiss, 25 Conn. il21; Pool "·
Lewis. 41 Geo. 162; 8. C. 1i Am. Hcp.
526; Honsee .,. Hammond, 89 Barll.
89; Dilling "· l'tlurray, 6 Ind. 324;
Gould "· B<>ston Duck C•J , 18 Gray,
442; Timm "· Bear, 29 Wis. 254;
Snmv tl. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459 ; Dumont"· Kellog-g, 2fJ Mich. 420; Em.
brey "· 0 wen, 6 Exch. a.'i2 ; Chase.
more"· Hichards, 2 H. & N. 1U8.
i Keeney, etc .. Manuf. Co."· Union
Manur. Co., 39 Conn. 576.
1 Hoy r.. Ste1-rctt, 2 Watts, 827.
' Pitts "· Lancaster Mills, 18 Met.

156 ; Gould .,. Boston Duck Co., 18
Gray, 442; Wood "· Edes, 2 Allen,
578 ; City of Springfield IJ. Harris, 4:
Allen, 494 ; Hl•trich r. Deachlcr, 6
,Penn. !:it. 32 ; Hartzull.,. Sill, 12 Penn.
St. 248; Hoy "· Sterrett, 2 Walts, 327;
Platt"· Johnson, 15 Johns. 213; Van
IIoesen .,. Coventry. 10 Harll. 518;
Clinton r. Myers, 4G N. Y. 511; S. C.
7 Am Rep 373; ~lubie 11. :Iatteson,
17 Wis. 1; Davis o. Getchell, 50 Me.
602; Parker " · Hotchkiss, 23 Conn.
321; Pool t:. Lewis. 41 Ga. 162; S. C.
5 Am. Rep. 526; Oregon Iron Co. "·
Trullinger, 8 Ore. 1.
6 Clinton "'· Myers, 46 N. Y. 511 ; 8.
C. 7 Am. Rep. 873; Brare v. Yale. 10
Allen, 441 ; Timm "· Bear, 29 Wis.
254.
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ﬁood may be obtained for the purpose of floating logs;‘ but it

is not unreasonable, and therefore not unlawful to detain the

surplus water not used in a wet season and discharge it in

proper quantities for use in a dry season.’

Diminution of the Water. The right of the lower proprietor

flood may bo obtaine<i for the purpose of floating logs;' hut it
i8 not unreasonable, and therefore not unlawful to detain the
surplus water not used in a wet season and di&charge it in
proper quantities for use in a dry season.•

to have the stream ﬂow to him in undiminished volume is quali-

ﬁed to this extent, that the proprietor may lawfully withdraw

from it whatever may be necessary to supply the wants of his

ﬁunily and of his domestic animals, and also for irrigation, man-

ufacturing and other useful purposes. provided what he with-

draws does not essentially diminish the volume to the prejudice

of those below him.‘

Flooding Lands by Water. At the common law,‘ the owner

of land has no right, by dams or otherwise, to cause the water

of a stream passing through his lands to set back upon the lands

of a proprietor above. Ile must allow the water to enter upon

Diminution or the Water. The right of the lower proprietor
to have the stream flow to him in undiminished volume is qualified to this extent, that the proprietor may lawfully withdraw
from it whatever may be necessary to supply the wantt! of his
family aud of his dnmestic animal!', and ah~o for irrigation, manufacturing and other Ut;cful purposes. provided what he withdt·aws does not essentially diminish the volume to the prejudice
of thooc below him.•

l Thunder Bay, etc., (10.0. Speechly,

31 Mich. 336 ; S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 184.

’ Oregon Iron Co. 0. Trulliuger, B
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Ore. 1, 7. The discharge, however,

must not be made in such unusual

and unuulurul quantities as to pre-

clude the lower proprietors from

Flooding Lands by Water. At the common law,' tl.e owner
of land ha8 no right, by dams or otllenvi=-c, to cause the water
of a stream passing through his lands to t'et back upon the lauds
of a proprietor abO\re. lie must allow the water to enter upon

making use of it as it ﬂows past

them. Pollilt 0. Long, 58 Barb. 20;

Merritt v. Brinkerhoff, 17 Johns. 306;

Thunder Buy ()0. o. Spcechly, 31

Mich. 336; Thurber o. Martin, 2

Gray, 39-1; Oregon Iron Co. 0. Trul-

linger, 3 Ore. 1.

in Drake v Hamilton Woolen Co.,

99 Mass. 574, it was held that the

owner ot‘ a l'eaer\'0ll‘ and mill may

discharge from his reservoir in dry

season what is reasonably necessary

for the use of his mill if it does not

increase the volume beyond its usuul

limits, though it exceeds the mnount

which would naturally ﬂow during

such season and renders the interme-

diate lnnd wet and less valuable for

cultivation.

Whatever injury is incidental to a

reasonable use of the water of a run-

nlng stream is of course dru/mum

alsque injurin. Tyler o. Wilkinson,

4 Masson. 397, 401; Chandler v. How-

land, 7 Gray, 3-I8; Pitts r. Lancaster

Mills, 12! )[et.1-36 ; Hetrich c. Douch-

ler, 6 Penn. St. 82; Hartzall v. Sill,12

Penn. St. 248; Bliss 0. Kennedy, 43

Ill. 68.

3 Evans 0. Merriweather. 4 Ill. -192;

Bliss r. Kennedy, 43 lll. 63: Fleming

u. I)a\'is, ll? Tex. 173: Blanchard v.

Baker, 8 Me 253; Lupham r. An-

thony, 5 Pick. 175; Lakin c. Antes,

10 Cush. 193; Colhurn v. Ricliards, 13

Mass. 420; Arnold v. Foot. 12 \\'eud.

330; Randall r. Silverthorn, 4 Penn.

St. 178; Wadsworth v. Tillotson, 15

Conn. 366; Gillett 0. John-on, 30

Conn. 190; limbrey 1: Owen, 6 Exch.

8-33; Sampson o. Hoddinott, 1 C. B.

(N. s.) 590; Wood 0. Wand, 3 Exeh.

748. 780; (‘hasemore r. Richards, 2

I Thun<ll·r Blly, etc., Co."· SpePchly,
S1 llich. :mu; 8. c. 18 Am. Ht·p. 184.
'Ort•g.. n Iron Cn. 1'. Trullin~er, S
Ore. 1, 7. The discharge, however,
must not be made in such unusual
and unnutuml quantities 88 to preclude the lower proprietors from
mnkin~ usc of it as it ftows past
them. Pollitt 11. Lon~. 58 Baru. 20;
J\lrrritt tl. Brinkerhoff, 17 Johns. :lO(i;
Thuntll"r Bay Co. "· Speerllly, 31
Mich. a:;G; Thurber "· llu.rtin, 2
Gray, 394; Oregon Iron Co. 1'. Trullinger, 8 Ore. 1.
In Drakt• 11 llRmllton Woolen Co.,
99 lll:\lls. 5i4, it was held tlmt the
owner of a rt'Nt!rvoir and mill may
dlschur~e from his rl'servoir in dry
ecuson what is reasonably nPrcssnry
for the usc of his mill if it tlot•s not
lnereusc the vohlm!' ht•yond its usual
limits. thou~h it exl'ePds the umount
which would natuntlly ftow during
such 3cason and rendt·rs the intcrmc.
diatc land wet and lcSll valuuule for
cultivation.
Whutevt>r Injury Ia incidental to a

J'(':tsonahle use of the water of a running stream is of course dnm1111m
alsqtu injuria. Tyler 1'. Wilkinson,
4 llasson. !1!17, 401; Chandler 11. Howland, 7 Gray, 348 ; Pitts r. Lunca..... tt.•r
llillo~, 1:1 llet. 1."16 ; Hctrich r;. l>eachler, 6 Pf'nn. St. 82 ; Hartz:11l D. Sill, 12
Penn. St. 248; Blis<J 1'. Kennedy, 43
Ill. 6~.
3 E\·an" "· llerriweather, 4 Ill. 492:
Bli,;,. r. Kt•n1wdy, 43 111. flR: I<'h·miug
1'. Davi~. :li Tf':t. li:l: Bl:mehard "·
Baker, 8 lie 2;;3: Lapham r. Anthony, 5 Piek. 175; L11kin t:. Autell,
10 Cush. W~: Col hnrn "·Hie bards, 13
:Mas,.. 420; Arnold r. Foot, 1:.! W t'IHI.
330; Randl\11 r. ~ih·erthnrn. 4 Penn.
St. 17R; '\"ads worth 1'. Tillotson, 15
Conn. 3fl(l; Gilh•tt 1'. John-on, 30
Conn. tfiO; l:murt•y" Owen, II l<~xd1.
853: SAmpson 1'. Hotltl inntt, 1 C. B.
(N. s.) lifiO; Wood "·Want!, 3 Exrh.
74~. 7~0: Chn~t·more r. Riehartlll, 2
H. & N. 16"l. Compare Wl'ston r. Ald<·n, 8 Xnss. 136; Perkins"· Dow, 1
Rnnt, 535; lluywooJ "·Muon, 1 Root,
637.
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his premises in the accustomed way, and the upper proprietor,
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if necessary, may cross his line -to keep the channel open.‘ Any

act of his which raises the water in the stream above his estate

is presumptively damaging, and therefore actionable.’ It is

actionable also, because, if persisted in, without objection, it

might, in the lapse of time, establish permanent rights by pre-

scription.‘ Any showing of actual damage is therefore unne-

cessary to the maintenance of the action.‘ It has been already

stated, that in aid of manufactures, this common law has been so

far changed by statute in some States as to allow parties to ﬂow

the lands of others for the purpose of obtaining power, on making

compensation.’

All the foregoing principles are as much applicable to muni-

cipal corporations in their dealings with.water courses as to

individuals. Thus, if a town shall so erect a bridge as that the

natural and probable consequence shall be to raise the wa:er on

the lands above, by the partial obstruction interposed to its

ﬂow, the town will be liable, as an individual would for a like

obstruction.‘

‘ Prescott 0. Williams, 5 Met. 429.

" Bell v. Mc(Ilintock, 9 Watts, 119;

Martin v. Riddle. 26 Penn. St. 415;
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Brown 1:. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519; Brown

o. Cayuga,etc., R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 486;

Be-llinger v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 23

N. Y. 42; Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y.

520; Williams 1». Nelson, 23 Pick.

141; Staple v. Spring, 10 Mass. '72;

his premises in the accustomed way, and the upper proprietor,
if ncccs:;ary, may cross his line .to keep the channel upen.' Any
act uf his whieh raises the water in the stream abo\·e his estate
is presumptively damaging, and therefore actionable.• It is
actionable also, because, if persisted in, without objection, it
might, in the lapse of time, establish permanent rights by prescription.• .Any showing of actual damage is thcrd'ot"C nnnece~;sary to the maintenance of the action! It has l1een alre.a dy
stateLl, that in aid of manufactures, this common law has been so
far changed by statute in some States as to allow parties to flow
the lands of others for the purpose of obtaining power, on making
cum pensation. •
.All the foregoing principles are as much applicable to municipal corporations in theit· dealings with. water cour:w~ as to
individuals. Thus, if a town shall so erect a bridge ns that the
natural and probable cons~q Hence shall be to rai,.;c tlae wa~er on
the lands above, by the partial obstruction interposed to its
flow, the town will be liable, as an indi\·idual would for a. like
obstruction.•

Smith 12. Agawam Canal, 2 Allen. 355;

Monson v. Fuller, 15 Pick. 554; Pills-

bury v. Moore, 44 Me. 154; Monroe u.

Gates, 48 Me. 463; Stront p. Milbridgc

Co., 45 ;\le. '76; Merritt v. Parker, 1 N.

J. 460; Phiuzy 0. Au_-Justa, 47 Geo.

260; \Vl1itcomb v. Vt. Cent. R. R. Co.,

25 Vt. 49; Davis 1;. Fuller, 12 Vt. 178;

Hutchinson 1;. Granger, 13 Vt. 3-‘S6;

Cowles 0. Kidder, 21 N. H. 364;

W'ood|nan v. Tufts, 9 N. H. 88; Amos-

keug Munuf. Co. 0. Goodale, 46 N.

H. 53; Miss. Cent. R. R. Co. 0. Ca-

ruth, 51 Miss. 77; Arimond v. Green

Buy, etc., Co., 81 Wis. 316; Lull 0.

-- - 7 _ - _ h _-Ii‘

Davis, 1 Mich. '77; Eaton 0. Railroad

Co.. 51 N. H. 504.

' Sec ante, p. 66; Mississippi Com,

R. R. (Yo. o. Mason, 51 Miss. 2134.

‘ Ante, p. 66, and cases cited. The

rule applies not only to the raising of

water, but to any diversion or deten-

tion that cannot be jnsliticd on the

ground of reasonable use. (‘ook o.

llull, 3 Pick. 269;Butm:1n v lins-

sey. 12 Me. 407; Monroe r. Stick.

ncy, 48 Me. 462; Parker 1:. Griswold,

Pn·scott 11. Wilhnms, 15 1\let. 429.
BdiD 1\IC'Ciintock, 9 Watts, 119;
Martin "· Hiddlr. 26 Pt•nn. St. 415;
Brownv.Howen,SON. Y.519; Brown
"·Cayuga, etc., R. R. Co., 12 N.Y. 486;
Bellinger "· N. Y. Cl·nt. R. R. Co., 23
N.Y. 42; Pixl(•y "· Clark, 3.''i N.Y.
520; Williams "· NC'Ison, 23 Piek.
141; Staple ,, Spring, 10 1\lass. 72;
Smith "· Agawam C1mal, 2 Allt·n, 3.15;
Monson "'·Fuller, 15 Pick. 554; Pillsbury v. Moore, 44 Me. 154; :Monroe t~.
G11tes, 48 1\lc 403; ~tr·out '!'· 1\1 illJridgc
Co., 45 ~I e. 76; Merritt,, Parker, 1 N.
J . 400; Puiuzy "'· Au)!'usta, 47 GelJ.
200; Whitcomb "· Vt. Cent. R. R Co.,
2t> Vt. 49; Duvi:o~ "·Fuller, 12 Vt. 178;
Hutchinson "· Grang1•r, 13 Vt. 386;
Cowles "· Kidder, 2-l N. H. 364;
Woodman"· Tufts, 9 N.H. tiS; Amoskcag )lauuf. Co. 11. Goouale, 46 N.
H. 53 ; .Miss. Cent. R. R. Co. "· Caruth, 51 .Miss. 77; Arimond "'· Green
Bay, etc., Co., 81 Wis. 316; Lull e.
J

2

Davis, 1 Mich. 77; Eaton e. R~tilroad
Co.. 51 N. H. ,jO.l.
1 8('1' nntc, p. 66; Mi;:si~sippi Cent.
R R Co."· :\IRSon, 51 llis:; 2:J4.
• Antr, p. 66, and ca~>rs cited. The
rule applies not only to the rabing of
water, but to nny lli\'ersion or d...tcntion tlmt cnnnot he justitkJ on the
ground of rt•asonnhll' usc. Cook "·
Hull, S Pick. 269; Butman t Hussey, 12 l\le. 407; )[onroc r. ~til' kIll')". 48 Me. 402; Parke1· "· Griswold,
17 Conn. 287; Woollmnn t1. Tufts, 9
N. H . 88; Amoskeng 1\lnnuf. Co. "·
GnodzllC, 46 N. II. 5:J; Newhall t".
Ireson, 8 Cush. 1ifl5: \Vi Its, ('11:'., Ca.
nal Co."· Swindon Wat(•r Works Co.,
L. R. 9 Ch. Ap. 451; S. C. L. H. 7 II.
L 697.
• The cases nndcr thesl' statute!~ are
collcctcJ in Cooley Const. Lim. 61i6669.
6 Haynes "· Burlington, 38 Vt. 350;
Lawrence "· FairhliVl'D, o Gray, 110;

17 Conn. 287; \Voodman e. Tufts, 9

N. H. 88: Amoskcng Munuf. (‘o_ »v_

Goodule, 46 N. Il. 53; Newlmll 1-,

lreson, 8 (lush. 595; Wills, etc., (Ta-

nal Co. v. Swindon Water Works (‘o.,

L. R. 9 Ch. Ap. 451; S. C. L. R. T H.

L 697.

' The cases under these statutes are

collected in Cooley Const. Lim. 666-

669.

° Haynes 0. Burlington, 38 Vt. 350;

Lawrence o. Fairliuven, 5 Gray, 110;

I
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Fouling the Water of Streams, etc. It has been said, in one

587

case, that whether the use of a stream to carry otl' the waste from

a manufaetory is reasonable or not, is a (1114-.~'tli()n of fact for the

jury, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case;

such as the size and character of the stream, and for what pur-

poses it is used, the extent of the pollution, the beneﬁt to the

manufacturer, and the injury to the other riparian owners.‘ The

general right of every riparian owner is to have the stream come

to him in its natural state,‘ and when the privilege is claimed

to do that which will foul the water to his prejudice, the reason-

ableness of so doing must be justiﬁed by the circmnstances, and

usage short of the period of prescription cannot determine this.“

In the leading case of ll’/1/ul v. Wazul, the ground of complaint

was that the defendant fouled the water of a stream, to the preju-

dice of lower riparian proprietors, by pouring into it soapsuds,

wool comber’s suds, etc. In defense, is was urgel that the act

of defendant did no actual damage to the plnintitfs, because the

stream was already so polluted by similar acts of mill owners

above the defendan t’s mills, etc., that the wrongt'ul act complained

of made no practical difference. It was held, notwitl1stan<ling,

that the plaintiffs had received damage in point of law: “they

had a right to the natural stream ﬂowing through the land in its
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natural state, as an incident to the right to the land on which the

water course ﬂowed/" And again, it is said, in Ilols/min v.

Boiling Spring Blerzc/u'n_q Co., “ Every owner of land, through

which a stream of water ﬂows, is entitled to the use and enjoy-

ment of the water, and to have the same flow in its natural and

accustomed course, without obstruction, diversion, or pollution.

Parker 0. Lowell, 11 Gray, 353;

Sprague 0. Wo|'('este1', 13 Gray, 193;

llelena v. Tlimnpson, 29 Ark. 569.

' Iluyes r. Waldron, 44 N. H. 580.

Sec .\Iurg:\troyd v. Robinson, '7 El. &

BI. 391; Merriﬂeld n. Lombard, 13 Al-

len. 16; Merriﬁeld o. Wort-estc-r,110

Muss. 216; S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 592.

' .\lt-rriﬂeld u. Lombard, 13 Allen,

16; Glndfclter 1:. Wztlkt-r, 40 Md. 1.

' Stockport Waterworks (Yo. 0. Pot-

ter. 7 H. & N. 160; Clowes v. Staf-

fordshire Potteries, etc., Co., L. 11.8

Fouling the Water or Streams, etc. It lu1s heen ~aid, in one
case, that whether tho use of a stream to cnny oft' the wm;tc from
a manufactory is reasonable or not, is a q llf':-<tion of fact fur the
jury, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case;
such as the size and character of the stream, and tor what purpo•P~ it is used, the extent of the pollntiou, the benefit to the
tu:utufacturer, and the injury to the otlter riparinn o.v;.ers.' The
general right of every riparian owner is to have the strl'!Un come
to him in its natural Rtate; • und when the privih·ge is clnimeu
to <lu that which will foul the water to his pnjudice, the reasonableness of so doing must be justified by the cir·cnmst:mces, and
ut:ngc short of the period of preset·iption cannot <letcrmiue tltis.•
In the lending ca$e of w·ood v. lraud, the grunnd of complaint
was that the defcwlant fouled the water ot' a ,;tream, to the prt·judk'C of lower riparian proprietors, by pouring into it ~:»u:q>sn<ls,
wool comber's suds, etc. In defen;,c, is was urge I that the act
qf defeudn.nt did no actual damage to the phintill's, bccau:;.c the
stt·eam Wl\8 lllready so polluted by similar acts of mill owners
nhovc the del(mdant's mills, etc., that the wrongfula<'t complained
of made no practical difference. It was helu, uvt,dthstawling,
tlmt the plaintiffs had recch•ed damage in p11int of law: '' tht·y
had a right to the natural stream flowing through the land in its
uatmal state, as an incident to the right to the laud on which the
water cont·se flowed." • And ag1lin, it i:-; said, in llolxm•w, v.
Boiling Sprluy Ble((clu'ug Co., "'E\'l'r,Y owuer of laud, through
which a stream of water flows, is entitled to the u::.e and cu}J.Yment of the water, and to ha ...·e the :;:une flow in its natural and
accustomed course, without oL,tl"lletion, divert>ion, or pollution.

Ch. Ap. 125; Norton v. Scholeﬁeld, 9

M. & W. 665; Goldsmid 0. Commit;

sioners. L. R. 1 On. Ap. 349; Wright

o.Willinu1s, 1 M. & W. '77; Baxt-ndale

r. .\It~.\iurray, L. IL 2 Ch. Ap. T90; St.

Tleicns’ ('hemical Co. 0. St. Ilelens, 1

Ext-h. Div. 196; Richmond, etc., (‘o.

1:. Atlantic. etc., (‘o . 10 R. I 106; Bly.

denburgh r. .\lilcs.31! Conn. 484; .\Ier-

riﬁt-ld v. Lombard, 13 Allen, 16; lluyes

1!. \Vnldron_ 44 .\'. ll. 550; Mcrriﬁt-ld

0. ¥Vorct-ster, 110 Mass 210; llowell

0. .\IcCoy, 3 ltnwlc, 256.

‘ Wood 0. Wand. 3 Exch. 748, 772.

Bee Btonehewer v. Farrar, 6 Q. B. 780.

Parker e. Lowell,

Sprngue e.
Helena

~-

11 Hmy, 8!i!l;

Won·r:~tcr,

18 Gr"Y· 193;

Thomp)<on, 29 Ark. 569.
r. Waldron, 44 N. H. 580.
Sec )Jurgntro~·d 11. Rohin~on, 7 El. &
B:. aut; llerriflf'ld "· Lmnhnn.l, 13 Allen. 16; l\lcrrifield tl. \\'on•e)<ter, 110
}Ius'. 216; S.C. 14 Am. Rt•p. !i!.l2.
' )lt>rrifleld e. Lombtutl, til Allen,
16; Gl:nlft•ltcr e. Wnlkt•r. 40 lld. 1.
1 Stockport WaterworkR Co. e. Pot.
ter, 7 H. & N. 160; Clowe~ 11. 8taf.
fonlsbire Potteries, t•tc., Co., L. H. 8
Ch. Ap. 125; Norton 1). Bcholdield, 9
1

lluye~

.M. & W. 66S; Gohlllmitl e. Commi~
aioner!l, L. R. 1 Cu. Ap. 349; Wri1!ht
"· Willinms, 1 ll. & W. 77; llax1•ntlale
t'. ~ll<\lnrray, L. H. 2 Ch. Ap. i!IO; S~.
Heiens' Chemical Co. •· tit Helens, 1
Ex1'11. Div. 11.16; Richmond, el!'., ('o.
r. Atlantic. f'te., ( 'o. to H. I 100; Blydenburgh r. ~~ iles, 311 Conn. 484; ~I cr.
riflPid r. Lomhard . 13 Allen,16; Hayes
"· Wnldrnn, 44 .X. II. 5~0; ~lerrifl..Jd
"· ·worcester, 110 ~la,.s 216; Howell
e. llcCoy, 3 Hnwle, 2:i6.
4 Wood e. WtJUt.l, !J Exeh. 748, 772.
Bee Stonehewer e. Farrar, 6 Q. B. 730.

588 THE LAW or TORTS.

The right extends to the quality, as well as to the quantity of
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the water. If, therefore, an adjoining proprietor corrupts the

water, an action upon the case lies for the injury.” ‘ Language

equally pointed is used in other cases.’ Nevertheless, we think

these must be understood merely as strong and clear declarations

of the general principle in eases in which it did not become

necessary to consider how far there might be exceptions, or‘how

far one might be at liberty to complain of insigniﬁcant injuries

which still left the stream to ﬂow on_in the main as it did before.

Every saw mill upon a stream of water to some extent chang

the natural condition of the water, and many saw mills may

entirely unﬁt it for some purposes; but a very large proportion

of the value of all the streams in the country would be sunk and

lost, if mills might not be erected upon them heetuse some

taint to the water was inevitable from their use. But if there

may be some change in the natural condition of the water with-

out legal wrong, the question, how much, and what. shall consti-

tute a legal wrong must necessarily, it seems to us, be a question

of what, under the circumstances, is a reasonable use. This is

strongly and clearly put by Chief Justice R:-m"n~:i.u, in one ease:

“The reasonableness of the use.” he says, “ must determine

the right, and this must depend upon the extent of detriment to
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the riparian proprietors below. If it essentially impairs the use

below, then it is unreasonable and unlawful, unless it is a thing

(T-

(Ia

l Holsman 0. Boiling Spring Bleach-

ing Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 335, 342, citing

Aldred‘s Case, 9 Co. 59, and other

cases. This language is approved

and adopt:-d in Richmond Manuf. Co.

0. Atlantic Delaine Co., 10 R. I. 106,

111. In both cases the language of

Chancellor KENT is quoted with ap-

proval: “The right of the riparian

The right extends to the qualit!J, as well as to the quantity of
the water. If, therefore, an adjoining proprietor corrupts the
water, an action upon the case lies for the injury." 1 Langu~uoe
equally pointed is used in other cases.' Nevertheless, we think
these must be understood merely as strong and clear declarations
of the general pri11ciple in cases in which it did not become
necessat·y to consider how tar there might he exceptions, or ·hn\v
fiu· one might be at liberty to complain of insignificant iujuries
which still left the stream to flow on. in the main as it did before.
E\-·ery saw mill upon a stream of water to some extent changes
the natural condition of the water, and many ~;aw mills may
entirely unfit it for some purpo:;es; but a vet·y large proportion
of the value of all the streams in the country would be sunk and
lost, if mills might not be erected upon them bPc.Luse some
taint to the water was inevitable from their use. But if there
may he some change in the natural condition of tlte water without legal wrong, the question, how maeh, and what. slutll constitute a legal wrong must nece~sarily, it seems to us, he a question
of what, under the circumstances, is a reasonable use. This is
strongly and clearly put by CLief Justice U1 DFn:r.n, iu one ca,;.e:
"The reasonahlenP.ss of the use," he says, ''must determine
the right, and this must depend upon the extent of detriment to
the riparian proprietors below. If it essentially impairs the use
below, then it is unreasonable and unlawful, unle~.:; it is a thin~

proprietor to the use and enjoyment

of a stream of water in its natural

state is as sacred as the right to the

soil itself." Gardner 0. Newhurgh, 2

Johns. Ch. 162.

' See Gladfelter o. Walker, 40 Md.

1, where astream was fouled by throw-

ing into it the refuse of a paper man-

ufactory, where Judge Donnm in-

structed the jury as follows: “Every

man must so use his own property as

not to injure the property of another;

and if the jury shall ﬁnd that the

drainage or refuse from the defend-

ant’s paper mill was, prior to the in-

stitution of the suit, discharged into

a stream of water which ﬂowed

through the land of the plaintiff, and

that the stream was thus soiled or

polluted, to the injury of the plain-

tiff, then he is entitled to recover,

even if the jury shall believe that the

business carried on by defendant at

his mill was a lawful one, conducted

in the usual manner, and with the

usual precaution" This instruction

was fully approved by the Court of

Appeals.

1 Holsman "·Boiling Srring Bleuchlng Co., 14 N.J. Eq. 835, ;.J42, citing
Aldred's Case, 9 Co. 59, and other
cases. This language is approved
and udopt.Pd in Richmond Manuf. Co.
v. Atlantic Delaine Co., 10 R. I. 106,
111. In both cases the langua~e of
Chancellor KENT is qtwted with np..
provul: "Tho right of the ripuriun
proprietor to the usc Rnd enjoyment
of a stream of water in its naturul
state is as sacred as the right to the
soil itself." Gardner"· Newburgh, 2
Johns. Ch. 162.
'See Gladfelter "·Walker, 40 Md.
1, where a strcum was fouled by throwing into 1t the refuse of a paper manufactory, where Judge DonDIN instructed the Jury as follows: "Every

man must so use hia own property as
not to injure the property of another;
and if the jury shall find that the
drainage or refuse from the defend.
ant's paper mill was, prior to the institution of the suit, di~chn1·ged into
a strcllm of water which flowed
throuJ,:'h the lumi of the pluintifr, nod
that the stream was thus s<~iled or
polluted, to the injury of the plaintiff, tlaen be is entitled tin recover,
en>n if the jury shall believe tlmt the
business carried on by defendant at
his mill was a lawful one, conc.luctcu
in the usual munncr, and with tht.
usual precaution" This instruction
was fully approved by the Court of
Appeal&.
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altogether indispensable to any beneﬁcial use at every point of

589

the stream. An extent of deposit which might be of no account

in some streams, might seriously affect the usefulness of others.

So, too, a kind of deposit which would affect one stream seriously

would be of little importance in another. There is no doubt one

must be allowed to use a stream in such a. manner as to make it

useful to himself, even if it do produce slight inconvenience to

those below. This is true of everytliing which we use in com-

mon with others. The air is somewhat corrupted by the most

ordinary use; large manut'actnring establishments all'ect it still

more seriously, and some, by reason of their vicinity to a nmner-

ous population, becomes so oti'ensive and destructive of comfort,

and health, even, as to be regarded as common nuisances. \\'ithin

reasonable limits, those who have a common interest in the use

of air and running water, must submit to small inconveniences

to afford a. disproportionate advantage to others.”‘

Negligent Fires. Fire being a dangerous element. a degree

of care is required in making

l Snow 1:. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459. 462.

The same idea is expressed clearly

and t'ully by BELLOWS, J.. in Ilayes

0. Waltlron, 44 N. H. 580, 585, and by
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Wt:LLs. J., in Merriﬁcld 0. Worces-

ter, 110 Mass. 216; S. C. 14 Am. Rep.

altogether indispensable to any beneficial use at c>cry point of
the stream. An extent of deposit which might be of no account
in some streams, might seriously affect the u"efnlness of others.
So, too, a kind of deposit which would affect one stream seriously
wonlc.J he of little importanet~ in another. There is no donht one
must be allowed to use a stream in such a manner as to make it
useful to himself, even if it do produce slight incon\'enicuce to
those oelow. This is true of ev~rything which we use in common with others. The air is somewhat corrupted hy the most
orc.Jiuary use; large manufacturing establishments affect it still
more seriously, anc.J some, oy reason of their \'icinity to a numcr<HlS popnh\tion, becomes so offensive and destructive of comtort,
and health, even, as to be regarded as common nuisan('cs. 'rithin
reasonable limits, those who have a common interest in the use
of air and running water, mn~t submit to smnll inconveniences
to afford a disproportionate adnmtage to others." 1

592. In this last case it was held

that a city was liable for polluting a

stream by the ﬂow from its sewers,

Fire being a dangerous clement, a dc~ree
of care is required in making nse of it corresponding to the
Negligent Fires.

provided it was attributable to the

improper construction or unreason-

able use of the sewers, or to negli-

gence or other fault in the care or

niann_:,etnent of them; but it is said

that " the natural right of the plain-

tiﬂ' to have the water descend to him

in its pure state, ﬁt to be used for the

various purposes to which he may

have occasion to apply it, must yield

to the equal right of those who hap-

pcn to beabove him. Their use of

the stream for mill purposes, for irri-

gation, watering cattle, and the man-

ifold purposcs for which they may

lawfully use it, will tend to render

the water more or less impure. Cul-

nse of it corresponding to the

tivating and fertilizing the lauds bor.

dering on the streams, and in which

are its sources, their occupation by

farm houses and other erections, will

unavoidably cause impurities to be

curried into the stream. As the lands

are subdivided, and their occupation

and use become multifarious, these

c:iu<es will be rendered more opera-

tive and their effects more perceptible.

The water may thus be rendered un-

ﬁt. for many uses for which it hail

before been suitable; but so far as

that condition results only from the

reasonable use of the stream in ac.

cordanco with the common right,

the lower riparian proprietor has no

remedy."

For other cases where this sort of

nuisance has been complained ot‘, see

Carhart v. Gas Light Co., 22 Barb.

297; Davis 1:. Ltlllll)t‘l‘l.st)Il, 56 Barb.

480, case of fouling a spring. Tate

0. Parrish, 7T. B. .\lon.32-1; Jacohs 0.

J Snow 11. Parsons, 28 Vt. 4i39. 4tl2.
Th<' same idea is expr<'slwd cl<'arly
and fully by BELLOWS, J .. in Ilnyes
11. Waldron, 4-l N. H. !580, 585, and by
Wt:Lr.s, J., in Merrifield 11. Wm·c<'stcr, 110 :\lnss. 216; S.C. 14 Am. R<•p.
592. In this last case It was held
that a city was liublc for polluting a
strt•nm by the flow from its sl'wers,
provitlctl it Wll::l attributable to the
improper construction or unreasonable use of the sewers, or to nel{ligence or other fault in the care or
managt•ment of them; but it is snid
that "the nutural right of the plaintiff to hB\'C the water dr,;rend to him
in its lmre stute, fit to be userl for tho
various purposes to which he may
have occasion to apply it, must yield
to the <'qunl right of those who hnpp<'n to be above him. Th<'ir usc of
the sln•am for mill purpose,;, for irrlgntinn, watering rattle, and the manifold purposes for which they may
lawfully usc it, will tend to render
tlw water ruore or less impure. Cul-

tivating ami fertilizing the lands bordering on tl1e strenms, and In which
are its sour<'Ps, their occupation by
farm hoU!!Cl> ami othl•r crt!ctions, will
Una\•oidalJiy <'!\USC impnriti<•>~ to be
carried into the stream. As the lands
arc subdi\'illed, and thf'ir O<'('llpation
and usc become multifarious, tll('sc
cau•l'!l will be rendered more opcrath·e anti their effects more percPptiblc.
The wnter may thus be rl'ntlcred unfit for many uses for which it hntl
before b<•!•n suitable; but so far as
that condition n·~ults only from the
r<'asonable usc of the stream in ac..
cordancc with the common right,
the lower riparian propriutor hu no
remedy."
For other cases where this sort of
nuh:nnce has b:!cn complaincll of, !>ee
Carhart "· Gus Light Co., 22 Barb.
2!17; Davis 11. LnmlJertson, 50 Barb.
480, cnse of fouling a spring. Tate
11. Parrisll, 7 T. B. ~Ion. 32.i; JnC'ohs "·

Allard, 42 Vt. 303; S. C. 1 Am. Rep.
881.
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danger. It may be employed lawfully for all the purposes of

life for which it is useful, and also for amusement, upon one's

own premises, subject only to the condition of due care. But

due care is a degree of care corresponding to the danger, and

requires cireumspeetion not only as to time and place of starting

it, but in protecting against its spread afterwards. The obliga-

tion of the party kindling it is well stated in a casein Maine.

Ile must do it at a proper time and in a suitable manner, and

use “reasonable care and diligence to prevent its spreading and

doing injury to the property of others. The time may be

suitable and the manner prudent, and yet if he be guilty of

negligence in taking care of it, and it spreads and injures the

property of another in consequence of such negligence, he is

liable in damages for the injury done. The gist of the action is

negligence, and if that exists in either of these particulars, and

an injury is done in consequence thereof, the liability attaches,

and it is immaterial whether the proof establishes gross negli-

gence or only a want of ordinary care on the part of the defend-

ant.”‘ But there must be some evidence which will warrant

imputing the injury to the negligence or misconduct of the
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dc-:i'cn<lant or his servants. and the burden is upon the plaintiﬁ

to make this showing.’ The plaintiff makes out this part of his

case by showing that the ﬁre was kindled when and where it

would be likely to spread as it did, or pass beyond control, or

that it was left without proper care afterwards.‘ If the ﬁre was

kindled by a servant while engaged about his master's business,

1

'~IIow_ey 0. Nourse, 54 Me. 256,

citing Barnard o. Poor, 21 Pick. 378;

Bachclder 0. I-Ieagan, 18 Me. 30;

Tourtellot v. Rosebrook, 11 Met. 4-‘i2;

Dem 1:. McCarty, 2 Up. Can. Q. B. 448.

In Scott 1;. Hale, 16 Me. 326, the care

required was “that degree of careful-

ness which a discreet, prudent and

careful man would do in the posses-

danger. It may be employed lawfully for all the purposes of
life tor which it is useful, and also for amusement, upon one"s
own premises, subject only to the condition of due care. But
dne care is a degree of care corresponding to the danger, and
requires circumspection not only as to time and plac..-e of starting
it, but in protecting against its spread aftenrn.r·ds. Tlie obligation of the party kindling it is well stated in a case in :Maine.
He must do it at a proper time and in a suitable rbanner, and
nse "reasonable care and diligence to prevent its spreading and
doing injury to the propet·ty ot' others. The time may be
suitable and the manner prudent, and yet if he be guilty of
negligence in taking care of it, and it spreads and injures the
property of another in cunseqnence of such negligence, he is
,, liable in damages for the injury done. The gi:-:t of the action is
negligence, and if that exists in either of these pat·ticnlars, and
an injury is done in consequence thereof, the liability attaches,
and it is immaterial whether the pl'Uuf establishes gt·oss negligence Ol' only a want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant."' But there must be some evidence which will warrant
imputing the injury to the ncgli~rence or misconduct of the
defendant or his ser·vants. and the hnrden is upon the plaintiff
11 to make this showing! The plaintiff makes out this part of his
case by showing that the fire wa,; kindled when anJ where it
would be likely to spread as it did, or pass beyond control, or
that it was left without proper care afterwards.' If the fire was
kindled by a sm·vant while engaged about his master's business,

sion of his own premises." See Fahn

n. lleielmrt, 8 Wis. 255; Mich. Cent.

R. R. Co. 0. Anderson. 20 Mich. 244.

'1 Clark 0. Fool, S Johns. 421; Han-

lon v. Ingram, 3 Iowa, 81; Gagg 1:.

Vetter, 41 Ind. 228, Cleland 1:. Thorn-

ton, 43 Cal. 437; Stuart 0. Hawlcy,

22 Barb. 619; Teall v. Barton, 40

Barb. 137; Calkins 0. Burger, 44

Barb. 4'24; Miller e. Martin, 16 Mo.

508; Avcritt v. Murrell, 4Joues. (N. C.)

322; Fahn 1). Rt-it-hart, 8 W'is. ‘.255.

See Sturgis v. Rohhins, 62 M01289,

(under statute); Gillson v. North Grey,

etc., 33 Up. Can. Q. B. 128; S. C. :35

Up. Can Q. B. 475.

3 Higgins v. Dewey, 107 Mass. 494;

S. C. 9 Am. Rep. 63; (Jlcland 0.

Thornton, 43 C41. 437; Garrett e. Free-

man, 5 Jones, (N. C.) 78; Hewey r.

Noursc, 54 Me. 256; Fahn c. Reichart,

8 Wis. 255; Barnard '0. Poor, 21 Pick.

378; Jacobs 0. Andrews, 4 Iowa, 506.

Tﬁ _ ““M

1 •IlPw_ey "·
Nourse, 54 !le. 256,
citing Barnard"· Poor, 21 Pick. 378;
Bachelder "· Heagnn, 18 }{c. 3U;
Tourtellot "· Rnsehrook, 11 Met. 4:;2;
Dc·m tJ. :McCarty, 2 Up. Can. Q. B. 448.
In Scott t'. Hale, 16 i\le. 320, the rnre
requir<>d was "that degree ,.f careful.
ness whieh a discreet, prudent und
careful man would do in the posses..
sion of his own premises.'' See Fahn
"· HPil'hart, 8 Wis. 255; :Mich. Ct•nt.
H. H. Co. "· Anderson. 20 Mich. 244.
., Clurk t'. Foot, 8 Johns. 421; Hanlon v. I ntrram, 3 Iowa, 81; Ga~rg t'.
Vetter, 41 Ind. 228, Cleland 1l. Thornton, 43 Cal. 437; Stuart e. Hawley,

22 Barb. 619; Teall "· Barton, 40
Baru. 137; Calkins "· Bar_gt•r, 4-1
Barb. 424; }Iiller 1l. Mm·tin, 16 Mo.
508; Averitt f!. Murrell, 4Jones. (X. C.)
322; Fahn "· Rt•ichart, 8 Wi!!. 2<3.3.
Sec Stur~is "· Hohhins, 62 }le. 2~9.
(under statutt·): Gillson"·~ orth Grl'y,
etc., 33 l' p. Can. Q. B. 128; 8. C. ;J.j
Up. Can. Q. H. 475.
1 Higgins 1l. Dewey, 107llns'5. 49!;
S. C. U Am. Rep. 63; Cleland "·
Thornton, 4.'3 C.d. 437; Garrett ll. Freeman, 5 Jones, (N. C.) 78; Hewey t'.
Nourse, 54 Me. 2.36; Faltn r. Rekhart,
8 Wis. 2.):}; Barnard "· Poor, 21 Pick.
378; Jacobs "· Andrews, 4 Iowa, 506.
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and acting within the general scope of the employment, it is no

excuse for the master that the servant departed from his instruc-

tions in doing so.‘ A case of spontaneous combustion may be

one of negligent ﬁre, if ignition was reasonably to be looked

for.’ It is immaterial whether the ﬁre spreads by running along

the ground or by sparks or brands being carried through the air

by the wind.‘

The setting of ﬁres, under certain circumstances, is sometimes

prohibited by statute because of the great danger of injurious

consequences. This is the case in some States where large

prairies exist. Whoever unlawfully sets a ﬁre thus prohibited

must take all the consequences.‘ The same must be true in any

case where the kindling of the ﬁre was a trespass or otherwise

unlawful.‘

Fires Communicated by Machinery. Steam machinery is so

exceedingly liable to cause unintentional ﬁres that special pre-

cautions are required to prevent them. But where the use is

lawful, the principles already mentioned apply. If ﬁres are

kindled by sparks or otherwise in the use of it, no action lies

unless negligence appears‘. But it is negligence if those em-

and acting within the general scope of the employment, it is no
excuse for the master that the servant departed from his instruc- "
tions in doing so! A case of spontaneous combustion may be
one of negligent fire, if ignition was reat:onably to he looked
for.• It is immaterial whether the fire spreads by running along
the ground or by sparks or brands being carried through the air
by the wind.•
The setting of fires, under certain circnmstnn<.-es, is sometimes
prohibited by statute because of the grea: danger ot' injurious
consequences. This is the ca..:;e in some States where large
prairies exist. Whoever unlawfully sets a tire thus prohibited
must take all the consequences.• The same must he true in any
case where the kindling of the fire wag a trespass or otherwise
unlawful.•

ploying such machinery fail to make use of approved appliances
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for arresting sparks, or if the machinery, by reason of being

unsuitable or out of order, is likely to scatter ﬁre.’ And in the

I Johnson 0. Barber, 10 Ill. 425;

Armstrong 0. Cooley, 10 Ill. 509.

Compare Wilson 1:. Peverly, 2 N. H.

518; Garrett 9. Freeman, 5 Jones.

(N. C.) 78.

'1Vau_;han 0. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.

C.) 468.

3 Higgins 0. Dewey, 107 Mass. 494.

See Ayer 0. Starkey, 30 Conn. 304.

‘ Burton v. McClellan, 3 Ill. 434.

Fires Communicated by Kaohinery. Stearn machinery is so
exceedingly liable to cause unintentional fires that special precautions are required to pre\'ent them. But where the use is
lawful, the principles already mentioned apply. If fires are
kindled by sparks or otherwise in the usc of it, no action lies
unless negligence appears.•. But it is negligence if tho:'e employing such machinery fail to make usc of appro\·cJ applianees
for arresting sparks, or if the m~tchinery, by rea.;on of being
unsuitable or out of order, is likely to scatter fire.' And in the

Sec Finley v. Langston, 12 Mo. 120.

° This rule was applied in Jones 0.

Festiniog R Co., L. R. 8 B. 733, to

an incorporated company using a

steam engine which it was held

under its charter it had no right to

employ.

‘ Burrouziis v. Housatnnic, etc., R.

R. Co., 15 Conn. 121; Hoyt 0. Jetiers,

30 Mich. 181; Jeileriso. Philadelphia,

etc., R. R. Co., 3 lloust. -147. See

Huyctt 0. Philadelphia, etc., R. R.

Co., 23 Penn. St. 373; Mc('re:uly 0.

Sou. Car. R. R. Co., 2 Strob. 3-‘iii; Hull

0. Sac. Val. R. R. Co., 14 Cal. IHT; Shel-

don e. Hud. Riv. R. R. Co., 29 Barb.

226; Hinds o. Barton, 25 N. Y. 544;

Teall 0. Barton, 40 Barb. 137.

’ Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. 0. I\Ic('lelland,

42 Ill. 355; Frankford, etc., ('0. 0.

Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 54 Penn.

St 345; Hoyt 0. Jetiers, 30 Mich. 181;

Anderson 0. Cape Fear Steamboat

Co, 64 N. C. 399; Chicago, etc., R. R.

Co. 0. Mc(‘ahill, 56 Ill. 23; Toledo,

etc., R. R. Co. 1:. (‘orn, 71 lll. 493. It

must. of course, be made to appear

that the burning was the natural and

II

1 Jolin son v. Barher, 10 Ill. 42.'>;
Armstronp: v. Cooley, 10 Ill. 509.
Compare Wilson o. Peverly, 2 N.H.
5!8; Garrett "· Freeman, 6 Jones.
(X. C.) iB.
'•Vau~han o. }[enlove, 3 Bing. (N.
C.) 468.
a Higgins v. Dewey, 107 :Mass. f94.
St:c Ayer "· Starkey. 30 Conn. 304.
t Burton o. 1\lcClellan, 8 Ill. 434.
St•c Finlt>y "· L:\ngston, 12 llo. 120.
& Thii rule was applied in Jonl's "·
Fest in iog R <.:o., L. R. 8 Q. B. 733, to
an incorporated company using a
steam engine which it was held
under ita charter it had no right to
employ.
• Bu!'r;ou~;~~ o. Hou:<atonic, etc., R.
R. Co., 15 Conn. 124; Hoyt o. Jell'ers,

80 ?tlich. 181; Jl'ffcriu. PhilRdelphia.,
etc., H. R Co., 3 Houst. 44i. See
Huyett "· llhihl<h•lphia, etc:., H. H.
Co., 2:J Pt•un. St. 3i3; ~lc( 'rl'atly "·
Sou. Car. R. H. Co., 2 Stroh. a.ili; Hull
"·Sac. Val. H. R Co.,14 Cal. :l-<i; 8hcl.
don ,. Hud. Riv. R R. Co., 29 Dnrb.
226; Hinds o. Barton, 2,j X. Y. 5H;
Teall "· Barton, 40 B11rb. t:n.
' Ill. Cent. R R C.l. o. ~[cCicll:~nll,
42 Ill. 3.15; Frankford, cte., ('o. o.
l'hilrulclphia, cLc., R. R. Co., :;4 Penn.
Bt 34.'>; Hoyt o.Jeff.;rs,30 ~[ich. lSI;
Amler:~on o. CRpc Fear Stt•ambnnt
Co, 64 N. C. 3!)!); ('hica~o. etc., H. R.
Co. "· McCahill, !i6 Ill. 29; Tolcllo,
<'lC., H. R. Co. r. Corn, 71 Ill. 4!l:l. It
mullt. or course, he mmlc to appear
that the burning WI\S the natuml and
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case of railroad engines it has been repeatedly decided that the

fact that ﬁre has been communicated by them to the premises of

individuals is suflicieut to raise a presumption that the railroad

company was not employing the best known eontrivances' to

retain the ﬁre and to make out a p7“Z'1II,(l.f(l0l-6 case of negligence.‘

Still, as the business itself is lawful, all that can be required is

that it be managed with a care proportioned to its risks; the law

cannot require that which is unusual.’

In some States statutes exist which either render railroad

companies responsible for all injuries by ﬁre originating with

their engines, or which expressly impose upon them the burden

of showing that the ﬁre originated without negligence on their

part.’

It is held to be negligent in a railroad company to leave grass

and other combustibles lying along the track, where they are

peculiarly liable to take ﬁre by falling sparks or coals.‘ The

rules of contributory negligence apply here, as in other cases,

proximate consequence of the de-

fendant's carelessness, and ought to

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

have been foreseen. Milwaukee, etc.,

R. R. Co. 0. Kellogg, 94 U. S. Rep.

469; Penn. R. R. Co. 0. Hope, 80

ease of railroad engines it has been repeatedly deeided that the
fact that fire has been communicated by them to the premises of
individuals is sufficient to raise a presumption that the railroad
company was not employing the best known contrivances· to
retain the fire and to make out a prima facie case of negligence!
Still, as the business itself is lawful, all that can be required is
that it be managed with a care proportioned to its risks; the Ia.w
cannot require that which is nnnsual. •
In some States statutes exist which either render railroad
companies responsible tor all injuries by fire originating with
their engines, or which expressly impose upon them the burden
of showing that the fire originated without negligence on their
part.•
It is held to be negligent in a railroad company to leave grass
and other combustibles lying along the track, where they are
peen liarly liable to take fire by fal1i ng sparks or coals.• The
rules of contributory negligence apply here, as in other cases,

Penn. St. 373.

1 Pigolt 0. East. Counties R., 3 C. B.

229; lll. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Mills, 42

Ill. 407; Ellis v. Portsmouth, etc., R. R.

Co.,2 Ired. 188; Galpin v. Chicago,

etc., R. R. Co., 19 Wis. 638; Spalding

0. Cl|io:1_:,o, etc., R. R. Co., 80 Wis.

110. See Erd 0. Chicago, etc., R. R.

Co., 41 Wis. 65.

’ Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. 0. Coleman,

28 Mich. 440; Frankford, etc., Co. v.

Philaulclphia, etc., R. R. Co.,54 Penn.

St. 345; Jelferis 2;. Philadelphia, etc.,

R. R. Co., 3 Hnust. 447; Aldridge 0.

Great West. R. R. Co., 3 M. & Gr.

515; Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Corn,

71 Ill. 493.

“ See Lyman 1:. Boston, etc., R. R.

Co., 4 Cush. 288; Hart v. Western R. R.

Co., 13 Met. 99; Ingersoll v. Stock-

bridge, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Allen, 438;

Perley 1:. Eastern R. R. Co., 98 Mass.

414; Chapman 0. Atlantic, etc., R. R.

Co., 37 Me. 92; Pratt v. Same, 42 Me.

579; Stearns 1:. Same, 46 Me. 95;

Chicago, etc , R. R.Co.1:. McCuhill, 56

Ill. 28; Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Shiplcy, 39 Md. 251; Hookselt 0.

Concord, etc., R. R. Co., 38 N. H.

242; Rowell 0. Railroad, 57 N. H.

182. For a case arising under the

Vermont statute, see Grand Trunk

R Co. o. Richardson, 91 U. S. Rep.

454.

‘ Flynn v. San Francisco, etc., R. R.

Co., 40 Cal.14; Webb v. Rome, etc.,

R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 420; Kellogg 0.

Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 26 Wis. 223;

Bass v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 28Ill.

9; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. o. Mills, 42 Ill.

407; Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Frazier. 47 lll.

505; Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. r. Sal-

mon, 39 N. J. 299; Ohio. etc., R. R.

Co. 0. Clutter, 82lll.123; Troxler 0.

proximate consequence of the de.
fendaut's carelessness, and ought to
have been foreseen. Milwaukee, etc.,
R R Co. e. Kellogg, 94 U. S. Rep.
469; Penn. R R Co. e. Hope, 80
Penn. St. 373.
1 Pigott "· East. Counties R.. 8 C. B.
229; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. "· 1\lills, 42
Ill. 407; Ellis"· Portsmouth, etc., R. R.
Co., 2 Ired. 188; Galpin "· Chlcag1•,
etc., R. R. Co., 19 Wis. 638; Spalding
"· Chicago, etc., R R. Co., 80 Wis.
110. See Erd "· Chicago, etc., R. R
Co., 41 Wis. 65.
9 llicb. Cent. R. R. Co. e. Coleman,
28 ~lich. 440; Frankford, etc., Co. tl.
Phihulelphia., etc., R. R. Co., 54 Penn.
St. 34::;; Jefferis "· Philadelphia, etc.,
R. R. Co., 3 Houst. 447; Aldridge "·
Great West. R. R Co., 8 M. & Gr.
515; Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. e. Corn,
71 Ill. 493.
• See Lyman "· Boston, etc., R. R
Co.,4 Cush.288; Hart". WesternR R
Co., 18 llet. 99; Ingersoll "· Stockhl'idge, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Allen, 4.'J8;
Perley tl. Eastern R. R Co., 98 Mass.
4:14; Chapman "· Atlantic, etc., R. R

Vo., 87 Me. 92; Pratt e. Same, 42 Me.
579 ; Stearns "· Sllme., 46 Me. 95 ;
Chicago, etc, R. R.Co. tJ.llcCahill, 56
Ill. 28; Baltimore, etc., R R. Co. "·
Shipley, 89 Md. 251; Hooksett "·
eoncord, etc., R. R. Co., 38 N. H.
242; Rowell "· Railroad, 57 N. H.
132. For a cnsc arising uodl•r the
Vermont statute, ~e Grand Trunk
R Co. •· Richardson, 91 U. S. Rep.
454.
c Flynn "· San Francisco, etc., R R.
Co., 40 Cal. 14; Webb "· Rome, etc..
R R. Vo., 49 N.Y. 420; Kellogg e.
Chicago. etc., R. R Co., 26 Wis. 228;
Bass tl. Chicago, etc., R. R Co., 28 Ill.
9; Ill. Cent. R R. Co. "· }Iills, 42 Ill.
407; Ill. Cent. R. R. e. Frazier. ·1.7 Ill.
5().); Delaware. etc., R. R Co. r. Salmon, 39 N.J. 299; Ohio, etc., R. R
Co. "· Clutter, 82 Ill. 123; Troxler e.
Richmond, etc., R R Co., 74 N. C.
877. Compare Henry "· Sou. Pac.
R R. Co., 50 Cal. 176; Smith "· Hannibal, etc., R R. Co., 3i Mn. 287;
Pittsburgh, etc., R. R Co. "· Nelson,
51 Ind. 150.
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but the fact that the neighboring and owner leaves grass and

other combustibles on his premises, near the road, does not

render him chargeable with contributory negligence; the ol)li_;3,-

tion of care to prevent ﬁres resting not upon him, but upon the

company.‘ 1

The explosion of a steam boiler whereby one is injured is held

in Illinois prime facie evidence of negligence in those having

l/ 1

~ ?t%~~F.~~7?;/;d:!~/Jt$ 1-

bllt tlte fact that the neighboring ~d owner leaves grnsg and
other combustibles on his premi:es, neat· the mad, does not
render Lim cltargeable with contrihutOI'y negligence; the obligation of care to prevent fires resting not upon him, but npon the
company.' 'I
The explosion of a steam boiler whereby one is injured i held
in Illin ois prima facie e\·idence of negl igence in tho e having
the lllnnagcment of it; • but this does not see m to be the role
elsewhere.•

the management of it;' but this does not seem to be the rule

elsewl1cre.'

Injuries by Fire-Arms and Explosives. When one makes

use of loaded weapons, he is l‘€S])()nSil)l€ only as he might be

for any negligent handling of dangerous machinery, that is

to say, for a care proportioned to the danger of injury from it.‘

The tiring of guns for sport or exercise is not unlawful if suit-
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able place is chosen for the purpose; but in the streets of a city,

or in any place where many persons are congregated, it might

be ne_-gligence in itself.’ In New York a military oﬁicer has been

hehl liable for negligence in ordering the ﬁring of blank cart-

ridges by the men under his commaml, at an assembled crowd

of people, whereby one of them was injured.‘ But the owner

of a vessel is not responsible for an injury caused by the ﬁring

of a gun therefrom, where the ﬁring was by one of the crew.

not in the line of his employment and against the o\\'ner’s

' Flynn v. San Francisco, etc., R. R.

C-0., 40C ll. 14. See I’bila(lelpbi:\. etc.,

R. R. (Yo. v. Hentlrickson, St) Penn.

SL183; Delaware, etc., R. R. (Io. o.

Injuries by Fire-Arms and Explosives. When one makes
nse of loadcrl weapons, he is t·e ponsible only a he migh t be
for any negligent handling of dangerous nuwhin ery, that i
to say, tor a <:are proportioned to the danger of injury from it.'
The fit·ing of g un · for sport ot· exerci e is not unlawful if uitable place is chosen for the purpose ; but in the treet of a city,
or in any place where many persons are congregated, it might
be n e;:l igcnce in itF:el f. • In X ew York a military ofticer ha heen
held li able for negligence in ordC'ring the fil-ing of blank cartridges by the men under his comm an d, at an at'scmblcd r~ rowd
of people, whereby one of them was injured." But the owner
of a vessel is not responsihlc fuJ' sm injury canEed hy the firing
of a gtm th erefrom, where the firing was b_v one of the crew.
not in the line of his employment anu again t tl1o owner's

Salmon. 39 N. J. 299; Fern v. Buﬂhlo,

etc.. R. R. (.‘o , 22 N. Y. 209: Vaughan

12. Talf Vale R. (7o., 3 H. & N. 743.

But see Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Nunn,

51 lll. TS.

'3 Ill. (‘i-nt. R. R. (Yo, 0. Phillips, 49

Ill. ‘ZIH, and 55 Ill 191.

5 Spencer v. Campbell, 9 W. & S.

32; Lo<ee v. Buchanan. 51 N. Y. 476;

S. B. Ne\v \Vorld '0. King, 16 How.

46!); Marslial 0. Welwootl, 38 N. J.

339.

‘ Underwood v. Hewson, Stra. 596;

Weaver r. Ward, Hob. 134: (‘hu-

taigue 0. Bergeron, 10 La. Ann. 699.

‘See (‘onklin v. Thompson, 29

Barb. 21-‘l, ease of injury by fright

from exploding ﬁre crackers. Com-

pare Cole 1‘. Fisher, ll Mass. 137;

Blsscll 0. Booker, 16 Ark. 308

“Shooting at a mark is lawful, but

not necessary, and may be danger.

ons, and the law requires extraor

dinary care to prevent injury to oth-

ers; and if the act is done where

there are objects from which the

balls may glance and endanger oth-

ers, the act is wanton, reckless, with-

out ‘Inc care, and grossly negligent.“

Bt"rI.I-:R, J., in Weleh r. Durand, 36

Conn., 182. 185, citing Bullock 1:. Bab»

cock, 8 Wend. 391, approving Y. B.

21 H. vli., 28 11.

‘ Castle 0. Duryce, 2 Keyes, 169.

• Flynn "'· S11n FranciRco, rtc., R R
Co., 40 C a!. 14. See Philadelphia, etc.,
R. R. ('n. 11. H endrick on, t!O P t•nn.
St. 183 ; D elaware, etc., R. K Co. tl.
Salmon, 3!J :N. J. 290; Fero 11. Buff,llo,
etc.. R R Co, 22 N.Y. 209; V uu g hnn
11. T uff Val e R. Co., 3 H . & N . 743.
But sl'<' Ill. Cent. R. R. Co."· Nunn,
51 Ill. 7S.
' Ill. Cl'nt. R. R. C''l. "'· Phillips, 49
Ill. 2:11. nnd 55 Til l!H.
3 pencer 11. Campbell, 9 W . & S.
82: Lo.;ce r. Bucha nan. 51 N . Y. 470 ;
S. B. N ew W orld 11. King, 16 How.
469; )[arshal t~. W elwood, 38 N. J .
339.
4 Underwood 11. H e wson, Stra. 5!)6;
W ca'"er -r. Ward, Hob. 134 : Chataigne 11. Bergeron, 10 La. A.nn. G99.

38

6
Sre Conklin "· Th ompson, 29
Barb. 218, ca c of injury by fri ght
fmm exploding flre crackE>rs. Compa re Cole t'. l<'isltcr, 11 .lin . 187;
Bis'lell o. Booker, 16 Ark. 30
"Shooting at a m ark is lnwful, but
not necessary, and may be d angerous, a nd the law requires exlrnor
din nry care to prc\'ent inju ry to otlJ.
er. ; and if the act is done wh ere
th ere are obj l'cts from whi ch the
balls may glance and endanl!er other:;, th e act is wnnt(ln, reck lrss. without ,Jue care, nnd g rossly n eg li.~cnt.''
BrTL E R, J .. in Welch r. Durnud, 36
Conn., 1 2. 185, citin~ Bullock 11. Bab.
cock, 3 \Vend. 391, approvin~ Y. B.
21 II. vii., 28 fl .
• Cnstle o. Duryee, 2 Key es, lG9.
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orders.‘ An injury by a young child with a loaded gun placed
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in its hands negligently by another, is the wrong of the person

putting it in his hands.’

If one deliver to a carrier explosive articles for transportation,

without disclosing what they are, he will be responsible to par-

ties injured if an explosion takes place.’ So if he put articles

in the trade for a certain use, in which they would be danger-

ous,‘ or sell poisonous drugs wrongly labeled, or labeled as being

innocent.’

Removing Lateral Support. Incident to the ownership of

land is the right to lateral support by the land which adjoins

it. This exists independent of contract, and to remove it, or to

d_o anything which endangers it is to commit a nuisance.‘ \Vho-

ever in the course of improvements on his own lands may have

orders.• An injury by a yonng child with a loaded gun placed
in its hands negligently by another, is the wrong of the person
putting it in his hands.'
If one deliver to a carrier explosive articles for transportation,
without disclosing what they are, he will be responsible to parties inj nred if an explosion takes place.• So if he put articles
in the trade for a certain use, in which they would be dangerous: 01· sell poisonous drugs wrongly labeled, or labeled as being
innocent.~

occasion to make excavations which endanger the land of his

neighbor, must supply walls or other sufficient substitutes for

the support which he removes. But his obligation is limited

to the support of the land in its natural condition; and if the

neighbor’s land shall be weighted with buildings or other bur-

dens, the owner of the servient tenement. in removing collateral

support, can be held responsible only for such consequences as

would have followed if the land had not been thus weighted.’
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' Haack v. Fearing, 5 Rob. 528.

’ Dixon o. Bell, 5 M. & S198: S. O.

1 Stark. 287. Achild too young to

understand the effects of exploding

powder, and who injures himself

therewith may have his action against

the person who sold it to him. Car-

ter v. Towne, 98 Muss. 567. It is a

Ex. 1; Loop v. Litchﬂeld, 42 N. Y.

351; Hansford 0. Payne, 11 Bush,

380; Norton 0. Sewall. 106 Mass.

Incident to the ownership of
land is the right to lateral support by the land which adjoins
it. This exists independent of contract, and to remoYe it, or to
d.o anything which endangers it is to commit a nuisun<.-e.• Whoever in the course of improvements on his own lands mny have
occaRion to make excavations which endanger the land of his
neighbor, must supply walls or other sufficient substitutes for
the support which he removes. ]~ut his obli:.,"Rtion is limited
to the support of the land in its nRtoral condition; and if the
neighbor's land shall be weighted with buildings or other burdens, the owner of the servient tenement~ in removing collateral
support, can be held responsible only for such consetptences as
would have followed if the land hRd not been thns weighted.Y
Removing Lateral SUpport.

143; S. C. 8 Am. Rep. ‘.398.

‘Thurston v. Hat1co('k,12 Mass.

220; Farrand 0. Marshall, 19 Barb.

380; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige,

169; McGuire o. Grant, 25 N. J. 356 ;

nuisance to explode ﬁreworks in . .Folcy r. Wyeth, 2 Allen. 131; (‘har-

streets. Conklin 0. Thom/pson, 29

Barb. 218.

1‘ Williams '0. East India Co., B East,

192; Farrant '0. Barnes, 11 C. B. (N. s.)

553; Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567;

Boston, etc., R. R. C0. 0. Carney, 107

Mass. 568.

‘ Wellington 0. Downer, etc., Co.,

104 Mass. 64.

‘Thomas 0. Winchester, 6 N. Y.

397; George 0. Skivington, L. R. 5

less v. Rankin, 22 Mo. 566: Boothby

0. Androscoggiu R. R. Co., 51 Me.

318; Guest -r. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478:

Baltimore, etc., R. R. (To. 1:. Reancy,

42 Md. 117; Beard o. Murphy, 37 Vt-

99. '

‘Wyatt v. Harrison, 8 B. & Ad.

871; Partridge 12. Scott, 3 M. & W.

220; Backhouse '0. Bononi, 9 H. L.

Cas. 502; Humphrit-s r. Brogdcn, 12

Q. B. 739; Quincy 0. Jones, 76 Ill.

1

Ex. 1; Loop

1

Ilftack 11. Fearing, 15 Rub. l'i28.
Dixon 11. Bell, 5 M. & 8. 1118: 8. C.
1 Bturk. 287. .A. child too young to
unden<tl\nd the effects of exploding
powder, and who injures himself
therewith may have his action against
the person who sold it to him. Car.
&er "·Towne, 98 MRSS. 567. It is a
nuisance to explode fireworks in ,
streets. Conklin t~. Thompson, 2b
Barb. 218.
1 WilliamB1!. East India Co., 8 East,
192; Farrant 11• .Harnes, 11 C. B. (N. s.)
558; Carter 11. Towne, 98 Mass. 567;
:Boston, etc., R. R. Co. o. Carney, 107
Mass. 568.
'Wellington o. Downer, etc., Co.,
104 MnBB. 64.
• Thomas "· Winchester, 6 N. Y.
39'7; George o. Btivington, L. R. G

BM; Hansford 11. P~~oyne, 11 Bush,

11.

Litchfield, 49 N . Y.

880; Norton t~. Sewall. 106 Mass.
148 ; 8. C. !:\ Am. Rep. 298.
1 ThurRton o. Ha:~cuck, 12 Masa.
220; Farrand 11. Mllrsball, 19 Bub.
880; LRsala "· Holbrook, 4 PlligP.
169: McGuire 11. Grant, 2.~ N.J. 3:)6;
.Foley r. Wyeth, 2 Allen. 131; ('111\rlt.>ss 11. Rnnkln, 22 Mo. M6: Boothby
11. Androscoggin R. R. Co.. 51 Me.
818; Gut-st f'. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478:
Baltimore, etc., R. R C'.o. !'. Rean~y.
49 Md. 117; Beard t~. Murphy, 37 Vt..
99.
1
' Wyatt 11. Harrison, 8 Ji. & Ad.
871; P~~ortridgc 11. Scott, 8 X. & W.
220; Backhouse 11. :S.moni, 9 H. L.
Cal'. 502; Humphri<·s r. Brogden, 19
Q. B. 739; Quincy "· Jnnes, 76 Ill.
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The case, however, is eminently one in which the obligation of

595

care for the protection of the neighbor’s interest is imposed;

and before proceeding to remove collateral support, he should

give reasonable notice of his intention, that the owner of the

dominant tenement may have the opportunity to provide against

any threatened danger.‘ He must also observe due care in

making the excavations, and will be responsible for all the con-

sequences of negligence.’

The right to collateral support for land weighted with build-

ings may be acquired by prescription; it being in the nature of

an easement.‘

Subjacent Support. A freehold is sometimes divided lat-

erally, that is, one man owns the surface, and another owns the

sub-surface where minerals exist or are Bllpposefl to exist. Where

that condition of things is found, it must have had its origin in

grants emanating from a common source; as the whole must at

some time have been in the same hands. Then-et'ore contracts or

The CMC, however, is eminently one in which the uhligntion of
care for the protection of the neighbor's intercl!t is irnpot;ed;
and before proceeding to remove collateral support, he should
give reasonable notice of his intention, that the owner of the
dominant tenement may luwc the opportunity to pro,·idc against
any threatPned dnnger. 1 lie must also ohset·ve dnc care in
making the excanttions, and will be rct-punsible tor all the conSl'quences of nl'gligence.'
The right to collateral support for land weight('() with buildings may be acquired by prescription; it being in the nature of
an easement.•

covenants ﬁxing the respective rights and obligations of the

parties are likely to exist, and these must govern so far as they

extend.‘ In the absence of any such contracts or covenants, the

owner of the surface is entitled to support, not only for the laud

itself, but for the buildings erected upon it.“ The liability ot
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the sub-surface owner does not depend upon negligence, but if

he removes the natural support he must substitute that which is

231; Thurston o. Hancock, 12 Mass.

220; Foley 0. “'_\'elh, 2 Allen. 131;

Richardson u. Vermont Cent R. K

Co., 25 Vt. 465. See Cahili o East

man, 18 Minn. 334; S. (J. 10 Am. Rep.

184; McMillun&.Watt, 2'1: Ohio. (N.

F 3 |' ,1 i}

%vl'% anal (‘o. 0. Bradley, 7

East, 368; lll':\s.~e_\' r. Go_\-der, 4 ('. &

P. 161; Shrievcr 0. Stokes, 8 B. Mon.

453; Richart r. Scott, 7 Watts, 460;

Brown n. Werner, 40 Md. 15.

Subjacent SUpport. A freehold is somt>titnes divided lateraily, that is. one man owns the surface, and another owns tl~e
snh-surtace where minerals exist or are snppo;.eri to exist. 'Vhere
that condition of things is f(mnd, it must luwe had its origin in
grants emanating from a common source; as the whole must at
!'Ome time have bt..>en in the same hands. Thert-t~•re contracts or
<'O\'<'nants fixing the respective rights and obligations of the
parties are likely to exist, and these must govern so far as they
extend.t In the ahf;ctwe of any such contracts or covenants, the
owner of the surface is entitled to support, not only fur the land
itselt~ but tor the buildings erectetl upon it.• The liability ot
the sub-surface owner does not d{'pend upon ne~ligPru:c, hut if
he removes the natural support he must snh:'titutc that which is

' Jetfries v. Williams, 5 Exeh. 1'92;

Elliot v. N. E. R. Co., 10 H. L. Cas.

333; Humphries v. Bro-_'den, 12 Q. B.

739; Baltimore. etc., R. R. (‘o. v Ren-

ney, 42 Md. 117; Slmfcr v. “'ll:u)l'l, 44

Md. 268; Boolhby 0. Androscoggin,

0' Wvfw

etc., R. R. Co., 51 Me. 319; Shrieve o.

Stokes. B B. Mon. 453; Foley r. \\'y-

elh, 2 Allen, 131 ; Clltl.l‘l('SS r. Rankin,

22 Mo. 560. If lhc drainage of lund

weakens collateral support, there is

no responsibility for it. Popplewell

4:0. Hodkinsun, L. R. 4 Exeh. 248.

' Washb. on Euseineuls, 3d ed. 547;

Rii-hart 0. Scott, 7 Willis, 460,

‘ See, for example, Smith r. Du-lay,

L. R. 7 B. 716; S. (‘. 3 Monk, ‘JHI;

ARp(l\’n 0. Beddon, L R. 10 Ch. Ap.

394.

' Hext r. Gill, L. R 7 Ch. Ap. 690;

S. C. 3 Monk. -‘>74: Bononi r. B1:-k.

house, EL. Bl. & I'll. 6'32; S (Y. in

error, 9 H. L. Pas. 503; Smith v.

Thackerah, L. R. 1 C. P. 564.

etc., R. R. Co., lit lie. !liR; Rhrievl' o.
Stok,.~. 8 B. Mon. 4!i:t; .l<'oh•y r. Wy.
eth, 2 Allen, 131; Chllrlt•ss r. Rankin,
22 Mo . .161'1. If the drsinn~e of lund
weakens rnll~tt<·rsl Rnpport, lh<'re itt
no re~pon!!ihility for it. Pnpplewt>ll
PJ~··
J• C#• ~· ~-GI-J.{e. Hodkin!>on, J,. H. 4 E~rh. 2~.
7 ~y~ ~al C"o. "· Rrndley, 7 • 1 Wno~hh. on Elllll'lllPnls, 3d ed. 547;
En~t, 31l8; ~{a,.~ry r. G•>_rcler, 4 G. &
Rirhart "· Arott, 7 W•1tls, 460.
4 &>e. for exnmple, Smith r. D11'·hy,
P. 161; Shrie\'!!T t'. Stokl'!l, R B. Mon.
4;)3; Ricluut r. Scott, 7 Wntts, 460;
L. R. 7 Q. B. 716: S.C. a Monk,~~~:
Brown"· Wernl'r, 40 Hd. to.
A~pllt·n "· Seddon, L R. 10 Ch. Ap.
'J('ffrlrs r. Wllliama, ~ I<;x<'h. 792;
3U·l.
1 Hext r. Oill, L. R 7 C'h. Ap. (ifJ9;
Elliot r. N. E. R. Co., 10 H . L. Cns.
333; Humphrif.'s "· Bro;:df.'n, 12 Q. B. S. C. 8 :Mnnk. ;174: Bnnoni r.. B·wk.
789; B"ltimol'(', l'tc., R. R. ('o." HPnhnu~e. El .. HI. & J<;J. fl ·~~: S C. in
ncy. 42 ~ld. 117; Rhafer "· Wil!!on, 44 errnr, {) H. L. ('''"· 511:1; Hmith c.
lld. 2G~; Hoothhy •· Andro~c·•<;gin, Thackerah, L. R 1 C. P. 5G-i.
231; Thurston "· Hllncock, 12 1\fa!IS,
2:?0; Foley tl. Wyeth, 2 Alll'D, 131;
Richardson "· \"l'rmont Cent H. R
Co., 2.5 Vt. 4fl.'l See Cahill " Ea!<tnt~m, 18 Minn. ~!4; 8. C. 10 Am. H<·p.
184; ~[cMilliUJ ~Watt, 2~ Ohio, (N.

)e·l·
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sufiicient to protect the surface. And a custom to work mines
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without providing such support is unreasonable and void.‘

Nuisances causing Personal Discomfort. Wliere the com-

plaint is that something done or suffered by the defendant causes

sufficient to protect the surface. And a custom to wm·k mines
without providing such support is unreasoua.ble and void. 1

personal discomfort to the plaintiff, it is seldom that the con-

troversy is conﬁned to the single point of personal anno_vance,

and it will generally be found to embrace considerations of what

is a reasonable use of the property of the parties respectively,

and what discomforts and inconveniences one can reasonably be

required to submit to and endure for the convenience or beneﬁt

of his neighbor. If a discomfort were wantonly caused from

malice or wickedness, a slight degree of inconvenience might be

suﬁicient to render it actionable; but if it were to result from

pursuing a useful employment in a way which but for the dis-

comfort to others would be reasonable and lawful, it is perceived

that the position of both parties must be regarded, and that

what would have been found wholly unreasonable before may be

found as clearly justiﬁed by the circumstances now.

The rule by which the relative rights of the parties are to be

regulated is laid down for England by the case of St. Ilvlenfs

Sznelting 0'0. v. Tipling. The Lord Chancellor. in that ease,

speaking for the court, said, that with regard to the personal
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inconvenience and interference with one’s enjoyment, one’s quiet,

one’s personal freedom, anything that discomposes or injurionsly

affects the senses or the nerves, whether that may or may not he

denominated a nuisance, must undoubtedly depend greatly on

the circumstances of the place where the thing complained of

' Hilton 0. Lord Granville, 5 Q. B.

701; Humphries 1:. Brogden, 12 Q. B.

739; Blackett v. Bradley, 1 Best & S.

940; Jones o. Wagner, 66 Penn. St.

429; S (1. 5 Am. Rep. 385; Horn:-r zr.

Watson, 79 Penn. St. 242; S. C. 21

Am. Rt-p. 55; Zinc Co. '0. Franklinite

Co., 13 N. J. 342.

The right of action arises when

some actual damage is done. Bononi

o. Ilnckhouse. El., Bl. & El. G22; S. C.

in error, 9 H. L. Cas. 503; Fisher v.

Beard, 32 Iowa. 346.

Nuisances causing Personal Discomfort. Where the com plaint is that something done or suflb·ed by the defendant causes
personal discomfort to the plaintiff, it is seldom that the contro\·ersy is confined to the single point of personal annoyance,
and it will generally he found to embrace consideration~ of what
is a reasonable use of the property of the parties respertivdy,
and what discomforts and incon,·eniences one can reasonably he
required to t~ubmit to and endure tor the con\'Cnience or benefit
of his neighbor. If a discomfort were wantonly canse•i from
malice or wickedness, a slight degree of inconvenience might he
sufficient to render it actionable; but if it were to result from
pursuing a u~eful employment in a way which hut fi1r the discomfort to others would be renson11.ble and lA.wful, it is perceh·ed
that the position of both parties must he regarded, R.nd that
what would have been found wholly unreasonable before may be
tound as clearly ju:;titied hy the circumstances now.
The rule by which the relative rights of the pR.rties are to be
regulated is laid uown for EnglR.tlll by the (!:tSe of St. Ilt·l.en ·s
Smelting Oo. v. Tipling. The Lord Chancellor. in that ease,
speaking tor the court, ~<aiel, that with n•gat·d to the pcrEonal
incom·enience and inted(ll'ence with one's enjoyment, one's quiet,
one's personal freedom, anything that discomposes or injuriously
affects the senses or the nerves, whether that may or may not be
denominated a nui~atwe, mui't undoubtedly depenrl 7reatly on
the circumstances of the place wltere the thing complained of

Perhaps it is not entirely certain

how far the party mining is bound to

provide support for the buildings on

the surface. There is no doubt on

the authorities that he is liable if the

buildings are injured for want of

support that would have been suf-

ﬂcient without their weight; in other

words, is liable unless the buildings

themselves caused the support to give

way. So he would be liable if the

buildings had been on the lind for

the period of prescription. Sec Bo-

noni o. Backhousc, El. Bl. & El. 622.

• Hilton "· Lord Gr1mvi1Je, 5 Q. B.
701; Humphries -v. Brogc.len, 12 Q. B.
730; Blackett "· Bradley, 1 B<•8t & S.
U40; Jones"· Wagner, 60 Penn. St.
420; S C. 5 Am. Hep. 38;): Hornl'r r.
Watson, 71.1 Penn. St 242; 8. C. 21
Am. Hl'p. 5:1; Zinc Co. "· Franklinite
Co., 13 N.J. :l42.
The ri~rht of action arise~ when
som£' actual damage is done. Bononi
" · Bac k house. El., Bl. & El. 022; 8 C.
in l'rror, 0 H. L. Cas. :)O!J: Fisher "·
ll<•nr1l, 32 Iowa. il46.
Perhaps it is not entirely ct:rtain

bow far the party mining is hound to
proville support for the buildings on
Uae surface. There is no doubt on
the nuthoritics that he is liable if the
buildmgs arc injured for want of
support that would h!Lve bPco suf..
ficicnt without their weight; in ntlwr
wonh, is liable unless the buildin~
thcmselvc~ cau;;cd the support to gi;e
way. So he would be liahlc if the
buihlings had bet:n on the 1 •nd for
the period of preHrription. ~ec ~
noni e. Backhousc, El. Bl. & El. 622.
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actually occurs. If 0. man lives in a town, it is necessary that

507

he should subject himself to the consequences of those opera-

tions of trade which may be carried on in his immediate locality

which are actually necessary for trade and commerce, and also

for the enjoyment of property, and for the beneﬁt of the inhab-

itants of the town and of the public at large. If a man lives in

a street where there are numerous shops, and a shop is opened

next door to him which is carried on in a. fair and reasonable

way, he has no ground for complaint because to himself individ-

ually there may arise much discomfort from the trade carried on

in that shop. But when an occupation is carried on by one

person in the neighborhood of another, and the result ot' that

trade or occupation or business is a material injury to property,

then there unquestionably arises a very diﬁ'e|-ent consideration.

In a case of that description the submission that is required

from persons living in society to that amount of discomfort

which may be necessary for the legitimate and free exercise oi

the trade of their neighbors would not apply to circumstances

the immediate result of which is sensible injury to the value of

the property.‘ Every business should be carried on in a suitable

and convenient place, and by convenient is meant, not a place

which may be convenient to the party himselt', looking at his
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interest merely, but a place suitable and convenient when the

interests of others are considered.’ "

In the application of this rule to actual controversies, in this

country. there has been some apparent divergcncy in views; but

this probably is to be attributed to local or special circumstances

and not to any disagreement concerning the law itself.‘

‘St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tip-

ling, 11 H. L. (‘as. 642; S. C. Big.

Lend. ('as. 454. And sec Bamford 0.

Turnlcy, 3 Best & S. I56. questioning

Hole 0. Barlow. 4 (3. B. (N. S) 334;

(‘avey 0. Leadbittcr, 13 C. B. (N. s.)

470; Waller v. Sclfe, 4 Dc G. & S.

315; S. C. 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 15; Gaunt

v. Fynney, L. lt. 8 Ch. Ap. 8; S. C. 4

l\[o:\k, 718

' \Vn.u,\.\ts.J., in Bamford 1:. Tum.

lcy, 3 B1-st&. S. 65. 75, citinr Jones 0.

Powell, Palm. 536: S. (". llutt. 135

Mtually occurs. If a man lives in a town, it is necessary that
he should su~ject himself to the consequences of those operations of trade which may be carried on in his immediate locality
which are actually neceiif>Bry for trade and commerce, and alt~o
for the cr.joyment of property, and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the town and of the public at large. If a man lives in
a stt·cet where there are numerous shups, and a shop is opened
next door to him which is carried on iu a fair and reasonable
W<lJ, he has no ground for complaint hecanse to himself individually there may arise much discomfort from the tra1le cat·ried on
in that shop. But when nn occupation is cnnied on Ly one
pet·sou in the neighborhood of another, and the re~ult of that
tt·ndc or occupation or bul'inc~s is a material injury to JWoperty,
then there nn<iuestionably u.t·iscs a very different consideration.
In a case of that description the submis,-ion thut is requiretl
from persons Ih·ing in society to that amount uf diseomtort
which may be necessary tor the legitimate and free cxcrch:e of
the trade of their neighbors would not apply to circum~tatlc(•,;
the immediate rj•tmlt of' which is sen:.iblc injury to the value uf
the pruperty.' Every business should he cal'l'ied on in a suitable
and convenient placl·, aud by com·enient is meant, not a phwe
which may be convenient to the party himself, looking at his
interest merely, but a place suitable and com·cnient when the
int<'rcsts of otl1ers are considered.'
In the application of this rule to actual controversieR, in this
c•nmtry. there has been S•Hne appat·ent tli\'t~r;;en<~y in views; hut
this probably iR to be attributed to local or special circnmstaucc.i
and not to any disngrPement concerning the law it,:elt:"

‘St. IIclen’s Smelling Co. n. Tip-

ling was accepted as authority in

Huck:-nstiuc‘s Appeal, 70 Penn. St.

102; S (P. 10 Am. Rep. 669. That

was an application to enjoin the

burning of brick adjoining com-

plainant's premises. The court de-

t

Sr. Ilelen's

Smeltin~

Co. u. Tip-

ling, 11 H. L. ('aH. 642; S. C. Big.

L<!:HI. Cas. 4.'"14. And sec Bamford "·
Turnley, 3 &•st & S. fiG, qnPstioning
Hole "· Harlow, 4 (!. B. (N. s) a::4;
Cavey "· Lc·adbitt<'r, 13 C. B. (~. R.)

nied the injunction on the special

4i0; Walter "· Self<•, 4 De G. & 8.

circumstances, but dwelt upon the

fact that the business of dci'|~ndant

only caused that sort of inconvenience

which must be caused by manufac-

tures, and said: “ In the present case

the kiln of the defendant is situated

on an outskirt of the city ol' Alle-

lWi: S. C. 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 15: Guunt
"· Fynncy, L. R 8 Ch. Ap. 8; S. C. 4
~lo:1k,

718

• Wn.t.r.urs.J., in Ramfonl

r:.

Tuln-

lcy, a IX·st & 8. 6;), 75, eitin!!' Jom•s "·
Puw1•ll, Palm. :Ja6: S. f'. Hutt. 135
• St. IIclen's Smelling Co. D. Tip-

ling was accepted as Rtllhoritr in
HtH'kPnstinc's Appt>a), 70 Pconn. 8t.
102; S C. 10 Am. Hcp. 669. Tlmt
WitS an application to Pnjoin the
hurnin.~ nf brick nfljoining com.
plui111tnt's premises. Till' court rle.
n iNI the injunction on tlu• topceial
cirruml'l!lnees, but dwt•lt upon the
fuct th1tt the husinrss of def•·•t~lant
ouly caused that sort of lnron\"'I'Dh·nce
which must be CRU~t>d hy manufur~
turP,., 111HI said: "In tht• pr<'!ll'nt cn!'e
the kiln of the defendnnt i~ situated
on an outskh1 of the city of Aile-
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The question, then, is what is reasonable under all the circum-
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stances. The unlimited and undisturbed enjoyment which one

is entitled to have of his own property must be qualiﬁed to this

extent: that triﬂing inconveniences resulting from the useful

employment of his neighbor's property must be submitted to

when that which is done by the other, in point of locality is not

unsuitable, and in point of management not unreasonable.‘

Towns cannot be built up and the business of a dense popula-

tion cannot be carried on upon any principle less acconunodating.

It should be remarked, liowerer, that in those eases in which

the questions of nuisance or no nuisance have been raised in a

court of equity, the conclusion of the court to grant or deny

relief in the particular case is not always a guide to a court of

law when it comes to pass upon similar facts. The relief which

equity gives by way of injunction is so severe in its conse-

quences that it is never granted except upon a ease clearly and

conclusively made out-. To break up a 1uan’s business in a case

gheny. The properties of the plain-

tiff anti defendant lie atljoinng each

other on the hill side overlooking the

city, who_-t- every day cloud of smoke

from thousands of chimneys and

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

stacks lmngs like a pall over it, ob-

scuring it from sight. This single

word (lt-scribes the characteristics of

TIJe question, tlwn, is what is reasonable u11r1cr all the cireamstam·es. The unlimited and undisturbed enjoyment whieh one
is entitled to have of his own property mu:-;t be qnalitied to this
extent: that trifling incom'enicnces resulting from the u:;eful
e111ployment of his neighb01·'s property mu:;t be submittcJ to
wlwn that which is done Ly the other, in point of locality is not
unsuitabh·, and in point of mana!-{ement not unreasonnlllc.'
Towns cannot be built up and the business of a dense population cannot Le carried on upon uny principle less accommodatin~.
It should be remarked, howe,·er, that in tlwse cases in wl:ich
the qnc,tions of nuisance or no nuisance have been rais~·d in a
court of cqnit.r, the concln~ion of the <·ourt to gmnt or dt>ny
rei ief in the particular CUSe is not a: ways IL guide to l\ COill't of
law when it comes to pa~s upon similar fact:O. The relief which
equity gives Ly way of injunction is so severe in its consequences that it is ne,·er granted except upon a c:1se clearly and
ctmclusively made out. To Lreak up a mau's business in a case

this city, its kinds of fuel, its busi-

ness, the habits of its people. and the

industries which give it prosperity

and wealth. The people who live in

sut-h a city, or within its sphere of

inﬂuence. do so of choice, and they

voluntarily sul-jt-ct themselves to its

peculiarities and its disconiforts for

the greater beneﬁts they think they

derive from their residence or their

business there. A chancellor cannot

disregiirtl all this " In McKeon v.

See, 51 N. Y. 300; S. C. 10 Am. Rep.

659, St. Helen's Smelling Co. v. Tip-

ling—or rather the case in the court

below where the same rule was laid

tlo\vn—wns also cited with approval;

but there the business was found to

be a nuisance. In Campbell v. Sea-

man, 2 N. Y. Sup. C. 231; S. C. on

Appeal, 63 N. Y. 568, and 20 Am.

Rep. 567, it is assumed that the cases

in 70 Penn. St. and 51 N. Y. are in

conﬂict. which they ch-arl_\' are not,

on the rule of law. But in the latter,

which was a ca~c of brick burning,

near the little village of Cnstlt-ton, on

the lludson river, the business was

declared to be a nuisance, and the

pluintitf recovered datnages. The spe-

cial t3ll‘CLlll1.~‘l.lllCL's to which the Penn-

sylvania court attached importance

were entirely wanting here, and it

seems quite probable that on the

same state of facts the Pt-iinsylvania

court would have reached the same

conclusion. Moreover, the Pt-nnsyl.

vania court only refused an injunc-

tion without deciding what rights

the plaintiff might have had at law.

For further American cases laying

down a like rule of law. see Gilbert

0. Showerman, Mich. 448; Kirk.

man v. llandy, 11 Humph. 406; Whit,

gheny. The properties of the plaintift' uud d~fcnunnt lie !lrljoin n!! each
other on the hill side overlook in~ the
city, who~(' every day clnml of l:lllloke
from thousands of chimney~ and
stack~ hang.; like a pall m·t•r it, obscnrin.!! it from sight. This siu~le
w11rd rlt·st-ril.Jes the characteristics of
tlli!! city, its kind~ of fuel, its husiDl'!'S, the hnuits of its people, 11ntl the
intlustl'ies which give it prosperity
and wealth. The people who live in
sn<'h a city, or within its sph~re of
influence. do so of choil'l', and they
volunta• ily sul•jN~t thcmsl')vcs to its
pt•eulinritil'S nnd its dis<'omfortll for
the greater benefits they think they
dt·rive from their residence or their
hu:-:ill('SS there. A cbancl'llor cannot
dlsre.!!nrtl all this" In ~lcKeon "·
See, ;;1 N.Y. 300; 8. C. 10 Am. Hep.
65!>, St. Hd<·n's ~melting Co. '11. Tipling-m· rath<•t· the cuse in the court
below where thf' same rule was laid
down-wns also cited with approval;
but there the bulline~s was found to
be n nui!lant·c. In Campbell "· Seaman. 2 N. Y. Sup. C. 231; S. C. on

Appeal, 63 N. Y. 568, an<l 20 Am.
R~·p. 567, it Is K-"sumed tlmt the cases
in 70 Pt•un. St. tmd 51 N. Y. are in
conflict. which lh(•y clt·arly ut·c not,
on the rule of law. But in the latter,
which was a Cl\.. e of brick burning,
near tlw littl<' village of Caslll'toa, on
the Hudson rh·cr, the busint-ss was
dcr.lared to be t\ nuisance, and the
plain tilt' rccovcrml dama.g-!'s. Tlu· spe.
cia! drclltn:'t.mct•;~ to whil'h the Pl'nusylvanin Ct>urt attacltC'l) importance
Wl're <'nlirely wnnting h<'re, :md it
i'C<•ms quite probable that on the
same state of fncts the Pt·nn<;yh·ania
court would hnve rea.chPd the lliUuc
conclullion. llnreovcr, the Pf'nn-<ylvania court only I'cfuscc.l an injune.
tion without deciding what righi:J
the plaintiff mi~ht have ha<t nt lnw.
For fut·ther American cases la,·in~
rlown n like rule of law, st>e Giih,.;,
"· Showerman, 23 llich. 448; Kirk.
man "· Handy, 11 Humph . 406; Whitney il. Bartholomew, 21 Conn. 213.
1 Gaunt r. l<'yuncy, L. R 8 Ch Ap.
8; 8. C. 4 1tloak, 718.
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of doubt, or even of slight inconvenience, would be an abuse of
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power. The court of equity wisely and justly, in such cases,

declines to interfere, and sends the plaintiff to a court of lu\v for

damages.‘ In the latter court the question of law is the same,

but the remedy not resting in discretion, as it does in equity, the

court and jury must apply the rule of law and award or refuse

damages according as they ﬁnd that the plaint.iﬁ' does or does

not suffer an inconvenience which is not merely triﬂing :md pro-

ceeds from conduct of defendant that cannot be justiﬁed as

reasonable under the circumstances.

Offensive Noises. A dog which disturbs the rest of the com-

munity at night by loud and continuous barking about or in the

neighborhood of their residences, may be a nuisance.’ S0 the

noises of billiard rooms, of places which are frequented by per-

sons for drinking and earousing, and disorderly houses of all

of doubt, or e\'en of slight inconvenience, would be an ahnse of
powc1·. The court of equity wisely and jthtly, in snch cases,
declines to interfere, and sends the plaintitr to a court of law for
danntges! In the latter court the q ne,..tion of law is the same,
but the remedy not reRting in discretion, a~ it does in equity, the
court and jury must apply the rule of law and award or refuse
damages accoJ·ding as they find that the plaintiff tlues or doc:>
not suffer an inconvenience which ia 11ot merely tl"ifliug and proc.~cds from conduct of defendant that cauuot be jw:~tificd as
reasonable uuJer the circum,;tances.

sorts. while they constitute public nuisrmces, may also, from

their noises and other reasons, be nuisances to the neighborhood.“

No doubt the blowing of a steam whistle as a signal of the

approach or departure of trains may be prohibited in cities and

places densely populated; but it may possibly, under extraor-

dinary circumstances, become a private nuisance also.‘ And so

may the keeping of a noisy livery stable,‘ or the manufacture of
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'Huckenstine's Appeal, '70 Penn.

St. 102; S. C. 10 Am. l{ep.'669. "If

one lives in a city he must expect to

suller the dirt, smoke, noisome odors,

noise and confusion incident to city

life. As Lord Justice JAMES beauti-

fully said in Salvin v. North Brance-

peth (‘oal Co., L. R. 9 Ch. Ap 705.

‘ If seine picturesque haven opens its

arms to invite the commerce of the

world. it is not for this court to forbid

Offensive Noises. A dog which di~tnrbs tl1e rest of the community at night by loud and continuous barking about or in the
neighborhood of their •·csidences, may be a nuisance.' So the
noisPs of billiard rooms, of places which are fretpleuted by persunt>. f(lr drinking and carousing, aud ,]i,-orderly houses of all
sorts. while they constitute public nnis:mcl'S, may als(J, from
their no_iscs and other ~al'ons, be nuisances to the ueighborhood.'
No doubt the blowing of a steam whistle as a signal of the
approaeh or clepa.t·ture of trains may be pi'Ohihited in cities and
places densely populated; but it may po~~ihly, under extr·aurdinary circum~tances, bewme a private nuisance also. 4 And so
may the keeping of a noisy livery stable," or the manufacture of

the embrace, although the fruit of it

should be the sights and sounds and

smells of a common seaport and

ship-building town, which would

drive the Dryads and their inasters

from their an 'ient solitudes.’ " EARL,

J., in Campbell o. Seaman, 68 N. Y.

568.

' Brill v. Flagler, 2‘? Wend. 354.

* Sec Tanner r. Albion, 5 Hill, 121;

Bloomhuﬂ‘ v. State, 8 Blackf. 205 ;

People v. Sergeant, B Cow. 139;

Gaunt u. Fynncy, L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 8;

S. (1.4 Moak, 718; Inchhald v. Rob-

inson, L. R. 4 Ch. Ap. 23*-8. (lather-

ing in a noisy way in s pigeon shoot-

ing match may be a nuisance. King

0. Moore, 3 B. & Ad. 184. See Walker

0. Brewster, L It. 5 I-Iq. (‘us ‘Z5.

‘ See Knight v. Goodyear, etc., Co.,

33 C inn. 438; S. C. 9 .~\m. ltep. 406;

First B‘l]l1l.~lt Church v. Si-lienectady,

etc., R R. Co., 5 Barb. '79.

-* Ball v. Ray, L. R. 8 Ch. 467; Bro-

der 0. Saillard, 2 Ch. Div. 692; S. C.

17 Moak, G93; Durgan 0. Waddill, 9

Ired. 244.

I Huckenstine's AppPal, 70 Penn.
St. 102; S.C. 10 Am. Hcp .. 6G9. "If
one lives in a city he must expPct to
sutler the uirt, smoke, noh!ome odors,
noise and confusion Incident to city
life. As Lord Justice JAVKS l.Jcautifully said in Salvin D. North Brancc}JCth ( 'oal Co., L. R 9 Ch. Ap 703.
• If some picturt·!lquc haven opens its
&!"IDS to invite the c•Hnmercc of the
world. it is u.lt for this court to forbid
the eml.Jrac£", although the fruit of it
should be the si~hts and sounrls and
smells of a common ~eaport and
ship-building town, which would
drive the Dryads and their IllllSil·rs
from their an ·ient solitudes.' " EARL,
J., in Campbell t1. Scuwan, 63 N. Y.

• Brill D. Flagler, 2.'1 Wend. 354.
Sec Tanrwr r. Albion, 5 Hill, 121;
Bloomhuff D. State, 8 Blackf. 20/j ;
People D. Sergl•unt, 8 Cow. 139;
o.mnt D. Fynncy, L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 8;
S.C. 4 ::\loak. 718; Inrhhahl D. Robinson, L. R 4 Ch. Ap. :;.-~. Gatherin~ in a noisy WilY In a pi)l;l'nn shooting- matrh may be a nuisanrc. King
t1. ~loore, S B & .\d. l!H. 8<'1' Walker
e. Brew~:~tcr, L H. 5 Eq. Cots ~:;.
4 See Knil!;ht D. Homlyl·ar. etc., Co.,
88 C •nn. 438; 8. C. 9 Am. Ht•p. 406;
Firsl B-1pti~t Church D. ~dwnect.udy,
etc., H H. Co., 5 B~~orb. 7U.
~Bull "· Hay, L. U. 8 Ch. 4fi7; Bro.
der t1. 8aill:ml, 2 Ch. Div. 0112; S.C.
17 '!\lonl•, GD3; Dargan e. Wuddill, 9

668.

Ired. 2!4.

1
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machinery, or any business in which the noises are great and
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incessant or frequent.‘

Jar of Machinery. Vlrhere manufacturing operations are

carried on with heavy machinery in the part of a city mainly

machinery, or any business in which the notscs are great and
incessant or frequent.'

occupied by residences, the jar of machinery may constitute a

serious nuisance, injurious not to comfort merely, but to health.

It is usually increased, also, by smoke, soot, etc.‘ Grist mills

are sometimes complained of on this ground.‘

Nuisance of Dust, Smoke, etc. This may be caused in many

kinds of business. lt is what is generally complained of in

brick making, but sometimes also in the grinding of grain, the

manufacture of machinery, etc.‘ If the smoke or dust, or both,

that rises from one man’s premises and passes over and upon

Jar of Machinery.

Where mannfacturing operations are
carried on with heavy machinery in the part of a city mainly
occupied by residences, the jar of machinery may constitute a
serious nuisance, injurious not to comtort merely, but to health.
It is usually increased, also, by smoke, soot, etc.• Grist mills
are sometimes complained of on this ground.'

those of another causes perceptible injury to the property, or

so pollutes the air as sensibly to impair the enjoyment thereof,

it is a nuisance." But the inconvenience must be something

more than mere fancy; mere delicacy or fastidiousness; “ it

must be an inconvenience materially interfering with the

ordinary comfort, physically, of human existence; not merely

according to elegant and dainty modes and habits of'living, but

according to plain, sober and simple notions among the English

people.” °
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‘ Soltaue. De lleld, 2 Sim. (N. s.) 133;

Elliotson v. Feetham, 2 Bing. (N. C.)

134; Fish v. Dodge, 4 I)enio, 311;

Mclieon 12. See, 51 N. Y. 300; Green

v. Lake, 54 Miss. 540; Bishop v.

Banks, 33 Conn. 118; Rhodes v. Dun-

bar, 57 Penn. S. 274; Robinson 0.

Baugh, 31 Mich. 290: Duncan '0.

Hayes, 22 N. J. Eq. 25; Davidson 0.

Isham, 9 N. J. Eq. 186,190; Dennis

-v. Eckhardt, 3 Grant, 390; Bradley 0.

Gill, Lutw. 69.

Nuisance of Dust, Smoke, etc. This may be caused in many
kinds of busiuc~s. It is what is generally complained of in
brick making, hut sometimes also in the grinding of' ~rain, the
manufacture of machinery, etc.• If the smoke or dust, or both,
that rises fmm one man's premises aud passes o\·er and npou
those of another causes pereeptible iujnry to the property, or
so pollutes the air as sensibly to impair the enjoyment thereof,
it is a nnisnnce." But the inconvenience must be something
mo1·e than mere timcy; mere delicacy or tastidiousness; '"it
must Le au incon\'eniencc matct·ially interttll'ing with the
ordinary comfort, physically, of human exit;teuce; not merely
a.ceording to elegant and dainty modes and habits of'liviug, but
a.ccorJiug to plain, sober and simple notions among the Euglish
people." •

9 Robinson 1:. Baugh, 31 Mich. 290;

McKeon v. See, 51 N. Y. 300; S. C.

10 Am. Rep. 659; Wesson v. 1Vash-

burn Iron Co., 18 Allen, 95; Whitney

v. Bartholomew, 21 Conn. 213; Crump

v. Lambert, L. R. 3 Eq. Cas. 409.

“Gilbert v. Shower-man, 23 Mich.

448; Cooper v. Randall, 53 Ill. 24.

‘ See Ross 0. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq.

294; Hutchens 1:. Smith, 63 Barb.

251; Wesson 0. Iron Co, 13 Allen,

95; (Iooper v. Randall, 53 lll. 24;

Norcross 0. Thoms, 51 Me. 503;

Conklin v. Phoenix Mills, 62 Barb.

299; Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich.

448; Sampson v. Smith, 8 Sim. 272;

Crump r. Lambert, L. R. 2! Eq. C-as.

409; Hyatt v. Myers, 71 N. C. 271;

Jelfersonville, etc., R. B. Co. v. Es-

terle, 13 Bush, 667.

‘ Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294;

Rhodes 0. Dunbar, 57 Penn. St. 274.

‘ V. C. Knight Bacon, in Walter 0.

Se1fe,4 De G. &: S. 315; S. C. 4 Eng,

L. & Eq. 15. And, see Soltau v. De

Held, 2 Sim (N. s.) 133, 159; Colum-

bus Gas O0. 0. Freeland, 12 Ohio, (N.

s.) 392.

Soltau tl. D{' Held, 2 Sl m . (N. s.) 138;
Elliot!lon ~'· Fcetham, 2 Hing. (N. C.)
134; Fish t•. Dodge, 4 Denio, 3t1;
:McKeon "· Sec, 51 N.Y. aoo; Green
l'. Lake, 54 !I iss. 540; Bishop "·
Banks. aa Conn. 118; H.hodcs "· Dunoar, 57 Penn. S. 274; Robinson "·
Bau~rh, at Mich. 290; Duncan "·
II nyc~, 22 N.J. Eq. 25; Davidson "·
Isham, 9 N. J. Eq. 1811, 100; Dennis
"· Eckhardt, 3 Grunt, U!JO; Bradley "·
Gill, Lutw. 69.
~ Houinson ~'·Baugh, 31 ~lich. 200;
McKeon v. See, 51 N.Y. 300; S.C.
10 Am. Itep. 659; Wt>~uu "· Washburn Iron Uo.,l3 Allen, 05; Whitney
v. Bartholomew, 21 Conn. 213; Crump
o. Lambert, L. H. 3 Eq. Cas. 409.
8 Gilbert -c. Showcrman, 23 Mich.
448; Couper ~'· Hand all, 53 Ill. 24.
1

• See Hoss e. Butler, 10 X . •J. Eq.
294; Hutchens 11. Smith, 63 Barb.
2:il; Wesson "· Iron Co. 1:3 Allen,
!15 ; Cooper t>. Randall, 58 Ill. 2-t;
Norcross "· Thoms, 51 Me. 503;
Conklin "· Phoenix :Mills. 62 Barb.
299; Gill1ert "· Showcrman, 23 :\lich.
449: Samp!ion "· Smith, 8 Sim. 272;
Crump c. Lambe1·t, L. R a Eq. Cas.
40ll; Hyutt v. Myers, 71 N. C. 271;
Jefl'ersonville, etc., R. R. Co. r>. Esterle, 13 Bush, 667.
'Huss "· Butler, liJ N. J. Eq. 294;
Rhodes "· Dunbar, 57 Penn. St. 274.
'V. C. Knight BRL'CE, in Walter"·
Sclfe, 4 De G. & S. 315; S. C. 4 Eng,
L. & Eq. 15. And, !!ee Soltau v. De
Held, 2 Sim (N. s.) 1::33, 159; Col urn.
bus Gas Co. ~. Freulunc.l, 12 Ohio, (B.
8.) 392.
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Olfensive Odors. These may proceed from a business carried
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on in an inconvenient place, or managed iuiproperly, or from

something simply permitted on one’s premises from which

offensive odors arise. Where they proceed from a lawful and

proper business, the question of suitableness and reasonable-

ness in point of place and management is almost necessarily

presented. Some kinds of business are in their nature otl'en.~.ive,

and tenements near them can be occupied with neither health

nor comfort. But if a business be necessary or useful, it is

always presumable that there is a proper place and a proper

manner for carrying it on; in other words. that it may be car»

ried on without being a. nuisance. “ It is the injury, annoyance,

inconvenience or discomfort that the law regards, and not the

particular business, trade or occupation from which these result.

A lawful as well as an unlawful business may be carried on so

as to prove a nuisance. The law in this respect looks with an

impartial eye upon all useful trades. avocations and professions.

However ancient, useful or necessary the business may be, if it

is so managed as to occasion serious annoyance, injury or incon-

venience, the injured party has a remed_v.”' It has, therefore,

been held repeatedly that the burning of brick was a nuisance;'

but this can be no general rule: indeed the contrary has been
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sometimes held. The same methods of making brick are not

universal; the same fuel is not always used; and sometimes the

business is not oﬁbnsive even in the immediate nei'rhbor-

75

hood. So the business of tanning leather is often found to

be a nui.<ance;’ in part because of otfensive smells proceeding

from it, and in part from the fouling of streams on which the

business is usually carried on. A livery stable is often a

nuisance; and it is said in one ease that situated within sixty-

The keeping of jacks and stallions

for service w'u.hin sight of private

houses is a nuisance. Hayden v.

Tucker, 37 Mo. 214.

‘Nor-cross o. Thoms, 51 Me. 503,

504. To coustilule it a nuisance, it

is not ne('ess-try the offensive smell

should be unwholesome. Davidson

0. Isham, 9 N. J. Eq. 186.

’ Sec, in addition to the cases be-

fore mentioned Duke of Grafton u.

Hilliard, referred to in 18 Ves. 210,

Offensive Odors. Thefle may proceed from a business carried
on in an incom·enicnt place, or manageu improperly, or from
something simply pt:rmitted on one's premises from wl1ich
oftensivc odors arise. Where they proceed from a lawful and
proper business, the question of suitableness and reasonableness in point of place and management is almost ne('<'Ssarily
presented. Snme kinds of business are in their nature otlcn~i-.·e,
and tenements near them can be occupietl with neither health
n'Or comf(,rt. But if a bnsiness be necessary or useful, it is
always }H'esnmable that there is a proper pln.ce aud a proper
manner tor carrying it on; in other words, that it may be car.
ried on without bt:ing a nnisauce. " It is the injury, unno,vam:e,
inconvenience or discomfort that the law regards, and not the
pat·ticular business, trade or ocmtpation from which th<'se result.
A lawful as well as an unlawful business may he carried on so
as to pt'O\'C a nuisance. The law in this re~pect looks with an
impartial eye upon all useful trades, avocations and proti.·.ssions.
Howe\'er ancient, useful or necessary the husitwss may he, if it
is so m:magcd as to occasion serious annoyance, injury or inconveni<'nce, the injured pnrty has a remedy.'' • It has, therefore,
been held repeatedly that the burning of brick was a nuisance;'
hut this can he no general rule: indeed the contrary has been
sometime~ held. The same methods of making briek are not
uni\·crsal; the same fuel is not always used; and sometimes tho
businc,.;s is not oft'tmsive even in the immediate nei~hhor
hood. So the business of tanning kather is often f(.)ntHl to
be n nui,.;ance;' in part because of otii.•nsive smells pro<'P<·ding
from it, anu in part ft·om the fouling of streams on whidt tho
business is usually carried on. A livery stable is often a
nuisance; and it is said in one case that situa.tcu within sixty-

and in note to 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 18;

Earl of Ripon r. Hobart, 3 .\l. & K.

169; \Vallcr 0. St-lfe, 4 De G. & S. 315;

S. C. 4 Eng. L. & Eq.15.

' See Rex 0. Pappincau. 1 Slra. 686;

Howard 1-. Lee, 3 Sandt ‘J81; Moore

v. \\'(-bb, 1 U. B. (N. 5.) GT3; Ilowt-ll

v. i\Ic(?oy, 3 Rawle, 2-'16; Francis 0.

Sehoclkopf, 53 N. Y. 152.

The keeping of jacks and stallions
for service wi.Lhin sight of privutc
houses is a nuisance. I-lltyt.lcn o.
Tucker, 37 Mo. 214.
J Norcross "· Thoms, ol Me. 503,
504. To con~titute it a nuisanc<•, it
is not nceP;;s·try the nffcu:;ive smell
shoultl he unwholesome. D~vithmn
"· ~!:!hum, 0 N.J. Eq. 186.
' SPe, in addition to the cases before mentioned Duke of Gral\on "·

Hilliard, referred to in 18 Vcs. 210,
ami in note to 4 Eng. L. & E't· 18;
Earl of Hipon r. Ilnlmrt, 3 :tl. & K.
169; Walter ll. 8.-Jt'c, 4 De G. & 8. a13;
B. C. 4 Eng. L. & Eq. l.i.
1 Sec Ht'X fl. Pnpphwau. 1 8trn. 686;
Ilnwurd ['. Lc>c, a 8untlf 2::'1; )[oore
tl. W<·hb, 1 C. B. ~N. s.l G';':t; llow<·ll
tl. :McCoy, 8 Rawlc, 2.i6; Francis tl.
Schoclkopf, 58 N.Y. 152.
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ﬁve feet of a hotel it is prima facie a nuisance.‘ But no such
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general rule can be applied. A livery stable may well be kept

from being oﬂensive in almost any locality not generally devoted

to residences. It is peculiarly a business which may or may

not be offensive according as it is carried on.’ The same may

be said of a brewery, which is also sometimes a nuisance.’ A

distillery is more likely to be one,‘ and a soap manufaetory still

more.‘ A gas manufactory may be under some circumstances,‘

and so may a tobacco mill.’ For a slaughter house or a fat ren-

dering establishment the only “ convenient” nlace would seem

to be at some considerable distance; ’ and the same may be said

of some manui'actories of manure.

Dead animals left unburied are likely to be a nuisanee;' and

a privy may be one if offensive odors arise from it which destroy

the comfortable occupation of a neighboring tenemen t.'° Further

illustrations of the nuisance of oﬂensive smells will be found in

cases cited in the note.“

Mental Disquietude. It was decided in Owen v. llcnman

that an action would not lie for being disturbed in the hearing

of a clergyman and the other exercises of a place of public wor-

ship. The plaintiff, it was said, “claims no right in the build-

ing or any pew in it, which has been invaded. There is no
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1 Coker 0. Birgc, 9 Geo. 425; S. C.

10 Geo. 336. Sec Aldrich v. Ilownrd,

‘Ellis o. Kansas City, etc., R R.

five feet of a hotel it is prima facie a nuisance.' But no such
general rule can be applied. A livery stable may well be kept
from being ofieusive in almost any locality not geuemlly <levott.-d
to rP:;idences. It is peculiarly a business which may or may
not be offensive according as it is carried on.' The same may
be said of a brewery, which is also sometimes a nuisance.• A
distillery is more likely to be oue,' and a soap manufactory still
more.• A gas manufactory may be under some cil·cumstances,'
and so may a to"!J~cco mill.' For a slaughter house or a tat rendering estahli,;hment the only "convenient" r•lace would seem
to Lc at some considerable di::;tance; t and the same may be said
of some manufactories of manure.
Dead animals left Ullbnriet.l are likely to be a nuisance;• and
a privy may be one if offensive odord arise from it which de:;troy
the comfm·table occupation of a neighboring tenement." Fut·ther
illustrations of the nuisance of offensive smells will be fuuud in
cases cited in the note. 11

Co., ($3 .\Io.131.

8 R. I. 246; Dargan 9. Wnddill, 9

Ired. 244.

’ Kirkman 0. Handy, 11 Humph.

406; Dnr_;an 0. Waddill, 9 Ired. 244;

BI'(ltl(.‘I‘ e. Snillard, 2 Ch. Div. 692; S.

C. 17 Monk, 693.

' J0ne~4 v. Williams, 11 M. &W. 176.

Mental Disquietude. It was decided in Owen v. llemnan
that an action would not lie tor being disturb ..,d in the hearing
of a clergyman and the other exercises of a place of public worship. The plaintiff, it was said, "claims no rig-ht in the building or any p~w in it, which has been invaded. Ti1ere is no

‘ Smiths 1;. McConathy, 11 Mo. 517.

‘ Brady 1: Wet-ks, 3 Barb. 157.

‘ Cleveland v. Gas Light Co., 20 N.

J. Eq. 201 ; Pottstown Gas Oo.v. Mur-

phy, 39 Penn. St. 257.

" Jones v. Powell, Hutt. 136.

9 Catlin 1:. Valentine, 9 Paige, 575;

Peck n. Elder, 3 Sandf. 126; Morley

0. Pragnal, (Jro. Car. 510; Bishop o.

' Coker e. Birge, 9 Geo. 42.'); 8. C.
10 Gco. 336. 8cc Aldrich v. Howard,
8 R I. 246; Darg!Ul e. Wttddill, 9
Ired. 244.
II Kirkman e. Handy, 11 Humph.
406; Dur_gan 1!. Wulidill, 9 Ired. 2-U;
Broder"· R:lillarJ, 2 Ch. Div. 0!)2; S.

Banks, 33 Conn. 118; Mcigs 0. Lister,

23 N. J. Eq. 199. t

1° Barnes v. Halhorn, 54 Me. 1%;

Wahlc v. Reinbach, '76 Ill. 322.

" Shaw 0. Cmnmiskey, 7 Pick. 76 ;

Mcigs 0. Lister, 23 N. J. Eq. 199;

Ashbro tk o. Commonwealth, 1 Bush,

139; Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. 1:. Grnbill,

50 lll. 241; Pottstown Gus. Co, 1»,

Murphy, 39 Penn. St. 257; (‘lei-1-land

0. Gas Light Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 201;

Marshall v. (‘ohen, 4-4Geo. 4&1); Neal

v. Henry, Mcigs, 17; Davis c. Lam-

bcrtson, 56 Burl). 480; Cooke r.

Forbes, L. R. 5 Eq. Cas. 1615; Hack-

ney v. State, 8 Ind. 494. A private

tomb may be a nuisance. Barnes 0.

Hathorn, 54 Me. 124.

— ~ --‘vi

C. 17 Muali, 0!13.

• Jooc~ r. Williams,ll M. &W. 170.
'Smiths v. llcConathy. 11 Mo. ol7.
'Brady 1' Wct•ks, 3 Barb. t:i7.
1 Cleveland"· Gas Li~ht Co., 20 N.
J. Eq 201 ; Pottstown Gas Co. e. Murphy, UU Pl'nn. St. 257.
1 J cuH·s "· Powell, Hutt. 136.
I Catlin '{'. Yalentine, 9 Paige, o75;
P('ck "· Eld<·r, :3 Sand f. 121l; Morley
"· Pra~nal, Cro. Car. 510; Bishop"·
Bunks, a:l Conn. 118; :Mcigu. Lister,
23 N. J. Eq. 199.

• Ellis "· Kansas City, etc., R R.
Co., li3 :\lo. 131.
1o B11mcs "· Hathorn, 54 Ue. 124;
Wahle v. Reinbach, 76 Ill. :!:!.!.
11 Shaw v. Cummiskey, 7 Pick. 7G;
M('igs 11. Listt·r. 23 N. J. Eq. 199;
A!<huro •k 11. Commonwealth, 1 llush,
t;JO; Illinois, etc., R. R Co. c. Grabill,
50 Ill. 2-H; Pottstown Gu..~. Co. t'.
)llll'phy, 39 Penn. St. 2.17; C'l<•n·land
e. Gas Light Co., 20 N. J. Eq. :201;
Mnr;;hull v. ('oheo, 44 Gt'o. 4b!J; Neal
ll. llc!nry, 1\lei!!~, 17; Dads -c. Lam.
bertson, 56 Bru·b. 480; Cooke r.
Forucs, L. R. li Eq. Cns. 166; Jl:tck.
ncy 11. State, 8 Ind. 494.. A prinLtc
tomb may be a nuisance. &roes cr.
Hathorn, 54 Me. 124.
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damage to his property. health, reputation or person. He is

603

disturbed in listening to a sermon by noises. Could an action

be brought by every person whose mind or feelings were dis-

turbed in listening to a discourse, or any other mental exercise—-

and it must be the same whether in a church or elsewhere—by

the noises, voluntary or involuntary of others, the ﬁeld of lit-

igation would be extended beyond endurance. The injury,

moreover, is not of a temporal nature: it is altogether of a

spiritual character for which no action lies.”' This case has

been approved in a suit brought to restrain a street railway

company from running its cars on‘Snnday; the grievance alleged

being “ that by reason of the said unlawful business carried on

as aforesaid by the defendants, they, the complainants, have been

and are and will be deprived of their right of enjoying the Sab-

bath as a day of rest and religions exercise, free of all disturb-

ance iroin merely unnecessary and unauthorized worldly employ-

ment; that they have been and are and will be deprived from

enjoying peaceably and without interruption the worship of

Almighty God in their accustomed places of public worship,

or in their own residences on the Sabbath day; and that the

lawful peace of the said day is thereby disturbed and broken;

and the right of property which they possessed in their said
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churches or places of public worship and in their private res-

idences are, and will continue to be thereby infringed upon, and

their said churches and residences deteriorated and lessened in

value.” Putting aside the question of alleged injury to prop-

erty—-which at the time it was not IlOC1‘S.~'21l'_Y to eonsider—the

Court say: “Religions meditation and devotional exercises are

a duty and a privilege undoubtedly, but result nevertheless from

sentiments not universal in their demonstrations, by any means,

but peculiar to individuals rather than to the whole community.

()t' this, * * injury to it by disturbance cannot be measured

by any standard applicable to the privation of ordinary comfort.

It cannot be aﬁ:irmed, in regard to the devotional exercise em-

braced within the privilege that it is more than a. mental dis-

turbance—an inconvenience. Human tribunals cannot tell

anything about the effect of mere noise occasioned by ordinary

einploymeuts on the mind. The belief is reasonable that its

1 Owen 0. llenman, 1 Watts & S. 548.

damngo to his property. health, reputation or perwn. He is
disturbed in listening to a 8e1·muu by noises. Could an action
be brought by every person whose miud o1· feelings wm·o disturbed in listening to a discourse, or any other mental exerciseand it must be the samo whether in a chnrch or elsewhere- by
the noises, voluutary or in\·uluutary of others, the field of litig<Ltion would be extended beyond endurance. The injury,
moreon~r, is 11ot of a temporal naturu: it is altogether of a
spiritual character for which no action lies." • This case has
been appro\·cd in a suit brought to restrain a street railway
company from runuing its cars ou Snnday; the grievance allcgL'<i
being "'that by rcasun of the said unlawful business carried on
as aioresaid by the defendants, they, the complainant~, have beeu
and a1·e ami will be deprived of their right of enjoying the Sabbath as a day of rest and religious exet·cise, free of all di~turb
auce from merely unnecessary aud unanthorizctl worldly elllploymcut; that they have been aud are and will be dcp1·ived from
enjoying peaceably and without interruption the worship of
Almig!Jty God in their accustomed pbces of puLlic wurehip,
or in their own residences on tho Sabbath day; and that the
lawful peace of the said day is thereby dititurbed and bruken;
and the t•ight of property which they possessed in their said
churches or pla<.-cs of public wor~hip and in tl1eir private resiJence.,; are, and will continue to be thereby infriuged upon, and
their said churches and residen(~es detl'rioratl'd and lessened in
value." Putting aside the quetiti"n of alleged iuju1·y to property- which at the time it wns not ncct's~'ary to con~>ider- the
Court say: "Religions meditation and devotional exercist•s arc
a duty and a privilege undoubtedly, but result nevertheless from
senti meuts not uuh·ert~nl in their demonstrationi', by any nwaus,
but peculiar to individnals rather than to the whole community.
Of this, * * injury to it by disturbance cannot be measm·cd
l,y any standard applicable to the pl'ivation of ordinary comfort.
It cannot be affinm•d, in regard to the devotional exercise embraced within the privileg-e that it is more than a mental disturbance-an incoll\·cnience. llnman tribunals cannot tell
anything about the effect of mere noise o<.:casioned by ordinary
employments on the mind. The belief is reasonable that its
I

Owen •· llcnman, 1 Watts & 8. 548.
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operations are independent of such physical facts; that it is
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cognizant of its own impulses and emotions under all ordinary

circumstances, when in its normal condition and free from dis-

ease. This is the rule of the criminal law, and it has never been

held that a disturbance from ordinary causes excuses a criminal

act.” The only true rule in judging of injuries from alleged

nuisances is declared to be, “such as naturally and neces.~aril_v

result to all alike who come within their influence. Not to one

on account of peculiar sentiments, feelings or tastes, if it would

have no effect on another, or all others without these peculiar

sentiments or tastes. Not to a sectarian if it would not be to

one belonging to no church. It must be something about the

effects of which all agree; otherwise that which might be no

nuisance to the majority might be claimed to deteriorate prop-

erty by particular persons. Noises which disturb sleep, bodily

rest a physical necessity, noxious gases, sickening smells, cor-

rupted waters and the like, usually affect the mass of community

in one and the same way, and may be testified to by all possessed

of their natural senses, and can be judged of by their probable

effect on health and comfort, and in this way damages may be

perceived and estimated. Not so of that which only atleets

thought or meditation. \Vhat would disturb one in his reﬂec-
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tions might not disturb another. There can be no general rule

or experience as to this; it is incapable of being judged of, like

those things which aﬁ'eet health or comtbrt.” ‘

So in Massachusetts it has been held that, although by statute

the keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors. was made a common

nuisance, yet that such keeping of liquors, and the sale thereof,

even though made to the husbands, Wives, children and servants

of complaining parties, did not make it a special nuisance te

such persons, so as to authorize and justify them in proceeding

to break into the shop or building where the liquor was kept and

the sales made, and to destroy the liquor and the vessels in which

it was found; but that the nuisance must be deemed a public

nuisance exclusively.’ Here, as in the cases before referred to,

'TnoMrso1w, J., in Sparhawk 0.

Union Passenger R. Co., 54 Penn.

St. 401, 4:27. But a railway may be

a nuisance to a religious corporation

it" its trains disturb worship on that

day, and thereby deteriorate the value

of the church property. First Bap.

tist (‘Inn-ch o. Schenectady, etc., R. R.

Co., 5 Barb. 79.

' Brown 0. Perkins, 12 Gray, 89.

operations are independent of such physical facts; thnt it is
cognizant of its own impulses and emotions under all ordinary
circumstances, when in its normal condition and free from disease. This is the rule of the criminal law, and it has never been
held that a disturbance from ordinary ca.nse; excu:;es a criminal
act." The only true rule in judging of injuries from alll'~red
nuisances is declar. . d to be, "such as naturally and nece:;.-arily
result to all alike who come within their i!atluence. Not to one
on account of peculiar seutimcnts, feelings or tastes, if it would
have no effect on anothe1·, or all othe1·s without these peenliar
sentiments or tastes. Not to a sectarian if it would not ue to
one belonging to no church. It must be something about the
effects of which all agree; othenvise that which might be no
nuisance to the majority might be claimed to deteriorate property by particular persons. Noi~cs which dit'tnrh sleep, bodily
rest a physical necessity, noxious gases, sickening smells, corrupted waters and the like, usually ntfect the mass of community
in one and the same way, and may be testified to by all posse,..:;.ed_
of their natural senses, and can be jn:lged of by their probable
effect on health and comfort, and in this way damages may be
perceived and Pstimated. Not so of that which only atle~..·ts
thought or meditation. w·hat would disturb one in his reflections might not disturb another. There can be no general rule
or expe1·icnce as to this; it is incapable of heing judged of, like
those things which affect hralth or comfort." 1
So in ~Iassachusetts it has been held that, although by statute
the keeping for sale of intoxicating lifpwr·s WllS made a common
nuisance! yet that such keeping of liquors, and the sale theJ·e~,t~
even though made to the husbands, wh·es, children and sen1l11t~
of complaining parties, did not make it a spceial nuisance tc
such persons, so as to authorize and justify them in Jll'or.reding
to break into the shop or bniJ,lin;r where the li<tuor was kept ancl
the sales made, and to destroy the liquor and the ''c~seh~ in wllich
it was fouud; but that the nuisance must be deemed a public
nuisance exelusively. 2 Here, as in the cases befi>re referred to,
1 TuOMPSoN, J., in SpllrhRwk "·
Union Passenger R Co., M Penn.
St. 401, 4:.!7. But a. railway may be
a. nuis,mce to a religious corporation
if it& lrllins tlisturb worship on tha.'

day, and thereby deteriorate the \':tl uc
of the church properly. Fil'llt Bap.
tist ('hlll'ch "· Schenectady, etc., R. R.
Co., 5 Barb. 79.
1 Brown "· Perkins, 12 G1·ay, 89.
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the disturbance was only mental. Such cases may become com-
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mon law nuisances if noisy and riotous proceediiigs are suﬁ'cred,

and if disorderly people are allowed to gather in them for their

custoinary practices. But the nuisance is then in the disorder,

not in the business itself. If the mental disqiiietude they occa-

sion could give a right of action, the question ol' locality would

be of li ltle importance, and one might be specially inconvenienced

by a nuisance in a distant town as well as by one near him.

As any public evil or disorder which by statute is declared to

be a nuisance must be held and deemed to be out", there may be

many other statutory nuisances which cannot afibrd grounds for

a private action, for the reason above assigned, namely. that the

only annoyance they could cause to individuals would be such

as might be caused by any breach of public order or of good

inorals.

Inviting one into Dangerous Places. It has been stated on a

preceding page that one is under no obligation to keep his prem-

ises in sate condition tor the visits of trespassers. On the other

hand, when he expressly or by implication invites others to conic

upon his premises, whether for busiiiess or for any other purpose,

it is his duty to be reasonably sure that he is not inviting them

into danger, and to that end he must exercise ordinary care and
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prudence to render the premises reasonably safe for the visit.

the di~tnrbance was only mental. Such cases may become common law nni~ances if noisy nnd riotous proceedings arc sutfcJ·cd,
and if disorderly people arc allowed to gather in them for their
cu:-:otomary practices. But the nuisance is then in the disorder,
not in the business itself. If the mental disquietude they occa.
sion could give a right of action, the queRtion of locality would
be of little importance, n.nd one might be ~pcdally incon\·enienced
by a uui~ance in a distant town as well as by one nea.r him .
.As any public evil or disorder which by statute is declared to
be a nuisance must be held and deemed to be oJH', there may be
many other statntory uuisances which cannot aftorcl g-rounds fur
a pd\·ate action, tor the reason aboo,·e a~~i~ned, namely. that the
only nunoyance they conld cause to indivi,luals wonlrl he tmch
as might be caused by any breach of public_ onlcr or of goud
mut·alt:.

Many cases illustrate this rule.’ Thus, individuals holding a

fair and erecting structures for the purpose are liable for injuries

to their patrons caused by the breaking down of these structures

thronvh such defects in construction as the exercise of )l‘0 ier

5

care would have avoided.’ A railroad company is liable to a

~

1 The power to declare what shall

be nuisances is not \'e.~itcd in city or

town councils, and they can punish

as such only what are nuisances at

the common law orliy statute. ‘Yates

0. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; \Vret‘ord

v. People, 14 Mich. 41; Everett v.

Council Blutis, 46 Iowa, 66.

‘ llush r. Stcinmnn. 1 B. & P. 404;

Burgi-~s v. Gru_v,1 1\[., G. & S. 578;

Randleson r. Murray, 8 Ad. & El. 109;

Inviting one into Dangerous Places. It lms been stated on a
pret'l'ding page thatone is under no obligation to kePp hi.:; premises in sate condition tor the \'iRits of trcspa:'-se•·s. On the other
hand, when he expres~Jy or hy impli('ation invites othPrs to come
upon his premises, whether tor bnsine,;s or for any oth('J' purpose,
it is his duty to be rea.sona.hly snre that he is not indting them
into dang-er, and to that eJI(l he must exerci:-~e or,Jinar_y cam and
prndPnce to render the p1·emiscs reasonably safe ti1r the visit.
)!any cases illustrate this rnle.• Thus, individuals holding a
fair nnd Pr~>cting structures fi.>r the pnrpos;e aJ'l' liable for injn•·ies
to their patl·ons cnu~ed hy the brPaking down of tltt·t:e struetuJ·es
thron~h such Jefcrts in con:-tJ·nction as the ex(•r<"isc of prop(•r
care wonhl have avoided.' A railroad company is liable to a

Sout'i<-ole 0. Stanley, 1 ll. & N. 247;

S. C. 88 E. L. 6: Eq. 295; Indermaur

0. Dauics, L. R. 1 C. P. 27-1, and L. R.

2 C. P. 181; Pickard r. Smith, 10 C

B. (x.s.) 470; Friucis r. Cockrcll, L.

R. 5 Q B. 181; Elliott 1". Pray, 10 Al-

len, 378.

' Latluim v. Roach, 72 ill. 179. The

owner of a house who has put up a

scaffold for tlic ptlrpnsvs of nn ad li-

tion to it is liable to a worknrin who

is injured by the scaffold falling be-

cause of its insufficiency. (‘ouglitry

0. Glolie Wr>(ilt*n Co., 56 N. Y. 124;

S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 387. Sec the gen-

I The power to l'lerlare whllt shnll
be nuisam"l's is not n·stl'll in city or
town <"Otlllcils, and lh<'y can punl,;h
as such only what arc nuisnnc(•s at
the l'nmmnn Ja,v or hy stalute. · Yatl•s
"· 1\lilwnukec, 10 Wnll. 497: Wrcfnrd
"· l'copll', 14 :Mich. 41; Evcr£>1t "·
Con nl'i I ij!ulfs, 46 I own, lio.
'Bush r. l"tt>inman. 1 B. & P. 404;
Bur~<·,s t~. Gr11y, 1 ll., G. & R 578;
Rnndll'!!nn r. :Murray, 8 Ad. & El. 109;
Snut'l('nte "· Stanley, 1 II. & N. 247;
B. C. ~ E. L. & Eq. 293; lndcrmaur

"·

Daml'>~,

L. R. 1 C. P.

:n t,

and I-. R.

2 C. P. 181; Pirknrd r. Smith, 10 ('
B. (N. !!.) 470; Fr 1nds r . Coekrl'll, L.
R. 5 Q B. HH; EIIHt r. Pray, 10 Allen, 878.
• Lnth:un tt. Ronch, 72111. 179. The
owm·r of n hou~e whn hu..q put up a
scaffold for the pnrposPs of rm ::1lli.
tinn to it l!l :ialtlc Inn wnrkm·m who
is injured by the S<'affnld f11liin;: l~e.
cnu~c nf its insufficicnry. ( 'on].!hlry
"· Glohc Wool<•n Cn., 56 N.Y. 12-1;

B. C.

1~

Am. Rep. 387. Sec the gen.
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hackman doing business with it, who steps without fault into a
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cavity negligently left by them in their platform, whereby l1e is

injured.‘ So a railroad company is liable to one who is injured

in attempting to cross its track, invited to cross by a signal indi-

cating that it is safe to do so,‘ and to people who, coming to the

station to welcwme an arrival, are injured by the giving way of

the platform.‘ So a- brewer is liable to one who, coming on his

premises to do business with him, without fault of his own, falls

through an unguarded trap door.‘ Other illustrations are given

in the notes.

But one is not invited into danger when his entrance upon

dangerous premises is simply not opposed and prevented. Thus,

one whose unenclosed grounds people cross without objection is

not liable to one who falls into an unguarded cistern there.‘ The

owner of a vessel is not liable to a servant employed upon it who,

in wandering about the vessel from curiosity, falls through a

scuttle.“ One who publicly exposes a machine on market day is

not responsible for injuries to boys who meddle with it without

permission.’ The liability in any such case must spring from

eral rule laid down in Beck 1:. Car-

ter, 6S N. Y. 283, citing Blithe n. Top-

ham, Cro. Jae. 158; Hardeastle v.
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Railway Co., 4 H. & N. 67; Barnes 0.

Ward, 9 C. B. 1:92; Hadley v. Taylor,

L. R. 1 C. P. 53; Corby v. Hill, 4 C.

B. (N. s.) 556; llounsell v. Smyth, 7

(Y. B. (N. s.) 730. Au l, sec Dcford 0.

l(o_\-scr, 30 Md. 179; Godlcy o. Ila-

harkman doing business with it, who steps without fault into a
ca\·ity negligently left by them in their platform, whereby he is
injured. 1 So a railroad company is liable to one who is injured
in attempting to cross its track, invited to cross by a. signal indicating that it is safe to do Ro,' and to people who, coming to the
station to welc'lme a.n arrival, are injured. by the gi,·ing way of
the platform.• So &· brewer is liable to one who, ('Oming on his
premises to do business with him, without fault of his own, falls
through an unguarded trap door.t Other illustrations are given
in the notes.
But one is not invited into danger when his entrance upon
dangerous premises is simply not opposed and prevP.nted. Thus,
one whose unenclosed grounds people cross without objection il!
not liable to one who falls into an unguarded ci,;tcrn there.• The
owner of a vessel is not liable to a servant employed upon it who~
in wandering about the vessel from curiosity, tails through a
scuttle.• One who publicly exposes a maehine on market day is
not responsible for injuries to boys who meddle with it without
permission.' The liability in any snch case must spring from

garty, 20 Penn. St. 387.

l 'l‘obin v. Portland, etc., R. R. Co.,

59 Me. 183 See Swords 0. Edgar,

59 N. Y. 28; S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 295.

’ Sweeny v. Old Colony R. R. Co.,

10 Allen, 368.

' Gillis 1:. Penn. R. R. Co., 59 Penn.

S’. 129. Soc Gautret v. Egcrton. L.

R. 2 C. P. 371; Holmes 1:. N. E. Rail-

way Co., L. R. 4 Exch. 254.

‘Chapman v. Rothwell, El. Bl. &

El. 168. See Frccr 1». Cameron, 4

Rich. 228: Totteu 0. Phipps, 52 N. Y.

354; Swords 1;. Edgar. 59 N. Y. 28;

Fairbauk 1:. llacntzsche, 73 Ill. 236;

Strattou 0. Staples, 59 Me. 94; Elliott

0. Pray, 10 Allen. 878; Gilbert n. Na-

gle, 118 Mass. 278: Pierce r. \Vhit-

comb, 4S Vt. 1137; S. C. 21 Am. Rep.

120; Hydraulic Works r. Orr, S3 Penn.

St. 332. See the general rules of

liability stated in Malone 0. Ilawley,

46 Cal. 409. For injuries in conse.

qucnce of defective or unsafe build-

ings, the owner is not responsible if

he has employed com petcnt contract-

ors or mechanics to build or examine

them, and is guilty of no personal

fault. Brown v. Cotton Co., 3 II. 8:

C. 511 See Ryan n. Fowler. 24 N. Y.

410. Compare lloman 0. Stanley. 66

Penn. St. 464; S. C. 5 Am. Rep. 359.

‘ llurgreavcs e. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1.

°Sevcry 0. Nickersou, -120 Mas.

306. See, for a case like this in prin-

ciple, Pierce u. Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127;

S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 120.

" Mangnn v. Attcrton, L. R. 1

Exch. 239. Compare Kcffc v. Mil-

waukee, ete.,R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 207;

ante, p. 303.

erR] rule laid down in B<'rk t. Carter, 68 N. Y. 28.1, citing Blithe n. Topham, Cro. J JtC. 158; IlardenMtle "·
RRilway Co., 4 H. & N. 67; Barnl':'! "·
Ward, 9 C. B. :m2; Hadley 11. Tnylor,
L. R. 1 C. P. 53; Corby 11. Hill, 4 C.
B. (N. 8.) 556; Hounsell 11. Hmyth, 7
C. H. (N. s.) 7!30. An I, see ~t·ford ,_
Keyser, ao 1\ld. 179; Godley ,. Ila.
gnrty, ~0 Penn. St. 387.
1 Tobin 11. Portland, etc., R. R. Co.,
59 Me. 183 Sec S1vords ,_ Etlgar,
59 N.Y. 28; S.C. 17 Am. Rt•p. 295.
1 Sweeny ,. Old Colony R R. Co.,
10 Allen, aas.
8 Gillis v. Penn. R. R. Co., 59 Penn.
S·. 129. SPc Gautrct fl. Egerton, L.
H. 2 C. P. 871; Holmes 11. N. E. R:tilway Co., L. R. 4: Exch. 254.
4 ChapmRn ,_ Hothwell, El. Bl. &
El. Hitt. 8l"e Freer "'· Canwron, 4:
Hich. 228: Totten"· Phipps, fl2 N.Y.
354; Swords 11. Edg-ar, 59 N. Y. 28:
l:<'nirbank 11. Jlnentzsche, 73 Ill. 2!J6;
Stratton"· Staples, 59 Me. 94; Elliott

e. PrRy, 10 Allen, 878: Gill,ert "· Na.
gle, 118 :Mnss. 278: Pierce r. '\nitcomb, 4S Vt. 127; B. C. 21 Am. Hep.
120; Hrdrnulic Works r. Orr, S:l Penn.
St. 3!12. Sec the gcnl.'ral rult'S of
liability stated in !\lnlone "· Hawley,
46 Cal. 409. For Injuries in consequence of defecth·c or unsafe buildings, the owner is not responsible if
he hns employed eompetl.'nt contractors or mechnnics to build or exRm ine
thrm, nnd is guilty of no person11.l
fault. Brown n. Cotton Co., 3 H. &
C. 511 See Hynn r.. Fowler. 24 N.Y.
410. Compare Homan ,. Stanl<'y, 66
Penn. St. 464; 8. C. 5 Am. Hep. :JS9.
• Ilar.~l"et\VCS t'. Deacon, 2.i Mich. 1.
s Severy "· Nickerson, ·120 Mu!'S.
306. See, for a ra.o;;e like this in principle, Pierce,_ Whitcomb, 4S Vt. 127;
B. C. 21 Am. Rep. 120.
' Mang-nn 11. Atterton, L. R. 1
Exrh. 239. CompRre Keffe "· ~nt.
wnukee, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 207;
tmte, p. 803.
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negligence; and therefore, if the injury arises from some danger
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not known to the owner, and not open to observation, he is not

responsible, because he is not in fault.‘

The duty in all such cases must in general pertain to occu-

pancy, not to ownership; ’ but sometimes it is assumed by others.

Thus, if a landlord, by his covenants with tenants, assumes the

obligation of repairs, he is responsible for any injuries consequent

upon his failure to make them, not to the tenants merely, but to

third persons lawfully coming upon the premises.‘

Nuisances which Threaten Calamity. Many things are nui-

sances because they threaten calamity to the persons or prop<=|'t_v of

others. and thereby cause injury, though the calamity feared may

never befall. A building so negligently constructed or so greatly

decayed that it is likely to fall upon an adjoining tenement, or

negligence; and therefore, if the injury arises ft·om some danger
not known to the owner, and not open to observation, he is not
responsible, because he is not in fault!
The dnty in all such cases must in general pertain to orcupancy, not to ownership; • but sometimes it is assumed by othc1·s.
Thus, if a landlord, by his covenants with tenants, as,.umcs the
obligation ot' repairs, he is ret'ponsible for any injuries con:;t~<lucnt
upon his failure to make them, not to the tenants merely, but to
third pet·sons lawfully coming upon the premises.•

upon persons lawf'ully'making use of easements near it is a uni-

sauce of this sort;‘ and so is po\\'der_or any other dangerous

explosive stored and imperfectly guarded in the vicinity of resi-

dences;' and so is a building infected with disease, and rented in

that condition without notitying the fact.’ So if one who is eon-

structing a brick building abutting on a highway shall put his

servants at work without providing any protection against the

1 As where n mash tub in n brewery
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gave way and injured a servant, being

weakened by natural decay. Malone

v. Hathawuy,64 N. Y. 5; S. C. 21 Am.

Rcp.573. The question in every such

case must be whether the defect was

one that ought to have been detected

and remedied, and would have been

by the exercise of due care. If so,

the owner should be responsible; oth-

erwise, not.

Nuisances which Threaten Calamity. Many things are nuibecause they threaten calamity to the persons or pl'OP('I'ty of
others. and thereby cause injnr_,., though the calamity fca~·ed may
never befall. A building so neglig-ently constructed ot· su gn'atly
decayed that it is like!y to fall upon an adjoining tencml'nt, or
upon }>ersons lawfully making use of casements near it is a nuisance of this sort; • and so is powder_ or any othct· dangerous
explosive stored and imperfectly gnarded in the vicinity of rp.:j.
denccs; • and so is a building inft.'Cted with disea:;c, ancl rentecl in
that condition without notit)·ing the faet.• Sc.> if one who is constructing a brick building abutting on a highway bhall put his
servants at work without providing any protection against the
~nces

i Soc Rich o. Basterﬂeld, 4 M., G. &

S. 783.

‘ (‘nmpbell v Sugar (‘o.,62 Me. 552;

Bur-dick 0. Cheadle, 26 ()hio, (N. s.)

393; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 767. A land-

lord who undertakes to protect hlS

building against excavations on the

adjoining lot, but by the negligence

of whose workmen the wall falls, ren-

dering the building untenantable, is

liable to the tenant for dl\lIl$\L!'(‘S, and

the luller may abandon. )lclln-ury 0.

Marr, 39 Md. 510. Sec Toolc 0. Beck.

ett, 67 .\_Ie.5-14; Marshall v. Cohen, 44

Geo. 439.

‘ Mullen 0. St. John, 57 X. Y. -767;

S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 530, case of u suit

for an actual injury, citing R1-'_'ina 1-.

Watts, 1 Salk, 357; Grove o. Fort

Wayne, 45 Ind. 429; S. C. 15 .\m. Rep.

262, case of dan_-_'erous cornice over-

hanging a street; Meyer v. Mctzlcr, 51

Cal. 142.

' Myers 0. Malcolm. 6 llill, 292;

Cheatham v. Shcaron, 1 Swan, 213.

' Minor u. Sharon, 112 Mass.-177;

S. C. 1'7Am. Rep. 122; Cesare. Karutz,

60 N. Y. 229; S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 164.

See Eaton 1-. Winnie, 20 Mich. 156: S.

C. 4 Am. licp. 377; King v. Vantam

dillo, 4 M. & S. 73.

I As where n mnsh tub in R brewery
gM·e way anti injured B servant. being
weakened by natural decay. :\Ialone
"· llathawny,64 N.Y. 5; 8. C. 21 Am.
Hcp. 573. The question in every such
case must be whether the defect was
one that ought to have ~en detectl'!l
and remedied, and would have been
by the exP.rcise of due <'nre. If ~o,
the owner should be respuusi ble; otb.
erwise, not.
' ~t·e Rich "· BRsterfield, 4 H., G. ct

s. 7S::J.

Cnmpbcll " Sugar Co., 62 Me. M2;
Btmlick "· Cheadle, 26 Ohio, (N. s )
3{)3; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 767. A lnnd.
lord who underu.kes to protect h1s
building against excavations on the
aujoining lot, but by the nez!i.zcnco
of whose workmen the wall falls. ren.
dcriog the building untenantable, is
!

liable to the tenant for dnm:l~<·s, and
the Iutter may abandon. :\1<' I h·nry "·
1\larr, 39 }[d . .itO. See Toole r. &·<'kett, 67 Me. 544; 1thrshnll "· ColH•n, 44
Gco. 489.
1 )lullcn e. St. John, l'i7 X. Y. :i67;
8. C. 15 Am. Rep. 530. ca~t· of n !'Hit
for an actual injury, citing Hc·~ina r.
Watt~. 1 Salk, :J57; Oro\"1' "· Fol't
W:1yoe, 4!5 Incl. 4'!9; B. C.]:; .\m. Hep.
26~, <'asc of dan)!crous corn icc over.
hanging a street; l\leyer "· l\lctz((•r, 51

CaL 142.
1 :\lyers "· Mnlt'olm. 6 Hill, 292;
Cheatham"· SheRron, 1 Swan. 21!1.
•Minor "· Sharon, 112 lias~. 4i7;
A. C. 17 Am . R('p, 122; Crsare. Knrutz,
60 N. Y. 22!1: S. C. 19 Am. R('p. 164.
Sec E:1tnn r. Winnie, 20 llich. Hi6; B.
C. 4 Am. H('p. 377; King"· Vantan..
dillo, 4 M. & B. 73.
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accident of a brick falling upon passing travelers, he may be
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held responsible for such an accident, even if the servants have

observed due care.‘ S0 the blasting of rocks suﬁiciently near the

dwellings of ot-hers to endanger them is a nuisance.’ S.) is a.

mill dam from which pestilential vapors arise,“ and any business

which endangers the neighborhood by the noxious vapors which

come from the place where it is carried on.‘ In these cases the

party injured or endangered need not wait for the calamity to

happen, but may bring suit at once, and take proceedings for

abating the nuisance.

Diseased Beasts. Domestic animals which have an infections

or contagious disease become a nuisance when the care and man-

agement of them by their owners is such as to expose the domestic

animals of others to the infection or contagion,‘ or when they are

sold to be put with others, to one who is not informed of their

accident of a brick falling upon passing travelers, he may be
held responsible for such an accident, even if the servants have
observed due care.• So the blasting of rocks sufficiently near the
dwellings of others to endanger them is a nuisance.• s.) is a
mill dam from which pestilential vapors arise," and any business
which endangers the neighborhood by the noxious vapors which
come from the place where it is carried on.' In these cases the
party injured or endangered need not wait for the calamity to
happen, but may bring suit at once, and take proceedings for
abating the nuisance.

condition.‘ The question of liability is one of negligence,’ and

of the want of good faith.‘

Who Responsible. A party is responsible for a nuisance on

the ground eitl1er,ﬁrst, that he purposely or negligently created

it, or, second, that he continues it.’ And here, as elsewhere in

the law of torts, there may be distinct parties equally liable; one,

perhaps, for the positive wrong of creating, and the other tor the
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negative wrong of failing to abate.

' Jager o. Adams, 123 Mass. 26. A

building so constructed that snow and

ice are likely to slide ‘from the roof

Diseased Beasts. Domestic animals whi<·h have an infectious
or contagious disease become a nuisance when the care and management of them by their owners is such as to expose the domestic
animals of others to the infection or contagion,' or when they are
sold to be put with others, to one who is not informed of their
condition.' The question of liability is one of negligence,' and
of the want of good faith.'

into the street is not necessarily a nui-

sance, and the owner is only liable if

he fails to observe due care in respect

to it. Garland v. Towne, 55 N. H. 55.

' Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 431.

3 Slate v. Rankin, 3 Sou. Car. 438;

S. (‘. 16 Am. Rep. 737.

‘ Cooke v. Forbes, L. R. 5 Eq. Cas.

166; (‘umphcll v. Seaman, 63 N. Y.

A party is responsible for a nuisance on
the ground either,first, that he purposely or negligently created
it, or, second, that he continues it.' And here, as elsewhere in
the law of torts, there may be distinct parties equally liable; one,
perhaps, for the positive wrong of creating, and the other tor the
negative wrong of failing to abate.
Who Responsible.

568; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 567.

° Mills s. New York, etc., R. R. Co.,

2 Rob. 326; aﬁlrmc-d 41 N. Y. 619,

nole; Ilite 0. Blandford, 45 Ill. 9. See

A"dvl'son v. Buckton, 1 Stra. 192;

Barnum v. Vandusen, 16 Conn. 200.

One who is induced to keep ahorse

with his own, on the false statement

that he is not diseased, when he is,

may have an action for the commu-

nicntion of the disease to those with

which he was placed. Fultz v. \Vyc0ff,

25 Ind. 321.

° Mullett v. Mason, L. R.1 C. P.

See .Ieﬂ‘rey v. Bigclow, 13 \\"end. 51

' See Fisher 0. Clark, 41 Barb. 329.

' See ante, p. 481.

' V\'here the nuisance is not in the

use alone, but also in the creation of

the structure, the liability attaches to

those who caused the erection. Cho-

nango Bridge Co. 1:. Lewis, 68 Barb.

111.

vi

9°53

r Jager e. Adams, 123 MMs. 26. A
building so constructed that snow and
icc are likely to slide ·from the roof
into the street is not necessarily a nuisancE', and the owner is only liable if
he fails to observe ciue care in respect
to it. Garllmd "· Towne, 55 N.H. 53.
• Scott "· Bay, 8 Md. 481.
a State"· Rankin, 8 Sou. Car. 488;
B. e. 16 Am. Rep. 737.
c Cooke "· Forbes, L. R. 5 Eq. Cas.
16R; ('amp bell "· Seaman, 68 N. Y.
568; 8. C. 20 Am. Rep. 567.
1 1\lills "'·New York, etc .• R. R. Ce.,
2 Rob. 8'26; affirmed 41 N. Y. 619,
note; Bite e. Blandford, 45 m. 9. Bee
A•·dPrson "· Buckton, 1 Stra. 192;
Barnum •· Vandusen, 16 Conn. 200.

One who is induced to keep a horse
with his own, on the false statement
that he is not diseased, when he is,
D)ay have an action for tbe communication of the disease to those with
which hPwaa placed. Fultz"· 'Wycoff,
25 l1:d. 821.

'Mullett e. Mason, L. R.l C. P. 559.
See Jeffrey e. Bigelow, 18 Wend. 518.
' See Fisher e. Clark, 41 Ba.rb. 320.
• See ante, p. 481.
• 'Where the nuisance is not in the
use alone, but also in the creation of
the structure, the linbility attaches to
those who caused the ere(\tion. Chenango Bridge Co. "· Lewis, 68 Barb.

111.
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In general, that party only is responsible for the continuance
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of a nuisance who has possession and control where it is, and

upon whom, therefore, the obligation to remove seems properly

to:-est. It follows that, as between landlord and tenant, the

party presumptively responsible is the tenant.‘ But the facts,

when developed, remove many cases from this presumption, for

the very satisfactory reason that there are many cases in which

the party out of possession is either in part or exclusively the

party in fault. Thus, if the owner of lands, through which a

water course runs, erects a dam across it which sets the water

back upon the proprietor above, and then leases the lands with

the nuisance upon it, he gives with the lease implied permission

for the lessee to keep up the dam, and he thus becomes a par-

ticipant with the lcssee in the wrong while the dam is maintained

as it was when he gave the tenant possession.’ “ He transferred

it with the original wrong, and his demise aﬁirms the continuance

of it. He has also his rent as a consideration for the continu-

ance, and therefore ought to answer the damage it occasions.” '

It has been held to be otherwise, however, where the landlord

requires the lessee to covenant to keep the premises in repair,

and the injury is one which, though attributable to the condition

of the premises when the landlord delivered possession, might
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have been avoided by care on the part of the tenant.‘ As is

said in one case, in order to render a. landlord liable in a case of

this sort, there must be some evidence that he authorized the

continuance of the nuisance; for instance, that he assumed the

obligation to repair the premises might be a circumstance to show

' Todd 0. Flight, 9 C. B. (N. s.) 377;

Rich 1:. Basterﬂeld, 4 C. B. 7811; Rus-

sell v. Shenton,3 Q. B.-149; Swords o.

Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28; S. C. 17 Am. Rep.

295.

' Roswell 0. Prior, 12 Mod. 635; S.

C. 2 Salk, 460, and 1 Ld. Raym. 713;

Fish 0. Dodge, 4 Denio, 811; Smith

Elliott, 9 Penn. St. 845; Ilelwig 0.

0. Jordan, 53 Ind. 21; S. C. 21 Am.

Rep. 189. Bee House 0. Metcalf, 2'7

Conn. 632; People v. Erwin, 4 Denio,

In general, that party only is responsible for the continuance
of a nuisance who has possession and control where it is, and
upon whom, therefore, the obligation to remove seems properly
to rest. It follows that, as between landlord and tenant, the
party presumptively responsible is the tenanl1 But the facta,
when developed, remove many cases from this presumption, for
the very satist&ctory reason that there are many cases in which
the party out of possession is either in part or exclusi\·cly the
party in fault. Thus, if the owner of lands, through which a
water course runs, erects a dam across it which seta the water
back 11pon the proprietor above, and then leases the lands with
the nuisance upon it, he gives with the lease implied permission
for the lessee to keep up the dam, and he thus becomes a participant with the lessee in the wrong while the dam is maintained
as it was when be gave the tenant possession.• "He transterred
it with the original wrong, and his demise affirms the continuance
of it. He has also his rent as a consideration for the continuance, and therefore ought to answer the damage it occasions." •
It has been held to be otherwise, however, where the landlord
requires the lessee to covenant to keep the premises in repair,
and the injury is one which, though attributable to the condition
of the premises when tho landlord delivered pos~cssion, might
have been avoided by care on the part of the tennnt.' ...\s is
said in one case, in order to render a landlord liable in a case of
this sort, there must he some evidence that he authorized the
con~inuance of the nuisance; for instance, that he assnmed the
obligation to repair the premises might be a circumstance to show

129; Rex 0. Pedley, 1 Ad. & El. 822;

B. C. 8 N. & M. 627.

' Sarronn, J ., in Grady v. Wolsner,

46 Ala. 881, 882. Lessor held liable

for a sink in afoot pavement leﬂ open

in cleaning. Owings 1:. Jones, 9 Md.

108. Sec Clancy o. Byrne, 56 N. Y.

129; S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 891.

‘ Leonard 0. Storcr, 115 Mass, 86;

S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 76. The roof was

so constructed that snow and ice, un-

less removed. were likely to slide from

it into the street, and the injury was

actually caused by its slitting oil‘ upon

a passing traveler. Compare Shipley

0. Fifty Associates, 106 Mass. 194; S.

C. 8. Am. Rep. 818.

39

Todd "·Flight, 9 C. B. (If. 8.) 877;
Rich "· Btlsterfteld, 4 U. B. 78.1; Rus..
eel11J. Shenton, 3 Q. B. 449; Swords"·
Edgar, 611 N.Y. 28; B. C.17 Am. Rep.
296.
• Roswell "· Prior, 12 Mod. 6M; B.
C. 9 Balk. 460, and 1 Ld. Raym. 718;
Fish "· Dodge, 4 Denio, 811; Smith
Elliott, 9 Penn. St. 845; Helwig "·
e. Jordan, 63 Ind. 21; B. C. 21 Am.
Rep. 189. Bee House "· Metcalf, 27
Conn. 682; People "· Erwin, 4 Denio,
129; Rex "· Pedley, 1 Ad. & El. 822;
B. C. 8 N. & M. 627.
• B.A.I'J'OLD, J ., in Grady •· Wolsner,
1

89

46 Ala. SSt, 882. Lessor held Hable
for a sink in a foot pavement left open
in cleaning. Owings "· Jones. 9 lid.
108. Bee Clancy "· Byrne, 56 N. Y.
129; B. C. 15 Am. Uep. 8tH.
• Leonard "· Storer, 115 MllSS, 86;
B. C. 15 Am. Rep. 76. The roof was
so constructed that snow and ice, unless removed, were likely to slide from
it into the street, and the injury wu
actually caused by i'- sliding off upon
a paasing traveler. Compare Shipley
e. Fifty A.uoclatea, 106 Mass. 1M; 8.
8. Am. Rep. 818.

c.
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that he authorized its continuance. But there is no such obliga-
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tion where the landlord has required the tenant himself to assume

it.‘ For similar reasons it has been held that one who ﬂoods his

neighbor’s lands by a dam erected on his own, and then conveys

his lands with covenants of seizin and of quiet enjoyment, “ with

the right to ﬂow as far as has hitherto been necessary for the use

of the mills on the premises conveyed, the dam remaining at its

present height,” is liable for the continuance of the nuisance, as

having expressly afiirmed and encouraged it.’ It would have

been otherwise had the possession passed to others without any

evidence of any conveyance or demise; for in such ease the evi-

dence that the will of the party accompanied and encouraged the

continuance of the nuisance would be wanting, and the law must

refer it to the will of the possessor.’ S0 the mere letting of a

house with a chimney in it which the owner has constructed,

does not render him responsible for a nuisance caused to the

occupant of an adjoining tenement by the smoke issuing from

the chimney from ﬁres built by his tenant. “It being quite

possible for the tenant to occupy the shop without making ﬁres,

and quite optional on his part to make them or not, or to make

them with certain times excepted, so as not to annoy the plain-

tiff, or in such a. manner as not to create any quantity of smoke
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that could be deemed a nuisance * * the utmost that can be

imputed to the det'endaut is that he enabled the tenant to make

ﬁres if he pleased.” ‘

1 Pretty v. Bickmore, L. R. 8 C. P.

401. See Gwinnell 1*. Earner, 32 Law

T. Rep. 835; Todd 0. Flight, 9 C. B.

(N. s.) 377.

’ Waggoner 0. Jermaine, 3 Denio,

806 See Staple e. Spring, 10 Mass.

'72; Cab ill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324;

Eastman '0. Amoskeag Co., 44 N. H.

143. Wliere parts of a building are

let to several tenants, the landlord is

liable to them severally forawater

that he authorized its continuance. But there is no snch obliga.
tion where the landlord has required the tenant himself to assume
it.' For similar reasons it has been held that one who :floods his
neighbor's lands by a dam erected on his own, and then conveys
his lands with CO\'cnants ot' seizin and of quiet enjoyment, "with
the right to flow as far as has hitherto been necessary for the use
of the mills on the premises conveyed, the dam remaining at ita
present heigh~" is liable for the continuance of the nuisance, as
having expressly affirmed and encouraged it.• It would have
been otherwise had the possession passed to others without any
evidence of any conveyance or demise; for in such case the evidence that tho will of the party accompanied and encouraged the
continuance of the nuisance would be wanting, and the law must
refer it to the will of the possessor.• So the mere letting of a
honse with a chimney in it which the owner has constructed,
does not render him responsible for a nuisance caused to the
occupant of an adjoining tenement by the smoke issuing from
the chimney from :fires built by his tenant. "It being quite
possible for the tenant to occupy the shop without making tires,
and quite optional on his part to make them or not, or to make
them with certain times excepted, so as not to annoy the plaintiff, or in such a manner as not to create any quantity of smoke
that could be deemed a nuisance * * the utmost that can be
imputed to the defendant is that he enabled the tenant to make
:fires if he pleased." •

closet nuisance therein. Marshall 0.

Cohen, 44 Geo. 489.

‘Blunt 0. Aikin, 15 Wend. 522.

This case examines and comments

upon Roswell 0. Prior, 1 Ld. Raym.

713; Beswick 0. Gander, Cro. Eliz.

402, 520; Chectham 0. Hampson, 4T.

R. 318, and they in turn. as well as

the principal case, are examined and

distinguished in Waggoner v. Jer-

maine. 3 Denio, 306.

‘ Rich 0. Basterﬂeld, 4 M., G. & B.

783, 801. This case examines very

fully all preceding cases which might

be supposed to have a bearing, and

especially Bush 0. Steinman, 1 B.&

P. 404; Burgess 0. Gray, 1 M., G. & S.

578; Randleson 0. Murray, 8 Ad. &

El. 109; Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C.

547, and 8 D. & R. 556; Quarman 0.

Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499, and Leslie v.

Pounds, 4 Taunt. 649, cases where the

responsibility of the owner of prop-

erty for injuries done or occasioned

by it was in question. Compare Lit-

J Pretty "· Bickmore, L. R. 8 C. P.
401. Bee Gwinnell t. Ea.mer, 82 Law
T. Rep. 835; Todd e. Flight, 9 C. B.

(N. s.)

377.

t Wa~goncr

e. Jermalne, 8 Denio,
806 See Staple "· l:lprinp;, 10 MMS.
72; Cab ill "· Eastman, 18 1tlinn. 824;
Eastman"· Amoskeag Co., 44 N. H.
148. Where parts of a building are
let to several tenants, the landlord Ia
liable to them severally for a water
closet nuisance therein. Marshall e.
Cohen, 44 Geo. 489.
• Blunt •· Aikin, 15 Wend. 522.
This l'ase examines and comment&
upon Roswell tt. Prior, 1 Ld. Raym.
718; Beswick "· Cander, Cro. Eliz.
402t 520; Cheetham •· Hampsont 4T.

R 818, and they In turn. u well aa
the principal case, are examined and
distinguished in Waggoner e. Jer.
maine, 8 Denio, 806.
• Rich e. Basterfteld, 4 :M:., G. & 8.
'188, 801. This case examines very
fully all preceding cases which might
be supposed to have a bearing, and
especially Boah "· Steinman, 1 B. &
P. 404; Burgess "· Gray, 1 M., G. & S.
578; Randleaon e. Murray, 8 Ad. &
EI. 109; Laugher e. Pointer, ti B. & a
M7, and 8 D. & R 556; Quarman •·
Burnett, 6 :M. & W. 499, and Leslie e.
Pounds, 4 Taunt. 649, cases where the
responsibility of the owner of prop.
erty for injuries done or occasioned
by it was in queation. Compare Lit.
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The fact that the party erecting the nuisance remains respon-

sible for its continuance does not excuse the actual possessor. The
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continuance and every use of that which is in its erection a nuisance

is a new nuisance.‘ And persons may be liable for the continuance

of a nuisance who have created it on the land of another, even

though they have no right to enter to abate it. “That is a con-

sequence of their original wrong, and they cannot be permitted

to excuse themselves from paying damages for the injury it causes

by showing their inability to remove it without exposing them-

selves to another action.” '

A party who comes into possession of lands as grantee or lessee,

with a nuisance already existing upon it is not, in general, liable

for the continuance of the nuisance until his attention has been

called to it, and he has been requested to abate it. “This rule

is very reasonable. The purchaser of property might be sub-

jected to very great injustice if he were made responsible for

consequences of which he was ignorant, and for damages which

he never intended to occasion. Tliey are often such as cannot

be easily known, except to the party injured. A plaintiif ought

not to rest in silence, and presently surprise an unsuspecting pur-

chaser by an action for damages; but should be presumed to

acquiesce until he requests a removal of the nuisance.” ' But it
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tie Schuylkill, etc., Co. u. Richards, gently weakened, so that it falls upon

57 Penn. St. 142.

‘ Staple v. Spring. 10 Mass. 72, 74;

McDonough v. Gilman, 3 Allen, 264.

267; Nichols 0. Boston, 98 Mass. 39,

43; Hadley 0. Taylor, L. R. 1 C. P.

53; Clancy 0. Byrne, 56 N. Y. 129; S.

C. 15 Am. Rep. 391; Pillsbury 0.

Moore, 4-1 Me. 154; Morris Canal 0.

Ryerson, 27 N. J. 457. VVhere the les-

see of premises makes use of an ex-

The fact tl1at the party erecting tbe nuisance remains responsible tor its continuance does not excuse the actual possessor. The
eoutinuanceaud every use ofthat which ill in ittl erection a nuisance
is a new nuisance.' And persons may be liable for the continuance
of a nuisance who have created it on the land of another, even
though they have uo right to enter to abate it. u That is a consequence of their original wrong, and they cannot be permitted
to excuse themselves from paying dama~res tor the injury it causes
by showing their inability to remove it without exposing themselves to another action." •
A party who comes into possession of lands as grantee or lessee,
with a nuisance already existing upon it is not, in general, liable
for the continuance ot' tho nuisance until his attention bas been
called to it, and he has been requested to abate it. "This role
is very reasonable. The purchaser of property might be subjected to very great injustice if he were made responsible for
consequence~ of' which he was ip:norant, and for damages which
he never intended to occasion. They are often such as cannot
be easily known, except to the party iujnrt.'<l. A pla,intiff ought
not to rest in silence, and predeutly surpri:;e an unsuspecting purchaser by an action for damagt·s; but should be presumed to
acquiesce until he reque~>ts a remo•;al of the unisan<:e." • Dot it

cavation in a sidewalk which was

made for the beneﬁt of the premises,

but insuﬂlciently covered, he is re-

sponsible either severally or jointly

with the lessor for a damage to one

who is injured by falling: into it. Ir-

vine u. Wood, 51 N. Y. 224; S. C. 10

Am. Rep. 603.

' Thompson 0. Gibson, '7 M. & W.

456, 462. If one's chimney is negli-

a passer-by, the owner may be liable,

though the weakening was through

the unauthorized act of another. But

he will have a remedy over. Gray 0.

Boston, etc., Co., 114 Muss. 149; S. C.

19 Am. Ilep. 32-1.

' SHERMAN, J., in Johnson v. Lewis,

13 Conn. 307. See, also, Pcnruddock's

Case, 5 Co. 101; Winsmore o. Green-

bank. 1 Willes, 577; \\'oodman 0.

Tufts, 9 N. II. 88; Plumer r. Har-

per, 3 N. H. 2%}; Carleton 0. Rt-ding.

ton. 21 N. H. 291; Noyes o. Stillman,

24 Conn. 15; Snow 0. Cowlea, 26 N.

H. 275; Eastman o. Amoskeag Co., 44

N. H. 143; Pierson o. Glenn, 14 N. J.

36; Beavers v. Trimmer, 25 N. J. 97;

Vi'altcr u. County Commissioners, 35

Md. 385; Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Geo.

296; Dodge v. Stacy, 39 Vt. 543; COIL

tie Schuylkill, etc., Co. t1. Richards,
lf1 Penn. SL 142.
1 Ataple "· Sprin~~;. 10 lis......,, 72, 74;
llcDonou~~:h "· Gilmau, 8 Allen, 264,
26'7; ~ ichols "· Bo~tton, D8 lla.'\8. 89,
48; Hadley "· Taylor, L. R. 1 C. P.
M; Clancy"· Byrne, 56 X. Y. 129; 8.
C. 15 Am. Rep. 891; Pillsbury t.
)[oore, 44 Me. 154; Morris Canal e.
Ry(•rson, 27 N.J. 457. Where the lcs.
see of premises makes use of an excavation in a sidewalk which was
made for the benefit of Lbe premises,
but lnsumciently covered, he Ia re.
apoos1ble either eeverally or jointly
with the lessor for a damage to ono
who ia injured by fallln~r into iL Ir.
Yine e. Wood, 51 N.Y. 224; 8. C. 10
Am. Rep. 003.

• Thompson •· Gill8on, 7 M. & W.

418, - . U one'• chimney Ia negll.

gently weakened, so Lhat It falls upon
a passer.by, the owner may be liable,
though the W(•akcning was through
the unauthorizE•<l act of another. But
he will have a remedy over. Gray •·
Boston, etc., Co., 114 llass. 149; 8. C.
19 Am. Ik-p. 324.
• 8BitBMAN, J., in Johnson e. Lewis,
18 Conn. 307. Sec, also, Penruddock'e
Case, IS Co. 101; Winsmore e. Green.
bank. 1 Willt>S, 677; Woodman t1.
Tul\s, 9 X. II. 88; Plumer t'. Harper, 8 N. 11. ~; Csrleton e. Reding.
ton, 21 N. H. 291; Xoyes "· Stillman,
24 Cnnn. tiS; Snow "· Cowleat, 26 N.
II. 2i5; Eastml\o e. Amoskeag Co., 44.
N. H . 148; Plt>rson e. Glean, 14 N. J.
86; Beavers"· Trimmer, 25 Y. J. 97;
Walter "· County Comml..siooen, 83
Md. SS:S; Bonn<>r "· Wt>lborn, 7 Geo.
296i Dodge"· Stacy, 89 Vt.G.tS; Coa..
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seems that if one has already been notiﬁed to remove the nui-
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sance, aud the party giving the notice then sells to another, his

alienee may sue without giving notice himself.‘ And notice is

not necessary in any case where the alienee is chargeable with

some personal duty or obligation cast upon him by law, or where

the nuisance is immediately dangerous to life or health.‘

\Vhere the nuisance consists in a dangerous building, which

was originally constructed properly, and the condition of the

structure has been changed so as to render it injurious or dan-

gerous by vis major, as by ﬁre, or by the act of a third person,

which the owner had no reason to anticipate, he cannot be held

liable, or bound to make the structure safe until he has had a

reasonable time after it has so become dangerous, to take the

necessary precaution.’

A mere agent or servant is not liable for the continuance of a

nuisance on the lan'd of his master or employer,‘ unless he is

guilty of some distinct wrongful act, or of personal negligence,

from which injury ﬂows.‘

Who may Complain. The party who at the time suﬂ'ers the

the inconvenience of a nuisance is entitled to complain of it, and

it is immaterial whether it was or was not a nuisance to him in

its origin. Therefore, it is of no importance to the right of
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action that the plaintiﬁ‘ has come into the neighborhood since the

nuisance was created; he has the right to locate himself where-

ever he can do so to his satisfaction, and no one can have the

authority to set limits to his choice of location by interposing

something which is offeiisive. Moreover, it would detract very

seems that if one has already been notified to remove the nuisance, and the party giving the notice then sells to another, his
alienee may sue without giving notice himself.' And notice is
not necessary in any case where the alienee is chargeable ·with
some personal dutyor obligation cast upon him by law, or where
t.he nuisance is immediately dangerous to life or health.'
Where the nuisance consists in a dangerous building, which
was originally constructed properly, and t.he condition of the
structure has been changed so as to render it injurious or dangerous by vis major, as by fire, or by the act of a third person,
which the owner had no reason to anticipate, he cannot be held
liabl~, or hound to make the structure sate until he has had a
reasonable time after it has so become dangerous, to take the
necessary precaution.'
A mere agent or servant is not liable for the continuance of a
nuisance on the lan"d of his mast.er or employer,' unless he is
guilty of some distinct wrongful act, or of personal negligence,
from which injury flows.'

seriously from the value of property if the owner, desiring

hocton Stone Road 1:. Buffalo, etc., R.

R. Co., 51 N. Y. 573; S. C. 10 Am.

Rep. 646.

1 Caldwell 0. Gale, 11 Mich. '77. See

Brown o. Cayuga, etc., R. R. Co., 12

N. Y. 486.

’ Jonesv. Williams, 11 M. & W. 176;

Irvine v. Wood, 51 N. Y. 224; S. C.

10 Am. Rep. 603. Where a nuisance

consists in continuing the obstruction

of a stream by a highway, an action

will not lie against the county com-

missioners unless there has been on

their part some active participation

Who may Complain. The party who at the time suffers the
the inconvenience of a nuisance is entitled to complain of it, and
it is immaterial whether it was or was not a nuisance to him in
its origin. Therefore, it is of no importance to the right of
action that the plaintiff has come into the neighborhood since the
nuisance was created; he has the right to locate himself whereever he can do so to his satisfaction, and no one can have the
authority to set 1imits to his choice of location by interposing
something which is offensive. Moreover, it would detract very
seriously from the value of property if the owner, desiring

in its continuance, or some positive

act evidencing its adoption. \Valter

0. County Commissioners, 35 Md. 385.

3 Mahoney e. Libbey, 123 Mass. 90,

citing L. R. 10 Exch. 255, and 1 Exch.

Div. 1; Gray 0. Harris, 107 Mass. 492-.

‘ Brown Paper C0. 0. Dean, 123

1\Iass. 267; Stone 0. Cartwright, 6T.

R. 411.

‘ Carleton o. Reddington, 21 N. H.

291; Brown 0. Lent, 20 Vt. 529.

bocton Stone Road "· Buffalo, etc., R.
R. Co., 51 N.Y. IS73; S. C. 10 Am.
Rep.646.
1 Caldwell e. Gale, 11 Mich. 77. Beo
Brown "· Cayuga, etc., R. R Co., 12
N.Y. 486.
• Jones". Williams, 111\I. & W. 176;
Irvine "·Wood, 51 N.Y. 224; S. C.
10 Am. Rep. 603. Where a nuisance
consists in continuing the obstruction
of a stream by a highway, an action
will not lie against the county commissioners unless there bas been on

their part some active participation
in its continuance, or some positive
act evidencing its adoption. Walter
v. County Commissioners, 35 Md. 383.
1 Mahoney •· Libbey, 123 Mass. 20,
citing L. R.lO Exch. 255, and 1 Exch.
Div. 1; Gray ~'· Harris, 107 :Mass. 492.
• Brown Paper Co. "· Dean, 123
Mass. 267; Stone "· Cartwright, 6 T.
R411.
• Carleton "· Reddington, 21 N. H.
291; Brown "· Lent, 20 Vt. 529.
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to dispose of it, could not transfer all his rights, including his
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right to protection in its complete enjoyment, but must, when a

nuisance is created near him, either await the result of proceedings

for its abatement, or dispose of his land with the nuisance prac-

tically assented to, and for a price which the nuisance has assisted

in establishing. Nothing can be plainer than if the grantor could

have complained when he conveyed, the grantee may complain

afterwards; and to whatever use the grantor might have put the

land, as being suitable and proper for the locality, the grantee

is at liberty to choose and adopt.‘ Nevertheless, if one were to

purchase an estate in the neighborhood of a nuisance, for the

express purpose of litigation, and should demand the extraordi-

nary process of injunction to put a stop to another’s business, it

may be that the court of equity, in its discretion, would refuse

him this relief, while conceding his undoubted right to a remedy

in damages.’ ~

It is a familiar principle that no lapse of time can confer the

right to maintain a. nuisance as against the State.‘ On the other

hand where a nuisance is purely private and concerns only the

one person or the few who are injured, its maintenance for the

period of prescription, without interruption, will bar any subse-

quent suit.‘ There still remains the case of a public nuisance,
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not complained of by the State but by those to whom it works a

special and peculiar injury; and whether the right to maintain

it as against such persons can be gained by lapse of time may

possibly be open to some question. It would seem plain that it

could not be as against any one who had not personally been a

‘St. Hclen’s Smclting Co. u. Tip-

ping, 11 II. L. Cas. 642; Bliss v. Hall,

4Bing.(N. C.) 183; King o. Morris,

etc., R. It. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 897; Gil-

bert 1:. Showcrman. 23 Mich. 44$.

‘Edwards 0. Allonez Mining Co.,

88 Mich.

‘ United States 0. Hoar, 2 Mason,

811; State 0. Rankin, 3 S. U. (N.8.)

438; S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 737; People 0.

Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524; Com-

monwealth o. Upton, 6 Gray, 4'73;

to dispose of it, could not transfer all his rights, including his

right to protection in its c.'Omplete enjoyment, but must, when a
nuisance is created ne{lr him, either await the result ot' proceedings
for ita abatement, or dispose of his land with the nui~ance practically assented to, and f(lr a price which the nuisance has assisted
in ~stablishing. Nothing can be plainer than if the grantor could
have complained when he conveyed, the grantee may <.'Omplain
afterwards; and to whatever use the grantor might have put the
land, as being suitable and proper for the locality, the grantee
is at liberty to choose and adopt: Nevertheless, if one were to
purchase an estate in the neighborhood of a nuitoanc.:e, for the
express purpose of litigation, and should demand the extraordinary procegs of injunction to put a stop to another's bnsiness, it
may be that the court of equity, in its discretion, would refuse
him this relief, while conceding his undoubted right to a remedy
in damages.•
It is a familiar prin<."iple that no lapse of time can confer the
right to maintain a nnisam.:c as against the State.• On the other
hand where a nuisance is purely private and concerns only the
one person or the tew who are injured, its maintenance for the
period of prescription, without interruption, will bar any subsequent suit. 4 There still remains the case of a public nuisance,
not complained of by the State but by those to whom it works a
special and peculiar injury; and whether the right to maintain
it as against such persons can be gained by lapse of time may
possibly be o~n to some question. It would seem plain that it
could not be as against any one who had not personally been a

Commonwealth v. McDonald, 16 S. &

R. 390; Commonwealth v. Alhurger,

1 Whart. 469; State 0. Phipps, 4 Ind.

515; Elkins v. State, 2 Humph. 543;

State n. Franklin Falls Company, 49

N. H. 240; S. C. 0 Am. Rep. 513; Phi-

ladelphia, etc., R. R. Co. 0. State, 20

Md. 157.

‘ Elliotson o. Feeltham, 2 Bing. (N.

(‘.) 134; Carlyon 0. Lovcring, 1 H. &

N. 784; Johns 0. Stevens, 3 Vt. 308;

Bolivar Manuf. C0. 0. Neponset

Munuf. Co., 16 Pick. 241; Gladfelter 0.

Walker. 40 Md. 1; Crosby 0. Bcssey,

49 Me. 539; Baldwin 1:. Calkins, 10

Wend. 167; Stiles o. Hooker, 7 Cow.

266.

' St. Helen's Smelting Co. "· Tip.
ping, 11 II. L. Cus. 642; Bliss "· Hall,
4 Din~. (N. C.) 183; King "· )lorris,
etc., R. R Co., 18 N. J. Eq. lro7; Gil.
bert 1:. Showerman. 23 llicb. 4·18.
• Edwards "· Allonez llining Co.,
88 Mich.
I rnitP<l States "· Hoar. 2 )Iason,
811; ~tate "· Hankin, 3 M. V. (N. s.)
438; M. C. 16 Am. Hep. 737; People"·
Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524; Com.
monweallh "· rpton, 6 Gmy, 473;
Commonw('alth r. llcDonalti, 16 8. &
R. 890; Commonwealth "· AIIJUrgcr,
1 WharL461.1; State w.Phipps,4lnti.

:i15; Elkins 11. State, 2 Humph. 543;
!;;tate "· Franklin Falla Company, 49
~.H . 240; B. C. 6 Am. Rep. 513: Pbl.
]adelphia, etc., R. H. Co. "· State, 20
Md. 157.
' Elliotson e. Feeltbam, 2 Bing. (N.
C'.) 134; Carlyon e. Lovering, 1 H. ~
N. 784; Johns e. Stevens, 3 Vt. 808;
Bolivar Manuf. Co. "· Neponset
~lllnuf. Co., 16 Pick. 241; Gladfelter e.
Walker. 40 1\(d. 1: Crosby e. Bcs!<t>y,
49 ~le. 539; &ldwin 1:. Calkins, 10
Wend. 167; Stiles e. llookcr, 7 Cow.
266.
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sufferer from the nuisance for the whole period and while the

nuisance was maintained without change. In other words, the

prescription would run against individuals, and one could lose

his action only because he had failed to complain, having had

the whole period of prescription in which he was at liberty to

do so. Therefore persons coming newly within the evil inﬂuence

of the nuisance might complain when others could not. More-

over, if the injury was not constant, but could only arise occa-

sionally, there would be no room for the application of the

doctrine of prescription. Thus, if the nuisance consisted in an

obstruction to navigation, no one could maintain a personal

action until he had occasion to make use of the public right and

found it obstructed; and his failing to bring suit for that partic-

ular injury would be a waiver only of such right of action as he

then had, but nothing more, and if another injury should be

received more than twenty years subsequently, the fact that he

had once abstained from bringing suit for a similar wrong could

have no bearing whatever upon his right of action. And in any

case of a public nuisance from which individual injury was

received, it would seem anomalous—to say the least—that a.

portion of the suﬂerers should be at liberty to bring private

suits and another portion not, or that a land owner who had
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long lived near it should be precluded, but might sell to another

who should come in with ample right. On the whole the better

doctrine would seem to be, that the acquisition of rights by

prescription can have nothing to do with the case of public

nuisances, either when the State or when individuals complain

Of them.‘

Private Inim~y from Public Nuisance. When the complaint

is that the plaintiff has been injured in respect to his right to

enjoy in common with all others some public easement or privi-

lege, it becomes necessary for him to show, ﬁrst, that the public

easement or privilege exists; and. second, that he has been

I See Folkes v. Chad, 3 Doug. 340; o. Thompson, 66 N. Y. 88; Veazie 0.

Weld v. Hornby, 7 East, 195; Sim- Dwinel, 50 Me. 479; Lewis o. Stein,

mons 0. Cornell, 1 R. I. 519; Knox u. 16 Ala. 214; Stoughton 1:. Baker, 4

Chaloner, 42 Me. 150; Mills v. Hall, Mass. 522; Arundel 0. McCulloch, 10

9 Wend. 315; Reuwick u. Morris, 3 Mass. 70.

Hill, 621; S. O. 7 Hill, 575; Kellogg

i -"""I~l|J

sufferer from the nuisance for the wl10le period and while the
nuisance was maintained without change. In other words, the
prescription would run against individuals, and one could lose
his action only because be had failed to complain, having had
the whole period of prescription in which he was at liberty to
do so. Therefore persons coming newly within t.he evil influence
of the nuisance might complain when others could not. Moreover, if the injury was not constant, but could only arise occasionally, there would be no room for the application of the
doctrine of prescription. Thus, if the nuisance consisted in an
obstruction to navigation, no one could maintain a personal
action until he had occasion to make use of the public right and
found it obstructed; and his failing to bring suit for that particular injury would be a waiver only of such right of action as he
then had, but nothing more, and if another injury should be
received more than twenty years subsequently, the fact that he
had once abstained from bringing snit for a similar wrong could
have no bearing whatever upon his right of action. And in any
case of a public nuisance from which individual injury was
received, it would seem anomalous-to say the least-that a
portion of the sufl'erers shoultl be at liberty to bring private
suits and another portion not, or that a land owner who had
long lived near it should be precluded, but might sell to another
who should come in with ample right. On the whole the better
doctrine would seem to be, that the acquisition of rights by
prescription can have nothing to do with the case of public
nuisances, either when the State or when individuals complain
of them.•
Private Injury from Publlc Nuisance. When the e.omplaint
is that the plaintifi' has been injured in respect to his right to
enjoy in common with all others some public easement or privilege, it becomes necessary for him to show,firat, that the public
easement or privilege exists; and, second, that he has beeft
t See Folkes 11. Chad, 3 Doug. 340;
Weld 11. Hornby, 7 East, 195; Sim.
mons 1l. Cornell, 1 R. I. 519; Kuox "·
Chnloner, 42 1\le. 150; Mills 11. Hall,
9 Wend. 315; Renwick f). :Morris, 3
Hill, 621 ; S. C. 7 Hill, 575 ; Kellogg

"· Thompson, 66 N.Y. 88; Veazie e.
Dwincl, 50 Me. 479; Lewis 11. Steiu.
16 Ala. 214; Stoughton 11. Baker, 4
Mass. 522; Arundel •· McCulloch, 10
Mass. 70.
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hindered or obstructed in the common right to enjoy it. To
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show both is necessary to his action, because the public wrong

must be redressed at the suit of the State and not of an individ-

ual, and the fact that a public wrong is suil'ered creates no

presumption of individual injury.‘

It being found that a public easement exists, it may then

appear, perhaps, that what is complained of has been authorized

by the State. If so, no action can be maintained on the assump-

tion that what is thus allowed is a public nuisance, for that can-

not be a public nuisance that the State a<sents to and authorizes.

It would be a contradiction in terms to say that the State assents

to a certain act, and yet that the act constitutes an offense against

the State.‘ Therefore, the State having, in some form, provided

for and created a certain easement, may at its will abandon it, or

change it to some other easement, or restrict or enlarge the use

of it, and generally do with the creature of its authority what it

pleases. A common highway may thus be qualiﬁed by the lay-

ing of a railway track upon it; ' a navigable stream may be

bridged or dammed;‘ awnings may be permitted above a city

street and covered areas below it; navigation companies may be

given special privileges in the public streams of the State,‘ and

‘Brown o. Perkins, 12 Gray, 89;
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Fort 0. Groves, 29 Md. 188; Houck 0.

Wachter, 34 Md. 265; Gcrrish 0.

Brown, 51 Me. 256. That one cannot,

of his own authority, abate a public

nuisance unless it causes him special

injury, see Clark 1:. St. Clair Ice Co.,

24 Mich. 508; McGregor 0. Boyle, 34

Iowa, 268, ante, p. 46 and cases cited.

hindered or obstructed in the common right to enjoy it. To
show both is neces~ary to his action, because the public wron;
must be redressed at the suit of the State and not of an indh·idual, and the fact that a public wro11g is sufl'ercd creates no
presumption of individual injnry. 1
It being found that a public easement exists, it may then
appear, perhaps, that what is complained of has been authorized
by the State. If so, no action can be maintained on the assumption that what is thus allowed is a public nuisan<·c, fi1r tlmt cannot he a public nuisance that the State a.;scnts to and authorizes.
It would be a contradiction in terms to say that the State af;scnts
to a certain act, and yet that the act constitutes an offense against
the State.' Theretore, the State having, in some form, pro\•ided
for and created a <.oertain easement, may at its will abandon it, or
change it to some other easement, or restrict or enlarge the use
of it, and generally do with the <'reature of its authority what it
pleases. A common highway may thus he qualified by the laying of a railway track upon it; • a navigable stream may be
bridged or dammed; • awnin~ may be permitted above a city
street and covered areas below it; navigation companies may be
·given special pri\·ileges in the public streams of the State,• and

' Commonwealth v. Reed, 34 Penn.

St. 275; Danville, etc., R. R. Co. o.

Commonwealth, 73 Penn. St. 29; Peo-

ple v. Gaslight Co., 64 Barb. 5'5.

'Dunville, etc., R. R. Co. 1:. Com-

monwealth, 73 Penn. St. 29; Com-

monwealth v. Eric & N. E. R. R. Co.,

27 Penn. St. 339; Commonwealth 0.

Old Colony, etc., R. R. Co., 14 Gray,

93; Milburn n. Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa,

246; Rundle v. Paciﬁc R. R. Co., 65

Mo. 325; Williams o. N. Y. Cent. R.

R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Wager 1:. Troy

Union R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 526; Sou.

Car., etc., R. R. Co. v. Steiner, 44 Geo.

546; Easton v. New York, etc., R. R.

Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 49.

A pier built in navigable water

without legal authority is a nuisance

per ac. People v. Vanderbilt, 38 Barb.

282. Sec Plankroad Co. 0. Elmer, 9

N. J. Eq. 754; Franklin Wharf Co. 0.

Portland, 67 Me. 46.

A street railway constructed with-

out authority of law is a nuisance.

Denver, etc., R. Co. 0. Denver City R.

Co., 2 Col. 673.

‘ Arimond o. Green Bay, etc., Co.,

31 Wis. 316; Trenton Water Power

C0. 0. Ralf, 36 N. J. 335; Lee 0. Pem-

broke Iron Co., 57 Me. 481.

' Muskegon Booming Co 0. Evert

Boomin_:, Co., 34 .\lich.-162; People 0.

Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 71.

I Brown "· Perkins, 12 Gray, 8!1;
Fort c. Groves, 29 lid. 188; Houck "·
Wachter, 34 :lid. 26.1; Gerrish "·
Brown, 51 Me. 2.)6. That one cannot,
of his own authority, abate a public
nuisance unless it cause!! him Sllecinl
injury, see Clark "· St. Clair Ice Co.,
24 Mich. 508; McGregor "· Boyle, 84
Iowa, 268, ante, p. 46 and cases cited.
t Commonwealth "· Reed, 34 Penn.
St. 275; Danvlllc, etc., R. R. Co. "·
Commonwealth, 73 Penn. St. 29; People v. Gaslight Co., 64 Barb. 53.
• Danville, etc., R. R. Co. e. Commonwealth, 73 PPnn. St. 2!1; Commonwealth "· Eric & :N. E. R It Co.,
27 Penn. St. 3:.!9; Commonwealth c.
Old Colony, etc., It R Co., 14 Gray,
93; ~Iii hum 11. Cedar Hap ids, 12 Iowa,
246; Hnndle 11. Pacific R. U. Co., 63
:Mo. 325; Willinms "· N. Y. Cent. R.
R. Co., lG N.Y. 9i; Wager c. Tmy

"Cnion R. R. Co., 25 :N.Y. 526; Son.
Car., etc., R R. Co. "· Steiner, 44 Geo.
546; Easton e. New Y nrk, etc., R. R.
Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 49.
A pier built in "Davigable water
without legal authority is a nuisance
per te. People"· Vanderbilt, :JS Barb.
282. 8ee Plankroad Co. "· Elmer, st
:N.J. Eq. 75-l; Franklin Wharf Co. e.
Portlanll, 67 )le. 46.
A street railway constructed without authority of law is a nuisance.
Denver, etc., R. Co. "· Denver City R.
Co., 2 Col. 673.
• Arimond "· Green Bay, etc., Co.,
31 Wis. :ilfi; Trenton Water Power
Co. c. Half, 36 X. J . 335; Lee c. Pembroke Iron Co., 57 )lc. 481.
• ~luskegon Booming Co "· Evar\
Booming Co., :J4 )lich. 462; People v.
Ferry Cu., GS ~. Y. il.
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so on. In these eases the State only restricts or narrows its own

right, and the right of the individual, which is only a part of

the public right, can be no broader than that which the State

has retained.

. But while the State may restrict its own right, it cannot

restrict or take away the rights which are purely individual,

even though they are intimately associated with the public right.

An example has been given in another place of a railroad laid

down in a public highway by State consent, and it was stated

that this consent would not empower the railroad company to

cut oﬂ' an adjacent land owner from convenient access to the

street. This right of access is an individual, not a public right,

and the land owner, in claiming damages for being deprived of

it, is complaining not of a public but of a private nuisance.‘ So

no regulation of the right of navigation can la\vf'ully take from

a riparian proprietor his water front and the right to make use

of it for the purposes of navigation; ' nor can any special privi-

lege which is conferred, to make use of public waters, empower

the beneﬁciaries to ﬂood the lands of individuals.‘ The State

license in all these eases precludes complaint for anything which,

but for the license, would be a State oifense, but it cannot go
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further.‘

' See Stone 0. Fairbury, etc., R. R.

Co., 68 Ill. 894; Grand Rapids, etc.,

R. R. Co. 4:. Ileisel, 38 Mich.; Eliza-

beth, etc., R. R. Co. 1:. Combs, 10 Bush,

382; S. O. 19 Am. Rep. 67.

' Ryan o. Brown. 18 Mich. 196. See

Davis v. Winslow, 51 Me. 264; Arun-

del 0. McCulloch. 10 Mass. 70; Wash-

so on. In these cases the State only restricts or narrows its own
right, and the right of the individual, which is only a part of
the public right, can be no broader than that which the State
bas retained .
. But while the State may restrict its own right, it cannot
restrict or take away the rights which are purely individual,
even though they are intimately associated with the public right.
An example has been given in another place of a railroad laid
down in a pubiic highway by State consent, and it was stated
that this consent would not empower the railroad company to
cut off an adjacent land owner from convenient access to the
street. This right of access is an individual, not a public right,
and the land owner, in claiming damages for being deprived of
it, is complaining not of a public but of a private nuisance.' So
no regulation of the right of navigation can lawfully take from
a riparian proprietor his water front and the right to make use
of it for the purposes of n_avigation;' nor can any special privilege which is conferred, to make use of public waters, empower
the beneficiaries to flood the lands of individuals.• The State
license in all these cases precludes complaint for anything which,
but for the license, would be a State offense, but it cannot go
furthe~
·

burn, etc., Co. 0. Worcester, 116 Mass.

458.

3 Trenton Water Power Co. o. Ralf,

86 N. J. 335; Grands Rapids Boom-

ing Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308; Mid-

dletown v. Booming Co., 27 Mich.

533; Thunder Bay, etc., Co. v. Speech-

ly, 31 Mich. 336; Muskegon Booming

Co. '0. Evart Booming Oo.. 34 Mich.

462; Brown v. Dean, 123 Mass. 254;

Lee v. Pembroke Iron Co.. 57 Me. 481.

‘ Danville, etc., R. R Co. '0. Com.,

73 Penn. St. 29; Williams v. N. Y.

Cent. R... 16 N. Y. 97: Wager 0. Troy

Union R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 526; People

0. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188; Starr 1:. Camden,

etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. J. 592; Trenton

Water Power Co. 0. Ralf, 36 N. J . 835.

It is no nuisance for a railroad to cross

a highway at grade where the proper

authority has been obtained therefor,

even though the railroad might have

been carried above or below the high-

way. Town Council of Johnston 0.

Providence, etc., R. R. Co., 10 R. I. 365.

Nor, when a railroad company is em-

powered to operate its road in the

highway, is it any nuisance to stop a

train therein for the purpose of load-

ing or unloading a car, provided it

be (lone in such a prudent manner as

not unreasonably to interfere with

the rights of those having occasion

to use the highway for ordinary pur-

1 See Stone t~. Fairbury, etc., R R
Co., 68 Ill. 894; Grand Rapids, etc.,
R. R Co. "· Heisel, 88 Mich.; Eliza.
beth, etc., R. R. Co. 'I). Vombs, 10 Bush,
382; 8. C. 19 Am. Rep. 67.
'Ryan 11. Brown, 18 :Mich. 196. See
Davis"· Winslow, 51 ~fe. 26!; Arundel"· McCulloch, 10 ~lass. 70; Washburn, etc., Co."· 'Vorcester, 116 Mass.

458.
'Trenton Water Power Co."· Ratf,
S6 N.J. 335; G1·ands Rapids Booming Co.11. Jarvis, 30 llich. 308; :Middletown "'· Booming Co., 27 :Mich.
533; Thunder Bay, etc., Co."· Speechly, 81 :Mich. 330; }f uskegon Booming
Co. 11. Evart Booming Co .. 34 Mich.
462; Brown 11. Dean, 123 ::\lass. 25-i;
Lee"· Pembroke Iron Co., 57 1\Ie. 481.
4 Danville, etc., R. R Co. ""· Com.,
'/3 Peon. St. 29; Williams v. N. Y.

Cent. R.. 16 N. Y. 97: Wager 11. Troy
Union R. R. Co., 25 N.Y. 526; People
fl. Kerr, 27 N.Y. 188; Starr"· Camden.
etc., R. R. Co., 2.J N. J. 592; Trenton
Water Power Co."· Rllff, 36 N.J. 835.
It is no nuisance for a railroad to cross
a highway at grade where the proper
authority has been obtained therefor,
even though the railroad might have
been carried above or below the high.
way. Town Council of Johnston t~.
Providence, etc., R. R. Co., 10 R. I. 365.
Nor, when a railroad company is empowered to operate its road in the
highway, is it any nuisance to stop a
train therein for t.he purpose of loadIng or unloading a. car, provided it.
be done in such a pr.udent manner as
not unreasonably to interfere with
the rights of those having occasion
to use the highway for ordinary pur.
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Objects in the highway, which do not prevent passage, but
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render it dangerous from the tendency to frighten horses, are

nuisances.‘ But when the object is something employed to

facilitate travel or traﬁic on the highway, the question whether

it is a nuisance is seen to be one which is not susceptible of

being determined on the single consideration of its tendency to

frighten horses of even ordinary gentleness. A traction steam

engine on the common highway, for example, is no more a

wrong because of its tendency to frighten horses than is a bridge

over a navigable river a wrong because of its tendency to delay

vessels. The one may be a wrong under some circumstances,

and so may the other; but it is equally true that both may be

proper and lawful under other circumstances. It would be dif-

ﬁcult to pass through the streets of any considerable city without

encountering objects moving along them which are well calcu-

lated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness until they have

become accustomed to them, but which, nevertheless, are used

and moved about for proper and lawful purposes. The steam

engine for protection against ﬁre may be mentioned as one of

these; and though this is usually owned and moved about by

public authority, there can be no doubt of the right of a private

individual to keep and use one for his own purposes, and to take
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it through the streets \vhen necessary. But other things which

are sometimes moved on wheels along the streets are equally

poses of travel. Mathews I. Kelsey,

58 Me. 56.

If by legislative authority adam ls

erected across tide waters, which

causes injury to an ancient mill, the

proprietor is entitled to redress at the

common law, if the statute provides

for none. Lee n. Pembroke Iron Co.,

57 Me. 481. citing many cases.

If a stream is navigable for a single

purpose only—t‘or example for ratt-

Objects in the highway, which do not prevent passage, bnt
render it dangerous from the tendency to frighten horse1.1, are
nnisances. 1 But when the object is something employed to
facilitate travel or traffic on the highway, the question whether
it is a nuisance is seen to be one which is not susceptible of
being determined on the single consideration of its tendency to
frighten horses of even ordinary gentleness. A traction steam
engine on the common highway, for example, is no more a
wroug becanse of its tendency to frighten horses than is a bridge
over a navigable river a wrong because of its tendency to delay
vessels. The one mRy be a wrong under some circnmBtances,
and so may the other; but it is equally true that both may be
proper and lawful under other circumstances. It would be difficult to pass through the streets of any considerable city without
encountering objects moving along them which are well calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness until they have
become accustomed t,, them, but which, nevertheless, are UE!ed
and moved about for proper and lawfnl purposes. The steam
engine for protection against fire may be mentioned as one ot
these; and though this is usua1ly owned and moved about by
public authority, there can be no doubt of the right of a private
individual to keep and use one for his own pnrposes, and to take
it throngh the streets when necessary. Bnt other things which
are sometimes moved on wheels along the streets are equally

ing—the bank proprietor, as against

the public, is only bound not to ob-

struct it in that regard. Morgan e.

King, 18 Barb. 277. And see. as to

obstructing streams, Knox 1:. Chale-

ner, 42 Me. 150; Veazic v. Dwlnel, 50

Me. 479; Parks v. Morse, 52 Me. 260;

Amoskeag Manuf. Co. o. Goodale, 48

N. H. 53. Obstructions to navigation

by the casting of slabs into the stream

to ﬂoat away, may give rise to private

rights of action. Washbum v. GiL

man, 64 Me. 163; Haskins v. Haskins,

9 Gray, 390.

' See Cook 0. Charlesmwn, 98 Mass.

80; Klngsbury-v. Dcdhnm, 13 Allen,

186; Horton v. Taunton, 97 Mass. 266,

n. ; Foshay v. Glen Haven, 25 Wis. 288;

Dimock 0. Sufﬁeld, :10 Conn. 129;

Young e. New Haven. 39 Conn. 485;

Ayer 0. Norwich, 89 Conn. 376; S. C.

12 Am. Rep. 396; Morse v. Richmond,

41 Vt 435. The habitual failure of a

railroad company to make signals at

dangerous crossings may be a nui-

sance. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. »v.

Commonwealth, 13 Bush, 388.

poses of travel. Mathews •· Kelsey,
.ft8 Me. 56.
If by legislative authority a dam ls

erected across tide waters, which
causes injury to an ancient mill, the
proprietor is entitled to redress at the
eowmon law, if the statute provides
for none. Lee v. Pembroke Iron Co.,
67 ?tle. 481, citing many cases.
If a stream is navigable for a single
purpose only-for example for ran..
ing-tbe bnnk proprietor, as against
the public, is only bound not to ob.
etruct it in that regard. Morgan "·
King, 18 Barb. 277. And sec, as to
obstructing streams, Knox "· Chalo.
ocr, 42 :Me. 11SO; Veazie "· Dwinel, 50
Me. 479; Parks "· Morse, 52 lie. 260;
• Amoskeag Manuf. Co. •· Goodale, 46

N. H . 53. Obstructions to oavigatloo
by the casting of slalJs into the stream
to float away, may give rise to private
rights of action. WBShlmm e. GiL.
man, 6t Me. 163; Haskins D. Haskins,
g Gray, auo.
a See Cook 11. Charlestown, 98 Masa.
80; Klngsbury.t~. Dedham, ta Allen,
186; Ilort~n v. Taunton, 9'7 :MRSS. 266,
n.; ~oshay "·Glen Haven, 2,j Wis. 288;
Dimock v. Suffield, ~0 Conn. 129;
Young t'. New Haven, 39 Conn. 4ll5;
Ayer "· X orwich, 39 Conn. 376; 8. C.
12 A.m. Rep. 3!16; )lor.~e tl. Richmond,
41 Vt. 435. 'the habitual failure of a
railroad company to mllke signals at
dangerous cros.~lngs may be a nul.
sancc. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Commonwealth, 13 Bul\b, 388.
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alarming to horses when ﬁrst used. Wild beasts collected and

moved about the country for exhibition are even more likely to

frighten domestic animals. So steam power is admitted as a

matter of necessity on street railways; even on the roads where

cars move above the heads of the people and over the common

vehicles; and these are not nuisances, but if injury occurs from

their use, the question the injury presents is whether, under all

the circumstances, there is fault imputable to some one, and if

so, who should be held accountable for it.‘

What is a Special Injury. It is a special injury if one has a.

dock on navigable water, and the city, by running a sewer into

it, causes it to be ﬁlled up, or the entrance materially obstructed.’

So it is a special injury to the plaintiff if having occasion to pass

along a navigable stream, he ﬁnds a barge moored across it

alarming to lwrses when first used. Wild beasts collected and
moved about the country for exhibition are even more likely to
frighten domestic animals. So steam power is admitted as a
matter of necessity on street railways; even on the roads where
cars move above the heads of the people and over the common
vehicles; and these are not nuisances, but if injury occurs from
their use, the question the injury presents is whether, under all
the circumstances, there is fault imputable to some one, and if
so, who should be held accountable for it.'

which prevents his boat passing,‘ or a bridge which has been eon-

strueted without permission and which renders his passage incon-

venient or impossible;‘ or if in passing along the highway he

ﬁnds himself stopped by a fence put up without authority,‘ or

kept up after the authority once given has expired.‘ So the

public nuisance of an offensive mill dam is a special and peculiar

injury to the man whose residence is near it, and the comfort of

whose home is destroyed thereby. So any dangerous excavation
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made in the public way is a nuisance. It is only necessary for

the plaintiff in these cases to show how he has been injured by

the nuisance, and to distinguish his injury from that suffered by

the public at large, and he brings himself within the rules

entitling him to redress.’ So if one’s premises are situate upon

1 Macomber 0. Nichols, 34 Mich.

212; S. C. 22 Am. Rep. 522, where in

a note the following cases under Eng-

lish statutes regulating the use of

steam engines for the protection of

travel on the highway are referred to.

\\'atkins 0. Reddin, 2 F. & F. 629;

Smith 1:. Stokes, 4 B. & S. 84; Harri-

son a. Leaper, 5 Law Times Rep. (N.

s.) 640. Compare Favor o. Boston,

etc., R. R. Co., 114 Mass. 350; S. C. 19

Am. Rep. 364.

" Clark 0. Peckham, 10 R. I. 35; S.

What is a Special Injury. It is a special injury if one has &
dock on navigable water, and the city, by running a sewer into
it, causes it to be filled up, or the .entrance materially obstructed.,.
So it is a special injnry to the plaintiff if ha\·ing occ.:'l.Sion to pass
along a navigable stream, he finds a barge moored across it
which prevents his boat passing,• or a bridge which has been constructed without permission and which renders his pass~ae inconvenient or impossible; 4 or if in passing along the highway he
finds himself stopped by a fence put up without authority," or
kept up after the authority once given has expired.• So the
public nuisance of an offensive mill dam is a special and peculiar
injury to the man whose residence is near it, and the comfort of
whose home is destroyed thereby. So any dangerous excavation
made in the public way is a nuisance. It is only necessary for
the plaintiff in these cases to show how he has been injured by
the nuisance, and to distinguish his injury from that suffered by
the public at large, and he brings himself within the rules
entitling him to redress.' So if one's premises are situate upon

C. 9 R. I. 455; Brayton '0. Fall River,

113 Mass. 218; S. O. 18 Am. Rep. 470.

3 Rose v. Miles, 4 M. & S. 101. See

Walker v. Shepardson, 2 Wis. 282.

Or a boom. Dudley o. Kennedy, 63

Me. 465.

‘ Arundel o. McCul1och, 10 Mass. 70.

° Gregory v. Commonwealth, 2 Da-

na, 417.

' Adams 0. Beach, 6 Hill, 271. See

Allen 11. Lyon,2Ro0t, 213; Columbus

'0. J aques, 80 Geo. 506.

" See case of a warehouse project-

ing into the street and obstructing the

view from the plaintiﬂ"‘s warehouse.

1 Macomber i7. Nichols, 84 llich.
212; B. C. 22 Am. Rep. 522, where in
a note the following cases under Eng.
lish statutes regulating the use of
steam· engines for the protection of
travel on the highway are referred to.
Watkins i7. Reddin, 2 F. & F. 629;
Smith v. Stokes, 4 B. & S. 84; Harrison i7. Leaper, I) Law Times Uep. (N.
s.) 640. Compare Favor "· Boston,
etc., R. R. Co., 114 }[ass. 350; 8. C. 19
Am. Rep. 364.
1 Clark 11. Peckham, 10 R. I. 35; 8.
C. 9 R. I. 455; B1·ayton v. Fall River,

113 Mass. 218; 8. C. 18 Am. Rep. 470.
1 Rose v. Miles, 4 M. & 8. 101.
See
Walker v. Shepardson, 2 Wis. 282.
Or a boom. Dudley i7. Kennedy, 63
Me. 465.
4 Arundel 11. McCulloch, 10 )[1\SS. 70.
• Gregory i7. Commonwealth, 2 Da..
na, 417.
• Adams i7. Beach, 6 Hill, 271. See
Allen v. Lyon,2Root, 213; Columbus
11. Jaques, SO Geo. 506.
1 See case of a warehouse projec'ing into the street and obstructing the
view from the plaintiff's warehouse.
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specially to interfere with his access to the water is an action-

able injury.‘ And in general it may be suﬁicient to say that

to entitle him to an action it is only necessary that he suffer

some peculiar injury, differing from that suffered by the com-

munity at large.’

Continuity of the Wrong. A nuisance continued is a fresh

nuisance every day it is suffered to remain unabated. New suits

for the damage caused by its continuance may therefore be

brought from day to day.‘ ~

public navigable water, whatever obstruction in the stream tends
specially to interfere with his access to the water is an actionable injury.' And in general it may be sufficient to say that
to entitle him to an action it is only ne<.-essary that he l'uffer
some peculiar injury, differing from that suffered by the community at large.'

Nuisances by Municipal Corporations. As the wrongs for

which municipal corporations may be responsible are more often

than otherwise in the nature of nuisances. the present seems a.

suitable place for according to them brief notice.

Municipal corporations are to be considered ﬁrst, as parts of

the governmental machinery of the State, legislating tor their

ConUnuity of the Wrong. A nuisance continued is a fresh
nuisance every day it is suffered to remain unabated. New snits
for the damage caused by its continuance may therefore be
brought from day to day.'
•

corporators, and planning and providing for the customary

local conveniences for their people: second, as corporate bodies

through proper agencies putting into execution their plans,

and discharging such duties as they have imposed upon them-

selves or as the State has imposed upon them; and, t/einl, as

artiﬁcial personsowning and managing property. In this last.
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Stetson 0. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147. Of a

bridge built so as to prevent entrance

to a building. Knox 0. New York, 55

Barb, 404. Of a wall extended into

the street. Schulte 0. N. P. T. Co., 50

Cal. 592.

1 Dobson 0. Blackmore, 9 Q. B. 991;

Ryan '0. Brown, 18 Mich. 196.

' See Venard o. Cross, B Kan. 248;

Green v. Nunnemacher, 36 Wis. 50;

Yolo v. Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193. But

Nuisances by Kunicipal Corporations. As the wrongs for
which municipal corporations may be responsible are more often
than otl1erwise in the nature of nni~anccs, the present seems a.
suitable pl8(.'E! for according to them brief notice•
.Municipal corporations are to be considered first, as parts of
the governmental machinery of the State, legislating tor their
corporators, and planning and providing for the customary
local conveniences for their people: second, as corporate bodies
through proper agencies putting into execution their J>lans,.
and discharging such duties as they have imposed upon themselves or as the State has imposes} upon them; and, thirtl, a&
artificial persons· owning and managing property. In this last.

a special injury to plaintilf’s prop-

arty in the street, by acrowd gathered

to hear a speech, is not a special in-

jury from the public nuisance of ob-

structing the street. Fairbanks 9.

Kerr, '70 Penn. St 86; S. C. 10 Am.

Rep. 664.

' Shadwell o. Hutchinson, 4 C. & P.

888; Holmes 0. Wilson, 10 Ad. & El.

503; Howell 0. Young, 5 B. & C. 250;

Gillon 0. Boddington, Ry. & M. 161;

Bowyer 0. Cook, 5 C. B. 236; Allen 0.

Worthy, L. R. 4 Q. B. 163; Queen 0.

Waterliouse, L. R. '7 Q. B. 545; Beck-

with 0. Griswold, 29 Barb. 201; Con-

hocton Stone C0. 0. Buffalo, etc., R.

R. Co., 52 Barb. 390; Vcdder v. Ved.

der, 1 Denio, 257; Mahon r. New

York Cent. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 658;

Slight 1:. Gutzlaﬁ‘, 35 W'ls. 675; Phila-

bury v. Moore, 44 Me. 154; Staple 0.

Spring, 10 Mass. 72. The more enn-

tinuance of a building wrongfully

erected on the land of another is A

continual wrong, for which the own-

er of the land may bring new suits

after recovery and satisfaction for the

original erection. Russell v. Brown,

63 Me. 203.

Stetson "· Fu:on, 19 Pick. 147. or a
bridge built so as to prevent entrance
to a building. Knox "· New York, M
Barb, 404. or a wall extended into
the streel Bchnlte "· N. P. T. Co., ISO
Cal. 692.
1 Dobson "· Blackmore, 9 Q. B. 991;
RyAD "· Brown, 18 llicb. 196.
• See Venard t~. Cross, 8 Kan. 248;
Green t~. Nonnemacher, 86 Wis. 50;
Yolo"· Sacramento, 86 Cal. 198. But
a special injury to plaintiff's prop.
erty ln the street, by a crowd gathered
to hear a speech, is not a special injury from the public nuisance of obatructing the streeL Fairbanks t~.
Kerr, 70 Penn. SL 86; S. C. 10 Am.
Rep. 664..
• Shadwell"· Hutchinson, 4 C. & P.
888; Holmes "· Wllson, 10 Ad. & EI.

603; Howell"· Young, lJ B. & C. 2.59;.
Gillon "· Boddington, Uy. & .ll. 161;.
Bowyer "· Cook, lJ C. B. 236; Allen e.
Worthy, L. R. 4 Q. B. 163; Qtwcn "·
W aterhoose, L. R. 7 Q. B. 64-"i; Beckwith "· Griswold, 29 Barb. 291 ; Conhocton Stone Co. "· Buffalo, ctr., R.
R. Co., 62 Barb. 800; Vedder o. Vedder, 1 Denio, 257; Mahon "· New
York Cenl R. R. Co., 24 N.Y. 658;
Blight t~. Gutzlalf, 85 W1s. 675; Philsbury t~. Moore., -H Me. 15-i; StaJ•Ie "·
Spring, 10 Mass. 72. The meru con.
tinoance of a building wrongfully
erected on the land of another is &
continual l\TOng, for which the owner of the land may bring new suits
after recovery and satisfaction for the
original erection. Ruuell "· Brown.
68 lie. 208.
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capacity they are chargeable with all the duties and obligations
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of other owners of property, and must respond for creating or

suffering nuisances under the same rules which govern the

responsibility of natural persons.‘ Under this head, therefore,

nothing more need be said in this place.

F orltaking or neglecting to take strictly governmental action,

municipal corporations are under no responsibility whatever

except the political responsibility to their corporators and to

the State. The reason is that it is inconsistent with the

nature of ‘their powers that they should be compelled to respond

to individuals in damages for the manner of their exercise.

They are conferred for public purposes, to be exercised within

prescribed limits, at discretion, for the public good; and there

can be no appeal from the judgment of the proper municipal

authorities to the judgment of courts and juries. Therefore,

one shows no ground of action whatever when he complains

that he has suffered damage because the city he resides in has

made insutﬁcient provision for protection against ﬁre,’ or because

-cattle are not prohibited from running at large,’ or because

“coasting” in the highways is not prevented,‘ or‘ because the

operation of an ordinance which prohibits the explosion of ﬁre

works within the city is temporarily suspended,’ or because
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provision is not made for lighting the streets,‘ or because the

drains which it orders and constructs are insuﬁicient to carry

oﬁ' the surface water,’ or because the plan of a bridge, or sewer,

or any other public work does not provide against accidental

injury to individuals as completely as it might have done.’

Neither is a municipal corporation responsible for the failure

1 See Clark v. Pcckham, 9 R. I. 455;

Pennoyer 0. Saginaw, 8 Mich. 534;

Cumberland, etc., Co. 1:. Portland, 62

Me. 504.

’ Davis 0. Montgomery, 51 Ala. 139;

8. C. 23 Am. Rep. 545; Wheeler 0.

Cincinnati, 19 Ohio, (N. s.) 19; Patch

0. Covington, 17 B. Mon. 722. See,

also, Howard 1:. San Francisco, 51

Cal. 52; Joliet 1:. Vcrley, 35 Ill. 58;

Russell 0. New York, 2 Denio, 461;

O’Meara 0. New York, 1 Daly, 495;

~pacity

they are chargeable with all the duties and obligations
cf other owners of property, and must respond for creating or
suffering nuisances under the same rules which govern the
responsibility of natural persons.• Under this head, therefore,
nothing more need be said in this place.
For.b\king or neglecting to take strictly governmental action,
municipal corporations are under no responsibility whatever
-except the political responsibility to their corporators and to
tho State. The reason is that it is inconsistent with the
nature of .their powers that they should be compelled to respond
to individuals in damages for the manner ot' their exercise.
4fhey are conferred tor public purposes, to be exercised within
prescribed limits, at discretion, for the public good; and there
.can be no appeal from the judgment of the proper municipal
authorities to the judgment of courts and juries. Therefore,
.()De shows no ground of action whatever when he complains
that he has suffered damage because the city he resides in has
made insufficient provision for protection against fire,s or because
-cattle are not prohibited from running at large,' or because
"''coasting" in the highways is not prevented: or· because the
.()peration of an ordinance which prohibits the explosion of fire
w01·ks within the city is temporarily suspended: or because
pro\·ision is not made for lighting the streets,' or because the
-drains which it orders and constructs are insufficient to carry
.()ft' the surface water,' or because the plan of a bridge, or sewer,
.()r any other public work does not provide against accidental
injury to indh·iduals as completely as it might have done.'
Neither is a municipal corporation responsible for the failure

Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, ‘.29 Ind. 187;

Hatford 1:. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297;

Fisher e. Boston, 104 Mass. ST; Grant

0. Erie, 69 Penn. St. 420.

' Kelly 12. Milwaukee, 18 “'is. 83.

Bee Michigan, etc., R. R. Co. 1:. Fish.

er, 27 Ind. 96.

‘ Hutchinson 1:. Concord, 41 Vt. 271.

See Altvater -v. Baltimore, 31 Md. 462.

‘ Ilill 1:. Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55; S.

0.21 Am. Rep. 451.

‘ Frceport 1:. Isbell, 83 Ill. 440.

" See Roberts 0. Chicago, 26 Ill. 2-19

and cases cited in next note.

‘ Governor, etc. '0. Meredith, 4 '1‘. R.

794; Wilson v. New York, 1 Denio,

l Bee Clark t!. Peckham, 9 R I. 4.'i5;
Pennnyer "· Saginaw, 8 Mich. 584;
Cumberland, etc., Co."· Portlllnd, 62

lie. 504.
• Davis t!. Montgomery, 51 Ala. 139;
S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 54:5; Wheeler "·
Cincinnati, 19 Ohio, (N. s.) 19; Patch
e. Co\"'ington, 17 B. ]')[on. 722. St'l"'.
also, Howard "· San Francisco, 51
Clll. 52; Joliet "· V crley, 35 Ill. 58;
Russell t!. New York, 2 Denio, 461;
O'Meara t!. New York, 1 Daly, 425;
Brlnkmeyertt. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187;
Hafford"· New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297;

Fisher "·Boston, 10! 1tlllSS. 87; Grant
"· Eric, 60 Penn. St. 420.
1 Kelly "· Milwaukee, 18 Wi;;. 83.
See Michigan, etc., R. R. Co. "· Fisher, 27 Ind. 96.
• Hutchinson"· Concord, 41 Vt. 2'71.
See Altvater t!. Baltimore, 31 }[d. 462.
' Hill t!. Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55; S.
C. 21 Am. Rep. 4.~1.
1 Freeport"· Isbell, 83 Ill. 44.0.
, See Roberts"· Chicago, 26 Ill. 249
and cases cited in next note.
e Governor, etc."· lieredith, 4 T. R.
794; Wilson"· New York, 1 Denio,
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of its oﬁicers to discharge properly and eﬁ'ectually their oﬁicial

duties; for in respect to these the officers are not properly the
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servants or agents of the corporation, but act upon their own

oﬁicial responsibility, except as they may be specially directed

by the corporate authority.‘ Neither is it responsible for the

destruction of property by a mob, unless expressly made so by

statute, as in some States it has been.’ "But municipal corpo-

rations are responsible for due care in the execution of any work

ordered by them,‘ and if the work is one for the special beneﬁt

of its own people, it must not negligently be allowed to get out

of repair to the injury of individuals.‘

595; Mills 0. Brooklyn. 32 N. Y. 489;

White v. Yazoo, 27 Miss. 357; Lam-

bar v. St. Louis, 15 Mo. 610; Detroit

0. Beckman, 34 Mich. 125; Delphi 0.

Evans, 36 Ind. 90. See Cotes v. Dav-

enport, 9 Iowa, 227 ; Carr v. Northern

Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 824; Pontiac

of its officers to discharge properly and effectually their official
duties; tor in respect to these the officers are not properly the
servants or agents of the corporation, but act npon their own
official responsibility, except as they may be specially directed
by the corporate authority.• Neither is it responsible for the
destruction of property by a mob, unless expressly made so by
statute, as in some States it bas been.• But municipal corporations are responsible for dne care in the execution of any work
ordered by them,• and if the work is one for the speeial benefit
of its own people, it must not negligently be allowed to get out
of repair to the injury of individuals.•

0. Carter, 32 Mich. 164.

'Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511;

Perley 1:. Georgetown, '7 Gray, 464;

Barney v. Lowell, 98 Mass. 570; Big-
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elow v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541; Hayes

0. Oshkosh, 33 VVis. 314; S. C. 14 Am.

Rep. ‘T60; Young 0. Comr. of Roads,

2 N. & McC. 537; Martin o. Brook-

lyn, 1 Hill, 545; Lorillard o. Monroe,

11 N. Y. 392; Sherman 0. Grenada,51

Miss. 186; Mitchell 0. Rockland, 52

Me. 118; Barbour 0. Ellsworth, 67 Me.

294; Prather 0. Lexington, 18 B. Mon.

659; Judge 0. Meriden, 38 Conn. 90;

Sheldon 0. Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383;

Eastman 0. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284;

Hyde u. Jamaica, 27 Vt. 448. See

Hunt 0. Boonville, 65 Mo. 620. A

city is not responsible for the negli-

gence or misbehavior of its ﬁremen.

Jewett 0. New Haven, 38 Conn. 368;

S. C. 9 Am. Rep. 682; Greenwood v.

Louisville, 18 Bush, 226; Torbush 0.

Norwich, 38 Conn. 225; S. C. 9

Am. Rep. 895. Nor a town for the

negligence of the town surveyor or

his assistant. Barney 0. Lowell, 98

Mass. 570; Walcott 0. Swamscott, 1

Allen, 101; Judge 0. Meriden, 88

Conn. 90. Nor for the neglects of

persons connected with its sanitary

service or hospitals. Ogg 1:. Lan-

sing, 35 Iowa, 495; S. C. 14 Am. Rep.

499; Murtaugh 0. St. Louis, 44 Mo.

479; Brown o. Vinalhaven, 65 Me.

402; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 709; White v.

Mztrshﬁeld, 48 Vt. 20. See, further,

Sherbourn o.Yuba. County, 21 Cal.

113; Rudolphe v. New Orleans, 11 La.

Ann. 242; Mitchell 0. Rockland, 41

Me. 363; and 45 Me. 496; l)ar_;an 0.

Mobile, 31 Ala. 469; Richlnontl 0.

Long, 17 Grat. 3'75 ; Stewart u. New

Orleans.9 La. Ann. 461; Pollock's

Admr. 0. Louisville, 13 Bush, 221.

' \Vestern College, etc. 0. Cleveland,

12 Ohio, (N. s.) 375. See In re Penn-

sylvania Ilall,5 Penn. St. 204; Dar-

lington v. New York, 31 N. Y. 164;

Folsom 0. New Orleans, 28 La Ann.

936; Underhill v. Manchester, 45 N.

595; Mills"· Brooklyn, 82 N.Y. 489; Allen, 101; Judge e. Meriden, SS
White 11. Yazoo, 27 l\liss. 857; Lam- Conn. 90. Nor for the neglects of
bar "· St. Louis, 15 1tlo. 610; DetroU persons connected with its sanitary
e. Beckman, 34 Mich. 125; Delphi e. service or hospitals. Ogg "· LanEvans, 36 Ind. 90. See Cutes 11. Dav. sing, 35 Iowa, 495; S. C. 14 Am. Rep.
en port, 9 Iowa, 227; Carr 11. Northern 4.00; MurtAugh "· St. Louis, 44 llo.
Liberties, 85 Penn. St. 824; Pontiac 479; Brown "· Vinalhaven, 65 :Me.
e. Carter, 32 llich. 164.
402; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 709; White "·
• Thayer 11. Boston, 19 Pick. 1n1; •MIU'Shfield, 48 VL 20. See, further,.
Perley 11. Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464; Sheroourn "· Yuba County, 21 Cal.
Barney 11. Lowell, 08 .Mass. 570; Big. 113; Rudolphe tJ. New Orleans, 11 La.
elow "·Randolph, 14 Gray,/541; Hayes Ann. 242; Mitchell "· Hockland, 41
e. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 814; S. C. 14 Am. · }[e. 363; and 45 }Ie. 496; I>ar!!an e.
Rep. 760; Young"· Comr. of Roads, Mobile, 81 Ala. 469; Richmond 11.
2 N. & ~IcC. 537; Martin "· Brook- Long, 17 Grat 375; Stewart "· New
lyn, 1 Hill, 545; Lorillard "· l\Ionroe, Orleans, 9 La.. Ann. 461; Pollock'&
11 N.Y. 392; Sherman "·Grenada, 51 Admr. 11. Louisville, 13 Bu~h. 221.
1 Western College, etc."· Cle,·eland,
Miss. 186; Mitchell "· Rockland, 52
lie. 118; Bnrboun. Ellsworth, 67 1tle. 12 Ohio, (N. s.) 375. See In re Penn294; Prather"· Lexington, 18 B. )[on. sylvania Hall, 5 Penn. !:it. 204; Dar559; Judge"· :Meriden, 38 Conn. 00; lington"· New York, 31 N. Y. 164•
Sheldon "· Kalamazoo, 24 1\lich. 38.'J; Folsom "· New Orleans, 28 La Ann.
Eastman "· llen-ditb, 86 N. H. 284; 986; Underhill "· :Manchester, 45 N .
llyde 11. Jamaica, 27 Vt. 448. See II. 214; Chadbourne "· New Cnstle,.
Hunt "· Boonville, 65 llo. 620. A 48 N. H.196.
1 See Detroit "· Corey, 9 Mich. 165;
city is not responsible for tht> negli.
gencc or misbehavior of its firemen.
Hannon 11. St. Louis, 62 Mo 813.
• Thus, a city is liable if one of Its.
Jewett"· New Haven, 88 Conn. 368;
S. C. 9 Am. Rep. 382; Greenwood "· drains or sewers is &ulfered to become
Louisville, lS Bush, 226; Torbush e. obstructed, whereby the lands of lnNorwich, 38 Conn. . 225; S. C. 9 d _ivldua!s arc flooded. Gilman "· LaAm. Rep. 895. Nor a town for the conia, M N. H. 130; S. C. 20 Am.
negligence of the town surveyor or Rep. 175; Ashley "· Port Huron, ~
his assistant. Barney "· Lowell, 98 llich. 296; S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 629.
llasa. 1570 ; WalcoU e. Bwamscott. 1
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Municipal corporations are generally required to construct and
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keep in repair the public ways within their limits. These, how-

ever, are for the use, not of their own citizens merely, but of all

the people of the State, and any duty they owe to keep them in

repair is a duty to the State, and not to individuals. It is well

settled, therefore, that at the common law a municipal corpora-

tion is not liable to an individual for neglect to keep a highway

in repair, whereby he suffers an injury in using it.‘ In some of

the States, however, the liability is expressly imposed upon towns

-by statute,’ and in the note eases are referred to which have been

decided under these statutes.‘

' Russell 0. Men of Devon, 2 T. R.

i667; Young o. Comr. of Roads, 2 N.

& -McC. 537; Morey 0. Newfane, 8

Barb. 645; Mower 0. Liecester, 0 Mass.

247; Niles 0. Martin, 4 Mich. 557;

Perry o. John, 79 Penn. St. 411; State

0. Cumberland, '7 R. I. '75; Hutfman

Municipal corporations are generally required to construct and
'keep in repair the public ways within their limits. These, however, are for the use, not of their own citizens merely, but of all
the people of the State, and any duty they owe to keep them in
repair is a duty to the State, and not to individuals. It is well
settled, therefore, that at the common law a municipal corporation is not liable to an individual for neglect to keep a highway
in repair, whereby he suftcrs an injury in using it. 1 In some of
the States, however, the liability is expressly imposed upon towns
·by statute,' and in the note cases are referred to which have been
decided under these statutes.•

0. Sun Joaquin Co., 21 Cal. 426; Sut-

ton 1:. Board of Police, 41 Miss. 236;

Frcelioldcrs 0. Strader, 18 N. J. 108;

Livermore 0. Freeholders, 31 N. J.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

507; Barbour Co. 0. Horn, 48 Ala.

649; Detroit o. Blackeby, 21 Mich.

84.

‘The statutes extend the ob-

-ligation so far as to require the

supplying of suitable fences, pro-

tections and guards at the sides,

and the following are cases where

towns were prosecuted for failure to

perform this duty. Collins o. Dor-

chester, 6 Cush. 396; Sparhawk v. Sa-

lem, 1 Allen, 80; Alger o. Lowell, 8

Allen, 402; Stevens v. Boxford, 10 Al-

len, 25; Burnham 0. Boston, 10 Allen,

290; Murdoch e. Warwick, 4 Gray,

1'78; Palmer 1:. Andover, 2 Cush. 600;

Hayden v. Attleborough, '7 Gray, 338;

Titus '0. Northbridge, 97 Mass. 258;

Horton v. Taunton, 97 Mass. 266, note;

Cobb 0. Standish, 14 Me. 198; Blais-

-dell 0. Portland. 89 Me. 113; Stinson

e. Gardiner, 42 Me. 248; Moulton v.

Sanford, 51 Me. 127; Hey 0. Phila-

-delphia, B1 Penn. St. 44; Winship 0.

Enﬁeld, 42 N. H. 197; Houfe 0. Fulton,

29 Wis. 296; Hunt o. Pownal, 9 Vt.

411; Weeks 0. Conn., etc., Turnpike

Co., 20 Conn. 134. See Barnes 0.

Ward, 9 C. B. 892; Toms v. Whitby,

85 Up. Can. Q. B. 195; Hyatt 0. Ron-

dout, 44 Barb. 885; Palmer ~v. Ando-

ver, 2 Cush. 600; Winship 0. Enﬂeld,

42 N. H. 197. If one makes use of

the railings of a bridge to lean against

or rest upoh, he does it at his own

risk. Orcutt 0. Kittery Point Bridge

Co., 53 Me. 500. See Stickney 0. Sa-

lem, s Allen, 374. '

' The obligation to repair is in the

main conﬁned to that part of the road

usually traveled. Philbrick e. Pitts-

ton, 63 Me. 477, and cases cited. This

is varied somewhat by custom and

the circumstances. Cobb u. Stan-

dish, 14 Me. 198. That stumps and

logs left in the road may constitute

defects, see Ward 0. J etfcrson, 24 Wis.

1 Russell "· Men of Devon, 2 T. R
•667; Young"· Comr. of Roads, 2 N.
& ~IcC. 537; Morey "· Newfane, 8
Barb. 640; Mower"· Liecester, 9 Mass.
247; Niles "· Martin, 4 1\lich. 557;
Perry "· John, 79 Penn. St. 411; State
-e. Cumberland, 7 R. I. 75; Hufl'man
"· San Joaquin Co., 21 Cal. 426; But.
ton "·Board of p,,Iice, 41 Miss. 236;
Freeholders'"· Strader, 18 N.J. 108;
Livermore "· Freeholde~, 31 N. J.
507; Barbour Co. "· Horn, 48 Ala.
649; Detroit "· Blackeby, 21 Mich.
84.
• The statutes extend the obligation so far as to require the
supplying of suitable fences, protections and guards nt the sides,
and the following are cases where
towns were prosecuted for fail urc to
perform this duty. Collins "· Dor.
chester, 6 Cush. 396; 8parhawk "· Sa.
lem, 1 Allen, 30; Alger "· Lowell, 3
Allen, 402; Stevens "'· Boxford, 10 AI.
len, 25; Burnham "· Boston, 10 Allen,
290; Murdoch "'· Warwick, 4 G1·ay,
178; Palmer"'· Andover, 2 Cush. 600;
Hayden "'· Attie borough, 7 Gray, 338;
Titus"'· Northbridge, 97 Mass. 258;
Horton"· Taunton, 97 Mass. 266, note;
·Cobb "· Standish, 14 lie. 198; Blais.
·dell "· Portland. 89 Me. 118; Stinson
"· Gardiner, 42 Me. 248; Moulton "·
8anford, lit Me. 127; Hey "· Phil a.
-delphia, 81 Penn. St. 44; Winship"·

Enfield, 42 N.H. 197; Houfe "·Fulton,
29 Wis. 296; Hunt "· Pownal, 9 Vt.
411; Weeks "· Conn., etc., Turnpike
Co., 20 Conn. 134. Sec Barnes e.
Ward, 9 C. B. 892; Toms"· Whitby,
85 Up. Can. Q. B. 195; Hyatt"· Rondout, 44 Barb. 885; Palmer "· An do.
ver, 2 Cush. 600; Winship "· Enfield,
42 N.H. 197. If one makes use of
the railings of a bridge to lean against
or rest upob, he does it at his own
risk. Orcutt "· Kittery Point Bridge
Co., 53 Me. 500. See Stickney "· Salem, 3 Allen, 374. ·
1 The ouligation to repair is in the
main confined to that part of the road
usually traveled. Philbrick "· Pittston, 63 1\lc. 477, and cases cited. This
is varied somewhat by custom and
the circumstances. Cobb "· Standish, 14 1\le. 198. That stumps and
logs left in the road may constitute
defects, see Ward fl. Jefferson, 24 Wis.
842; Coggswell "· Lexington, 4 Cush.
807; Snow "· Adams, 1 Cush. 443.
Compare Rogers "· Newport, 62 Me.
101; Springer "· Bowdoinham, 7 .Me.
442; Bigelow"· Weston, 8 Pick. 267.
So may a tent set up in the road which
frightens horses. Ayer "· Norwich,
89 Conn. 376; 8. 0. 12 Am. Rep. 396.
Or a steam roller, suffered to remain
in it over Sunday. Young "· New
Haven, 39 Conn. 435. See Keith e.
Easton, 2 Allen, 552. Or a dangero111
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awning over a walk. Drake 0. Low-

ell, 13 Met. 292.
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But a town is not liable for an in-

jury occasioned by the falling of a

sign which has been fastened to an

adjacent building. Taylor e. Peck-

ham, 8 R. I. 849. Nor for an injury

occasioned by the jubilating of a mob

in the street. Cambell’s Admr. 0.

Montgomery, 53 Ala. 527. Nor for an

injury suffered by unmanageable and

unruly horses, where the road is in

such condition that horses under con-

trol would have been driven with

safety. Jackson o. Bellevieu, 30 Wis.

250. N or for an injury caused by the

earth giving way under the feet of

the horses. in consequence of a defect

not d iseoverable. Prindle 0. Fletcher,

39 Vt. 255. Nor for an injury caused

by a locomotive of a railway com-

pany whose track illegally crossed
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the street. Vinal v. Dorchcster, '7

Gray, 421. Nor for an injury caused

by the traveler leaving the beaten

track in order to have the beneﬁt of

snow. Kelly o. Fond du Lac, 31 Wis.

179; Rice u. Montpelier, 19 Vt. 470.

See Rowell v. Lowell, '7 Gray, 100.

Compare Cassidy v. Stockbridge, 21

VL391. Norforaninjuryoccasioned

by a defect in the bridge of a railroad

crossing the street, and which the

railroad company is bound to repair.

Sawyer o. Northﬂcld, 7 Cush. 490.

Compare Currier v. Lowell, 16 Pick.

170; Wellcome o. Leeds, 51 Me. 313.

Nor for one caused by running upon

stones outside the traveled way and

beyond the gutter. Howard 0. North

Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189. Objects

within the limits of thehighway, but

outside the traveled way, are held in

Massachusetts not to be defects,

merely from their tendency to fright-

en horses; and tho towns are held,

therefore, not liable for injuries occa-

sioned by teams becoming frightened

by them and running away. Keith

0. Easton, 2 Allen, 552; Kingsbury 0.

Dedham, 13 Allen, 186; Horton 0.

Tuunton, 97 Mass. 266; Cook 0.

Charlestown, 98 Mass. 80; but in

Connecticut and Vermont the con-

trary doctrine is maintained. Young

0. New Haven, 39 Conn. 435; Ayer 0.

Norwich, 39 Conn. 376; S. C. 12 Am.

Rep. 896; Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt.

435, where the Massachusetts cases

are reviewed.

Whether one can recover where the

injury is the combined result of neg-

lect of duty on the part of the town

and of accident, has been, and still is,

a disputed question. In Vermont,

New Hampshire, Missouri and Wis-

consin it is held he may. Hunt v.

Pownal, 9 Vt. 411; Kelsey v. Glover,

15 Vt. T08; Allen 1:. Hancock, 16 Vt.

awning over a walk. Drake 11. Lowell, 13 Met. 292.
But a town is no~ liable for an injury occasioned by the falllng of a
sign which has been fastened to an
adjacent building. Taylor 11. Peckham, 8 R. I. 849. Nor for an injury
occasioned by the jubilating of a mob
in the street.
Cambell'tJ Admr. 11.
Montgomery, MAla. 527. Nor for an
injury suffered by unmanageable and
unruly horses, where the road is in
such condition that horses under control would have been driven with
safety. Jackson 11. Bellevicu, 30 Wis.
250. Nor for an injury caused by the
earth giving way under the feet of
the horses. in consequence of a defect
not discoverable. Prindle"· Fletcher,
89 Vt. 255. Nor for an injury caused
by a locomotive of t1o railway company whose track illegally crossed
the street. Vinal 11. Dorchester, 7
Gray, 421. Nor for an injury caused
by the traveler leaving the beaten
track in order to have the benefit of
snow. Kelly o. Fond duLac, 81 Wis.
179; Rice"· Montpelier, 19 VL. 470.
8ee Rowell fl. Lowell, 7 Gray, 100.
Compare Cassidy "· Stockbridge, 21
Vt.3!11. Nor for an injury occasioned
by a defect in the bridge of a. railroad
crossing the street, and which the
railroad company is bound to repair.
Sawyer "· Northfield, 7 Cush. 490.
Compare Currier "· Lowell. 16 Pick.
170; Wellcome "· Lecd,.., 51 Me. 313.
Nor for one caused by running upon
stones outside the traveled way and
beyond the gutter. Howard "· North
Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189. Objects
within the limits of thel1ighway, but
outside the traveled way. are held in
llassach usetts not to be defects,
merely from their tendr.ncy to frigh~
en horses; and the towns are held,
therefore, not liable for injuries occa.
eioned by teams becoming frightened
by them and running away. Keith

Easton, 2 Allen, 552; Kingsbury 11.
Th.>dham, 13 Allen, 186; Horton •·
Taunton, 97 Ma.<~s. 266; Cook "·
Charl~town, 98 Mass. 80; but in
Connecticut and Vermont the con.
trary doctrine is maintaine1l. Young
11. N cw Huvcn, 39 Conn. 4:3.'); Ayer "·
Norwich, 39 Conn. 376; S.C. 12 Am.
Rep. 896; Morse 11. Hichmond, 41 Vt.
4M, where the Massachusetts cases
are reviewed.
Whether one can recover where tho
injury is the combined result of neg.
lect of duty on the part of the town
and of accitlent, has been, and still is,
a disputed question. In Vermont,
New Hampshire, :Missouri and Wis.
consln it is hehl be may. Hunt 11.
Pownal, 9 Vt. 411; Kelsey 11. Glover,
15 Vt. 'i08; Allen "· Hancock, 16 VL
230; Hull"· Kansas City, 54 llo. 5D8;
Norris 11. Litchfield, 85 N. H. 271;
Clark "· Barrington, 41 N. H. 44;
Tucker 11. Henniker, 41 N. H. 817;
Winship 11. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197;
Dreher 11. Fitchburg, 22 Wis. 67tl;
Ward tJ. Milwaukee, etr., R. R. Co., 29
Wis. 14l; lloufe "· Fulton, 29 Wis.
296; S.C. 9 Am. Rep. 568. Compare
Willey "· Belfast, 61 1\Ie. 569; and the
same doctrine is held in Upper Can.
ada. l:;herwood tJ. Hamilton, 37 Up.
Can. Q. B. 410. See, also, Lower Macungie 11. Merkhoffcr, 71 Penn. St.
276. The rule is the other way in
!Iassacbusetts and ~Iaine. Duvis 11.
Dudley, 4 Allen, 5.i7; Titus"· North·
bridge, 97 Mass. 2J8; Horton "· Taunton, 97 )lass. 266; Fogg 11. Nahant,
98 }lass. 578; Murdock "·Warwick,
4 Gray, 178; lloore t:l. Abbot. 32 1\le.
46; Farrau. GrePne, I d. 574; Coombs
II. Topsham, ~ Me. 20-l; Anderson 11.
Bath, 42 Me. 846; )lou!ton "· Sanford,
51 Me. 127. But if a horse takes
fright from the carl'iagc striking an
obstruction in a road, and becomes
unmanageable and runs away, throw.
lng out the driver and injuring him,
11.
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proximate cause of the injury. Clark

0. Lebanon, 63 Me. 393.

The following statement of cases in

Vermont may be of interest: Hunt

0. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411, a nut fastening

the tongue of the vehicle to the axle-

tree gave way, and the vehicle was

thrown over a bank not sufficiently

guarded; Kelsey 0. Glover, 15 Vt. 708,

a runaway team was turned upon the

plaintiffs by the projection of a tree

top into the highway; Allen 1:. Han-

cock, 16 Vt. 230, a horse smooth shod

was not able to hold back a load, and

plaintiﬂ"s team was thrust over an un-

guarded bank; Fletcher 0. Barnet, 43

Vt. 192, plaintitf’s gig was broken in

passing a depression in the highway,

the gig being defective; Hodge ~v.

Bennington, 43 Vt. 450, the injury was

the combined result of the defect in
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the way and of the breaking of a de-

fective axle. In all these cases the

principle is applied that where the

traveler on the highway, in the exer-

cise of ordinary care and prudence,

receives an injury, which is the com-

bined result of accident and insuﬂi-

ciency of the highway, and the injury

is attributable to such insuﬁiciency

co-operating with the accidental

cause, the town is liable. This doc-

trine approved in J oliet 0. Verley, 35

Ill. 58. In Toms 0. Whitby, 35 U.

C. Q. B. 195, the approach to a bridge

was not protected, and the plaintiﬁ"a

horse, being driven over the bridge,

shied, and backed the carriage over

the bank. The town was held liable.

If a highway at a railway crossing

is defective, it is no defense that the

defect was one the railroad company

ought to have remedied. Wellcome 0.

Leeds, 51 Me. 313, citing State v. Gor-

ham, 37 Me. 451; Currier '0. Lowell,

16 Pick. 170. Compare Sawyer '0.

Northﬂeld, '7 Cush. 490.

The liability of the town always

presupposes the existence of fault;

7 W '7 7‘ '_*“*~

and therefore, if the defect is caused

suddenly, by -via nuzjor, or accident,

or the wrongful act of an individual,

the town is not liable until the proper

authorities have notice of it, or until

after such delay that notice must be

presumed. Reed o. Northtield. 13

Pick. 94; Green o. Danby, 12 Vt. 338;

Springer 1:. Bowdoinham, '7 Me. 442;

Hamden 0. New Haven, etc., Co., 27

Conn. 158; Bragg v. Bangor, 51 Me.

532; Holt 1:. Penobscot, 56 Me. 15;

Colley 1:. Westbrook, 57 Me. 181. See

Chicago v. McCarthy, 75 Ill. 602; Chi-

cago n. Langlass, 66 Ill. 361; Peru c.

French, 55 Ill. 317; Rowell 0. Wil-

liams, 29 Iowa, 210. As to what is

constructive notice, Galesburg v. Hig-

the obatntction is to be deemed tho
proximate cause of the Injury. Clark
"· Lebanon, 63 Xe. 898.
The following statement of cases in
Vermont may be of interest: Hunt
fl. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411, a nut fll8tening
tho tongue of the vehicle to the u:l~
tree gave way, and the vehicle was
thrown over a bank not sufficiently
guarded; Kelsey,, Glover, 1.5 Vt. 708,
a runaway team was turned upon the
plaintiffs by the projection of a tree
top into the highway; Allen tl. Hancock, 16 Vt. 230, a horse smooth shod
was not able to hold back a load, and
plaintiff's team was thrust over an unguarded bank; Fletcher 11. Barnet, 4J
Vt. 192, plaintiff's gig was broken in
passing a depression in the highway,
the gig being defective; Hodge 11.
Bennington, 43 Vt. 4.50, the injury was
the combined result of the defect in
the way and of the breaking of a d~
fective axle. In all thtse cases the
principle is applied that where the
traveler on the highway, in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence,
receives an injury, which is the combined result of accident and insufficiency of the high way, and the injury
is attributable to such insufficiency
co..operating with the accidental
cause, the town is Hable. This doctrine approved in Joliet 11. Verley, 35
Ill. 58. In Toms e. Whitby. 35 U.
C. Q. B. 19:>, the approach to a bridge
was not protected, and the plaintifl"s
horse, being driven over the bridge,
shied, and backed the carriage over
the bank. The town was held liable.
If a highway at a railway crossing
is defective, it is no defeuse that the
defect was one the railroad compllDy
ought to have remedied. Wellcome e.
Leeds, 61 Me. 818, citing St&te 11. Gorham, 87 Me. 451; Currier 11. Lowell,
16 Pick. 170. Compare Sawyer "·
Northfield, 7 Cush. 400.
The liability of the town always
presupposes the existence of fault;

and therefore, if the defect is caused
suddenly. by 11il moJqr, or accident.
or the wrongful act of an individual,
the town is not liable until the proper
authoriUes have notice of it, or until
after such delay that nollce must be
presumed. Reed e. Northfield, 18
Pick. 94; Green "· Danby, 12 Vt. 388;
Rpringer "· Bowdoinham, 7 Me. .(42;
Hamden "· New Haven, etc., Co., ?11
Conn. 158; Bragg "· Bangor, 51 He.
632; Holt "· Penobscot, M Me. 15 ;
Colley e. Westbrook, 57 Me. 181. See
Chicago 11. McCarthy, 75 III. 602: Chicago 11. Langlass, 66 Ill. 861 ; Peru •French, M Ill. 817; Rowell "· Williams, 29 Iowa, 210. As to what ia
constructive notice, Galesburg "· Higley, 61 Ill. 287; Springfield 11. Doyle,
76 Ill. 202; Atlanta 11. Perdue, 53 Geo.
607; Alexander,, Mt. Sterling, 71 IlL
866. But it is no defense to an action
for an injury that the town used ordinary care and diligence in repairing,
U" notwithstanding the road continues
defective. Horton fl. Ipswich, 19
Cush. 488. And snow and ice may
become defects, giving rise to a cause
of action when allowed to continue
an unreasonable time. McLaughlin
11. Corry, 77 Penn. St. 109; Green 1'.
Danby, 12 VL 338. That a road is let
to a contractor to keep in repair does
not affect the liability of the town.
Mahanoy 11. Bcholly, 84 Penn. St. 136.
If an individual causes the defect, he
will be responsible; but so will the
town for suffering or not preventing
it. Rowel111. Wilhams, 29 Iowa, 210;
Smith 11. Leavenworth, 15 Kan. 81;
Centerville 11. Woods, 57 Ind. 192;
Boucher fl. New Haven, 40 Conn. 456.
And it will be liable, though under
llroper authority it bas imposed the
obligation to repair upon the adjacent
land owners. Wallace 11. New York,
2 Hllt. 440; Rockford 11. Hildebrand,
61 Ill. 1M. If the municipality ia
compelled to make compensation for
an injury for which some individual
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1:.

The statutes rendering towns liable for
defects in highways are genera1ly held to include defects in sidewalks also.•
Defeota in 8idewalk8.

On

Defects in Sidewalks. The statutes rendering towns liable for

defects in highways are generally held to include defects in side-

walks also.' '

Streets and Highways in Incorporated Cities, etc. It is a

principle of nearly universal acceptation in this country, when a

town is incorporated and is given control over the streets and

walks within its corporate limits, and is empowered to provide

the means to make and repair them, that the corporation not

only assumes this duty, but by implication agrees to perform it

for the beneﬁt and protection of all who may have occasion to

make use of these public easements; and that for any failure in

the discharge of this duty the corporation is responsible to the

party injured.’ This rule applies to injuries sustained in conse-

quence of defects in sidewalks.‘ A city may impose the duty

ls primarily liable, it ls entitled to in-

demnity under the principles hereto-

fore laid down. See ante 144, et seq.

Also, Patterson 0. Colebrook, 29 N. H.

94; Elliott ,0. Concord, 27 N. H. 204;

Streete and mghwaya in Inoorporated Cities, eto. It is a
principle of nearly universal acceptation in this country, when a
town is incorporated and is given control over the streets and
walks within its corporate limits, and is empowered to provide
the means to make and repair them, that the eorporation not
only assumes this duty, bnt by implication agrees to pertorm it
for tho benefit and protection of all who may have occasion to
make use of these public easements; and that for any failure in
the discharge of this dnty the corporation is responsible to the
party injured.' This rule applies to injnries sustained in consequence of defects in side\valks.• A city may impose the duty
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Willard 9. Newbury. 22 Vt. 458: New.

bury 0. Conn., etc., R. R. Co., 25 Vt.

877; Robbins 0. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657;

Portland 0. Richardson, 54 Me. 46;

Centcrville v. Woods, 57 Ind. 192.

‘Bacon v. Boston, 3 Cush. 174;

Brady o. Lowell, 8 Cush. 121; Ray-

mond o. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524; Lowell

0. S;»aulding,4 Cush. 277; Kirby 0.

Harkct Assn., 14 Gray, 249; Man-

chester e. Hartford, 30 Conn. 118;

Hubbard o. Concord, 35 N. H. 52;

Ooombs 0. Purrintzton, 42 Me. 332;

Stewart 0. Ripon, 38 Wis. 584; Smith

0. Wendell, 7 Cush. 498; Winn 0.

Lowell, 1 Allen, 177; Loan 1;. Boston,

106 Mass. 450; Wears v. Filchburg, 110

Muss. 334; Harriman 0. Boston, 114

Mass. 241; McAuley 0. Boston, 113

Mass. 503; Street I7. Holyokc, 105

Kass. 82; Drake 0. Lowell, 13 Met.

292; Hixon 0. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59;

Providence 0. Clapp, 17 How. 161,

(from R. I.) See Monies 0. Lynn, 121

Mass. 442.

' See Weightman o. Washington, 1

Black, 89; Chicago 0. Robbins, 2

Black, 418; Nebraska 0. Campbell, 2

Black, 590; Weet v. Brockport, 16 N.

Y. 161, note, and numerous other

cases. Contra, Detroit 0. Blackeby,

21 Mich. 84. This subject cannot be

pursued here; it is of course treated

fully in the exhaustive treatise of

Judge DIm.ou' on the Law of Muni-

cipal Corporations.

' Bloomington 0. Bay, 42 Ill. 503;

Scammon 0. Chicago, 25 Ill. 424;

Rockford 0. Hillcbrand, 61 Ill. 155;

Lacou o. Page, 48 Ill. 499; Alexander

0. Mt. Sterling, 71 Ill. 366; Lovcnguth

9. Bloomingtou, 71 Ill. 238; Quincy

v. Barker, 81 Ill. 300; Chicago o. Mc-

Given, 78 Ill. 347; Chicago 0. Mc-

Carthy, 75 Ill. 602; Joliet 0. Verley,

85 Ill. 58; Galesburg 0. Iligley, 61 IIL

287; Chicago 0. Kelly, 69 Ill. 475;

Ia primarl1y Hable, It Ia entitled to ln.
demnity under the principles hereto.
fore laid down. See ante 144, et SLq.
Also, Patterson 11. Colebrook, 29 N. H.
94; Elliott·"· Concord, 2/l N.H. 2M;
Willardt~. Newbury.22VL4:SS: New.
bury e. Conn., etc., R R Co., 25 VL
877; Robbins"· Chicago, • Wall. 65'7;
Portland e. Richardson, 54 Me. ";
CentenilJe "·Woods, ~'7 Ind. 192.
1 Bacon e. Boston, 8 Cush. 1'74;
Brady e. Lowell, 8 Cush. 121; Ray.
mood e. Lowell, 6 Cusb. 524; Lowell
e. Spaulding, 4 Cush. 2'7'7; Kirby e.
Harket Assn., 14 Gray, 249; :Mancheater e. Hartford, 80 Oonn. 118;
Hubbard e. Concord, M N. H. 152;
Ooomba e. Purrin~n, 42 Me. 332;
S&ewart e. Ripon, 38 Wis. 584; Smith
e. Wendell, 7 Cu<~h. 498; Wino e.
Lowell, 1 Allen, 177; Loan e. Boston,
106 Mau..(5(); Weare e. Fitnhborg,tlO
Haas. 834; Harriman e. Boston, 114
llau. 941; McAuley e. Boston, 113
Mass. 003; Stree' e. Holyoke, 100
llass. R2; Drake e. Lowell, 18 lle'292; Hixon •· Lowell, 18 Gray, 159;
Providence •· Clapp, 17 How. 161,
(from R I.) See Monies e. Lynn, 121

........

1 See Weightman "· Washington, 1
Black, 89; Chicago e. Robbins, 8
Black, 418; Nebraska e. Campbell, I
Black, 500; Wee&"· Brockport, 16 N.
Y. 161, note, and numerous other
cues. OMtra, Detroit e. Blackeby,
It Mich. 8-l. This subject cannot be
pursued here; it is or coursu treuLed
folly in the exhaustive treatise or
Judge DILLOR" on the Law ot llunL.
elpal CorporationL
1 Bloomington e. Bay, 42 Ill. 503;
Scammon e. Chicago, 25 Ill. 424;
Rockford e. Dille brand, 61 Ill. 1M;
Lacon e. Page, 48111. 499; Alex:lnder
e. ML Stcrl ing, 71 lll. 366; Lovengutb
•· Bloomington, 7l Ill. 238; Quincy
"· Barker, ~11ll. 800; Chicago e. MeGiven, '78 Ill. 847; Chicago e. Mo.
Carthy, 'i5 Ill. 602; Joliet e. Verley,
~ lll.GS; Galesburg e. IIi~ley, 61 IlL
28'7; Chicago e. Kelly, 69 Ill. •'75;
Chicago e. Robbins, 2 Black, 418.
(from Illln()is); Wallace •· New York,
I HilL 440: Davenpol1 e. Rockman,
87 N.Y. 568; Koea&ere. Ottomwa,84
Iowa, •1; Rowell e. Williams, It
Iowa, 210; St. Paul"· Koby, 8 Minn.
1M; Atlanta "· Perdue, 158 Geo. 807 .
Bee Bell e. Wm Point, Glllill. 263;
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of making and keeping the sidewalks in repair upon the adjoin-
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ing owners; but doing so does not relieve the city itself from

responsibility to perform the duty imposed upon it by law; and

if the duty fails in performance, the city and the individual in

default may be united in a suit for the injury caused by the

nuisance.‘ _

Obstructions consequent on the repair of streets create no

liability if there is no negligence.‘

Individual Liability for Defects in Streets. If an individual-

whether the adjoining owner or not, and whether the fee in the

public way is in himself or in the public, does any act which

renders the use of the street hazardous or less secure than it was

left by the proper public authorities—as by excavations made

of making and keeping the sidewalks in repair upon the adjoining owners; but doing so does not relieve the city itself from
re~ponsibility to perform the duty imposed upon it by law; and
if the duty fails in performance, the city and the individual in
detiu11t may be united in a snit for the injury cam~cd by the
nuisance.• .
Obstructions consequent on the repair of streets create no
liability if there is no negligence.•

in the sidewalks, or by unsafe hatchways left therein, or by open-

ing or leaving open area ways in the traveled way, or by under-

mining the street or sidewalk—he commits a nuisance, and he

is liable to any person who, while exercising due care, is injured

in consequence.’ If, however, he has the consent of the

proper public authorities, and what he does is consistent with

the customary use of the way for private purposes—-as where

he is making connection with a public sewer or with a gas

Baltimore 0. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; At-
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chison s. King, 9 Kan. 550; McDon-

ough 0. Virginia City, 6 Nev. 90.

1 Davenport o. Ruckmun, 37 N. Y.

568. Sec Rowcll 0. Williams, 20 Iowa,

210. Contra, Marquette v. Cleary, 37

Mich. 296.

Space will not be taken up with a

speciﬁcation of what constitute de-

fects in sidewalks. How far snow

and ice may constitute a defect has

If an individual,
whether the adjoining owner or not, and whether the fee in the
public way is in himself or in the public, does any act which
renders the use of the street hazardous or less secure than it was
left by the proper public authorities-as by exc.avations made
·in the sidewalks, or by unsafe hatchways left therein, or by opening or leaving open area wa.vs in the traveled way, or by ondermining the street or sidewalk-he commits a nuisance, and he
is liable to any person who, while exercising doe care, is injured
in com:eqnence.• If, however, he has the consent of the
proper public authorities, and what he does is consistent with
the customary use of the way for private purposes-as where
he is making connection with a public sewer or with a gas
Individual Liability for Defects in Streets.

been so much a matter of controversy

that the following references to cases

are given: (look 0. Milwaukee, 24

Wis. 270; Luther 0. Worcester, 97

Mass. 268; Hutchins 0. Boston, 97

Muss. 272, note; Collins 0. Council

Bluffs, 32 Iowa, 824; Nason 0. Boston,

14 Allen, 508; Stanton o. Spl‘lu_\_!ﬁt3l(l,

12 Allen, 566; Chicago v. Mctlivcn,

78 Ill. 347; McLaughlin '0. Corry, 77

Penn. St. 109; Shea e. Lowell, 8

Allen, 136; Wilson o. Charlestown, 8

Allen, 137; Payne v. Lowell, 10 Allen,

147; Hall 0. Lowell, 10 Cush. 260;

Baltimore 1:. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; Pro-

vidence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Cal-

kins v. Hartford, 33 Conn. 57; Dooley

0. Meriden, 44 Conn. 117.

' Kimball 0. Bath, 88 Me. 219. See

Robbins 11. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657.

' Robbins 1:. Chicago, 2 Black, 418;

S. C. 4 Wall. 657; Bush o. Johnston,

23 Penn. St. 209; Beatty 0. Gilmore.

16 Penn. St. 463; Irvin o. Fowler, 5

Rob. 482; Davenport 1:. Ruckmnn, 10

Bosw. 20; S. C. 87 N. Y. 568; Con-

greve o. Smith, 18 N. Y. '79; Congreve

0. Morgan, 18 N. Y. 84; Durant 1:. Pal-

mer. 29 N. J’. 544; Pfau o. R~ynolds,

53 Ill. 212; Severin 0. Eddy, 52 Ill.

189; llowcll 0. Williams, 29 Iowa,

210.

— ~ -~-7-\w-‘IC-=1

Baltimore"· Marriott, 9 Md. 160; At.
ellison "· King, 9 Kan. 550; llcDon.
ough "·Virginia City, 6 Nev. 90.
J Davenport "· Ruckm~&n, 87 N.Y.
MS. Sec Rowell "·Williams, 29 Iowa,
210. Contra, Marquette "· Cleary, 87
Mich. 296.
Space will not be taken up with a
apedftcation of what constitute defects in sidewalks. How far snow
and ice may constitute a defect has
been so much a matter of controversy
that the following references to cases
are given: Cook "· Milwaukee, 24
Wis. 270; Lnther 11. Worcester, 97
Mass. 268; Hutchins "· .Boston, 97
Muss. 272, note; Collins e. Council
Bluffs, 32 Iowa, 324; Nason"· Boston,
14 Allen, 508; Stanton "· Springfield,
12 Allen, 566; Chicago "· McGiven,
78 Ill. 847; McLaughlin "· Corry, 77
Penn. St. 109; Shea e. Lowell, 8

Allen, 186; Wilson "· Charlestown, 8
Allen, 137; Payne"· Lowell, 10 Allen.
147; Hall "· Lowell, 10 Cush. 260;
Baltimore"· Marriott, 9 :&ld. 160; Pro.
vidence "· Clapp, 17 How. 161; Cal.
kina "· Hartford. 38 Conn. 57; Dooley
"·Meriden, 44 Conn. 117.
1 Kimball e. Bath, 88 lie. 219. See
Robbins"· Chicago, 4 Wall. 6.17.
• Robbins"'· Chicago, 2 Black, 418;
B. C. 4 Wall. 657; Bush "·Johnston,
23 Penn. St. 209; Beatty "· Gilmore,
16 Penn. St. 463; Irvin 11. Fowler, ~
Rob. 482; Davenport 11. Ruckman, 10
Bosw. 20; S. C. 87 N.Y. 568; Con.
greve "·Smith, 18 N.Y. 79; Congrere
"· llorgan,lS N.Y. 84; Durant"· Pal.
mer, 29 N.J. 544; Pfau "· R"ynolda.
53 Ill. 212; Severin "· Eddy, fi2 Ill.
189; Rowell "· Williams, 29 Iowa,
210.
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main—and he observes a. degree of care proportioned to the
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danger, and is consequently chargeable with no fault, he cannot

be held responsible for accidental injuries, inasmuch as in such

case he has failed in the observance of no duty.‘ The question

in all such cases is one of due and proper care.

' Otturnwa o. Parks, 43 Iowa, 119; See Kimball I. Bath, 38 Me. 219.

Portland 0. Richardson, 54 Me. 48.

main- and he observes a degree of care proportioned to the
danger, and is consequently chargeable with no fault, he cannot
be held responsible for accidental injuries, inasmuch as in such
case he has failed in the observance of no duty.• The question
in all such cases is one of due and proper care.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

1 Ottumwa •· Parks, 43 Iowa. 119;
Portland .. Rlchardaoo, M Me. 48.

See Kimball .. Bath, 88 Me. 110.
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WRONGS FROM NON-PERFORMANCE OF CONVENTIONAL AN D

. STATUTORY DUTIES.

In this chapter will be considered certain cases in which, by

virtue of some conventional relation between parties, a speciﬁc

obligation is imposed upon one to observe some special course

of conduct as regards the person or the property of the other.

The most numerous of these are eases of bailment, but in some

a special duty is undertaken or in contemplation of law promised

as regards both person and property.

Bai1ment,wha.t is. Bailmeut is a delivery of goods in trust,

upon an agreement expressed or implied, that the trust shall be

CHAPTER XX.

duly exercised, and the goods returned or delivered over when

the purpose of the bailment is accomplished. There are several

sorts of bailment, and for our purposes we follow the classiﬁca-

WRONGS FROH NON-PERFORMANCE OF CONVENTIONAL AND
STATUTORY DUTIES.

tion of Mr. Justice Srronr, which is as follows:

1. Those in which the trust is for the beneﬁt of the bailor.

2. Those in which the trust is for the beneﬁt of the bailee.

3. Those in which the trust is for the beneﬁt of both parties.‘

The classiﬁcation is important here, because the degree of care

and vigilance required of the bailee is ustly held to be in some

degree dependent upon the circumstance that the beneﬁt is to

only.
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accrue to one rather than the other, or to both instead of one

Bailments for the Beneﬁt of the Bailor. Of the ﬁrst class

of bailmcnts, or those in which one assmnes a trust in goods for

In this chapter will be considered certain cases in which, by
virtue of some conventional relation between parties, a specific
obligation is imposed upon one to observe some special course
of conduct as regards the person or the property of the other.
The most numerous of these are cases of bailment, but in some
a special duty is undertaken or in contemplation of la.w promised
as regards both person and property.

the beneﬁt of the owner, it is to he said that these are usually

mere matters of friendly accommodation; such as the carriage

of a parcel from one town to another by one who is going on his

' Story on Bailments, § B.

— ~ — ~~~—-I1.

Bailment, what is. Bailment is a delivery of goods in trust,
upon an agreement expressed or implied, that the trust shall be
duly exercised, and the goods returned or delivered over when
the purpose of the bailment is accomplished. There are several
sorts of bailment, and for our purposes we follow the classification of Mr. Justice SroRY, which is as follows:
1. Those in which the trust is for the benefit of the bailor.
9. Those in which the trust is for the benefit of the bailee.
8. Those in which the trust is for the benefit of both parties.'
The classification is important here, because the degree of care
and vigilance required of the bailee is justly held to be in some
degree dependent upon the circumstance that the benefit is to
accrue t.o one rather than the other, or to both instead of one
only.
Bailment& for the Benefit of the Bailor. Of the first class
of bailments, or those in which one assnmes a trust in goods for
the benefit of the owner, it is to be said that these are usually
mere matters of friendly accommodation; such as the carriage
of a parcel from one town to another by one who is going on his
a Story on Bailment&, § 8.

NON-PERFORMANCE or DUTIES. 629
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own business, for his neighbor, who is thereby saved the neces-

629

sity of a journey to carry it himself. In this case by receiving

the parcel on an understanding that he will carry it, the bailee

undertakes to do so, and though there is no beneﬁt to accrue to

him from the performance of the trust, the delivery to him

of the parcel is a suﬂicient consideration for the undertaking.

Another illustration is the case of one who, at his neighbor's

request, receives some article of value to be cared for during

the latter’s absence from his home or place of business. Here

the trust is one of“ safe keeping only, but the law implies a

promise commensurate with the trust.

If the trust to carry and deliver in the one case, or to keep

safely'in the other is not performed, the bailee is guilty of a

breach of duty unless he has some legal excuse for the failure.

It would be a good legal excuse if the goods are injured, lost

or destroyed without the bailee’s fault: of this there can be no

question.

Wliat, then, would be a loss or injury without the bailee’s

fault? One occurring by inevitable accident would certainly be;

but this term is somewhat ambiguous and uncertain, and few

accidents occur that might not, by extreme care, have been

avoided. It has been said in another place‘ that for accidents
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occurring without fault no action will lie; and those accidents

are usually spoken of as inevitable which have occurred notwith-

standing the exercise of such care as might reasonably have been

expected under the circumstances.‘ The utmost human vigilance

is not to be anticipated or demanded under the ordinary circum-

stances of every day life.

The bailee who accepts a trust for the beneﬁt of the bailor is

of course obligated to its performance, and he is not discharged

from this obligation unless he has done all that can reasonably

be required of him in respect to it. But he has not done all

that can reasonably be required of him if he has been guilty of

negligence; for negligence implies fault, and to be in fault in

discharging a legal duty to another is to place one’s self under

legal obligation to make good the consequent loss.

I Ante, p, 80, the editor's note thereto, for an exam-

’ Sec Holmes 0. Mather, L. R. 10 ination of the subject of accident.

Etch. 261; S. C. 14 Musk, 548 and

own business, for his neigl1bor, who is thereby saved the necesaity of a journey to carry it himself. In this case by receiving
the parcel on an understanding that he wiJI carry it, the bailee
undertakes to do so, and though there is no benefit to accrue to
him from the performance of the trust, the deli very to him
of tho parcel is a sufficient consideration for the undertaking.
Another illustration is the case of one who, at his neighbor's
request, receives some article of value to be cared for during
the latter's absence from his home or place of business. Here
the trust is one of" safe keeping only, but the law implies a
promise commensurate with the trust.
If the trust to carry and deliver in the one case, or to keep
safelyin the other is not performed, the bailee is guilty of a
breach of duty unless he has some legal excuse for the failure.
It would be a good legal excuse if the goods are injured, lost
or destroyed without the bailee's fault: of this there can be no
question.
What, then, would be a loss or injury without the bailee's
fault! One occurring by inevitable accident would certainly be;
but this term is somewhat ambiguous and uncertain, and few
accidents occur that might not, by extreme care, have been
avoided. It has been said in another place 1 that for accidents
occurring without iault no action w!ll lie; and those accidents
are usually spoken of as inevitable which have occurred notwith~tanding the cxerdse of such care as might reasonably have been
expected under the circumstances.' The utmost human vigilance
is not to be anticipated or demanded under the ordinary circumstances of every day life.
The bailee who accepts a trust for the benefit of the bailor is
of course obligated to its performance, and he is not discharged
from this obligation unless he has done all that can reasonably
be required of him in respect to it. But he has not done all
that can rea~onably be required of him if he has been guilty of
negligence; for negligence implies fault, and to be in fault in
discharging a legal duty to another is tt> place one's self under
legal obligation to make good the consequent loBII.
Ante, p. 80.
Bee Holmes "· Mather, L. R. 10
Bzcb. 161; S. 0. lt Moak, G~ and
I

t

the editor's note thereto, ror an examination of the eubjec~ ot acclden&.
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Negligence, what is. The question of legal liability is there-
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fore one of negligence, and its consideration demands, ﬁrst, a.

determination of what negligence is. To reach this we are not

to look solely at a man’s acts or his failure to act: the term is

relative, and its application depends on the situation of the

parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the circum-

stances reasonably impose. That degree is not the same in all

cases: it may vary according to the danger involved in the want

of vigilance. A few simple illustrations may make this appa-

rent. It might not be negligence in one having charge of an

infant to permit it to wander in the ﬁelds where friendly people

would be continually within call and no peculiar danger was to

be looked for, when to allow the same liberty in a country where

the people were few and ferocious beasts abundant would be

highly culpable if not criminal. The degree may vary also

according to the beneﬁt, if any, that the party assuming the

duty is to derive from its performance: if he is paid a large sum

for undertaking it, the evident understanding is that he shall

give to it an attention and vigilance in proportion, and he is

justly put to a watchfulness that is not expected of one who,

on request, undertakes a mere friendly commission. The degree

may also vary according to the value of the thing in respect to
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which the trust is assumed, not only because the loss that might

result from want of care would be more severe, but also because

the danger of loss generally bears some proportion to the value;

a jewel being unsafe where something of little worth might be

exposed with impunity, and consequently requiring more care

and vigilance for its protection. All these circumstances are to

be taken into account when the question involved is one of neg-

ligence; for negligence in a legal sense is no more nor less than

this: the failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of

another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance

which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other

person suffers injury.‘ Some writers classify negligence as gross

' Negligence is the absence of care

according to circumstances. Turn-

pike Co., etc. o. Railroad Co., 54 Penn.

St. 345; Philadelphia, etc., Railroad

Co. 0. Stinger, '78 Penn. St. 219; Texas,

etc., R R. Co. o. Murphy, 46 Texas,

356; Blaine 0. Ches. & Ohio R. R. Co ,

9 W. Va. 252; Nor. Cent. R. R. Co. 0.

State, 29 Md. 420; Barber 0. Essex, 27

Vt. 62.

“ The omission to do something

which a reasonable man, guided

~ A — ~ -~~<-Iii

Negligence. what fs.

The question of legal liability is therefore one of negligence, and its consideration demands, first, a
determination of what negligence is. To reach this we are not
to look solely at a man's acts or his failure to act: the term is
relative, and its application depends on the situation of the
parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose. That degree is not the same in all
cases: it may vary according to the danger involved in the want
of vigilance. A few simple illustrations may make this apparent. It might not be negligence in one ltaving charge of an
infant to permit it to wander in the fields where friendly people
would be continually within call and no peculiar danger was to
be looked for, when to allow the same liberty in a country where
the people were few and ferocious beasts abundant would be
highly culpable if not criminal. The degree may vary also
according to the benefit, if any, that the party assuming the
duty is to derive from its performance: if he is paid a large sum
for undertaking it, the evident understanding is that he shall
give to it an attention and vigilance in proportion, and he is
justly put to a watchfulness that is not expected of one who.
on request, undertakes a mere friendly commission. The degree
may also vary according to the value of the thing in respect to
·which the trust is assu~I?-ed, not only becam~e the loss that might
result from want of care would be more severe, but also because
the danger of losa generally bears some proportion to the value;
a jewel beiug unsafe where something of little worth might be
exposed with impunity, and consequently requiring more care
and vigilance tor its protection. All these circumstances are to
be taken into account when the question involved is one of negligence; for negligence in a legal sense is no more nor less than
this: the failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of
another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.• Some writers classify negligence as gross
1 Negligence is the absence of care
according to circumstances. Turn.
pike Co., etc."· Railroad Co., 54 Penn.
Bt. 845; Philadelphia, etc., Railroad
Co."· Stinger, 78 Penn. Bt. 219; Texas,
etc., R. R. Co. e. Murphy, 4.6 Texas,

856; Blaine ~'· Ches. & Ohio R. R. Co,
9 W.Va. 252; Nor. Cent. R. R. Co."·
State, 29 Md. 420; Barber"· Essex, 21
Vt. 62.
"The omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided
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negligence, ordinary negligence and slight negligence; but this
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classiﬁcation only indicates this: that under the special circum-

stances great care and caution were required, or only ordinary

care, or only slight care. If the care demanded was not excr-

cised, the case is one of negligence, and a legal liability is made

out when the failure is shown.‘

Applying these principles to the case of a gratuitous bailee we

perceive that that is not to be attributed to him as negligence

which is only a failure to apply to his charge the highest degree

of vigilance and prudence, because to require so much would

not be reasonable. Neither on the other hand should he be

excused for a loss which has occurred from an entire neglect of

his charge, for this would be equally unreasonable.’ His under-

taking must consequently be for something which falls short ot

the highest vigilance, but which, on the other hand, is not entire

neglect.

Degrees of Negligence. Sir WILLIAM Jonas has undertaken

to deﬁne the degrees of care which can justly be required of

bailees under the different classes oi‘ bailmeuts. Where the

bailment is for the mutual beneﬁt of both parties, he ﬁnds it

just to require that degree of care which every person of com-

mon prudence and capable of governing a family ordinarily
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takes of his own concerns; and this he designates ordinary dil-

igence. If, on the other hand, the bailment is for the beneﬁt of

negligence, ordinary negligence and slight negligence; but this
classification only indicates this: that under the special circumstances great care and caution were required, or only ordinary
care. or only slight care. If the care demanded was not exercised, the case is one of negligence, and a legal liability is made
out when the failure is shown. 1
.Applying these principles to the case of R gratuitous bailee we
perceive that that is not to be attributed to him us negligence
which is only a. tailure to apply to his charge the highest degree
of vigilance and prudence, because to require so much would
not be reasonable. Neither on the other hand should he be
excused for a Jo.;s which has occurred from an entire neglect of
his charge, for this would he equally unreasonable." His undertaking must consequently be for something which falls short ot
the highest vigilance, but which, on the other hand, is not entire
neglect.

the bailee, it is proper to require of him the highest vigilance,

or such as a very cautious and vigilant man would take of his

own possessions, while it' it were for the beneﬁt of the bailor

exclusively, the bailee is chargeable only with such slight care

as a man of common sense, however inattentive, would give to

his own aﬁhirs.’ \Ve have here the three degrees of extreme

care, ordinary care and slight care demanded in different cases,

upon those considerations which

ordinarily regulate the conduct of

human affairs would do." Alderson

B. in Blyth 0. Birmingham Water-

works, 11 Exch. 781, 784.

' Hinton 0. Dibbin,2 Q. B. 644, 661;

Wilson 0. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 115;

Steamboat New World o. King, 16

How. 469, 474. A bailment for the

mutual amusement and recreation of

both parties, is to be C()l1$lliL'l'\:d one

for the beneﬁt of both, and the want

of ordinary care in the bailee will

render him liable. Carpenter 0.

Degrees

of Negligence.

Sir WILLIAK

JONES

has undertaken

• to define the degrees of care which can justly be required of
~ilees

under the different classes of bailments. Where the
bailment is for the mntual benefit of both parties, he finds it
just to require that degree of care which every person of common prudenc-e and capable of governing a. family ordinarily
takes of his own concerns; and this he designates ordinary diligence. If, on the other hand, the bailment is for the benefit of
the bailee, it is proper to require of him the highest vigilance,
or such as a very cautious and vigilant man would take of his
own possessions, while if it were for the benefit of the bailor
exclusively, the bailee is chargeable only with tmch slight care
as a man of <:ommon sense, however inattentive, would give to
his own affair:;;.• "\Ve have here the three degrees of ~xtremo
care, 01·dinar·y care and slight care demanded in difi'erent cases,

Branch, 13 Vt. 161.

9 Sec Griilith 0. Zipperwick, 28

Ohio, (N. s.) 388.

' Jones on Bailments, 4-10.

upon those cona.idcrations which
ordin1lriJy rcgul!lte the conuuct o(
humun affu.il'9 would do." Alderson
B. in Blyth "· Birmin~ham Waterworks, 11 Exch. 781, 781.
I Hinton"· Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 644,661;
Wilson "· Brett, 11 :M. & W. 113, 115;
Steamboat New World "· King, 16
How. 46&, 474. A bailment for the

mutual amusement and recreation of
both parties, is to be considcr...-d one
for the bmetlt of both, and the want
of ordinary care in the bailee will

render him liable.

Carpenter e.

Branch, 13 Vt. 161.
1 Sec Griffith "· Zlppcrwick, 98
Ohio, (N. 8.) 888.
1

Jones on Bailment&, '-10.
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according to the circumstances and the nature of the trust; the
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highest being demanded when the person who is to be beneﬁted

by the trust is himself the person to perform it, and the lowest

when he accepts the trust as a mere favor to another. But, as

has already been said, these degrees are subject to be affected by

the nature of the thing in respect to which the trust is created,

its value, its liability to injury, etc.’

Liability as gratuitous bailee only arises when the trust has

once been assumed: the promise to accept such a trust is void

for want of consideration, and probably after he has accepted

the bailee may surrender it without performance if he restore

the property uninjured, and without having put the bailor to

any inconvenience or damage.’ But any dealing with the

subject of the bailment in a manner not warranted by the

understanding, is in law wrongful. Therefore, if one having

undertaken to carry and deliver money for another, shall hand

it over to a third person to be carried, from whom it is stolen or

by whom it is lost, the loss must fall upon the bailee, who alone

was trusted by the owner.’

The question whether the proper degree of care has been

observed is one of fact, not of law.‘ A bailee is not responsible

if the property is stolen from him without his fault, and this
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rule applies to a bank from which a. special deposit is stolen by

its oﬁicers.' Neither is a railroad company liable for the loss,

without fault, of property which it has received to carry gra-

tuitously.‘ '

'C0ggS 0. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym.

909; Foster 0. Essex Bank, 17 Muss.

4'79; Chase 0. Muberry, 3 Harr. 266.

' Thorue 0. Deas, 4 Johns. 84. Com.

pare Shillibeer 0. Glyn, 2 M. & W.

143.

’ Colyar 0. Taylor, 1 Cold. 372. If

one who undertakes to carry money,

sends it by mail, he is responsible for

the loss. Stewart o. Frazier, 5 Ala.

114. See Bland o.Womack, 2 Mur-

phey, 873; Jenkins e. Motlow, 1

according to the circumstances and the nature of the trust; the
highest being demanded when the person who is to be benefited
by the trust is himself the person to perform it, and the lowest
when he accepts the trust as a mere favor to another. Bot, aa
has already Leen said, these degrees are subject to be affected by
the nature of the thing in respect to which the trust is created,
its value, its liability to injury, etc. 1
Liability as gratuitous bailee only arises when the trust haa
once been assnmeJ: the promise to accept such a trust is void
for waut of consideration, and probably after he has accepted
the bailee may surrender it without performance if he restore
the property uninjured, and without having put the bailor to
any inconvenience or damage.' But any dealing with the
subject of the bailment in a manner not warranted by the
understanding, is in law wrongfu1. Therefore, if one hal'ing
undertaken to carry and deliver money for another, shall hand
it over to a third person to be carried, from whom it is stolen or
by whom it is lost, the loss must fall upon the bailee, who alone
was trusted by the owner. •
The question whether the proper degree of care has been
obser\'cd is one of fact, not of law.' A bailee is not responsible
if the property is stolen from him without his fault, and thia
rule applies to a bank from which a special deposit is stolen by
its officers.' Neither is a railroad compan.r liable for the loss,
without fault, of property w~ich it has received to carry gratuitously.'

Sneed, 218; Graves 0. Ticknor, 6 N.

H. 537.

‘ Chase 0. Mayberry, 3 Harr. 266;

Jenkins 0. Motlow, 1 Sneed, 248;

Beatty 0. Gilmore, 16 Penn. St. 463,

Storer 0. Gowen, 18 Me. 174; Tracy 0.

Wood, 3 Mason, 132; Doorman I

Jenkins, 2 Ad. & E. 256.

‘ Foster o. Essex Bank, 17 Mass.

479; DeHaven v. Kensington Bank,

81 Penn. St. 95.

' Van Gilder v. Chicago, etc., R R.

Co., 44 Iowa, 548; Flint, etc., R. Co.

0. Weir, 37 Mich. 111, case of gra-

tuitous curriage of baggage. But if

one receives money to be carried gra-

tuitously, nncl can give no account

whatever of its disposition, a pre

sumption of gross neglect arises

against him. Boyd o. Estis, 11 La.

— — —- - ~ -»~~-~~-1-so

1 Coggs e. Bernard, 9 Ld. Raym.
909; Fo.:ter "· Essex Bank, 17 }[nss.
479; Chase"· Maberry, 3 Harr. 266.
• Thorne "· Deas, 4 ,Johns. 84. Compare Shillibeer o. Glyn, 2 M. & W.
143.
• Colyar v. Taylor, 1 Cold. 372. If
one who undertakes to carry money,
sends it by mail, he is responsible for
the loss. Stewart v. Frazier, 5 Ala.
114. See Bland v. Womack, 2 Mur.
pbey, 373; Jenkins v. ?l!otlow, 1
Sneed, 218; Graves "· Ticknor, 6 N.
B. 537.
'Chase e. Mayberry, 8 Harr. 266;
Jenkins "· Motlow, 1 Sneed, 248;

Beatty e. Gilmore, 16 Penn. St. 463,
Storer"· Gowen, 18 )Ie.174; Tracy•.
Wood, 3 1\lason, 132; Doorman •
Jenkins, 2 Ad. & E. 2'l6.
1 ~'ostcr "· E~ex Bank, 17 Mass.
479; DeHaven "· Kensington Bank,
81 Penn. St. 95.
• Van Gilder "· Chicago, etc., R R.
Co., 44 Iowa, 548; Flint, etc., R. Co.
"· Weir, 37 1\Iich. 111, case of gratuitous carriage of bap:gagc. But if
one receives money to be carried gratuitously, and can give no account
whatever of its disposition, a presumption of gro:JS neglect arises
against him. Boyd "· Estis, 11 La.

NON-P1~Ilt]:‘0RMA1\'CE or DUTIES. 633

Bailments for the beneﬁt of the Bailee. The case of a bail-
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ment for the exclusive benefit of the bailee is the opposite of

that already considered, and requires of the bailee the exercise

of more than the ordinary care and vigilance. A common

instance is the gratuitous loan of his horse by the owner to a

friend for a particular journey. If in such a transaction the

party accommodated is guilty of even slight neglect, and the

horse is lost or injured in consequence, this is such negligence

as will render him responsible.‘

Bailments for Mutual Beneﬁt. The most common bailments

are those from which each party expects, or is supposed to

receive, some advantage. Some of these cases are simple, involv-

ing a consideration only of the particular transaction, as where

the livery-keeper lets a horse, to be taken by the bailee for a

Bailment& for the benefit of the Bailee. The case of a bailment for the cxclnsh·e benefit of the bailee is the opposite of
that alrendy considered, and requires of the bailee the exercise
of more than the ordinary care and vigilance. A common
instance is the gratuitous Joan of his horse by the owner to a
friend for a particular journey. If in such a transaction the
party accommodated is guilty of even slight neglect, and the
horse is lost or injured in consequence, this is such negligence
as will render him responsible.'

journey, for a consideration paid or to be paid. Others are com-

plicated by the consideration that the bailee receives the property

in the course of a certain occupation to which the law attaches

exceptional duties, imposing upon those who follow it extraor-

dinary liabilities. Among the ﬁrst may be named the case of a

pledge of goods in security for a debt.‘ Here the goods are

delivered to a bailee, whose implied undertaking is that he

will keep them safely and return them when the debt is paid.
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Another case is that of the delivery of a thing to a mechanic, in

order that something may be done by him upon or in respect to

it, in the line of his employment and for a compensation. As

in each of these cases the bailment is for the beneﬁt of both

Ann. 704. See Fairfax 0. N. Y. Cent. posited as security for a loan, is bound

R. R. (‘o., GT N. Y. 11.

l Phillips 12. Coudon, 14 Ill. 84;

llowartl o. Babcock, 21 Ill. 259; Wat-

kins v. Roberts, 28 Ind. 167.

Ilc is responsible for even the

slightest neglect, and when a loss 00-

curs the burden is upon him to prove

that it was the result of inevitable ao-

cident or of a wrongful act which, in

the exercise of due diligence, could

not have been foreseen or prevented.

Scranton 0. Baxter, 4 Sandi‘. 5; Wood

Bailment& for Kutual Beneflt. The most common bailment&
are those from which each party expects, or is snpposed to
reeeive, some advantage. Some of tl1ese cases are simple, involving a consideration only of the particnlar transaction, as where
the lh·er,Y-kecper lets a horse, to be taken by the bailee for a
journE>y, for a co11sideration paid or to be paid. Others are complic-clted by the consideration that the bailee receives the property
in the course of a certain occupation to which the law attaches
ex<'<>ptiona1 duties, imposing upon those who follow it extraordinary liabilit.ies. Among the first may be named the case of a
pleclgc of goods in security for a debt.' IIere the goods are
delivered to a bailee, whose implied undertaking is that he
will keep them safely and return them when the debt is paid.
Another case is that of the delivery of a thing to a mechanic, in
order that something may be done by him upon or in respect to
it, in the line of his employment and for a compewmtion. As
in each of these ca-ses the bailment is for the benefit of both

0 McClure, '1 Ind. 155.

' A bank, as bailee of bonds de-

only to ordinary care. Jenkins v.

Nat. Bank of Bowdoinham, 58 Me.

275, citing Field v. Brackctt, 56 Me.

121. And see Maury v. Coyle, 34 Md.

235; First Nat. Bank o. Graham. 79

Penn. St. 106; S. C. 21 Am. Rep._49.

A warehouseman is only liable for

want of ordinary care. Mobile, etc.,

R. R. Co. 0. Prewitt, 46 Ala. 68. As

to the liability of a national bank as

gratuitous bailee, see Dcilnvcn e.

Kensington Bank, 81 Penn. St. 95;

Wiley 0. First Nat. Bank, 47 Vt. 546;

S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 122.

Ann. 70-t Sec F1Lirf:LX v. N. Y. CcnL
R. R. ('o., 67 N.Y. 11.
I Phillip~ 11. Coudoo, 1-i Ill. s•;
Jlowanl tt. Babcock, 21 Ill. 259; \Vat.
kins 11. Hol.lcrts, 2'3 ln1l. Hl7.
lie is rt•spousihlc for e\·cn the
slight.•llt nt>~lel'l, and when a Io~s oo.
curs the burden is upon him to prove
that it was the result of lnevitublc accident or of a wrongful act which, In
the exercise of duo diligence, could
not have been foreseen or prevented.
Scranton"· Baxter, 4 Sandf.li; Wood
e McClure, 7 Ind. 155.
• A bank, as bailee of bonds de-

posited as security for a loan, is bound
only to ordinary cnrc. Jenkins v.
Nat Bank of &•wdoinbam, 58 Me.
275, citing Field 1:. llrackt•tt, 56 Me.
121. And see lluury v. Coyle, 34 Md.
235; First N;lt. Bank "· Graham, 711
Penn. St. 100; 8. C. 21 Am. !Wp..49.
A warel10uscman is only liable for
want of ordinary care. Mollile, etc.,
R R. Co. "· Prewitt, 46 Ala. 68. AI
to the liability of a national bank aa
gratuitous bailee, seo DeHaven •·
Kensington Bank, 81 Penn. Bl 93;
Wiley"· Firat Nat Bank, -&:7 Vt. Me;
8. c. 19 Am. Rep. 122.
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parties, the bailee is charged with the obligation of ordinary
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care, but no more. Another case is that of the deposit of grain

in a mill or warehouse, to be returned on demand. This case is

peculiar in that it is commonly expected that the grain deposited

will be stored with other grain of like kind and quality, so that

the return of precisely the same grain will be impossible. This

circumstance, however, does not vary the rules of legal respon-

sibility. The bailor is entitled to receive from the aggregate an

amount of grain of like kind and quality equal to the deposit,

and the bailee must deliver it on demand, or he must show an

excuse which does not involve a want of ordinary care on his

part. It would be a valid excuse if, while he was in the exercise

of ordinary care, the grain was stolen, or was destroyed by an

accidental or incendiary ﬁre.‘ If, however, by the custom of the

business, a warehouseman is expected to buy and sell, and to

store what he buys with that which he receives on deposit,

making his sales from the aggregate, this course of dealing

negatives the supposition that the grain deposited is to remain

subject to call. It is, therefore, not a bailment., but it is a sale

of the grain on an undertaking to pay for it on demand in grain

of like kind and quality; and all risks are upon the warehouse-

man.‘
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Every bailee is bound, in his use of the property, to keep

within the terms of the bailment. If he hires a horse to go to

one place, but goes with it to another, he is guilty of a conver-

sion of the horse from the moment t_he departure from the

journey agreed upon takes place. It is immaterial that the

change is not injurious to the interests of the bailor; it is enough

that it is not within the contract.’ Contracts are matters of

| Erwin o. Clark, 13 Mich. 10; Per-

kinsv. Dacon,13 Mich. 81; Norton

0. Woodruﬂ", 2 N. Y. 152.

See Nelson o. Brown, 44 Iowa, 455;

Young 11. Miles, 20 Wis. 615.

' Nelson 0. Brown, 44 Iowa, 455;

Wilson v. Cooper, 10 Iowa,56-3; Smith

0. Clark, 21 Wend. 83; Carlisle 0.

Wallace, 12 Ind. 252; Chase 0. Wash-

burn, 1 Ohio, (N. s.) 244; Sou. Aus-

tralian Ins. Co. 0. Randell, L. R. 3 P.

C. 101.

parties, the bailee is charged with the obligation of ordinary
care, but no more. Another case is that of the deposit of grain
in a. mill or warehouse, to be returned on demand. This case ia
peculiar in that it is commonly expected that the grain deposited
will be stored with other grain of like kind and quality, so that
the return of precisely the same grain will be impossible. This
circumstance, however, does not vary the rules of legal responsibility. The bailor is entitled to receive from the aggregate an
amount of grain of like kind and quality equal to the deposit,
and the bailee must deli\·er it on demand, or he must show an
excuse which does not involve a want of ordinary care on his
part. It would be a valid excuse if, while he was in the exercise
of ordinary care. the grain was stolen, or was destroyed by an
accidental or incendiary fire.' If, however, by the custom of the
business, a warehouseman is expected to buy and sell, and to
store what he buys with that which he receives on deposit,
making his sales from the aggregate, this course of dealing
negatives the supposition that the grain deposited is to remain
subject to call. It is, therefore, not a bailment, but it is a sale
of the grain on an undertaking to pay for it on demand in grain
of like kind and quality; and all risks are upon the warehouseman.•
Every bailee is bound, in his use of the property, to keep
within the terms of the bailment. If he hires a horse to go to
one place, but goes with it to another, he is guilty of a conversion of the horse from the moment t)le departure from the
journey agreed upon takes place. It is immaterial that the
change is not injurious to the interests of the bailor; it is enough
that it is not within the contract.• Contracts are matters of

' Homer 0. Thwing, 3 Pick. 492;

Rotch v. Hawes, 12 Pick. 136; Dun-

can v. Sou. Car. R. R. Co., 2 Rich.

618; Columbus o. Howard, 6 Geo.

213; Mullen v. Ensley. 8 Humph. 428.

Compare Harvey o. Epes, 12 Gratt.

153, in which it was decided that a

departure from the terms of a hiring

was not a conversion, unless injury

was occasioned thereby.

-Intil

I Erwin e. Clark, 18 Mich. 10; Perkins-.,. Dacon, 18 Mich. 81; Norton
e. Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 1152.
See Nelson "· Brown, 44 Iowa, 455;
Young"· Miles, 20 Wis. 615.
1 Nelson "· Brown, 44 Iowa, 455;
Wilson "· Cooper, 10 Iowa, 565; Smith
"· Clark, 21 Wend. 83; Carlisle "·
Wallace, 12 Ind. 252; Chase e. Washburn, 1 Ohio, (N. s.) 244; Sou. Aus·
tralian Ins. Co. e. Randell, L. R 8 P.
c. 101.

1 Homer e. Thwing, 8 Pick. 492;
Rotch 11. Hawes. 12 Pick. 136; Dun.
can e. Sou. Car. R R Co .• 2 Rich.
618; Columbus e. Howard, 6 Goo.
213; Mullen "·Ensley, 8 Humph. 428.
Compare Harvey "· Epes, 12 GratL
153, in which it was decided tbat a
departure from the terms of a hiring
was not a conversion, unless injury
was occasioned thereby.

'
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agreement, and even a more beneﬁcial contract cannot be sub-

stituted for another without the mutual assent upon which all

agreements must rest.

Innkeepers. Among the employments to which special

obligations are attached is that of an innkeeper. An innkeeper

agreement, and even a more beneficial contract cannot be substituted for another without the mutual assent upon which all
agreements must rest.

is one who holds himself out to the public as ready to accom-

modate all comers with the conveniences usually supplied to

travelers on their journeys.’ He is bound, as a matter of law,

to furnish the entertainment called for; and while he may de-

mand his hire in advance, if he doubts the traveler’s ability to

pay, yet if that be paid or tendered, he must receive the person

offering himself as guest at any hour of the day or night.‘ He

would be excused, however, if the inn were full, or if the trav-

eler were infected with a contagious disease, or if he came in a

disorderly manner or intoxicated. And after having received a

guest he might turn him away if his conduct was disorderly, or

if he refused to comply with the reasonable rules of- the estab-

lishment. And a disorderly guest might be removed with force

if necessary;' but a traveler turned away without cause, either

before or after being received, may sustain an action therefor.‘

One who only furnishes occasional entertainment is not an inn-
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keeperz‘ neither is a boarding-house keeper, or one who lets

lodgings and furnishes their occupants with meals.‘

As bailee of the personal effects which the guest brings with

him to the inn, it is generally held, that where the guest himself

is not in fault, the innkeeper is responsible as insurer, except

' See Thompson 0. Lacy, 3 B. &

Ald. 283. An inn is a public house

' State v. Mathews, 2 Dev. & Bat.

4%; Lyon v. Smith, 1 Morris, (Iowa,)

of entertainment for all who choose to

visit it. Pinkerton r. Woodward 323

Cal. 557. See Southwood 0. Myers, 3

Bush. 681; Dickerson 0. Rogers, 4

Humph. 1'19.

' Hawthorn o. Hammond, 1 C. & K.

404; Rex o. Ivens. 7 O. & P. 213.

' Howell v. Jackson, 6 C. & P. 723.

Among the employments to w1tich special
obligations are attached is that of an innkeeper. An innkeeper
is one who holds himself out to the public as ready to accommodate all comers with the convenienees usually supplied to
·travelers on their journeys.' He is bound, as a matter of law,
to furnish the entertainment called for; and while he may demand his hire in advance, if he doubts the traveler's ability to
pay, yet if that be paid or tendererl, he must receive the person
offering himself as guest at any honr of the day or night.• He
would be excused, however, if tho inn were full, or if the traveler were infected with a cont~ious disease, or if he came in a
disorderly manner or intoxicated. And after having received a.
guest he might turn him away if his conduct was disorderly, or
if he refused to comply with the reasonable rules of. the estab.
lishment. And a disorde1·ly gnest might be removed with force
if necessary; • but a traveler turned away without cause, either
before or after being received, may sustain an action therefor.'
One who only furnishes occasional entertainment is not an innkeeper; • neither is a boarding-house keeper, or one who lets
lodgings a.nd furnishes their occupants with meals.•
AA bailee of the personal effects which the guest brings with
him to the inn, it is generally held, that where the guest himself
is not in fault, the innkeeper is responsible as insurer, except
Innkeepers.

Bee Calye’s Case. 8 Co. 82; Markham

0. Brown, 8 N. H. 528.

‘ Whiting 0. Mills, 7 Up. Can. Q. B.

450; McCarthy 0. Niskern, 22 Minn.

90.

184; Carter o. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52;

Johnson 0. Reynolds, 3 Kan. 257;

Soutliwood o. Myers, 3 Bush, 681.

‘ Parkhurst o. Foster, Carth. 417;

B. C. 1 Salk. 387; Shoecraft v. Bailey,

25 Iowa, 553; Pinkerton 0. Wood-

ward, 33 Cal. 557; Chamberlain 1:.

Masterson, 26 Ala. 371; Winterinute

0. Clarke, 5 Snndf. 212; Walling 0.

Potter, 35 Conn. 183. A saloon keeper

is not an innkeeper. Doe 0. Laming,

4 Camp. 73.

1 Bee Thompson e. Lacy, 8 B. &
.Ald. 288. An inn is a public bouse
of entertainment for all who choose to
Tlalt it. Pinkerton 11. Woodward sa
Cal. M7. Bee Southwood e. Myers, 8
Bush, 681 ; Dickerson e. Rogers, '
Bumph.179.
1 Hawthorn "· Hammond, 1 C. & K.
404; Rex"· Ivens, 7 C. & P. 213.
• Howell e. Jackson, 6 V. & P. 728.
Bee Calye's Case. 8 Co. 82; Markham
e. Brown, 8 N. H. ~28.
• Whiting "· Mills, '7 Up. Can. Q. B.
.&riO; McCartlJy e. Niskern, 22 Minn.

80.

• State e. Mathews, B Dev. & Bal
Lyon e. Smith,lllorris, (Iowa,)
184; (,'artcr "· Hobbs, 12 Mjcb. ~2;
Johnson e. Reynolds, 3 KUD. 257;
Southwood e. Myers, 3 Busb, 681. ·
• Parkhurst e. Foster, Carth. 417;
8. C. 1 Salk. 387; Shoecraft. 11. Bailey,
23 Iowa, 553; Pinkerton e. Woodward, 83 Cal. 557; Chamberlain "·
llutcrson, 26 Ala. 871; Wintcl'mute
o. Clarke, IS Sand f. 2i2; Walling o.
Potter, 3.5 Conn. 188. A aaloon kooper
is not an innkeeper. Doe e. Laming,
4 Camp. 78.
4~;

•
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only as against losses by the act of God or of the public enemy.‘

This imposes upon the innkeeper not only all losses attributable

to his own negligence or misconduct, or those of his servants,

but also such as may result from accidental ﬁres, and the thefts

or other misconduct or negligence of third pei-sons—a degree

of responsibility which is certainly very severe, and the justice

and policy of which have recently been called in question, both

in England and in this country.‘ In Illinois, it is held that the

loss of the goods of the guest only makes out a pm'm.afacie case

of liability against the innkeeper, and that he may exonerate

himself by showing that the loss was in no manner occasioned

by a want of proper care and attention on his part;‘ and the

like rule has been laid down in Vermont and in Michigan.‘

One important difference between innkeepers and other bailees

is, that the former do not necessarily come into actual possession

of the thing bailed; usually they have a constructive possession

only. Their liability extends to the traveler’s luggage, to the

clothes upon his person, and to the money in his pocket.‘ It has

' Mason 0. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280;

Shaw u. Berry. 81 Me. 478; Norcross
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v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163; Piper 0.

Manny, 21 Wend. 282; Grlnncll 0.

Cook, 3 Hill, 485; I-Iulett v. Swill, 83

N. Y. 571; Hill v. Owen, 5 Blackf.

B2‘); Thickstun 0. Howard, 8 Blackf.

only as against losses by the act of God or of the public enemy.•
This imposes upon the innkeeper not only alllossea attributable
to his own negligence or misconduct, or those of his servants,
but also such as may result from accidental fires, and the thefta
or other misconduct or negligence of third pE-rsons-a degree
of responsibility which is certainly very se\·ere, and the justice
nnd policy of which have recently been called in question, both
in England and in this country.• In Illinois, it is held that the
loss of the goods of the guest only makes out a p-rima faci8 ease
of liability against the innkeeper, and that he may exonerate
himself by showing that the loss was in no manner occasioned
by a want of proper care and attention on his part; • and the
like rule has been 11\id down in V crrnont and in Michigan.•
One important difference between innkeepers and other bailees
is, that the former do not necessarily come into actual possession
of the thing bailed; usually they have a constructive possession
only. Their liability extends to the traveler's lng~c:re, to the
clothe~ upon his person, and to the money in his pocket.' It has

535; Johnson 0. Richardson, 17 Ill.

802; Sasseen 0. Clark, 37 Geo. 242;

Manning 0. Wells, 9 Humph. 746;

Matcer v. Brown,1 Cal. 221; Burrows

v.'I‘rieher. 21 Md. 320; Sibley 0. Al-

drich, 33 N. H. 553; Woodworth 0.

Morse, 18 La. Ann. 156; Howth 0.

Franklin, 20 Tex. 798; Packard 0.

Nortlivraﬂ, 2 Met. (Ky.) 439.

An innkceper, however, may enter-

tain travelers and also keep boarders,

and as respects the latter he is not an

innkeepcr, and does not assume any

such extraordinary liabilities. As to

the dis'inction between guests and

boarders. see Chamberlain v. Master-

son, 26 Ala. 371; Shoecraft 1:. Bailey,

25 Iowa, 553; Johnson v. Reynolds, 3

Kan. 257. A farmer-who receives and

provides for travelers as matter of so

commodution, is not an iunkeeper,

though he receives pay therefor.

Howth 0. Franklin, 20 Tex. T98.

' See Burgess 0. Clements, 4 M. &

S. 306; Dawson 0. Clnunney, 5 B.

164; Merritt 0. Claghorn, 23 Vt. 177.

' Mctcalf 0. Hess, 14 Ill. 129. And

see Laird v. Eichold, 10 Ind. 212.

4 Merritt. 1;. Clughorn, 23 Vt. 177;

Cutler o. Bonney, 30 Mich. 259. See

Clary 0. Willey, 49 Vt 55. And as to

boarders in a hotel, see Vance 0.

Throckmorton, 5 Bush, 41.

‘ Wilkins 0. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172; S.

C. 4 Am. Rep. 655. See the extent of

this liability discussed at length in

Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush, 41.

The liability extends only to such

things as are brought in the characler

of guest. Mateer 0. Brown, 1 Cal.

221. Not for what is brought there

for business, as a stallion to the hotel

1 :\la.<~on "·Thompson, 9 Pick. 280;
Shaw 11. Berry. 31 Me. 478; Norcroas
"· Norcross, 53 Me. 163; Pi per e.
Manny, 21 Wend. 2~2; Grannell e.
Cook, a Hill. 4~;;; Hulett 11. Swift, 83
N. Y. 571; Hill 11. Owen, 5 Blackf.
82'!: Thick!ltun 11. Howard, 8 Blackf.
535; Johnson e. Richardson. 17 Ill.
802; Sasseen "· Clark, 37 Gco. 242;
Mannin~ "· Wells, 9 Humph. 746;
Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cnl. 221; Burrows
1). Trieher, 21 Md. 320; Sibley "· Aldrich, 3::1 N. H. 553; Woodworth "·
Mor~c~e, 18 La. Ann. 156; Howth e.
Franklin, 20 Tex. 708; Packard "·
Northc·raft, 2 Met. (Ky.) 439.
An innkeeper, l10wever, mny enter.
tain travelers nnd also keep boarders,
and as n·spccts the latter he is not an
lnnkeepL·r, and does not assume any
euch extraordinary liabilities. As to
tho dis•inction between gue<Jts and
boarders. see Chamherla.in "· Master.
ton, 26 Ala.. 871 ; Shoecraft "'· Bailey,
23 Iowa, 553; Johnson "· Re)·nolds, 3
Kan. 257. A farmer•who receives and

provides for travelers as matter of accommodation. Is not an innkel.'per,
though he receives pay therefor.
Howth "· Franklin, 20 Tex. 798.
1 See Burgess "· Clements, 4 M. &
S. 806; Dawscm e. Chamney, 5 Q. B.
164; Merritt"· Claghorn, 2a Vl 177.
1 Metcalf"· Hess, 14 Ill. 129. And
see Laird "· Eicholcl, 10 Ind. 212.
4 llerritt e. Claghorn, 23 Vt. 177;
Cutler e. Bonney, 30 Mich. 259. See
Clary"· Willey, 49 Vt 55. And as to
boarders in a hotel, see Vance •·
Throckmorton, 5 Bush, 41.
• Wilkins"· Earle, 44 N.Y. 172; B.
C. 4 Am. Rep. 655. See the extent of
this liability discussed at ll.'ngth in
Vance e. Throckmorton. 5 Bush, oiL
The liability extends only to such
things ns are brought in the character
of guest. Mateer "· Brown, 1 Cal.
221. Not for what is brou~ht there
for business, as a stallion to 1he hotel
barn to stand for service. Mowers •·
Fethers, 61 N.Y. 84. See Myen e.
Cottrill, 5 Biss. 465.
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been held that the grain in the traveler’s sleigh, when brought
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within the enclosure, was constructively in the innkeeper’s pos-

session;' and in a very careful decision the landlord has been

held responsible for a considerable sum of money taken from a

trunk in a traveler’s room, though the traveler appears to have

left the room unguarded and the key in the door, the jury having

acquitted him of the charge of negligence.’ An innkeepér, at

the common law, cannot relieve himself of this responsibility,

or of any part of it, by any notice posted about the inn which

may or may not have been brought to the notice of the guest.‘

But by statute, in England and in many of the States, he is

permitted to restrict his liability within certain limits which the

statute deﬁnes, by the posting of notices in his rooms. These

are very reasonable and proper statutes, but they must be strictly

complied with or they will constitute no protection.‘

If the loss or injury to the goods oceeurs through the fraud

or intermeddling of the guest, or through his failure to use the

ordinary care that a prudent man might be reasonably expected

to have taken under the circumstances, the innkeeper is, of

course, excused.‘

If an innkeeper’s servants take charge of the luggage of 8

departing guest to deliver it to a railroad company or other
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carrier, the responsibility of the innkeepcr continues until actual

delivery.‘ And probably if the guest goes away without, at the

'Clute o. Wiggins, 14 Johns. 175.

See Iiill 0. Owen, 5 Blackf. 823; Ma-

son v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 2150; Pack-

ard 1;. Northcraft, 2 Met. (Ky.) 439.

‘ Berkshire Woolen C0. 0. Proctor,

7 Cush. 417. And, see Burrows o. Trie-

ber, 21 Md. 320; S. C. 27 Md. 130;

Classen 0. Leopold, 2 Sweeney, 705;

Butldenhurg 0. Benner, 1 Hilt. 84.

' Bodwell 0. Bragg, 29 Iowa, 23$.

Maltby o. Chapman, 25 Md. 310. See

been held that the grain in the traveler's sleigh, when brought
within the enclosure, was constructively in the innkeeper's poa.ession; 1 and in a very careful decision the landlord has been
held responsible for a considerable sum of money taken from a
trunk in a traveler's room, though the traveler appears to have
left the room unguarded and the key in the door, the jury having
acquitted him of the charge of negligence.' An innkeeper, at
the common law, cannot relieve himself of this responsibility,
or of any part of it, by any notice posted about the inn which
may or may not have been brought to the notice of the guest.•
Bnt by statute, in England and in many of the Stateil, he is
permitted to restrict his liability within certain limits which the
statute defines, by the posting of notices in his rooms. These
are very l'easouable and proper statutes, but they must be strictly
complied with or they will constitute no protection.'
If the loss or injury to the goods occcnrs through the fraud
or intermeuJling of the guest, or through his failu1-e to use the
ordinary care that a prudent man might be reasonably expected
to have taken under the circumstances, the innkeeper is, of
course, excused. •
If an innkeeper's servants take charge of the luggage of a
departing gne~t to deliver it to a railroad company or other
cdrrier, the responsibility of the innkeeper continues until actual
delivery.• And probably if the guest goes away without, at the

Epps o. Hinds, 27 Miss. 657.

An innkeeper does not relieve him-

self from responsibility by telling the

guest, when he receives his property,

that the guest must run all risks.

Woodward v. Birch, 4 Bush, 510.

‘ Porter c. Gilkey, 57 Mo. 235;

Woodworth n. Morse, 18 La Ann. 156.

See Faucett 0. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 377.

‘ Cashill 0. Wright, 6 El. & Bl. 891;

Burgess 0. Clements, 1 Stark. 251;

Berkshire Woolen Co. s. Proctor, '1

Cush. 417; Vance s. Throckmorton, 5

Bush, 41; Read o. Amidon, 41 Vt. 16;

Kelsey 0. Berry, 42 Ill. 469; Hadley

0. Upshaw, 27 Tex. 547. The inn.

keeper may establish reasonable rules,

which the guest must observe. Fuller

0. Coats, 18 Ohio, (n. s.) 348.

It is negligence in a guest to carry

a large sum of money in his valise,

and, without notifying the innkeeper,

allow it to be treated as mere lug-

gage. Fowler s. Dorlon, 24 Barb. 381.

‘ Richards 0. London, etc., R. Co., 7

C. B. 839.

• Clute "· Wiggins, t• Johns. 173.
See Hill"· Owen, 5 Dlackf. 823; Maeon "· Thompson, 9 Pick. ~; Pack..
ard e. N ortbcraft, 2 Met. (Ky.) 439.
'Berkshire Woolen Co. e. Proctor,
'l Cusb. 417. And, see Burrows e. Trie.
ber, 21 Md. 320; S. C. 27 lid. 130;
Classen e. Leopold, 2 Sweeney, 705;
Budden burg e. Benner, 1 Hilt. 84.
• Bodwell e. Bragg, 29 Iowa, 232.
Maltby"· ChapmRn, 25 Md. 310. See
Eppa e. Hinds, 27 "&I iss. 657.
An innkeeper docs not relieve hlmMlf from responsibility by telllng the
guest, when be receives his property,
thu the guest must run all risks.
Woodward e. Birch, 4 Bush, litO.
• Porter ~. Gilkey, tf1 Mo. 233;
Woodwonh e. Morse, 18 La. Ann.166.

Bee Faucett e. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 877.
1 Cash ill e. Wright, 6 El. & Bl. S!H;
BorgeN e. Clements, 1 Stark. 251;
Berkshire Woolen Co. "· Proctor, 'I
Cush. 417; Vtmce r:. Throckmorton, II
Bush, 41; Read e. Amidon, 41 Vt. tiJ;
Kelsey e. Berry, 42 Ill. 469; Hadley
•· Upshaw, 27 TeL 547. The innkeeper may establish reasonable rull'S,
which the guE'st must observe. Fuller
e. Coats, 18 Ohio, (:a. s.) 343.
It is nl'gl igencc in a guest to carry
a large sum of money in his valise,
and, without notifying the Innkeeper,
allow it to be treated u mere luggage. Fowler e. Dorion, 24 Barb. BS!.
• Rlcharda e. London, etc., B. Co., 'l
B. 888.

c.
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time, taking his baggage with him, the innkeeper’s liability as
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such will continue until it is removed, if this be within reasona-

ble time.‘

An innkeeper has a lien for reasonable charges on the goods

brought with him by his guest,’ but not upon the clothing on his

person.’ A boarding-house keeper, or an innkeeper as to those

who merely board with him and are not guests in the proper

sense, has nosueh lien. On the other hand, his liability to his

boarders for such of their property as may be in his care is only

that of any other bailee in a bailment for mutual beneﬁt.

Common Carriers. Closely resembling the liability of an inn-

kecper is that of a common carrier. A common carrier is one

who regularly undertakes, for hire, either on land or on water,

to carry goods, or goods and passengers, between different places.

for such as may offer.‘ The deﬁnition includes railway corpora-

tions, express companies, stage coaclvproprietors, the proprietors

time, taking his baggage with him, the innkeeper's liability as
such will continue until it is removed, if this be within reasonable time. 1
An innkeeper has a lien for reasonable charges on the goods
brought with him by his guest,S but not upon the clothing on his
perspn.' A. boarding-house keeper, or an innkeeper as to those
who merely board with him and are not guests in the proper
sense, has no.such lien. On the other hand, his liability to his
boarders tor such of their property as may be in his care is only
that of any other bailee in a bailment for mutual benefit.

of all ships, boats and vessels employed inicarriage on regular

routes, wagoners and carmen, who carry as a regular employment

from town to town or from place to place within the same town,

street railway companies and the proprietors of omnibus routes.

It does not include vessel owners who employ their vessels for

particular voyages as they may make contracts, nor draymen and
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others who take particular jobs or commissions, but who have no

regular route, nor those who let horses and carriages for hire, nor

tug-boatmen.'

‘Adams 0. Clem, 41 Geo. 65; S. C. who is not a carrier for hire. Citi.

6 Am. Rep. 524; Murrray v. Clarke,

2 Daly, 102.

' Watson o. Cross, 2 Duv. 147; Ew-

art v. Stark, 8 Rich. 423; Pollock -v.

Landis, 86 Iowa. 651. Even though

they be goods with which another has

entrusted him. Snead o. Watkins, 1

C. B. (rs. s.) 207; Manning c. Hollen.

beck. 2"! Wis. 202. Contra-, Domestic,

etc., Co. o. Watters, 50 Geo. 573.

' Sunbolf 1:. Alford, 3 M. & W. 248.

Common Carriers. Closely resembling the liability of an innkeeper is that of a common carrier. A common carrier is one
who regularly undertakes, for hire, either on land or on water~
to carry goods, or goods and passengers, between different places,
for such as may offer.• The definition includes railway corporations, express companies, stage coach-proprietors, the proprietors
of all ships, boats and vessels employed in· carri9nooe on regular
routes, wagoners and carmen, who carry~ a regnlM" employment
from town to town or from placo to place within the same town,
street railway companies and the proprietors of omnibus routes.
It does not include vessel owners who employ their vessels for
particular voyages as they may make contracts, nor draymen and
others who take particular jobs or commissions, but who have nc.
regular route, nor those who let horses and carriages for hire, nor
tug-boatmen.•

‘Gisbourn o. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249;

Mcrshon v. Hohensack, 22 N. J. 3'73;

U. S. Express Co. v. Bncknian, 28

Ohio, (N. B.) 144; Parsons on Cont.

163. No person is a common carrier

zens' Bank 0. Nantucket Steamboat

Co., 2 Story, 16; Knox 0. Rives, 14

Ala. ‘.249; Fay o. Steamer New ‘World,

1 Cal. 3-18.

‘ But as to tug or tow-boatmen, see

White 0. Tug Mary Ann, 6 Cal. 462;

Smith c. Pierce, 1 La. (0. s.) 354; Du-

vis v. Houren, 6 Rob. La. 255; Clapp

0. Stanton, 20 La. Ann. 495; Bussey c.

Mississippi, etc. Co., 24 La. Ann. 165.

These Louisiana cases hold that tug-

boatrnen, such as ply between New

Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico, are

common carriers. The rule is other-

wise in New York and Pennsylvania.

Caton 0. Rumney, 13 Wend. 387;

• Adams e. Clem, 41 Geo. M; B. 0.
Am. Rep. 524; Murrray e. Clarke,
2 Daly, 102.
' Watson e. Cross, 2 Duv. 147; Ewart e. Stnrk, 8 Rich. 423; Pollock e.
Landis, 86 Iowa. 651. Even though
they be goods with which another has
entrusted him. Snead "· Watkins, 1
C. B.(x.s.) 267; Mannin~ e. Ilollen..
brck. 27 Wis. 202. Contra, Domestic,
etc., Co. e. Watters, 50 Geo. 573.
1 Sunbolf "·Alford, 8 M. & W. 248.
• Gisbourn e. Hurst, 1 Snl k. 249;
Mershon t~. IIobensack, 22 N.J. 873;
U. 8. Express Co. "· Backman, 28
Ohio, (N. s.) 144; Parsons on Cont.
163. No person is a common carrier
~

who Is not & carrier for hire. Citizens' Bank e. Nantucket Steamboat
Co., 2 Story, 16; Knox e. Rivt>s, 14
Ala. 249; Fay,, Steamer New World,
1 Oal. 848.
1 But as to tug or tow-boatmen, see
White e. Tug !lary Ann, 6 Cal. 462;
Smith"· Pierce, 1 La. (o. s.) 834; Davis "· Houren, 6 Rob. La. 25!'i; Clapp
e. Stanton, 20 La. Ann. 495; Bussey"·
:Mississippi, etc. Co., 24 La. Ann. 165.
These Louisiana cases hold that tug.
boatmen, s'uch as ply between New
Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico, are
common carriers. The rule is other.
wise in New York and Pennsylvania.
Caton t. Rumney, 13 Wend. 881;

NON-PERFORMANCE or nurrms. 639

A carrier may profess to limit his employment to some one

:NON-PEBFOBKANOE OJ' DUTIES.
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species of goods, or may exclude one or more things from his

general offer to carry. His employment is then limited by his

offer, and he cannot be required to go beyond it. But within

the limits of his accustomed business he must receive and carry

for all who offer, without partiality or discrimination.‘ He may,

nevertheless, make special bargains for carrying for exceptional

prices or on exceptional terms; " but he cannot restrict or change

his common law liability by a mere notice posted at his place of

business, or given to the party delivering goods Tor carriage, and

to which the latter does not appear to have given assent.‘ It is

thus seen that a common carrier cannot declinea bailment which

is tendered to him within the line of his employment, neither

Wells 1:. Steam Nuv. Co., 2 N. Y. 204;

Leonard v. Hcndriekson, 18 Penn. St.

40; Brown 0. Clegg, 63 Penn. St. 51;

Hays 0. Miller. 77 Penn. St. 238. See

Alkali C0. v. Johnson. L. R.9 Exch.338.

'Keeney v. Grand Trunk, etc., R.

Co. 47 N. Y. 525; Chicago, etc., R.

A carrier may prof~ to limit his employment to some one
species of goods, or may exclude one or more things from his
general offer to carry. His employment is then limited by his
offer, and he cannot be required to go beyond it. But within
the limits of his accustomed business he must receive and carry
for all who offer, without partiality or discrimination.' lie may,
ne\·ertbelcss, make special bargains for carrying for exceptional
prk-es or on exceptional terms; s but he cannot restrict or change
Lis common law liability by a mere notice posted at his place of
business, or given to the party delivering goods Tor carriage, and
to which tho latter does not appear to have given assent.• It is
thus seen that a common carrier cannot decline a bailment which
is tendered to him within the line of his employment, neither

R. C0. 0. People, 67 ill. 11; S. C. 16

Am. Rep. 599; McDuﬂ'eo v. Railroad
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Co., 52 N. H. 430; Mich. Cent. R. R.

Co. 0. Hale, 6 Mich. 243.

' New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. 0.

Merchant's Bank. 6 How. 844; Fitch-

burg R. R. Co. 0. Gage, 12 Gray, 393;

Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. 0. Hale, 6 Mich.

248; Audenrlcd 0. Philade1phia.etc.,

R. R. Co., 68 Penn. St. 370; Bankard

v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 84 Md.

197; N. E. Express Co. 0. Maine Cent.

R. R. Co., 5'7 Me 188. In Messenger

0. Penn. R. R. Co., 37 N. J.531, a con-

tract by which a railroad company

undertook to give to certain favored

parties a largo speciﬁed drawback in

freights, beyond what from time to

time ought to be allowed to others,

was held void. as establishing a prac-

tical monopoly. See the American

cases on the right of a carrier to re-

strict hls liability by agreement, etc.,

collected in 18 Monk's Eng. R. 152,

note.

‘New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. 0.

Merchant's Bank, 6 H0w.344; Hol-

lister 0. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234; Mc-

Millan v. Michigan, etc., R. R. Co., 16

Mich. '79; Brown v. Eastern R. Co., 11

Cush. 97; Buckland 0. Adams EX-

press Co., 97 Mass. 124; Baltimore,

etc., R. R. Co. o. Brady, 32 Md. 888;

Smith u. Nor. Car. R R. Co., 64 N. C.

Steele v. Townsend. 37 Ala. 247;

Sou. Exp. Co. 0. Caperton, 44 Ala. 101;

Sou. Exp. O0. 0. Arutstcad, 50 Ala.

350; Bennett 0. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481;

Jones 0. Vonrhees, 10 Ohio, 145; Fil-

lehrown 0. Grand Trunk R. Co., 55

Me. 462; Baldwin v. Collins, 9 Rob.

La. -168; Railroad Co. 0. Manuf. C0.

16 Wall. 318. The contract for any

exemption must be by clear and dis-

tinct terms, and there must be reason

and justice to sustain it. McCoyo.

Erie, etc., Co., 42 Md. 498; Sou. Exp.

C0. 0. Caperton, 44 Ala. 101.

Carriers have a right to require that

Wells"· Steam Nav. Co., I N.Y. 904;
Leonard "· Hendrickson, 18 Penn. SL
40; Brown •· Clegg, 68 Penn. St. 51;
Haya " · ~llllar, 77 Penn. 8t. 2H8. Bee
Alkali Co."· Johnson. L.U.9 Exch.838.
' Keeney e. Grand Trunk, etc., R
Co.. 47 N.Y. 52:5; Chicago, etc., R.
R. Co. e. People, 67 Ill. 11; 8. C. 16
Am. Rep. 50!>; McDnft'eo "·Railroad
Co., 152 N.H. 430; Mich. Cent. R R
Co. e. Hale, 6 Mich. 243.
I New Jersey Steam Nav.
Merchant's Bank, 6 How. 3-14; Fitch.
burg R. R. Cn. e. Gage, 12 Hray, 893;
Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. e. Hale, 6 Mich.
243; Audenried "· Philndelphla, etc.,
R. R. Co., 68 Penn. St. SiO; Bankard
e. Bl\ltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 84 !rd.
197; N. E. Express Co. e. )Ialne Cent.
R. R. Co., 57 Me 188. In ME>!~Senger
e. l'cnn. R. R. Co., 87 N. J.531, a con.
tract by which a railroad company
undertook to give to certl\in favored
parties a large specified drawback in
freight~. beyond what from time to
time ought to be allowed to others,
was belli void, aa establlshing a practical monopoly. Bee the American
csses on tho right of a carrier to restrict his liability by agreement, etc.,
collected In 13 )[oak's Eng. R. 162,
note.

eo. "·

• New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. •·
Herchant's Bank, 6 How. 844; Hoi.
lister •· Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234; McMillan "· Michigan, etc., R. R. Co., 18
Mich. 79; Brown e. Eastern R Co., 11
Cosh. 97; Buckland "· Adam11 Ex.
press Co., 97 Mua. 124; .Baltimore,
etc., R. R. Co. "· Brady, 82 Md. 888;
Smith "· Nor. Car. R. R. Co., 64 N.C.
285; Steele "· Townsend, 87 AlL 247;
Sou. Exp. Co. •· Caperton, 44 AlL 101;
Sou. Exp. Co. e. Armstead, 50 AIL
850; Bennett •· Dutton, 10 N. H. 481;
Jones e. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 14.'~; Fillebrown e. Graud Trunk R. Co., Mi
Me. 46'J; Baldwin •· Collin.s, 9 Rob.
La. 468; Railroad Co. "· Manuf. Co.
18 Wall. 818. The contract for any
exemption must be by clear and di..
tinct terms, and there must be reason
and justice to sustain it. McCoy • ·
Erie, etc., Co., 42 Md. 408; Sou. Exp.
Co. e. Caperton, 44 Ala. 101.
Carriers have a right to require that
those entrusting property to them for
carriage shall disclose its value. Bee
Crouch •· London R. Co., 14 C. B.
2M; Magnin •· Dinsmore, 62 N. Y.
815; Oppenheimer .. V. 8. Exp. Co.,
691ll. 69.
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can he enforce upon the party proposing to employ him any

terms to which the latter refuses assent. The obligation which

is imposed on him by the common law is that he shall deliver at

its destination the property received by him, without damage

while in his hands, unless prevented by the act of God, or of the

public enemy.‘ And he must deliver, or be ready to deliver,

‘Coggs 0. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym.

909; Eagle 0. White, 6 Whart. 505;

Morrison v. Davis, 20 Penn. St. 171;

Orange (Jo. Bank vi’ Brown, 9 Wend.

can he enforce upon the party proposing to employ him any
terms to which the latter refuses assent. The obligation which
is imposed on him by the common law is that he shall deliver at
its destination the property received by him, without damage
while in his hands, unless prevented by the act of God, or of the
public enemy. 1 And he must deliver, or be ready to deliver,

85; Hollister o. Nowlen, 19 Wend.

234; Fish 1:. Chapman, 2 Kelly, 349:

Turney 0. Wilson, 7 Yerg. 340; Boyle

0. McLaughlin, 4 l-I.&J. 291; Friend

o. Woods, 6 Gratt. 180; Bohannan 0.

Hammond, 42 Cal. 227; Powell 0.

Mills, 30 Miss. 231; Swindler 0. Hil-

llard, 2 Rich. 286; McMillan ti. Mich-

igan, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Mich. 79; Fil-

lebrown v. Grand Trunk, etc., Co., 55

Me. 462; Railroad Co. 0. Reeves, 10

Wall. 176.
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In Gordon 0. Buchanan, 5 Ycrg 72,

82, the act of God, it is said, “ means

disasters with which the agency of

man has nothing to do, such as light-

ning, tempests, and the like." In

Friend o. Woods, 6 GraL 189, 196, it

is said the act of God, which excuses

the carrier, must be " a direct and vio-

lent act of nature." The negligence

of the carrier must not concur with

it in producing the injury. New

Brunswick. etc., Co. u. Tiers, 24 N. J .

697. Wnioirr, J., in Michaela v. N.

Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 30 N. Y. 564, 571,

says: “ What is precisely meant by

the expression ‘act of God,’ as used

in the case of carriers, has undergone

discussion, but it is agreed that the

notion of exception is those losses and

injuries occasioned exclusively by

natural_causes, such as could not be

prevented by human care, skill and

foresight. All the cases agree in re-

quiring thc entire exclusion of human

agency from the cause of the injury

or loss. If the loss or injury happen

in any way through the agency of

man, it cannot be considered the act

of God; nor even if the act or negli-

gence of man contributes to bring or

leave the goods of the carrier un-

dcr the operation of natural causes

that work to their injury, is he ex-

cused. In short, to excuse the car.

rier, the act of God, or via ditina,

must be the sole and immediate cause

of the injury. If there be any co-

operation of man, or any admixture

of human means, the injury is not,

in a legal sense, the act of God."

" The act of God," says Lord Maxe-

FIELD. “ is natural necessity, and

wind and storms, which arise from

natural causes, and distinct from in-

evitable accident." Pmpriemrs, etc.,

0. Wood, 4 Doug. 287, 290. See, also,

Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Sawyer, 69

J Cogga e. Bernard, 9 Ld. Raym.
or loa If the loss or injury happen
909; Euglo "· Whitf>, 6 Whart. 005; in any way through the agency of
Morrison e. Davis, 20 Penn. St. 171 ; man, it cannot be considered the ac&
Orange Co. Bnnk ,~Brown, 9 Wend. of God; nor even if the act or ne-gliM; llolliHter "· Nowlen, 19 Wend. gence of man contributes to bring or
284; Fish "'· Chapman, 2 Kelly, 849: leave the goods of the carrier unTurney 11. Wilson, 7 Yerg. 840; Boyle . rlcr the operation ot' natural causes
e. McLaughlin, 4 H. & J. 291; Friend that work to their injury, is he ex.
e. Woods, 6 Gratt. 189; Bohannan e. cused. In short, to excuse the car.
Hammond, 42 Cal. 227; Powell e. rier, the act of God, or .,;, diri~
Mills, 30 Miss. 231; Swindler e. Hil- must IJe the sole and immediate cause
liard, 2 Hich. 28(J; Mcllillan e. Mich- of the injury. If there be any co.
igan, etc, H. R. Co., 16 Mich. 79; Fil- operation of man, or any admixture
of human means, the injury is not.
lebrown "· Grand Trunk, etc., Co., M
lie. 462; Railroad Co. e. Reeves, 10 in a legal sense, the act of God."
" Tbc act of God," says Lord MA~
Wall. 176.
In Gordon e. Buchanan, 5 Yerg. 72, li'IEJ.D. "is natural necet~Sity, and
82, the act of God, it is said, "means wind and storms, which arise frotn
natural causes, and distinct from indisasters with which the agency of
man has nothing to do, auch as light- evitable accident." Proprietors, etc..
ning, tempests, and the like." In •· Wood, 4 Doug. 287, 200. See, also,
Friend e. Woods, 6 Grat. 189. 196, it Chicago, etc., R R. Co."· Sawyer, 69
ia aaid the act of God, which excuses Ill. 2ij;), Accidental fires, the explo.
the carrier, must be" a direct and vio- aion of steam boilers, etc., arc t.herelent act of nature." The negligence fore casualties against which a comof the carrier must not concur with mon carrier Is Insurer. Cslclwell e.
It in producing the injury.
New N. J. Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282;.
Brunswick, etc., Co."· Tiers, 24 N.J. Merchants' Despatch Co. •· Smith, 76
697. WRIGHT, J., in Michaels "· N. fll. M2; Bulkley "· Naumkeag, etc.,
Y. Cent. H. R. Co., 30 N.Y. 564,571, Co., 24 How. 386; Cox "· Peterson, 3()
aays: "What is precisely meant by Ala. 608. See Hayes e. Kennedy, 41
the expression 'act of God,' as used Penn. St. 878, for discussion of the
In the case of carriers, has undergone phrases act of God, inevitable acci.
discussion, but it is agreed that the dent, and unavoidable dangers. The
notion of exception is those losses and fidelity of the servants of a common
injuries occasioned exclusively by carrier is at the risk of the employers.
natural, causes, such as could not be Therefore, it is no answer to a sui~
prevented by human care, skill and for failure to deliver goods with reaforesight. All tho cases agree in re. sonable promptness, that a strike
quiring the entire exclusion of human among their employees preventeq.
agency from the cause of the Injury Blackstock e. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co••
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within a reasonable time; but custom has much to do with the

641

time, place and manner of delivery.‘

The common la\v liability of a common carrier does not apply

in all respects to railroad ‘companies as carriers of live stock.

This mode of transportation is new; it imposes great risks of

a different character, demanding more labor and special arrange-

ments for the protection of the stock, and docs not come within

the reasons which, at the common law, imposed upon common

carriers the duty of care and custody of other property, and

made them insurers. The owner is expected to accompany them

and have the entire charge, care and management, and to that

extent he takes upon himself the risk of loss and injury; the com-

pany being responsible for the furnishing of proper cars and motive

power, and for the proper making up and running of the train.‘

The liability of the common carrier, as such, does not attach

in respect to goods in his hands awaiting the orders of the owner

for shipment.’_ The time when the liability ceases depends upon

circumstances. If the carrier is to transport the goods for a

portion only of the whole distance, and then deliver them to

another, his liability as carrier ceases when the goods arrive at

the point of intersection, and he then becomes a forwarder only.‘

1 Bosw. '77; B. C. 20 N.Y. 48; Galena,
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etc., R. R. 00.0. Rae, 18 Ill.-188. But

if the employees are discharged, and

atlerwards interfere unlawfully with

the business, and cause delays, the

carrier is no more chargeable with

this than he would be with the law-

less conduct of any other mob. Pitts-

burgh, ctc.. R. R Co. o. Hazen, Sup.

Ct. Ill. 15 Alb. L. J.39.

within a reasonable time; bot custom has much to do with the
time, place and manner of deli very .1
The common law liability of a common carrier does not apply
in all respects to railroad ·companies as carriers of live stock.
This mode of transportation is new; it imposes great ritiks of
a different character, demanding more labor and spl'cial arranbP(!.
ments for the protection of the stock, and docs not t'Ome within
the reasons which, at the common law, imposed upon common
carricro the duty of care and custody of other pr•Jperty, and
made them in~mrers. The owner is expected to accompany them
and have the en tire charge, care and management, and to that
extent he takes upon himself the ri~k of loss and injury; the company bci ng rc~ponsible for the fn rn ishing of proper <:ar:> and motive
power, and for the proper makil1g up und running of the train.'
The liability of the common carrier, as such, does not attach
in resrect to goods in his hands awaiting the orders of the owner
tor shipment.~ The time when the liability ceases depends upon
circmmtances. If the ('Rrrier is to transport the gonds tor a
porti{m only of the whole distance, and then deliver them to
another, his liability as carrier ceases when the goods arrive at
the point of intersection, and he then becomes a forwarder only.•

‘If, by the local custom. the con-

signcee is to furnish the conveniences

for unloading and delivery, and he

does so, and an injury occurs through

defects in them, the carrier is not rc-

sponsible for this injury. Lovcland

0. Burke, 120 Mass. 139; S. C. 21 Am.

Rep. 507. citing St. John 0. Van Sant-

voord, 25 Wend. 660: Gibson 0. Cul-

ver, 17 Wend. 305; Farmers’, etc.,

Bank v. Transportation Co., 18 Vt. 181,

and 28 Vt.'176.

' Michigan, etc., R. R Co. u. Mr,

Donough, 21 Mich. 165: Clark 0.

Rochester, etc., R. R Co., 14 N. Y.

570; Penn v. Bntlhlo, etc., R. R. Co.,

49 N. Y. 204; Smith v. New Haven,

etc., R. R. Co., 12 Allen, 531; Squire

0. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 98 Muss. 239.

Bee Farnham 0. Camden. etc., R R

Co., 55 Penn. St. 53; East. Tennessee,

etc., R. R. Co. o. Whittle, 27 Geo. 535;

Ohio, etc., R. R Co. 9. Dunbar, 20 Ill.

023; Kansas Pac. R. Co. o. Nichols,

9 Kan. 235.

' lllichigan, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Shurtz,

7 Mich. 515; Bt. Louis. etc., R. R C0.

0. Montgomery, B9 Ill. 835.

‘ Gray 0. Jackson, 51 N. H. 9; Am.

Ex. Co. 0. Second National Bank, 69

Penn. St. 894; l’ender;::1st v. Adams

Ex. Co., 101 Mass. 1'20; Baliimorc,etc.,

R. R. Co. 0. Schumacher, 29 Md. 168.

41

1 Botw. 77; B. C. 20 N.Y. 48; Galena,
etc., R. R. Co."· Rae, 18 Ill. 4SS. But
if the employees are discharged, and
at\ennmJs intcrl"t•rc unlllwfully with
the business, und cause delays, the
carrier is no more chargeable with
this thl\0 be would be with the li\W·
leas co~ duct of any other mob. Pitta.
burgh, etc.. R R Co. "· Hazen, Sup.
Ct. Ill. 15 Alb. L. J. 39.
1 If, by tbc locl\1 custom. the conaignecc is to furnish the conveniences
for unloading and d«.>Iivery, and he
does so, and an injury occurs through
defects in them, tbe carrier is not re.
sponaible for this injury. Loveland
"· Burke, 120 Mn.ss 130; S. C. 21 Am.
Hep. 007, citing St. John"· VanSantvoord, 26 Wend. 660: Gibson "· Culver, 17 Wend. 805; Farmers', etc..
Bank "· Transportation Co., 18 Vl 181,
and 28 Vt.:t76.

41

lllchigan, etc., R. R. Co. e. Mc..
21 Mich. 16.>: Clark e.
Rochester, etc., R. R. Co., 14 N. Y.
070: Penn"· Butli1lo, etc., R. R. Co.,
49 N.Y. 204; Smith "· New Haven,
etc., R. R. Co., 12 Allen, sat; Squire
e. N. Y. CenL R R. Co., 98 llnas. 239.
Bee Farnham e. Cnm•lcn, etc., R. R
Co., 55 Penn. St. 5!'1; Eu.st Tennessee.
etc., R R Co. tl. Whittle, 27 Gco. 63;j;
Ohio, etc., R. R Co. tl. Dunbar, 20 Ill.
623; Kan!lrLS Pac. R Co. "· Nichols,
9 Kan. 235.
1 llichig-nn, etc., R. R Co. •· Bhurts.
'1 Mich. fil5; St. J..ouis. P.tc., R. R. Co.
e. Montgomery, 89 Ill. 335.
• Gray e. Jackson, 51 N.H. 9; Am.
Ex. Co. e. Second National Bank, 68
Peon. St.. 894; Pendergast. 11. Adams
Ex. Co., 101 Maas.120; Baltimore, etc..
R. R. Co. •· Schumacher, 18 lld. 168.
1

Donou~h,
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But if his route covers the whole distance, his liability as carrier
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only ceases when the goods are actually delivered, unless, by the

custom of the business, the consignee is expected to receive them

at the carrier's warehouse, in which case his liability changes

from that of carrier to that of warehouseman when the goods

are received at the warehouse, and the consignee has had reason-

able time and opportunity to remove them.‘

Prime facie the consignee is the person entitled to demand

and receive the goods of the carrier at the place of destination,

and to sue for any breach of the carrier’s contract. But the pre-

sumption is not conclusive. One may have a special interest in

the goods which entitles him to demand and receive possession; ‘

or he may, as vendor to one who has become insolvent, be en ti-

tled to exercise his right of stoppage in transitu,’ or some other

right which the carrier cannot resist.

Carriers of Persons. Where the business of a carrier is to

transport both persons and property, his obligation. and his con-

sequent liability in respect to the two are different. For the safe

transportation of the property he is responsible as insurer, with

the exceptions already stated; but in the case of passengers he

only undertakes that he will carry them without negligence or

fault. But as there are committed to his charge for the time the

But if his route covers the whole distance, his liability as carrier
only ceases when the goods are actually delivered, unless, by the
custom of the business, the consignee is expected to receive them
at the carrier's warehouse, in which case his liability changea
from that of carrier to that of warehouseman when the goods
are received at the wareho~1se, and the consignee has had reasonable time and opportunity to remove them. 1
Pr£ma faci8 the consignee is the person entitled to demand
and recei\·e the goods of the carrier at the place of destination,
and to sue for any breach of the carrier's contract. But the presumption is not conclusive. One may have a special interest in
the goods which entitles him to demand and receive possession; ..
or he may, 88 vendor to one who has become insoh·ent, be entitled to exercise his right of stopp~ooe in tranaitu,' or some other
right which the carrier cannot resist.
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lives and safety of persons of all ages and of all degrees of ability

for self-protection, and as the slightest failure in watchfulness

may be destructive of life or limb, it is reasonable to require

of him the most perfect care of prudent and cautious men, and his

undertaking and liability as to his passengers goes to this extent,

that, as far as human foresight and care can reasonably go, he will

transport them safely. He is not liable if injuries happen from

sheer accident or misfortune, where there is no negligence or

fault, and where no want of caution, foresight or judgment would

1 Morris, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Ayres, 29

N. J. 393; Blumenthal c. Brainerd, 38

Vt. 402; Thomas u. Boston, etc., R. R.

Co., 10 Met. 472: Vlfood 0. Crocker, 18

Wis. 845; Moses 0. Boston, etc., R. R.

Co., 32 N. H.523; McMillan 0. Mich-

igan, elc., R. R. Co., 16 Mich. 79.

’ Sou. Exp. Co. 0. Caperton, 44 Ala.

101.

' Bohtlingk 0. Inglis, 8 East, 381;

N ewsom v. Thornton, 6 East. 17; Ver-

tue 0. Jewell, 4 Camp. 31; James o.

Griﬁln,1 M. & W.20; Buckley v. Fur-

niss, 15 Wend. 137, and 17 Wend. 504;

Carriers of Persons. Where the business of a carrier is to
transport both persons and property, his obligation' and his consequent liability in respect to the two are different. },or the safe
transportation of the property he is responsible as insurer, with
the exceptions already stated; but in the case of passengers he
only undertakes that he will carry them without negligence or
fault. But 88 there are committed to his charge for the time the
lives and safety of persons of all ages and of all degrees of ability
for self-protection, and as the slightest failure in watchfulness
may be destructive of life or limb, it is reasonabl~ to require
'Of him the most perfect care of prudent and cautions men, and his
undertaking and liability as to his passengers goes to this extent,
thnt, as far as human foresight and care can reasonably go, he will
transport them safely. He is not liable if injuries happen from
sheer accident or misfortune, where there is no negligence or
fanlt, and where no want of caution, foresight or judgment would

Mottram v. Ht-yer, 5 Dcnio, 629; Nay-

lor 0. Dcnnic, 8 Pick. 198; Atkins 0.

Colby, 20 N. H. 154; Reynold! It

Railroad, 48 N. H. 580. '

\

z Morris, etc., R. R Co. •· Ayres, 29
N.J. 893; Blumenthal"· Brainerd, 38
Vt. 402; Thomas "· Boston, etc., R. R
Co., 10 }let. 472: Wood "·Crocker, 18
Wis. 84:>; Moses "· Bol!ton, etc., R. R.
Co., 32 N.H. 52-'3: llcMillan "·Mich.
igan, etc., R. R. Co., lG Mich. 79.
1 Sou. Exp. Co. "· Caperton, 44 Ala.
101.

• Bohtlingk tl. Inglis, 8 East, 881 i
Newsom"· Thornton, 6 East. 17; Vertue "· Jewell, 4 Camp. 31; James e.
Griffin. 1 M. & W. 20; Buckley"· Fnr.
nis.q, 15 Wend. 137, and 17 Wend. 50(;
Mottram "· Heyer, 5 Denio, 629; Naylor "·Dennie, 8 Pick. 198: Atkins e.
Colby, 20 N. H. 154; Reynold) e.

Railroad, 43 N.H. 580.
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prevent the injury. But he is liable for the smallest negligence

DUTU~S.

()43

in himself or his servants.‘ And this liability is applied with

great strictness, as well as great justice, when he undertakes to

transport passengers by the powerful and dangerous agency of

steam.’ On the other hand, the luggage, which it is customary

for carriers to permit their passengers to take with them, without

charge beyond what is paid for their own conveyance, is taken

under the like obligation which attends the carriage of ordinary

freight.’

The responsibility of the carrier begins when the passenger

l Derwort 0. Loomer, 21 Conn. 246,

per Et.t.s\von'ru, J . ; Christie 1:. Griggs,

2 Camp. '79; Farish 0. Reigle, 11 Grat.

697; Frink o. Potter, 17 Ill.406; Sim-

mons 0. New Bedford, etc., Steamboat

Co., 97 Mass. 361; Knight 1:. Portland,

prevent the injury. But he is liable for the smallest negligencn
in himself or his servants.' And this liability is app1ied with
great strictness, as well as great jnstice, when he undertakes to
transport passC11gcrs by the powerful and dangerous agency of
steam.' On the other hand, the lngga;;e, which it is customary
tor carriers to permit their passengers to take with them, without
charge beyond what is paid for their own conveyance, is taken
under the like obligation which attends the carriage of ordinary
freight.•
The responsibility of tho carrier begins when the passenger

etc., R. R. Co., 56 Me. 234; Maverick

o. Eighth Av. R. R. 00., as N. Y. 378;

Johnson 0. Winona, etc., R. R. Co., 11

Minn. 296; Taylor 0. Grand Trunk K

Co., 48 N. H. 304; Sherlock 0. Ailing,

44 Ind. 184.
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’ Caldwell v. N. J. Steamboat Co.,

47 N. Y. 282; Meier 11. Pennsylvania

R. R. Co., 64 Penn. St. 225; Baltimore

& Ohio R. R. Co. 0. Miller, 29 Md.

252.

‘Hannibal R. R. Co. v. Swift, 12

Wall. 262; Merrill v. Grinncll, 80 N.

Y. 594. Luggage or baggage includes

such articles of necessity and con-

venience as passengers usually carry

for their personal use, comfort, in-

struction, amusement or protection,

having regard to the length and ob-

ject of their journeys, including such

an amount of money as it would be

reasonable to take for expenses and

contingencies. Parmelce 0. Fischer,

22 Ill. 212; Dibble v. Brown, 12 Geo.

217; Doyle 0. Kiser, 6 Ind. S43; Jor.

dan 1;. Fall River R. R. Co., 5 Cush.

69; Bomar 0. Maxwell. 9 Humph. 621;

Giles v. Fauntleroy, 13 Md. 127. Sec

Hopkins o. Westcott, 6 Blatch. 64;

Hutchings 0. Western, etc., R. R. Co.,

25 Geo. 63; Woods 0. Devln,13 Ill.

746; Torpey 1;. Williams, 8 Daly, 162;

Dexter 0. Syracuse, etc., R. R. Co., £2

N. Y. 326; Johnson 0. Stone, 11

Humph. 419.

A notice by a carrier that baggage

must be at the risk of the owner is of

no force, unless assented to. Hollis-

ter 0. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234; Jones

v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 146; Gott 0.

Dinsmore, 111 Mass. 45; Bennett 0.

Dutton, 10 N. H. 481. But a rule that

carriers will not be responsible for

baggage beyond a certain amount,

unless the value is reported to them

and carriage paid for, is reasonable,

and Obligatory when brought home

to the knowledge of the passenger.

Brown 0. Eastern R. R., 11 Cush. 97;

Brehme 9. Dinsmorc, 25 Md. 328.

Express companies may limit their

liability in the same way. Green v.

Southern Express Co., 45 Geo. 805;

• Derwor& e. Loomer, 21 Conn. 246,
per ELLSWORTII, J.; Cbristiet~. Griggs,
2 Camp. 79; Farish"· Reigle, 11 Gra&.
697; Frink"· Potter, 17 Ill. 406; Sim.
mons"· New Bedford, etc., Steamboat
Co., 97 Mass. 861; Knip;ht "· Portlands
etc., R R Co., IS6 Me. 234; Maverick
e. Eighth Av. R. R. Co., 86 N.Y. 878;
Johnson e. Winona, etc., R. R. ·eo.,ll
Minn. 200; Taylor e. Grand Trunk R.
Co., 48 N.H. 304; Bherlockt~.Alling,
(4 Ind. 184.
'Caldwell e. N.J. Steamboat Co.,
47 N.Y. 282; Meier"· Pennsylvania
R. R Co., 64 Penn. St. 225; Baltimore
& Ohio R. R. Co. •· Miller, 28 Md.

252.
• Hannibal R. R. Co. e. Swift, 19
Wall. 262; Merrill e. Grinnell, 80 N.
Y.694. Luggageorbaggageincludca
such articles of necessity and con.
venience as passengers usually carry
for their personal use, comfort, in·
atruction, amusement or protection,
having regard to the length and object of their journeys, including such
an amount of money as it would be
reasonable to take for expens(•s and
contingencies. Pam1cleo "· Fischer,
22 Ill. 212; Dibble "· Brown, 12 Geo.
217; Doyle e. Kiser, 6 Ind. :::43; Jor.
dan e. Fall River R. R. Co., 5 Cush.
69; HomiU' e. MaxwclJ, 9 Humph. G21;
Giles"· Fauntleroy, 13 Md. 127. Sec
Hopkins t~. Westcott, 6 Blutch. 64;
Hutchings e. Western, etc., R R. Co.,

23 Geo. 63; Wooda e. Devin, 18 Ill.
746; Torpey e. Williams, 8 Daly, 162;
Dexter e. Syracuse, etc., R. R. Co., 43
N. Y. 826; Johnson •· Stone, 11
Humph. 419.
A notice by a carrier that baggage
mu:~t be at &he risk of the owner is of
no force, unless assented to. Hollta.
ter e. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234; Jonee
e. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 146; Got& e.
Dinsmore, 111 Mass. 45; Bennett e.
Dutton, 10 N. H. 481. But a role tha&
carriers will not be responsible for
baggage beyond a certain amount,
unless the value Is reported to them
and carriage pnid for, is reasonable,
and obligatory when brought home
to the knowledge or the passenger.
Brown e. Eastern R. R., 11 Cush. 97 ;
Brehme e. Dinsmore, 25 Md. 828.
Express companies may limit their
liability In tho same way. Green e.
Southern Express Co., 45 Geo. 80:S;
Oppenheimer"· U. B. Expreas Co., 69
Ill. 62; Newst.adt e. Aunms, 5 Doer,
43. See Nicholson e. Willan, 5 East,
507; Baldwin e. Collins, 9 Rob. La.
468. But the owner need not disclose
the value, unll'!IS required to do so.
Phillips"· Earle, 8 Pick. 182; Patm~
lee e. Lowitz, 74 Ill. 116.
For such bag~agc as a paaenger
ke~ps in his own possc~sion a carrier
is not liable as insurer, but only for
negl igcnce. Steamship Co. "· Bryan,
88 Penn. St. «6.
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presents himself for transportation; and this he may be said to

do when he approaches the place of reception for the purpose.

Therefore, if the carrier is negligent in respect to the platforms

and other approaches provided for the use of passengers, and in

consequence of their being in an unsafe condition, the person

coming to be carried is injured, he may have his action therefor.‘

The carrier of persons, like the carrier of goods, is under obliga-

tion to carry impartially; and, therefore, he cannot refuse to

receive one who oﬂ'crs, unless he has valid excuse therefor. It

will be a suﬂicient excuse that the person refuses to pay his fare

in advance, when demanded, or to procure a ticket evidencing

his right to a passage, or that he is grossly intoxicated, or for

other reason unﬁt to be received as a passenger with others.’

But the color of a person is no justification for refusing to carry

him as others are carried.‘ The carrier is also under obligations

to use the utmost care and diligence in providing safe, suitable

and suﬂicient vehicles for the conveyance of his passengers,‘ to

' Smith 0. London, etc., R. Co., L.

R. 3 C. P. 326; Poucher 0. N. Y. Cen-

tral R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 263; Tobin 0.

Portland, ctc., R. R. Co., 59 Me. 183;

Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Wilson, 63
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Ill. 167; McDonald v. Chicago, etc.,

R. R. Co., 26 Iowa. 124; Mich. Cent.

R. R. Co. 0. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440.

presents himself for transportation; and this he may be said to
do when he approaches the place of reception for the purpose.
Therefore, if the carrier is negligent in respect to the platforms
and other approaches provided for the use of passengers, and in
. consequence of their being in an unsafe condition, the person
coming to be carried is injn1·ed, he may have his action therefor.• •
The ~urier of person~, 1ike the carrier of goods, is under obligation to carry impartially; and, therefore, he cannot refuse to
r«~cehc one who offer11, unless he has ,·alid excuse therefor.
1t
will be a sufficient excuse that the person refuses to pay his fare
in advance, when demanded, or to procure a ticket e\·idencing
his right to a passage, or that he is grossly intoxicated, or for
other reason unfit to be received as a passenger with others.'
But the color of a person is no- justification for refusing to carry
him as others are carried.• The carrier is also under oLligations
to use the utmost care and diligence in providing safe, suitable
and sufficient vehicles tor the conveyance of his passen~e1·s," to

The obligation of care extends to

those who come to welcome friends

or to aid them in leaving. Gillis 0.

Penn R. R. Co., 50 Penn. SL129;

Doss v. Missouri, etc., R. R. Co., 59

Mo. 27; S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 371, e val-

uable case.

' See Jencks 0. Coleman, 2 Snmn.

221; Bennett 0. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481;

Elmore 0. Sands, 54 N. Y. 512; Pitts-

burgh. etc., R. R. Co. v. Vsndyne, 57

Ind. 5'76.

‘See ante, p. 284. One is to be

deemed a passenger on a steamboat

who enters for the purpose of being

carried, though he has not yet paid

his fare. Cleveland v. Steamboat Co.,

68 N. Y. 806. There is no doubt,

however, of the right to require pas-

sengers to purchase and exhibit s

~ ‘L

ticket before going on board boat or

cars. Pittsburgh, etc.," R. R. C0. 0.

Vsndyne, 57 Ind. 576. The conduc-

tor has a right to put one off the cars

when the point indicated by his tick-

et is reached, and if the passenger

claims that he purchased a ticket for

a more distant point and received the

wrong ticket by mistake, he should

pay the additional fare, and have the

mistake corrected afterwards. Fred-

erick o. Marquette, etc., R. R. Co., 37

Mich. 342. ’

‘ Iieadliead v. Midland R. Co., L. R.

2 Q. B. 412; S. C.4L. R. Q. B. 379;

Ingalls 1:. Bills, 9 Met. 1; Taylor 0.

Grand Trunk R. Co., 48 N. ll. 304;

Caldwell v. New Jersey, ctc., Co., 4'7

N. Y. 28:3; Grand Rapids, etc., R,

R. Co. 0. Huntley, 38 Mich.; Balti-

more, etc., R. R. Co. o. Miller, 29 Md.

252; Va. Cent. R. R. Co. 1:. Sanger, 15

Grat. 230. A railroad company must

1 Smith e. London, etc., R. Co., L.
R. 8 C. P. 826; Poucher e. N. Y. Ceo.
tral R. R. Co., 4:9 N. Y. 263; Tobin e.
Portland, etc., R. R. Co., 69 Me. 183;
Chicago, etc.• R. R. Co. "· Wilson, 63
Ill. 167; Me Donald "· Chicago, etc.,
R. R. Co., 26 Iowa. 124; Mich. Cent.
R. R. Co. fl. Coleman, 28 Mich. 4:40.
The obligation of care extends to
those who come to \\'clcome friends
or to alJ them In leaving. Gillis tr.
Penn R. R. Co., 59 Penn. Mt. 129;
Doss 11. )lissouri, etc., R. R. Co., 59
Mo. 27; B. C. 21 Am. Rep. 871, a val.
uable Calle.
• See Jencks "· Coleman, 2 Sumo.
221; Bennett "· Dutton, 10 N. H. 481;
Elmore t~. Sands, 54 N. Y. 512; Pitts.
burgh. etc., R. R. Co. e. Vandyne, 57
Ind. 576.
• See ante, p. 284. One is to be
deemed a passenger on a steamboat
who enters for the purpose of being
carried, tboup:h be bas not yet paid
his fare. Cle\'eland "·Steamboat Co.,
68 N. Y. SOG. There is no doubt,
however, of the right to require pas.
aeogera to purchase and exhibit a

ticket before going on board boat or
ca~. Pittsburgh, etc.,· R. R. Co. ~
Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576. The conduCtor has a right to put one off the cars
when the point indicated by his ticket is reached, and if the passenger
claims that he purchased a ticket for
a more distant point and received the
wrong ticket by mistake, be should
pay the additional fare, and have the
mistRke corrected afterwards. Frederick "· Marquette, etc., R. R. Oo., 37
Mich. 842.
•
• Read bead"· Midland R. Co., L. R.
2 Q. B. 4:12; S. C. 4: L. R. Q. B. 379;
Ingalls "· Bills. 9 Met. 1; Taylor t~.
Grnnd Trunk R. Co., 48 N. H. 304:;
Caldwell 11. New Jersey, etc., Co., 47
N. Y. 282; Grand Rapids, etc., R.
R. Co. "· Huntley, 88 Mich.; BRltimore, etc., R. H. Co. e. .Miller, 2D }!d.
252; Va. Cent. R. R. Co."· San~er, 15
Grat. 230. A railroad company must
also see that its track is rea..cmnably
safe for use. Curtis "· Rochester, etc.,
R. R. Co., 18 N.Y. 5H4; Baltimo~
etc., R. R. Co. •· Worthin~too, 21 Md.
275; State "· 0' Brien, 82 N. J. 109.
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carry the passenger therein to the end of his route,‘ to protect
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him against assaults and other ill-treatment by those employed

by or under the carrier’s control while on the way;’ “ to exercise

the utmost vigilance and care in maintaining order and guarding

the passengers against violence from whatever source arising,

which might reasonably be anticipated or naturally be expected

to occur in view of all the circumstances, and of the number and

character of the persons on board,”' and when the journey is

completed, to afford the passenger reasonable opportunity to leave

the cars with safety.‘ It is scarcely necessary to add that a failure

in the performance of any of these duties, whereby damage

results, will render the carrier liable to the appropriate action.

Carriers are permitted to adopt rules for the regulation of

their business; and so far as these are not opposed to_ law or

unreasonable in themselves, the passenger must observe them.

These supplement the rules of law which require a passenger to

conduct himself with decency, and not render himself an oifense

or an annoyance to others; for a failure to observe which, he

may and should be removed from the vehicle.‘ A common rule

' Porter u. Steamboat New Eng.

land, 17 Mo. 290; Gllhooly 0. New

Y0: k, etc., Co., 1 Duly, 197; Hamil-
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ton o. Third Av. R. R. Co., 53 N. Y.

25. As to liability for putting a pas-

senger otfwron,-gtully, see Cincinnati,

etc., R. R. C0. 0. Cole, 29 Ohio, (N. s.)

126.

_ i Baltimore, etc., R. R Co. o. Bloch-

cr, 27 Md. 277; St. Louis, etc., R. R.

carry the passenger theJ'C'in to the end of his route,' to protect
him against assaults and other ill-treatment by those employed
by or under the carrier's control while on the way;' "to exercise
the ntmost vigilance and care in maintaining order and guarding
• the passengers against violence from whatever som·ce arising,
which might reasonahly be anticipated or naturally be expected
to occur in view of all the circumstances, arul of the nnmher and
character of the persons on board," • and when the journey is
eompleted, to afford the passenger reasonable opportunity to leave
the cars with safety.• It is scarcely nece8tmry to add that a failure
in the performance of any of these duties, whereby damage
results, will render the carrier liable to the appropriate Rction.
Carriers are permitted to adopt rules for the rcgulntion of
their business; and so far as these are not opposed to. law or
unreasonable in themselves, the pn:-scnger must observe them.
'fhege supplement the rules of law which require a pa~:;enger to
conduct himself with decency, and not render hirn~;elf an offense
or an annoyance to others; for a failure to observe which, he
may and should be removed from the vehicle.• A common rule

C0. 0. Dulby,19 Ill. 353; Ilnnsou 0.

European, etc., R. R. Co., 62 Me. 84;

Goddard v. Grand Trunk, etc., R. R.

Co., 57 Me. 202; Sherley 0. Billings,

8 Bush, 147; Bass 0. Chicago, etc., R.

Co., 86 Wis. 450: Crukcr v. Chicago,

etc., R. Co., 80 Wis. 657; Ramstlen 0.

Boston, etc., R. lt. Co., 104 Mass. 117;

Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180; Atlan-

tic, ctc., R. R. Co. 0. Dunn, 19 Ohio,

(R. s.) 162.

' Snrrman, D. J., in Flint v. Nor-

Wlch, etc., Co., 34 Conn. 551; Pitts-

burgh, etc., R. R. Co. Q. Pillow, 70

Penn. St 610. But the carrier is not

liable for the acts of a mob which

could not have been anticipated.

Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. C0. e. Hinds,

53 Penn. St. 512. In New York a

carrier has been held l't'sponsil)lc t'or

the mont-_\-s of which a gambler was

permitted to defraud a minor while

in his charge. Smith 0. Wilson, 81

Ilow. P. B. 272.

‘ Burrows o. Erie, etc., R Co.,83 N.

Y. 556; Southern, etc.. R. R Co. 0.

Kendrick, 40 Miss. 874. If, however,

the passenger gets out and moves

about at iuhsrmediate stations, he

gives up, for the time, his character

of passenger. State v. Grand Trunk

R. Co., 58 Me. 176.

'Vinton 0. Middlescx. etc., R R.

Co., 11 Allcn,30~1; Putnam 0. Broad-

way, etc., R. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 108;

Marquette 0. Chicago, etc., R R. Co.,

83 Iowa, 562; Hanson 0. European,

etc., R. Co., 62 Me. 84: Keeley 0.

Maine Cent. R. R. Co., 67 Me. 168.

• Porter 11. Stl'ambont New Eng.
)and, 17 Mo. 200; Gilhooly e. New
York, etc., Co., 1 Daly, 197; Hamilton e. Third Av. R. lt Co., 53 N.Y•.
2~.
A.s to liahility for puttin~ a pns.
M"nger olf wron~fully, see Cincinnati,
etc., R. R. Co. e. <.:ole, 29 Ohio, (1'1'. e.)
126.
. • llaltimore, etc., R. R. Co."· Bloch.
cr, 27 Md. 277; St. Louis, etc., R. R.
Co."· D11lby, 19 Ill. 353; HAnson e.
Enropeno, etc., R. R. Co., 02 1\le. 8t;
Ooddard 11. Grnnd Trunk, etc., R. H.
0•.• 57 :Me. 202; Shcrlt>y "· Billio~s,
8 Bush, 14i; Bnss "·Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 86 Wis. 4t.O; Crnker "·Chicago,
etc., R. Co., 36 Wis. 657; Ramsden e.
Boston, etc., It R Co., 104 ~lass. 117;
Bryant D. Rich, 106 }{1\89. 1~0; Atlan.
tic, etc., R. R. Co. "· Dunn, 19 Ohio,
(1'1'. 8.) 162.
• SmPMAl'l', D. J., In Flint e. Nor.
wlch, etc., Co., 84 Coon. 551; Pitt!lburgh, etc., R. R. Co. e. Pillow, '76
Penn. BL 610. But the carrier b no&

liable for tho RCts or a moh which
bern anticipated.
Pittsburgh, (~tc., R. R. Co. e. llindB,
63 Penn. St. i:i12. In New York 11.
carrier hn.s been held rl'Spon!.ible for
the mnn<·ys or which 8 )!lltnhlcr WIUI
permittl'd to defraud a minor while
In his char~E'. Smith e. Wilson, 81
How. P. H. 2i2.
• Burrows"· Erie, etc., R Co.,63 N.
Y. liM; Southl'rn, <'lc.. R. R Co. 1.
Kendrick, 40 :Miss. 374. If, however,
the passenger gets out and moves
about at iuterwcdiatc stntions, he
gh·cs up, for the time, his chnrncter
of pa!'<sen~er. Stat<'"· Grand Trunk
R. l'o., ~s ~lc. 176.
• Vinton "· llidd11'S<'X, etc.. R R
Co., 11 Allen, 804; Putnam"· Broadway, etc., R. R. Co., M N.Y. 108;
Marquette"· Chicngo, etc., R R Co.,
88 Iowa, li02; flnnl\nn fl. Enropei!UI,
etc., R. Co.. 62 Mt>. 84: Keeley 1.
Maine Cenl R. R Co., 6'l He. 163.
could not have

•
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and not an unreasonable one, is that the passenger sha‘_l procure
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a ticket as evidence of his right to a passage; that he shall show

this whenever called upon by the carrier to do so, and that this

ticket shall be used only for one continuous journey, unless per-

mission be asked for and obtained to take a part of the journey

at one time and part at another.‘ These are only instances of

reasonable rules: many others might be named. But while a

passenger may be removed from the cars for non-compliance

with any reasonable rule, the carrier must see that this is not

done with unnecessary force or injury. The same rule applies

here as in the case of force to remove a wrong-doer from one’s

premises: no more must be employed than the necessity of the

case demands. '

Telegraph Companies. Companies for the transmission of

messages by telegraph hold relations to the public and to those

doing business with them much resembling those of railway

companies. Their lines are constructed under legislative author-

ity, and are either set up in the public highways, or on private

lands where they appropriate an easement for the purpose under

the eminent domain. The legislation which permits this recog-

and not an unreasonable one, is that the passenger sha~ procure
a ticket as evidence of his right to a passage; that he shall show
this whenever called upon by the carrier to do so, and that this
ticket shall be uecd only for one continuous journey, unless permission be asked for and obtained to take a part of the journey
at one time and part at another.' These are only instances of
reasonable rules: many others might be named. Bot while a
passenger may be removed from the cars for non-compliance
with any reasonable rule, the C.'\rrier must see that this is not
done with unnecessary force or injury. The same rule applies
here as in the case of force to remove a wrong-doer from one's
premises: no more must be employed than the necessity of the
case demands.

nizes them as public agencies, and requires them to accommo-

date the public impartially, and to transmit messages in the
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order in which they are received. They, therefore, to some

extent, in their functions and in their responsibilities, resemble

common carriers, and are sometimes so designated. But the

resemblance does not go very far: they receive nothing to carry,

and the risks of theft, robbery, ﬁre and ﬂood which render the

undertaking of the common carrier so onerous, they are not

exposed to. In reason as well as on authority, they are respon-

sible in sending, receiving and delivering messages, on the

grounds only that through their negligence errors or unneces-

' Cheney o. Boston, etc., R. R. Co.,

111 Met. 121; Boston, etc., R. R. C0.

Marquette, etc., R. R. Co., 3'7 Mich.

342; Stale v. Overton, 24 N. J. 435.

o. Proctor, 1 Allen, 267; Elmore 0.

Sands, 54 N. Y. 512; Shedd 0. Troy,

etc., R. It. Co.,40Vt. 88; Jeromeu.

Smith, 48 Vt. 230; S. C. 21 Am. Rep.

125; Dietrick o. Penn. R. R. Co., 71

Penn. St. 432; Brooke u.Grand Trunk

R. Co., 15 Mich. 332; Frederick o.

See Picr v. Finch, 24 Barb. 514. If

the agents of the railway company

inform a passenger he can purchase

a ticket for a continuous journey and

Telegraph Companie.. 0'>nlpanies for the transmission of
messages by telegraph hold relatione to the public and to those
doing business with them much resembling those of railway
companies. Their lines are constructed onder legislative authority, and are either set up in the public highways, or on private
lands where they appropriate an easement for the pnrpose under
the eminent domain. The legislation which permits this recognizes them as public agencies, and requires them to accommodate the public impartially, and to transmit messages in the
order in which they are received. They, therefore, to some
extent, in their functions and in their responsibilities, resemble
common carriers, and are sometimes so designated. But the
resemblance does not go very far: they receive nothing to carry,
and the risks of theft, robbery, fire and flood which render the
undertaking of the common carrier so onerous, they are not
exposed to. In reason as well as on authority, they are responsible in sending, receiving and delivering messages. on the
grounds only that through their negligence errors or unne<.-es-

stop over with it. the company is

bound by this. Burnham 0. Grand

Trunk R. Co., 63 Me. 298.

--4-_ _.- ~ 10080.1

1 Cheney o. Boston, etc., R. R. Co.,
, 11 Met. 121 ; Boston, etc., R R. Co.
tl. Proctor, 1 Allen, 267; Elmore e.
Sands, M N.Y. 512; Shedd o. Troy,
etc., R. R. Co., 40 Vl 88; Jerome o.
Smith, 48 Vt. 230; 8. C. 21 Am. Rep.
123; Dietrick e. Penn. R R. Co., 71
Penn. St. 432: Brooke e. Grand Trunk
R Co., 15 Mich. 832; Frederick o.

Marquette, etc., R R. Co., 87 Mich.
842; State o. Overton, 24 N. J. 435.
Sec Pier e. Finch, 24: Barb. 514. If
the agents of the railway compnny
inform a pa..'ISCngcr he can purchll.S8
a ticket for a continuous journey and
stop ove1· with it. the company is
bound by this. Burnham e. Grand
'frunk R. Co., 63 Me. 298.
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sary delays have occurred, or that they have failed to transmit
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and deliver messages impartially. If a message is not sent and

delivered within a reasonable time under the circumstances, or

if errors occur in the transmission, which are attributable to

their negligence, they are responsible for all consequent dain-

ages;‘ but they are not insurers, and if errors occur with-

out their fault, they are not responsible.’ And like common

carriers they are permitted to make rules for the regulation of

their business; and these when brought home to those dealing

with them, and assented to expressly or by implication, will be

binding as contracts, provided they appear to be reasonable. A

rule, for example, that any claim against the company for dam-

ages arising from delays or errors shall be presented within

sixty days, has been sustained in Pennsylvania as a reasonable

regulation of the business.‘ So a rule is valid that the company

sending the message will not be responsible for errors occurring

on connecting lines.‘ And if rules which are reasonable in

themselves are printed conspicuously on the blanks of the com-

pany, they will be deemed assented to by those who make use

of the blanks.‘

Skilled Workman. Every man who offers his services to

another and is employed, assumes the duty to exercise in the
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employment such skill as he possesses with reasonable care and

diligence. In all those employments where peculiar skill is

requisite, if one offers his services, he is understood as holding

himself out to the public as possessing the degree of skill com-

monly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his

l Western U. Tel. Co. 0. Carew, 15

Mich. 525; Aiken v. Telegraph Co., 5

Sou. Cur. 358; Parks 0. Telegraph

sary delays have occurred, or that they have failed to transmit
and deliver messages impartially. If a message is not sent and
ddivered within a reasonable time under. the circumstances, or
if errors oecur in the transmission, which are attributable to
their negligence, they are responsible for all consequent damages; 1 but they are not insurers, and if errors occur without their fault, they are not responsible.' And like common
carriers they are permitted to make rules for the regulation of
their business; and these when brought home to those dealing
with them, and assented to expressly or by implication, will be
binding as contracts, provided they appear to be reasonable. A
rule, for example, that any claim against the company tor dam.
ages arising from delays or errors shall be presented within
sixty days, has been sustained in Pennsylvania 88 a reasonable
regulation of the business.' So a rule is valid that the company
sending the mess~ae will not be responsible for errors occurring
on connecting lines.' And if roles which are reasonable in
themselves are printed conspicuously on the blanks of the compan_y, they will be deemed assented to by those who make use
of the blanks. •

Co., 13 Cal. 422; Grinncll 0. Western

U. Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299; B. C. 18

Am. Rep. 485; Washington, etc., Tel.

Co. 0. llobson, 15 Grat. 122.

' Swcetland v. Illinois, etc., Tel. Co.,

27 Iowa, 433; S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 285;

Brecsc 0. U. 5. Telegraph Co., 48 N.

Y. 132; S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 526.

' Wolf 0. West. U. Tel. Co., 62 Penn.

Bt. 83.

Skilled Workmen. Every man who offers his services to
another and is employed, assumes the duty to exercise in the
employment such skill 88 he possesses with reasonable care and
diligence. In all those employments where peculiar skill is
requisite, if one offers his services, he is understood 88 holding
himself out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his

‘ West. U. Tel. Co. s. Carew, 15

Mich. 525. See, further, Redpath 0.

West. U. Tel. Co., 112 Mass. '71; U. S.

Telegraph C0. 0. Gildersleeve, 29 Md.

232. As to the liability independent

of such regulation, see Leonard 1:. N.

Y., etc., Tel. Co., 41 N. Y. 544; S. C.

1 Am. Rep. 446; Baldwin o. U. S. Tel-

egraph Co., 45 N. Y. 744; B. C. 6 Am.

Rep. 105.

' Young 0. West. U. Tel. Co., 65 N.

Y. 163; Pussmore 0. West. U. Tel. Co.,

'78 Penn. St. 238; West. U. Tel. C0. u.

Buchanan, 35 Ind. 430.

J Western U. Tel. Co."· Carew, 15
Hicb. 525; Aiken "·Telegraph Co., 5
Bou. Cnr. 858; Parks c. Telegraph
Co., 13 Cal. 422; Grinnell c. W estero
U. Tel. Co., 113 1\[ass. 299; B. C. 18
Am. Ucp. 485; Washington, etc., Tel.
Co. "· IIobRnn, 15 Grat. 122.
1 Sweetland"· Illinois, etc., Tel. C'.o.,
27 Iowa, 4:~3: S. C. 1 Am. Hep. 285:
Breese"· U. o. Tell'graph Co., 48 N.
Y. ta2; B. C. 8 Am. Rl•p. 526.
• Wolf"· West. U. Tel. Co., q2l'cnn.
Sl83.
• West. U. Tel. Co. "· Carew, 15

:Mich. ~25. Bee, further, Redpath ..
WeaL U. Tel. Co., 112 ~lass. 71; U. B.
Telegrnph Co. "· Gildersleeve, 29 Md.
232. As to the Jisbility independent
of such regulation, see Leonard "· N.
Y., etc., Tel. Co., 41 N.Y. 544; B. C.
1 Am. Rep. 446; Baldwin"· U. S. Tel.
egraph Co., 43 N.Y. 741; B. C. 6 Am.
Rt-p.1G5.
1 Young"· West. U. Tel. Co., 65 N.
Y. 163; Pnssmoret1. West. U. Tel. Co.,
71:1 Penn. BL 238; West. U. Tel. Co. "·
Buchanan, 35 Ind. 430.
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pretensions are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud upon
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every man who employs him in reliance on his public profession.

But no man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes that the

task he assumes shall be performed successfully, and without

fault or error; he undertakes for good faith and integrity, but

not for iufallibility, and he is liable to his employer for negli-

gence, bad faith or dishonesty, but not for losses consequent

upon mere errors of judgment.‘

Professional Services. It is the misfortune of members of

the learned professions that, in a very considerable proportion

of all the cases in which their services are employed, their efforts

must necessarily fall short of accomplishing the purpose desired,

so that if they do not disappoint expectations, they must at

pretensions are unfounded, ho commits a species of fraud upon
every man who employs him in reliance on his public profeesion.
But no man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes that the
task be assumes shall be performed successfully, and withoat
fault or error; he undertakes tor good faith and integrity, bot
not for infallibility, and he is liable to his employer for negligence, bad faith or dishonesty, but not for lossea consequent
upon mere errors of judgment.'

least fail to fulﬁll hopes. For this reason they are peculiarly

liable to the charge of failure in the performance of professional

duty, and it is therefore important to know exactly what it is

that the professional man promises when he engages his services.

As the promise is not different in the case of the physician and

surgeon from what it is in the case of the attorney. solicitor and

proctor, one general rule may be given which will apply to all.

The English authorities are, perhaps, somewhat more indul-

gent to the faults and mistakes of professional men than are
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those of this country. Thus Lord CAMPBELL, with the full con-

currence of his associates in the House of Lords, declared that

in order to maintain an action against one’s legal adviser, it was

necessary, “ most undoubtedly, that the professional adviser

should be guilty of some misconduct, some fraudulent.proceed-

ing, or should be chargeable with gross negligence or with gross

ignorance. It is only upon one or the other of these grounds

that the client can maintain an action against the professional

adviser.”'

' Page v. Wells, 87 Mich. 415.

Wherever an employment requires

skill, a failure to exercise it is action-

able ncgligence. The New World v.

King, 16 How. 469.

‘ Purvcs e. Landell, 12 C. & F. 01,

102. See, also, Shiells v. Bluckburne,

1 H. Bl. 158; Bnikie 0. Chandless. 8

Camp. 1'7; Godefroy v. Dalton,6 Bing.

461; Hart '0. Frame, 6 C.& F193; Pip-

pin v. Sheppard, 11 Price,-100; Slater

0. Baker, 2 Wils. 359; Rich o. Picrpont,

8 F. 8: F. 35; Scare o. Prentice, 8

East. 349; Hancke v. Hooper. '7 C. &

Professional Services. It is the misfortune of members or
the learned prof('s~ions that, in a very considerable proportion
of' aB the cases in which their services are employed, their efforts
mnst necessarily fall short of accomplishing the purpose desired,
so that if they do not disappoint expectations, they mnst at
least fail to fulfill hopes. For this reason they are peculiarly
liable to the charge of failure in the performance of professional
duty, and it is therefore important to know exactly what it it
that the professional man promises when he en~ooes his services.
As the promise is not different in the case of the physician and
surgeon from what it is in the case of the attorney, solicitor and
proctor, one general rule may be given which will apply to all.
The En~Iish authorities are, perhaps, somewhat more indolgE'nt to the fl\nlts and mistakes of professional men than are
those of this country. Thus Lord CulPBEt.t, with tlte full concurrence of his associates in the llonse of I...ords, declared that
in order to maintain an action against one's legal advil:ler, it waa
necessary, "most undoubtedly, that the professional adviser
should be guilty of some misconduct, some f1'8ndulent. proceeding, or should be chargeable with gross negligence or with grOBI
ignorance. It is only upon one or the other of these grounds
that the client can maintain an action against the professional
adviser.'"

P. 81; Lanphier '0. Phipos, 8 C.'& P.

475; Lowry 0. Guilford, 5 C. 8: P.

234; Russell o. Palmer ils.825;

Chnpuiuu '0. Chapman, Eq.
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1 Page "· Wells, 87 Mich.
411).
Wherc\·cr an employment requir~
skill, a failure to exercise it ia actionable negligence. The New World e.
King, 16 flow. 469.
I Purves e. Landell, 12 C. & F. 91,
102. See, also, Shlella "· Blackburne,
1 H. Bl. 158; Baikie "· Clumdlrss. 8
Camp. 17; Godef1·oy "· Dalton, 6 Bing.

461 ; Hart"· Frame, 6 C. & F. 198: Pip.
pin"· Sheppard, 11 Price, 400; Slater
"· Baker, 2 Wila. 359 ; Rich e. Pierpont.
8 F. & F. 86; Beare e. Prentice, 8
EasL 849: Hancke "· Hooper. 7 C. &
P. 81; Lanphier "· Phi poe, 8 C."& P.
475; Lowry "· Guilford, G C. & P.
2.'J4; Ru!ISCll "· Palmer, 2 Wils. 825;
Chapmun 11. Chapman, L. R. 9 Bq.
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On the other hand, the rule is laid down in Pennsylvania that

lWS·PEltl•OIDIAXCL~

().!9

OF DUTIE-3.

the professional man must bring to the practice of his profession

a degree of skill and diligence such as those “thoroughly edu-

cated in his profession ordinarily employ.”' This is a severe

rule, and ﬁxes a standard of professional skill and attainments

which, in the newer portions of the country, would be quite out

of the question. In New Hampshire the undertaking of the

practitioner has been stated in the following language: “ By our

law a person who oﬁ'ers his services to the community generally,

or to any individual, for employment in any professional capa-

city as a person ot' skill, contracts with his employer: 1. That

he possesses that reasonable degree of learning, skill and expe-

rience which is ordinarily possessed by the professors of the

salne art or science, and which is ordinarily regarded by the

community and by those conversant with that employment as

necessary and sutlicient to qualify him to engage in such busi-

ness.” “ 2. That he will use reasonable and ordinary care and

diligence in the exertion of his skill and the application of his

knowledge to accomplish the purpose for which he is employed.

He does not undertake for extraordinary care or extraordinary

diligence any more than he does for uncommon skill.” “ 3. In

stipulating to exert his skill and apply his dili_'_{encc and care,
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the medical and other professional men contract to use their best

judgment.”' This is believed to be an accurate statement of

the implied promise. The practitioner must possess at least the

average degree of learning and skill in his profession in that

part of the country in which his services are oiI'ered to the

public; and if he exercises that learning and skill with reasona-

ble eare and ﬁdelity, he discharges his legal duty.‘ f

Cns. 276; Parker 0. Rolls, 14 C. B.

691; Pitt v. Yultlcn, 4 Burr. 2060. See

Pennington v. Yell, 11 Ark. 2l2.

1 McL‘andless u. MeWha, 22 Penn.

BL 201.

' Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. H. 460.

‘Lamina 0. llumphrcy, 9 Conn.

209; Iloward v. Grover, 28 Me. 97;

Siinonds 0. Henry, 89 Me. 155; Patten

0. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594; Holmes v.

Peck, 1 ll. I. 213; Rl!t'lu'_)' v. \\'\st,23

Ill. 385; L'!h~_\ r. lilltns, 70 lll. I62;

Barium v. Mezzns, 323 lll.1)T9; \\':ilkt:l'

53¢-~
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Q. Goodman, 21 Ala. 647; Branner s.

Stormont, 9 Kan. 5|; Wilmot 0. How.

urd, 89 Vt. 447; Huthorn 0. Rich-

mond, 48 Vt. 5-'17; Gullaher v. Thomp-

son, Wri_'_'l|t, (Ohio,) 466; (‘raig 1;.

Chambers, 17 Ohio, (N. s.) 2-‘>3; Wood

0. Clapp, 4 Sneed, 6-'1; Smothers 0.

Hanks, 34 Iowa, 256; llitchcock 0.

Bnrgett, 38 Mich. —; Rt'_\'nnltls 9,

Graves, 3 Wis. 416; Long v. Morrison,

14 Ind. 595; Gramm 1-. Bocner, 56

Ind. 497; Reilly 0. Cavanau_;h, 29

Ind. 435; Gambert o. Ilart, 44 Cal.

—I-

d

On the other hand, the rnle is laid down in Pennsylvania that
the professional man must bring to the practice of his profession
a degree of skill and diligent-a such as those " thoroughly educated in his profession ordinarily employ." 1 This is a sc\'ere
rnle, and fixes a standard of professional skill and attainments
which, in the newer portions of the conntry, would be quite out
()f the question. In New Hampshire the undertaking of the
practitioner has been stated in the following language: "By onr
law a person who offers his services to the community generally,
()r to any individual, for employment in any professional capacity as a person of skill, contracts with his employer: 1. That
he possesses that reasonable degree of learning, skill and experience which is ordinarily possessed by the pnlfessors of the
same art or science, ami which is ordinarily regarded by the
community and by those conversant with th:\t employment aa
necessary and suflicicnt to quality him to engage in such busioe::,s." "2. That he will use reasonabl~ and ordinary care and
iiligence in the exc1·tion of his skill and the application of his
knowledge to accomplish the purpose for which ho is employed.
He does not undertake for extraordinary care or extra01·di nary
iiligence any more than he does fo1· uncommon skill." "3. In
3tipulating to exert his skill and apply his diligence and <.'are,
the medical and other pt·ofcssiona.l men CtJntract to uso their best
judgment."' This is belitvcd to bo nn accurate statement of
the implied promise. The practitioner must pos:-e~s at least the
g,,·crabi"C degree of learning and skill in his profe:'siou in that
part of the country in which his servic...:s are om~rcJ to the
public; and if he exercises that learning and skill with reasonable care and fitlelity, he discharges his legal duty.' "f.
~-

Cll8. 2i0; Purkcr "· Rolle, 14 C. B.
601; Pitt t~. Ynhlen, 4 Burr. 2000. Bee
Pennington c. Yell, 11 Ark. 212.
1 ~(cl'andless D. 111cWha, 22 Penn.
St 261.
• kigltton t~. Hnrg-Pnt, 27 N. H. 4GO.
• Lnudon e. Humphrey, 0 Conn.
209; Howard "· Gr• •Vl'r, 28 }[c. 97;
8iuwmls 11. Henry, 39 :\Ic. 155; Patten
c. Wiggin, 51 )[c. !i!l4; Holmes 11.
Peck, 1 H. I. 2·tl; RitdH·y v. Wt st, 23
Ill. aSS; "l'th·~ r. llnrn-<. 70 Ill. lfi2;
IJuruea 11. )le;~ns, ti:J Ill. 379; Walker

.,. ~. w...,. ~
~·~·"'·'7J-:-

J-_
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Goodman, 21 A ln. 647; Branner e.
Stormont, 0 KRn. 51; Wilmot e. How.
:ml, 80 Vt. 447; Huthorn "· Rich.
mood, 48 Vt. 5:-i 7; Gullahl·r 11. Thompson, Wl"ig-ht, (Ohio,) 460; ('r:li~ e.
Chnmbt·rl!, 17 Ohio,(~. 8.) 2:-kl; Wood
e. Clapp, 4 Sneed. (i.i; Smothers e.
Hanks, 34 Iowa, 2-;{}; llitchcor.k e.
Burgett, 38 }li<'h. - ; Rl'ynolds e.
GraH's, 3 Wis. 416; Long 11. llorri ..on,
14 I Ill!. 5l).i; Oramm t'. Boencr, 58
Inti. 497; Reilly e. Cuvanaugh, ~
Ind. 435; Gam bert "· llart, 44 Cal .
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650 THE LAW OF TORTS.

Voluntary Services. Wl1e1'e friends and acquaintances are

650

THE LAW OF TORTS.

accustomed to give, and do give, to each other voluntary services

Without expectation of -reward, either because other assistance

cannot be procured, or because the means of parties needing

help will not enable them to engage such as may be within

reach, the law will not imply an undertaking for skill, even

when the services are such as professional men alone are usually

expected to render. And where there is no undertaking for

skill, the want of it can create no liability.‘ So the “street

opinion ” of an attorney, given in answer to a casual inquiry by

one to whom he holds no professional relation, cannot, however

erroneous, render him liable.‘ But when one holds himself out

to the public as having professional skill, and offers his services

to those who accept them on that supposition, he is responsible

for want of the skill he pretends to, even when his services are

rendered gratuitously.’

STATUTORY DUTIES-

Liability for Neglect. Wliere duties are imposed by statute

upon individuals or corporations, questions of liability for neglect

corresponding tc the questions which arise when oﬂicial duty

fails in performance, are of frequent occurrence and often of

diﬂiculty. The regulations which include the requirement of
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such duties are usually in the nature of regulations of police,

and the duties may be imposed for the purpose of giving to the

Voluntary Services. Where friends and acqoaintanees ar&
accustomed to give, and do give, to each other voluntary services
without expectation of. reward, either beca11se other assistance
cannot be procured, or because the means of parties needing
help will not enable them to engage such as may be within
reach, the law will not imply an und~rtaking for skill, even
when the services are such as profes£=ional men alone are usnal1y
expected to render. And where there is no undertaking for
skill, the want of it can create no liability.• So the "street
opinion" of an attorney, given in answer to a casual inquiry by
one to whom he holds no professional relation, cannot, however
erroneous, render him liable.' But when one holds himself out
to the public as having professional skill, and offers his services
to those who accept them on that supposition, he is responsible
for want of the skill he pretends to, even when his services are
rendered gratuitously.•

general public some new protection which the common law did

not provide, or in order to give to individuals liable to injury a

STATUTORY DUTIEB.

542; Heath 0. Glisan, 3 Ore. 64; 158; Beardslee 0. Richardson, 11

Boydston 0. Giltncr, 3 Ore. 119; Wil- Wend. 25.

liams 0. Popplcton, 3 Ore. 139; Hord

v. Grimes, 13 B. Mon. 188; Bcllinger

o. Craigue, 81 Barb. 534; Carpenter 0.

Blake, 60 Barb. 488; Phillips 0.

Bridge, 11 Mass. 242; Varnum 0.

Martin, 15 Pick. 440. If a proft-s-

sional mun turns an employment

over to another, he is responsible for

his conduct Walker o. Stevens, 79

Ill. 193; Bradstreet o. Everson, 72

Penn. St. 12-L.

1 Shiclls 0. Blackburne, 1 H. Bl.

Where duties are imposed by statute
upon individuals or corporations, questions of liability for neglect
corresponding tC' the questions which ari~;e when official duty
fails in performance, are of frequent occurrence and often of
difficulty. The regulations which include the requirement of
such duties are usually in the nature of regulations of poli~
and the duties may be imposed for the purpose of giving to the
general public some new protection which the common law did
not provide, or in order to ~ive to individuals liable to injury a
Liability for Neglect.

4 * i A *'--"*~‘-IIIIIQJ

* Fish o. Kelly, 17 C. B. (x. s.) 19-L

But when an employment actually

exists, it is immaterial whether the

injured party was the employer or

not; the liability is the same. Pippin

0. Sheppard, 11 Price, 400; Gladwell

0. Stc-ggall, 5 Bing. (N. C.) 733.

'McNevins 0. Lowe, 40 Ill 209;

Herd 0. Grimes, 18 B. Mon 158. See

Conner 0. Winton, 8 Ind. 315; Mus-

ser's Executor 0. Chase. 29 Ohio, (N. s.)

577.

M2; Heath e. Glisan, 8 Ore. M;
Boydston i!. Giltner, 8 Ore. 119; Wil.
Iiams e. Poppletun, B Ore. 1ll9; Hord
"· Grimes, 18 B. Mon. 188; Bellinger
e. Craigue, 81 "Harb. 534; Carpenter •·
Blake, 60 Barb. 488; Phillips •·
Bridge, 11 :Mass. 242; Varnum il.
Martin, 15 Pick. 440. If a profPs.
sional mnn turns an employment
over to another, he is responsible for
his conduct. Walker e. Stcl"cns, 79
Ill. 198; Bradstreet "· Everson, 72
Penn. St. 124.
• Shiel!& "· Blnckbarne, 1 H. Bl.

158 ; Beardslee •· Richardson, 11
Wr.nd. 25.
1 Fish e. Kelly, 17 C. B. (N. a.) 194_
But when an employment actually
exists, it is immaterial whether tho
Injured party was the employer or
not; the liability is the same. Pippin
"· Sheppnrd, 11 Price, 400; Glad well
e. 8t<>ggall, a Bing. (N. C.) 733.
a McNevins "· Lowe, 40 Ill 209 ~
Hord "·Grimes, 18 B. Mon. 188. See
Conner "· Winton, 8 Ind. 815; )Ius.
Rer'a Executor"· Chase, 29 Ohio, (N. e.)
577.
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remedy where none existed before, or more complete remedy than
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before existed. Often all these purposes are had in view, though

none of them may be expressly declared. \Vheu the latter is

the case the question of civil liability to parties who may be

danmiﬁed hy the neglect can only be determined on a careful

consideration of the statute and of the end it was manifestly

intended to accomplish.

There are certain rules for the construction of such statutes

which will afford some aid in the endeavor to arrive at the real

intent. It must be admitted, however, that they are not very

certain or very conclusive guides, and that the exceptions to

them are numerous. The rules, as we shall give them below,

relate not only to the cases where new duties are imposed, but

also to those where a new remedy is given for the breach of a

pre-existing duty; and they are brought together because the

cases that illustrate one rule will often throw light upon the

others also.

I. Where a remedy existed at the common law, and a new

remedy is given by statute, and there are no negative words in

the statute indicating that the new remedy is to be exclusive, the

presumption is it was meant to be cumulative, and the party

injured may pursue at his option either the common law remedy,
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or the remedy given by the statute.‘ For example, the common

law gives to one whose property is seized on an attachment sued

out maliciously and without probable cause an action on the ease

for the injury, and it has often been held that a statute requiring

the attachment creditor to give bond to pay all damages suffered

by the suing out of his writ, provided for a cumulative remedy

only, and the remedy at the common law might still be resorted

to.’ So a statute giving a summary remedy for the assessment

' Farmer's Turnpike Road o. Cov-

entry, 10 Johns. 889; Crittenden 1:.

Wilson. 5 Cow. 165; Livingston 0.

Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507; Renwiek v.

llorris, 7 llill, 575; Treinain 0. Rich-

ardson. 68 N. Y. 617; Ward 0. Sever-

ance. 7 Cal. 126; Gooch 0. Stevenson,

18 Me. 371; Hayes o. Porter, 22 Me.

871; Culnherlund, etc., Corp. v. Hitch-

lngs, 59 Me. 206; Washington, etc.,

Road 0. State, 19 Md. 239; Cundce 0.

Hayward. 37 N.Y. 653; Lane o. Salter,

51 N. Y. 1; Mayor, etc., of Liehﬂi-ld

remedy where none existed before, or more complete remedy tlum
before existed. Often all these purposes are had in view, though
none of them may be expressly declared. 'Vhen the latter is
the case the question of civil liability to parties who may ~
damnified by the neglect can only be determined on a careful
consideration of the statute and of the end it was manifestly
intended to accomplish.
There are certain rules for the construction of sneh statutes
which will afford some aid in the endeavor to arrive at the real
intent. It must be admitted, however, that they are not very
certain or very conclusive gnidt.>s, and that the exeepttons to
them are numerous. The rules, as we shall give them below,
relate not only to the cases where new duties are imposed, bot
also to those where a new remedy is given for the breach of a
pre-existing duty; and they are brought together be<."Buse the
eases that illustrate one rule will often throw light upon the
others also.
L Where a remedy existed at the common law, and a new
remedy is given by statute, and there are no negative words in
the statute indicating that the new remedy is to be exclusive, the
presumption is it was meant to be cumulative, and the party
injured may pur~>ue at his option either the common law remec..ly,
or the remedy given by the statute: For example, the common
law gives to one whose property is seized on an attachment sued
ont maliciously and withont probable cause an action on the case
for the injnry, and it has often been held that a statute requiring
the attachment creditor to give bond to pay all damages suffered
by the suing out of his writ, provided for a cumulative remedy
only, and the remedy at the common law might still be resorted
to.• So a statute giving a summary remedy for the assessment

c. Simpson, 8 Q. B. 65; Williams 0.

Golding, L. R. 1 C. P. 69.

' Lawrence c. Ilagcrman, 56 Ill. 68:

Spaids 0. Barrett. 57 Ill. 289; Donnell

0. Jones, 18 Ala. 490; Sanders 0.

Hughes, 2 Brevard, 495: Smith 0.

Eakin, 2 Sneed, 456; Smith 0. Story,

4 Humph. 169; Pettit o. Mercer, 8 B.

Mon. 61; Sledge 0. McLaren, 29 Geo.

I Farmer's Turnpike Road "· Cov.
entry, tO Johns. 889; Crittenden "·
Will!On, rs Cow. 165; Livingston •.
Van lngen, 9 Johns. 507; Renwick e.
Horris, 7 Hill, 575; Tremain"· Uicb.
ardson, 68 N. Y. 617; Ward "· Sever.
mce, 7 Cal. 126; Gooch "· Stevenson,
18 Jrle. 371; Hayes "· Porter, 22 Me.
871; Cumberland, etc., Corp. e. Hitchtoga, 69 lle. 206; Washington, etc.,
Road e. State, 19 Jrld. 239; Candee e.

Hayward, 87 N.Y. 653; Lane"· Balter.
Gl N.Y. 1; Mayor, etc., of LicbiMd
"· Simpson, 8 Q. B. 65; Williams e.
Golding, L R. 1 C. P. 69.
• Lawrence e. Hagerman, GO Ill. 68;
Bpaids "· Barrett, 57 Ill. 289; Donnell
"· Jones, 18 AI&. 400; Sanders "·
Hughes, 2 Brevard, 493; Smith "·
Eakin, 2 Snet>d, 456; Smith "· Story,
4 Hnmph. 169; Pettit "· Mercer, 8 B.
Mon. 61; Sledge e. MclAren, 29 Geo.
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THE LAW OF TOB'1‘B-

of damages done by trespassing cattle is cumulative.‘ So the

statute authorizing highway commissioners to order the removal

of fences encroaching upon highways does not take away the

common law remedy by abatement.’ So the statutory authority

to forfeit stock in corporations for non-payment of calls lawfully

made upon the subscriptions thereto does not take away the

remedy by suit upon the promise to pay contained in the sub-

scription.’ So if a highway surveyor obstructs the passage from

one’s dwelling to the road by cutting a ditch along the side of

the road. it is no answer to a common law action against him

that a statute in such case gives a remedy against the town.‘

Neither is it an answer to an action against a ferry keeper for

an injury OCC1\.~‘lOll0d by his negligence that under the statute he

has been compelled to give bond, on which an action will lie for

the same injury.‘

II. But the common law remedy may be excluded by implica-

tion as well as by express negative words; and where that which

constitutes the actionable wrong is permitted on public grounds,

but on condition that compensation be made, and the statute pro-
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vides an adequate remedy, whereby the party injured may obtain

redress, the inference that this was intended to be the sole remedy

must generally be conclusive. It has been so held in many eases

where land or other property has been taken for public use under

the eminent domain.‘

64. Sec Booker's Exrs. 0. McRoberts,

1 Clll, "213; Washington, etc., Co. 1:.

‘ Adams 1:. Richardson. 43 N. H. 212.

‘ Wells v. Steele, 31 Ark. 219. Mak-

State, I9 Md. 2:39.

‘ Cohh-n 0. Eltlrcd, 15 Johns. 220;

Stafford v. Ingersoll, 3 Hill, 38; Moore

0. \Vhi1e, 45 Mo. 206.

-of damages done by trespassing l'llttle is cumulative.' So tho
statute authorizing highway commissioners to order the removal
of fence;; encroaching upon highways does not take away the
common law remedy by abatement.' So the statutory anthority
to forfeit stock in corporntions for non-payment of calls lawfully
made upon the subscriptions thereto does not take away the
remedy by snit upon the promise to pay contained in the subscription! So if a highway surveyor obstructs the passage from
<me's dwelling to the road by cutting a ditch along the side of
the road. it is no answer to a common law action against him
that a statnte in such case gives a remedy against the town. 6
Neither is it an answer to an action against a ferry keeper for
an injury occa:-;ioned by his negligence that under the statute he
ha..; been compelled to give bond, on which an action will lie for
the same injury.•
II. But the common law remedy may be excluded by implication as well as by express negative words; and where that whieh
constitutes the actionable wrong is permitted on public grounds,
but on condition that compensation be made, and the statute provides nn adequate remedy, whereby the party injured may obtain
rerlrer-,.;, the inferen<.oe that this was intended to be the sole remedy
must generally be conclusive. It has been so held in many ca.sea
where land or other property has been taken for public use under
the eminent domain.•

" Wclmore 1;. Tracy, 14 Wend. 250.

See, for the same principle, Renwick

0. Morris, 7 Hill, 575. '

'Goshen Turnpike Co. v. Hurtin,

9 Johns. 217; Small v. Hcrkimer

Mauuf. Co., 2 N Y. 330; Nor. R. R.

Co. v. Miller, 10 Barb. 260; Troy, etc.,

R. R. Co. 0. Tibbits, 18 Barb. 297;

Carson 0. Mining Co., 5 Mich. 288;

Inglis v. Great Nor. R. Co., 1 Macq.

H. L. Gas. 112; Great Nor. R. Co. 1:.

Kennedy, 4 Exch. 417; Giles 0. Hutt,

3 Exch. 18. '

- 7 7 __ _ A - _ _.< ‘-ml

ing the supervisor of roads liable for

dcfects in the highways does not re-

lieve the county commissioners who

were liable before. County Commis-

sioners o. Gibson, 36 Md. 229.

‘Fuller 1;. Edings, 11 Rich. 289;

Conwt-ll v. Hagerstown Canal Co., 2

Ind. 588; Crawfordsville, etc., R. R.

(30.1. Wright, 5 Ind. 252; People e.

Mich. Sou. R. R. Co., 3 Mich. 496;

Smith o. McAdam, 3 Mich. 506; Mc-

Cormick v. Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co.,

9 Ind. 283: Sudbury Meadows v. Mid-

dlcsex Canal Co., 23 Pick. 36; Ste-

vens u. Middlesex, 12 Mass. 466; Sou-

lard v. St. Louis, 36 Mo. 546; Baker

9. Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co., 36 M0_

64. Bee Booker's Exrs. 11. McRoberts,
1 C:•ll, 213; \Va!'>hington, etc., Co. 11.
State, 1!J ?tld. 2:39.
1 Cr,hlr·n "'· Eldred, 15 Johns. 220;
Stnftiml "·Ing-ersoll, 3 Hill, 88; }[oore
11. White, 45 :Mo. 206.
• Wetmore "· Tracy, 14 Wend. 250.
See, fur the s1une principle, Renwick
"·:Morris, 7 Hill, 575.
• Goshen Turnpike Co. "· Hurtin,
9 Johns. 217; Small "· Herkimer
Maouf. Co., 2 N Y. :130: Nor. R. R.
Co."'· lliller, 10 Barb. 260; Troy, etc.,
R. R. Co. "'· Tibbits, 18 Barb. 297;
Carson "· !lining Co., 5 Mich. 288;
Inglis "· Great Nor. H. Co., 1 Macq.
H. L. Vas. 112; Great Nor. R. Co. "'·
Kennedy, 4 Exch. 417; Giles "· Hutt,
.S Exch. 18.

• Adams"· Richardson, 43 N.H. 212.
• Well<~ 11. Steele, 31 Ark. 219. MakIng the Bllpcrvisor of roads liable for
defects in the highways does notrelieve the county commissioners who
were liuble before. County Commi:J..
sioners "· Gibson, 36 :\[d. 229.
1 }'uller 11. Edings, 11 Rich. 239;
Conwell 11. Hagerstown Canal Co.• 3
Ind. 588; Crawfordsville, etc., R. R
Vo. "·Wright. 5 Ind. 252; People e.
Mich. Sou. R. R. Co., 8 Mich. 498:
8mith 11. McAdam, 8 llich. 506; MeCormlck "·Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co.,
9 Ind. 283: Sudbury Meadows v.lliddlesex Canal Co., 23 Pick. 86; Stevens "· Middlesex, 12 Mass. 466; Soulard "·St. Louis, 86 !lo. 546; Baker
e. Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co., 86 Mo.
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III. Where the statute imposes a new duty, where none existed
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before, and gives a. speciﬁc remedy for its violation, the presump-

tion is that this remedy was meant to be exclusive, and the party

complaining of a breach is conﬁned to it.‘ It is upon this ground

that it has been many times held that when the right to exact

tolls has been conferred upon a corporation, and a summary

_remedy given for their collection, the corporation must ﬁnd in

this summary remedy its sole redress when an attempt is made

to evade paymcnt."' So if performance of the duty is enjoined

under penalty, the recovery of this penalty is in general the sole

remedy, even when it is not made payable to the party injured.‘

But the rule is not without its exceptions; for if a plain duty is

543; Caiking 0. Baldwin, 4 Wend.

667; McKinney 0. lilonon. Nav. Co.,

14 Penn. St. 65; Cole v. Mnscstine,14

Iowa, 296; Si.u\\'('ll 1:. Flag-g, 11 Mass.

3454: Dodge 1-. Connnissioners, etc.,

8 Met. 380; Null v. Whitewater, etc.,

III. Where the statnte imposes a new dnty, where none existed
before. and gives a specific remedy tor its violl\tion, the presumption is that this remedy was meant to be exclusive, and the party
complaining of a breach is confineq to it: It is upon this ground
that it has been many times held that when the right to exact
tolls has been <..'Onfcl'l'eJ upon a corporation, and a summary
.remedy gi\·en for their collection, the corporation must find in
this summary remedy its sole redress when an attempt is made
to evade payment.' So if performance of the dnty is enjoined
under penalty, the re<.'O\'ery of this penalty is in general the sole
remedy, even when it is not niade payable to the pat·ty injured.'
But the rule is not without its exceptions; tor if a plain duty is

Co., 4 Ind. 431; Kimble o. White-

water, etc.,Co., 1 ind. 285; Lebanon

v. Oicott, 1 N. ll. 339; Troy 0. Ches-

hire R R. Co., 23 N. H. 83; Henuikcr
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0. Contoocook Valley R. R. Co., 29

N. H. 146; Renwick u. Morris,7 Hill,

575; Babb o. Mackcy, 10 Wis. 371.

In some cases it has been held that

the common law remedy still re-

mained and might be resorted to; as

where a water course was diverted by

statutory authority. Proprietors, etc.,

o. Frye, 5 Me. 38. Oontra, Caiking 0.

Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667; McKinney 0.

Monon. Nav. Co., 14 Penn. St. 65. And

where land and buildings were in-

jured by ﬂooding, or by the percola-

tion of water, caused by the enlarge-

ment of a canal under statutory au-

thority. St-iden 0. Canal Co., 24 Barb.

362. Contra, Stowell 0. Fiagg, 11

Mass. 364; Hazcn 0. Essex Co., 12

Cush. 4'75. If a privilege is given by

statute which is exceeded, the statu-

tory remedy will not exclude a suit

for the excess. Renwick u. Morris,

7 Hill, 575.

' Aimy 0. Harris, 6 Johns. 175; Ed-

wards u. Davis, 16 Johns. 281; Smith

0. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209; Dudieyo.

Mahew, 3 N. Y. 9; Thurston c. Pren-

tiss, 1 Mich. 193; Retidick 0. Governor,

1 Mo. 147; Lang v. Scott, 1 Blackf.

405; Johnston o. Louisville, 11 Bush,

527; Smith v. Drew, 5 Mass. 514;

Green 0. B:\iley,3 N. H. 33; Beckford

0. Hood, 7 T. R. 620; Doe 0. Bridges,

1 B. & Ad. 847; Vestry of St. Pan-

cras 0. Batterbury, 2 C. B. (N. s.) 477;

Stevens 0. Jeacocke, 11 Q. B. 731;

Marshall 0. Nichoils. 18 B. SS2.

' Turnpike Co. v. Martin, 12 Penn.

St. 361; Beclcr 1:. Turnpike C0,, 14

Penn. St. 162; Kidder 0. Boom Co.,

24 Penn. St. 103; Turnpike Co. e. Van

Dusen, 10 Vt 197; Russell 0. Turn-

pike Co., 13 Bush, 307. This is the

rule generally applied in the case of

taxes; if the statute imposing them

prescribes a remedy, no other can be

implied. See cases collected in Coo-

643; Culking e. Baldwin, oi Wend.
667; McKinm·y e. Monon. Nav. Co.,
Penn. 8t. 6.3; Colu !1.1\luscatine,14
Iowa, 2H6; St'''H II "· Fla.~g. 11 llass.
Rli4; Dodge r. Comm issiom•rs, etc.,
8 MeL 380; Null e. Whitewater, etc.,
Co., ' Ind. 431; Kimble "· White.
water, etc., Co., 1 lou. 2$.3; Lebanon
"·Olcott. 1 N. H. 339; Troy "· CheshireR R. Co., 23 N. H.83; Henniker
"· Contoocook Valley R. H. Co., 29
N. II. 146; Renwick"· Morris, 7llill,
o75; llabb "· .Mack<'y, 10 Wi11. 371.
In some C'ases it ha!i lK>en held that
the common la\v remedy still re.
mnined and might be r<•!!orted to; as
where " water course was diverted by
11tatutory authority. Proprietors, etc.,
tJ. Frye, 5 ~[c. 38. Oontm, Calking e.
Baldwin, 4 Wt•nd. 667; McKinney •·
}Ionon. N RV. Co., 14 Penn. St. 65. And
where land and buildings were fn.
jured by Oooding, or by the percola.
tion of watPr, cnusPd by the tmlarge.
ment of " canal under statutory au.
thority. Sdden "· Canal Co., 24 Barb.
a62 Contra, Stowell "· Flagg, 11
Mass. 364; llazPn "· Essex Co., 12
Cush. 475. If a privile~c is given by
11tatutc which is exceeded, the statu.
tory remedy will not exclude a suit
for the excess. Renwick •· Morris,
'I Hill, 575.
I Alroy tJ. Harris, IS Johns. 1715; Ed-

1'

wards o. D.wis, 16 Johns. 281; Smith
c. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 200;

Dudley~

1\IKbew, 8 N. Y. 9; Thurston "· Pren.
tisa, 1 Mich. 193; Re.ldick "·Governor,
1 llo. 147; L:mg" 11. Scott, 1 Blackf.
405; Johnston 11 Louis\·illc, 11 Bush,
527; Smith tJ, Drew, 5 llaas. 51';
Green c.llailey,3 N.H. 88; Beckford
"· Hood, 7 T. R. 620; Doc e. Bridges,
1 B. & Ad. 847; V Pstry of St. PIUlcras "· Batterbury, 2 C. B. (R. s.) 477;
Stevens e. J encockc, 11 Q. B. 731;
Marsh:1l1 "· Nicholl!i. 18 Q. B. 882.
1 Turnpike Co. e. }(artin, 12 Penn.
St. 861; Bet•lcr tJ. Turnpike Co,, 1'
Penn. St. 162; Kidder "· Boom Co.,
M P<·nn. St. 1ll3; Turnpike Co. e. Van
Duscn, 10 VL 197; Russell e. Turn.
pike C'.o., 13 Bush, 307. This Ia the
rule gt•nerally applied In the case of
taxes; If the statute imposing thean
pre!<cribes a remedy, no other can be
implit.od. Sec cases collected in Coo.
ley on Taxation, 13. But If the &tat..
ute gives a corporation the right to
"demand and recover " tolls for tho
passnge of logs, and to detain the logs
until the tolls arc paid, this, by im.
plication, autborizt'S anita.
Bear
Cnmp River Co. e. Woodman, 2 Me.
404.
1 Turnpike Co. e. Brown, 9 Pen. &
Watts, 4(j2; Almy e. Harris. 15 Johns.
175; Flynn c. Canton Co., 40 lrld. 81J;
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imposed for the beneﬁt of individuals, and the penalty 1B obvi-
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ously inadequate to compel performance, the implication will be

strong, if not conclusive, that the penalty was meant to be cumu-

lative to such remedy as the common law gives when a duty

owing to an individual is neglected.‘ And if the duty imposed

is obviously meant to he a duty to the public, and also to indi-

viduals, and the penalty is made payable to the State or to an

informer, the right of an individual injured to maintain an

action on the case for a breach of the duty owing to him will be

unquestionable.

There are always questions of ditﬁcnlty respecting the remedy

when a statute imposes a duty as a regulation of police, without

in terms pointing out what shall be the rights on the one side

and the liabilities on the other, if the duty is neglected. Is the

duty imposed on public grounds exclusively, and if not, what

persons or classes of persons are within its intended protection?

These are the problems which such statutes usually present.

Some idea of the ditiieulties attending their construction may be

had from a brief consideration of one class of them.

Statutes for Fencing Railroads. At the common law, railroad

companies, as owners of the land over which their tracks run,

are under no obligation to fence them in order to protect their
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tracks against cattle straying upon them, and it is the duty of the

owners of cattle to prevent their thus straying.’ If the owners

Kirby 0. Market Ass‘n.. 14 Gray, 249.

Compare Collinson v. Newcastle, ctc.,

R. Co., 1 C. 8: K. 545.

' Salem Turnpike, ctc., Co. 0. Hayes,

imposed for the benefit of individuals, and the penalty 18 ob\·iously inadequate to compel performance, the implication will be
strong, if not conclusive, that the penalty was meant to be cumulative to such remedy as the common law gives when a duty
owing to an individual is neglected.' And if' the duty imposed
is obviously meant to be a duty to the public, and also to individuals, and the penalty is made payable to the State or to an
informer, the right ot' an individual injured to maintain an
action on the case for a breach of the duty owing to him will be
unquestionable.
There are always questions of difficulty respecting the remedy
when a statute imposes a duty as a regulation of police, without
in terms pointing out what shall be the rights on the one side
and the liabilities on the other, if the duty is neglected. Is the
duty imposed on public grounds exclusively, and if not, what
persons or classes of persons are within its intended protection!
These are the problems which such statutes usually present.
Some idea of the difficulties attending their construction may be
bad from a brief consideration of one class of them.

6 Cush. 458. See Aldrich 0. Howard,

'7 R. 1. 199; Ryan v. Gallatin Co., 14

lll. '78; Dunlap 0. Gallatin Co., 15 Ill.

'7; Johnston 0. Louisville, 11 Bush,

527; Curry v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.,

43 Wis. 665. See, also, Shepherd v.

Hills, 11 Exch. 55; Mayor of Litch-

Statutes for Fencing Bailroada. At the common law, railroad
companies, as owners of the land over which their tracks rnn,
are under no obligation to fence them in order to protect their
tracks RoO"Rinst cattle straying upon them, and it is the duty of the
owners of cattle to prevent their thus straying.• If the ownera

ﬁeld v. Simpson, 8 Q. B. 65.

1 Manchester, etc., R. o. Wallis, 14

C. B. 213; S. C. 25 E. L. & Eq. 373;

Touawanda R. R. Co. 0. Munger, 5

Denio, 255; S. C. 4 N. Y. 349; Wil.

liams o. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 2 Mich.

259; Vandergrift 0. Rediker, 22 N. J.

é i 7___ __ _ _ _ _ _--J

185; Price 0. N. J. R. R. Co., 81 NJ.

229; Brown 1:. Hannibal, etc., R. R.

Co., 33 Mo. 309; Richmond e. Rail-

road Co., 18 Cal. 351; Railroad C0. 0.

Skinner, 19 Penn. St. 298; Nor. Penn.

R. R. Co. 0. Rchman, 49 Penn.St. 101;

Vandergrift 0. Delaware. etc., R. R.

Co., 2 Houst. 287; Louisville, etc., R

R. C0. v. Ballard, 2 Met. (Ky.) 177;

Hurdo. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 25

Vt. 116. Compare Jackson v. Rut-

land, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 150; Hou-

satonic R. R. Co. 0. Knowles, 30 Conn.

813; Locke e. First Div., etc., R R.

Co., 15 Minn. 350 Compare Fritz e.

First Div., etc., R. R Co.,22 .\linn.

404; Towns 0. Cheshire R. R. Co., 2!

N. H. 363; Michigan, etc., R. R. C0.

Kirby e. Market Ass'n .• 14 Gray, 249.
Compare Collinson e. Newcaslle, etc.,
R. Co., 1 C. & K. 545.
• Salem Turnpike, etc., Co. e. Hayes,
li Cush. 458. See Aldrich e. Howard,
7 R. I. 199; Ryan "· Gallatin Co., 14
111. 78; Dunlap e. Gallatin Co.,15 Ill.
7; Jolmston "· Louisville, 11 Bush,
627; Curry"· Chicago, etc.. R. R. Co.,
4:i Wis. 665. See, also, Bhephcrd •·
Hills, 11 Exch. 55; Mayor of Litchfield"· Simpson, 8 Q. B. 65.
i :rtianchester, etc., R. e. Wallis, 14
C. B. 2Vj; S. C. 2.5 E. L. & Eq. 373;
Tonawanda R. R. Co. •· Munger, 5
Denio, 255; S. C. 4 N. Y. 349 : Wil.
liams "· Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 2 Mich.
259; Vandergrift e. Hedikcr, 22 N.J.

18!i; Price e. N.J. R. R. Co., 81 N.J.
229; Brown e. Hannibal, etc., R. R.
Co., 83 :Mo. 809; Richmond e. Railroad Co., 18 Cal. 851 ; Railroad Co. t.
Skinner, 19 Penn. tit. 298; Nor. Penn.
R. R. Co. "· Rehman, 49 Penn. St.101;
Vandergrif\ "· Delaware. etc., R. R.
Co., 2 Houst. 287; Louisville, etc., R
R. Co. "· Ballard, 2 Met. {Ky.) 177;
Hurd e. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 25
Vt. 116. Compare Jacbon e. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 150; Housatonic R. R. Co. e. Knowles, 80 Conn.
813; Locke e. First Div., etc., R. R
Co., 15 Minn. 850 Compare Fritz •·
First Div., etc., R. R. Co., 22 Minn.
404; Towns e. Cheshire R. R. Co., 21
N. H. 363; Michigan, etc., R. R. Co.
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fail in this duty, they would not only be without remedy for any

injury their cattle might receive while trespassing on the track,

but they might even be liable themselves if cars or engines were

injured by the cattle being encountered, provided the owners

were negligent in suffering them to stray there.‘

It is now very generally required by statute that railroad com-

panies shall fence their tracks. The statutes differ greatly in

their provisions, and in the remedies they prescribe for a breach

of the duty. It is conceded that one of the chief purposes of

such statutes is to protect the lives and limbs of the traveling

public, who, as they pass over railroads, are exposed to great and

constant hazards when cattle are not eﬁeetually excluded from

the tracks. But another purpose is to protect the cattle them-

selves, and this is commonly done by making railroad companies

responsible for the cattle killed or injured by their engines or

otherwise upon the unfenced tracks.‘

Where a liability for injury to cattle is imposed in general

terms, a question is certain to arise, whether, in fact, the remedy

is intended to be as broad as the general terms would indicate, or
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whether, on the other hand, its beneﬁts were not intended exclu-

sively for those whose cattle were lawfully on the adjacent lauds;

that is to say, the cattle of the owners of such adjacent lands, and

such other cattle as might be kept there, or have a right for any

reason to be there. In many cases this question has arisen, and

the decisions are not uniform. In some States it has been held

o. Fisher, 27 Ind. 96; Nor. East. R. R.

Co. 1:. Sineath, 8 Rich. 185.

Grat. 619; Baltimore, etc., R. R. C0.

0. Mulligan, 45 Md. 486; Darling 0.

' Railroad Co. 0. Skinner, 19 Penn.

St. 298; Williams 0. New Albany,

etc., R. R. Co., 5 Ind. 111. The ques-

tion in such a ease will of course

fail in this duty, they would not only be without remedy for any
injury their cattle might receive while trespassing on the track,
but they might even be liable themselves if cars or engines were
injured by the cattle being encountered, provided the owners
were negligent in suffering them to stray there.'
It is now very generally required by statute that railroad companies shall fence their tracks. The statutes differ greatly in
their provisions, and in the remedies they prescribe for a breach
of the duty. It is conceded that one of the chief purposes of
such statutes is to protect the lives and limbs of the traveling
public, who, as they pass over railroads, are exposed to great and
constant hazards when cattle are not effectually excluded from
the tracks. But another purpose is to protect the cattle themselves, and this is commonly done by making railroad companies
responsible for the cattle killed or injured by their engines or
otherwise npon the unfenced tracks.'
Where a liability for injury to cattle is imposed in general
terms, a question is certain to arise, whether, in fact, the remedy
is intended to be as broad as the general terms would indicate, or
whether, on the other band, its benefits were not intended excluaively for those whose cattle were lawfully on the adjacent lands;
that is to say, the cattle of the owners of such adjacent lands, and
such other cattle as might be kept there, or have a right for any
reason to be there. In many cases this question has arisen, and
the decisions are not uniform. In some States it has been held

be one of negligence. If cattle are

straying upon a railroad track they

must not be willfully or recklessly

run over; if they are, the company

may be responsible. See Laws 0.

Nor. Car. R. R. Co., 7 Jones, (N.

C.) 468; Hurd 0. Rutland, etc., R. R.

Co., 25 Vt. 110: Holden v. Sumo, 30

Vt. 297; New Orleans, etc., R. It Co.

0. Ficld,46 Miss. 573; Fritz e. First

Div., etc., R. R. Co., 22 Minn. 404;

Trout v. Virginia, etc., R. R. Co., 23

Boston, etc., R R. Co., I21 Mass. 118;

Rockford, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ratferty,

73 Ill. 58.

' If a railroad is leased, the lessor

is liable under such a statute. Nel.

son v. Vermont, etc., R. R. R. Co.,

26 Vt. 717; Clement 0. Cnnﬁeld, 28 Vt,

802. So is the lessee. lll. (‘ant R.

R C0. 0. Kanouse, B9 111.272; Toledo,

etc., R R. Co. v. Rumbold, 40 Ill. 143.

The contractor is liable under some

statutes while building the road.

Gardner 0. Smith, 7 Mich. 410. See

St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Gerber, 82

Ill. 632.

•· Fisher, 27 Ind. 96; Nor. East. R R
Co. "· SineaLh, 8 Rich. 1~.
' Railroad Co. "· Skinner, 19 Penn.
HL 298; Williams .,. New Albany,
etc., R. R. Co., IS Ind. 111. The qoe.tion in auch a case will of course
be one of negligence. IC cattle are
straying upon a railroad track they
must not be willfully or recklessly
run over; if they are, the company
may be responsible. See Laws "·
Nor. Car. R. R. Co., 7 Jones, (N.
C.) 468; llurd .,, Rutland, etc., R. R.
Co., ~ Vt. 116: Holden "· Same, 80
Vt. 297; New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co.
e. Field, 46 :&ti~s. 578; Fritz .,, First
Div., etc., R. R. Co., 22 Minn. 404;
Trout e. VIrginia, eto., R R Co., 23

OraL 619; Baltimore. etc., R R. Co.
t. Mulligan, 45 Md. 486; Darling 1.
BoetrJn, etc., R. R Co., 121 MBSlJ. 118;
Rockford, etc., R R. Co. t. RaJferty,

'l8 Ill. 58.
• Ir a railroad ia leased, the leaaor
Ia liable under such a statute. NeL
eon "· Vermont, etc., R R. R. Co.,
26 Vt. 717; Clement •· Canfield, 28 Vt.
802. So ia the lessee. Ill. Cent. R.
R. Co. e. Kanouse, 89 Ill. 272; Toledo,
etc., R. R. Co. 11. Rumbold, 40 Ill. 143.
The contracLor Ia liable under some
etatutea while building the road.
Gardner.,, Smith, 7 llich. 410. Bee
SL Louis, etc., R R Co. t. Gerber, 82
Dl. 632.
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that if cattle stray upon the adjoining lands, and from thence
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pass upon the track through insuﬂicient fences, and are injured,

the owners, being themselves in fault for suffering them to stray,

have no remedy whatever.‘ But in other States the conclusion

is, that it was intended that all persons should have the beneﬁt

of the statutory protection.’ Differences in the phraseology of

statutes will account in part for the differences in conclusions, but

not entirely.‘

‘ See Bemis o. Connecticut, etc., B.

B. Co., 42 Vt. 375; Eames v. Salem,

etc., R. R. Co., 08 Muss. 560; Mc-

Donald c. Pittstlcld,etc., R. R. (30,115

that if cattle stray npon the adjoining lands, and from thenoo
pass upon the track through insufficient fences, and are injured,
the owners, being themseh·es in fault for suffering them to stray,
ha\·e no remedy whatever.' But in other States the conclusion
is, that it was intended that all persons should have the benefit
of the statutory protection.• Differences in the phraseology of
statutes will account in part for the differences in conclusions, but
not entirely. •

Mass 564. Bee Berry 0. St. Louis.

etc., R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 172.

’ Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. o. Mc-

Kinney, 2l Ind. ‘.353; lsbell v. New

York, etc., R. R. Co., 27 Conn. 393;

McCall o. Chamberlain, 18 Wis. 637;

Curry 1:. ClllCrl_'_!(), etc., R. R. Co., 43

Wis. 665; Corwin v. New York, etc.,

R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42; Bradley 0.

Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 427;
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Shepard v. Butfulo, etc., R. R. Co., 35

N. Y. 641: Tracy 0. Troy, etc.,R.R.

Co., 38 N. Y. 433; Ewing 0. Chicago,

etc., R. R. Co., 72 Ill. 25; Cairo, etc.,

R. R. Co. o. Murray, 82 Ill. 76. Sec

Fawcett o. York, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Q.

B. 610.

These statutes do not impose on

railroad companies the obligation to

fence their stations and such grounds

aswould be lnconveniently used if

fenced, and the question of liability

for cattle injured in such places is

purely one of negligence. Swearin-

gen 0. Missouri, etc., R. R. Co., 64 Mo.

73; Smith 0. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.,

34 Iowa, 5- 6; Robertson 0. Railroad

Co., 64 Mo. 412; Toledo, etc., R. R.

Co. v. Spengler, 71 Ill. 568. Wliere

they are required to fence, an agree-

ment with the adjoining owncr that

they need not do so will not relieve

them from any obligation to other per-

sons. Gilinun 0. European, etc., R.

00., so Me. 235. And the fact um

they exercise the highest care in run-

ning their trains will not excuse tht-tn.

German e. Railroad Co., 26 Mo 441

See Union Pac. R. R. C0. u. Rollins,

5 Kan. 167.

' Following are cases in which the

liability of railroad companies for in-

jury to cattle on unfenced or imper-

fectly fenced tracts have been consid-

ered: Dawson o. Midland R. Co., L.

R. 8 Exch.S; Willianis 0. Great West-

ern R. Co., L. R. 9 Exch. 157; Wanless

v. N. E. R. Co., L. R. 6 Q.B 481;

Stnplcy c. London, etc., R. Co., L. R.

1 Exch. 20. Hurd o. Rutland, etc., R.

R. Co., 25 Vt. 116; Nelson c. Vt. Cent.

R R. Co., 26 Vt. 717; Thorpe 1.1. Rut-

land,etc., R R Co., 27 Vt. 140; Clark

0. Vt. & Can. R. R. Co., 28 Vt. 103; Cle-

ment 0. Cantleld, 28 Vt. 802; Holden

0. Rutlaud, etc., R R. Co., 30 Vt. 297;

Bcmis e. Can., etc., R. R Co., 42 Vt.

J See Bemis t!. Connecticut, etc., R.
they exercise the highest care 10 runR. Co., 42 Vt. 375; Eames e. H11lem, nin~ their trains will not excuse them.
etc., R. R. Co., 9~ 1\[llSS. 560; Mc- Gorman fl. Railroad c,,., 26 Mo. 441.
Donald t:. Pittsfield, etc., R. R. Co ,115 See Union Pac. R. R. Co. e. Rollins,
Mass 564. Sec Berry e. St. Louis.
5 Kan.167.
1 Following are cases in which the
etc., R R. Co , 6:; 1\lo. 172.
'Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. e. Mc- liability of railroad companil'S for inKinney, 21 Ind. 2tl3; lsuell e. New
jury to cattle on unfenced or imper.
York, etc., R R. Co., 27 Conn. 393; fectly fenced tracts have been con~id
McCall e. Chamberlain, 18 Wis. 637; ered: Dawson "· Midland R. Co., L.
Curry t!. Ch ic:1_go, etc., R. R. Co., 4S R. 8 Excb.S; Williams"· Great West.
Wis. 665; Corwin t!. New York, etc., ern R. Co., L. R. 9 Exch. 157; W aniCIIS
R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42; Bradley e.
"· N. E. R. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B 481;
Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 427; Stapley"· London, etc., R. Co., L. R.
1 Exch. 20. Hurd"· Rutland, etc.. R.
~bep11rd "· Buffalo, etc., R H.. Co., M
N.Y. 641: Tracy e. Troy, etc., R. R. R. Co., 25 VL 116; N elsnn ~- Vt. Cent
Co.,38N.Y.433: Ewing fl. Chicago, R R. Co., 26 Vt. 717; Thorpe v. Rutetc., R. R. Co., 72 Ill. 2.); Cairo, etc., land, etc., R R Co., 27Vt.l40; Clark.
R. R. Co."· 1\Iurray, 82 Ill. 76. Sec "· Vt. & Can. R. H. Co., 28 Vt.103; Cle.
Fawcett"· York, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Q. ment "· Canfield, 28 Vt. 302; l.Jolden
e. Rutland, etc., R. R Co.. 30 VL 297;
B. 610.
These statutes do not impose on .Bemis "·Can., etc., R. R Co., 42 Vt.
railroad companies the obligation to 375; White e. Concord R R. Co.,
fence their .stations and such grounds 30 N H. 188; Horn e. Atlantic, etc.,
1\8 would be Inconveniently used if
U. R. Co., 85 N. H. 169; Smith e.
fenced, and the question of liability Eastern R. R. Co., 85 N. H. 356;
for cattle injured in such places is Wilder e. 1\faine Cent. R. R. Co., 6.5
purely one of negl igcnce. Swearin- Mo. 882; McCall t!. Cbnmberlain, 18
gen "·Missouri, etc., R. R. Co., 64 Mo. Wis. 637; Brown "· Milwaukee, etc.,
73; Smith o. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., R. R. Co., 21 Wis. 39; Blair "· Mil.
S4 Iowa, 5. 6; Hobertson t!. Railroad waukee, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Wis. 2M;
Co., 64 1\lo. 412; Toledo, etc., R. R
Schmidt". llilwankee, etc., R R. Co.,
Co. "· Spangler, 71 Ill. 5G8. Where 23 Wis. 186; Antisdcl e. Chicago,
they are requl.rcd to fence, an agree. etc., R. R. Co., 26 Wis. 1~; Lauue
ment with the adjoining owner that e. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Wia.
they need not do so will not relieve 6!0; Bay City. etc., R. R Co."· Aus.
them from any obligRtion to other per. tin, 21 Mich. 890; Flint, etc., R. R.
sons. Gilman e. European, etc., R. Co. "· Lull, 28 Mich. 510; Grand
Oo., 60 Me. 23:J. A.nd the fact that Raoida, etc., R. R. Oo. e. Southwick.
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Other Neglects of Statutory Duty. The following are 8l:O

NON·PERFOitMA:SCE OF DU1'n:s.

eases of neglect of statutory duty for which individuals injured

G57

have been allowed to recover in actions on the case as for newli-

O

gence. Neglect of railway companies to ring bells or sound

the whistle on approaching a highway crossing, or to put up

a sign to warn travelers;' neglect to guard their crossings with

30 Mich. 445; Ill. Cent. R. R. (Io. v.

Williams, 27 Ill. 48; Chicago, etc., R.

R. Co. v. Utley, 38 Ill. 410; Chicago,

etc., R. R. Co. 1:. Cttutfinan, 38 Ill. 424;

Other Negleota of Statutory Duty. The following are al~
cases of neglect of statutory duty for which individuals injnrt.>d
have been allowed to recover in actions on the case as for negligence. Neglect of railway companies to ring bells or sound
the whistle on approaching a highway crossing, or to pot up
a sign to warn travelers; • neglect to guard their crossings with

Ill. Cent. R Ii. C0. 1:. Kanouse, 39

Ill. 272; Toledo, etc., R.R. Co. v. Rum-

hold, 40 Ill. 143; Toledo, etc., R. R.

('0. 0. Arnold, 43 Ill. 418; Peoria, etc.,

R. R. Co. 0. Barton, 80 Ill. 72; McCoy

0. California, etc., R. R. Co., 40 Cal.

532; Jeifersonville R. R. Co. o. Mar-

tin, 10 Ind. 416; Gahbert 0. Jefferson-

ville R R. Co., 11 Ind. 365; Indianapo-

lis, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Taﬂe, 11 Ind. 458;

Indianapolis R. R. Co. 0. Fisher, 15
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Ind. 203; Indianpolis, etc., R. R. Co. v.

.\[cKinney, 24 Ind. 283; Ohio, etc., R.

R. Co. o. Miller, 46 Ind. 215; Ohio, etc.,

R. R. Co. o. McClure, 4'7 Ind. 317; In-

dianapolis, etc., R. It Co. o. Lyon, 48

Ind. 119. There are many others.

If a fence is out of repair, the com-

pany is not responsible for injury re-

sulting therefrom, provided there is

no negligence in proceeding to put it

in repair. Robinson 1:. Grand Trunk

R. Co., 82 .\Iich. 322; Toledo, etc., R.

R. C0. 0. Daniels, 21 Ind. 256; Indian-

apolis, etc., It. R. Co.o. Truitt, 24 Ind.

162; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Smith, 26 Ohio, (N. s.) 124; Russell o.

Hanley, 20 Iowa, 219; Aylcsworth 0.

Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 80 Iowa, 459.

Compare Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. -0. Clut-

ter, 82 Ill. 123. As to what is n suﬂ‘i-

cient fence, see Lyons v. Merrick, 105

Mass. 71; Chambers 1:. Matthews, 18

N. J. 368. \Vhet.her the doctrine of

contributory negligence is to be al-

lowed any force when an injury oc-

curs through the neglect of a statu-

tory requirement, see Caswell v.

Worth, 5 El. & Bl. 849; Steves 0. Os-

wego, etc., R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 422;

Nashville, etc., R. B. Co. o. Smith, 6

Ileisk. 174.

‘Wilson o. Rochester, etc., R. R.

Co., 16 Barb. 167; Ernst v. Hnd. Riv.

R R. Co., 35 N. Y. 9; Richardson v.

N. Y.. etc., R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 846;

Rt-nwick 0. New York, etc., R. R. Co.,

86 N. Y. 132; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.

0. Triplett, 38 Ill. 482; Toledo, etc.. R.

R. C0. 0. Jones, 76 Ill. 811; Toledo,

etc., R. R. Co. 0. Durkin, '76 Ill. 395;

Indianopolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith,

78 Ill. 112; Dimick 0. Chicago, etc.,

R. R. Co., 80 Ill. 338; Langhoff 0.

Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 19 Wis.

489; Horn o. Chicago, etc., R. R Co.,

36 Wis. 463; Linﬁeld 0. Old Colony,

etc., R. R.Co., 10 Cush. 562; Kimball

80 Mich. 44~; Ill. Cenl R. R. Co. e.
Williams, 27 Ill. 48: Chicago, etc., R.
R Co. e. Utlt>y, 38 lll. -itO; Chicago,
t>tc., R. R. <.:o. ~- <.:autfmsn, 38 Ill. 42-l;
Ill. C(•nt. R. U. Co. e. Kanouse, 89
I II. 2i2: Tolt'do, etc.• R.R. Co. e. Rumbold, 40 Ill. 141: Toledo, etc., R. R.
<'o. e. Arnold, 4.1 Ill. 418; Peoria. ete.,
R. R. (',o. e. Barton, t!O 111. 72; McCoy
e. California, etc., R. R. Co., 40 Cal.
532; Jeffersonville R. R. Co. e. Mar.
tin, 10 Ind. 416; Gabbert e. Jeffersonville R R. Co., lllnd. 86lS; lndiaoRpo.
lis. etc., R. R Co. e. Tatle, 11 Ind. 4.58;
Indianapolis R. R. Co. "· Fisher, 13
Ind. 208; Indian polis. ~tc., R. R. Co. e.
)(cKiooey, 24 Ind. 28:J: Ohio, etc., R.
R. Co.t~. Miller,46 Ind. 915; Ohio, etc.,
R. R. Co. e. McClure, -&7 Ind. 817; In.
disnapolis, etc., R. R. Co. o. Lyon, 48
Ind. 119. There are many others.
If a fence Ia out of repair, the com.
pany Ia not responsible for injury ~
aulting therefrom, provided there la
no negligence In procoedlng to pot it
in repair. Robinson o. Grand Trunk
R. Co., 82 llich. 822; Toledn, etc., R.
R. Co. e. Daniela, 211nd. 266; Indian.
apolis. etc., R R. Co. e. Truitt, 94 Ind.
162; Pittsburgh, etc., R R. Co. e.
Smith, 26 Ohio, (N. s.) 124; R1188ell o.
Hanley, 20 Iowa, 219; Aylesworth e.
(.,'b lcago, etc., R. R Co., 80 Iowa, 439.
Compare Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. e. Clot.
ter, 82 Ill. 128. As to what Is a aufftclt>nt fence, see J.yooa e. Merrick, lOIS
llasa. 71 ; ChRtnbera e. Matthews. 18
N.J. 368. Whether the doctrine of
contributory negligence la to be allowed any force when an iojury ocean through the neglect of a statu..
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tory requirement, see Caswell e.
Wnrtb, 5 El. & Bl. 849; Steves •· 01o
wego, etc., R. R. Co~ 18 N.Y. 422;
Nllllhville, etc., R. R. Co. tJ. Smith, 6
Ileit~k. 174.
s Wilson e. Rochester, etc., R. Il
Co., 16 Barb. 167; Ernst e. Hud. Uiv.
R R. Co., M N. Y. 9; Rlchard11on e.
N.Y., etc., R. R. Uo., 4.'i N.Y. tj46;
Renwick e. New York, etc., R. R Co.,
86 N.Y. 132; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.
e. Triplett, 88111. 482; Toledo, etc.. R
R Co. e. Jones, 76 Til. 811; Toledo.
etc., R. R. Co. e. Durkin, 76 Ill. 8U6;
lndiaoopolis, etc., R. R. Co."· Smit.ta.
78 Ill 119; Dimick tJ. Chicago, etc.,
R. R. Co., 80 Ill. 338: Langhoff •·
llllwaukee. etc., R. R. Co.. 19 Wia.
489: Horn e. Chicago. etc., R. R. Co.•
88 Wis. -'68; Linfield •· Old Colony,
etc., R. R. Co., 10 Cub. 562; Kimball
e. Wet~tern R. R. Co., 6 Gray, M2;
Norton e. Eastern R R. Co., 118 Mass.
866; State •· Vermont, etc., R. ll eo..
18 Vt. 583; Wakefield e. Connecticut,
etc., R. R. Co., 87 VL 880; Dodge e.
Burlington, etc., R R. Co., 84 Iowa,
276; Correll e. Burlington, etc.. R. R.
Co., 88 Iowa. 1.20; Augusta, etc., R.
R. Co. e. McElmurry, 24: Geo. 715;
Nashville, etc., R. R. Co. "· Smith, 6
Belak. 17-i. Such a statute ln Rhode
Island held not to be designed for the
benefit of othen than thoee intending
to crou on the highway, and therefore one who la injured in walking
along the track can bave no action becauae of the omission. O'Donnell e.
Providence, etc., R. R. Co., 6 R. I.
211. But, see Hlll •· Portland, etc.,
R. R. Oo., MMe. 488; Norton e. E118t.
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a gate or with watchmen when required;' moving trains at

unlawful speed;' neglecting to fence or other“-ise protect dan-

gerous machinery,‘ or the shaft of a mine; ‘ neglecting to keep

a bridge in repair; ' neglecting to sink telegraph wire in crossing

a sti-cam;' disregarding a statute which forbids selling naphtha

as a burning ﬂuid;' neglect of the master of a vessel to take a

proper supply of medicines for the beneﬁt oi" his crew and pas-

sengers when going upon a voyage,‘ and neglect of a toll-bridge

company to keep the bridge in repair, as required by its charter.’

But without going further into particulars, it is sutiicient to say

of the authorities that they recognize the rule as a general one,

that when the duty imposed by statute is manifestly intended for

the protection and beneﬁt of individuals, the common law, when

an individual is injured by a breach of the duty, will supply a

remedy, if the statute gives none."

ern R R. Co., 113 Mass. 866; Wilson

0. Rochester, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Barb.

167; Wakeﬁeld 0. Connecticut, etc.,

R. R. Co., 37 Vt. 330. It was not pre

sumpiively negligent not to sound a

signal in approaching a crossing be-
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fore these statutes were passed. See

a gato or with watchmen when required; • moving trains at
unlawful speed; • neglecting to fence or otherwise protect dangerous machinery,' or the shaft of a mine; • neglecting to keep
a bridge in repair; • neglecting to sink telegraph wire in crossing
a stream;' disregarding a statute which for·bids selling naphtha
as a burning fluid;' neglect of the master of a vessel to take a
]H'oper supply of medicines for the benefit of his crew and pasbcugers when going upon a voya:::,-re, 1 and neglect of a toll-bridge
company to keep the bl"idge in repair, as required by its charter.•
But without going further into particulars, it is sntlicient to say
of the authorities that they 1·ecognize the rule as a general one,
that when the duty imposed by statute is manifestly intended for
the protection and benefit of individuals, the common law, when
an individual is injured by a breach of the duty, will supply a
remedy, if the statute gives none.••

Galena, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Dill, 22 Ill.

264; Galena, etc., R R. Co. v. Loomis,

13 Ill. 548,111. Cent. R. R. Co. 0.

Phelps, 29 Ill. 447.

' Lunt v. London, etc., R. R. Co., L.

R. 1 Q. B. 277; Bilbec v. London, etc.,

R. R. Co., 18 C. B. (N. sf) 583; St.

Louis, etc., R. R. C0. 0. Dunn, '78 Ill.

197.

’ Houston, etc., R. R. C0. o. Terry.

42 Tex. 451; Aycock o. Wilmington,

etc., R. R. Co., 6 Jones, (N. C.) 231.

‘ Coe 1:. Plntt, 6 Exch. 752; Holmes

0. Clarke, 6 H. & N. 348; Clarke 0.

Holmes, 7 H. & N. 937; Caswell 0.

Worth, 5 El. 8: Bl. 849; Fawcctt v.

York, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Q. B. 610;

Reynolds '0. Hindman, 32 Iowa, 146.

‘ Bartlett, etc., Co. 0. Roach, 68 IIL

174.

'Titcomb 0. Fitchburg R. R. Co.,

12 Allen, 254.

' Blanchard 0. West. Un. Tel. Co.,

60 N. Y. 510.

" Hourigan v. Nowell, 110 Mass. 470;

Wellington v. Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64»

Where a statutory requirement can.

not be fully complied with, whatever

is possible under the circumstances

to prevent injury should be done.

Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. v. Malone. 46

Ala. 391, citing Gr. West. R. R. Co. 1;.

Geddis, 33 Ill. 804; Nashville, etc., R.

R. C0. 0. Comans, 45 Ala. 437.

5 Couch u. Steel, 3 El.& Bl. 402.

' Grigsby v. Chappell, 5 Rich. 443.

See Orcutt 0. Bridge Co., 53 Me. 500.

‘° Commissioners o. Duckctt, ‘Z0 Md.

468. See Caswell 0. wﬁflll, 5 El. &

Bl. 849; Holmes 0. Clarke, 6 H. & N.

848; S. C. in Ex. Ch., 7 H. 8: N. 937;

Fawcett 0. York, etc., R. Co., 16 Q. B.

610; Britlon v. Gt. West Cotton Co.,

L. R. 7 Exeh. 130; Atkinson 'a. New.

castle, etc., Co., L. R. 6 Exch. 402.

_ ..__

em R. R. Co., 118 Mass. 866; Wilson
"· Rochester, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Barb.
167; Wakefield "· Connecticut, etc.,
R. R. Co., 87 Vt. SSO. It was not presumptively negligent not to sound a
aignal in approaching a crossing befo.-e these stAtutes were passed. See
Galena, etc., R. R Co. "· Dill, 22 Ill.
264; Galena, etc., R. R. Co."· Loomis,
13 Ill. 548; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. '1.
Phelps, 29 Ill. 447.
1 Lunt "· London, etc., R. R. Co., L.
R. 1 Q. B. 277; Bilbee "· London, etc.,
R. R. Co., 18 C. B. (N. s.) ~; St.
Louis, etc., R. R. Co. e. Dunn, 78 IlL
197.
• Houston, etc., R. R. Co."· Terry,
42 Tex. 4:.i1; Aycock "· Wilmington,
etc., R. R. Co., 6 Jones, (N. C.) 231.
• Coe "·Platt, 6 Ex:eh. 752; Holmes
"· Clarke, 6 H. & N. 348; Clarke fl.
Holmes, 7 H. & N. 937; Caswell e.
Worth, 5 El. & BI. 849; Fawcett fl.
York, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Q. B. 610;
Reynolds "· Hindman, 82 Iowa, 146.
' Bartlett, etc., Co. "· Roach, 68 IlL
174.

I Titcomb t1. Fitchburg R. R. Co.,
12 Allen, ~4.
I Blanchard "· West. Un. Tel. Co.,
60 N. Y.510.
' Hourigan"· Now ell, 110 M&88. 470;
Wellington "· Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64..
Where a statutory requirement C&Dnot be fully complied with, whatever
la possible unllcr the circumstances
to prevent injury should be done.
Mobile, etc., R. H.. Co. e. Malone. 48
Ala. run, citing Gr. West. R. R Co. -.
Geddis, 83 Ill. 804; Nashville, etc., R.
R. Co. e. Comans, 4:.i Ala. 437.
• Couch "· Steel, 8 EJ. & Bl. 402.
'Grigsby "· Chappell, 5 Rich. 443.
Bee Orcutt"· Bridge Co., 53 Me. 000.
•• Commissioners"· Duckett, 20 Md.
468. See Caswell "·Worth, l'i El. &
BI. 849; Holmes "· Clarke, 6 H. & N.
848; S.C. in Ex. Cb., 'l H. & N. 937;
Fawcett"· York, etc., R. Co., 16 Q. B.
610; Britton e. Gt West. Cotton Co.,
L. R. 7 Exch. 180; Atkinson"· New.
castle, etc., Co., L. R. 6 Exch. 402.
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CHAPTER XXI.

BEDBESS Ii'OB NEGLIGENOE;

6o9

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING REDRESS FOR

NEGLIGENCE.

In the last chapter some attention was given to wrongs result-

ing from the non-performance of conventional and statutory

duties, and it was shown that where negligence in the perform-

ance of a legal duty is brought home to any one, and another

has suﬁ'e1-ed damages therefrom, an action will lie therefor. The

endeavor was also made to point out in what negligence con-

sisted: to show that the term was rather negative than positive,

and implied only the absence of such care, prudence and fore-

thought as under the circumstances duty required should be

OHAPTER XXI.

given or exercised: that although the terms slight negligence,

ordinary negligence and gross negligence are frequently em-

ployed to characterize particular conduct, yet the terms them-

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING REDRESS FOR
NEGLIGENCE.

selves have no distinctive meaning or importance in the law,

and only imply that there has been culpable neglect under cir-

cumstances calling for diiferent degrees of care; any injurious

neglect of duty being actionable. It was also shown that the

law imposes on those who follow certain callings in life excep-

tional obligations, requiring in some cases a care and caution tar

beyond what is required generally: also that in the case of
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oﬁicial and other statutory duties, an individual may bring suit

for failure in performance wherever it appears that they were

imposed for his advantage or protection. But, as in every rela-

tion of life, and in every position in which one may possibly be

placed, some duty is imposed for the beneﬁt of others, it becomes

now of importance that we consider the general principles which

must govern when in any of these cases complaint is made that

one has been injured by the neglect of another to observe due

care.

1. The ﬁrst requisite in establishing negligence is to show the

existence of the duty which it is supposed has not been per-

In the last chapter some attention was given to wrongs resulting from the non-performance of conventional and statutory
duties, and it was shown that where negligence in the performance of a legal duty is brought home to any one, and another
has suffered damages therefrom, an action will lie therefor. The
endeavor was also made to point out in what negligence consisted: to show that the term was rather negative than positive,
and implied only the absence of such care, prudence and forethought as under the circumstances duty required should be
given or exercised: that although the terms slight negligence,
ordinary negligence and gross negligence are frequently employed to characterize particular conduct, yet the terms them.
selves have no distinctive meaning or importance in the law,
and only imply that there has been culpable neglect under circumstances calling for different degrees of care; any injurious
neglect ot' duty being actionable. It was also shown that the
law imposes on those who follow certain callings in life exceptional obligations, requiring in some cases a care and caution tar
beyond what is required generally: also that in the case of
official and other statutory duties, an individual may bring snit
for failure in performance wherever it appears that they were
imposed for his advantage or protection. But, as in every re]a.
tion of lite, and in every position in which one may possibly be
placed, some duty is imposed for the benefit of others, it becomes
now of importance that we consider the general principles which
must govern when in any of these cases complaint is made that
one has been injured by the neglect of another to observe due
care.
1. The :first requisite in establishing negligence is to show the
existence of tho duty which it is supposed has not been per-
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formed. A duty may >c general, and owing to everybody, or

it may be particular, and owing to a single person only, by

reason of his peculiar position. An instance of the latter sort

is the duty the owner of land owes to furnish by it lateral

support to the land of the adjoining owner. But a duty owing

to everybody can never become the foundation of an action

until some individual is placed in position which gives him

particular occasion to insist upon its performance: it then

becomes a duty to him personally. The general duty of a rail-

way company to run its trains with care becomes a particular

duty to no one until he is in position to have a right to complain

of the neglect: the tramp who steals a ride cannot insist that it

is a duty to him; neither can he when he makes a highway of

the railway track and is injured by the train.‘ A man may he

careless to the degree of criminality who leaves poisoned food

about where others will be likelyto pick it up and be injured

by it; but he owes in this regard no duty to the burglar who

breaks into his house to despoil it. So it may not be wise or

prudent for one to have upon his premises an uncovered pit, but
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he is under no obligation to cover it for the protection of tres-

passcrs.' On the other hand if one shall make an excavation

so near the line of the highway that one lawfully making use

of the highway might accidentally fall into it, his duty to erect

guards as a protection against such accidents is manifest, and he

will be responsible for injuries occasioned by his neglect to do

' Ill. Cent. R. R. 0. Hall, 72 Ill. 222.

In any suit for negligence the partic-

ular duty neglected must be counted

upon: a recovery cannot be had for

one breach on a declaration counting

on another. Flint, etc., R. Co. 0.

Stark, 38 Mich.

' Aldrcd's Case, 9 Co. 58 b.; Blithe

0. Topham, Cro. Jac. 158; Stone 0.

fonned. A duty may >C general, and owing to everyhody, or
it may be particular, and owiug to a single person only, by
reason of his peculiar position. An instance of the latter sort
is the duty the owner of land owes to furnish by it lateral
support to the land of the adjoining owner. But a duty owing
to everybody can never become the foundation of an action
until some individual is placed in po~ition which gives him
particular occasion to insist upon its performance: it then
Lccomes a duty to him personally. The general duty of a railway company to run its trains with care becomes a particular
dnt.v to no oue until he is in pooition to have a right to complain
of the neglect: the tramp who steals a ride ~nnot insist that it
is a duty to him; neither can he when he makes a high~ay of
the railway track and is injured by the train. 1 A man may he
careless to the degree of criminality who leaves poisoned food
about where others will be likely to pick it up and be injured
by it; but he owes in this regard no duty to the burglar who
breaks into his house to dee.poil it. So it may not be wise or
prudent for one to have upon his premises an uncovered pit, hot
he is under no obligation to cover it for the protection of trespasflers.• On the other hand if one shall make an excavation
so near the line of the highway that one lawfully making use
of the highway might accidentally fall into it, his duty to erect
guards as a protection against such accidents is manifest, and he
will be responsible for injuries occasioned by his neglect to do

Jackson. 16 C. B. 199; S. C. 32 E. L.

& Eq. 349; Hounsell 0. Smyth, 7 C.

B. (11. s) 731; Humphries v. Brog-

den, 12 Q. B. 739; Gautret 0. Egcrton,

L. R. 2 C. P. 871; Mangan v. Amer-

ton, L. R. 1 Exch. 239; Parker 0. Foote,

19 Wend. 309; Steuart 0. Maryland,

% Md. 97; Hargreaves 0. Deacon, 25

Mich. 1; Zocbisch 0. Tarbell, 10 Al-

len, 885; Knight v. Abert, 6 Penn. St.

472. One who leaves syrup exposed

on his premises, which a trespassing

cow drinks and is damaged is under

no iiabiiitv to the owner of the cow

for this injury. Bush 0. Brainard, 1

Cow. '78. Compare Fisher 0. Clark.

41 Barb. 329, case of injury by dis-

cased sheep. A loiterer about a rail-

way station has no claim upon the

railway company for an injury caus-

ed by negligence in the construction

or maintenance of the station house.

Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Bingham,

29 Ohio, (11. s) 364.

1 Ill. Cent. R. R. "· Hall, 72 111. 222.
In any suit for negligence the particular duty neglected must be counted
upon: a recovery cannot be had for
one breach on a declaration counting
on another. Flint, etc., R. Co. e.
Stark, 38 Mich.
• Aldred's Case, 9 Co.~ b.; Blithe
e. Topham, Cro. J ac. HiS; Stone e.
Jackson. 16 C. H. 199; S.C. 32 E. L.
& Eq. 349; Hounsell "· Smyth, 7 C.
B. (N. s) 731; Humphries "· Brog.
den, 12 Q. B. 730; Gautret "· Egerton,
L. R 2 C. P. 871; Mangan "· Atterton, L. R. 1 Exch. 230; Parker"· Foote,
19 Wend. 309; Steuart e. Maryland,
20 Md. 97; Hargreaves e. Deacon, 25

Mich. 1; Zocbisch "· Tarbell, 10 A.J.
len, 385; Knight 11. Abert, 6 Penn. St.
472. One who leaves syrup exposed
on his premises, which a trespllSSing
cow drinks and is damaged is under
no liability to the owner of the cow
for this injury. Bush e. Brainard, 1
Cow. 78. Compare Fisher •· Clark.
41 Barb. 329, case of injury by dis.
cased sheep. A loiterer about a railway station has no claim upon the
railway company for an injury caus.
ed by negligence in the construction
or maintenance of the station house.
Pittsburgh, etc., R R. Co. e. Bing bam.
29 Ohio, (N. s.) 864.
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so.‘ These are illustrations; but in every instance the complain-
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ing party must point out how the duty arose which is supposed

to have been neglected. And this is the real reason why one

cannot complain of an injury to which his own negligence has

contributed: When it appears that but for his own fault the

injury would not have occurred, it also appears that the duty to

protect him did not rest upon others; for no one is under obliga-

tion to protect another against the consequences of his own

misconduct or neglect.

2. The duty being pointed out, the failure to observe it is to

be shown; in other words, the existence of negligence. This is

an afﬁrmative fact; the presumption always being, until the

contrary appears, that every man will perform his duty. But

the quantum of evidence necessary to make out a prima facia

case of negligence is very slight in some cases, while in others

a more strict showing is required. A bailee who returns in an

injured condition an article which has been loaned to him is, by

this very condition, called upon for an explanation; for a pre-

sumption of fault must arise therefrom against him. If a child

is sent into the streets of a city in charge of a spirited team

which apparently he is too young and weak to manage, the neg-

ligence seems manifest, while there might be no appearance of
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want of due care had the team been broken down by labor and

years. Often the injury itself affords snﬁicient prima facie

evidence of negligence. Thus if the buildings of individuals

are destroyed by ﬁre originating in sparks from a locomotive,

the ﬁre itself is held to be evidence of negligence, which requires

to be overcome by some showing that the railway company pro-

vides suitable precautions against such an occurrence.’ Every

lawful business is supposed capable of being carried on in a

manner that will be consistent with safety to the business and

‘Barnes o. Ward, 2 (‘. & K. 661;

S. C. 9 C. B. 392; Wetter 0. Dunk, 4

F. & F. 298; Hardcastle 0. South

Yorkshire, etc., R. Co., 4 H. & N.

67; Vale 0. Bliss, 50 Barb. 358; Davis

0. Ilill, 41 N. H. 329; Baltimore &

Ohio R. R. (Yo. 9. Boteler, 88 Md. 568;

Strntton o. Staples, 59 Me. 94; Beck

0. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283.

This principle has been applied to

towns, which, being under obligation

to keep highways in repair, fail to

guard properly against passengers

falling into dangers immediately

so.' These are illustrations; but in every instance tl1e complaining party must point out how the duty arose which is supposed
to have been neglected. And this is the real reason why one
cannot complain of an injury to which his own negligent-a has
contributed: When it appears that but for his own fault the
injnry would not have occurred, it also appears that the duty to
protect him did not rest upon others; for no one is under obligation to protect another against the conseq.uences of his own
misconduct or neglect.
2. The dnty being pointed out, the failure to observe it is to
be shown; in other words, the exi.:>tence of negligence. This is
an affirmative tact; the pre8tunption always being, until the
contrary appears, that every man will perform his duty. But
the quantum of evidence necessary to make out a prima faci6
case of negligence is very slight in some cases, while in others
a more strict showing is required. A bailee who returns in an
injured condition an article which has been loaned to him is, by
this very condition, called upon for an explanation; for a presumption of fault must arise therefrom against him. If a child
is sent into the streets of a city in charge of a spirited team
which apparently he is too young and weak to manage, the negligence seems manifest, while there might be no appearance of
want of dne care had the team been broken down by labor and
_years. Often the injury itself affords sufficient prima facio
evidence of negligence. Thus if the buildings of individuald
are destroyed by fire originating in sparks from a locomotive,
the fire itself is held to be eviden<~ of negligence, which requires
to be overcome by some showing that the railway company provides suitable precautions against such an occurrence.• Every
lawful business is supposed capable of being carried on in a
manner that will be consistent with safety to the bnsinesR and

outside the line. Coggswell v. Lex-

ington, 4 Cush. 807; Alger r. Lowell.

3 Allen, 402; Norris 0. Litchﬁeld, 35

N. H. 271.

'Piggot 1:. Eastern Counties R.

Co., 8 C. B. 229.

1 Barnes i'. Ward, 9 C'. & K. 661;
B. C. 9 C. B. 392: Wettor e. Dunk, 4
F. & F. 298; liardcasLlo i'. South
Yorkshire, etc., R. Co., 4 H. & N.
67; Vale e. Bl i!~s. M Bnrb. 358; Dnvi s
•· Hill, 41 N. H. 329; Baltimore &
Ohio R R. Co. e. Boteler, 38 lid. 368;
Strl\tton e. Siaples, tiD ::\le. 94; Beck
e. Carter, 68 N. Y. 28."J.
Tbia principle bas been applied &o

towns, which, being under obligation
to keep highways in r<'pair, fail to
guard properly against passPngl"rs
falling into d&D!,'CT8 lmmec.Jiattlly
outside the line. Cog!r-lwell e. Lex.
iogton, 4 Cush. 307; Alger r. Lowell.
3 Allen, 402: NorriB e. Litchfield, 311
N.H. 271.
1 Piggot e. Eastern Counties R.
Co.• 8 c. B. 229.
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of the common law or imposed by statute, must assume that

this is practicable. The construction of railroads could not be

pernlitted if their trains must necessarily run across the country,

scattering ﬁre and destruction along their way. But experience

shows that this may be avoided by the exercise of reasonable

care. Reasonable care in such a case is unquestionably a high

degree of care, because the risk of injury when care is not

observed is very great, not to one person merely, but to whole

communities of persons all along the line of the road. There

is, consequently, nothing unreasonable in presuming negligence

from the occurrence of an injury, and calling upon the railway

authorities to rebut the prima facie case by showing that they

take reasonable care, in the selection and management of their

machines, to prevent such injury occurring.

In the case of a railway company as carriers of passengers,

the reasons which charge the company with presumptive neg-

ligence in case of an injury seem to be still stronger. Suppose

a railway train thrown from the track from some cause not at

ﬁrst apparent, and a large number of persons injured; would it

be reasonable to put an injured person to the necessity of dis-

covering and pointing out the cause, and tracing to the railway
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company the fault, before he could recover? Must he show that

it did not occur through a defect in the machinery which vigi-

lance would not have discovered, or through a. felonious tearing

up of the rails by robbers, or by the act of God or inevitable

accident, and thus make out negligence in the company by neg-

ativing the existence of any other cause? Or may he who has

entrusted his person and his life to the control of the company,

to be carried by them in vehicles of their own selection and

management, rely upon the injury itself as entitling him to

redress, and leave to the defense the task of presenting excul-

patory evidence?

Perhaps this question may be answered by a consideration of

the nature of railway carriage of persons, and the means usually

employed to render it safe. Wlieli properly managed it is sup-

posed to be at least as safe as any other method of travel, and

when crime or negligence or inevitable accident do not intervene,

the risk of injury is so small as to awaken little concern. A

ﬂood may tear up the track, a felon may place obstructions upon

O

‘\-

property of others: all police roles, whether constituting a part
of the common law or imposed by statute, most assume that
this is practicable. The construction of railroads could not be
permitted if their trains must necessarily run across the country,
scattering fire and destruction along their way. But experience
shows that this may be avoided by the exercise of reasonable
care. Reasonable care in such a case is unquestionably a high
degree of care, because the risk of injury when care is not
obeerved is very great, not to one person merely, but to whole
communities of persons all along the line of the road. There
is, consequently, nothing unreasonable in presuming negligence
from the occurrence of an injury, and calling upon the railway
authorities to 1-ebut the prima facie case by showing that they
take reasonable care, in the selection and management of their
machines, tO prevent such injury occurring.
In the case of a railway company as carriers of passengers,
the reasons which charge the company with presumptive negligence in case of an injury seem to be still stronger. Suppose
a railway train thrown from the tra~k from some cause not at
first apparent, and a large number of persons injnred; would it
be reasonable to put an injured person to the necessity of discovering and pointing out the cause, and tracing to the railway
company the fault, before he could recoverY Must he show that
it did not occur through a defect in the machinery which vigilance would not have discovered, or through a felonious tearing
up of the rails by robbers, or by the act of ·God or inevitable
accident, and thus make out negligence in the company by negativing the existence of any other cause¥ Or may he who has
entrusted his person and his life to the control of the company,
to be carried by them in vehicles of their own selection and
management, rely upon the injury itself as entitling him to
redress, and leave to the defense the task of presenting exculpatory evidence¥
Perhaps this question may be answered by a consideration of
the nature of railway carriage of persons, and the means usually
employed to render it safe. When properly managed it is supposed to be at least as safe as any other method of travel, and
when crime or negligence or inevitable accident do not intervene,
the risk of injury is so small as to awaken little concern. .A.
:flood may tear up the track, a felon may place obstructions upon
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it; but even as against these due caution will usually give com-
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plcte protection. If,'therefore, such caution is observed, the

probability that any particular passenger will be injured is only

as one to many millions. When, therefore, an injury occurs, it

seems perfectly logical to assume that the cause must be found

in a failure at some point to observe the caution the business

required.

Presumptions accept the ordinary and probable as true until

it is shown not to be true. Thus we presume a man innocent

of crime; that a house standing yesterday is standing to-day:

that a man in peaceful possession of a tenement has a rightful

possession; that a man and woman living together as husband

and wife. recognizing each other and being recognized by the

community as such, are lawfully married: these presumptions

are made because in the great majority of cases the fact accords

with the presumption, and therefore any diﬂ'erent presumption

in the great majority of cases would be a false one. It is equally

reasonable when an injury to a railway passenger is shown,

the muse of which is not at once apparent, to assume that it is

chargeable to some want of care in the company or in some of

its agents or servants. As is well said in a Pennsylvania case:

“.P-rima facie where a passenger, being carried on a train, is
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injured without fault of his own, there is a legal presumption

of negligence, casting upon the carrier the onus of disproving

it.” This is the rule when the injury is caused by a defect in

the road, cars or machinery, or by a want of diligence or care in

those employed, or by any other thing which the company can

and ought to control, as a part of its duty to carry the passen-

gers safely; but this rule of evidence is not conclusive. The

carrier may rebut the presumption, and relieve himself from

responsibility by showing that the injury arose from an accident

which the utmost skill, foresight and diligence could not pre-

vent.‘ The same rule is applied as against the proprietors of

stage coaches, and on like reasons. The presumption of negli-

gence is raised by the injury, but it may be overcome by showing

a cause consistent with due care.’

' Carpuc o. London, etc., R. Co., 5 Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 64 Penn. St

Q. B. 747; Laing o. Colder, 8 Penn. 225. 230.

St 479; Sullivan o.Philaclelphia,etc.. ' Christie 0. Grlggs, 2 Camp. 79;

R. R. Co., 30 Penn. St. 234; Meier 0. Croﬂs 0. Waterhouse, 11 Moore. 138;

it; but even 881lo0'8.inst these due caution will usually give complete p1·otection. If, ·therefore, such caution is observed, the
probability that any particular passenger will be injured is only
as one to many millions. When, therefore, an injury occurs, it
seems perfectly logical to assume that the canse must be found
in a failure at some point to observe the caution the business
required.
Presumptions accept the ordinary and probable as true until
it is shown not to be true. Thus we presume a man innoccut
of crime; that a house standing yesterday is standing to-day;
that a man in peaceful possession of a tenement has a rightful
possession; that a man and woman living together as husbund
and wife. recognizing each other and being recognized by the
community as such, are lawfully married: these presumptions
are made because in the great majority of eases the fact accord11
with the presumption, and therefore any diffe1·ent presumption
in the great majority of cases would be a false one. It is equally
reasonable when an injury to a railway passenger is shown,
the cause of which is not at once apparent, to assume that it is
chargeable to some want of care in the company or in some of
its agents or servants. As is well said in a Pennsylvania ease:
"Prima facie where a passenger, being carried on « train, is
injured without fault of his own, there is a legal presumption
of negligence, casting upon the carrier the onu8 of disproving
it." This is the rule when the injury is caused by a defect in
the road, cars or machinery, or by a want of diligence or care in
those employed, or by any other thing which the company can
and ought to control, as a part of its duty to carry the passengers safely; but this rule of evidence is not conclusive. The
carrier may rebut the presumption, and relieve himself' from
responsibility by showing that the injury arose from an R('Cident
which the utmost skill, foresight and diligence could not prevent.' The same rule is applied as against the proprietors of
stage coaches, and on like reasons. The presumption· of negligence is raised by the injury, but it may be overcome by showing
a cause consistent with due care.'
1 Carpue "· London, etc., R. Co., ll
Q. R. 747; Laing"· Colder, 8 Penn.
8L 479; Sullivan"· Philadelphia, etc.,
R R Co., 30 Penn. BL 234; lleicr "·

•

Pennsylvania R. R Co., 64 Penn. Sl
225, 230.

Christie e. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79;
Crofls "· Waterhouse, 11 lf.uore, 133;
1
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In the case of an injury by a railway train to one who is not

a passenger, the rule of presumption would seem to be quite

different. Common observation does not teach that in the great

majority of cases where one is run over at a railway crossing

the managers of the train are in fault. The probabilities are

that with the exercise of due caution one will protect himself

against injury at such places; and if he receives an injury and

complains of it, he may justly be called upon for an explanation.

Thonghtlessness, pre-occupation, intoxication, a reckless pushing

forward to cross in advance of the train——any of these would

be at least as likely to lead to such an injury as carelessness in

the managers of the train; and it would be unreasonable to call

upon the railway company to disprove negligence when to the

common mind there could be no presumption that negligence

existed.‘ Unlike the case of the passenger, who submits him-

self to the control of the carrier, and is not called upon to do

more than quietly to remain in his place, this case is one calling

for vigilance on both sides, and in which the want of care by

either would be equally liable to result in injury.

But while the plaintiff ’s ease would require some showing of

negligence, it might, perhaps, be easily made out if the statute

required a warning to be sounded as the train approached, and
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it could be shown that this was neglected. Trace the injury to

this neglect and the prime facie case is made out; and while

the -fact of neglect does not conclusively determine that the

injury is attributable to it,’ yet as the party approaching a cross-

S. C. 3 Bing. 819; Boyce 0. California

Stage Co., 25 Cal. 460; McKinney 0.

Ncil,1 McLean, 540; Stokes v. Sal-

tonstall, 13 Pet 181. An injury caus-

ed by a gun going off while held in

one’s hand prima fucie charges him

with negligence. Underwood v. Hew-

son, 1 Strange, 596; Morgan a. Cox,

22 Mo. 3'73; Clmtaigne 0. Bcrgeron,

10 La. Ann. 699. So where it occurs

in shooting at a mark. Wclch v. Du-

In the case of an injury by a railway train to one who is not
a passenger, the rule of presumption would seem to be quite
different. Common observation does not teach that in the great
majority of cases where one is run over Qt a railway crossing
the managers of the train are in fault. The probabilities are
that with the exercil)e of due caution one will protect himself
against injury at such places; and if he receh·es an injury aud
complains of it, he may justly be called upon for an explanation.
Thoughtlessness, pre-oc'Cupation, intoxication, a reckless pushing
forward to cross in ad vance of the train- any of these would
be at least as likely to lead to such an injury as carelessness in
the managers of the train; and it would be unreasonable to call
upon the railway company to disprove negligence when to the
common mind there could be no presumption that negligence
existed.' Unlike the case of the passenger, who submits himself to the control of the carrier, and ia not called upon to do
more than quietly to remain in his place, this case is one calling
for vigilance on both sic.les, and in which the want of care by
either would be equally liable to result in injury.
But while the plaintiff's case would require some showing of
negligence, it might, perhaps, be easily made out it' the statute
l'L'<luired a warning to be sounded as the train approached, and
it could be shown that this was neglected. Trace the injury to
this neglect and the prima facie case is made out; and while
the .fact of neglect does not conclusively determine that the
injury is attributable to it,' yet as the party approaching a crosa-

rand, 36 Conn. 182.

It has been said that it is compe-

tent, in connection with all the facts

and circumstances of the case, to in-

fer the absence of fault on the part of

K

the injured party from the known

disposition of men to avoid injury

to themselves. Northern Cent. R. Co.

0. State. 81 Md. 357; but as this would

generally, in the case of railway accl-

dcnts, operate strongly with both par-

ties, it cannot oﬂen aid much in

reaching a just conclusion.

' Shelton v. London, etc., R. Co., L.

R. 2 C. P. 631; Clilf o. Midland R.

Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 258.

' The failure to ring abell or sound

a whistle does not alone make out it

case of liability. Quincy, etc., R. R.

8. C. 8 Bing. 819; Boyce e. California
Stage Co., 26 Cal. 400; llcKiooey e.
Xeil, 1 McLean. MO; Stokes "· Saltoostall, 18 Pet. 181. An injury caused by a guo going off while held in
one's band prima ftUu charges him
with negligence. Underwood". Hew.
son, 1 Strange, 396; Morg!Ul o. ~x.
22 Mo. 878; Chatalgoe e. Bergeron,
10 La. Ann. 699. So where it occurs
in shooting at a mark. Welch e. Du.
rand, 86 Coon. 182.
It bas oc>eo said that it Is competent, in connection with all the f~&cts
and circumstances of the case, to infer the absence of fault on the part of

the injured party from the known
disposition of men to avoid injury
to themsch·es. N orthem Cent. R. (XI.
e. State, 81 lid. 837: but as this would
generally, in the case of railway accl·
dents, opt:rate strongly with both parties, it cannot often aid much in
reaching a just conclusion.
• Skelton tJ. London, etc., R. Co., L.
R 2 C. P. 631 ; Cliff o. Midland R.
Co., L. R ti Q. B. 258.
1 The failure to ring a bell or sound
a whistle dot's not alone make out a
case of liability. Quincy, etc., R. R.
Co."· Wellhoeoer, 7211l. 60; Chicago.
etc., R. R. Co. e. Bell, 70 Ill. 102; Kid-

(Yo. 1:. Wcllhoener, 72 Ill. 60; Chicago.

etc., R. l{.Co. 0. Bcll,70 Ill. 102; Kid-

__-—-‘nib

•

•
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ing has reason to expect that the statute will be complied with,
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and is not put to that degree of vigilance and watchfulness that

otherwise would be required of him, and he goes into the evidence

with less necessity for full and satisfactory explanation of his

own movements than would otherwise be demanded. IIe has

shown fault in the railway company when he has ‘shown the

failure to sound the alarm; and as the injury is precisely such

an one as the alarm was intended to prevent, some presumption

that the injury resulted from the neglect may well be indulged

unless his own fault was manifest.

The rule applied to carriers of passengers is not a special rule,

to govern only their conduct, but is a general rule which may be

applied wherever the circumstances impose upon one party alone

the obligation of special care. The case may be instaneed of a

householder on a prominent street of a city repairing his roof.

\Vhile thus engaged a slate falls from the roof and injures a

person passing along the street below. Here, manifestly, it was

the duty of the householder to take such precautions as would

reasonably guard against such an injury; all the obligation of

special care was upon him, and the passer-by had a right to

assume that no work being done over the walk was to subject

him to danger.‘ True, the act of God or some excusable acci-
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dent may have caused the slate to fall, but the explanation should

come from the party charged with the special duty of protection,

It is thus perceived that though the onus of showing negli-

gence is on the party complaining of it. there are some cases in

which it is made out by showing the injury and connecting the

defendant with it. Some other cases may not be quite so plain,

and yet in these a similar presumption may go far to support

the plaintiﬁ"s case. The case of collisions in the use of the

highway is in point. The custom of this country, in some States

der 1-. Dunstable, 11 Gray, I242; Cleve-

land, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Elliott, 28

Ohio, (N. s.) 340. See Baltimore, etc.,

R. R. Co. e. Miller, 29 Md. 252. Es

peeially if sounding the alarm could

not have prevented the injury. lll.

(‘ent. R. R. Co. v. Phelps. 29 lll. 447:

Toledo, etc., R. R. ('0. r. Jones, 76

lll. 311; Toledo, etc., R. R. C0. 0.

Durkin, 76 Ill. 3!)-'1. (‘omparc Bei-

sicgel r. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 84 N.

Y. 622; Steves v. Oswego, etc , R. R.

Co., 18 N. Y. 422; Hoffman v. Union

Ferry (‘o., 68 N. Y. 885.

ing bas reason to expect that the statute will be complied with.
and is not put to that degree of vigilance and wa&tcht'ulnells that
otherwist• would be required of him, and he goes into the evidence
with less necessity for full and satisfactory explanation of his
own movements than wonld otherwise be demanded. He has
shown fault in the railway company when he has ·shown the
failure to sonnd the alarm; and as the injury is precisely snch
an one as the alarm was intended to prevent, some presumption
that the injury resulted from the neglect may well be indulged
unless his own fault was manifest.
The rule applied to carriers of passengers is not a special rule,
to govern only their conduct, but is a general rule which may be
applied wherever the circumstances impose upon one ]l&l'ty alone
tho obligation of special care. The case may be instanced of a
householder on a prominent street of a city repairing his roof.
While thus engaged a slate falls from the roof and injures a
person passing along the street below. Here, manifestly, it w~
the duty of the householder to take such precautions as would
reasonably guard against such an injury; all the obligation of
special care was upon him, and the passer-by had a right to
assume that no work being done over the walk was to subject
him to danger.' True, the act of God or some excusable accideat may have caused the slate to fall, but the explanation should
eome from the party charged with the &JX'cial duty ot' protection.
It is thus perceived that though the onus of showing negligence is on the party complaining of it. there are some cases in
which it is made out by showing the injury and connecting the
defendant with it. Some other cases may not be quite so plain,
and y<'t in these a similar presumption may go far to support
the plaintiff's case. The case of collisions in the use of the
highway is in point. The custom of this country, in some States

'Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & (‘. 722.

Sec Hunt 0. Hoyt, 20 lll. 544. Also,

cases of injury by throwing snow

from roofs. (‘orrigan 0. Union Sugar

Reﬂncry, 09 Mass. 577: Jewell 0.

Grand Trunk R. Co., 55 N. H. 84. '

der 11. Dunstable. 11 Gray, :;42; Cleve.
land, etc., R. R. <'.o. "· Elllott, 28
Ohio, (N. R.) 340. See Baltimore. etc.,
R. R. Co. •· :Miller, 29 :Md. 252. Ea.
pcciallJ if sounding the alarm could
not have prevented the injury. Ill.
C'enL R. R. <.'o. "· Phelps, 29 Ill. 447:
Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. r .•Jom'!l., 76
111. 811 ; Tol('do, etc., R. R. Co. "·
Durkin, 76 Ill. so.;. Compare Bei.

siegel r. ~. Y. CenL R. R. Co., 84 N.
Y. 622; Steves t. Oswego, etc, R. R.
Co., 18 N.Y. 422; Hoffmant. U'oion
Ft'rry ('o., 68 N. Y. 88.5.
I Byrne "· Boadle, 2 n. & <'. 722.
Bee Hunt"· Hoyt, 00 Ill. M4. Also,
<'a.<!<'& of lojury by throwing Rnow
from roof&. ('orrlgao "· l!nion Rugar
Rcftnery, 9A :MIUIS. 577; Jewell •·
Grand Trunk R. Co., M N.H. M. ·

•
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enacted into statute law, requires that where teams approach
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and are about to pass in the highway, each shall keep to the

right of the center of the traveled portion of the road. This is

a regulation to avoid collisions, and if one neglects it he is justly

required to take upon himself unusual care to avoid mischief,‘

and, if an accident follow, an explanation of the occurrence must

begin with some presumption against him. Still, the other

party, though he has obeyed the statute and kept to the proper

side of the road, is not at liberty to neglect all further precau-

tion, and if he can prevent injury by the exercise of ordinary

care, he will have no ground for complaint if he is injured

through a failure to exercise it.’ The being on the wrong side

of the road is a fault, but it is not one from which a collision

necessarily results, and if the collision only followed the concur-

rence of this fault with others equally blaineworthy, the apparent

case which the ﬁrst fault went far to establish is met and over-

come by the further showing.‘

Whether Negligence is a question of Law. A point of very

high importance is, whether the question of negligence is one

which, under any circumstances, can be disposed of as a question

of law, and if so, what those circumstances are. It is of high

importance because in a great proportion of cases where injuries
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are supposed to have resulted from negligence the case of the

injured party is one which appeals strongly to sympathy, and

' Pluckwcll e. Wilson, 5 C. & P.

enacted into statute law, requires that where teams approach
and are about to pass in the highway, each shall keep to the
·right of the center ot' the traveled portion of the road. This is
a regulation to avoid collisions, and if one neglects it he is justly
required to take upon himself unusual care to avoid mischief,'
and, if an accident follow, an explanation of the occurrence must
begin with some presumption against him. Still, the other
party, though he has obeyed the statute and kept to tho proper
side o1' the road~ is not at liberty to neglect all further precaution, and if he can prevent injury by the exercise of ordinary
care, he will have no ground for complaint if he is injured
through a failure to exercise it.' The being on the wrong side
of the road is a fault, but it is not one from which a collision
necessarily results, and if the collision only followed the concurrence of this fault with others equally blameworthy, the apparent
case which the first fault went far to establish is met and overcome by the further showing.•

375; Chapin 0. Hawes, 3 C. & P. 554;

Wilson 0. Rockland. etc., Co., 2 Harr.

67; McLane 0. Sharpe, 2 Harr. 481;

Daniels '0. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32; Brooks

-v. Hart, 14 N. H. 307.

" See ante, p. 158, and cases cited;

also, Clay c. Wood, 5 Esp. 44; Wayde

v. Carr, 2 D. 80 R. 255; Turley 0.

Thomas, 8 C. & P. 103; Kennard '0.

Burton, 25 Me. 39; Bigclow 0. Reed,

51 Me. 325; McLane '0. Sharpe, 2

Whether Negligence fa a question of Law. A point of very
high importance is, whether the question of negligence is one
which, under any circumstances, can be disposed of as a question
of law, and if so, what those circumstances are. It is of high
importance because in a great proportion of cases where injuries
are supposed to have resulted from negligence the case of the
injured party is one which appeals strongly to sympathy, and

Harr. 481. If an obstruction forces

one over on the wrong side of the

road and he runs against another

without fault, the case is to be treated

as one of inevitable accident, and he

is not liable. Strouse 1;. Wliittlescj',

\

41 Conn. 559. The fact. that one is on

the wrong side of the road is no evi-

dence of negligence in an action

brought by one who was injured

while crossing the road on foot.

Lloyd V1. Ogleby, 5 C. B. (rt. s.) 667.

‘The party on the wrong side of

the road should be held responsible

for an injury, unless it appear clearly

that the other had ample means and

opportunity to prevent it. Chapin 0.

Hawes, 8 C. & P. 554. See the sub-

ject discussed in Hoffman 0. Union

Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 385. And, see

' Pluckwell "· Wilson, ~ C. & P.
Chapin "· Hawes, 8 C. & P. 554;
Wilson "· Rockland, etc., Co., 2 Barr.
67; McLane t!. Sharpe, 2 Harr. 481;
Dan leis t~. Clegg, 28 :Mich. 82; Brooks
"· Hart, 14 N. H. 307.
• See ante, p. 158, Rnd eases cited;
also, Clay t~. Wood, 5 Esp. 44; Wayde
"· Carr, 2 D. & R. 2.15; Turley "·
Thomas, 8 C. & P. 103; Kennard "·
Burton, 25 Me. 89; Bigelow t~. Reed,
lit .Me. 325; McLane "· Sharpe, 2
Harr. 481. If an obstmction forces
one over on the wrong side of the
road and he runs again1.1t another
without fault, the case is to be treated
aa one of inevitable accident, and he
is not liable. Strouse"· Whittlesey,
37~;

further, Sheridan v. Brooklyn, etc.,

R. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 39; Lane v. Atlan-

tic Works, 107 Mass. 104.

•

41 Conn. 559. The fact that one is on
the wrong side of the road is no evidence of negligence in an action
brought by one who was injured
whilo crossing the road on foot.
Lloyd fl. Ogleby, ~ C. B. (N. s.) 667.
1 The party on the wrong side of
the road should be held responsible
for an injury, unless it appear clearly
that the other had ample means and
opportunity to prevent it. Chapin o.
Hawes, 8 C. & P. 554. See the subject discussed in Hoffman ~. lJnioo
Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 385. And, see
furth<.>r, Sheridan fl. Brooklyn, etc.,
R. R. Co., 36 N.Y. 39; Lane "· Atlantic Works, 107 Mass. 104.
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this sympathy is in danger of inﬂuencing improperly—perhaps
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insensibly—the minds of those who are called upon to consider

the question of redress. If a jury is summoned, the inﬂuence

upon their minds is likely to be more than upon the mind of the

judge. The judge is the representative of order and stability

in the State; his training has impressed upon his mind the

necessity of ﬁxed laws, and has taught him how destructive of

these is the yielding to sympathy. He knows that “hard cases

are apt to make bad law.” Moreover, when corporations are

defendants in suits for negligence, the popular prejudice is apt

to run strongly against them, and this may affect the jury when

it might not affect the judge. Defendants are, therefore, likely

to prefer that the judge himself shall dispose of the question of

negligence, in the belief that in his rulings they will be safer

than in the uncertain conclusions of the popular tribunal.

Questions of law the judge can conclusively pass upon; ques-

tions of fact are solved by the jury. If negligence is a question

of law the judge may say that there is or is not negligence under

a given state of facts, and the jury must accept this conclusion

as they must his ruling on any other question of law. But if it

is not a question of law he will not be likely to venture an

opinion upon it, and if he does the jury may disregard it.
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On the general question whether the law can draw the con-

clusion of negligence, the following considerations are presented:

The question broadly stated must be, whether, in the inﬁnite

variety of human transactions, the law can say that, as to certain

of them, the party charged with a duty was negligent, and as to

all others he was not negligent. Manifestly this is impossible.

There is no clear line of either moral or legal right by which the

inﬁnite diversity of cases where injury has resulted may be

classiﬁed. Seldom, indeed, is one case in its facts exactly like

one which has preceded it, and the decision upon the fault of

one can consequently throw little light upon the next. Rules

of law must be certain so as to constitute guides; but the rule

of one case can never constitute a guide in the next if the facts

and the conclusions ﬂowing from them are of that indeterminate

character and quality that the question whether the one runs

parallel to the other is one upon which different minds and

different judges would be likely to disagree.

There are some cases as to which there should be and could be

this sympathy is in danger of influencing improperly-perhaps
insensibly- the minds of those who are called upon to consider
the question of redress. If a jury is summoned, the influence
upon their minds is likely to be more than upon the mind of the
judge. The judge is the representative of order and stability
in tl,le State; his training has impressed upon his mind the
necessity of fixed laws, and has taught him how destructive of
these is the yielding to sympathy. He knows that "hard cases
are apt to make bad iaw." :Moreover, when <.-orporations are
defendants in snits for negligence, the popular prejuc.lice is apt
to run strongly against them, and this may affect the jury when
it might not affect the judge. Defendants are, therefore, likely
to prefer that tho judge himself shall dispose of the question of
negligence, in the belief that in his rulings they will be safer
than in the uncertain l.'Onclusions of the popular tribunal.
Questions of law the judge can conclusively pass upon; questions of fact arc solved by the jury. If negligence is a question
of law the judge may say that there is or is not negligence under
a given state of facts, and the jury must accept this conclusion
as they must his ruling on any other question of law. Bot if it
is not a question of law he will not be likely to venture an
opinion upon it, and if he does the jury may disregard it.
On the general question whether the law can draw the conclusion of negligence, the following considerations are presented:
The question broadly stated must be, whether, in the infinite
variety of human transactions, the law can say that, as to certain
of them, the party charged with a duty was negligent, and as to
all others he was not negligent. Manifestly this is impossible.
There is no clear line of either moral or legal right by which the
infinite diversity of cases where injury has resulted may be
classified. Seldom, indeed, is one case in its fac!ts exactly like
one which has preceded it, and the decision upon the fault of
one ean conseqnently throw little light upon the next. Rnles
of law must be certain so as to constitute guides; but the rule
of one case can never constitute a guide in the next if the facts
and the conclusions flowing from them are of that indeterminate
character and quality that the question whether the one runs
parallel to the other is one upon which different minds and
different judges would be likely to disagree.
There are some cases as to which there should be and could be
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no real doubt in the minds of fair men. Thus, if the engineer
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of a train of cars were to run it at a maximum rate of speed

through a city, across its principal streets, at an hour of the day

when many persons would be likely to be passing, and a person

should be run over at one of the crossings, the case would seem

to be so clearly one of reckless conduct that the judge might

well say to the jury that it was a ease of negligence and that the

law so pronounced it. If, on the other hand, the engineer were

in the night time, when moving at customary speed, to run over

a drunken man lying upon the track at a point distant from

crossings and where danger was not to be anticipated, it would

seem equally plain that a conclusion exonerating the engineer

should be drawn.‘ It is not to be supposed that two men equally

fair could differ concerning such cases.

But in a very large proportion of the cases in which negli-

gence is counted upon, the facts are of that ambiguous quality,

or the proper conclusion so doubtful, that different minds would

be unable to agree concerning the existence of fault, or the

responsibility for it. The question will often be, does the defend-

ant appear to have exercised the degree of care which a reasona

ble man would be expected to exercise under like circumstances?

To such a question a man of exceeding cautious temperament
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might respond that he did not; another more sanguine and bold

might say he did; and by the side of one or the other of these

would the rest of the community range themselves, each person

largely affected by temperament and perhaps by his own expe-

rience. but ﬁrmly maintaining that rule to be a proper one which

now, on a. retrospective examination of the facts, seems to him

to be such.

If the udge, in such a case, were to pass upon negligence as

a question of law, he must, in doing so, be endeavoring to

enforce a rule of a variable nature, which must take its ﬁnal

coloring from the experience, training and temperament of the

judge himself; a rule which his predecessor might not have

accepted, and which his successor may reject, and upon which a

court of review may reverse his action, not because the facts are

differently regarded, but because judges are men and men are

' Toledo, etc., R. R. O0. 0. Miller, 76 Ill. 27$; Grows 0. Maine Cent. R. R. Co.,

6'7 Me. 100.

'5

no real doubt in the minds of fair men. Thus, if the engineer
of a train of cars were to run it at a maximum rate of speed
through a city, across its principal streets, at an hour of the day
when many persons would be likely to be passing, and a person
should be run over at one of the crossings, the case would seem
to be so clearly one of reckless conduct that the judge might
well say to the jury that it was a case of negligence and that the
law so pronounced it. If, on the other band, the engineer were
in the night time, when moving at cnt;tomary speed, to run over
a drunken man lying upon the track at a point distant from
crossings and where danger was not to be anticipated, it would
seem equally plain that a conclusion exonerating the engineer
should he drawn.' It is not to be supposed that two men equally
fair could differ concerning such cases.
But in a very large proportion of the cases in which negligence is <.'Ounted upon, the facts are of that ambiguous quality,
or the proper conclusion so doubtful, that different minds wQuld
be unable to agree concerning the existence of fault, or the
responsibility for it. The question will often be, does the defendant appear to have exercised the degree of care which a reasonable man would be expected to exercise under like circumstances!
To such a question a man of exceeding cautions temperament
might respond that he did not; another more sanguine and bold
might say he did; and by the side of one or the other of these
would the rest of the community range themselves, each person
largely affected by temperament and perhaps by his own experience. but firmly maintaining that rule to be a proper one which
now, on a retrospective examination of the facts, seems to him
to be such.
If the jndge, in such a case, were to pass upon negligence as
a qnc~tion of law, he must, in doing so, be endeavoring to
cntorce a rule of a variable nature, which must take its final
col01·ing from the experience, training and temperament of the
judge himself; a rule which his predecessor might not have
accepted, and which his successor may reject, and upon which a
court of review may reverse his action, not because the facts are
differently regarded, but because judges are men and men are
1 Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. e. Miller, 76 Ill. 278; Grows •· Maine Cent. R. R. Co.,
67 Me. 100.
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diﬁerent. As has been said'in one case, it must be a very clear
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ease, indeed, which would justify the court in taking upon itself

this responsibility. For when the judge decides that a want of

due care is or is not shown, he necessarily ﬁxes in his own mind

the standard of ordinary prudence, and measuring the conduct

of the party by that, turns the case out of court or otherwise

disposes of it upon his opinion of what a reasonably prudent

man ought to have done under the circumstances.‘ But this is

only one of many ditiiculties when the court takes into its own

hand the decision upon questions of negligence. It often hap-

pens that fault in some one is unquestionable, and yet that the

deduction of negligence is in dispute, because the duty to guard

against it is disputable and is disputed. Thus, a passenger by

railway allows his arm to project somewhat out of the window,

and he is injured by its striking some object which is being

passed. Some one, manifestly, is chargeable with want of due

care: either the passenger in allowing his arm to project at all,

or the railway company in not taking care that nothing shall be

so near to the cars as that so natural an act as the putting

the hand outside shall peril a limb. In some eases it has been

said the passenger is guilty of negligence in law;' but other

courts, with certainly some good reason, hold that the question
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of responsibility in such a case must be one of fact, and might

be diﬁ'erent according as the circumstances varied.’

‘Detroit, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Van

Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99. See Cum-

berland, etc., R. R. Co. 0. State, 87

Md. 156; Lewis 0. Baltimore dz Ohio

R. R. Co., 38 Md. 588; McMahon 0.

Nor. Cent. R. R. Co., 39 Md. 438;

Healey 0. City R. R Co.. 28 Ohio,

(x_ s.) 23; Eppendorl‘ o. Railroad Co.,

69 N. Y. 195; Lake 0. Millikan, 62

Me. 240; Estes o. Atlantic, etc., R. R.

Co., 63 Me. 308; Garlick o. Dorsey,

di:m~rent. As has been said ·in one case, it must be a very clear
case, indeed, which would justify the court in taking upon itself
this responsibility. For when the judge decides that a want of
duo care is or is not shown, he necessarily fixes in his own mind
the standard of ordinary prudence, and measuring the conduct
of the party by thatt turns the case out of court or otherwioe
disposes of it upon his opinion of what a reasonably prudent
man ought to have done under the circumstances.' But this is
only one of many difficulties when the court takes into its own
hand the deci~ion upon questions of negligence. It often happens that fault in some one is unquestionable, and yet that the
deduction of negligence is in dispute, because the duty to guard
against it is dit-:putable and is dispnted. Thus, a passenger hy
railway allows his arm to project somewhat out of the window,
and he is injured by its striking some object which is being
passed. Some one, manifestly, is chargeable with want of due
<.:are: either the passenger in allowing his arm to project at all,
or the railway company in not taking care that nothing shall be
so near to the cars as thnt so natural an act as the putting
the hand outside shall peril a limb. In some cases it bas been
said the passenger is guilty of negligence in law; • but other
courts, with certainly some good reason, hold that the questlon
of responsibility in such a ca:;e must be one of fact, and might
IJe different according as the circumstances varied.•

48 Ala. 220. “ Negligence in one

sense is a quality, attaching to acts

dependent upon and arising out of

the duties and relations of the parties

concerned, and is as much a fact to

be found by the jury as the alleged

facts to which it attaches, by virtue

of such duties and relations." Ron-

ERTS, Ch. J., in Texas, etc., R. R. Co.

0. Murphy, 46 Tex. 856, 366. See,

further, Smith v. Fletcher, L. R. 9

Exch. 64; Bridges o. North London

R. Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 218.

' Todd 0. Old Colony R. R. Co., 8

Allen, 18; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. C0.

0. McClurg, 56 Penn. St. 294, over-

ruling New Jersey R. R. Co. v. Ken-

nard, 21 Penn. St. 203; Indianapolis,

etc., R. R. Co. 1:. Rutherford, 29 Ind.

82; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Sick-

ings, 5 Bush. 1; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R

Co. 0. Andrews, 39 Md. 829.

' Spencer c. Milwaukee, etc., R. R.

Co., 17 Wis. 487; Holbrook 0. Utica,

etc., R. R Co., 12 N. Y. 236. Sec

Chicago, etc., R R. CO. v. Pondrom,

51 Ill 388.

Detroit, etc., R. R. Co. e. Van
3teinburg, 17 Mich. 00. Boo Cumberland, etc., R. R. Co. e. State, 87
Md. 156; Lewis 11. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R. Co., 38 Md. 588; ~lcMahon e.
Nor. CenL R. R Co., 39 Md. 438i
Healey e. City R. R. Co., 28 Ohio,
;N. e.) 23; Eppendorf 11. Railroad Co.,
69 N. Y. 195; Lake e. Milliken, 62
Me. 24.0; Estell e. Atlantic, etc., R. R.
Co., 63 Me. 808; Garlick e. Dorsey,
48 Ala. 220. "Negligence in oue
sense is a quality, attaching to acts
dependent upon and arising out of
the duties and relations of the plll'ties
concerned, atld is as much a fact to
be found by the jury as the alleged
facts to which it attaches, by virtue.
of such duties and relations." Roa.
1

ERT8, Cb. 1., in Texas, etc., R. R. Co.
•· llurphy, 46 Tex. 356, 366. See,
further, t)mith e. Fletcher, L. R. 9
Excb. 64; Bridges e. North London
R. Uo., L. R. 7 H. L. 218.
1 Todd e. Old Colony R. R. Co., 8
Allen, 18; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co.
e. McClurg, 56 Penn. St. 294, overruling Kcw Jersey R. R. Co. e. Kennnrd, 21 Penn. St. 203; Indianapolis,
etc., R. R. Co. c. Rutherford, 29 Ind.
82; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. e. Sicklogs, IS Bush. 1; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R.
Co. e. Andrews, 39 .Md. 829.
1 Spencer "· llilwnukee, etc., R R.
Co., 17 Wis. 487; Holbrook e. Utica,
etc., R. R Co., 12 N. Y. 286. Soo
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. •· Pondrom,
51 Ill 838.
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The proper conclusion seems to be this: If the case is such

()70

THB LAW Ol!' TORTS.

that reasonable men, unaffected by bias or prejudice, would be

agreed concerning the presence or absence of due care, the judge

would be quite justiﬁed in saying that the law deduced the con-

clusion accordingly. If the facts are not ambiguous, and there

is no room for two honest and apparently reasonable conclusions,

then the judge should not be compelled to submit the question

to the jury as one in dispute. On the contrary he should say to

them, “ In the judgment of the law this conduct was negligent,”

or, as the case 1nig11t be, “There is nothing in the evidence here

which tends to show a want of due care.” In either case he

draws the conclusion of negligence or the want of it as one of

law.

Many eases would be very clear if they were not complicated

with questions of contributory negligence. Such are the cases

of a disregard of a law expressly devised to prevent the like

injuries. An instance is that of the failure of a railway train

to come to a stop before crossing another road, as is required by

statute in some States, whereby another train is run into. Here

the negligence is plain, but it might happen that some parties

injured by it would, by their own negligence, be precluded from

any redress. The case might be equally clear if the railway
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company were to send out a train without brakes, and thereby

an injury should result through the impossibility of stopping

it when a danger appeared; or if one were to set a bonﬁre in a

town while a ﬁerce wind was raging; or if one were to deliver

a loaded gun as a plaything to a young child; or if he were to

send a package of dynamite by express without disclosing its

dangerous nature. Concerning such cases no one should be in

doubt. But in the great majority of cases the question of neg-

ligence on any given state of facts must be one of fact.’ And

1 Railroad Company 0. Stout, 1"!

Wall. 657; Hawks o. Northampton,

121 Mass. 10; Schmidt 11. Chicago,

‘etc., Ii. R. Co., 83 Ill. 405; Chicago,

etc., R. R. Co. 0. Lee, 60 Ill. 501; Cra-

mcr o. The City of Burlington, 42

Iowa, 315; Artz 1:. Chicago, etc., R. R.,

44 Iowa, 284; Bclair n. Chicago, etc.,

R. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 663; Lake Shore,

etc., R. R Co. 0. Miller, 25 Mich. 2'74;

Kan. Pac. R. Co. 0. Brady, 17 Kan. 380;

Atchison, etc., R. Co. o. Bales. 16 Kan.

252; Perry v. S. P., etc., R. R. (‘o., 50

The proper conclusion seems to be this: If the case is such
that reasonable men, unaffected by bias or prejudice, would be
agreed concerning the presence or absence of due Ca.re, the judge
would be qui~ justified in saying that the law deduced the conclusion accordingly. If the facts are not ambiguous, and there
is no room for two honest and apparently reasonable conclusions,
then the judge should not be compelled to snbmit the question
to the jury as one in dispute. On the contrary he should say to
them, " In the judgment of the law this conduct was negligent,"
or, as the case might be, "There is nothing in the evidence here
which tends to show a want of due care." In either case he
draws the conclusion of negligence or the want of it as one of
law.
Many cases would be very clear if they were not complicated
with questions of contributory negligence. Such are the cases
of a disregard of a law expressly devised to prevent the like
injuries. An instance is that of the failure of a railway train
to come to a stop before crossing another road, as is req.uired by
statute in some States, whereby another train is run into. Here
the negligence is plain, but it might happen that some parties
injured by it would, by their own negligence, be precluded from
any redress. The case might be equally clear if the railway
company were to send out a train without brakes, and thereby
an injury should result through the impossibility of stopping
it when a danger appeared; or if one were to set a bonfire in a
town while a fierce wind was raging; or if one were to deliver
a loaded gun as a plaything to a young child; or if he were to
send a package of dynamite by express without disclosing its
dangerous nature. Concerning such cases no one should be in
doubt. But in the great majority of cases the question of negligence on any given state of facts must be one of fact. 1 And

Cal. 578; McNamara v. N. P., etc., R

R. Co., 50 Cal. 581 ; Conroy o. Vulcan

Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35; Kcegun 0.

Kavanaugh, et al., 62 Mo. ‘Z31; Geor-

gia, etc., Co. o. Neely, 56 Geo. 541;

Allen o. Hancock, 16 Vt. 230; Rice 0.

Montpelier, 19 Vt. 470; Hill v. New

_ ____s__<--1&1

t Railroad Company t!. Stout, 1'7
Wall. 657; Hawks "· Northllmpton,
121 Mass. 10; Schmidt 11. Chicago,
etc., H. R. Co., 83 Ill. 405; Chicago,
etc., R. R. Co. ~'· Lee, 60 Ill. 501 ; Cra.
mer "· The City of Burlington, 42
Iowa, l315; Artz v. Chicago, etc., R. R.,
44 Iowa, 284; Belair "· Chicago, etc.,
R. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 663; Lake ~bore,
etc., R. R Co. o. :Miller, 25 Mich. 274;

Kan. Pac.R.Co.t.Brady, 17 Kan.380;
Atchison, etc., R. Co. il. Bales, 16 Kan.
252; Perry "· B. P., etc., R. R. Co., 50
Cal. 5i8; MeN amara "· N. P., etc., R.
R. Co., 50 Cal. 581; Conroy"· Vulcan
Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35; Keegan •·
Kavanaugh, et al., 62 Mo. 231 ; Geor.
gia, etc., Co. ~'· Neely, 56 Geo. 541;
Allen t!. Hancock, 16 Vl 230; Rice.,
Montpelier, 19 Vt. 470; Hillv. New
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in no case where the facts are in dispute can the judge take the

671

case from the jury and decide against negligence, as matter ot

law, unless there is a want of evidence fairly tending to estab-

lish the negligence which is counted on.‘

It should be added that the principles herp stated are applica-

ble as mueh when negligence is relied upon to defeat an action

as when the plaintiff seeks to recover upon it.‘

Haven, 37 Vt. 501; Gagg 0. Vetter, 41

Ind. 228; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co.

0. Pearson, 72 Penn. St. 169; Sht-ehy

0. Burger, 62 N. Y. 558; Spooner 0.

in no case where the facts are in dispute can the jndge take the
ease f'rom the jury and decide against negligence, as matter ot
Jaw, unless there is a want of evidence fairly tending to establish the negligence which is counted on!
It should be added that the princi plea herp stated are applica.blc as much when negligence is relied upon to defeat an action
as when the plaintiff seeks to recover upon it.•

Brooklyn, 54 N. Y. 230; Delany 0.

Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 83 Wis.

6'7 ; Wheeler 0. Wcstport, 30 Wis. 392.

The frightening of horses by the

use of a steam whistle may or may

not be a negligent injury according

to circumstances. Knight v. Good-

year Co., 38 Conn. 438; Philadelphia,

etc., Co. 0. Stinger, 78 Penn. St. 219.

So may be an injury at a road cross-

ing which might have been avoided
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by stationing a ﬂagman there. Del-

aware. etc., R. R C0. 0. Totfey, 38 N.

J. 525, citing Pennsylvania R. R. Co.

o. Mathews, 36 N. J. 531. So may be

the entering of a street car when in

motion. Eppendorf 0. Railroad Co.,

69 N. Y. 193.

. Where alternatives are presented

to a traveler upon s highway as

modes of escape from collision with

an approaching traveler, it is a ques-

tion of fact whether either might not

fairly be chosen by an intelligent and

prudent person. Larrabce o. Scwall,

66 Me. 376.

Where city authorities have negli-

gently blocked up u way with stones,

it is not negligence in law for one

having occasion to pass with a sound

and steady horse, to endeavor to lead

him over. If he is injured in so doing,

the question of negligence is for the

jury. Baltimore 0. llolmes, 39 Md.

243.

It has been recently decided by the

New York Court of Appeals. that

where one is placed by the negligent

acts of another in such a position

that he is compelled to choose upon

the instant, and in the face of a grave

and impending peril, between two

hazards, and he makes such a choice

as a person of ordinary prudence in

the same position might make, and

an injury results therefrom, the fact

that if he had chosen the other haz-

ard he would have escaped injury

docs not prove contributory negli-

gence. Twomley 11. Railroad Co.,

69 N. Y. 158.

' Barber v. Essex, 2'1 Vt. 62.

' Donaldson 0. Milwaukee, etc., R.

R. Co., 21 Minn. 298; l\ic)Iah0n v.

Nor. Cent. R. R. Co., 89 Md. 438; N.

J. Cent. R. R. Co. s. Moore, 24 N. J.

824.

It is negligence in law to leave a

Haven, 87VL ~1; GRgg e. Vetter, ·U
Ind. 228; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co.
e. P<'nrsoo, 72 Peon. St. 169; Sheehy
•· Burger, 62 N. Y. 558; Spooner t.
Brooklyn, 54 N. Y. 230; Delany t.
Milwuukee, etc, R. R. Co.• 83 Wis.
~; Wheeler e. WestpOrt, 80 Wis. 892.
The frightening of horses by tht'
URC of a steam whistle may or may
not be a negligen~ injury according
to circumstances. Knight e. Good·
year Cn., ~ Conn. 438; Philadelphia,
etc., Co. e. Stinger, 78 Peon. SL 219.
So may be an injury u a road crOIJI.
lng which might have been avoided
by stationing a flagman there. Del.
aware, etc., R. R. Co. "· Tolfey, 38 N.
J. 525, citing Pennsylvania R. R. Co.
e. Mathews, 36 N. J. 531. So may be
the entering of a street car when ia.
motion. Eppendort t. Railroad Co..
69 N. Y.193.
• Where alt('rnativea are presented
to a traveler upon a highway as
modes of escape from collision with
an appronching traveler, it is a quea.
tiun of fact whether either might not
fnirly be chosen by an iotelligent and
prudent person. Larrabee e. Sewall,
66 ){e. 876.

Where city authorities have negligently blocked up a way with stones,
it is not negligence in law for one
having occasion to pass witb a sound
and etettdy horse, to endeavor to lead
him over. If be is injured ln so doing,
&he question of negli~ence is for the
Jury. Baltimore •· Holmes, 89 1dd.
243.
It haa been recen&17 decided by ~he

New York Court or Appeals, tbu
where one is placed by the negligent
acta or another in such a position
thu he is compelled to choose upon
the lostant, and in tbe fllce of a grave
and impending peril, between two
hazards, and he makes such a choice
&8 a person or ordinary prudence in
the same position might make, and
an Injury results therefrom, the tact
that it he had chosen the otber bu.
ard he would have escaped injury
does not prove contributory negligence. Twomley t. Railroad Co..
09 N. Y.158.
1 Barber e. Essex, 27 Vt. 62.
1 Donaldson t!. Milwaukee, etc., R.
R. Co., 21 Minn. 293; )[c}[ahon •·
Nor. Cent. R. R. Co., 89 Md. 488; N.
J. CenL R. R. Co. e. Moore, U N. J.
824.
It is negligence in law to leave a
street railway car by the front eo.
trance in disregard of the known
rule of the road forbidding It, even
though allowed by the driver. Bal.
timure, etc., R. Co. e. Wilkinson, 80
ll!l. 221. 8o it is negligence not to
look out upon the track in approtlcb..
ing a railroad crossing to cross ll
CeoL R. R. Co. "· Feller, 84 Peon. SL
226. Sec, also, Cleveland, etc., R. R.
Co. e. Elliott, 28 Ohio, (N. s.) 340. The
subject Is much discusse!l in Ulcve.
land "· N.J. Steamboat Co., 6S N. Y.
800, 809, where FoLGER. J., speaking
of the duty of carriers of passengers,
eay11: "That duty is to use the 11trict.
es~ diligence to protect the lifo and
person. By thia rule the defendant

672 . THE LAW or Tours.

Contributory Negligence. It may happen that the injury

672

THE LA \V OF TORTS.

complained of was brought about by the concurring negligence

of the party injured and of the party of whose conduct he com-

plains. This presents a case for the application of the principle

that no man shall base a right of recovery upon his own fault.

Between two wrong-doers, the law will leave the consequences to

rest where they have chanced to fall.‘ Therefore, although the

injury complained of was caused by the negligence of the

defendant, yet if legal fault contributing to the injury is impu-

table to the plaintiff himself, he will not be heard to complain.

This is the general rule.

Respecting the application of this rule the following questions

will frequently arise: .

1. Upon whom is the burden of proof when contributory

negligence is in question?

2. \Vhat must be the nature and degree of contributory neg-

ligence which will disentitle an injured party to maintain a suit?

3. What is the rule where the party injured, and whose want

of care contributed to the injury, was not morally accountable

therefor, by reason of immaturity, mental unsonndness or im-

beeility?

is liable for any injury which might
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reasonably be anticipated to occur,

in view of all the circumstances, and

of the nature of the carriage, and the

number and character of the persons

on the boat: Flint 0. Nor. & N. Y.

Trans. Co., 84 Conn. 554; Putnam v.

Broadway, etc., R. R. Co., 55 N. Y.

108, 119. This broad statement has

limits. A carrier of passengers is

Contributory Negligence. It may happen that the injury
complained of was brought about by the concurring negligence
of the pa1·ty injured and of the party of whose conduct he complains. This presents a case for the application of the principle
that no man shall base a right of recovery upon his own fault.
Between two wrong-doers, the law will leave the consequences I;(}
rest where they have chanced to fall. 1 Therefore, although the
injury complained of was caused by the negligence of the
defendant, yet if legal fault contributJng to the injury is imputable to the plaintiff himself, he will not be heard to complain.
This is the general rule.
Respecting the application of this rule the following questions
will frequently arise:
1. Upon whom is the burden of proof when contributory
negligence is in question¥
2. 'Vhat must be the nature and degree of contributory negligence which will disentitle an injured party to maintain a suitt
3. What is the rule where the party injured, and whose want
of care contributed to the injury, was not morally accountable
therefor, by reason of immaturity, mental unsoundness or imbecility¥

not bound to foresee and provide

against casualties never before known

and not reasonably to be expected:

Dougan 0. Ch. Tr. Co., 56 N. Y. 1;

see, also, Wyckoti v. Queens Co. Fer-

ry Co., 56 N. Y. 656. Hence his duty

is not to be estimated by what, alter

an accident, then ﬁrst appears to be

a proper precaution against a recur-

rence of it. Bowen v. N. Y. Cent. R.

R. Co., 18 N. Y. 408; Dougan’s case

supra."

It is not negligence in law that the

speed of a railroad train is not slack-

ened at a road crossing. Zeigler 0. N.

E. R. R. Co., 7 Sou. Car. (N. s.) 402.

‘ Gibbon 0. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2298;,

Clay v. Willan, 1 H. BL298. “There

must be a wrong as well as damage,

nnd there is no legal injury where

the loss is the result of the common

fault of both parties." Rathbun 1:.

Payne, 19 Wend. 899, per BRONSON, J.

The doctrine of contributory neg-

ligence applies to statutory actions.

Curry v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 43

Wis. 665, where the subject is care-

fully and ably examined by RYAN,

Ch. J. See, also, Keech o. Baltimore,

etc., R R. Co., 17 Md. 82; Little 0.

Brockton, 128 Mass. 511 and cases

cited.

-—--nib’.

is liable for any injury which might
reasonably be anticipated to occur,
in view of all the circumstances, and
of the nature of the carriage, and the
number and character of the persons
on the boat: Flint "· Nor. & N.Y.
Trans. Co., 84 Conn. M4; Putnam "·
Broadway, etc., R. R. Co., li5 N. Y.
108, 119. This broad statement bas
limits. A carrier of passengers is
not bound t.o foresee and provide
against cusualties never before known
anu not reasonably to be expected:
Dougan "· Ch. Tr. Co., ~6 N. Y. 1;
see, also, Wyckoff o. Queens Co. Fer.
ry Co., 56 N. Y. 656. Hence his duty
is not to be estimated by what, after
an accident, then first appears to be
a proper precaution against a recur.
renee of it. Bowen"· N.Y. Cent. R.
R. Co., 18 N.Y. 408; Dougan's ease
supra."

It is not negligence in law that the
speed of a railroad train is not slackened at a road crossing. Zeigler"· N.
E. R. R Co., 7 Sou. 01\r. (N. 8.) 402.
1 Gibbon"· Paynton, 4 Burr. 2298;.
Clay "· Will an, 1 H. Bl. 298. "There
most be a wrong as well as damage,
and there is no legal injury where
the loss is the result of the common
fault of both parties." Rathbun "·
Payne, 19 Wend. 899, per BRONSON, J.
.The doctrine of contributory negligence ·applies to statutory actions.
Curry "· Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 43
Wis. OM, where the subject is carefully and ably examined by RYA!f,
Ch. J. See, also, Keech e. Baltimore.
etc., R R Co., 17 lid. 82; Little e..
Brockton, 128 Maaa. 511 aa.d cues.
cited.
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Upon each of these questions some remarks seem to be called
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for.

n

Burden of Proof. Wliere negligence is the ground of an

action, it devolves upon the plaintiff to trace the fault for his

U pun each of these questions some remarks seem to be calk'(]
for.

injury to the defendant, and for this purpose he must show the

circumstances under which it occurred. If from these circum-

stances it appears that the fault was mutual. or, in other words.

that contributory negligence is fairly imputable to him, he has

by showing them disproved his right to recover.‘ But going no

further, it may be said that there is a legal presumption against

negligence upon which he is at liberty to rely,’ thus casting the

l)lll‘(icIl of showing contributory negligence upon the defendant.

Many cases so hold.‘ But in other cases it is said that negli-

gence in one party ])I'c.<llpp0SOS the duty of care imposed upon

him for the protection of the other; and that the plaintiff does

not show the existence of this duty until he has ﬁrst shown his

own relative position, and that he \vas himself in the exercise of

proper care. In this view the absence of contributory negli-

gcuce becomes a part of the plaintiﬁ"s ease, and should appear,

pr-ima ﬁzcie at least, before the defendant can be called upon

to answer the negligence imputed to himself.‘ Nor is this call-
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ing upon him to prove a negative; it is requiring of him merely

that he show the duty he counts upon and its breach.

‘See Railroad Co. 0. Glnclmon, 15

Wall. 401; Frcch 0. Philadelphia,

etc., R. R. Co., 39 Md. 574; McQuil-

ken 0. Cent. Psc. R R. Co., 50 Cal. 7.

' Hoyt 0. Hudson, 10 Wis. 105 ; Penn-

sylvania R. R. Co. o. Weber, 76 Penn.

St. 157; Weiss v. Pennsylvania R. R

C0., 79 Penn. St. 887; Pnducuh, etc.,

R. R. Co. 0. Hoehl, 12 Bush, 41.

' Railroad Co. o. Gladmon, 15 Wall.

401; M('Qui|keu 1:. Cent. PRO. R. R.

Burden of Proof. Where negligence is the ground of an
acJ;ion, it de\·olves upon the plaintiff to trace the fault for hia
injury to the defendant, and for this purpose be mnst show the
circnmstances under which it occurred. If fr·om these circumstan<'cs it appears that the fault was mntnal, or, in other words.
that contributory n<'gligcnce is fairly imputable to him, be has
by ~howing them dispro\·cd his right to reco\'er: But going no
fm·ther, it m:Ly be said thn.t there is a legal presumption ag-ainst
negli~cnce upon which he is at liberty to rely,' thus castin~ the
burdl'n of showing contributory negligence upon the deftmdant.
Many ca:;c:; so lwld.' Bnt in other cases it is said that negligence in one party prc,;npposes the duty of care imposed upon
him for the protection of the other; and that the plaintiff does
not show the exititcncc of this duty until he ltas first shown hi1
own relative position, and that he was himself in the exercise of
proper care. In this view the absence of contributory negligence bceomes a part of the plaintiff's case, and should appear,
prima facie at least, before the defendant can be called upon
to answer the negligence imputed to himself.• Nor is this calling upon him to prove a negath·e; it is requiring of him merely
that he show the duty be counts upon and its breach.

Co., 50 Cal. 7; St. Puul 0. Kuby, 8

Minn. 154; Wheeler 0. Westport, 30

Wis 392; Thompson 0. Nor. Mo. R.

R. Co., 51 Mo. 190; Cleveland, etc.,

R. R Co. 0. Rowan, 66 Penn. St. 393.

‘Lane 0. Crombie, 12 Pick. 177;

Wilson 9. Charlestown, 8 Allen, 137;

Wheelock 0. Boston, etc., R. R. Co.,

105 Kass. 203; Galena, etc., R. R. Co.

0. Yarwood, 15 Ill. 468; Dyer o. Tal.

cott, 16 Ill. 300; Galena, etc., R. R.

Co.o. Dill, 22 Ill. 264; Lake Shore,

etc., R. R. Co. 0. Miller, 25 Mich. 274;

Button 11. Hudson R. R. R. Co., 18 N.

Y. 248; Warner v. N. Y. Cent. R.R. Co.,

44 N. Y. 465; Merrill 9. Hampden

26 Me. 234; Hyde v. Jamaica, 27 Vt.

443; Moore 0. Cent. R. R. Co., 24 N.

J. 268. 284; Park v. O'Brien, 23 Conn.

839; Jelfersonville, etc., R. R Co. 0.

Lyon, 55 Ind. 477; Murphy 0. Chi-

cago, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 661;

• S<>e Railroad Co. e. Glndmon, 1~ 10.'i ~nss. 203; Galena, etc., R. R. Co.
Wall. 401; Frech "· Phillldclphia, "· Yarwood, l:S Ill. 468; Dyer •· Taletc., It R. Co., 39 1tld. ~74; 1tlcQuil. cott, 16 Ill. 300; Galena, etc., R. R.
ken "· Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 50 Cal. 'l. Co. "· Dill, 22 111. 264; L:1kc Shore,
'Hoyt D. Hu<lson, 10 Wis. 10.); Penn. etc., R. R. Co. •· Jrliller, 23 }[ich. 274;
aylvania R. R. Co."· Wchcr, 76 Penn. Button 11. Hudson R. R. R. Co., 18 N.
St. 157; Wcisstl. Pcnnsylvunia R. R. Y. 248; Warner"· N.Y. Cent. R. R Co.,
Co., 79 Penn. St. 387; Pnducnh, etc., -« N. Y. 465; :Merrill 11. Hampden
26 Me. 234; Hyde D. Jamnica, 27 VL
It R. Co."· Hochl, 12 Bush, 41.
• Railroad Co."· Glndmon, 15 Wall. · 44.1; :Moore "· Cent R. R. Co., 2t N.
401; 1tlrQuilkcu "· Cent. Pac. R. It J. 268. 284; Park"· O'Brien, 23 Conn.
Co., 50 Cal. 7; St. P11Ul "· Kuhy, 8 839; Jeffcmonville, etc., H. R Co. •·
)linn. 15-i; Wheeler"· Westport, 30 Lyon, 55 Ind. 477; Murphy"· Chi.
Wis 392; Thompson e. Nor. Mo. R. ~go. etc., U. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 661;
R. Co., 61 ?tlo. 190; Clcvc!lmd, etc., Miss. Ccnl It R. Co. •· Mason, Gl
R. It Co."· Rowan, 66 Penn. SL 393. Jrliss. 234; Vicksburg •· Hcnncsay,
'Lane "· Crombie, 12 Pick. 177; M Miss. 891; Bigelow .. Reed, Gl
Wilson~· Clu,rlt!&town, 8 .\lien, t:-17;
:He.~Wheelock •· Boston, etc., R. R. Co.,

Miss. Cent. R. R. C0. 0. Mason, 51

Miss. 234; Vicksburg 0. lienncssy,

54 Miss. 391; Bigelow 0. Reed, 51

Me. 325.
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duct of the defendant is wanton and willful, or where it indicatea

~~~ustly

~hat degree of indifference to the rights ot' others which may

ue charnctcl'izcd as recklessness, the doctrine of contribnnegligonL-e has no place whatever, and tho defendant ·is
•
,
· rP-sponsib:e for the injury he inflicts irrespective of the fault
placod the plaintift' in tlte way of such injnry.•"-The fact
~~hat one lms carelessly pnt himself in a pla<:o of danger is never
,LJ .I
• an excuse for another purposely or recklessly injuring him.
~~
·~\·en- the criminal is not out of the protection of the Jaw," and
(.. 7 . ~ is not to be struck down with impunity by other persons. If,
~
therefore, the defendant discovered the negligence of the plain tift'
•
•
in time, by the use of ordinary care, to prevent the injury, and
tr..._._,,~, ~did not make use of such· care for the purpose, he is justly
'~~1argcaule with reckless injury, and cannot rely npon the negli·
~ ~
•g~:nce of the plaintiff as a protection.• Or it may be said that
~N_~ such a case the negligence of the plaintiff only put him in
~"'??'~osition of danger, and was, therefore, only the remote cause of
~~~he inj111·y, while the snbsequentJy intervening negligence of the
'-<1 f d 1t !V8j the proximate canso.•
~~ 1 ~ory

4.

W’ rlnet of the defendant is wanton and willful, or where it indicates

y wllﬂt degree of indifference to the rights of others which may

w ustly be characterized as recklessness, the doctrine of contribu-

Lx ¢0"‘tor_y negligence has no place whatever, and the defendant is

”'%1-esponsibie for the injury he inﬂicts irrespective of the fault

h‘ _ V . . . . . _ . . . _

Q%-

\\l11(;ll placed the p1a1ut|ﬁ' in the way ot such injury ‘a' The fact

P l Y Y J 1:

a\ en the cummal is not out of the protection of tne law, and

's not to be struck down with impunity by other persons. If,

therefore, the defendant discovered the negligence of the plaintiff

in time, by the use of ordinary care, to prevent the injury, and

did not make use of suelrcare for the purpose, he is justly
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1argealJle with reckless injury, and cannot rely upon the negli-

-nee ot' the plaintiﬁ' as a protection.‘ Or it may be said that

such a case the negligence of the plaintiff only put him in

osition of danger, and was, therefore, only the remote cause of

‘f hat one has carelessly put himself in a place of danger IS never

~ an excuse for another uriosel or reeklessl_ in'uri1w him.

1

~~~;,t::::~t;t:_~~~;;;

~
~--;:{;~:which

~
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~
General Bule of Oontributo17 Negligenoe.

' Q‘-\.D the injury, while the subsequently intervening negligence of the

iqefendant w the proximate cause.‘

W__0

General Rule of Contributory Negligence. Rebarding

the case of a negligent injury the general result of the author-

ities seems to be, that if the plaintiff or party injured, by the

exercise of ordinary care under the circumstances, might have

avoided the consequences of the defendant’s negligence, but did

not, the case is one of mutual fault, and the law will neither cast

all the consequences upon the defendant, nor will it attempt any

Regarding

the caao of a negligent injnry the general result of the author.
ities seems to be, that if the plaintiff or party injured, by the
exercise of ordinary care under the circumstances, might have
avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence, but did
not, the case is one of mutual fault, and the law will neither east
aJl the consequences upon the defendant, nor will it attempt any

' Hartﬁeld o. Roper, 21 Wend. 615;

Vandegriﬂ; o. Reiliker, 22 N. J. 185;

Lafayette, etc., R. R Co. 0. Adams, 26

Ind. 76; Indianapolis, etc , R. R. C0.

o. McClure, 26 Ind. 370; Mulherrin

0. Delaware, ctc., R. R. Co., S1 Penn.

St. 366; Norris '0. Litchﬁeltl, 35 N. H.

2'71; Daley 1:. Norwich, etc., R. Co.,

26 Conn. 591 ; Chicago, etc., R. Co. 0.

Donahue, '75 Ill. 106; Litchﬁeld Coal

Co. 0. Taylor, 81 Ill. 590. See Glax-

ton's Admr. '0. Railroad Co., 13 Bush,

636. and cases cited.

’ See ante, p. 157.

-l|

* Brown 1:. Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co.,

50 Mo. 461; Macon, etc., R. R Co. 0.

1 Hartfield e. Roper, 21 Wend. 615;
Vandegrif\ e. Rediker, 22 N.J. lS:S;
Lafayette, etc., R. R. Co. e. Adams, 26
I.od. 76; Indian~tpolia, etc, R. R. Co.
e. McClure, 26 Ind. 870; Mulherrln
e. D<'laware, etc., R. R. Co., 81 Penn.
St. 366; Norris e. Litchftchl, 85 N. H.
271; Daley "· Norwich, etc., R. Co.,
21J C(lnn. 591 : Chicago, etc., R. Co. e.
Donahue, 75 Ill. 106; Litchfield Coal
Co. e. Taylor, 81 Ill. 590. Seo CJax.
ton's Admr. 11. Uailroad Co., 13 Buab,
6SIJ, and cases cited.
• Bee ante, p. 157.

Davis, 18 Geo. 679; State v. M:incl1es-

ter, etc., R. R. Co., 52 N. H. 523;

Cooper 1:. Cent. R. R. Co., 44 Iowa,

134; Kcrwhaker 1:. Cleveland, etc.,

R. R. Co., 3 Ohio, (n.s.)172;

‘ See Balt. & Ohio R. R Co. v. Slate,

83 Md. 542, 554. This seems to be

the precise doctrine applied in Bur-

ham 0. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 56 Mo.

838. See Greenland v. Chaplin, 5

Exch. 243.

.

_ ii»,

-..

• Brown e. Hannibal, etc.• R. R. 0o..
GO Mo. (61; Macon, etc., R. R.. Co. &
Davis, 18 Geo. 679; State "· Manche.
ter, etc., R. R. Co., Iii N. H. 528;
Cooper tl. Cent. R. R. Co..
Iowa,
184; Kerwhaker ·•· Cleveland, etc..
R. R. Co., 8 Ohio, (N. 8.) 172:
4 See Bait. & Ohio R. R Co. e. State,
88 Md. 542, 5M. This aeema to be
tho precise doctrine applied in Bur.
ham v. St. Louis, etc., R. B. Co.. 56 ){o.
838. See Greenland e. ChapliD. I
Exch.243.
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apportionment thereof. This is the English rule, and it has
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been accepted by the courts in this country with few exceptions.

In a leading English case, often quoted, in which the respon-

sibility for the collision of vessels was in question, Mr. Justice

WIGIITMAN said: “It appears, to us that the proper question for

the jury in this ease, and indeed in all others of the like kind,

is, whether the damage was oeursioned entirely by t-he negligence

or improper conduct of the defendant, or whether the plaintiff

himself so far contributed to the misfortune by his own negli-

gence or want of ordinary or common care and caution, that but

for such negligence or want of ordinary care and caution on his

part, the misfortune would not have happened. In the ﬁrst case

the plaintiff would be entitled to recover, in the latter not; as,

hut for his own fault, the misfortune would not have happened.

Mere negligence or want of ordinary care and caution would not,

however, disentitle him to recover, unless it were such that but

for that negligence or want of ordinary care and caution the

misfortune could not have happened; nor, if the defendant

might, by the exercise of care on his part, have avoided the con-

sequences of the neglect or carelessness of the piaintiﬁ'.”‘ In

the note a great many American cases are named which follow

this rule.‘
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‘Taft’ 0. Wax-man, 5 C. B (x. s.)

573, 585. See, also, Butterﬂeld v.

Forester, 11 East, 60; Mayor of Col-

chester 0. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 339; Davies

0. Mann, 10 M. & W. 545; Lewis 0.

Baltimore, etc., R. R Co , 38 Md. 588.

‘Indianapolis, etc., R. R. C0. 0.

Horst, 93 U. S. Rep. 29l; Railroad

C0. v. J ones, 95 U. S. Rep. 439; Reeves

0. Delaware. etc., R. R. Co., 80 Penn.

apportionment thereof. This is t}le English rule, and it has
been accepted by the courts in this country with few exception&.
In a leading English case, often quoted, in which the responsibility tor the collision of vessels was in question, Mr. Justice
WIGIITMAS ~:~aid: "It appears. to us that the proper question for
tho jury in this case, aud indeed in all others of tQe like kind,
is, whether the damage was occasioned entirely by tbe negligence
-or impt·oper conduct of the defendant, or whether the plaintiff
himself so far contributed to the misfortune by his own negligence or want of ordinary or common care and cnotion, that but
for such negligem•e or want of ordinary care and caution on his
pnr~, tho misfiu·tnne would not have happened. In the first case
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover, in the latter not; as,
but for his own fault, the misfortune would not have happened.
Mere negligence or want of ordinary care and caution would not,
however, disentitle him to recover, unless it were such that but
for that negligence or want of ordinary care and caution the
misfortune could not ltave happened; nor, if the defendant
might, by the exercise of care on his part, have avoided the eonsequences of the neglect or carelessness of the plaintiff." • In
the note a great many American cases are named whieh foflow
this role.'

St. 454: Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 0.

Lewis, '79 Penn. St. 32); Muiherrin 0.

Delaware, etc., R. R. Co., 81 Penn.

St. 366; Cent. R. R. Co. v. Feller, 84

Penn. St. 226; Forks Township v.

King, St Penn. St. 230; Nor. Cent.

R. R. Co. v. Price, 29 Md. 420: Frech

0. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 30

Md. 574; Lewis 1:. Bait. & Ohio R. R.

Co., 88 Md. 558; Baltimore, etc., R. R.

Co. 0. Mulligan, 45 Md. 486; Trow 0.

Vt. Cent. R. R. Co., 24 Vt. 487; Hill

0. New Haven, 37 Vt. 501; Barnes 0.

Cole, ‘ll Wend. 188; Johnson v. Hud-

son R. R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 65; Gray v.

Second Av. R R. Co., 65 N. Y. 561;

Slcves 0. Oswego, etc., R. R Co., 18

N. Y. 422; Dufer o. Cuiiy, 8 Oreg.

877; Lucas 0. New Bedford. etc., R.

R. Co.. 6 Gray, 64; Smith 0. Smith, 2

Pick. 621; Farnum u. Concord, 2 N.

H. 392; State v. Manchester, etc., R. R.

Co., 52 N. H. 523; Moore u. Cent.

R. R. (‘o., 24 N. J. 268; Cent. R. R.

Co. v. Moore 24 N. J. 824; Tcifer v.

Nor. R. R. Co., 80 N. J. 188; Central

R. R. Co. 0. Van Horn, 38 N. J. 133;

Gurmon 0. Bangor, 38 Me. 443; Tim.

mons v. Cent. Ohio R. R. Co., 8 Ohio,

(N B.) 103; Cleveland, etc., R. R. C0.

0. Terry, 8 Ohio. (N. s.) 570; Sandusky,

etc., R R. Co. 0. Sloan, 27 Ohio, (N. s.)

1 Tuff' •· Warman, IJ C. B. (x. 1.)
IJ73, I>M. See, also, Butterfield v.
Forester, 11 East, 00; :&layor of Colebeater 11. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 330; Davies
•· Mann, 10 }[. & W. Mli; Lewis v.
Baltimore, etc., R. R Co, 38 Md. 1>88.
• Indianapolis, etc., R. It Co. v.
Horst, 98 U. S. Hep. 201; Railroad
~. D. Jones, 93 U. S. Rt'p. 439; Reeves
•· DelR\\"1\re, etc., R R. Co., SO Peon.
Sl 454: I>(•nnsylvania R. R Co. v.
Lewis, 70 Pt'nn. St. 3:1; Mulhcrrln e.
Delaware, t'tc., R. R. Co., 81 Penn.
St. 866; ('enl R. R. Co. e. Feller, 84
Penn. St. 226; Forks Township v.
.King, 81 P(•nn. St. 230; Nor. Ct•nl
R. R. Co. e. Price, 20 .Md. 420; Frech
e. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 89
lid. 674; Lewis e. Bait. & Ohio R R.
Co., 38 Md. :>1:!8; BaIt i more, etc., R. R.
Co. •· Mulli~an, 4.'J Md. 486; Trow •·

Vt. Cent. B. B. Co., 1M Vt. 4117; Blll
•· New Havt'o, 87 Vt. ti01; Barnes •·
Cole, 21 Wend. 188; Johnson •· Hudaon R R. B. Co., 20 N. Y. 65; Gray ..
Second Av. R. R Co., 63 N.Y. 661;
Steves v. Oswego, etc., R R Co., 18
N. Y. 422; Dufer v. Cully, 8 Oreg.
877; Lncas 11. New Bt•dfurd, etc., R.
R. Co., 6 Gray, 64; Smith •· Smith, 2
Pick. 621; Farnum v. Concord, 2 N.
B. 392; State e.lbnchester, etc., R R.
Co., 62 N. H. li28; )(oore e. Cent. ·
R. R ('o., 24 N. J. 268; C',ent. R R.
Co. e. :Muoro 1M N.J. 824; Telfer e.
Nor. R R Co., SO N.J. 188; Central
R. R Co. v. Vao Horn, 88 N.J. 133;
Garmon e. Ban~or, 38 Me. 44.'1; Timmoos e. Ct>nt. Ohin R R. Co., 6 Ohio,
(N s.) lO.'i; Cleveland, etc., R R. Co.
v. Terry,8 Ohio, (N.I.) 570; Sandusky,
etc., R. R. Co... Slou, :ll Oblo, (R.I.)
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But while the English rule has been generally accepted in this
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country, there has, perhaps, in two or three States, been a depart-

ure from it. The early Illinois cases accepted the English rule

without question; ' but in later cases, when the question of eon-

tributory negligence has been presented, a form of language has

been used which is, to say the least, liable to be understood as a

departure. The departure, if there is any, in that State, began

841; Williams 0. Mich. Cent. R. R.

Co., 2 Mich. 259; Lake Shore, etc,

R. R. Co. 0. Miller, 25 Mich. 274;

Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Campau, 35

But while the English rule has been generally accepted in this
country, there has, perhaps, in two or three States, been a departure from it. The early Illinois cases accepted the English rule
without question; 1 but in later cases, when the question of contributory negligence has been presenteod, a form of language has
been used which is, to say the least, liable to be understood as a
depnrtnre. The departme, if there is any, in that State, began

Mich. 468; New Haven, etc., Co. o.

Vanderbilt, 16 Conn. 420; Birge 0.

Gardiner, 19 Conn. 507; Beers 0. Hou-

B1|l.0l1lC R. R. Co., 19 Conn. 566; Park

0. O'Brien, 23 Conn. 339; Jackson v.

Commissioners. etc., '76 N. C. 282;

Donaldson o. Milwaukee, etc., R. R.

Co., 21 Minn. 293; Brown v. Milwau-

kee, etc., R. R. Co, 2'3 Minn. 165;

Erd 0. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 443; New

Orleans, etc., R R. Co. 0. Hughes, 49
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Miss. 238; Memphis. etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Thomas, 51 Miss. 637; Paducah, etc.,

R. R. (J0. 0. Hoehl, 12 Bush, 41;

Koutz 0. Toledo, etc., R. R Co., 54

lnd. 515; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. 0.

Boland, 58 Ind. 398; Jefiersonville,

etc., R. R. C0. v. Lyon, 55 Ind. 477;

West. Union Tel. Co. o. Eyser, 2 Col-

orado, 141; Robinson v. West. Pac.

R. R. Co , 48 Cal. 409; Deville 11. Sou.

Pac. R. R. Co., 50 Cal. 353; Hearne 0.

Bou. Pac. R. R. Co., 50 Cal. 482; Ma-

con, etc., R. R. Co. v. Baber, 42 Geo.

300; Adams 0. Wiggins Ferry Co., 27

Mo. 95; Smith u. Union Pnc. R. R.

Co., 61 M0. 588; Harlan v. St. Louis,

etc., R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 22; Laicher v.

New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 28 La.

Ann. 320; Johnson 0. Canal. etc., Co.,

27 La. Ann. 53; West. U. Tel. Co. 0.

Quinn, 56 Ill. 319; Mobile, etc., R. R.

Co. 0. Ashcrait. 48 Ala. 15; Lynam 0.

Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co.. 4 Houst.

683; Jefferson 1:. Brady, 4 Houst. 626;

Trout 0. Virginia, etc., R. R. Co., 23

Grat. 619; Patterson 0. Burlington,

etc., R. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 279; Murphy

0. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Iowa,

661. There is a statute in this State

which provides that “ every railroad

company shall be liable for all dum-

ages sustained by any person, includ-

ing employee of the company, in

consequence of any neglect of the

agents, or by any mismanagement of

the engineers or other employees of

the corporation, to any person sus

taining such damage." In the case

last cited it is decided that that

statute is not intended to disturb the

rule that the plaintiff shall not re-

cover when chargeable with con-

tributory negligence.

One who, through the mismanage-

ment of the train, is alarmed, and, in

his fright or anxiety, leaps from the

cars, is not to be charged with con-

841; Williams "· Mich. Cent. R R.
Co., 2 llich. 2.19; L~ke Shore, etc ,
R. H. <:o. "· 1tlillcr, 25 :Mich. 274;
llkh. Cent. R. R. c.,. "· Campau, 35
}I ich. 41l8; New IIRven, etc., Co. "·
VanderlJilt, 10 C'onn. 420; Birge e.
Gardiner, 10 Conn. 507; Beers v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 19 Coon. 506; Park
"· O'Brien, 23 Ct>Dn. 3:39; J aekson "·
Commissioners. etc., 76 N. C. 28·:!;
Donaldsrm "· :Milwaukee, etc., R. R.
Co., 2lllinn. 293; Brown"· llilwaukee, etc., It R Co, 2;3 Minn. 165;
Erd "· St. P1ml, 22 1tllnn. 443; New
Orlenns, etc., R R. Co. "· Ilu)!hcs, 49
Mba. 218; Memphis. otc .• R. R Co."·
Thomas, 51 Miss. 637; Paducah, etc.,
R. R. <:o. "· llochl, 12 Bush, 41;
Koutz "· Toledo, etc., H. R. Co., 54
Ind. 615; Louisville, etc., R. R Co. "·
Boland, M Ind. S!l~; Jeffersonville,
etc., R. R. Co. "· Lyon, 55 Ind. 477;
West. Union Tel. Co."· Eyscr, 2 Colorado, 141; Robinson "· West. Pac.
R. R. Co, 48 Cal. 409; Deville"· Sou.
Pac. R. R. Co., 50 Cal. 3S3; Hearne"·
Sou. Pac. R. R. Co., 50 Cal. 482; Ma..
con, etc., R R. Co. "· Baber, 42 Geo.
300; Adams"· Wip-gins Ferry Co., 27
Mo. 95; Smith "· Union Puc. R. R.
Co., 61 llo. 588; H:1rlan tl. St. Louis,
etc., R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 22; Laicher "·
Ne\V Orkans, etc., R. R. Co., 28 Lll.
Ann. 320; Johnson "· ~anal. etc., Co.,
27 La. Ann. 53; West. L". Tel. Co. "·
Quinn, 50 Ill. 319; Mobile, etc., R. R.
Co. "· Ashrraft, 48 Ala. 15; Lynam "·
Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co.. 4 Houst.
li83; Jefferson"· Brady, 4 1Ioust.626;
Trout e. Virginia, etc., R. R. Co., 23

Gral 619; Patterson e. Burlin~on,
etc., R. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 279; :Murphy
e. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.. 45 Iowa,
661. There is a statute in this State
which provides that" every railroad
comp:my shall be liaule for all dum.
ages sustain1..-d by any person, includ.
ing employes of the company, in
consequence of any neglect of the
agents, or by any mismanagement or
the engineers or other employees of
the corporation, to any person SUStaining such damage." In the case
last cited it is decided that thal
statute is not intended lo dh.turb the
rule that the plaintiff shall not re.
cover when chargeable with contributory negligence.
One who, through the mismanage.
ment of the train, is alarmed, and, in
his fright or anxiety, leaps from the
cars, is not to be charg<>d wi tb con.
triuutory negligence. Filer "· N. Y.
Cent. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 47. E'"en
though bad he remained in his place
the injury would not have happened.
Twomley e. Railroad <:ompany, 69
N. Y. 1-i8. For the same principle,
see Stokes 11. Saltonstllll, 13 Pet. 181;
Penn. H.. R. Co. e. Kilgore, :32 Penn.
St. 2!12; Frio k "· Potter, 17 111. 406;
1tlacun, etc., R. R. Co. "· Wino, 26
Gco. 250. If one is injured in obey.
ing a direction of a servant nf the
ruilroad company to pass from one
car to another, he is not charge·1ble
witb negligence. Mcintyre "· N. Y.
Cent. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. 287.
1 Aurora Branch R. R. Co. •· Grimel,
18 Ill. 585.
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with Galena, etc., 13. R. C0. v. Jacobs, in which the English
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cases are reviewed at length, and without at all questioning the

leading cases, either English or American, the following remarks

are made: “ It will be .~0L‘l1 from these cases that the question

of liability does not depend absolutely on the absence of all

negligence on the part of the plaintiff, but upon the relative

degree of care or want of care as manifested by both parties;

for all care or negligence is at best but relative, the absence of

the highest possible degree of care showing the presence of some

negligence, slight as it may be. The true doctrine, therefore, we

think, is, that in proportion to the negligence of the defendant

should be measured the degree of care required of the plaintiff;

that is to say, the more gross the negligence manifested by the

defendant, the less degree of care will be required of the plaintiff

to entitle him to recover.” “W'e say, then, that in this as in all

like cases, the degrees of negligence must be measured and con-

sidered, and whenever it shall appear that the plaintiﬁ"s negli-

gence is comparatively slight and that of the defendant gross,

he shall not be deprived of his action.” ‘ But was not this equiva-

lent, in the mind of the judge, to saying that if the defendant

is chargeable with the want of ordinary care, and the plaintiff is

not, the latter may recover, notwithstanding that a higher degree
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of care might have prevented the injury? In several cases the

court has declared that a mere preponderance of negligence on

the part of the defendant, where both were in fault, will not

justify a recovery,’ and when a jury has been told that the plain-

tiff may recover unless his negligence contributed to the injury

in a considerable degree the court has promptly set aside the

verdict.‘ And it seems to be clear that the court has aimed at

' Galena, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Jacobs,

20 Ill. 478, 496, per BREESE, J . The

following are some of the more re-

cent cases in which this doctrine has

been approved and applied: Ill.Cent.

R. R. Co. o. Benton, 69 lll.174;To-

ledo, etc., R. R Co. v. McGiunis, '71

Ill.3<l6; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. e. Ilall,

72 Ill. 222; Rockford, etc., R. R. Co.

0. Ilillmcr, 72 Ill. 235; Ill. Cent. R.

R. Co. v. Hammer. 72 Ill. 347; St.

Louis, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Britz, 72 Ill

250; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. o. Dona-

witl1 Galena, etc., R. R. Oo. v. Jacob1, in which the English
eases arc reviewed at length, and without at all questioning the
leading cases, either English or American, the following remarks
arc made: " It will he t-een from these cases that the question
of liability does not depend absolutely on the absence of all
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, but upon the relative
d~ree of care or want of care as manifested by both parties;
for all care or negligence is at best but relative, the absence of
the highest pns~il>le degree of eare showing the presence of some
negligence, slight as it may be. The true doctrine, therefore, we
think, is, that in proportion to the negligence of tho defendant
should be measured the degree of care required of the plaintiff;
that is to say, the more gross the negligence manifested by the
defendant, the less degree of care will be required of the plaintiff
to entitle him to recover." "We say, then, that in this as in all
like cases, the degrees of negligence must be measured and considered, and whenever it shall appear that the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively slight and that of the defendant gross,
he shall not be deprived of his action." • But was not this equivalent, in the mind of the judge, to saying that if tho defendant
is chargeable with the want of ordinary care, and the plaintiff is
not, the latter may recover, notwithstanding that a higher degree
of care mi~ht have prev~nted the injury¥ In several cases the
court has deelared that a mere preponde-rance of negligence on
the part of the defendant, whero both were in fault, will not
justify a recovery: and when a jury has been told that the plaintiff may reconr unle~s his negligence contributed to the injury
in a cona:derahl6 degre6 the court has promptly set aside the
verdict.• And it seems to be clear that the court bas aimed at

hue, 75 Ill. 106; Toledo, etc., R R O0.

0. O'Connor, 77 Ill. 391; Chicago, etc.,

R. R. U0. 0. Hatch, 79 Ill. 137; Sler.

ling Bridge Co. v. Pearl, 80 Ill. 231;

Kewance 0. Dc-pew, 80 Ill. 119; Chl-

cago, etc., R. R. C0. 0. Damcrell, 81

Ill. 450.

' Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Clark,

70 Ill. 276; Indianapolis, etc., R. R.

Co. v. Flannigan, 77 Ill. 365.

'Slcrling Bridge Co. 0. Pearl, 80

Ill. 251.

6;

1 Galena. etc., R R Co. e. Jacobe,
to Ill. <l78, 400, per BREESE, J. The
Coll••wing arc some of tho more re.
eent cases in which this cloctrlno has
.been approved and applied: Ill. Cenl
R. R Co. •· Benton, 69 Ill. 174; To.
ledo, etc., R R Co. e. McGinnis, '71

hue, 73 Ill. 106; Toledo, etc., R. R. Oo.
e. O'Connor, 'l71ll. aDl; Chlcag••, etc..
R. R. Co. •· Hatch, 79 Ill. 137; Srcr.
ling Bridge Co. e. Pearl, 80 Ill. 2.>1;
Kewnnee e. Th•pew, 80 Ill. 119; Chieago, etc., R R. Co. e. Damcroll, 81

Ill. 3-16; 111. Cent. R R Co. e. Hall,
'2'2 Ill. 222; Rockford, etc., R R Co.
e. Hillmer, '72 Ill. 23S; Ill. Cent. R
R. Co. e. Hammer, 72 Ill. 347; SL
Louis, etc., R R Co. e. Britz, 72 IU
11161 Chicago, etc., R R Co. e. Dona.

• Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. e. Clark.
'10 Ill. 276; lndlanapolla, etc., ll B.
Co. •· Flannigan, '17 Ill. 865.
1 Sterling Bridge Co. e. Pearl, 80
Dl. 931.

Ill. 430.
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all times to make the plaintiﬁ"s right of recovery—so far as
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concerned contributory negligence—-depend upon the question

Whether he had or had not been chargeable with a want of ordi-

nary care which directly contributed to the injury.‘ And as

what is ordinary care must of course depend upon the circum-

stances, this would be equivalent to holding—if the idea of

degrees in negligence was put aside—that the plaintiff may

recover in such cases, because he was not guilty of what in law

is negligence.

In G1-orgia a rule seems to be laid down not essentially different

from that in Illinois. “ It is this, that although the plaintiif be

somewhat in fault, yet if the defendant be grossly negligent and

thereby occasioned or did not prevent the mischief, the action

may be maintained.” ’ The same is true of Kansas.‘

In a ease in Tennessee, where it appeared that the engine of a

railroad company was running in the night time without a head-

light, and ran over and killed a man lying across the track, it

was held that the contributory negligence of the deceased was

no bar to a recovery for the killing, though it might be taken

into account in mitigation of damages.‘ That would be in eﬁ'ect

' Bee Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. 0. Green,

81 Ill. 10, and cases cilcd. Bee, also,

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Rocklord, etc, R. R. Co. 0. Delaney,

82 lll. 198; Schmidt 0. Chicago, etc.,

R. R. Co., B3 lll. 405. Says RYAN,

Ch. J., in Griﬂln v. Willow, 43 Wis.

509,512: “Slight negligence is not

slight want of ordinary care contrib-

uting to the injury, which would de-

feat an action for negligence. ‘ Slight

all times to make tl1e plaintiff's rigllt of recovery-so far a&
concerned contributory negligence-depend upon the question
whether he had or had not been chargeable with a want of ordinary care which directly contributed to the injury.• And a&
what is ordinary care must of course depend upon the circnmstances, this would be equivalent to holding-if the idea of
degrees in negligence was pot aside-that the plaintiff maz
recover in such cases, because he was not guilty of what in law
is negliA{ence.
In G"corgia a rnle seems to be laid down not eseentially different
from that in 111inois. "It is this, that although the plaintiff be
a:;omewhat in fault, yet if the def(mdant be grossly negligent and
thereby occasioned or did not prevent the mischief~ the action
may be maintained." w The same is true of Kansas.•
In a case in Tennessee, where it a}lpeared that the engine of a
railroad company was running in the night time without a beadlight, and ran over and killed a man lying across the track, it
was held that the contributory ncgli~rence of the deceased was
no bar to a t-ecovery for the killing, though it might be taken
into account in mitigation of damages.• That wonld be in effect

negligence is deﬁned to be only an

absence of that degree of care and

vigilance which persons of extraor-

dinary vigilnnce and foresight are

accustomed to use.’ And such want

of extraordinary care on the part of

the person injured will not defeat an

action for negsligcnce. Drchcr 0.

Fitchburg, 22 Wis. 675; Ward v. Rail-

way Co., 20 Wis. 144; Hammond 0.

Mukwa, 40 Wis. In ordinary cir-

cumstances. persons traveling upon

public highways are held to the excr-

ciae of ordinary care only."

‘Augusta, ctc.. R. R. Co. 0. McEl-

murry, 24 Geo. '75, 80.

‘ Union Paciﬁc R.'_R. Co. o. Rollins,

5 Kan. 167.

‘ Nashville, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Smith,

6 Hcisk. 174. The jury nllowed it to

"mitigate" the damages to $10,000.

In Pennsylvania it is held that the

railroad company is entitled to a

clear track. and whoever puts him.

self upon it, except as he has occa-

sion to cross, must take upon himself

the consequences. Mulherrin 0. Dela-

ware, etc., R. R. Co., 81 Penn. St. 366;

Penn. R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Penn.

St. 83. The early case in Tennessee

of Whirlcy 0. Whiteman, 1 Head,

610, seems to have adopted the Eng-

lish rule, and while this is approved

in Nashville, etc., R. R. Co. e. Carroll,

6 Ileisk. 347, yet the rule is so far

qualiﬁed as to support an instruction

that where the plaintiff could have

avoided the injury by ordinary care

_-.-J

1 Bee Ill. Cenl R. R. Co. "· Green,
81lll. 19, and cases cited. Bee, also,
Rockford, etc, R R Co. e. Delaney,
~ Ill. lOti; Schmidt "· Chicago, etc.,
R. R. Co., 88 111. 401). Bays RYAN,
Ch. J., In Grimn "· Willow, 43 Wis.
IS09, 512: "Sli~ht negligence ia not
alight want of ordinary care contrib.
uting to the injury, which would de.
feat HD action fo•· negligence. • Slight
negligence is deflned to bo only an
ab!lence of that degree of care and
vigilance which persons of extraordinary vigilunce and furcsight are
accustomed to usc.' And such want
of extraordinary care on the part of
the person injured will not tlcfeat an
action for nc~Jigencl'. Dreher e.
Fitchburg, 22 Wis. 673; Ward e. Railway Co., 29 Wis. 144; Hnmmnnd e.
M.ukwa. 40 Wis. 35. In ordinary cir.
cumstances. persons traveling upon
public highways are held to the exercise of ordinury care only."

wAugusta, etc.. R. R. Oo. e. KcBImurry, 24 Geo. '15, 80.
• Union Pacific R:.R Co. e. Rollioa,
lJ Kan. 167.
• N118hvllle, etc., R. R. Co. e. Smith.
6 Heisk. 174. The jury allowed it to
"mitigate" the damages to $10,000.
In Pennsylvsnia it is held that the
railroad compiLDy is entitled to a
clear track, and whoever puta himself upon it, except as he has occasion to cro!ls, must take upon himself
the consequences. Mulherrin "· Dela.
ware, etc., H. R. Co., 81 Penn. St. 366;
Penn. R. R. Co. "· Lewis, 'l9 PenD.
St. s:t The early CllSe In Tennessee
of Whirley e. Whiteman, 1 Head.
610, seems to have adopwd the English rule, and while this is approved
in Na~hvllle. etc., R. R. Co. 11. Carroll,
6 IIeisk. 847, yet the rule is so far
qualified as to support an instruction
that where the plaintiff couhl have
avoided the injury by ordinary care
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an attempt at an apportionment of damages, and that, too, in a
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case where the want of care in the party killed was at least equal

to that of the party .sued. '

Negligence must have been Proximate to the Iniury. The

negligence that will defeat a recovery must be such as proximately

contributed to the injury. The remote cause will no more be

an attempt at an apportionment of damages, and that, too, in a
case where the want of care in the party killed waa at least equal
to that of the party .sued.

noticed as a ground of defense than as a ground of recovery. It

would be quite impossible, within such limits as can here be

assigned to the subject, to enter upon an examination of speciﬁc

instances, and the mention of a few must suffice. Wl|c|'e the

injury is inﬂicted upon the plaintiff upon his own premises, it is

not contributory negligence that he had not guarded his premises

as perfectly against such injuries as prudence might dictate.

Thus, one’s buildings near the line of a railway, by reason of

very combustible material, may be peculiarly exposed ‘to take

tire from passing engines; but while the owner must take upon

himself all such risks as may result from a careful management

of tra.ins, he has a right to redress if his buildings are negligently

burned.‘ It is not contributory negligence that one allows his

cattle to pasture by an unfenced railway track, on laud belong-

ing to or controlled by himself, provided it is the fault of the

railway company that the track is not fenced.’ In neither of
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these cases does the party’ neglect any duty he owes to the rail-

road company; he merely does what he may rightfully do with

his own. And so highly does the law regard human life, that it

will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it if, from the

appearances, the party had reason to believe he might succeed in

the attempt, though not without danger of failure and injury to

himself.‘ But where a party, in the exercise of his own right, is

Salmon o. Delaware, etc., R. R. Co.,

88 N. J. 5.

he cannot recover. unless ﬂu defendant

was gzzilly of gross nr_r;li'gvnca. This

seems to allow the jury full liberty to

return averdict for thc plaintiff where

both were in fault. if in their opinion

the defendant was the more culpable.

' Philadelphia, etc., R. R Co. 0.

Hendricksnn, 80 Penn. St. 182. See,

for the same principle, Underwood 0.

Waldron, 33 Mich. 232; King o. Mor-

ris, etc., R. R. Co., 8 C. E. Green, 397;

' Blaine o. Ches. & Ohio R. R. Co,

Negligence must have been Proximate to the IJUury. The
negligence tl1at will defeat a recovery must be such as proximately
contributed to the injury. The remote eanse will no more be
noticed as a ground of defense than as a ground of recovery. It
would be quite impos~ible, within sneh limits ae can here be
assiWted to the subject, to enter upon an examination of specific
instances, and the mention of a few must suffice. Where the
injury is infticted upon the plaintiff upon his own premises, it is
not contributor,\' negligence that he had notguarded his premises
as perfectly against such injuries as prudence might dictate.
Thus, one's bnildings near the line of a railway, by reason of
very combustible material, may be peculiarly exposed~ take
tire from passing engines; but while the owner must take upon
himself all such risks as may result from a careful man~tn(>nt
of trains, be has a right to redress if his buildings are negligently
burned.' It is not contributory negligence that one allows his
cattle to pasture by an unfenced railway track, on ]and belonging to or controlled by himself, provided it is the fault of the
railway company that the track is not fenced.' In neither of
these t'8Ses does the party neglect any duty he owes to the railroad (:ompany; he merely dot>.d what he may rightfully do with
his own. And s<t highly does the Jaw regard human life, that it
will not impute uegligen<:e to an effort to preserve it if, from the
nppcarances, the party had reason to believe he might sn<.-eeed in
the attempt, though not without danger of failnre and injury to
himself.• Bot where a party, in the exercise of his own right, is

9 W. Va. 252. And. sec Trow r. Vt.

Cent. R. R. Co., 24 Vt 487. Compare

Fritz o. First Div., etc., R R. Co.. 22

Minn. 404; Wilder o. Maine Cent.

R. R Co., 65 Me. 332; Trout u. Vir-

ginia, ctc., R. R. Co., 23 Grat. 619.

3 Eckert 0. Long Island, etc., R. R.

Co., 43 N. Y. 602. Compare Nor.

be cannot recover, tUil~u t'M defendant
guiltg of gro88 n~!Jligmu. 'fbia
&eems to allow the jury full liberty to
return a ven.lict for tho plaintiff where
bo\11 wt'rc in fault, if in thl•ir opinion
the dt'fendant was the more culpable.
1 Philadelphia, etc., It It Co. •·
Hendrickson, 80 Penn. St. 182. See,
for the same principle, Underwood e.
Waldron, 33 Mich. 282; King"· Mor.
ria, etc., R R Co., 8 C. E. Green, 397;

tMI

Salmon e. Delaware, etc., R. R Co.,
88 N.J. 5.
1 Blaine e. Chea. & Ohio R ll Co,
9 W. Va. 252. And. IK'O Trow e. VL
Cent. R. R Co., 24 Vt 487. Compare
Fritz "· First Div., etc., R R Co., ~
:Minn. 404; Wilder e. Maine CenL
R. R Co., O.l lie. 332; Trout "· Virginia, etc., R. R Co.• 23 Grat. 619.
• Eckert "· Lontt bland, etc., R R.

Co., 48 N. Y. 602.

Compare Nor.
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in the enjoyment of that which is common toothers also, or which
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may in any way narrow, impede, or restrict the enjoyment of

rights by others, his duty to observea vigilance proportionate to the

danger of interference is manifest. Thus, one about to cross a

railway track by the public highway, where’ the liability to col-

lision is great, will be held precluded, by his contributory negli-

gence, from a recovery for an injury, if he drives upon the track

without looking for approaching trains, even though the railway

company has neglected to sound the alarm which the statute

requires of it at such places.‘

Negligence of Infants, etc. In an action brought in New

York for a negligent injury to a child two years of age, who was

run over while at play in the public street, the court held that he

was not entitled to recover, because it was negligent for him to

be thus'exposed to injury. It is true he was not of an age to be

in the enjoyment of that which is common to others also, or which
may in any way narrow, impede, or restrict the enjoyment of
rights by others, his duty to observe a vigilance proportionate to the
danger of' interference is inauifest. Thus, one about to cro:58 a
rc1ilway track by the public highway, where. the liability to ~1li~ion is great, will be held precluded, by his contributory negli.
gence, from a reco,·ery for an injury, if be drives upon the track
without looking tor approaching trains, even thongh the railwar
company has neglected to sound the alarm which the statute
requires of it at such places.'

able to judge for himself whether or not the place was one of

danger, but it was the duty of parents or others having charge

of him to judge for him, and it" they neglected this duty, their

negligence was to be imputed to him.‘ This -case has been fol-

Penn. R. R. Co. 0. Mahoney, 57 Penn.

Bt. 187.

' Railroad Co. 0. Whitton. 13 Wall.
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270; Butterﬁcld v. Western R. R. Co.,

10 Allen, 533; Allyn 1:. Boston, etc.,

R. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77; Craig 0. New

York, etc., R. R. Co., 118 Mass. 431;

Grippcn v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 40 N.

Y. 34; Baxter o. Troy, etc., R. R. Co.,

41 N. Y. 502; Mussoth v. Delaware,

Negligence of In&.nta, eto. In an action brought in New
York for a negligent injnry to a child two years of age, who was
run over while at play in the public street, the court held that he
was not entitled to recover, because it was negligent for him to
be tlms~xposed to injury. It is true he was not of an age to be
ahle to jndge tor himaclf whether or not the place was one of
danger, but it was the duty of parents or others having charge
of him to judge for him, and if they neglected this duty, their
negligenco was to bo imputed to him.' TJlis ·case has been fol-

etc.,R. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 524; Bellei'ou-

tainc, etc., R. R. Co.v. Hunter, 33 Ind.

365; Nor. Penn. R. R. Co. 0. Helle-

man, 49 Penn. St. 60; Gcrety 0. Phil-

adclphia. etc., R. R Co., 81 Penn. St.

274; Fletcher 1:. Atlantic, etc., R. R.

Co., 64 Mo. 484; Brown 0. Milwaukee,

etc., R. R. Co., 2?. Minn. 165; Belle-

fontaine, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Snyder,

24 Ohio, (N. B.) 671; Zeigler 0. Nor,

East. R. R. Co., 5 Sou. Car. 221; Chi-

cago, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Hatch, 79 Ill.

137; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Har-

H

wood, 80 Ill. 88; Rockford, etc., R. R.

Co. u. Byam, 80 lll. 528; Chicago.

etc., R. R. Co. 0. Damerell. 81 Ill. 451;

Lake Shore, etc , R. R. Co. 0. Miller,

25 Mich. 274. The rule is of course

liable to be affected by obstructions

which prevent the track on each side

being sccn as the team approaches.

See Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Mil-

ler, 26 Mich. 274; Craig v. N. Y., etc.,

R. R. Co., 118 Mass. 431. If one is

seen on the track in time for him to

get out of the way, the engineer has

a right to assume he will do so, unless

he has reason to suppose he is labor-

ing under some disability, or that he

does not hear or comprehend the sig-

nals. Frcch 0. Philadelphia R. R.

Co., 39 Md. 574, and cases cited.

' Hatﬁeld 0. Roper, 21 Wend. 615.

See Mangam o. Brooklyn R. R. Co,

38 N. Y. 455; Flynn 0. Hutton, 4 Daly,

552.

-—~=v!Iﬁﬂ

Penn. R R Oo. e. Mahoney, rr7 Penn.
SL187.
1 Railroad Co. o. Whitton. 18 Wall.
270; Butterfield"· Western R. R. Co,.
10 Allen, 533; Allyn "· Boston, etc,.
R. R. Co., 105 Ma."!!. '77; Craig e. New
York, etc., R R. Co., 118 }[a.."S. 431;
Grippen "·N.Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 40 N.
Y. 34; Baxter o. Troy, etc., R. R Co.,
41 N.Y. 502; Ma.'l.,nth o. Delaware,
etc., R U. Co., 64: N. Y.u2!; Bellefontaine, etc., R R Co."· Hunter, 33 Ind.
86:>; Nor. Penn. R R. Co. e. Heileman, 49 Penn. St. 60; Gerety •· Philadelphia. etc., R R Co., 81 Peon. St.
274; Fletcher"· Atlantic, etc., R. R.
Co., 64~Io. 484; Brown o. Milwaukee,
etc., R. R. Co., 2~ Minn. 16J; Bellefontaine, etc., R. U. Co. "· Snyder,
24 Ohio, (N. a.) 671; Zeigler •· Nor,
East R R Co., 6 Buu. Car. 221; Chi·
cago, etc., R. R. Co. •· Hatch, 79 Ill.
137; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. o. Bar-

wood, 80 Til 88; Rockford, etc., R. R
Co. o. Byam, 80 IJI. 628; Chicago.
etc., R R. Co. •· Damerell. 81 Ill. 451;
Lake Sbore, etc, R R Co. •· :Miller,
The rule ia ot COUI'IIe
liahlo to be affected by obstrucliou
which prevenL tht> track on each side
being seen aa the team approaches.
See Lake Shore. etc., R R. Co. •· Mil.
ler, ~Mich. 274: Craig"· N.Y.. etc.,
R R Co., 118 Mass. 4.11. If one it
seen on the track In time f'or him t.o
get out of thu way, tho engineer baa
a right to assume he will do so, unlea
he bas reason to suppose he is labor.
lng under some disability, or that be
does not hear or comprcnend the signals. Frech o. Philadelphia R. R.
Co., 80 Md. 574, and cases cited.
1 Hatfield e. Roper, 21 Wend. 815.
Bee Mangam "· Brooklyn R. R. Co.,
88 N.Y. 455; Flynn •· Hatton,4 Dal7,
552.
2:i )[ich. 274.
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lowed as authority in everal States,‘ but rejected in others. It

REDRESS FOR NEGLIGENCE.

6Sl

was very soon questioned by Ch. J . Rrznrll-11.0, of Vermont, in

an opinion, the pith of which is comprised in the following words:

“ We are satisﬁed that, although a child, or idiot, or lunatic may,

to some extent, have escaped into the highway, through the

fault or negligence of his keeper, and so be improperly there, yet

if he is hurt by the negligence of the defendant, he is not pre-

cluded from his redress. If one know that such a person is in

the highway, or on a railway, he is bound to a proportionate

degree of watchfulness. and what would be butordinary neglect in

regard to one whom the defendant supposed a person of full age

and capacity, would be gross neglect as to a child, or one known

to be incapable of escaping danger.” ’ The conclusions in many

other States have been to the same effect.‘ The law on the sub-

‘ Wright v. Maiden, etc., R. R. Co.,

4 Allen, ‘.283; Callahan 0. Bean, 9 Al-

len, 401; Holly v. Boston Gas Light

Co., 8 Gray, 123; Lynch 0. Smith, 101

Mass.5'3; S.C.6Am.Rcp.188; Brown

0. European, etc., R. R. Co., 58 Me.

88-1; Leslie v. Lewis-ton, 62 Me. 468;

lowed as authority in several St'ltcs,' but rejectt.>d in others. It
was very soon questioned by Ch. J. R.:oFu.:LD, of Vermont, in
an opinion, the pith of which is comprised in the following words:
c. We are satisfied that, although a child, or idiot, or lunatic may,
to some extent, have escaped into the highway, through the
fault or negligence ot' his keeper, and so be improperly there, yet
if he is hurt by the negligence of the defendant, he is not preeluded from his redreil&. If one know that such a person is in
the highway, or on a railway, he is bound to a proportionate
degree ot" watchfulness, and what would be bnt ordinary neglect in
regard to one whom the defendant supposed a person of full age
and capacity, would be gross neglect as to a child, or one known
to be incapable of escaping danger." • The conclusions in many
other States have been to the same etfec~· The law on the sub-

Pittsburgh, etc . R. R. Co. o. Vining,
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27 Ind. 513; Lafayette, etc., R. R.

C0. 0. Huffman, 28 Ind. 287; Jeffer-

sonville R. R. Co. 0. Bowen, 40 Ind.

545. See East Saginaw, etc., R. Co.

0. Bohu, 27 Mich. 503; Karr v. Parks,

40 Cal. 188. In the recent ease of

Ewen v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 38

Wis. 613, 628, where the complaint

was that a boy nine years of age had

been negligently run over, by the cars

of the defendant, COLE, J. said:

““'ere it clear, from the undisputed

facts of the case that the boy himself,

considering his age and intelligence,

was at fault, while crossing the rail-

road track, when he was killed, and

did not. exercise proper care; or, if it

appeared that he was too young to be

.nn'jurz'.w, and that the negligence of

his mother in permitting him to go

alone on the errand on which he was

sent, contributed to the accident, then

we could say, as a pr0pn~lllOn of law,

that there could be no recovery."

For a somewhat peculiar case, where

negligence of parent was imputed to

child, see Leslie 0. Lewiston, 62 Me.

468.

’ Robinson 0. Cone, 22 Vt. 218, 224.

' Pliiladelpliia, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Kel-

ly, 81 Penn. St. 372; Philadelphia,

etc., R. R. Co. 0. Spearen, 47 Penn.

St. 300; Oakland R. Co. 0. Fielding,

48 Penn. St. 320; Nor. Penn. R. R.

C0. 0. Mahoney, 57 Penn. St. 187;

Kay 0. Penn. R. R. Co., 65 Penn. St.

269; S. C. 8. Am. Rep. 628: Bellefon-

taine, etc., R. R. C». 0. Snyder, 18

Ohio, (N. s) 890; Daley v. Norwich,

etc., R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 591; Norfolk,

etc., R. R. Co. 0. Ormsby. 2'7 Grat.

455; St. Paul c. Kuby. 8 Minn. 154;

Cahill 0. Eastman, 18 Minn. 31%;

\Vhirley 0. Whitemau, 1 Head, 610;

Boland 0. Missouri, R. R. Co., 36

Mo.484. See, as having some bear.

lug, Paducah, etc., R. R. Co. u. Hoehl,

' Wright 11. Malden, etc., R. R. Co.,
.& All(.'n, 283; Callahl\0 11. Bean, 9 AI.
len, 401; Holly 11. Boston Gns Light
Co., 8 Gray,12!1; Lynch o. Smith, tO'

that there could be no recovery."
Por a somewhat peculiar case, where
negligence of parent was Imputed to
child, lee Lealie e. Lew~ton, 62 He.

llass. 52; S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 188; Brown
e. European, etc., R. R. Co., 58 Me.
884; Leslie e. Lewiston, 62 Me. 488;
Pittsburgh, etc, R. R. Co. e. Vining,
fll Ind. 518: Lafayette, etc., R. R.
Co. o. Huffnll\n, 28 Ind. 287; JefferIIOnvlllc R. R. Co. e. Bowen, .(0 Ind.
345. See EMt Snglnaw, etc., R. Co.
e. Bobu, Z1 Mich. 503; Karro. Park11,
40 Cal. 188. In tbe recent case of
Ewen "· Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 88
Wis. 613, 628, where the complaint
Wl\.'1 that a boy nine years of age bad
bet-n neg: lgent:y run over, by the C8J'I
of the dcftmdunt, CoLB, J. said:
.. ·were It ch:ar, from the undisputed
facts ofthe case that tho boy himself,
considering his age aod Intelligence,
was at fnult, while crossing the railroad track, when he wns killed, and
did not cxerdsc proper care; or, If i&
appeared that he was too young to be
.uijuri11, and that the neJtligence of
his mother in permitting him to go
alone on the errand on which he was
eent, contributed to tht- accident, then
we could say, as a propn.. ition of law,

468.
• Robinson e. Cone, 22 VL 913, 924..
• Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. •· Kelly, 81 Penn. SL 372; Philadelphia.
etc., R. R. Co. e. Spearen, 47 Penn.
SL 300; Oakland R. Co. e. Fielding,
4S Penn. St. 320; Nor. Peon. R. R.
Oo. t. ll~thonPy, tn Penn. St. 18'7;
Kay e. Penn. R. R. Co., 8:5 Penn. SL
289; S. C. 3. Am. Rep. 628: Bcllefon.
taine, etc., R. R. c.,. e. Snyder, 18
Ohio_ (N. a) 899; Daley o. Norwich.
etc., R. R. Co., 26 Coon. 6tH; Nr,rfolk,
etc., R. R. Co. t. Ormsby, 2'l OraL
4M; St. Paul e. Kuby, 8 Minn. 134;
Cahill e. Eutmao, 18 Minn. 82-i;
Whirley t. Whiteman, 1 llead, 610;
Boland e. Missouri, R. R. Co., 36
Ho. 48-l See, as having some bear.
lng, Paducah, etc., R. R. Co. e. Hoehl,
U Bush, 41: Baltimore. etc., R. R. Co.
e. McDonnell, 48 Hd. 634; Baltimore,
etc~ R. R. Co. e. State, 30 )(d. 47;
Chicago o. llajor, 18 Ill. 349; ChL
cagoe.Stsrr,421ll.174; Keeft"ee. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 207;
Wood o. Scbool D~trlc&, .&4 Iowa. WI.
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ject in this country is thus left in a very unsatisfactory state-
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The English rule‘ corresponds to that of the New York courts.‘

But the fact that a party who is not sui is found in a

place of danger, does not establish a case of negligence against

his proper custodian. Very young children are properly allowed

some liberties: a child of ﬁve may be allowed on a city sidewalk,

and a child of ten to run on errands without any one feeling

shocked by the risks to which he is exposed, though confessedly

these would be greater than in the case of an adult. Suifering

such liberties is not an exercise of the highest care, but it is,

nevertheless, not inconsistent with ordinary care. It is, there-

fore, not negligence. Moreover a child in. a dangerous position

may have reached it by escape from his proper custodian, who

was at the time in the exercise of proper care. In sucha case no

question of concurring negligence arises, and whether suit is

brought by the parent for the injury to his rights as such, or by

the child, there is nothing in the exposure which, under the

doctrine of any of the courts, should preclude recovery.’

But the extreme youth of a child is always an important cir-

The view of Chief Justice REDFIELD

has recently been fully approved by

the Supreme Court of Alabama, in a
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careful opinion by B|tIcm:1.1., Ch. J.,

Government St. R. R. 0. Hanlon, 58

Ala. 70.

' Waite v. Nor. East. R Co., El. Bl.

dz El. 719, 728; Singleton 0. Eastern

Eastern Counties R. Co., 7 C. B. (N. s.)

ject in this country is thns left in a very unsatisfactory state.
The English rule' corresponds to that of the New York courts.•
But the fact that a party who is not 8'Ui juris is found in a
place of danger, does not establish a case of negligence ~aa.inst.
bis proper custodian. Very young children are properly allowed
some liberties: a child of five may be allowed on a city sidewalk,
and a child of ten to run on errands without any one feeling
shocked by the risks to which he is exposed, though confessedly
these would be greater than in the case of an adult. Suffering
such liberties is not an exercise of the highest care, but it is,
nevertheless, not inconsistent with ordinary care. It is, therefore, not negligence. Moreover a child in. a dangerous position
may have reached it by escape from his proper custodian, who
was at the time in the exercise of proper care. In such a case no
question of concurring negligence al'ises, and whether suit is.
brought by the parent for the injnry to his rights as such, or by
the child, there is nothing in the exposure which, under tbe
doctrine of any of the courts, should preclude recovery.•
But the extreme youth of a c4ild is always an important eir-

287; Mangan 0. Atterton, L. R. 1

Exch. 23W. See Gardner o. Grace, 1

Fost. & F. 359. It may be urged,

with some plausibility, that this doc-

trine is more likely to guard the in-

terests of children and imbeciles than

is the opposite If a heartless parent

or guardian may sulfer a child to take

his ﬁrst lessons in walking in the

crowded streets of a city, and then,

when he is injured or killed, as in all

probability he would be, may recover

for such injury or killing, on the

ground that the child himself is too

young to be chargeable with negli-

gence, there will not, perhaps, be

wanting depraved custodians of chil-

dren, unrestrained by any considera-

tions of liunuinity, willing enough to

count upon probable gains from such

reckless conduct.

‘ Railroad Company 0. Stout, 17

Wall. 657; Mangam 0. Brooklyn R.

R. Co., 38 N. Y. 455; Karr u. Parks,

40 Cal. 188; Mulligan 0. Curtis, 100

Mass. 542; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. O0.

0. Bumstead, 48 Ill. 221; Koons 0. St.

Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 592;

ltauch 1:. Lloyd, 31 Penn. St. 358;

Bronson 0. Southbury, 37 Conn. 199;

Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. o. State, 30

Md. 47. See Brown u. European,etc.,

R. R. Co., 58 Me. 384. If the conduct

of the infant, relied upon as showing

negligence, would not have been neg-

ligence in an adult, of course the

questions discussed in the text be-

come unimportant. McGary 0. Loom.

is, 613 N. Y. 104; S. C. 20 Am. Rep.

510; Ihl 0. Ferry Co.,47 N. Y. 317;

S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 450.

The view or Chief Justice RBDJ'IELD
haa recently been fully approved by
the Supreme Court of Alabama. in a
careful opinion by BRICKELL, Ch. J ..
Government Sc. R. R. e. Hanlon, G8
Ala. 70.

'Waite o. Nor. E:.LSC. R. Co., El. 81.
&I El. 711J, 728; SingMon o. Eastern
Eastern Counties R Co., 7 C. B. (N. a.)
287; }Iangan o. Atterton, L. R. 1
Exch. 23'1. See Gardner o. Grace, 1
Fost. & F. 8.}9. H may be urged,
with snme plausibility, that this doctrine Ia more likt>ly to guard the interests of children and imbeciles than
Ia the opposite If a hea•·tless parent
or guardian may sufl'er a child to take
his first lessons in walking in the
crowded streets of a ci1y, and then,
when bt> is injured or killed, 1\8 in all
probability he would be, may recover
for such injury or killing, on the
ground that. the child himself is too
young to be cba&rgeable with negligenoe, there will not, perhaps. be

wanting depraved custodians of children, unl'f'atrained by any considerations of humanity, wllling enough to
count upon probltble gains from soeh
reckless conduct.
• Railroad Company e. Stout, IT
Wall. 657; Maogam t1. Brooklyn R.
R. Oo•• 88 N. Y. 455; Karr o. Parks.
40 Cal. 188: Mulligan e. Curtis, too
Mass. M2; Pittsburgh, etc., R R. Co.
e. Bumstead, 4:8 Ill. 221; Koons e. St.
Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 692;
Hauch t~. Lloyd, 81 Peon. St. 858;
Bronson e. Southbury, 87 C<lnn. 199;
Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. o. State. 30
Md. 47. See Brown"· European, etc.•
ll R. Co., 5S lie. 384. If the conduct
of the infant, relied upon as allowing
negligence, would not have been negligence in an adult, of coarse the
questions discussed in the text become unimportant. McGary e. Loom.
is, 6:J N. Y. 10-l; 8. C. 20 Am. Rep.
tnO; lhl "· l<'crry Co., 47 N. Y. 817;
8. C. 7 Am. Uep. 450.

•
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cumstance in its bearing on the question of negligence in the

683

party by whose act or neglect he is injured.‘ One has no right

to demand of a child, or of any other person known to be want-

ing in ordinary judgment or discretion, a prudence beyond his

years or capacity, and therefore in his own conduct, where it

may possibly result in injury, a degree of care is required com-

mensurate to the apparent immaturity or imbecility that exposes

the other to peril.’ Thus, a person driving rapidly along a high-

way where he sees boys engaged in sports, is not at liberty to

assume that they will exercise the same discretion in keeping

out of his way that would be exercised by others; and ordinary

care demands of him that he shall take notice of their imma-

turity and govern his action accordingly.‘ And if a carrier of

persons receives an infant passenger without any guardian, he

should give him the care and attention required by his age, and

cannot object, when an injury happens to him, that it was negli-

gence iu those responsible for his care, in permitting him thus

to move about by himself.‘

Concurring Negligence Subsequent to Injury. It is no answer

to an action that the injured party, subsequent to the injury, was

guilty of negligence which aggravated it. The negligence that

will constitute a defense must have concurred in producing the
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injury.‘

' Where infants are the actors that

might probably be considered an un-

avoidable accident which would not

be so considered where the actors are

cumstance in ita bearing on the question of negligence in the
party by whose act or n('glect be is injured! One bas no right
to demand of a child, or of any other person known to be wanting in ordinary jnd~ment or discretion, a prudence beyond hia
years or capacity, and therefore in his own conduct, where it
may possibly retiult in injury, a degree of care is required commensurate to the apparent immaturity or imbecility that exposes
the other to peril.• Thus, a person driving rapidly along a highway where be sees boys engaged in sports, is not at liberty to
assume that they will exercise the same discretion in keeping
out of his way that wonld be exercised by others; and ordinary
care demands of him that he shall take notiee of their immaturity and govern his action accordingly.' And if a carrier of
persons receives an infant passenger without any guardian, he
should give him the care and attention required by his age, and
cannot object, when an injury happens to him, that it was negligence in those responsible for his care, in permitting him thus
to move about by himself!

adults. Bullock v. Babcock, 8 Wend.

Oonourrin1 lfegUgenoe Subsequent to Injury. It is no answer

891, 894; Cosgrove o. Ogden, 49 N. Y.

255; S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 361.

‘See, as to persons apparently of

unsound mind, or deprived of one or

more of their senses, Chicago, etc.,

R. R. Co. 0. Gregory, 58 Ill. 226;

Chicago, etc., R. R. C0. v. McKean,

to an action that the injured party, subsequent to the injury, was
guilty of negligenee which aggravated it. The negligence that
will conatitute a defense must have concurred in producing the
injury.•

40 Ill. 218; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. 0.

Buckner, 28 Ill. 299.

' Railroad C0.'v. Gladmnn, 15 Wall.

401; Lynch 11. Smith, 104 Mass. 52;

S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 188; Walters v. Chi-

cngo,etc., R. R. Co..-ii Iown,71; East

Tenn. R. R. Co. 0. St. John, 5 Sneed,

524; Hund e. Geier, 72 Ill. 894; Kerr

o. Forguc, 54 Ill. 482; B. C. 5 Am.

1 Where Infants are the actors tha&
might probably be considered an un.
avoidable accident. which would no\
be so considered where tho actors are
adults. Bullock"· Babcock, 8 Wend.
811, 894; Cosgrove o. Ogden,49 N.Y.

~;

Rep. 146.

‘East Saginaw, etc., Co. 0. Bobn,

27 Mich. 503; Maher v. Central Park,

etc., Co., 67 N. Y. 52; Baltimore, etc.,

R. Co. 0. McDonnell, 43 Md. 534.

'Wilmot 0. Howard, 89 Vt. 447;

Hathorn 0. Richmond, 48 Vt. 557.

These were actions against physi-

cians, where the defense was that the

cases were taken out of their hnnds

and committed to others who were

negligent. It is nevertheless the duty

of the party injured to take care that

the damage shall be us light as possi.

ble. Plummer 0. PenobscottAss’n.,

67 Me. 863.

I

8. C. 10 Am. Rep. 861.
See, &S to personS apparently Of

unsound mind, or deprived of one or
more of their senses, Chicago, etc.,
R R Co. e. Gregory, 1>8 111. 226;
Chicago, etc., R. R Co. e . .McKean,
40 IlL 218;
Cent. R. R. Co. e.

m.

Buckner, 28 111. 200.
• Railroad Co. e. Uladmon, 11'5 Wall.
401; Lynch o. Swith, lot MIUI8. li2;
S. 0. 8 Am. Rep. 188; Wnlters e. Chi.
cago, etc., R R. Co.. 41 Iowa, 71; Eas\
'l'eon. R R. Co. o. St. John, G Sneed,

GM; Bond e. GelAI', 'fJ 111. SM; Kerr
o. Forgue, M IU• .a2; 8. 0. G Am.
Rep.146.
4 Eus\ Saginaw, etc., Co. •· Bohn.
97 Mich. 503; Maher o. Central Park,
etc., Co., 6'7 N.Y. 52; Baltimore, etc.,
R. Co. e. McDoont'll, 48 Md. 534..
'Wilmot e. Howard, 89 Vt. 447;
Hathorn o. Richmond, 48 Vt. 5.'rl.
Th<'Se were actl••ns against physl.
clans, where the dl'ft>nse was thRt the
CllSOI were taken out. of their banda
and committed to others who were
negligent. It is nevertheless the duty
of the party injured to take care thal
the dama.!;e shall be as 11gb\ as posaible. Plummer e. PenobscoU Als'n..
67

lie. 868.
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Negligence of Third Parties. In general the negligence of

684
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third parties concurring with that of the defendant to produce

an injury is no defense: it could at most only render the third

party liable to be sued also as a joint wrong-doer.‘ But in some

cases where the person injured was for the time being with and

under the direction of the third party, whose negligence concur-

red in producing the injury, this negligence has been held to be

a bar to any recovery. In the leading English case the plaintiﬂ,

in alighting from a public omnibus, was knocked down and

injured by an omnibus belonging to the defendant. The case

was put to the jury under instructions that if it was found that

the driver of each omnibus was guilty of negligence contributing

to the injury, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover; he being

so far identiﬁed with the driver of the vehicle he was riding in

that he 'n1ust be considered a party to the negligence.’ The like

rule has been frequently laid down in this country.‘ But in

New York its soundness is denied,‘ and in New Jersey it is held

that the negligence of the driver of a street car in which the

plaintiff was riding is not to be imputed to the plaintiff as a

bar to an action for the injurious negligence of a third party.‘

Contracts against Liability for Negligence. The right of

common carriers to agree for a limitation of their common law
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liability has been supported in many cases, while their right to

force contracts upon those who come to do business with them

has been denied. The contracts are supported on the ground that

the parties respectively have found it for their interest to make

them, and no reason exists to preclude it. But there may be

' North Penn. R. Co. o. Mahoney,

5'7 Penn. St. 187; Cleveland, etc., R.

R. Co. '0. Terry, 8 Ohio, (N. s.) 570.

Negligence of Third Parties. In general the negligence of
third partie:; concurring with that of the defendant to produce
an injul'J is no defense: it could at most only render the third
party liable to be sned also as a joint wrong-doer.l But in some
eases where the person injured was for the time being with and
under the direction of the third party, whose negligence concurred in pi'Oducing the injnr.v, this negligence has been held to he
a bar to any recovery. In the leading English case the plaintiff,
in alighting from a public omnibus, was knocked down and
injured by an omnibus belonging to the defendant. The case
was pnt to the jnry under instructions that if it was found that
the dri,·er of each omnibus was guilty of negligence contributing
to the injury, the plaintiff was not entitled to recove1·; he being
so far identified with the driver of the vehicle he was riding in
that he 'must be considered a party to the negligence.' The like
rule has been frccpH.'nt.ly laid down in this country.• But in
New York its soundness is denied,• and in New Jersey it is held
that tho negligem-e of the driver of a street car in which the
plaintiff was riding is not to be impntod to the plaintiff as a
bar to an action for the injurious negligence of a third party. •

’ Thorogood 12. Bryan, 8 C. B.

115. See, also. Bridge 1:. Grand June-

tion R. Co., 3 M. dc VV. 2-14; Child 0.

Hearn, L. R. 9 Exch.176; Armstrong

0. Lancashire, etc., R. Co., L. R. 10

Exch. 47.

' Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. o. Mil-

ler, 25 Mich. 274; Houfe 0. Fulton,29

Wis. 296; Prideaux o. Mineral Point,

43 Wis. 613; Lockhart 22. Litchten-

Contracts against Liability for Negligence. The right of
common carriers to agree for a limitation of tht!ir common law
liability has been supported in many cases, while their right to
foree contracts upon those wl,lO come to do business with them
has been denied. The contracts are supported on the ground that
the parties rcspcctive]y have found it for their interest to make
them, aud no reason exists to prec]udo it. But there may be

thalcr, 46 Penn. St. 151 ; Forks Town-

ship s. King, 84 Penn. St. 230; Payne

v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Iowa,

523.

‘ Chapman 0. New Haven, etc., R.

R. Co., 19 N. Y. 341; Colegrove 0.

New York,etc., R. R. Co., 6 Duer, 383

and 20 N. Y. 492; Robinson 1». N. Y.

Cent. R. R. 00., as N. Y. 11; s. 0. 23

Am. Rep. 1. And, see Webster v. Hud-

son Riv. R. R. Co.,38 N. Y. 260; Arc-

tic, ctc., Co. 0. Austin,69 N. Y. 471.

' Bennett u. New Jersey R. R. Co.,

86 N. J . 225.

I North Penn. R. Co. "· Mal10ney,
67 Penn. St. 187; Clevdaud, etc., It
R. Co."'· Terry. 8 Ohio, (N. s.) 570.
• Thorogood "'· Bryun, 8 C. B.
115. See, also. Brid.~e "'·Grand June.
tion R. Co., 3 ~[. & W. 2!4; Vhild "·
Hearn, L R. 9 Exch.176; Armstrong
e~. Lancashire, etc., R. Co., L. R. 10
Exch. 47.
• Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. "· Miller, 25 Mich. 274; Houfc "'· Fulton,29
Wis. 296; Prideaux "'· Mineral Point,
43 Wis. 513; Lockhart "'· Litcht.enUlalcr, 46 Penn. St. 151 ; l<,orks Town-

ship"· King, 84 Penn. St. 230; Payne
'· Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Iowa,
623.
'Chapman "· New Haven, ete., R
R. Co., 19 N. Y. 3!1; Colegrove •·
New York, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Duer, 383
and 20 N.Y. 492; Robinson"· N.Y.
Cent. R. R. Co., 66 N.Y. 11; 8. C. 23
Am. Rep.l. And, eee Webster"· Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., 38 N.Y. 260; Arc.
tic, etc., Co. tt. Austin, 69 N. Y. 471.
1 Bennett "· New Jersey R. R. Co.,
86 N.J. 225.
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contracts which, perhaps, public policy would forbid. This has
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been held to be the case with the contracts of common carriers

which assume to exempt them, not only from liability for the

inevitable risks attendant upon their business, but for risks from

the negligence of themselves and their servants. In numerous

cases it has been held that they could not by any stipulation

relieve themselves from responsibility for injuries resulting

from a want of ordinary care.‘ Therefore, any general stip-

ulation inserted in a carrier’s bill of lalling or receipt, by which

the consignor is made to take upon himself the risks of convey-

ance, or any special risks like those of ﬁre, will be read with an

implied exception ot' injuries for the want of ordinary care on

the part of the carrier himself or his servants.’ Carriers of

passengers, it is also held, cannot relieve themselves from the

' Camden, etc., R R Co.e. Baldauf,

16 Penn. St. 67; Goldey 0. Pennsylva-

nia R. R. Co., 30 Penn. St. 242; Penn-

sylvaniu R. R. Co. v. H8l1(l€l'snl‘|, 51

Penn. St. 315; Farnham 0. Camden,

etc., R. R Co., 55 Penn. St. 53; Col-

ton 0. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 67

eotJtra.cts which, perhaps, public policy would forbid. This baa
been held to be the case with the contt·a.cts of common carriers
which nssnme to exetn})t them, not only frvm liability for the
inevitable risks attendant upon their business, but for risks from
the negligence of themselves and their servants. ln numerous
cases it has been hcltl that they could not by any stipulation
•·elie\'O themselves from responsibility tor injuries resulting
from a want of ordinary care.• Therefore, any general stipn]ation inserted in a carrier's bill of latling or receipt, by which
the consignor is made to take upon himself the risks of conveyant-e, or any special risks like those of fire, will be read with an
implied exception ot' injuries for the want of ordinary care on
the part of the carrier himself or his servants! Cnrriers of
passengers, it is also held, cannot relieve themselves from the

Penn. St. 211; Bickham o. Smith, 62
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Penn. 45; Lackawana, etc., R. R. Co.

0. Chenewith, 52 Penn. St. 382; Orn-

dorlf 0. Adams Express Co., 3 Bush,

194; Smith 0. Nor. Car. R. R. Co., 64

N. C. 235; Great West. R. Co. 0.

Hawkins, 18 Mich. 427; S. C. 17

Mich. 57; Steele 0. Burgess, 37 Ala.

247; Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. 9. Hop-

kins, 41 Ala. 486; Sou. Exp. Co. 0.

Crook, 44 Ala. 468; South, etc., R. R.

Co. o. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606; Hooper

0. \Vclls, 27 Cal. 11; Sager 0. Ports-

mouth, etc., R. R. Co., 31" Me. 228;

Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. '0. Allen,

31 Ind. 394; Michigan, etc., R. R. Co.

o. Heaton,37 Ind. 448; Virginia, etc.,

R. R. Co.1:. Sayers, 26 Grat 328; Gra-

ham 0. Davis, 4 Ohio, (a. s.) 362;

Gaines 0. Union Trans. Co., 28 Ohio,

(N. s.)~l18; Adams Exp. Co. 0. Stet-

tancrs, 61 lll. 184; Levering v. Union

Trans. Co., 42 Mo. 88; Sturgeon 0. St.

Louis, etc., B. R. Co., 65 Mo. 569;

Swindler 1:. Hilliard, 2 Rich. 286;

Berry 0. Cooper, 28 Geo. 5-13; White-

sides v. Thurlkill, 20 Miss. 599; Sou.

Exp. (10.0. Moon, 39 Miss. S22; Welch

0. Boston, etc., R. R Co., 41 Conn. ' New Jersey, etc., Co. s. Merchants’

Bank. 6 How. 844; York Co. 0. Cen-

tral R. R. Co., 3 Wall. 107; School

Dist. 0. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 102

Mass. 552; Comlict 0. Grand Trunk

R. Co., 54 N. Y. 500; Powell 0. Penn-

sylvania R. R Co., 82 Penn. St. 414;

Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Starrs, 69

Penn. 86; Mo. Val. R. it. Co. 0. Cald-

well, 8 Kan. 244; N. O. Ins. Co. 0.

New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 20 La.

Ann. 802. Leaving cattle to die of

neglect. is not negligence, but an

abandonment of the contract of car-

riage, and the carrier is responsible

on that ground. Kccney v. Grand

Trunk R. Co., 59 Barb. 104; S. C. 47

N. Y. 525. Though the bill of iading

provides that in case of loss of goods

the carrier shall be liable foraccr-

I c .,mdcn, etc .. R R. Co."· Baldauf,
16 Penn. St. 67: Uohh:y "· Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 30 Penn. St. 242; Penn.
sylvania R. U. U<l. "· Henderson, 51
Penn. St. 815; Farnham e. Uamt.len,
e~. R. R. Co., ();) Penn. St. 53; Col.
ton "· Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 67
Penn. St. 211; Bickham tr. Smith, 62
Penn. 45; Lackawana, etc., R. R. Co.
tl. Chenewith, :>2 Penn. St. 382; Orn.
dorlf tl. Adums Express Co., 3 Bush,
194; Smith"· Nor. Car. R. R. Co., 04
N. C. 235; Great W <'St. R. Co. tl.
Hawkins, 18 Mich. 427; B. C. 17
lllcb. 57; Steele "· Burgess, 87 Ala.
247; Mobile, etc., R R. Co. tl. Hop.
kina, 41 Aln. 486; Snu. Exp. Co. t1.
Crook, 44 Ala. 4fl8; South, etc., R. R.
Co. t~. Hcnlein, 52 Ala. 006; Hooper
t~. Wells, 27 Cui. 11; Sager tl. Ports.
mouth, etc., R. R. Co., 81- 1\[e. 228;
Indiannpolis, etc., R. R. Co. "· Allr:n,
81 Ind. 31!4; :Michl~nn, etc., H. R. Co.
t~. Heaton,37 Ind. 448; Vh·~inia, etc.,
R. R. Co."· Sayf:rs, 26 Grat. 328; Grn.
ham tl. Duvis, 4 Ohio, (K. 8.) 862;
Gaines t~. Union Trans. Co., 28 Ohio,
(B. 8.) 418; Adams Exp. Co. "· Stet.
taners, 61 Ill. 184; Lcvt>ring "· Union
Trans. Co., 42 :\lo. 88; Sturgeon "· St.
Loaia. etc., R R. Co., 65 Mo. 569 i

Swindler "· 1Ii111ard, S Rich. 280;
Ikrry "· Cooper, 28 Gen. 543; White.
aides"· Thurlkill, 20 1\liss. li99: Sou.
E.s:p. Co. tr.l\loon, 89 Miss. 822; Welch
e. Boston, etc., H. R. Co., 41 r.onn. 333.
1 NcwJers<'y,etc., Co. t'•.Merchants'
Bank, 6 How. 844; York Co. tl. Central R. R. Co., 8 Wall . 107; School
Dist. "· Bnston, etc., R. R. Co., 102
111\~s. 552; Cond ict tl. Grand Trunk
R. Co.. 54 N.Y. 500; Powell tl.l>cnn.
sylvan!" R. R. Co., 82 Penn. St. 414;
Delaware, etc., R. R. Cn. "· Starrs, 09
Penn. 86; Mo. Val. R. H. Co. e. Culd.
well, 8 Kan. 244; N. 0. los. Co. tl.
New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 20 La.
Ann. 802. Leaving cnttle to die of
neglect, Is not negligence, but an
abandonment of the contract of car.
riage, and the carrier is ret-.pon~ible
on that ground. Keeney e. Grand
Trunk R. Co., 59 B:1rb. lOi; 8. C. 47
N.Y. 525. Though the bill of lading
provides that. in case of loss of goods
the carrier shall be liable for a cer.
tain amount only, yet If the sum
named wns understood at the time
not to be the real value, he will be
liable for the full value if lost through
his negligen<'e. U. B. Express Co. e.
Backman, 28 Ohio, {If. a.) 1«.
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obligation to observe ordinary care by any contract whatsoever,

even in the case of “drovers’ passes,” which are given without

charge to those who accompany consignments of cattle,‘ or in

cases where free passage is given as mere matter of courtesy or

favor.‘ In New York and New Jersey, however, it is held to be

entirely competent to contract against liability for any negligence

but the personal negligence of the carrier himself; which, in the

case of corporations, would embrace any negligence of their

servants, and of all but the managing board.’ The weight of

authority, however, is most distinctly the other way, both in

this country and in England.‘

' Flinn o. Philadelphia, etc., R.‘ R.

Co., 1 Hout. 469; Cleveland, etc.,R.

R. Co. 0. Curran, 10 Ohio, (N. s.)1;

Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. 0. Selby, 47 Ind.

471.

obligation to observe ordinary care by any contract whatsoever,
even in the case of "drovers' passes," which are given withont
charge to those wbo accompany consignments of ('8ttle,' or in
cnses where free passage is given as mere matter of courtesy or
favor.' In New York and New Jersey, however, it is held to be
entirely competent to contract Roo-ainst liability for any negligence
but the personal negligence of the carrier himself; which, in the
case of corporations, would embrace any negligence of their
servants, and of all but the managing board.• The weight of
·a uthority, however, is most distinctly the other way, both in
this country and in England.'

9 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. '0.

Derby, 14 How. 468; Pennsylvania

R. R. C0. o. McCloskey, 23 Penn. St.

526; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 0. But-

ler, 57 Penn. Bt. 335; Ind. Cent. R. R.

o. Mnndy, 21 Ind. 48; Ill. Cent. R. R.
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Co. o. Read, 37 Ill. 484.

*Bissell 0. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co.,

25 N. Y. 442: Wells 0. N. Y. Cent. R.

R. Co., 24 N. Y. 181; Perkins v. N. Y.

Cent. R. R. Co., M N. Y. 196; Smith

0. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co.,24 N. Y. 222;

Poucher v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 49

N. Y. 263; Kinney v. Cent. R. R. Co.,

32 N. J. 407; S. (1.34 N. J. 513. See

Knowlton n. Eric R. Co., 19 Ohio, (N.

s.) 260.

‘The subject is exhaustively con-

sidered by Mr. Justice BRADLEY, in

Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17

Wall. 357, which was the case of a

di-ovcr's pass. The authorities are

all examined with care, and the prin.

ciple of the decision is that careful-

ness and ﬁdelity are essential duties

of the carrier's employment, which

cannot be abdicated. It was recog-

nized in that ease, as it has been gen-

erally, that a drover's pass is not in

reality gratuitous, but must be con-

sidered as taken into account in pay-

ing for the transportation of stock.

Whether in the case of a strictly gra-

tuitous carringe the carrier might

stipulate against liability, the court

was not called upon to decide. See,

also, Railway Company v. Stevens, 95

U. S. Rep. 655. In Jacobus 0. St.

Puul, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Minn. 125, it

wus said that the carrier is held to

the same extreme care in such cases

as in others, but in Illinois where

comparative negligence is recognia

ed, the court say of a stipulation

against liability for negligence in

the case of a gratuitous carriage.

“While we hold this agreement did

not exempt the railroad company

from the gross negligence of its ent-

ployees, we are free to say that it

does exempt it from all other species

or degrees of negligence not denom.

inated gross, or which might have

'Flinn ,. Philadelphia, etc.. R.' R.
Co., 1 Huut. 4GU; Clcvelnnd, etc., R.
R Co. ,, Curran, 10 Ohio, (N. s.) 1;
Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. e. Selby, 47 Ind.
471.

' Philadelphia, etc., R. R Co. e.
Derhy, 14 How. 461::1; Pennsylvania
U. U. Co. o. McClo~key, 23 Penn. St.
.')26; Pennsylvania U. R. Co. e. But.
ler, 67 Penn. St. 335; Ind. Cent. R. R
41. ~Iundy, 21 Ind. 48; Ill. Cent. R R.
Co. ,. Rl'ad, 37 Ill. 484.
• Bissell ,, N. Y. Cent. R. R Co.,
25 N.Y. 442: Wells o. N.Y. Cent. R.
R Co., 24 N.Y. HH; Perkins,, N . Y.
Cent. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 196; Smith
,, N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 222;
Poucher l!. N.Y. Cent. R R. Co., 49
N. Y. 203; Kinney ,, Cent. R. R Co.,
32 N.J. 407 ; S. C. 34 N.J. 513. See
Knowlton 11. Erie R. Cu., 19 Ohio, (N.
s.) 260.
• Tho subject is l'xbaustively considered by Mr. Justice BnADI.F..Y, in
Railroad Company l!. Lockwood, 17
Wall. 357, which was the case of a
drover's pass. The authorities are
all examined with care, and the principle of the decision is that carefulness and fidelity are e~scntinl duties
of the carrier's employment, which
cnnnot- be nb•licatell. It was recog.
nized in that case, ns it hns been generally, that a drover's pass is not In
reality gratuitous, but must be con-

sldered as taken Into account in payIng for the transportation of stock.
Whether in the case of a strictly gra..
tnitous carriage the carrier might
stipulate against liabillty, the court
was not called upon to decide. See,
also, Railway Company "· Stevens, 95
U. B. Rep. 6.'S5. In Jacobus "· 8L
Paul, etc.• R. R. Co., 20 Minn. 125, U
wus said that the carrier Ia held \o
the same extreme care in such caaea
as In others, bot in Illinois where
comp!U'&tive negligence is recogniz.
ed, the court say of a stipulation.
against liability for negligence ln.
the case of a gratuitous carriage.
.. While we bold this agreement did
not exempt the railroad company
from the gross neg}Jgence of its employees, we are free to say that i&
does exempt it from all other species
or degrees of negligence not denomInated gross, or which might have
the 'chamctcr of recklessness." IlL
Cent. R. R. Co. 11. Read, 37 Ill. 48-l.
The English law is affected by
statute, which leaves the court to
determine the reasonabl<'ness of exemptions in carrier's contracts: bu\
the courts hold contracts for cxemp.
tion from liability for ncgligencf'l in
the transpnrtution of goods unre11.90nable, Peek 1l. N. Stafford. R. Co., 10
H . L. Cas. 473. They however hold
that carriers of passengcra. may atip.

REDRESS FOR Ni-zotronxcn. 687

Restrictions of Liability by Telegraph Companies. It is cus-
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tomary for telegraph companies to send messages subject to a

condition that they shall not be responsible for errors or delays,

unless the message is repeated at the sender’s cost. Such condi-

tions have frequently been supported as reasonable.‘ But the

condition to be available must be brought to the knowledge of

the party interested in the message, sender or receiver,’ and in

the absence of a provision requiring the message to be repeated,

it would be void as an attempt by the company to relieve itself

of the consequences of its own fault.‘

The eases of carriers and telegraph companies have been spe-

ciﬁcally mentioned, because it is chieﬂy in these cases that such

contracts are met with. But although the reasons which forbid

such contracts have special force in the business of carrying per-

sons and goods, and of sending messages, they apply universally,

and should be held to defeat all contracts by which a party under-

takes to put another at the mercy of his own faulty conduct.

nlate in passes to drovers that the

carrier shall not be responsible for

any risks. McCawley 0. Furness, L.

R. 8 Q. B. 57.

' McAndrc\v v. Eloc. Tel. Co., 17 C.
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B. 3; Ellis 0. Am. Tel. Co., 18 Allen,

226; Grinnell v. West. U. Tel. Co., 113

Mass. 299; S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 485;

Restrictions of Liability by Telegraph Companies. It is customary tor telegraph companies to 8cnd me~sages subject to a
condition that they shall not be responsible for errors or delays,
unless the mes,;agc is repeated at the ~cmlcr's cost. Such comlitions ha\·e frequently been supported as reasonable.' Bnt tho
condition to be available must be brought to the knowledge of
the party intt·rested in the message, sender or receh·cr,t and in
the absence of a provision requiring tho mess:1gc to be repeated,
it would be void as an attempt by the company to relieve itself
of' the consequences of its own fanlt.'
The cases of carriers and telegraph com}lanies have been specifically mentioned, because it is chiefly in these cases that such
contracts arc met with. Dnt although the reasons which forbid
such contracts have special force in the business of carrying persons and goods, and of sending messages, they apply universally,
and should be held to defeat all contracts by which a party undertakes to put another at the mercy of his own faulty conduct.

Young v. West. U. Tel. Co., 65 N. Y.

163; Camp. 0. West. U. Tel. Co., 1

Met. (Ky.) I64; West. U. Tcl. Co. 0.

Carcw, 15 Mich. 523; De Rnttc 0. N.

Y., etc., Tel. Co., 1 Daly, 547; Brecso

0. U. S. Tel. Co., 45 Barb. 274; S. C.

48 N. Y. 132; Birney o N. Y., etc.,

Tel. Co., 18 Md. ZHI; Pnssmore 0. W.

U. Tel. Co., '78 Penn. St. 288; Wann

v. West. U. Tel. Co., 37 Mo. 472.

’ N. Y., etc., Tel. Co. o. Dryburg,

35 Penn. St. ‘Z98. Compare Ellis 6.

Am. Tel. Co., 13 Allen, 226. In Lou-

isiana it is said it can be available. if

at all, only against the sender. La

Grange 0. Sou. West. Tel. Co., 25 La.

Ann. 383.

* True v. Int. 'ré1.c<>.,co Me. 0. In

Illinois the force of the condition

seems to be restricted to errors arising

trorn causes beyond the company's

control. Tyler o. West. U. Tel. Co.,

60 lll. 421; S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 38;

West. U. Tel. Co. v. Tyler, T4 Ill. 168.

And sec Sweatland o. lll., etc., Tel.

Co., 27 Iowa, 432; Candee v. West. U.

Tel. Co., 84 Wis. 471. In Missouri it

is denied that telegraph companies

can contract not to be responsible for

their own carelessness. Wann 0.

West. U. Tel. Co., 3'! Mo. 472. In Col-

orado it is held that the condition not

to be responsible for unrcpeated mes-

sages is no defense to an action for

failure to deliver. West. U. Tel. C0.

o. Graham, 1 Col. 2130. In Maine and

Wisconsin it is recently decided that

acnntlilion in sending a night mes-

sage that the company shall be liable

for errors or delay only to the extent

of what is received for sending the

message is void, as contrary to public

policy. Bartlett 0. West. U. Tel. Co.,

62 Me. 209; Ilibbard o. West. U. Tel.

ulate In pRSscs to drovers that the
carrier shBII not be responsible for
any risks. McCawley "· Furness, L.
R 8 Q. B. .17.
1 McAndrew tt. Elec. Tel. Co., 17 C.
B. 3; Ellis "· Am. Tel. Co., 18 Allen,
226; Grinnellu. West. U. Tel. Co.,l13
Mass. 299; B. C. 18 Am. Rep. 485;
Young D. West. U. Tel. Co., 6.1 N.Y.
1G3; Camp. e. West. U. Tel. Co., 1
Mer. (Ky.) 104; West. U. Tel. Co."·
Carew, 15 1\[ich. 521; De Rutte tl. N.
Y., etc., Tel. Co., 1 Daly, :;47; Breese
t~. U. B. Tel. Co., 43 Barb. 274; B. C.
48 N. Y. ta~; Birney t1 N.Y., etc.,
Tel. Co., 18 )It!. 341; Passmore"· W.
U. Tel. Co., 78 Penn. St. 238; Waon
"· Wl•st. U. Tel. Co., 37 )[o. 472.
1 N . Y., etc.• Tel. Co. e. Dryburg,
3:j Penn. t;t. 2!!8. Comp~rc Ellis u.
Am. Tel. C•>., 13 Allen, 220. In Louisiana it i>~ said it cnn be availnhle, if
at all, only against the sender. La
Gmn:rc "·Sou. West. Td. Co., 2:5 La.
Ann. a83.
• True "· Int. Tel. Co., GO ~le. o. In
Illiuois the force or the condition
seems to be restricted to l.'rrors arising
from causes beyond. the company's

control. Tyler e. WeaL U. Tel. Co.•
80 Ill. 421; B. C. 14 Am. Rep. 38;
West. U. Tel. Co."· Tyler, 74 Ill. 168.
And see Bweatlaud e. Ill., etc., Tel.
Co., 27 Iowa, 432; Candee e. West. U.
Tel. Co., 84 Wis. 471. ln Missouri It
Is denied that telegraph companies
can contract nut to bP responsible for
'heir own carel<'ssness. Wnnn e.
West. U. Tel. Co., 37lln. 472. In CoJ.
orado it is held that the condition not
to be responsible for unrepealed mes.
sages is no defense to an actina for
failure to deliver. West. U. Tel. Co.
e. Graham, 1 Col. 230. In )[aine and
Wisconsin it is recently decitl~d thd
a Cl'ntlitlon In sending n night mes.
snge thnt the company shu II bo liable
for errors or delay only to the e:tten&
of what is receh·ed for sending the
messa~c is void, ns rontmry to puhllc
policy. Bnrtlctt "· West. C. Tl'l. Co.,
62 ){(>. 209; Hibbard D. we~t. u. Tel.
Co., S:l Wis. :;:;u. Ami. sec S\\·eatlzmd
e. Illinois, etc., Tel. Co., 27 Iowa, 433,
West. U. T(•J. Co. "· Fenton, :'i~ Ind 1;
West. U. Tel. Co."· :Meek, 49 Ind. 53;
Birney"· N.Y., etc!., Tel. Co., 18 lld.

841.
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THE LAW OF TORTS.

THE PLACE or EVIL MOTIVE IN THE LAW OF TORTS.

When a bad Motive Important. l n the course of the preceding

pages it has been made very manifest that when the question at

issue is, whether one person has suffered legal wrong at the hands

of another. the good or bad motive which inﬂuenced the action

complained of is generally of no importance whatever. Vllhat

was said in the opening chapter of the work, that the exercise by

one man of his legal right cannot be a legal wrong to another,

has been abundantly shown to be justiﬁed by the authorities, even

if it were not in itself a mere truism. “ An act which does not

CHAPTER XXII.

amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because it is done

with a bad intent.” ' “ Any transaction which would be lawful

and proper if the parties were friends, cannot be made the found-

THE PLACE OF EVIL MOTIVE IN THE LAW OF TORTS.

ation of an action merely because they happened to be enemies.

As long as a man keeps himself within the law by doing no act

which violates it, we must leave his motives to Hm who searches

the heal-t.”' To state the point in a few words, whatever one

has a right to do another can have no right to complain of.

Damage at the hands of Government. It has been shown, also,

that when a government oﬁicial assumes an authority which the

law does not warrant him in exercising, he is personally respon-
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sible, whatever may have been his motive. The discussions in

Jl{'illz'gan’s case cover this point very fully.‘ But if the circum-

‘ PARKE. B., in Stevenson 0. Newa-

hum, 13 C. B. 285, 297. See Floyd 0.

Barber. 12 C0. 23; Stowball o. Ansell,

Comb. 11; Tayler 0. Hcnnikei-.12 Ad.

&El. -188; Heald 0. Carey, 11 C. B.

977.

' Bmcx, J., in Jenkins o. Fowler,

34 Penn. St. 308, 310. See Fowler 0.

Jenkins, 28 Penn. St. 176; Covanho-

van v. Hart, 21 Penn. St. 495; Clinton

0. Myers. 46 N. Y. 511; Frazier 0.

Brown, 12 Ohio, (N. s.) 294; Thomas.

son 0. Agnew, 24 Miss. 93; Mclliillin

0. Staples, 36 Iowa, 532.

When a bad Motive Important. In the course oftl1e preceding
pages it has been made very manifest that when the question at
issue is, whether one person has snftered legal wrong at the hands
of another. the good or bad motive which inflnem:ed the action
complained of is generally of no importance whatever. 'Vhat
was said in the opening chapter of the work, that the exercise by
one man of his legal right cannot be a legal wrong to another,
bas been abundantly shown to he justified by the authorities, even
if it were not in itself a mere truism. "An act which does not
amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because it is done
with a bad intent." • "Auy transaction which would be lawful
and proper if the parties were friends, cannot be made the foundation of an action merely because they happened to be enemies.
As long as a man keeps himself within the law by doing no act
which violates it, \ve must leave his motives to liiK who searches
the heart." • To state the point in a few words, whatever ono
has a right to do another can have no right to complain of.

' E: parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 8. See

Planters‘ Bank 0. Union Bank. 16

Wall. 483; Mitchell 0. Harmony, 13

Ilow. 115; Griﬂin e. Wilcox, 21 Ind.

Damage at the hands of Government. It has been shown, also,
that when a government official assumes an authority which the
law docs not warrant him in exercising, he is personally responsible, whatever may have been his motive. The discussions in
.Milligau'a case cover this point very fully.• But if the circum1 PARKE. B., In Stevenson "· Newn.
hnm, 13 C. B. 285, 297. See Floyd"·
Barber. 12 C'o. 23; Stowball"· Ansell,
Comb.ll; Tayler tl. Henniker, 12 Ad.
& El. 4.88; Heald v. Carey, 11 C. B.
977.
t Br,ACJt, J., in Jenkins v. Fowler,
~ Penn. SL 308, 310. See Fowler "·
Jenkins, 28 Penn. BL 176; Covanho.

van •· Hart, 21 Penn. St. 495; C1 in ton
"· Myers. 46 N. Y. 511; Frszier e.
Ilrown, 19 Ohio, (N. e.) 294; Thomas.
eon"· Agnew, 24 Miss. 93; McMillin
e. Staples, 86 Iowa, 532.
• Ez parte MilliJ::"a'l, 4 Wall. 8. Bee
Planters' Bank "· Union Bank. 16
Wall. 48lJ; l-Iitchell v. Harmony, 13
How. 115; Gri1Hn e. Wilcox, 21 Ind.
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stances were such that no individual can be held responsible, as

689

may be the case where the injury was done in time of war, in the

exercise of orders from a superior authority, which the agent was

powerless to resist, the wrong may be the same; but the remedy

is by an appeal to the justice of the government, or to such court

of claims or auditing board as the government may empower to

hear and allow claims against itself.‘ There can be no other

under such circumstances.

It has also been stated that an exercise of legislative authority

can afford no ground for legal complaint. A strong illustration

of this is aﬁbrded by the grant by the government of a new fran-

chise which has the effect to destroy or render useless a prior

grant of a like franchise.‘ If the ﬁrst grant was not in terms

exclusive, the second is perfectly lawful, and no inquiry into the

motives for making it \vill be suffered. The rule is universal,

that legislation shall not be assailed in the courts on an allega-

tion of malice, bad faith or corruption in passing it; and it is

manifest that if the allegation, when established, could not affect

the validity of the legislation, permitting it to be made could

only be an impertineuce and an aﬁ'ront.’ One department of the

government is not at liberty to assail another department in this

manner, or to suffer its machinery to be employed by individuals
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for such a purpose. But legislation exceeds its limits when it

orders a trespass upon the property or persons of individuals,

or when it provides for taking individual property for the public

mo; Johnson 0. Jones, 44 Ill. 142;

Hough v. Hoodless, 35 Ill. 166; Wil-

son o. Franklin, 63 N. C. 259; Hogue

v. Penn, 3 Bush, 663.

' Durand o. Hollins, 4 Blntch. 451;

Ford 0. Surget, 46 Mia. 130; Sutton v.

Tiller, 6 Coldw. 593; Despnn 0.01-

ney, 1 Curt. C. C. 306. In Great Bri-

tain it is customary, after times of

civil commotion. to pass acts of lu-

demnity and oblivion to heal the dis-

orders which may have sprung up

stances were such that Do individual can be held responsible, as
may be the case where the injury was done in time of war, in the
exercise of orders from a superior authority, which the agent was
powerless to resist, the wrong may be the same; but the remedy
is by an appeal to the justice of the government, or to such court
of claims or auditing board as the government may empower to
hear and allow claims against itself.' There can be Do other
onder such circumstances.
It has also been stated that an exercise of legislative authority
can afford no ground for legal complaint. A strong illustration
of this is afforded by the grant by the go\·ernment of a new franchise which has the effect to destroy or render useless a prior
grant of a like franchise.• If the first grant was not in terms
exclusive, the second is perfectly lawful, and no inquiry into the
motives for making it will be suffered. The rule is universal,
that legislation shall not be assailed in the courts on an allegation of malice, bad fAith or corruption in passing it; and it is
manifest that if the allegation, when established, could not affect
the validity of the legislation, permitting it to be made could
only be an impertinence and an affront.• One department of the
government is not at liberty to assail ano~her department in this
manner, or to suffer its machinery to be employed by individuals
for such a purpose. But legislation exc-eeds its limits when it
orders a tt·espass upon the property or persons ot' individuals,
or when it provides for taking individual property for the public

while alarm prevailed, and to protect

oﬂcials who in good faith exceeded

their authority in attempts to prevent

or suppress breaches of the law.

There is an enumeration of such acts

in Phillips o. Eyre, L. R 4. Q. B. 225.

Something similar was done by pro-

visions in some of the revised State

constitutions alter the recent civil war

in this country. See Drehman 0.

Stlﬂe, 8 Wall. 595.

' Sec Charles River Bridge 0. War-

ren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420.

' Sunbury. etc., R. R. Co. 0. Cooper,

88 Penn. St. ‘Z78; Baltimore o. State, 15

Md. 376; Ea: parts McCardle, 7 Wall.

506; Doyle u. Insurance Co., 94 U. S.

Rep. 535; E1: parts Newman, 9 Cal.

502; Slack 0. Jacob,8 W. Va. 612, 635;

Flint, etc., P. R Co. o. Woodhull, 25

Mich. 199; State 0. Fagan,22 La. Ann.

545.

44

370; Johnson e. Jones, -44. Ill. 1-'2;
Hough e. Hoodless, 35 Ill. 166; Wll.
son e. Franklin, 63 N. 0. ~9; Hogue
e. Penn, 8 Bush, 663.
1 Durand o. Hollins, ' Blatch. 451;
Ford "·Burget, 46 Xis. 130; Button v.
Tiller, 6 Coldw. 5!l3; Despan e. 01.
ney, 1 Curl C. C. 806. In Great Britain it is customary, after times of
civil commotion, to pass acts of ln.
demnity and oblivion to heal the dis.
orders which may have sprung up
while alarm prevalled, and to protect
o1Dcials who In good faith exceeded
their authority in attempts to prevent.
or suppress breaches or the law.
There Ia an enumeration or auch acta

44

In Phillips o. Eyre, L. R. '-. Q. B. 22:1.
SomethJng similar WM done by pro.
visions in some of the revist.'<l State
constitutions after the recent civil war
In this country. See Drchman e.
Btltle, 8 Wall. ~93.
• See Charles River Bridge o. War.
reo Bridge, 11 Pet. 420.
• Sunbury, etc., R R. Co. e. Cooper,
8S Penn. St. 278; Baltimore o. Statt•, 13
Md. 376; Ex part~ llcCardle, 7 Wall.
MG; Doyle D. Insurance Co., 94 U. S.
Rep. ~35; Ez part~ Newman, 9 Cal.
002; Slack o. Jacob, 8 W.Va. 612. 633;
Flint, etc., P. R Co. e, Woodhull, 2lS
Mich. 199; State D. Fagan, 22 La. Ann.
643.
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use without making compensation. Legislatures, like courts,
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must keep within the limits of their lawful authority.

The General Rule. Bad motive, by itself, then, is no tort.

Malicious motives make a bad act worse, but they cannot make

that a wrong which in its own essence -is lawful.‘ \Vheu in legal

use without making compensation. Legislatures, like courts,
must keep within the limits of their lawful authority.

pleadings the defendant is charged with having wrongfully and

unlawfully done the act complained of, the words are only words of

vituperation, and amount to nothing unless a cause of action is

otherwise alleged .’ The principle is forcibly illustrated by the case

of ill (1/(an v. Brown. In that case the plaintiff declared against

the defendant for wantonly and maliciously erecting on his own

premises a high fence, near to and in front of the plaintiﬂ' ’s win-

dows, without beneﬁt or advantage to himself, and for the sole

purpose of annoying the plaintiff, thereby obstructing the air and

light from entering her windows, and rendering her house unin-

habitable. It was held that the action would not lie. “The

defendant has not so used his property as to injure another. No

one, legally speaking, is injured or damniﬁed unless some right is

infringed. The refusal or discontinuance of a favor gives no

cause of action. The plaintiff in this ease has only been refused

the use of that which did not belong to her; and whether the

motives of the defendant were good or bad, she had no legal
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cause of complaint.” ' The decision is important, not only as an

illustration of the general rule, but also because it is opposed to

the doctrine which prevailed in the common law of England,

that one, by the uninterrupted enjoyment of the privilege of

receiving light and air into his buildings over the contiguous land

of another, might acquire a prescriptive right thereto; a doctrine

which almost universally has been considered in this country

unsuited to our condition and circumstances.‘

‘Jenkins 0. Fowler, 24 Penn. St.

301$, 310, per BLACK, J.

* Winnns, J ., in Gerard 0. Lewis, L.

R. 2 C. P. 305.

' Malian 1;. Brown, 13 Wend. 261,

265. See Panton '0. Holland, 1'7 Johns

92; I-Iarwood v. Tompkins, 24 N. J.

425; Jenks o.Williams, 115 Mass. 217;

Thornton 0. Thornton, 63 N. O. 211.

‘Parker 0. Foote, 19 Wend. 809;

Myers 0. Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537; Rog.

ers u. Sawin, 10 Gray, 3'76; Oarrig 0.

Dee, 14 Gray, 583; Randall u. Sander-

son, 111 Mass.114; Keats v. Hugo, 115

The General Rule. Bad motive, by itself, then, is no tort.
Malicious motives make a bad act worse, but they cannot make
that a wrong which in its own essence ·is lawfuJ.l 'Vhcn in legal
pleadings the defendant is charged with having wrongfully and
unlawfully done the act complained of, the words areonl_v words of
vituperation, and amount to nothing unless a cause of action is
otherwise alleged.' The prinoiple is forcibly illustrated by the case
of .Jlaltan v. Brown. In that case the plaintiff declared Roo-ainst
the defendant for wantonly and maliciously erecting on his own
}))'emises a high fence, near to and in front of the plaintiff's windows, without benefit or advantage to himself, and for the sole
purpose of annoying the plaintiff, thereby obstructing the air and
light from entering her windows, and rendering her house uninhabitable. It was held that the action would not lie. "The
def(mdant has not so used his property as to injure another. No
one, legally speaking, is injured or damnified unless some right is
infringed. The refusal or discontinuance of a favor gives no
canse of action. The plaintiff in this case has only been refused
the nse of that which did not helong to her: and whether the
motives of the det(mdant were good or bad, she had no legal
cause of complaint." 1 The decision is important, not only as an
illustration of the general rule, but also because it is opposed to
the doctrine which prevailed in the common law of England,
that one, by the uninterrupted enjoyment of the privilege of
receiving light and air into his buildings over the contiguous land
of another, might acquire a prescriptive right thereto; a doctrine
which almost universally has been considered in this country
unsuited to our condition and circumstances.•

Mass. 204; Jenks 0. \Villiams, 115

Mass. 217; \Var~l 1.1. Neal, 3'7 Ala. 500;

Cherry 0. Stein, 11 Md. 1; Powell 0.

Sims, 5 W. Va. 1; Kelper e. Klein, 51

Ind. 316; Mullen 1;. Stricker, 19 Ohio,

(N. s.) 135; Napier 0. Bulwinkle, 6

r ~l

'.Jenkins "· Fowler, 24 Penn. St.

so;;, 310, per BLACK, J.
'~ WILLES, J., in Gerard"· Lewis, L.
R. 2 C. P. 805.
1 1\lahan "· Brown, 18 Wend. 261,
265. See Panton"· Holland, 17 Johns.
!l2; Harwood "· Tompkins, 24 N. J.
425; Jenks"· Williams, 115 linss. 217;
Thornton"· Thornton, 63 N. C. 211.
4 Parker "· Foote, 19 Wend. 809;

Myers "· Gemme], 10 Barb.li87; Rog.
ers D. Sawin, 10 Gray, 876; Carrig 11.
Dee, 14 Gray, 583; Randall"· Sanderson, 111 Mass.114; Keats"· Hugo, 115
Mass. 204; Jenks "· Williams, 115
Mass. 217; W ar,I "· Neal, 87 Ala.. 000;
Cherry "· Stein, 11 Md. 1; Powell •·
Sims, 5 W. Va. 1; Keiper"· Klein, 51
Ind. 816; Mullen"· Stricker, 19 Ohio,
(K. a.) 185; Napier "· Hul winkle, G

mronmancn or EVIL mo'riv1-:. 691

So it has been held that no action would lie for maliciously con-
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spiring as insurance oﬁicers to refuse insurance on the plaintiﬁ"s

property; ‘ or for maliciously collecting the notes of a bank and

presenting them for redemption;' or for maliciously adopting a

trade mark to the prejudice of a plaintiff who has no exclusive

right to appropriate it; ’ or for throwing open one’s land to the

public, so that they may pass over it, thereby avoiding a toll

gate; ‘ or for maliciously throwing down fences put up through

one’s land to mark the lines of a road which has never lawfully

been laid out.’ Illustrations might be multiplied indeﬁnitely,

Rich. 812; Pierre e. Ft-rnald, 26 Me.

4-‘Hi; Hubbard 0. Town, 33 Vt. 295;

Guest 0. Reynolds, 68 lll.478; S. C.

18 Am. Rep. 570. See Morrison 0.

Marquardt, 24 Iowa, 35, and compare

Robeson 0. Pittengcr, '2 N. J. Eq. 57;

So it has been held that no action would lie for maliciously conspiring as insurance officers to refuse insuran<:e on the plaintiff's
property; • or for maliciously collecting the notes of a bank and
pre~enting them for redemption; • or for malicio01;ly adopting a
trade mark to the prejudice of a plaintiff who has no exclusive
rig-ht to appropriate it; • or for throwing open one's land to the
pnhlic, so that they may pass over it, thereby avoiding a toll
gate; 4 or for maliciously throwing down fences put up through
one's land to mark the lines of a road which baa never lawfully
been laid out.• Illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely,

Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N. J. Eq. 481.

The intent to grant such a servitude

will not be implied from the grant of

a building having windows overlook-

ing the land retained by the grantor.

Keats 0. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204. The
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subject is discussed at large in this

case. Whether a grant may he im-

plied under any circumstances, see

United States v. Appleton, 1 Sum. 492;

Durel e. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. -107;

French v. New Orleans, etc., R R

Co., 2 La. Ann. 80; Haverstick 0.

Sipc, 38 Penn. St. 368; Janos 0. Jen-

kins, 84 Md. 1; Parker o.Foote, 19

Wend. 809.

' Hunt e. Simonds, 19 Mo. 588.

' South Royaiton Bank 9. Suffolk

Bank, 27 Vt. 505. .

‘Glendon Iron Co. o. Uhler, '75

Penn. St. 467.

‘ Auburn, etc., P. R. (To. 1:. Douglass,

9 N. Y. 444, 450, per Sn-.1.nEN, J. " In-

dependent of authority, if a malig-

nnnt motive is suﬁicient to make a

man's dealings, with his own prop-

erty, when accompanied by damage

to another, actionable, where is the

principle to stop? For instance, if a

man sets up a trade, not with a view

to his own proﬁt, but solely to injure

one already in the same trade, how

can the case be distinguished in prin-

ciple from this? So. if one compels

his debtor to pay, not because he

wants the money, but that the latter

may call upon his debtor and t.hus

ruin him; or if one who holds stock

in an incorporated company, with a

view to depreciate the stock and thus

injure some other holder, throws his

stock upon the market and sells at a

great sacriﬁce, would not these cases

fall within the same principle? and

yet no one would contend that an

action would lie in these or similar

cases." See, also, Stearns v. Sampson,

59 Me. 568, 572. The malice ofa wit-

ness in giving injurious testimony, or

of a party in making injurious allega-

tions in his pleadings, etc., cannot be

the foundation of a suit. Damport 1:.

Simpson, Cro. Eliz. 250; Revis 0.

Rich. 812; Pierre e. Ft>rnatd, 26 1\le.
4:ltl; Hubbard e. Town, 88 Vt. 295;
Ouest e. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478; B. 0.
18 Am. Rep. 670. Sec Morrison •·
:'\[arquardt, 24 Iowa, 85, and compare
Hoheson •· Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 67;
Barnett e. Johnson, liJ N.J. Eq. 481.
The intent to grant such a servitude
will no\ be implied from the grant ot
a building having windows overlooking the land retained by the grantor.
Kl·ats e. Hugo, 1111 Mu:~s. 204. The
Ruhject is discussed at Jnrge in this
case. Whether a gran\ may be implied under any circuma\ances, see
United States v. Appleton,l Sum. 492;
Durel e. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 40'7;
French e. New Orleans, etc., R. B.
Co., 9 La. Ann. 80; Haverstick •·
Sipe, 88 Penn. St. 868; Janca tl. Jeu.
kina, 84 Md. 1; Parker e. Foo\e, 19
Wend. 809.
1 Hunt t1. Simonds. 19 llo. IJ88.
1 South Royalton Bank .. Suft'olk
Bank, 27 VL 605.
1 Glendon Iron Co. e. Uhler, 71
Penn. St. 46'7.
4 Auburn, etc., P. B. Co. e. Douglass,
9 N.Y. 444, 4110, per S&LDRN, J. "Independent of authority, it a malignant moUve is sumclent to make a
man's dealings, with his own prop.
erty, when accompaoied by damage
to another, actionablo, where Is the
principle to stop? .J..'or lna\ance, If a
man ee&a up a trade, not with a view

to his own profit, but solely to injure
one already In tbe same trade, how
can the case be distinguished lo principle from tbla f So. if one compela
his debtor to pay, not because he
wanta the money, but that the lat\er
may can upon his debtor and thua
ruin him; or If one who holds stock
in &D Incorporated company, with a
new to depreciate the stock and \hua
injure some other holder, \brows hla
stock upon \he market and aells at a
great sacrifice, would not tbt>&e cues
fall within the same principle f and
yet no one would contend that an
action would lie in these or similar
c~:~cs., Bee, also, Stcnrns v. Sampson,
~9 )le. 668, 672. The malice ofa witness in giving injurious testimony, or
of a party in making injurious allega.
tions in his pleadings, etc., cannot be
the feundatlon of a suit. Dampon e.
Simpson, Oro. Ells. 2.'>0; Revia e.
Smith, 18 C. B. 1M; Henderson •·
Broomhead, 4 H. & N. 1>69; Cunningbam e. Brown, 18 Vt. 128; Dunlap tl.
Gild den, 31 'Me. 4M; White e. Oarroll, -'2 N. Y. 161.
1 Fowler "· Jenkins, 28 Penn. St.
176; Jenkiua e. Fowler, 24 Pena. SL
80!'4. If one maliciously throw do'Wil
a fence erected u a boundary fence,
but on his aide the line, this Ia no
wrong, for the other was a tl'e&puaer
in building it. Smith e. Jobnaon, 'l6
Penn. St. liH.
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but it is needless. And on the other hand the cases are equally
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numerous which show that the most correct motive, or even an

inability to indulge a motive, will not protect one who invades

the right of another. The legal wrong is found in the injury

done and not in motive.‘

Apparent Exceptions. Some cases are apparent exceptions to

the general rule. Thus, We have seen that malice is said to be

an ingredient in the wrongs of slander and libel. But in most

cases the exception is only apparent. If the damaging imputa-

but it is needless. And on the other hand the cases are equally
numerous which show that the most correct motive, or even an
inability to indulge a motive, will not protect one who il!vades
the right of another. The legal wrong is found in the injury
done and not in motive.'

tion is talse, the law supplies the malice, and will neither require

it to be proved, nor give immunity because it is disproved. That

malice is an element of the wrong in a case in which the proof

of it is unimportant, must be purely a legal ﬁction.

Real Exceptions. The cases in the law of slander and libel

in which the actual existence of malice is essential to constitute

an actionable wrong, are those in which the law gives a privilege

to speak or otherwise publish what at the time the party believes,

provided it is done in good faith. Many such cases of privilege

have been given in preceding pages,’ and it has been shown that

the party is protected, even though what he published is false, if

he published only what he honestly believed. But in such cases

Some cases are apparent exceptions to
the general rnle. Thus, we have seen that malice is said to be
an ingredient in the wrongs of slander and libel. But in most
ca8es the exception is only apparent. If the damaging imputation is talse, the law supplies the malice, and will neither require
it to be proved, nor give immunity because it is disproved. That
malice is an element of' the wrong in a case in which the proof
of it is unimportant, must be purely a legal fiction.
Apparent Exceptions.

the law itself sets bounds to the right; it gives a privilege with
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a limit plainly deﬁned; a privilege to speak in good faith, but

not otherwise, and the party who maliciously publishes what

proves to be untrue, does not avail himself of the privilege, and,-

therefore, cannot claim its protection.

Precisely the same may be said of the cases of malicious

prosecution. Every man is at liberty to make use of the

machinery of the law in the assertion of any legal demand

‘The servant who innocently con- 0. Smell, 5 W. Va. 26. If good mo-

vcrts the property of another when

acting for and in the interest of his

master, is nevertheless liable person-

ally. Porter v. Thomas, 23 Geo. 467.

The army oﬁlcer who undertook to

remedy the wrong done to a loyal

man in the taking of his property by

seizing and handing over to him the

property of a confederate, was of

course liable as a trespasser. Moran

L ~*‘-ma

tive could render an otherwise illegal

act lawful, one might justify inﬂict.-

ing punishment by way of discipline

Real Exceptions. The cases in the law of slander and libel
in which the actual existence of ruaJice is essential to constitute
an actionable wrong, are those in which the law gives a privilege
to speak or otherwise publish what at the time the party believes,
provided it is done in good faith. Many such cases of privilege
have been given in preceding pages,' and it has been shown that
the pat·ty is protected, even though what he published is fal&>, if
he published only what he honestly believed. But in such cases
the law itself sets bounds to the right; it gives a privilege with
a limit plainly defined; a privilege to speak in good faith, but
not otherwise, and the party who maliciously publishes what
proves to be untrue, does not avail himself of the privilege, and;
therefore, cannot claim its protection.
Precisely the same may be said of the cases of malicious
prosecution. Every man is at liberty to make use of the
machinery of the law in the assertion of any legal demand

on his neighbor's children when they

seemed to need it, and the improvised

lynch courts which exercise jurisdic.

tion on the borders of civilization in

some cases would become perfectly

lawful tribunals.

' Ante, p. 210 et seq.

1 The servant who innocently convCJrts the property of another when
acting for and in the interest of his
maater, is nevertheless liable person.
ally. Porter "·Thomas, 28 Geo. 467.
The army officer who undertook to
remedy the wrong done to a loyal
man in the taking of his property by
seizing and handing over to him the
property of a confederate, was of
course liable as a tre8passer. Horan

•

e. Smell, 5 W. Vs. 26. If gOO<l mo.
tive could render an otherwise illegal
act lawful, one might justify inflictIng punishment by way of discipline
on his neighbor's children when they
seemed to need it, and the improvi~
lynch courts which exercise juri~ic
tion on the borders of civilization in
some cases would become pt'rfectly
lawful tribunals.
1 Ante, p. 210 et seq.
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which he has probable cause to believe exists in his favor against
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another, and also in the prosecution of any criminal charge

against another which he has probable cause to believe is well

founded. This is his lawful privilege, and he is protected in its

exercise notwithstanding the demand or the criminal charge

proves on investigation to be unfounded. But he is not privi-

leged to seize the property of another upon legal process for a

demand which he has no reasonable ground for asserting, or to

defame another by a criminal prosecution on a charge which he

has no reason to believe is well founded. Good faith in these

cases is the limit of the privilege. It would be monstrous if one

might with impunity make use of the process of the law for the

sole purpose of wreaking his malice upon his fellows; and it

would, perhaps, be equally destructive_of social order if every

man were subject to be called to account for the motives with

which his legal rights were exercised.

Bad motive increases necessity for Caution. But it cannot

be said that motive is entirely unimportant when one is exer-

cising undoubted legal rights. All rights must be exercised

with due regard to the rights of others, and action becomes

unlawful when it becomes negligent. It may be that if one shall

assert his rights with no other object than annoyance, he should
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be put to the observance of a higher degree of care than if what

he was doing had in view a beneﬁcial purpose. Suppose, for

which he has probable cause to believe exists in his favor against
another, and also in the prosecution of any criminal charge
against another 1Vhich he has probable cause to believe ia well
founded. This is his lawful privilege, and he is protected in ita
exercise notwithstanding the demand or the criminal charge
proves on investigation to be unfounded. But he is not privileged to seize the property of another upon legal process for a
demand which he has no reasonable ground for asserting, or to
defame another by a criminal prosecution on a charge which he
has no reason to believe is well founded. Good faith in these
cases is the limit of the privilege. It would be monstrous if one
might with impunity make use of the process of the law tor the
sole purpose of wreaking his malice upon his fellows; and it
would, perhaps, be equally destructive .of social order if every
man were subject to be called to account for the motives with
which his legal rights were exercised.

instance, he were to make an excavation in his grounds for the

mere purpose of annoying his neighbor and compelling him to

be at the expense of supports for his building, would not his

motive demand of him the observance of more than ordinary

care toavoid injury? Suppose he were to build a ﬁre on his

own premises for the sole purpose of incommoding a neighbor

with the smoke and dust, and the ﬁre should spread to the

neighbor’s premises, would not the motive itself strengthen

greatly any other evidence that might exist of the want of proper

care to prevent the ﬁre spreading? The point is not without

interest, and it would seem that there must certainly be some

difference between the man who proposes to keep within the

limits of legal right, and also to cause no annoyance, and the

man who proposes to cause what annoyance he may ﬁnd possible

without exceeding those limits.

Bad motive inoreasee neoeuity for Caution.

But it cannot
be said that motive is entirely unimportant when one is exercising undoubted legal rights. All rights must be exercised
with due regat·d to the 1·ights of others, and action becomes
unlawful when it becomes negligent. It may be that if one shall
assert his rights with no other object than annoyance, he shonld
be put to the observance of a higher degree of care than if what
he was doing had in view a beneficial purpose. Suppose, for
instance, he were to make an excavation in his grounds for the
mere purpo!'e of annoying his neighbor and compelling him to
be at the expense of supports for his building, would not his
motive demand of him the observance of more than ordinary
care to avoid injury! Suppose he were to build a fire on his
own premises for the sole purpose of incommoding a neighbor
with the smoke and dust, and the fire should spread to the
neighbor's premises, would not the motive itself strengthen
greatly any other evidence that might exist of the want of proper
care to prevent the fire spreading¥ The point is not without
interest, and it would seem that there must certainly be some
difference between the man who proposes to keep within the
limits of legal right, and also to cause no annoyance, and the
man who proposes to cause what annoyance he may find pouible
without exceeding those limits.
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Motive generally becomes important only when the damages
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for a wrong are to be estimated. It then comes in as an element

of mitigation or aggravation, and is of the highest importance.

The unintended blow, though negligent, is excused, when the

blow meant for an affront, though no heavier, is justly punished

with heavy damages. The justice of this is universally and

spontaneously conceded in private life and acted upon every-

where.‘

1 If the following anecdote shall at

ﬁrst blush seem a little out of place

in a law treatise, the aptuess and force

with which it illustrates the point of

the text must excuse its introduction:

Motive generally IJecomes important only when the damages
for a wrong are to be estimated. It then comes in as an element
of mitigation or aggravation, and is of the higllest importance.
.The unintended blow, though negligent, is excused, when the
blow meant for an affront, though no hea.vier, is justly punished
with heavy damages. The justice of this is universally and
spontaneously conceded in private lite and acted upon everywhere.1

In his early years Mr. Macaulay

has a curiosity to see how an election

is conducted. and goes out for the

purpose. As he approaches the place

of voting he is, struck in the face by

the carcass of a dead cat which some

one has thrown in his direction. This

certainly is unpleasant; the missile

is unsavory and the victim is propor-
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tionally enraged. No money just

then would have compensated satis-

factorily for the outrage. It is an

unprecedented affront and insult. But

the guilty party soon appears and

apologizes. The missile was not in-

tended for Mr. Macaulay, but for

another person against whom it had

been thought to be a proper political

argument. The injury is almost re-

dressed at once. "Well," says Mr.

Macaulay, “please next time intend

the missile for me and hit the other

man.” Thus a grievous injury be-

comes merely the occasion for a.

jocose remark, and the trespass

which, if intended, would have been

for a considerable period a source of

irritation and annoyance, is all re-

moved by an explanation and a slight

ablution, and good nature is restored.

A tort was of course committed, but

the damage was nominal.

* ‘ * _"" "Q-i

t If the fo11owing anecdote aball at
apologizes. The mi!!Sile was not infirst blush seem a little out of place tended for Mr. Macaulay, but for
in a law treatise, the aptness and force , another person against whom it had
with which it illustrates the point of
been thought to be a proper polih~l
the text must excuse its introduction: argument. The injury is almost re..
In bls early years Mr. Macaulay dressed at once. "V\Tell," ssys Mr.
has a curiosity to see how an elt!ction Macaulay, "please next time intend
is conducted, and goes out for the the missilt:l for me and hit the other
purpose. AB be approaches the place mao." Thus a grievous injury beof voting be is. struck In the face by comes merely the occasion for a
jocose remark, and the trespass
the carcnss of a dead cat which some
one bas thrown in his direction. This which, if intended, would ha,·e been
certainly is unpleasant; the missile for a considerable period a source of
is unsavory and the victim is propor- irritation and annoyance, is all re.
tionally enraged. No money just moved by an explanation and a slight
then would have compensated satis- ablution, and good nature is restored.
factorily for the outrage. It is an A tort was of course committed, bot
unprecedented affront and insult. But tho damage was nominal.
the guilty party soon appears and
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ABANDONMENT,

by wife of husband, 38.

ABATEMENT,

of nuisance, 46-49.

Sec NUIBAIIOL

ABDUCTION,

of child, 228. _

of wife, 224.

ABUSE,

of license, effect of, 316, 317.

INDEX.

of process, actions for, 189.

See TRESPASS AB Imno.

ACCESSION,

property by, 55, 56.

AC1‘ OF GOD,

what. to be referred to, 040, J‘ 7/,

no action for damage by, 665.

innkccpers do not warrant against, 636.

common carriers not responsible for, 640.

ACCIDENT,

injuries from not actionable, 80, 629, 665, 672,

what is an, 80.
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l in cases of infants, 683.

AO'I‘IO1\'S,

rights are protected by, 19-28.

right of every person to institute, 180. 181.

malicious, 180-189.

.-\DUP'l‘ION,

of children. 42, 235.

of wrongs, 128.

See RATIIIGATIOR.

ADJUDI(‘A'l‘ION,

of insanity, necessity for, 1'78.

title changed by, 458.

ADVICE OF COUNSEL,

protection in acting under, 183, I84.
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ABANDONMENT,
by wife or husband, 88.
ABATEMENT,
of nuisance, 46-49.
Bee NUISAKO&
ABDU<:rriON,
of child, 228.
of wife, 224.
ABUSE,
of license, effect of, 816, 81'7.
of process, actions for, 189.
Bee TBESPA88 AB IIUTIO.
ACCESSION,
property by, t'i~, 66.
ACT OF GOD,
what to be referred to, 040, J' 7/.
no action for damage by, 663.
innkeepers do not warrant against, 686.
common carriers not reaponr;~lble for, MO.
ACCIDENT,
injuries from not actionable, 80, 629, 863, 67l
what is an, 80.
in cases of infants, 083.
A <TriO ISS,
rights are protected by, 19-28.
right of every person to institute, 180. 181.
malicious, 181}-189.
ADOPTION,
of children, 42, 285.
of wrongs, 128.
See RATiriOATIOK.
ADJUDH'ATION,
of insanity, necessity for, 178.
title changed by, 458.
ADVICE OF COlJNSEL,
protection in acting under, 183, 184.
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IN HEX.

AFFIRMING CONTRACT,

when obtained by fraud, 505.

AFFIRMING CONTRACT,

AGENTS,

when obtained by fraud, 501S.

cannot sell principal’s property to themselves, 525. l

gooil faith required of, 526, 527.

AGENTS,
cannot sell princip:ll's property to Ulelll88lves, ti95.
goo:! faith required of, 526, 527.
of corporation, torts by, 120-122, 494-496, 006-518.
are servants, 1131-li33.

of corporation, torts by, 120-122, 494-496, 506-523.

are servants, 531-533.

AGGREGATE BODIES,

wrongs to, 7, 8.

AGREEMENT,

to indemnify sheriff, when valid, 130.

when void, 147.

AGGREGATE BODIES,
wrongs to, 7, 8.
AG HEE.MENT,

See CONTRACTI-

to indemnify sheriff, when nlld, 180.
wln·n void, 147.
See CoNTRAO'r.

AIR,

common law easement of, 690.

AMUSEMENT, PLACES OF,

right of all to visit, 285.

ANIMALS,

common law obligation of owner to restrain, 837.

modiﬁcation of common law rule in some States, 338

statutes requiring fences against, 838, 339.

running at large under township votes, 339.
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trespasses by vicious beasts, 340.

of animals not usually domesticated, 340.

keeper must protect against, 340, 342, 345.

by cattle being driven in highway, 341.

vicious, injuries by, 310-348.

notice to owner of propensity, 341, 344.

statutes dispensing with notice, 347, 348,

right to kill, 345, 346,

injuries by several uniting, 348.

wild, injuries by, 348-350.

implied warranty in sale of food for, 430.

sale of diseased, 481.

warranty in sales of, 481, 499.

nuisance of diseased, 608.

AN NOYANCE WITHOUT FAULT,

not a nuisance, 566.

APPORTIONMENT.

of responsibility between joint wrong-doers, 135, 136.

APPRAISERS.

not liable to private suits, 410.

APPRENTICE,

AIR,
common law easement of, 690.

AMUSEMEXT, PLACES OF,
right of all to visit, 285.
ANIMALS,
common law obligation of owner to restrain, 837.
modification of common law rule in some States, 838
statutes requiring fences against, S:lB, 339.
running nt large under township votes, 339.
trespasses by vicious beasta, 340.
of animals not usually domesticated, 840.
keeper must protect against, 840, 842, 8~.
by cattle being driven in highway, M1.
ncious, injuri(·~ by, 3!0-348.
notice to owner of propensity, 341, 8«.
statllll'S dispensing with notice, 847, 848,
right to kill, 34.'i, 346,
injuries by several uniting, 848.
wild, Injuries by, 848-850.
implied warranty in sale of food for, 480.
sale of diseased, 481.
warranty in sales of, 481, 499.
nuisance of diseased, 608.

ANNOYANCE WITHOUT FAULT,
not a nuisance, 566.

lawful restraint of by master, 1'71.

APPROVAL,

of a wrong, does not make one a wrong-doer, 128.

ARBITRATORS.

not liable to private suits, 410.

ARKANSAS.

action for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 242.

I
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APPORTIONMENT,
of responsibility between joint wrong-doers, 1M, 186.

APPRAISERS,
not liable to private suits, 410.

APPRENTICE,
lawful restraint of by master, 171.

APPROVAL,
of a wrong, does not make one a wrong-doer, 128.

ARBITRATORS.
not liable to pri'l"atc suits, 410.

ARKANSAS,
action for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 242.

•
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INDEX.

ARMS,

right to bear, B01.

ARREST,

is an imprisonment when yielded to, 170.

under legit] process, 172—174.

without process, when legal, 174-176.

in case of insane persons, 176-180

unlawful, may be resisted, 165.

for ulterior purposes, 190.

party entitled to discharge from, 190, 191.

oﬂicer cannot make in his own case, 191, 192.

of privileged persons, 192. '

oppression in making, 395.

ARTISTS,

protection of, 853.

ASSAULT,

what is, 160. 161. 167.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY,

what is, 29, 160-162.

attempts to strike, shoot, etc., 161.

attempt to ride over one, 161.

chasing but not overtaking a woman, 161.
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any injury by force is, 162.

assent to, when a defense, 162.

not a defense in general, 162, 163.

deception when equivalent to force, 168, 164.

intent when not material, 164.

self protection, defense of, 165, 169.

by female in defense of chastity, 166.

words do not excuse, 167.

in defense of family. 167.

in defense of possessions, 167, 169.

by use of spring guns, 168.

by ferocious dogs, 169, 343.

by throwing missile into crowd, 165.

by deceiving one into taking drug, 168.

false imprisonment includes, 169.

corporations may be liable for, 120.

words do not constitute, 29.

ASSEMBLY,

violation of right of, 296.

ASSENT,

to battery, when a justification, 162.

when not, 168.

AB-SESSORS,

not liable to private suits, 410.

ASSIGNEES IN BANKRUPTCY,

cannot buy of themselves, 525.

ASSUMPSIT,

when may be brought on waiver of tort, 90-06.

ARMS,
right to bear, 801.
ARREST,
Ia an imprisonment when yielded*'>. 170.
under legnl procesa, 172-17'wllhout process, when legal, 17'-178.
in case of ill8&ne persona, 176-180
unlawful, may be resisted, 161S.
for ulterior purposes, 190.
party entitled to discharge from, 190, tet.
oftlcer cannot make in his own cue, 181, 181.
or privileged persons, 192. .
oppression in making, 89~.
ARTISTS,
protection of, MS.
ASSAULT,
what is, 160, 161. 167.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY,
what is, 29, 160-162.
attempts to strike, shoot, etc., 181.
attempt to ride over one, 161.
chasing but not overtaking a woman, Ult.
any injury hy force is, 16~.
assent to, wl1en a defense, 162.
not a defense in general, 162, 163.
deception when equivalent to force, 163, 1M.
intent when not material, 164.
aelf protection, deftmse of, 165, 169.
by female in defense of chastity, 166.
words do not excuse, 167.
in defense of fRmily, 167.
in defense of pnssesslons, 167, u,g,
by use of spring guns, 168.
by ferocious dogs, 169, 343.
by throwing missile into crowd, 185.
by deceiving one into taking drug, 168.
false imprisonment includes, 169.
corporations may be liable for, 120.
words do not constitute, 29.
ASSEMBLY,
violation of right of, 296.
ASSENT,
to battery, when a justification, 169.
when not, 163.
ASSESSORS,
not liable to private suits, 410.
AB81GNEES IN BANKRUPTCY,
cannot buy of themselves, 625.
ASSUM:PBIT,
when may be brought on waiver of tort, ~-

697

698

698

INDEX.

INDEX.

ASYLUM.

conﬁnement of insane persons in, 1'76-180.

ATTACHMENT,

malicious suing out, 187, 188, 651.

A'I'l‘EMPTS,

what constitute assaults, 160, 161.

ATTORNEYS.

slanders of, 201.

reliance on advice of, 183, 184.

when liable for 0ﬁlcer's trespasses, 131.

for illegal writs, 131.

obligation of good faith to client, 527-529.

must not disclose conﬁdential communications, 527.

implied contract of service of, 648.

liability for negligence, 640. ‘ _

AUTHORITY. '

abuse of, when makes one a trespasser, 816, 317. '

AUTHO RS,

protection of by copyright, 851, 352.

rights of in unpublished works, 353-B56.

of letters, protection of, 356-359.
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AUTOGRAPHS,

BAIL,

rights of property in, 359.

B.

rights of to imprison their principal, 172.

ABYLUll,
con4nemen\ of lnaane persons in, 176-190.
ATTAOBHENT,
m&licioua suing out, 187, 188, 831.

A1TEKPT8,
what constitute uaaul&s, 160, 181.
ATTORNEYS,
llandera of, 201.
reliance on advice of, 188, 184.
when liable for oftlcer's trespaaee, 181.
for illegal writs, 181.
obllgation of good faith to cll,ent, IS27-629.
must not disclose confidential communicatlou, ISI'l.
implied c;>ntract of service of, 648.
liabllity for negligence, MG.
AUTHORITY,·
abuse of, when makes one a treapaseer, 818, 81'2'.
AUTHORS,
protection of by copyright, 851, 862.
rights of in unpublished worka, 8lS8-8M.
of letters, protection of, 8~.
AUTOGRAPHS,
rights of property in, 869.

BAILEE,

conversion by, 450, 456.

B.

liable, if he dues not keep within his contract, 634.

when liable for accidental ﬁres, 634.

See B,u1,.\|m:'rs.

BAILMENTB, '

BANK,

whether infants liable upon, 107-109.

on Sunday, conversion in case of, 157.

what are, 628.

BAIL,
rights of to imprison their principal, 178.
BAILEE,
conversion by, 4M, 41S6.
liable, lf he does not keep within his contract, 884.
· when llable for accidental fires, 634.
See

the several classes, 628.

for the beneﬁt of the bailor, 628, 682.

care required in case of, 628, 629, 631.

for the beneﬁt of the bailee, 631, 633.

extreme care required of bailee, 633.

distinguished from sales, 634.

for mutual beneﬁt of both parties, 688.

to innkeepers, 635.

to common carriers, 638.

maliciously demanding redemption from, 690.

when liable for refusal to honor check, 203.

~ 76 *1I!lQii

BAtLMKNTI.

BA JJ,JlENTS,
whether infants liable upon, 107-109.
on Sunday, conversion In case of, 16'7.
what are, 628.
the several classes, 628.
for the benefit of the bailor, 628, 632.
care required in case of, 628, 629, 631.
for the benefit of the bailee, 631, 633.
extreme care required of bailee, 638.
distinguished from sales, 634.
for mutual benefit of both parties, 688.
to Innkeepers, 686.
to common carriers, 638.

BANK,
maliciously demanding redemption from, 690.
when liable for refusal to honor check, 2u8.

-
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BANKRUPTCY, '

INDEX.

malicious institution of proceedings ln, 187.

BEASTS. See Amusns.

BEES,

injuries by, 349.

property in, 435.

BETTERMENTS,

property in, when not made by owner of land, 483.

BIBLE,

reading of in schools, 289.

BILL OF LADING,

limitation of liability in, 685.

BOARDING HOUSE KEEPERS,

are not innkcepers, 635, 686.

0 have no lien on'goods of boarder, 638.

BOARDS, OFFICIAL,

action for neglect of duties of, 877, 378.

BOUNDARIES,

fraudulent representations concerning, 485.

on navigable waters, 319, 320.

on public ways, 317.

on water courses generally, 319.
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BREACH OF DUTY,

who liable‘ for, 14(»144, 050, ass.

See Nmouonncn.

BREACH OF THE PEACE,

not to be permitted in abatiug nuisance, 47, 49.

in repossessing lands, 58.

arrest without warrant for, 175, 176.

BRIDGES,

' liability for neglect to repair, 658.

BUILDINGS,

See llronwns.

erected by licensee. may be removed, 306, 812, 313,

abatement of as nuisances, 46, 47, 49.

BULLS. See ANIMALS.

BURDENS, EXCEPTIONAL,

right to exemption from, 292.

BURDEN OF PROOF,

to show want of probable cause for criminal suit, 184.

to show malice in such suits, 185.

where fraud is alleged, 4'75.

in actions for negligence, 661, 673.

BURIAL RIGHTS,

injuries in respect to, 239, 240.

BUSINESS.

right to form relations in, 278.

slanders in respect to, 201-203.

See Em*r.o\'1\um'1's.

BANKRUPTCY,
malicious Institution of proeeedinga lD, 187.
BEASTS. Bee .A.IuK.WJ.
BEES,
Injuries by, 849.
property in, 483.
BB'rl'ERMENTS,
property In, when not made by owner or land, 8 .
BIBLE,
reading or in echool1, 289.
BILL OF LADING,
limitation of liability in, 68G.
BOARDING HOUSE KEEPERS,
are not innkeepers, 686, 686.
•
have no lien on·goods of boarder, 688.
BOARDS, OFFICIAL,
action for neglect of dutlea of, 877, 378.
BOUNDARIES,
fraudulent representations concerning, 48G.
on navigable waters, 319, 820.
on public ways, 817.
on water courses generally, 819.
BllEA.OH OF DUTY,
who liable for, 140-144, MO, 658.
8ee N.BGLIGUC&.
BRB.A.OH OF THE PEACE,
not to be permitted in abating nula&nce, -i7, 4:8.
in repossessing lands, 68.
arrest without warrant for, 175, 176.
BRIDGES,
liability for ncglee\ to repair, 658.
See HIGHWAYS.
BUILDINGS,
erected by licensee, may be removed, 806, 81J, 818.
abatement of as nuisances, 46, 47, -'9.
BULLS. Bee .A.NIKA.La.
BURDENS, EXCEPTIONAL,
right to exemption from, 292.
BURDEN OF PROOF,
to show wan\ of probable cause for criminal aul" 186.
to lhow malice in such suits, 185.
where fraud is alleged, 4715.
in actions for negligence, 661, 678.
BtJRI.A.L RIGHTS,
injuries in respect to, 239, 240.
BUSINESS,
right to form relations in, 278.
llanders In respect to, 201-20H.
See .EJo>LOYMBNTI.
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C.

700

INDEL

CALAMITY,

nuisances which threaten, 607.

0.

CANDIDATES,

privileged discussion of, 217, 218.

CARRIERS OF PERSONS,

liability for injuries to persons carried, 148, 642, 648.

when it begins, 643, 644.

for luggage, 643

may demand pay in advance, 644.

may put off those who have no tickets, 644.

must protect those carried against assaults, etc., 645.

right of to establish rules, 645, 646. .

liable for putting oﬂ' passengers without justiﬁcation, 645.

liable for winnings of gambler on their vehicles, 645.

responsible for statements of agents, 646.

CARRIERS, COMMON. See Connor: Csaaxaas.

CASE, SPECIAL,

in case of indirect injuries. 437, 439, 441.

for running cars over animals, 440.

for disturbance of easements, 440.

for negligent injuries, 440.
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Bee N1-zououncn.

CALA.HITY,

nuisances which threaten, 607.
CANDIDATES,

privileged diacuuion of, 217, 218.
CARRIERS OF PERSONS,

liabilit)' for injuries to persons carried, 143, 642, 648.
when it begins, 648, Mi.
for luggage, 643
may demand pay in advance, 644.
may put off those who have no t~kets, 644.
must protect those carried against assaults, etc., M!i.
right of to establish rules, 645, 646.
liable for putting off pasRengers without justidcation. 8415.
liable for winnings of gambler on their vehicles, 646.
reapoBsi ble for statements of agents, 646.
CARRIERS, COMMON. See
CASE, SPECIAL,

CoMMON

C.&.BBIBB8.

for neglect of statutory duties, 650, 658.

for waste, 372.

for neglect of oﬂlcial duty, 375.

Sec OFFICERS.

CA'I‘TLE,

distress of, damage fensant, 58.

escaping from highway, right to follow, 304, 841.

owner must restrain, 337.

statutes respecting fences against, 888, 339, 654, 656.

trespasses by, 337-348.

in case of indirect injuries, 437, 439, «1.
for running cnrs over animals, 440.
for disturbance of easements, 440.
for negligent Injuries, 440.
Bee NEGLIGBNa..
for neglect of statutory duties, 650, 6158.
for waste, 872.
for neglect of oftlcial duty, 875.
Bee Onro BJUI.

injuries by vicious, 341-348.

by unruly, 846.

CATTLE,

distreu of, damage feasant, 58.
eacaping from highway, right to follow, 80(, 841.
owner must restrain, 337.
statutes respecting fences against, 888, 339, 654. MG.
trespasses by, 337-348.
injuriea by vicious, 841-348.
by unruly, 846.
kUling when found trespassing, ~.
driving off by dogs, 846.

. killing when found trcspztssitlg, 345-846.

driving oﬂ' by dogs, 346.

CAUSE.

proximate and remote, 68-77. 679, 683.

CAUTION,

when one privileged to give, 216, 217, 218.

neglect by railway companies of signals of, 657, 658.

See N EGLIGENCE.

CEMETERY, '

rights in, 239, 240,

CHARACTER,

conﬁdential inquiries respecting. 216, 217.

See LIBEL; Manrcrous Puosscnrron; SLANDEB.

‘ * *— s -"****-II-Ital.‘

CAUSE,

proximate and remote, 68-77, 679, 688.
CAUTION,

when one privileged to give, 216, 217, 218.
neglect by railway companies of signals of, 61S'1, 638.
Bee NEGLIGKNCB.
CEMETEUY,

rights In, 289, 240,
CHARACTER,

conddential inquiries respecting, 216, 217.

Bee

..

LIBBLj MALICIOUB PROSECUTION; 8LANDBB.

•

IN DEX.

'101

INDEX.

CHARITY, WORKS OF,

what are, 158-155.

CHECK,

when refusal to honor is actionable, 208;

CHILDREN,

parent's right to custody of, 39.

services of belong to parent, 39.

emancipation oi‘, 39.

parent's duty to protect and educate, 40.

and to leave property to, 41.

adopted, rights oi‘, 42, 235.

step-children, position of, 42.

injuries of by animals, 346.

liability of master for exposing to perils, 553-555.

inviting upon one's premises, 303.

delivering ﬂre arms to, when negligent, 670.

actions for negligent injuries to, 680-683.

whether negligence of custodians is imputable to. 680-682.

See Masrnn sun Ssnvaxr.

CHURCHES.

See Eccnssrasrtcan Booms.

CHURCH MATTERS,

CHARITY, WORKS OF,
what are, 168-lM.
CHECK,
when refusal w honor Ia actionable,

See

CIVIL

CIVIL
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CIVIL

CIVIL

privilege of communication in, 215, 216.

90&

CHILDREN,
parent's right to custody of, 89.
lei'Vices of belong to parent, 89.
emancipation of, 89.
parent's duty to protect and educate, 40.
and to leave property to, 41.
adopted, rights of, 42, 235.
step-children, position of, 42.
injuries of by animals, 346.
liability of master for exposing to perils, 558-MIJ.
•
inviting upon one's premises, 308.
delivering fire arms to, when negligent, 870.
actions for negligent injuries to, 680-683.
whethtlr negligence of custodians is imputable to. 880-&
MASTER AND 8EBVAKT.

CHURCHES.
See EcCLESIASTICAL BoDIU.
CHURCH MATI'ERS,
privilege of communication in, 215, 2Ul.

LIBERTY,

meaning oi‘, 8-10, 33.

POWER, '

supremacy over military, 299-301.

RIGHTS,

meaning of the term, 275.

right to labor, 276, 279.

to employ labor, 278, 279.

State regulations of, 276-278.

right to form business relations, 278.

conspiracy to control employments, 279-282.

combinations for like purpose, 282. '

right to be carried by common carriers, 282-286.

subject to reasonable regulations, 288-286.

right to control one's property, 286.

to control one's own actions, 286.

to acquire an education, 286-289.

right in the learned professions, 289.

tn religious liberty, 290,

to equality in privilege, etc., 291.

to exemption from unequal burdens, 292-294.

to exemption from searches and seizures, 294.

I what searches lawful, 295.

violation oi‘ by the military, 299-801.

RIGHTS ACT,

questions under, 282-286, ‘.289.

CIVIL LIBERTY,
meaning of, 8-10, 88.
CIVIL POWEH,
.
supremacy over military. 299-801.
CIVIL RIGHTS,
meaning of the term, 2715.
right to labor, 276, 279.
to employ labor, 276, 279.
State regulations of, 2i6-278.
right to form business relatione, 278.
conspiracy to control employments, 279-ISt.
combinations for like purpose, 282.
right to be carried by common carriers, 282-288.
subject to reasonable regulatlona, 283-288.
right to control one's property, 286.
to control one's own actions, 286.
to acquire nn education, 286-289.
right in thP. learned professions, 289.
to religious libt:rty, 200,
to equlllity In privilege, etc., 291.
to exemption from unequal burdens, 292-294.
to exemption from searches and seizurea, 294.
what searches lawful, ~.
'riolatlon of by the military, 299~1.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT,
questions under, 282-286, 2$.

702 INDEX-

CIVIL SUITS,

702

INDEX.

malicious, action for instituting, 187-189.

CLERGYMEN,

must not take advantage of their profession, 529.

disclosure of communications to, 530.

slanders of, 201, 202.

CLERKS OF COURTS,

liability of to private suits, 392, 412.

COERCION,

presumption of in case of married women, 115.

Bee Duanss.

COLLISION,

of vessels when one is disobeying the law, 158.

of travelers in highways, 157, 158.

COLORED PERSONS,

rights of, in public conveyances, etc., 283-286.

COMBINATIONS,

to control labor are illegal. 23-3.

COMMON CARRIERS.

who are, 638.

right to be carried by, 282-286.

rules and regulations of, 283.
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must be impartial, 282-286.

action against for negligent killing. 262.

may limit the scope of their employment, 639.

must receive and carry impartially, 639. '

may make special bargains, 639.

cannot limit liability by notice, 639.

may require value of property to be disclosed, 639.

extent of obligation, 640.

strikes do not excuse from liability, 640.

liability in carrying live stock, 641.

not liable where goods are waiting orders for shipment, 641.

when his liability ceases, 641, 642.

who entitled to demand goods from, 642.

cannot contract against liability for negligence, 684.

See Drrxru, Acrrox ma UAUSING; Mas’!-an AND Snnvnvr; Nmemasxcn;

RAILROAD Comntmss.

COMMON LAW,

meaning of, 14.

growth of principles of, 11.

evidenced in decisions, 15.

respecting restraint of domestic animals, 337, 838.

remedy at for breach of duty, 19. -

when superseded by statutory remedy, 650, 658.

COMMON, RIGHTS OF,

not frequent in America, 366.

public rights distinguished from, 366-868.

invasions of, 366-368.

*7 --mi

CIVIL SUI'rB,
maliclou.s, action for Instituting, 187-180.
CLERGYMEN,
must not take advantage of their profe~~lon, ISle.
disclosure of communications to, li80.
slanders of, 001, 202.
CLERKS OF COURTS,
liability of to private aults, 892, 412.
COERCION,
presumption of in cue of married women, tlG.
See DURESB.
COLLISION,
of vessels when one ia disobeying the law, 1G8.
of travelers in highways, 157, 15ij.
COLORED PERSONS,
rights of, in public coanyances, etc., 988-286.
COMBINATIONS,
to control labor are illegal, 282.
COMMON CARRIERS,
who are, 638.
right to be carried by, 282-286.
rules and regulations of, 283.
must be imp1utial, 282-286.
action agRinst for negligent killing, 262.
may limit the scope of their employment, 689.
must receive and carry impartially, 689.
•
may make special barg1lins, 639.
cannot limit liability by notice, 639.
may require value of property to be diacloeed, 68t.
extent of obligation, 640.
strikes do not excuse from liability, MO.
liability in carrying Jive stock, 641.
not liable where goods are waiting orders for shipment, 641.
when his liability ceases, 641, 642.
who entitled to demand goods from, 642.
cannot contract against liability for negligence, 684.
See DEATH, AOTIOX FOB GAUSING; J'tiAsTBB AND BBBVA.l!IT; NmLI&D08;
RAILROAD COKPAXIB8.

COMMON LAW,
meaning of, 14.
growth of principles of, 11.
evidenced in decisions, 15.
respecting restraint of domestic animals, 88'7, 888.
remedy at for breach of duty, 19.
when superseded by statutory remedy, eGO, 858.
COMMON, RIGHTS OF,
not frequent in America, 366.
public rights distinguished from, 866-868.
invasions of, 366-868.

nsnsx. 703

COMPLAINANT,

INDEX,

when liable for malicious prosecution, 180-187.

COMPROMISE,

under duress, 186.

See Dnmass.

CONCERT,

ticket to is a license, 806.

COMPLAINANT,
when liable for maUcioua prosecution, 180-181.
COMPROMISE,
under dareae, 186.

Bee DUR JCII.

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS,

when privileged, 213-217.

to attorneys, disclosure of. 527, 528.

to physicians and clergyman, 529, 580.

CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS,

privilege of communication in, 213, 215, 216, 217.

frauds in cases of, 508-530.

CONFINEMENT,

of insane persons, 1'76-180.

Sec lmrmsonumvr.

CONFUSION OF GOODS,

what it is, 53, 54.

when property is lost by, 53, 54.

CONNECTICUT,

action for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 242.
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CONBCIENCE,

freedom of, 88, 34.

CONSIDERATION,

want of in case of gratuitous bailment, 632.

CONSIGNEE.

is primu faoia entitled to goods, 642.

CONSPIRACY.

is a joint wrong, 124.

not actionable till some wrongful action done under it, 125.

in general is not important to the remedy, 126.

to ruin an actor, 126.

approval, docs not make one a conspirator, 126.

what constitutes participation, 127.

to prevent employment, 279-282.

to break a contract, 280.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,

to equal privileges on public conveyances, etc., 288.

to equal privileges in schools, 288.

to be exempt from military control, 299-301.

to carry arms, 301.

to exemption from searches, etc., 394.

See (Elvin RIGHTS.

CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUDS,

what are, 473, 174.

CON'l‘El\1P'l"S,

_ of legislative authority, 422, 42$.

of judicial authority, 422-425.

CONCERT,
ticket to is " license, 806.
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS,
when privileged, 218-217.
to attorneys, disclosure of, li27, 1528.
to physicians and clergymen, 629, 580.
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS,
privilege of communication in, 218, 2115, 216, Bl'l.
frauds in caaea of, 508-080.
CONFINEliENT,
of insane persons, 178-180.
See IXPRJ80101DT.
CONFUSION OF GOODij,
what it is, 53, 54.
when property is lost by, ISS, M.
CONNECTICUT,
action for causing injury by aale of liquors In, 1ft.
CONSCIENCE,
freedom of, 88, 84.
CON8IDERA.TION,
want of in case of gratultoua ballment, 681.
CONSIGNEE,
is prima facie entitled to goods, M2.
CONSPIRACY,
Ia a joint wrong, 124.
not actionable till some wrongful action done under lt, 1J5.
in general is not important to the remedy, 198.
to ruin an actor, 126.
approval, docs not make one a conspirator, 198.
what constitutes participation, 127.
to prevent employment, 271)...282.
to break a contract, 280.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
to equal prlvile.~es on public conveyances. etc., to equal privileges in schools, 288.
to be exempt from military control, ~1.
to carry arms, 301.
to exemption from searches, etc., 89'See CIVIL Rloll'l'B.
OONSTRUCTIVE FRAUDS,
what are, 478, 474.
CONTE!IPT8,
of legislative authority, 422, 498.
of Judicial authority, 422--!215.

'103
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CONTRACTORS,

'104:

INDEX.

are not servants, 546-549.

CONTRACTS,

breaches of distinguished from torts, 90-96.

when there may be election of remedies, 90-96.

who liable upon, 97.

fraudulent, of infants, 107-113.

fraudulent, of married women. 116-118.

against liability for negligence, 684-688.

conspiracy to induce breach of, 280.

inducing breach of is not fraud, 497.

rescinding for fraud, 503.

promptness required in, 503.

must place other party in statu qua, 504.

Waiver of right, 505.

aﬁirming fraudulent, 505.

CONTRIBUTION,

when one wrong-doer may claim a-om another, 147, 148.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE,

in case of neglect of oﬂicial duty, 899.

is s bar to action for causing death, 264.

in case of injury to servants, 568.
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in case of children, 680-682. '

general rules as to liability in eases of, 674-679, 688.

CONVERSION,

what constitutes, 441, 448.

distinguished from trespass, 442.

who may sue for. 442.

of wife's property, 443, 447.

what ownership necessary to, 443, 447.

right of possession in case of, 443-447.

of mortgaged property, 447, 450, 451, 452.

of goods leased, 446, 447.

what is subject to, 447.

by purchase from one having no title, 451.

under mistake of ownership, 451.

assistants in, 452.

by selling goods pledged, 452.

when demand of possession necessary, 452-454.

of tenant's ﬁxtures, 454.

by tenant in common, 455.

by bailees, 450, 456.

extent of injury by, 456-458.

change of property by judgment, 458.

justiﬁcation under process, 459-470.

of property abroad, 470.

assumpsit in case oi’, 91-96.

by infants, 107-109, 112.

CO-OPERATION,

See Consrmacr; J omr Wnonos; Paarrclrarron.

CONTRA<1I'OR8,
are not aerY&Du, M6-348.

005TRA.(.,YJ:'S,
breaches of diaUngufahed trom torta. 90-H.
when &here may be election of remedies, 90-H.
who Hable upon, 97.
fraudulent, of infanta, 10'7-118.
fraudulent, of married women, 118-118.
against liabllity for negligence, 684.-e88.
conspiracy to induce breach of, 280.
inducing breach of Is not fraud, .e7.
reacindlng for fraud, 508.
promptness required in, ~
must place other party in •tatu guo, IJCK.
waiver of right, 54».
aftlnnlng fraudulent, ~.
OONTRIBUTION,
when one wrong-doer may claim
another, lj'7, 148.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE,
in caae or neglect of ofllclal duty, 899.
is a bar to action for causing death, 264.
in case of injury to servants, 1568.
In case of children, 680-682. ·
general rulea u to liability in 01881 of, 674--679,
CONVERSION,
what conatltutet, 441, 448.
diatinguished from treapaas, 441.
who may sue for, 442.
of wife's property, 443, 447.
what ownership necessary to, 448, 44!7.
right of poBScssion in case of, 443-447.
of mortgaged property, 447, 450, 451, 41St.
of goods leased, 446, 447.
what is subject to, 447.
by purchase from one having no title, 431.
under mistake of ownership, 451.
aasistanta in, 452.
by selling goods pledged, 439.
when demand of posseBSion neceuary, ~~
of tenant's fixtures, 4~
by tenant in common, 433.
by bailees, 450, 456.
extent of injury by, 45fl....438.
change of property by judgment, 438.
justltlcatlon under proceBS, 4lJ~70.
of property abroad, 470.
uaumpsit in cue of, 91-96.
by infanta, 10'7-109, 119.
CO.OPERA.TION,
Bee CONBPDU.OY; JoiNT W:ao:see; PARTICIPATio•.

trom

eea.
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COPYRIGHTS,

how obtained, B51.

injuries in respect to, 351.

CORPORATE BODIES,

communications to, when privileged, 215-218.

CORPORATE OFFICERS,

contribution between when made liable for neglects, 147.

wrongs by, 516-523.

CORPORATE PRIVILEGEB,

granted for the public good, 11.

CORPORATION,

frauds in organizing, 494.

fraudulent reports by, 494-496.

frauds upon by otileers, 518-523.

torts by, 119.

liable for representations of ofﬂcers, etc., 119.

liable for acts of oflicers within corporate powers, 120.

for negligences, etc., 120.

for assaults, 120.

for libels, 121.

for frauds, 122.
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public, torts by, 122, 128.

nuisances by, 619-626.

not liable for legistutive action, 689.

delegation of superintendence of business by, 560-568.

remedy by for non-payment of calls, 652.

CORPORATORS.

frauds upon by corporate ofﬂcers. 494-496, 516-523.

COSTS,

collection of on several judgments for one wrong, 139.

the penalty for unfounded suits, 189.

See EX'l‘0R’1‘lON.

COUNSEL,

privilege oi‘, 212, 213.

protection of parties in acting under, 183, 184.

must not disclose conﬁdential communications, 527, 528.

wrongs by to client, 527-530.

COURTS,

punishment of contempt by. 422, 425.

jurisdiction essential to action ot, 416-421.

See JUDICIAL Or-rtcnas.

COURT MARTIAL,

authority and jurisdiction of, 300.

liability of members to private suits, 412.

CROPS. GROWING.

property in, 433-435.

CRIMES,

what are, 81.

deﬁnite rules of liability for, 97.
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COPYRIGHTS,
how obtained, M1.
injuries in respect to, M1.
CORPORATE BODIES,
communications to, when privileged, 213-218.
CORPORATE OFFICERS,
contribution between when made liable for neglects, 1,7.
wrongs by, 316-528.
CORPORATE PRIVILEGES,
granted for the public good, 11.
CORPORATION,
frauds in organizing, 494.
fraudulent reports by, 494--496.
frauds UJlon by officers, 518-323.
torts by, 119.
liable for representations of oftlcera, e&e., 119.
liable for acta of officers within corporate powen, 110.
for negllgenccs, etc., 100.
for assaults, 120.
for libels, 121.
for frauds, 122.
public, torts by, 122, 123.
nuisances by, 619-fitl.
not liable for legistatlve action, 689.
delegation of superintendence of bosineta by, l560-368.
remC\ly by for non-payment of calla, 652.
CORPORATORS.
frauds upon by corporate officers, -494-496, 616-328.
COSTS,
collection of on several Judgments for one wrong, 139.
the penalty for unfounded suits, 189.
See EXTOBTlON.
COUNSEL,
privilege of, 212, 218.
protection of parties in acting onder, 188, 184.
must not disclose confidential communications, Gt'J', 698.
wrongs by to client, 527--.'i:JO.
COURTS,
punishment of contempt by, 42'J, 423.
Jurisdiction essential to action of, 416-421.
See JuDICIAL 0JI'li'ICEB&
COURT MARTIAL,
authority and jurisdiction of, 300.
liability of members to private auita, -'11.
CROPS, GROWING,
property in, 433-4M.
CRIMES,
what are, 81.
definite rules of liability for, 97.
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INDEX.

distinguished from torts, 81-90.

civil actions, in case of, 85-89.

conviction of, no evidence in civil suit, 86.

suspension of civil remedy in case of, 87, 88.

imputation of, when actionable, 196-200.

what evidence necessary to establish, 208.

when nuisances are not, 614-618.

CR1 M I NAL PROSECUTIONS.

action for, if malicious, 180-187.

CUMULATIVE REMEDY.

statutory remedy, when presumed to be, 651, 652.

(‘I’S"l OMS COMMISSIONER.

liability of to private suits, 392.

D.

D KM AGE,

and wrong must concur to constitute a tort, 62.

CHI l\IES- Otmtinu«l.
distinguished from torts, 81-90.
civil actions, in case of, 85-89.
conviction of, no evidence in civil suit, 86.
suspension of civil remedy in case of, 87, 88.
imputation of, when actionable, 196-200.
what evidence necessary to establish, 208.
when nuisances are not, 614-618.
ClUMINAL PROSECUTIONS,
action for, if malicious, 180-187.
CUMULATIVE REMEDY.
statutory remedy, when presumed to be, 651, 652.
('L'STO:\IS CO:\IMISSIONER,
liability of to private suits. 892.

•

when presumed, 62-68.

actual not essential to an action, 64, 65.

special, from slander, what is, 199, 203, 204.

from public nuisance, 618.

measure of in trover, 456-458.
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essential to make out fraud, 502.

DA \I AGES,

award of, the usual remedy for wrongs, 60.

for loss of wife’s aﬂections or services, 224, 226.

for loss of consortium of the husband, 227.

for loss of services of child, etc., 228-235.

for injuries, by sale, etc., of liquors, 242-262.

for causing death, 262, 274.

bad motive adds to, 694.

DAMAGE FEASANT,

distress of cattle, 58.

on navigable waters, 617.

oﬁensive, 617.

injuries from bursting, 570-578.

from setting water back, 568, 585, 586.

when not a public nuisance, 618.

D KNGEROUS PREMISES.

when master liable for injuries upon, 549452, 555

nuisance of, 605-607.

D KUG IITER,

action for seduction of, 230-235.

for marriage of, 230.

for loss of services of, 228-235.

DLAD BODIES,

rights in respect to burial of, 289, 240.

D.
D.\.MAGE,
aud wrong must concur to constitute a tort, 62.
when presumed, 62--68.
actual not essential to an action, 64, 65.
special, from slander, what is, 199, 208, S<K.
from public nuisance, 618.
measure of in trover, 456-458.
essential to make out fraud, 502.
DAMAGES,
award of, the usual remedy for wrongs, 60.
for loss of wife's affections or services, 224, -..
for loBS of coJ&Bortium of the husband, 227.
for loss of services of child, etc., 228-235.
for injuries, by sale, etc., of liquors, 2D-262.
for causing death, 262, 274.
bad moti¥e adds to, 694:.
DAMAGE FEASANT,
distress of cattle, 68.
DAMS,
on navigable waters, 617.
offensive, 617.
injuries from bursting, 570-3'78.
from setting water back, 568, 685,
when not a public nuisance, 618.
DANGEROUS PREMISES.
when master litlble for injuries upon, 549-559, 555.
nuisance of, 605-607.
D.\UGIITER,
action for seduction of, 230-235.
for marriage of, 230.
for loss of services of, 228-2815.
DEAD BODIES,
rights in respect to burial of, 289, 2(0.
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DEAD BODIES — Continued.

whether property, 240.

DEATH,

old remedies for causing. 25, 26.

no common law action for causing, 14, 15, 27.

statutory action for causing, 28, 262-274.

I)E.\.TH, ACTION FOR CAUSING,

would not lie at common law, 14, 15, 262.

but might for incidental damages, 262.

given by statute, 26%274.

Lord Campbell's Act, 263.

construction of, 263, 264.

where death is instantaneous, 264.

contributory negligence a bar to, 264.

' American statutes giving, 264, 265.

is a local remedy, 266.

who liable to, 266.

plaintiff in. 267, 268.

beneﬁciaries in, 268, 269.

what wrong gives rise to, 270.

proximate cause, 270.
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damages recoverable in, 270-274.

DECEPTION,

when the equivalent of force in trespass. 163.

to obtain lawful p0ss(.'SSl0I1 of lands, 164.

wrongs by in general,

Sec FRAUD..

DE FACTO 0FFlCERS,

who arc, 401.

questioning acts of, 401, 402.

DEFAMATION,

meaning of, 193.

See Lmar. MALICXOUB Pnosacorrou , S

; ' 1-A

DEFENSE OF FAMILY,

right to use force in, 49. 50.

DEFENSE OF PROPERTY.

right to use force in, 49, 50.

by employment of dogs, 345, 847.

DEFENSE, SELF. See SELF Dian-nzsl

DEFiNITION.

ot‘ public wrongs, 6-8.

of civil liberty, s-10, 33.

of political liberty. 9.

of natural liberty, 6.

of judicial legislation, 11, 18.

of common law, 14.

of religious liberty, 33, 84.

of crimes, 81.

of slnnder.193.

of libel, 198.

NDRH.

DEAD BODIES- OominJUd.
whether property, 240.
DEATH,
old remedies for causing, 23, 26.
no common law action for causing, U, tiS,~.
statutory action for causin~. 28, 262-274.
DEATH, ACTION FOR CAUSING,
w~>uld not lie at common law, 14, tiS, sma.
but might for incidental damages, sa.
given by statute, 202-274.
Lord Campbell's Act, 263.
construction of, 2!l3, 264.
where <Ieath is instantaneous, 264.
contributory negligence a har to, 2k
American statutes giving, 264, 263.
Is a lucnl remedy, 206.
who liable to, 266.
p!aintiff in, 267, 268.
bcnl!flciarics in, 208, 269.
what wrong gives rise to, 270.
proximate cause, 270.
damages recoverable in, 270-274..
DE( 'EPTION,
when the <'qulvalent of force in treapua. tea.
to obtnin lawful possession of lands, 164.
wrongs by in general,
Bee FRAUD.•
DE FACTO OFFICERS,
who arc, 401.
questioning acts of, 401, 402.
DEFAMATION,
meaning of, 193.
Sec LIBEL; MA.LJCIOU8 PaoaiDCUTIOK; BLAKDD.
DEFENSE OF FAMILY,
right to use force in, 49, 50.
DEFENSE OF PROPERTY,
right to use force in, 49,lSO.
by employment of dogs, 843, M'J.
DEFENSE, SELF. See SELF DEFEHB&
DEFINITION,
of public wrongs, 6-8.
of civil liberty, 8-10, 88.
of political liberty. 9.
of satural Uberty, 6.
of judiciallegisl~ttion, 11, t8.
of common law, 14.
of rc•liglous liberty, 88, M.
of crimes, 81.
or slander,l93.
of libel, 193.
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INDEX.

DEFINITION -— Continued.

of defamation, 198.

of malice, 209.

of liberty of the press, 217.

of actionable per ae., 195.

of civil rights, 275.

of waste, 332.

of incorporeal rights, 851.

of trade mark, 359.

or party wall, 372.

of jurisdiction, 417.

of contempts, 422.

of ﬁxtures. 427.

of fraud. 474.

of constructive fraud, 473.

of duress, 506.

of undue inﬂuence, 508.

of servant, 531.

of nuisance,565.

of negligence, 630, 659.

of common carrier, 638.

of innkecper, 635.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of “ act of God," 640.

DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE,

doctrine of in some States, 676-679.

DEMAND AND REFUSAL,

importance of in trover, 452-454.

DEPOSITS UN LAND,

are nuisances, 569.

DEPUTIES,

responsibility of sheriff for acts tr", 132, 397.

personal liability of, 132.

liable with sheriff for their own wrongs, 132.

cannot act when principal cannot 192.

DISCOMFORT, PERSONAL,

when a nuisance, 506.

DISCRETIONA RY DUTIES,

action will not lie for neglect of, 379.

See J unrcuu. QFFICERB.

DISCUSSION,

of public affairs, privilege in, 219. 220.

DISEASE, CONTAGIOUS,

importation of, when actionable, 200.

DISEASE!) BEASTS,

sale of, when a fraud, 481.

when nuisances, 608.

DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS,

master liable for injuries by, 539-541.

DISSEISIN.

what amounts to, 322-326.

DEFINITION- Oontinwd.
of defamation, 198.
of malice, 209.
of liberty of the press, 11'1.
of actionable ~r •~. 1915.
of civil rights, 2711.
of waste, 882.
of incorporeal rights, 8111.
of trade mark, 859.
6f party wall, 872.
of jurisdiction, 417.
or contempta, 422.
of flxtures. 427.
of fraud, 474.
of constructive fraud, 478.
of duress, 506.
of undue in6uence, 308.
of servant, 531.
of nuisance, 565.
of negligence, 680, 659.
of common carrier, 688.
of innkeeper, 6.'~.
of "act of QQd," 640.
DF.GREES OF NEGLIGENCE,
doctrine of In some States, 6'7~.
DEMAND AND HEFUSAL,
importance of in trover, 4:12--4U.
DEPO!:HTS ON LAND,
are nuisances. 569.
DEPUTIES,
responsibility of sheriff for acts o'". 182, 897.
personal liability of, 182.
liable with sheriff for their own wrongs, 181.
cannot act when principal cannot. 192.
DISCOMFORT, PEHSONAL,
when a nuisance, 506.
DISCRETIONARY DUTIES,
action will not lie for neglect of, 879.
Bee JUDICIA.L 0J:ITICKB8.
DISCUSSION,
of public affairs, privilege in, 219. 220.
DISEASE, CONTAGIOUS,
importation of, when actionable, 000.
IHSEASED BEASTS,
sale of, when a fraud, 481.
when nuisances, 608.
DlSOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS,
master liable for injuries by, G89-Ml.
DISSEISIN,
what amounts to, 822-826.

mnnx. 709

DISSEISIN — Continued.

INDEX.

by tenant in common, 327, 328.

DISTRESS,

of cattle, damage feasant, 58, 59.

of goods, in certain cases. 59.

DIVORCE.

relieves husband from liability for torts, 115.

DOGS,

trespasses by, 340.

injuries by vicious, 840-348.

notice of vicious propensity. 843.

killing of, when justiﬁnble, 846.

defending premises by, 345.

inviting upon one’s premises, 303.

defense of property by, 169, 345, 347

DOWER. .

assignment of in wild lands, 833.

DRAINAGE,

special levies for, 566.

to draw oil‘ surface waters, 574-580.

DROVERS’ PASSES,

stipulations in for exemption from liability for negligence, 686.
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DRUGGIST.

negligently selling poisons, '75.

DRUNKARDS,

liable for torts. 103. 114.

frauds upon, 516.

DRIQNKENNESS.

imputation of when actionable, 201.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

for paupers, 291.

for insane persons, 291.

for vagrnnts, 291.

DUEL,

liability of parties who engage in, 1%.

DURESS.

what is. 506.

is a species of fraud, 506, 507.

redress in cases of, 506, 507.

torts committed under, 115.

compromise induced by, 186.

DUST,

nuisance of, 600.

DUTY,

when action will lie for neglect of, 650-658.

to the public, when will support individual action, 376-378 660.

neglect of is negligence, 659.

See Nsoueaxcn

DWELLING HOUSE,

forcible entry by oﬂicer a trespass, 314.

DISSEISIN- Otmtinu«l.
by tenant in common, 827,818.
DISTRESS,
of cattle, damage feasant, 58, G9.
of goods, In certain cases, G9.
DIVORCE,
relieves husband fi'om liablllty for tortl, US.
DOGS,
trespasses by, 840.
Injuries by vicious, 840-348.
notice of vicious propensity, 848.
killing of, when justifiable, 846.
defending premises by, 3~.
Inviting upon one's premises. 308.
defense of property by, 169, M:S, M'l
DOWER,
aasignment of In wild lands, 888.
DRAINAGE,
special levies for, 366.
to draw oft' surface watera, G7~.
DROVERS' PASSES,
stipulations in for exemption from llabUity for negligence, 888.
DRUGGIST,
negligently selling polsooa, 'lG.
DRUNKARDS,
liable for torta, 103, 114.
fmuds upon, 316.
DRL"NKENNESS,
imputation of when actionable, 101.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
for paupers, 291.
for insane persona. 291.
for vaw-ants, 291.
DUEL,
liability of parties who engage In, 1CI8.
DURESS.
what is. 306.
Is a species of Craud, G06, GO'l.
redress in cases of, GOO, 50'7.
torts committed under, llG.
compromise induced by, 186.
DUST,
nuisance of, 600.
DUTY,
when action will Jie for neglect of, ~
to the public, when will support Individual action, 87~ NO.
neglect of is negligence, 659.
See NBGLIGDc&
DWELLING HOUSE,.
forcible entry by omcer a trespass, 81-&.
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DWELLING HOUSE — Continued.
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INDI!:X.

force in defense of, 49, 50, 345, 347.

searches, etc , in, 294, 295.

E.

EASEMENT,

distinguished from license, 3044305.

DWELLING HOUSE- Continrud.
force in defense of, 49, 50, ~. 84'7.
searches, etc., in, 294, 295.

right to repair and protect, 304.

in respect to occupation and use of town lots. B69.

E.

to pass and repass over lands. 369-371.

to lay pipes, etc., 870.

of light and air, 690.

obstruction of, 371, 372.

abatement of nuisance to, 372.

party walls, 372, 374.

public, boundary on, 317-319.

abuse of right in, 319.

See Hrenwsrs.

ECCLESIASTICAL BODIES.

formation of, 290.

jurisdiction of State over, 291.

privilege in proceedings of, 215.

EDUCATION,
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right to obtain, 286.

State provision for, 287.

how right to may be violated, 288, 289.

ELECTION,

of remedies, where tort may be waived, 91-96.

in case of frauds, etc., by infants, 108, 109.

as between separate judgments against wt-ongdoers, 138.

ELECTION OFFICERS.

liability of to private suits. 413-416.

ELECIORS,

violation of rights of, 296-298.

actions by against election oﬂlcers, 413-416.

EMANCIPATION,

of wife from husband's control, 38.

of children. 39.

EMBLEMEN TS.

property in, 433-435.

EMINENT DOMAIN,

recovering compensation in case of, 652.

EMPLO YMEN T,

right to engage in, 276.

State regulation of, 276-278.

exclusions from arc unlawful, 276.

exceptions, 276, 277, 290.

case of monopolies, 277.

__ _ _._t_—q'N4

EASEMENT,
distinguished from license, 304-805.
right to repair and protect, SOl.
In respect to occupation and use of town lots, 88~.
to pass and repass over Ianda. 869-371.
to lay pipes, etc., 870.
of light and air, 690.
obstruction of, 371, 372.
abatement of nuisance to, 879.
party walls, 372, 874.
public, boundary on, 817-819.
abuse of right in, 819.
See HIGBW'AYI.
ECCLESIASTICAL BODIES.
fonnatlon of, 200.
Jurisdiction of State over, 291.
privilege in proceedings of, 2HJ.
EDUCATION,
right to obtain, 286.
State provision for, 287.
how right to may be violated, 288, 289.
ELJ!l<n'IO N,
of remedies, where tort may be waived. Ul-H6.
in cRSe of frauds, etc.. by infants, 108, 109.
as between separate judg10cnts against wrong.doers, 188.
ELE<n'ION OFFICERS.
liability of to private suits, 418-416.
ELEUfORS,
violation of rights of, 296-298.
actions by against election officers, 413-416.
BlrUNCIPATION,
of wife from husband's control, 88.
of cbildrtm, 89.
EliBLEMENTS.
property in, 4:38-485.

EMINENT DOMAIN,
recovering compenaation in case of, 652.
EMPLOYMENT,
right to engage in, 276.
State regulation of, 276-278.
exclusions from are unlawful, 276.
exceptions, 276, 277, 290.
case of monopolies, 277.
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EM PLOYMENT — Continued.

right to refuse, 278.

conspiracy to prevent, 279-282.

combinations to control, 282.

EMPLOYERS,

conspiracy to control, 279-282.

combinations by, 282.

ENGAGEMENT OF MARRIAGE.

frauds accomplished by, 510-514.

ENTICING.

the wife from the husband, 223, 226.

the child from the parent, 228.

ENTRY, ,

to repossess lands, 57.

to retake goods, 52.

to take goods purchased, 61, 305.

EQUALITY OF BURDENS,

general rule of. 292,

EQUALITY OF RIGHTS,

a fundamental principle, 35

is consistent with regulations, 35.
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general rule of, 291.

in public conveyances, etc., 282-286.

in schools. 287-289.

EQUITIES,

cannot spring from wrongs in favor of wrong-doers, 144.

exceptions where the wrong is only technical, 145

ESCAPE.

of cattle from highway, 341,

liability of ofllcer for, 893, 394.

ES'I‘A'l‘ES OF DECEASED PERSONS.

trcspasses on, 96.

ESTOPPEL.

against one who sees another sell his property, 477.

\ other cases of, 478.

- as against revocation of liccnse.308-1312

EXCAVATIONS,

When leaving unguarded is negligence, 605, 606, 660, 661.

EXCESSIVE FORCE.

in self defense is unlawful, 165, 168, 169.

in removing passenger from cars, 646.

EXCLUSION.

from right of suﬂrage, 296-293.

from oﬁlee, 298.

from public convyances, etc , 282-286.

from schools, 288, 289.

of females from employments, 276. 290.

of children from employments, 276.

EXECUTION.

protection of purchaser under, 469.

EMPLOYMENT- ContinUid.
right to refuSf', 278.
conspiracy to prevent, 279-282.
combinations to control, 282.
EMPLOYERS,
conspiracy to control, 279-282.
combinations by, 282.
ENGAGEMENT OF MARRIAGE,
frauds accomplished by, ~10-~51'
ENTICINO,
the wife from Ule husband, 2SS, 228.
the child from the parent, 228.
ENTRY,
to repossess lands, ~7.
to rctuke goods, ~2.
to take goods purchased, ~1, 8015.
EQUALITY OF BUHDENS,
general rule of, 292,
EQUALITY OF RIGHTS,
a fundamental principle, 85
is consistent with regulations, 83.
general rule of. 291.
In public conveyances, ttc., 282-286.
in schools, 287-289.
EQUITIES,
cannot spring from wrongs in favor of wrong..doera, 144.
exceptions where Ule wrong is only technical, 1~
ESCAPE,
of cattle from highway, 341,
liability of offic<·r for, 893, 394.
ESTATES OF DECEA~ED PERSONS.
trespasses on, 96.
ESTOPPEL.
against one who sees another aell his property, 477.
other cases of, 478.
as against revocation of license. 808-:J12
EXCAVATIONS,
When leaving unguarded Is negligence, ~. 606. 660, 66L
EXCES!:HVE FORCE,
in self defense is unlawful, 163, 168, 169.
In removing passenger from cars, 646.
EXCLUSION,
from right of suffrage, 200-298.
from office, 298.
from public convyances, etc.,. 282-286.
from schools, 288, 289.
of females from employments, 276, 200.
of children from employments, 276.
EXECUTION,
"lrolectlon of purchaser under, 469.

711

712 "INDEX.

712

"INDEX.

EXECUTIVE,

exemption of from_ suits for oﬁicial utterances, 214.

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR,

actions by for torts to the estate, 96.

cannot buy of themselves, 525.

frauds by, 525.

EXEMPTIONS.

liability of oiﬁcer for disregarding, 395.

family rights in respect to, 241.

EXPLOSION,

accidental. no action for, 80.

EXPLOSIVES,

EXECUTIVE,
exemption of from, suits for omclal utterances, IU4:.

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR,
actions by for torts to the estate, 96.
cannot buy of themselves, IS25.
frauds by, 52:i.
EXEMPTIONS,
liability of omcer for disregarding, aN.
family rights in respect to, 241.

EXPLOSION,

negligent use of, 593.

sending by carrier without notice, 6'70.

EXPRESS COMPANIES,

are common carriers. 638.

EXTORTION,

redress in cases of, 506, 5W.

EXTRADITION,

for fraudulent purposes, 191.

F.

FAIR ON ITS FACE,
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what process is, 459, 464.

accidental, no action for, 80.
EXPLOSIVES,
ne~li1,rent use of, 593.
sending by carrier without notice, mo.
EXPRESS COliPANIES,
are common carriers. 638.

EXTORTION,
redress In cases of, IS06, W7.
EXTRADITION,
for fraudulent pnrposes, 191.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT,

usually includes battery, 169.

what constitutes imprisonment, 169, 1'70.

F.

what is not, 170-180.

restraint by parent, 1'70.

by guardian, 171.

by master of apprentice, 1'71.

by teacher, 171.

by master of ship, 172.

under legal process, 172-1'74.

without warrant, 174-176.

of insane persons, 176-180.

FALSE WARRANTY,

is a fraud, 500.

FAMILY.

rights of members of, 38—43

adopted and step children, 42.

right to form, 41.

not known in law as an entity, 18.

assault in defense of, 49, 50, 167, 169

FAMILY RELATIONS,

privilege of communications in. 216.

rights in,

PAIR ON ITS PACE,
what process is, 41i9, 464.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT,
usually includes battery, 169.
what constitutes imprisonment, 169, 1'70.
what Is not, 170-180.
restraint by parent, 170.
by guardian, 171.
by muster of apprentice, 171.
by teacher, 171.
by master of ship, 172.
under legal process. 172-174.
without warrant, 174-176.
of insane persons, 176-180.

FALSE WARRANTY,
is a fraud, 500.
FAMILY,

See FAMILY R|ou'rs.

--sf

rights of members of, 88-48
adopted and step children, 49.
right to form, 41.
not known in law as an entity, 18.
assault in defense of, 49, 50, 167, 169

FAMILY RELATIONS,
privilege of communications in, 216.
rights in,
See FAHILT RIGHTS.

I

INDE~.

F

INDEX. t

FAMILY RIGHTS.

injuries in respect to, 222-274.

of husband, injuries to, 222-225.

of wife, injuries to, 226-228.

of parent, injuries to, 228-285.

of adopted children, 235.

of child, injuries to, 235.

of guardian, 236.

marriage, right to, 236-239.

in respect to burial of the dead, 239, 240.

in respect to exemptions, 241.

of master and servant, 241.

injutics to, by sale of intoxicating drinks, Ml~262.

injury to by causing death, 2tl%274.

FEMALES.

exclusions from employments, 277, 2110.

action for seduction of, 224, 230, 510.

FENCES,

J'AliiLY RIGHTS.
Injuries in respect to, 2~2'74.
of husband, injuries to, 222-22G.
of wife, injurh..'S to, 226-228.
of parent, injuries to, 228-283.
of adopted children, ~.
of child, injuries to, 2M.
of guardian, 236.
marriage, right to, 236-289.
In respect to burial of tho dead, 288,1(().
in r1~spcct to f'xemptions, 241.
of mnster and ~Servant, 241.
Injuries to, by sale of intoxicating drinks, 241-26!.
injury to by causing death, 262-274.
FEMALES,
exclusions from employments, 277, ~:10.
action for seduction of, 224, 280, 510.

common law respecting, 337.

modiﬁcation of in some States, 338.
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statutes respecting, 338, 654.

liability of railroad companies for not building, 654-657.

partition by statute, 339, 340.

FEROCIOUS DOGS. See Docs.

FIGHT,

injuries to those engaged in, 159. ,

FILTHY PERCOLATIONS,

FENCES,
common law respecting, 887.
mod itication of in some St:t!t·s. :t'la.
statutes respecting, 888, 654.
liability of railroad companiet~ for not building,~.
partition by statute, 3:m, 340.
FEHOCIOUS DOGS. See Doos.

FIGHT,
injuries to those engaged in, 159.

nuisance of, 567.

FIRE,

injuries by, to property delayed, 78. 74. '

FILTHY

accidental. actions for at common law. 14.

destruction of subject of bailuient by, 634.

liability of inukeeper for, 636.

FIRE ARMS,

negligent use of, 593.

negligent giving to child, 6'70.

Filtl-‘.S, NEGLIGENT.

liability for in general, 589-592.

contracts against liability for, 685.

set by machinery, 59l.

liability for when set by servant, 536.

when set by contractor, 548.

when set by locomotive, 66l, 662.

FISHERIES.

common rights in respect to, 386.

FISHING,

trespasses in, 3'29-332.

FIXTURES,

PERCOLATIO~S,

nuisance of, 567.

liability for negligent, 76-79, 536, 548, .189, 592, 698.

FIRE,
injuries by, to property delayed, 78. 7-t.
liability for ne:;ligent, 'i6-i9, 536,548. fiSO. ~92, 693.
accidental. actions for at common lnw. U.
destruction of subject of bailment uy, 634.
linbility of innkeeper for, 636.
FIRE ARl\18,
ne~ligent use of, 593.
n£'gligPnt. ~iving to child. 670.
FIHES, NEGLIGENT.
liubility for in g£'neral, 589-592.
contracts against liability for, 681J.
set by machinery. 591.
liability for when set by servant, ~6.
when set by contractor, 548.
when set by locomotive, 661, 662.

FISIIERIES.

what are. 427.

common rights in respect to, 866.

FUmiNG,
trespasses in, 829-332.

FIXTURES,
what arc. 427.
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INDEX.

INDEX.

FIXTURES — Continued.

l!'IX'tORES- Oontltav«L

when renl estate and when not, 427, 428, 430.

when real estate and wheo no~ 427,418, 480.
rolling atock of railro.da u, 428.
of tenanta, 429.
&Uacbed to land under eootract of purchase, 8.
&Uacbed without auUlority, 480.
mortgage of, 4.80, 431.
attached by licensee, tal.

rolling stock of railroads as, 428.

of tenants, 429.

FLOOD

attached to land under contract of purchase, 429.

attached without authority, 430.

mortgage of, 430, 431.

attached by licensee, 431.

removal of, 431, 432.

remonl of, tal, 482.

‘injuries by, to property delayed, 72. 73.

FLOOD,
lnjurlee by, to prc•perty delayed. 'JJ, 'lS.
FLOWING LANDS,
llccn.eea for, 807-819.
See N1118ABca
FORCE. Bee ExcE81IVB FOBCB.
FORCIBLE POSSESSION,
not to be taken of Ianda, 892, 898.
FOREIGN WRONGS,
remedies for, 470-479.
FOREMEN,
are fellow ~ervanta with aubordtna&ee, 54.4, MG, 561.
FORFEITt'RE,
of righta by Ule law, 4.8.
FORNICATION,
Imputation of, whether actionable, 199, 001, 2(K. See 188.
FOULING WATER COURSE,
llabllity for, 687~.

FLOWING LANDS,

FORCE.

licenses for, 307412.

See Nursmcn.

Bee Excsssrvn Foacs.

FORCIBLE POSSESSION,

not to be taken of lands, 322, 323.

FOREIGN WRONGS,

remedies for, 470-472.

FOREMEN,
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are fellow servants with subordinates, 544, 545, 562.

FORFEITURE.

of rights by the law, 43.

FORNICATION,

imputation of, whether actionable, 199, 202, 204. See 238.

FOULING WATER COURSE,

FRAUD

liability for, 587-589,

is actual or constructive, 473.

constructive, what is, 473.

FRAUD,
Ia actual or constructive, 478.

positive, what is, 474.

what necessary to make out, 475.

constructive, what Is, 478.
positive, what Is, 474.
what nccesssry to make ou~ 4'75.
burden of proof to ~tablish, 4'75.
mere silence is not, 476.
~ mtptvr the rule In sales, 476.
unless arti6C'es employed, 478.
or delusions encouraged, 471.
•toppel to circumvent, 477.
.Uence sometimes fraudulen~ 478.
u where payment Is made In worthless checks, 4'l8.
or bad bills, 478.
or where something Ia aold for a purpose for which I& II
unfit, 479.
or where diseased meata are sold, .f7D.
or unfit food for cattle, 480.
or beasta which have contagious diseases, 481.
or where Important facta are coucealctl fmm sureties, 481.
apnuions of opinion are not, 483.
u where eeller overestimates values. .mJ, 4':4:.
or prospectivll profits, 48:1, 4~t .

burden of proof to establish, 475.

mere silence is not, 476.

caveat emptur the rule in sales. 476.

unless artiﬂees employed, 476.

or delusions encouraged, 477.

estoppcl to circumvent, 477.

silence sometimes fraudulent, 478.

as where payment is made in worthless checks, 478.

or bad bills, 478.

or where something is sold for a purpose for which it is

unﬁt, 479.

or where diseased meats are sold, 479.

or unﬁt food for cattle, 480.

or beasts which have contagious diseases. 481.

or where important facts are concealed frmn sureties, 482.

expressions of opinion are not, 483.

as where seller overestimates values. 483, 4514.

or prospective proﬁts, 483, 484.

_ _ ——qnII$§
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INDEX. 715

INDEX.

FRAUD — Gontinued.

715

but false opinions by experts may be, 484, 485.

on matters of law are not, 485.

J'RAUD- Otmtinfl«<.

as to boundaries, etc., may he, 483.

promises, though deceptive are not, 486.

exceptions, 487.

ordinary prudence in self-protection required, 487.

case where property at a distance is bought, 488.

representations which disarm vigilance, 4%-190.

in procuring signature to commercial paper, 489.

commercial paper obtained or altered by, 400.

positive assertions may generally be relied on, 491.

in respect to title, 492.

misrepresentations, who entitled to rely on, 493.

not those to whom they are not made, 493.

any one may when they are made to inﬂuence the public, 494.

- case of fraudulent corporate reports, etc., 495.

case of sale of speculative stocks, 496.

misrepresentations must be material, 496, 41:7.

must be known by maker to be false, 407-501.

exceptions, 501.

inducing third person to violate contract, 497.
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positive representations are warranties, 499.

and if false are frauds, 499.

misrepresentations must have been acted on, 502.

waiver of, 503, 505.

rescinding contract for, 503-505.

indirect suppression of, 503.

where parties in pan’ dalicto, 505.

duress a species of, 506, 507.

in conﬁdential relations, 508-530.

by husband and wife on each other, 50$-510.

by persons engaged to marry, 510-514.

by parent and child on each other, 514. 515.

where illegal sexual relations exist, 515.

on persons of weak intellect, 515.

by corporate oﬁlcers on corporators, 516-528, 494-496.

by trustees, 523-525.

between principal and agent. 526. '

in professional relations, 527-530.

by servant, when master liable for, 534-538.

by infants, 107-113.

by married women, 116-118.

not purged by circuity, 76.

mutual, no remedy in case of, 151.

liability of corporations for, 122.

PRLUDS, STATUTE OF,

sales of growing trees are within, 806.

licenses, how aﬁected by, 306-312.

but false opinions by experts may be, 484, 4M.
on matters of law are not, ~as to boundaries. etc., may be, 48.).
promises, though deceptive are not, 486.
exceptions, 487.
ordinary prudence ln self-protection reqnirc1l, 487.
case where property at a distanc(• is bought, 488.
repreaentationa which disarm vigilance, 4'!;-l!lO.
in procuring signature to commerchd paper, 4H9.
commercial paper obtained or altered by, 490.
positive assertions may generally be relied on, 491.
in respect to title, 492.
mlarepreaentahons, who entitled to rely on, 493.
not those to whom they are not made, 493.
any one may when they Brc mnde to inftm•nce the public. 4k
- case of fraudulent corporate report:<, etc., 49.3.
case of sale of speculattve stocks, 490.
misrepresentations must be material, 496, 4!17.
must be known by maker to be falsl', 497-301.
excl.'ptions, 501.
lnduclng third person to violate contract, 4!Y7.
positive representations are warranties, 499.
and if false are frauds, 499.
misrepresentations must have been acted mJ, 500.
waiver of, 508, 500.
rescinding contract for, 50~.
lndlrect suppression of, 505.
where parties in pari d~Ucro, lK):S.
durt!88 a species of, 506, 507.
In confidential relations, 50S-.i30.
by husband and wife on each other, 50S-.'l10.
by persons engaged to marry, 5Hh'H4.
by par<•nt and child on each other, 514. 515.
where lllegal sexual relations exist, 51 ;) ,
on persons of weak intellect, IU5.
by corporate officers on corporatora, IH6-52ll, 494-496.
by trustees, 523--525.
between principal and agent, 526. '
In professional relations, 527-.')30.
by servant, when master liable for, 534-538.
by infants, 107-118.
by married women, 116-118.
not purged by circuity, 76.
mutual, no remedy in case ot', 1151.
liability of corporations for, 12$.
J'RAUDS, STATUTE OF,
aales of growing trees are within, 808.
llcenees, how affected by, 806-8155.

7 1 6 mnnx.

FRAUDULENT DIVORCE,

716

IlfD.BL

marriage after, 238-239.

FRAUDULENT MARRIAGE,

action for, 238.

what is, 238, 239.

G.

GAME,

FRAUDULENT DIVORCE,
marriage after, 988-8.
FRAUDULENT MARRIA.GB,
action for, 2:18.
what Ia, 988, 289.

property in, 485.

trespasses in taking, 828.

G.

GAMES. See Srowrs.

G001) FAITH,

when a protection for publishing false charges, 195, 203, 69$.

GOOD WILL OF BUSINESS,

protection of by trade-marks, 359-365

sale of as property, 865.

GOODS, CONFUSION OF. Bee Comrosrou or Goons.

GOVERNMENT.

torts by, 115, 123, 688.

not suable except by consent, 123.

acts of indemnity by, 689.

may adopt wrongs of its agents, 127.

GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY,
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municipal corporations not liable for exercise ol‘, 620, 6S8.

GUARDIAN,

lawful restraint of ward by, 171.

obligation of good faith to his trust, 525.

action by for loss of Ward's services, 236.

for seduction of ward, 236.

negligence of in exposing ward to injury, tit~‘o_682.

GUARDIAN AND WARD,

relation of how formed, 42.

GUARDIANSHIP,

of insane persons, 100, 176-180, 188.

See Guaunralm.

GU EST. See Innrmarnn.

GROWING CROPS,

property in. 438-435.

H.

HABEAS CORPUS,

discharge of privileged persons on, 193.

HACKMEN,

are not common carriers, 638.

HEARING,

right of all persons to have a, 178, 291.

GAllE,
property ln. 485.
trespasses ln t.attng,
GAlH;B. See SPOBTS.
GOOD FAITH,
v.·ben a protection for publishtog falee ehu-gee. tori, 108,-.
GOOD WILL OF BUSINESS,
protection of by trade.marke, 839-865
sale of as property, SM.
GOODS, CON~'USION OF. See Collru81o!l ol' Gool>li.
GOVERNMENT,
torts by, 11~, 128, 688.
not suable except by consent, 128.
acta of indemnity by, 689.
may Adopt wrongs of its agents, 12'7.
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY,
municipal corporations not liable for exercise of, 620, 888.
GUARDIAN,
lawful restraint of ward by, 171.
obligation of good faith to his trust,~~.
action by for loss of ward's services, SSG.
for seduction of wnrd, 2i36.
negligence of in exposing ward to injury, 680-689.
GUARDIAN AND WARD,
relation of how formed, 49.
GUARDIANSHIP,
of Insane persona, 100, 176-180, 188.
See GUARDU.Jn.
GUEST. See IIINEEEPBB.
GROWING CROPS,
property in, 438-4M.

a

H.
HABEAS CORPUS,
discharge of prlvtlegcd pereone on, 181.
HACKMEN,
are not common carriers, 688.
BEARING,
right of all persona to baTe a, 178, 181.

•
INDEX.

HEIR LOOMS.

INDU.

property in, 427.

HEREDITAMENTS,

incorporeal, 351-87L

1 corporeal,

Bee Ran. Pnornnn.

HIGHWAYS,

cattle running at large in, 338, 389.

cattle escaping from, 341.

comrnon rights in, 367, 368.

ownership of land in, 818.

boundary on, 317-322.

injuries on Sunday from defects in, 152-159,

right of access to, 867, 368.

consent of State to occupation of, 615.

individual rights in, 616-619.

crossing at grade with railroad track, 615.

objects in when nuisances, 617.

moving wild beasts in, 618.

steam engines on, 617, 618.

excavations in are nuisances, 618.

municipal corporations, when liable for defects in. 6
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individuals liable for causing nuisances in, 626.

what constitutes want of repair in. 622-62.3.

injuries when travelers are passing, 666.

injuries at crossings, 664, 665, 668, 671-680.

excavations near, when prove negligence, 660, 661.

HIGHWAY OFFICERS.

not in general liable to private suits, 362, 392.

when may be liable, 899-402, 410, 411.

HOMESTEAD,

family rights in, 241.

HORSE, _

warranty in sale of, 481, 499.

warranty in sale of food for, 489.

injuries by, 340.

fright of by steam~whistle, 671.

See ANIMAIJ.

HUNTER.

liable for trespass of those accompanying him, 135.

IIUNTING.

trespasses in, 829.

H USBAND.

position of, in the family, 222.

cannot have ordinary remedies against the wife, 222.

may not chastise wife, 223.

assaults by upon wife, 223.

injuries to by third persons, 228, 224.

action by for alienating affections of wife, 224.

mitigation of damages in, 225.

21-625

HBIR LOOMS,
property In, -07.
HEREDITAMENTS,
Incorporeal, M1-87f.
corporeal,
8ee REAL PaoPDft.
HIGHWAYS,
cattle running a& large In, 838, 888.
cattle escarlng from, 841.
common rights in, 867, 868.
ownership of land in, 818.
boundary on, 817-822.
Injuries on Sunday from defectaln, lli2-llil.
right of acce;s to, 867, 368.
consent of State to occupation of, 616.
Individual righta In, 616-619.
crossing at grade with railroad track. 611).
objects in when nuisances, 617.
moving wild beasts in, 618.
ateam engines on, 617, 618.
excavations in are nuisRnces, 618.
municipal corporations, when liable for defects In, 01-823.
individuals lialJle for causing nuisances in, 628.
what constitutes want of repair in, ~>:?.;.
injuries when travelers are pnssing, 666.
injuries at crossings, 664, 665, 668. 671-4:180.
exral"ntions near, when prove negligence, 660, 881.
HIGHWAY OFFICEHS.
not in general JialJle to private suits, 862, 892.
when may 1Je liable, 89()....4()2, 410, 411.
HOMESTEAD,
fnmily rlghta in, !Ml.
HORSE,
warranty In Sftle of, 481, 499.
warranty in Sftle of food for, 480.
Injuries lJy, 340.
fright of by steam.whistle, 071.
Eke ANIMAL&
HL"NTER,
liable for trespass of those accompanying him, 185.
IILNTINO,
tre~pa~ses in, 829.
HUSBAND.
position of, In the family, 222.
cannot lmve ordinary remedies against the wife, 91ll,
may not chastise wife, 228.
asaaulta by upon wife, 223.
Injuries to by tblrd person11, 228, 124.
action by for alienating affections of wife,~.
ml\lgation of damages in, 22-'5.

'117

•

71 8 mnnx.

'llh

INDEX.

HUSBAND — Continued.

action by for loss of wife's services, 226.

wrongs by to the wife, 227.

right to wife's services, etc., 38.

corresponding obligation, 38.

HUSBAND AND WIFE,

frauds between, 508-510.

See Dunn, ACTION son Caosmo.

I

ILLEGAL SEXUAL RELATIONS,

HUSBAND- Oon.UntUid.
action by for lou of wife's services, as.
wrongs by to the wife, 227.
right to wife's ee"icea, etc., 88.
corresponding obligation, 88.
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
frauds between, ~10.
8ee Dum, ACTIOK I'OB C.A.tJIIft,

frauds by means of, 575

ILLEGALITY,

I

of plaintiﬂ"s conduct, when not a defense to one who has injured

him, 155, 159.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN,

position of, 42-43.

ILLINOIS,

action for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 242-245.

ILLITERATE PERSONS.

deceptions upon, 491, 492.

IMMORAL MESSAGE,

‘ refusal by telegraph operator to send, 159.
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1M PARTIALITY,

required of innkeepers, 635.

of common carriers, 639.

IMPLIED LICENSE. Sec LICENSE.

IMI’ltESSMEN'l‘, .

for military needs, 300

of sailors, 294.

IMI’ltISONMENT,

duress of, 506.

See ESCAPE; Fans: IKPRISONKENT.

I.\l l’ltOVE.\‘IENTS,

property in, when not made by owner of land, 433.

lN(?()Rl‘()RA'1‘ED TOWNS,

li-ability of for defective ways, 625.

IN('()ltPOREAL RIGHTS,

wlmt they are, 351. '

copyriglits, 351.

patents. 351.

inventions not patented, 352.

literary and artistic productions, 858.

private letters, 356.

auto,r_rraphs, 359.

trade marks. 359-365.

good will of business. 365.

rights of common, 366.

ILLEGAL S"J:XUAL RELATIONS.
frauds by means of, .576
ILLEGALITY,
of plaintiff's conduct, when not a defense to one who hu
him, 155, 159.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDRBN,
position of, 42-43.
ILLINOIS,
action for causing injury by sale of liquora in, 242-24.15.
ILLITERATE PERSONS,.
drecptions upon, 491, 492.
IM!IORAL MESSAGE,
refusal by telegraph operator to send, 1~.
i MP.\RTIALITY,
required of innkeepers, 635.
of common carriers, 9.
IMPLIED LICE~SE. Sec Ltcus:a.
IMPHESS;\IENT,
for military needa, 800
of sailors, 294.
IMPHISONl\IENT,
duress of, 506.
See EscAPE; FALl& hiPJUBONXI!lft'.
Dl PROVEMENTS,
propCity in, when not made by owner of land, 438.
INU>RPOHATED TOWNS,
lhhility of for drfective ways, 625.
INl OHPOHEAL RIGHTS,
what they are, 851.

copyrights, 851.
p:ltl•nts. 351.
in,·entions not paten:ed, 852.
literury and artistic productiona, 8IRL
private letters, 8~6.
auto~raphs, 8;:59.
trade marks, 359-365.
good will of business, 865.
rights of common, 866.

inJured
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IN CORPOREAL RIGHTS — Continued.

easements, 869-372.

party walls, 872-874.

INDEMNITY.

to oliicer, may make party liable for his acts, 180.

as between persons liable for wrongs, 144-147.

for publishing libels, 195.

INDEMNITY ACTS,

are sometimes passed, 639.

INDIANA.

aetion for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 245-247.

IN DIGFABLE OFFENSE,

imputation of is actionable, 196-200.

INFANTS.

when chargeable with crime, 97.

liable generally for torts, 103.

intent generally unimportant, 104.

exceptions, 104 ct seq.

for negligence, when, 103-106.

not liable for torts growing out of contracts, 106, 107.

cases of bailment, 107-109. '

cases of fraud, rule in, 107-109, 118.
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whether liable for falsely representing themselves of ago, 109, 110.

cannot acquire title by fraud, 111.

not liable as master, 111.

waiving torts of, 112.

regulation of rights of, 35.

INFERIOR COURTS,

must show jurisdiction by the record, 417, 418.

INFORMER, '

privilege of, 214.

INFRINGEMENT,

of rights in literary property, 351-359.

of rights in trade marks, 360. 864, 865.

1NJUN(."l‘lON,

dangers from use of, 22. 4

INSANE PERSONS.

not chargeable with crime, 97.

liable for torts, 99.

reasons for this, 99.

only actual damages recoverable, 102.

not liable where evil intent is an element, 103.

regulation of rights of, 35.

imprisonment of, 1'76-180.

INSANITY,

imprisonment under pretense of, 176-180.

malicious prosecution on pretense of, 188.

INSPECTORS OF MERCHANDISE.

liability of to private suits, 890.

INCORPOREAL RIGHTS- OontinU«<.
eaaementa, 869-372.
party walls, 872-87-i.
INDEMNITY,
t.o offtcer, may make party Hable for his acts. 180.
aa between persons liable for wrongs, 1"-147.
for publisl1ing libels, 195.
·
INDEMNITY ACTS,
are sometimea passed, 639.
INDIANA,
action for causing injury by sale of llquol'l In, t4~-U7.
INDICTABLE OFFENSE,
imputation of is actionable, 1~.
INFANTS,
when chargeable with crime, 97.
liable generally for torts, 103.
Intent generally unimportant, 1M.
exceptions, 1~ ct seq.
for negligence, when, 10.3-106.
not liable for torts growing out of contracts, 106, 10'7.
cases of bailment, 107-109.
case~; of fraud, rule in, 107-109, 118.
whether liable f,r falsely representing themselves of age, 100, 110.
cannot acquire title by fraud, 111.
not liable as master, 111.
waiving torts of, 112.
regulation of rights of,~.
INFERIOH COURTS,
must show jurisdiction by t.he record, -i17, 418.
INft'OR~IEH,
'
privilege of, 214.
INFHINGE~IENT,

of rights in lit'.'rary property, a:n-839.
of rights in trade marks, 860, 3M, SM.
IN.JUNCTION,
dangers from use of, 22.
INSANE PERSONS,
not chargeable with crime, 97.
liable for torts, 00.
reasons for this, 99.
only actual damages recoverable, 100.
not liable where e\'il intent is an element, 103.
rcgulution of rights of, 85.
Imprisonment of, 176-180.
INSANITY,
Imprisonment under pretense of, 176-180.
malicious prosecution on prPtense of, 188.
IN81'ECTOHS OF MEHCHANDfSE,
llablllty of to private suits, 890.

7 20 _1NDEX.

INSURANCE,

720

)NDEX.

maliciously refusing, 690.

INTENT,

importance of in batteries, 164, 169.

Bee Morrvn.

INTENTION,

to commit a wrong is not actionable, 61.

INTENTIONAL WRONGS,

of servant, when master liable for, 5344538.

INTEREST,

of judge, is disqualiﬁcation to act, 421, 422.

INTOXICATING DRINKS,

action for injuries caused by sale, etc., of, 241-262.

in Arkansas and Connecticut, 242.

in Illinois, 242-245.

in Indiana, 245-247.

in Iowa, 248.

in Kansas and Maine, 249.

in Massachusetts, 250.

ln Michignn, 251, 252.

in Missouri and Nebraska, 252.

in New Hampshire, 253, 254.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

in New York, 255.

in North Carolina and Ohio, 356-258.

in Pennsylvania, 258.

in Rhode Island and Vermont, 259.

in West Virginia, 260.

in Wisconsin, 261.

licenses for sale of may he restricted to males, 277.

rcgulatin g sale of, 236.

nuisances in sale of, 604.

INTOXICATION.

actions for causing. 241-262.

frauds in cases oi‘, 516.

IN NKEEPERS,

discriminalions by, 284. '

liability of, 635-638.

must receive guests impartially, 635.

who he may refuse to receive, 635.

may expel disorderly persons, 635.

who are and who are not, 635, 636.

not liable for goods lost by negligence of guest, 637.

limitation of liability by statute, 637.

cannot limit his liability by notice, 637.

right of to establish rules, 637.

responsibility of for luggage, 637.

lien of. 638.

INVENTIONS,

patents for, 351.

not patented, rights in respect to, 852.

___

INSURANCE,
maliciously refuting, 690.
INTENT,
tmportauce of In batteries, 164, 169.
8ee MOTIT&
INTENTION,
to cCimmtt a wrong is not actionable, 81.
INTENTIONAL WRONGS,
of servant, when master liable for, ~
'INTEREST,
of judge, Ia dil~qualldcatlon to act, ~1. 422.
INTOXICATING DRINKS,
action for !njuries caused by sale, etc., of, 941-*St.
in Arkansas and Connecticut, 2U.
in Illinois, 242-~.
in Indian'!- 246-247.
In Iowa, 248.
In Kansas and Maine, 940.
ln M!lSa&chuaetts, 2ISO.
ln Michigan. 251, ~2.
In Miaaouri and Nebraska, 29.
In New Hampshire, 253, 2M.
ln New York. 2M.
In North Carolina and Ohio, 866-258.
ln Pennsylvania, 258.
In Rhode Island and Vermont, ~9.
in West Virginia, 260.
ln Wisconsin, 261.
licenses for sale of may be restricted to males,
regulating sale of, 286.
nuisances in sale of, ~
INTOXICATION,
actions for causing. 241-262.
frauds in cases of, 516.
INNKEEPERS,
discriminations by, 284.
liability of, 635-638.
must receive guests Impartially, 635.
who be may rl!fuse to receive, 63li.
may expel disorderly persons, 636.
who are and who are not, 63li, 636.
not liable for goods lost by negligence of JUe&t, es'f.
limitation of liability by statute, 687.
cannot limit his liability by notice, 637.
right of to establish rules, 637.
responsibility of for luggage, 637.
lien of, 638.
INVENTIONS,
patents for, 851.
not patented, rights In respect to, an.

m.
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IOWA,
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action for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 248,

IN v/ITATION,

to enter place of business, etc., 303.

See LICENSE.

J.

IOWA.
action for causing injury by sale ot liquonJ in, 248,

INVITATION,
to enter place

JOINT WRONGS,

what are. 7, 8.

ot baalness, etc., 303.
See Lxcum

most wrongs may he, 124.

J.

conspiracy, 12-1-126.

conviction of one on charge of, 126.

when action will not lie for, 126.

to ruin an actor, 126.

to induce one to violate his contract, 126.

to deprive one of gratuity, 126.

what constitutes participation, 127.

adoption of the wrong, 127, 131.

participation by sheriff, 130, 132.

by attorneys, 131.

by sheriﬂ"s deputies, 132.

general

wrongs
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rules respecting, 182.

separate suits may be brought, 183, 134,

where wrongs are intentional, all who assist are liable, 184.

one or all may be sued, 134.

responsibility cannot be apportioned, 135.

judgment must be for one sum agmist all who are sued, 136.

separate suits against ditferent wrong-doors, 1:36.

judgment against one, whether a bar, 136-139.

settlement with a part, 189, 149.

not intended, 140.

case of common carrier, 140.

neglect by servants of, 141.

neglect of duty by land owner, 141.

neglect by servants of, 142.

neglect by common carriers, 142.

when their servants liable.

neglect by other carriers, 148.

libels, joint liabilities for, 143.

corporations, when liable with servants, 144.

indemnity, not generally to be claimed by wrong-doers of

each other, 144.

may be claimed by master made liable for servant's ,wr0ng,

145.

and by servant of master in some cases, 146.

and in some, not, 143.

when Oﬂlccrs may have, of party, 146.

when of other pot-.~'on. 147.

when not of prisoner, 147.

142, 143.

46

JOINT WRONGS,
what nre. 7, 8.
moat wrongJJ may be, 124.
conspiracy, 124-1~6.
conviction of one on charge of, 120.
when action will not lio for, 126.
to ruin an nctor, 126.
to induce one to violate his contract, 121.
to deprive one of gratuity, 126.
what constitutt>s parth:ipntion, 127.
adoption of tbe wrong, 127, 131.
particlpution by sheriff, l!lO, 132.
by attorneys, 131.
by sheriff's deputies, 132.
general ruks respecting, 182.
separate suits may be brought, 183. 184,
where wrongs are intentional, all who asalat are liable, lN.
one or nll rnny be sued, 184.
responsibility cannot be apportioned, 133.
judgment must be ti'r one sum ag:,inst all who are sued, 181.
separate suits ngnlnst different wrong-doers, 136.
judgment against oue, whether n bar, 136-139.
settlement with a pKrt, 139, 140.
wrongs not lntentled, 140.
ease of common rarrler, 140.
neglect by servants of, 141.
neglect t>f duty by lnnd owne1·, 141.
nrglect by servants of, 142.
neglect by C()Jnmon carriers, 142.
when their servants liable, 1~, 143.
neglect by other carriers, 148.
libels, Joint llnl>ilitles for, 143.
corporations, when lbblc with st•rvnnts, 144.
indemnity, not generally to be claimed by wrong-doei'IJ ot
each other, 144.
may be claim<.'tl by msatcr lll:ldc liable f.,r scrTI\nt's •Wl'ODg,

143.
and by serv:mt of msater In some cast's, 146.
and in some, not, tn.
when omcers may hJAve, of p~&rty, t.t6.
whl!n of other prr:mn, 147.
when not of prbnnt•r, 14'7.

722 mmzx.

JOINT WRON GS ~— Continued.

722

INDJo:X.

contribution, when parties may have as between themselves,

147-149.

between corporators and partners, 150.

wrongs suffered in wrong doing, 152-159

in general no remedy for, 152-159.

in case of malicious prosecution, 187.

by trespassing animals, 348.

JOINT WRONG-DOERS,

in cases of fraud, 505, 506.

in cases of nc-gligence, 684

JOINT COl\'TRA(‘T()ItS.

only liable jointly, 134.

JUDGES OF ELECTION.

liability of to private suits, 413-416.

JUDGMENT,

in trover, change of property by, 458.

against wrong-doers, when a bar to further action, 136-139.

JUDICIAL LEGISLATION,-

meaning of, 11, 18.

condemnation of by some writers, 17.

necessity for, 13, 18.
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JUDICIAL OFFICERS.

not liable to private suits, 403-425.

rule applies to those of all grades, 409.

to military and naval oﬂieers, 410.

to grand and petit jurors, 410.

to assessors. 410.

to commissioners for appraising damages, 410.

to highway otﬁeers, 410, 411.

to boards of claims, 411.

to arbitrators, 411.

to collectors of customs. 411.

inferior, may be liable for malicious action, 411. 412.

having charge of elections, liability of, 412;-416.

liable if they proceed without jurisdiction, 416-421.

cannot act where interested, 421.

punishment of eontempts by, 42 °

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.

privileged publication of, 218, 219.

JUDICIAL TIIIBUNALS,

purpose in establishing, 1.

occasions for action, constantly increase, 1, 2

JURI .\‘l)I()'I‘ION,

want of renders process void, 1'73.

obtained by abuse of process, 190, 191.

what it consists in, 417.

necessity for in case of judicial action, 417.

inferior courts must show, 418.

disproving, 418.

JOINT WRONGB-Oontintl«l.
coobibution, when parties m.&f baYe w; between themael'fee,
147-149.
between corporlltora and partnera, 160.
wrongs suffered in wrong doing, l!S2-159
in general no remedy for, 152-1S8.
in case of malicious prosecution, 187.
by trespassing animals, 348.
JOINT WRONG-DOEllS,
in cases of fraud, 505, 50tJ.
in cases of D('gli~nce, 68'JOINT CO:XTRACTOHS,
only liable jointly, 13!.
Jt:DGES OF ELEC'TIO~.
liability of to private suits, 418-418.
JUDGliENT,
in trover. change of property by, ~8.
against wrong.doers, when a bar to further action, 186-188.
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION,·
meaning of, 11, 18.
condemnation of by some writers, 17.
necessity for, 18, 18.
JUDICIAL OFFICERS,
not liable to private suits, 403-421S.
rule appl it'S to those of all grades, 409.
to military and naval officers. •to.
to grand and pt>tit jurors, •to.
to assessors, 410.
to commii!Sioners for appraising damagea, 410.
to highway officers, 410,
to boards of claims, 411.
to arbitrators, 411.
to collectors of customs. 411.
Inferior, may be liable for malicious actinn, 411, 419.
having charge of elc:ctions, liability of, 4t:J-416.
liable if they proceed without juriadictinn, 416-421.
cannot act where interested, 421.
punishment of con tempts by, 422-'M.
JUDIVIAL PROCEEDINGS.
privileged publication of, 218, 219.
,Jl;DICIAL THIBUNALS,
purpose in e:stabli:.hing, 1.
occasions for action; constantly increue, 1. I

•u.

JUHI~DICTION,

want of renders process void, 173.
obtained hy abuse of process, 190, 191.
what it consists in, 417.
necessity for in case of jUt.licial action, 411.
inferior courts must show, 418.
diaproving, 418.

INI)I*I.\'.

INIH~X.
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J URISDI (.'I‘I ON - Continued.

proof of’ some'imes rests in parol, 419.

error of judge in respect to, 419, 420.

can be none where judge interested, Q1.

to punish for contempt, 422-425.

of military authorities, 299-801.

of courts martial, 300.

J UHORS,

not liable to private suits, 410.

J USTICE OF THE PEACE,

may punish for contempt, 422-425.

not liable for judicial action, 403-425.

liable for neglect of ministerial duty, 878.

for refusal to issue summons, etc., 378-

J l'S'l‘IFICA'l‘I()N,

under process, rules of, 459-472.

K.

KANSAS,

action for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 249.

J'URISDI UI'ION- OontintJ«l.
proof of some•imes rests in parol, 410.
error of judge in respect to, 419, 420.
can be none where judge inter(•sted, 411.
to punish for contempt, 422-425.
of military authorities, 299-801.
of courts martial, 800.
JUHORS,
not liable to private suil8, 410.
JL"RTICE OF THE PEACE,
mny punish for contempt. 422-421t
not lillble for judicial action, 403-42lS.
lial.llo for n<'glt>ct of ministerial duty, 8'78.
for refusal to issue summons, etc.• 8'78.
Jl:STIFICATIO~,

under process, rules or, 459-&71.

L.

I..\I3OR,
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right to, 276-282.

K.

LAIIORERS,

good faith and integrity required of, 648.

LAKES AND PONDS,

boundaries on, 321.

KANSAS,
action for causing iujury by sale of llauora In, IG.

LAND CONTliA(,"I‘, -

posseszsion under, 326.

LANDLORI).

L.

when liable for nuisance on leased grounds, 607, 608-612.

when not entitled to ﬁxtures, 429-432.

LANDLORD AND TENANT,

trespass by landlord, 326, 327.

waste by tenant,

See Wasrn.

LANDS,

right to exclusive pose 'ssion of, 50.

entry on to obtain goods, :30-54.

entry on to re-possess. 322-2293.

See NUISANCE; Ran. PBOl‘l-1171; TREBPABI.

LATERAL SUPPORT,

removal of, 594.

LAW, QUESTION OF,

whether negligence is a, 666-671.

L.\BOR,
right to, 276-282.
L.\BOREHS,
good faith and Integrity required ot, 648.
LAKES AND PONDS,
boundaries on, 821.
LAND CONTHA<-T, •
possession under, 326.
LANDLOUD.
when liable for nuisance on leased grounds, 60'1, ~tJ.
when not entitled to fixtures, 42U-432.
LANDI.OHD AND TENANT,
trespnss by landlord, 826, 827.
Wll8t.e by tenant,
See WABTB.
LANDS,
right to exclusive poss •ssion of, M.
entry on to ol.Jtain goods, 50-54.
entry on to re.poeaess. 322-~-i.
Sec NUI8A.NcB; llir.AL Plu>PtoRn; TBBBPAII.
LATERAL SUPPORT,
removal of, 594.
LAW, QUESTION 011',
whether negligence Is a, ~1.
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INDEX.

LAWFUL ACTS,

are ncver wrongs, 81, 688.

LEGAL ADVISERS,

Obligations of when not licensed, 528.

See Couxsrzn

LEGISLATIVE DUTIES,

failure in will not support action, 378.

LEGISLATOR,

' privilege of, 213, 214.

publication of speeches of, 219.

LETTER. CARRIER,

liability of to private suits, 194, 392.

LETTERS.

private, publication of, 356.

restraining publication, 357.

property in as autographs, 359.

LIABILITY,

not often dependent on motive, 688-694.

LIBEL,
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deﬁnition of, 193.

publication, what is, 194.

innocent receipt and delivery of a letter is not, 194.

all are libelers who unite in making, 194.

by agent for principal, 194, 195.

by attorney for client, 195.

in newspaper, responsibility for, 195.

contrasted with slander, 204, 205.

what publications actionable pt!‘ se, 205-207.

what are actionable on proof of damage, 207.

truth a defense in civil suits, 207.

what evidence suﬂicient to establish, 208, 209.

construction of words, 208.

malice an ingredient in, 209.

" what publications privileged, 210.

See Parvrnnon on was Panss.

repeating, 220.

liability of corporation for, 121.

of an author’s works, 356.

instances of special injury from, 2'78.

LIBERTY. See Civn. LIBERTY, POLITICAL Lrnnnrr, Rnnrorocs LIBERTY-

LICENSE.

to enter upon lands, 302.

when implied, 51, 303.

to enter, under what circumstances to be exercised, 52, 53.

express, is not an interest in lands, 304. ‘

may be given on condition, 304. l

is personal between the parties, 304. 1

revocation of by sale, 304.

by neglect to act upon it, 304.

by express act, 304.

LAWFUL ACTS,
are never wrongs, 81, 688.
LEGAL .A.DVISEHS,
obligations of when not licensed, li28.
See CoUNSEL.
LEGISLATIVE DUTIES,
failure in will not support action, 876.
LEGISLATOR,
privflege of, 218, 214.
publicntion of speeches of, 219.
LETTER CARRIER,
liability of to private suits, 194, 892.
LETTERS,
private, publication of, 856.
restraining publication. 857.
property in as autographs, 839.
LIABILITY,
not often dependent on motive, 688-6M.

I.IBEL,
deftnition of, 198.
publication, what ie, 194.
innocent receipt and delivery of a letter is no&, lk
all arc libelers who unite in mnking, 194.
by agent for principal, 104, 195.
by attorney for clit:nt, 19.).
In newspaper, responsibility for, 1M.
contraated with slander, 204, 205.
what publications actionable pa se, 205-207.
what are actionable on proof of damage. 207.
t.ruth a defense in civil suits, 207.
what evidence sufficient to establish, 908, 209.
construction of words, 208.
malice an ingredient in, 200.
what publications privileged, 210.
Sec PRIVILEGE OJ' THB PRESS.
repeating, 220.
liability of corporation for, 121.
of an author's works, 8.56.
instances of special injury from, 278.
LIBERTY. See CIVIL LIBERTY, PoLITICAL LtBKRTY, RKLIOIOt;S LrsuTt.
LICENSE,
to enter upon lands, 802.
when implied, ~1, 303.
to enter, under what circumstances to be exurcised, 52, 53.
express, is not an intcn•st iu lands, 804.
may be given on condition, 304.
is personal between the parties, 304.
revocation of by salr, a04.
by neglect to act upon it, 804.
by express nct, 304.

mnnx. 725

INDEX.

LICENSE -- Uontinuod.

'125

payment of consideration does not prevent, 305.

coupled with an interest, what is, 305.

payment of consideration does not prevent., D.
eoupled with an Interest, what is, 3M.
not subject to revocation, 3011.
when writing required for, 306.
to erect buildings, bow far revocable, 800-307.
to ftow lands, whether rcvoeablc, 307-312.
may be by parol or in writing, 807.
given by the law to enter private grounds, 818.
to extinguish fire, 818.
when highway is out of repair, 813.
to make surveys for railroads, :313.
to perform official duties, 81-'.
to serve process, 814:.
to 11bate a nuisance, 317.
abuse of, makes one trespasaer ab irlitao, 81'-81'7.

not subject to revocation, 305.

when writing required for, 306.

to erect buildings, how far revocable, 306-307.

to ﬂow lands, whether revocable, 307-312.

may be by parol or in writing, 807.

given by the law to enter private grounds, 318.

to extinguish ﬁre, 313.

when highway is out of repair, 313.

to make surveys for railroads. 313.

to perform oﬂiciai duties, 314.

to serve process, 314.

to abate a nuisance, 317.

abuse of, makes one trespasser ab initio, 314-317.

LICENSES.

right of State to require, 277.

LICENSOR,

assumes no duties to licensee, 304, 305.

LICENSES.

LIEN,

right of State to require, 2'77.

of inukeeper, 638.
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LIFE,

LICENSOR,
assumes no dutiea to licensee, 804, SOIL

how protected formerly, 24-261

no common law action for taking, 27.

LIEN,
of Innkeeper, 688.

statutory action for taking, 14, 15, 28, 262-274.

LIGHT,

LIFE,

common law easement of, 690.

how protected formerly, U--261
no common law action for taking, 27.
statutory action for taking, 14, 15, 28, ~'-

LIQUORS,

nuisance of sale of, 604.

Sec Imoxtcnmo Damn.

LITERARY PRODUCTIONS,

rights of authors in, 351-359.

LIVE STOCK,

responsibility of common carrier for, 641.

LOCALITY OF WRONGS,

rules of, 470-472.

LORD CAMPBELUS ACT,

giving remedy for causing death, 263-274.

LUGGAGE,

responsibility of inukeeper for, 637.

lien of inukeeper upon, 638

liability of common carrier for, 643.

LUNATICS,

imprisonment of, 176-180.

LIGHT,
common law easement of, 690.
LIQUORS,
nuisance of sale of, 604.
Sec INTOXICATING DlUKd.
LITERARY PRODUCTIO~S.
rights of authors in, 351-359.
LIVE STOCK,
responsibiltty of common carrier for, Ml.
LOCALITY OF WRONGS,
rules of, 470-472.
LORD CAMPBELL'S AC,T,
giving remedy for causing death, 263-27'-

LUGGA.GE,
responsibility of Innkeeper for, 637.
lien of Innkeeper upon, 633
liability of commnn carrier for, 648.
LUNATICS,
Imprisonment ot, 176-180.

726 INDEX.

M.

726

INDEX.

MACHINERY.

injuries from explosions oi‘, 80.

communicating ﬁres by, 591.

jar of, when a nuisance, 600.

liability of master for injuries from, 551-555, 556. 557.

MAGISTRATE,

liable for issuing void pmcess, 467.

See JUDICIAL Orsici-zus; Jusrici-: or -rm; PEACE.

MAI N E,

action for injury by sale of liquors in, 249.

MALICE,

in instituting criminal prosecutions, 185.

in instituting civil suits, 187.

an ingredient in libel and slander, 209.

meaning of, 209, 692.

presumption oi‘, 209, 221.

importance of in torts, 688-694.

MALICIOUS ABUSE OF PROCESS,

actions for, 189, 190.

MALICIOUS CIVIL SUITS,

are not in general the ground of an action, 187, 188.
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malicious institution of proceedings in bankruptcy is, 187.

malicious arrest may be, 187.

malicious attachments may be, 187, 18$.

or malicious proceedings to have one adjudged insane, 188

or malicious proceedings before land commissioner, 188.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,

nature of the wrong, 180. '

right of every person to institute suits, 180, 181.

conditions to this, 181.

probable cause, necessity for, 181.

what it is, 181, 182.

mistakes in, not necessarily actionable, 183.

must have existed when proceeding instituted, 183

advice of counsel respecting, 183, 184.

burden of proof respecting, 184.

what proves or disproves, 184, 185.

malice, plaintiff must show, 185.

inference of from want of probable cause, 185.

what it consists in, 183.

prosecution must end before suit for instituting it, 186.

what is end of, 186.

joint liability for, 187.

witness, when may be liable for, 186, 187.

in civil cases, 187-189.

by husband and wife, 110.

MANURE,

when sale of is waste, 334.

IIA.CBINERY,
iojurlca from t>xplotloaa of, 80.
communicating ftres by, 591.
Jar of, when a nuisance, 600.
liability of master for injuries from, M1-liM, MG, 56'7.
MA.GISTRA.TE,
liable for isening void process,
See JUDICIAL 0J'I'ICER8; JtJBTIOB OJ' 'I'll& Puca.
IIA.JNE.
action tor lojury by eale of liquon in, 248.
II.A.LICE,
in lnatttuting criminal proeecutlons, 1M
In instituting civil anita, 18'7.
an ingredient in libel and slander, D.
meaning of, 209, 692.
presumption of, 209, 221.
Importance of in torts. fi88...8M.
JULICIOUS A.BGSE OF PROCESS,
actions for, 189, 100.

m.

1U.LICIOUS CIVIL SU11'8,
are nol in general the ground of an ~w.tlon, 18'7, 188.
malicious institution of proceedings in bankruptcy la, 187.
malicious arrest may be, 181.
malicious attachments may be, 187, 18.~.
or malicious proceedings to have one adjudged inB&De, 188.
or malicious proceedings befora land commiasioner, 188.
KALICIOUB PROSECUTION,
nature of the wrong, 180.
right of every penon to institute suite, 180, 181.
conditions to this, 181.
probllble cause, necessity for, 181.
what it is, 181, 182.
mistakea in, not necessarily actionable, 188.
must have exlste<l when proceeding instituted, 188.
ldvlce of counsel respecting, 183, 184-.
burden of proof respecting, tt{.l
wba&t proves or disproves, 1~. 1~.
malice, plaintiff must show, 18.').
Inference of from want of probable cauae, lSIJ.
what it. consists in, ts:;.
pl'OieC1ltlon most end before suit for instituting it, 186..
what is end of, 186.
joint liability for, 18'7.
witness, when may be liable for, 186, 18'7.
In civil cases, 18'7-189.
by hnsbaml and wife, 116.
11A.NURE,
when sale of Ia waste, 834.

mmzx. 727

INDEX.

MARRIAGE,

right to enter into, 41-42, 236.

fraudulent contract of, 117.

fraudulent denial of by married woman, 117, 118.

fraudulent, action for, 2:18.

if valid, no action will lie for bringing about. 230.

action for preventing, whether maintainable, 286.

action for loss of, 236, 237.

frauds in relation of, 50$-510.

frauds under engagement of, 510-514.

MARRIAGE ENGAGEMENT,

irauds accomplished by, 510-514.

seduction under, 510-514.

MARRIED WOMEN,

torts of, husbands may be sued for, 115.

are liable for torts, 115, 116.

husband's coercion presumed, 115.

but may be disproved, 115.

not liable where tort. grows out of contract, 116.

liARRIAGE,
rlgh& to enter Into, 41--'2, 236.
fraudulent contract of, 117.
fraudulent denial of by married woman, 117, 118.
fraudulent, action for, 2.'18.
lt valid, no nction will lie fhr bringing about. 930.
action for preventing, whether malotalnable. 286.
action for loes of, 236, 237.
frauds In relation or, M:h510.
frauds under engagement of, 510-:51'lf.A.RRIAGE ENGAGEMENT,
frauds accomplished by, 51~1'
aeduction under, 510-51'-

JIARRIED WOMEN,
torts of, hu11bands may be sued for, 1115.

are liable for torts,

115, 116.

liable for frauds in dealing with separate estate, 116.

how liability affected by recent statutor_\' changes, 118.

frauds by in pretending to be unmarried. 117, 118.
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recovery for torts to, 118.

time of. belongs to husband, 119.

frauds upon by husband, 508-510.

Sec FAMILY Rrorrrs; Husnaan um Wivrz.

MARTIAL LAW.

effect of declaring, 299.

HASSACI-iUSE'i"i'S,

action for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 250.

MASTER,

may be wrong-doer by ratifying wrong of the servant, 127-180.

when may have indemnity from servant, 145.

when should indemnify servant, 145, 146.

when liable for libels of servant, 194.

action by for loss of services, 241.

for seduction of servant, 228-235.

restraint of apprentice by, 171.

cannot punish servant, 171.

liability of for wrongs to servant, 531-564.

and for wrongs by servant, 531-564.

who is servant, 581-533.

is liable for servant's wrongs, 583.

rule where wron,-_:s were Intended, 534.

where Wl‘0n_~_".~4 wt-re not intended, 535-598.

is liable for servant's frauds, 585.

if in his own business, 535.

when liable for servant's trcspass<-.~\_ 536, 537.

liable where servant exceeds his author-it_\-, 33$

liable for servant's negligent injuries, 5:18.

buaband's coercion presumed, ll!S.
but may be di11provcd, US.
not liable where tort grows out of cuntrnct, US.
liable for frauds in dealing with S('p'lrate estate, 118.
how liability affected by rect>nt slututoJ'Y changes, 118.
frauds by in pretending to be unmarried. 117, 118.
recovery for torts to, 118.
time of, belonga to husbAnd, 119.
frauds upon by husband, ~10.
&•e FA.KILY RIGBTB; HOBBAND AND WIJ'B.
MARTIAL LAW,
effect of declaring, 299.
IIASSACHUSETTS,
action for causing injury by sale of liquors In, ~:SO.

KASTER,
may be wrong.doer by ratifying wronst of tho tenant, 137-110.
wht'n may have Indemnity from lt'"ant, 14:s.
when should indC'mnlfy S('"ant, 145, 146.
when liable fnr libels of ae"ant, 194.
action by for loss of lt'"iccs, 241.
for lt'duction of ae"ant, 228-233.
restraint of apprentice by, 171.
cannot punish S('""nt, 171.
liability of for wrongs to IK'rv&nt, 6.'U-Ii64.
and for wrongs by servant, 531-M-t.
who Ia 11e"nnt, 531~.
Ia liable for se"&!Jl'll wrongs, IS83.
rule where wron~11 were lnt<'ndt>tl, :J3i.
where wron).!'" W(')'C not IDtl•nllt>d, 535-MS.
is Jia~le for IK'""nt's fraudt~, 535.
If In his own buslnP!I&. :SS.'i.
when liable for servant's trcspllSS<'l\ 536, 3:17.
liable where ae"ant exceeds his ttuthorit~., ;;:J&
liable for ae"ant.'e nt'gllgent injurit'B, li:l8.

7'27

728 INDEX.

MASTER — Continual.

728

INDEX.

immaterial that servant disobeyed orders, 539-541.

not liable for negligent injury by one servant to another. 541-544.

who are fellow servants, 544.

foremen, etc., are, 544, 561-563.

laborers in other branches of the business, 545.

independent contractors are not, 546449.

is responsible for his own negligence to contractor, 546.

and to servants, 549.

where he subjects servants to unknown dangers, 549.

or sends them into dangerous places, 550-552, 555.

where he exposes children, etc., to dangers, 553.

where he fails to provide safe machinery, etc., 556.

where he employs unsuitable servants, 557, 558.

where he fails to remove known perils, 559.

where his own negligence concurs with that of servant, 560.

where the hazard comes from another employment, 560.

where he delegates his superintendence, 560-563.

not liable where servant is also negligent, 563.

liable in all cases of personal fault, 564.

MASTER AND APPRENTICE,

relation of how formed, 42.
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See lllasrrzn.

MASTER AND SERVANT,

relation of, how formed, 42.

See ltlasraa. ‘

MASTER OF VESSEL,

neglect to supply medicines, 658.

MATERIALITY,

of fraudulent statements, 496.

MENTAL DISQUIETUDE,

no action for causing, 602-605.

MERCHANT,

liable for frauds of clerks, 534-538.

for trespasses of clerks, etc., 537.

MICHIGAN,

action for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 251, 252.

MILITARY COURTS,

authority and jurisdiction of, 300.

MILITARY OFFICERS,

when exempt from private suits, 410.

MILITARY POWER,

subordinate to the civil, 299-301.

MILITARY SERVICE.

requirement of, 292

MILL DAMS,

license to ﬂow lands by, 307-312.

whether revocable, 308-312.

damage from breaking away, 75, 590.

ﬂowing lands by, 585.

KASTER- Oontintuti
Immaterial that servant disobeyed orders. G39-641.
no& liable for negligent injury by one servant to another, Ml~
who are fellow senanta, M4.
foremen, etc.. arc, 544, 661-568.
laborers in other branches of the busine.a, 1545.
Independent contractors are not, 546-549.
II responsible for his own negligence to contractor, 546.
and to servants, 549.
where be subjects t~ervan's to unknown dangers, M8.
or sends them into dangerous places, 500-:>52, 555.
wbt>re he exposes <'hildren, <:tc., to dangers, MS.
where be fails to provide safe machinery, etc., 556.
where he employ.s unsuituble scr\·ant~, 557, 558.
where be fails to remove known perils, 5S9.
where his own negligence concurs with that of servant, Gea.
where Lhe hazard comes from anntl1er employment, 580.
where he delegates his superintendence, 560-563.
not liable where servant is also negligent, 563.
liable in all cases of personal fault, 664..
KASTER AND APPRENTICE,
relation of how formed, 42.
See MA8TEB.
KASTER AND SERVANT,
relation of, how formed, 42.
See Mum.
li.ASTER OF VESSEL,
neglect to supply medicines, 658.
:MATERIALITY,
of fraudulent stAtements, 496.

:MENTAL DISQUIETUDE,
no action for causing, (J()t...6()3.
KERCH ANT,
liable for frauds of clerks, 534-1138.
for trespasses of clerks. etc., 58'7.
liiCHIGAN,
action for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 151, 1111.
KILITARY COURTS,
authority and jurisdicUon of, 800.
liiL!TARY OFFICERS,
wht'n exempt from priT&te suits, 410.
MILITARY POWER,
subordinate to the civil, ~1.
MILITARY SEHVICE.
requiremen~ of, 292
JrliLL DAMS,
llcense to ftow lands by, 807-319.
wheth~r revocable, 308-319.
damage from breaking away, 76, 690.
flowing lands by, 585.

mmzx. 729

729

INDEX.

HILL DAMS — Uontinuad.

detention of water by, 584.

MINISTERIAL DUTIES,

HILL DA.MS- 0Dntinued.
detention of water by, 6M.

action for neglect of, 877, B78.

MISSOURI.

KIN ISTERIAL DUTTES,
uction for neglect of, 8'77, 878.

action for causing injury by sale of liquors ln, 252.

mtsraxn,

lt:ISSOURI,

labor performed under, 56.

in service of process, liability for, 896.

MOB,

municipal corporation not liable for acts of, 621.

HONOPOLIES,

right to grant, 277, 278.

under copyright and patent laws, 351.

in unpublished works, 3-">3-359.

MORTGAGE.

of ﬁxtures, 430.

of land, when will embrace ﬁxtures, 431

MORTGAGEE,

fraudulently obtaining money on satistlt-tl mortgage, 477.

conversion by, 451.

remedy for waste, 835.
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HORTGAGEOR,

conversion by, 450, $52.

when may sue for conversion, 450, 451.

liability of for waste, 335, 836.

HOTIVE,

improper or wrongful is equivalent to malice, 185.

not generally important in torts, 688. "

in case of damage by governmental at-tion, 688.

bad, is not in itself a tort, 690.

case of shutting oﬂ‘ light and air, 690.

of refusing insurance, 691.

of presenting bills for redemption, 691

of throwing open lands to the public, 691.

when an ingredient in torts, 692.

bad, may impose obligation of unusual care, 698.

importance in estimating damages, 694.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,

torts by, 122.

complex nature oi‘, 619.

nuisances by, 619.

not liable for governmental action, 620.

nor for acts of otlicers, 621.

nor for violence of mob, 621.

nor for misl).lu1vior of ﬁremen, 621.

nor for neglects of health Oﬂkt-rs, 621.

liable for defects in sewers, (I21.

for negligent management of property, 621.

for blocking up way with stones, 671.

nction for causing injury by sale of liquors ln,
lll8TAKE,
labor performed onder, 56.
in service of process, liability for, 898.

MOB,
municipal corporation not liable for acts of,

•~

mn.

MONOPOLIES,
right to grant, 277, 27ij.
und1•r copyright and patent laws, Ml.
in unpublished works, 353-M9.
liOUTGAGE,
of fixtures, 430.
of land, when wlll embrace fixtures, 4.11

MORTGAGEE,
fraudulently obtaining money on sati,.th·d mortgage, 477.
conversion by, 451.
remedy for waste, 83li.

HORTGAGEOU,
COJlVCI'Sion by, 450, 452.
when may sue for conversion, 450, 4.i 1.
liability of for waste, 835, 830.
:MOTIVE,
improper or wrongful is equivalent to m:llice, tBIS.
not gen('rally important in torts, 688.
in case of damn~e by governmental action. 11R8.
bad, is not in itself a tort, 690.
case of shutting ofT light and air, 690.
of refusing insurnnce, 091.
of presenting bills for redemption, 6!H.
of throwing open lands to the public, li91.
when an ingredient in torts, 692.
bad, may impose obligation of onU!III:II rart>, 698.
importnnrc in estimating damages, 6!14.

MUNICIPAL COHPORA.TIONS,
torts by, 122.
complex nature of, 619.
nuisanrt•s by, 619.
not liable for go\'ernmental action, 620.
nor fcu nets of officers, 621.
nor for violence of mob, 621.
nor for misb, hnvior of ftremC'n, 621.
nor for neglecb. of health officl'r,., 621.
liable for defects in sewL·rs, (]21.
for negligent management of property, 611.
for blocking up way with stones, 671.

730 isnrzx.
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MUNICIPAL COR.POltA'I‘I()NS— Continued.

not liable for defects in ways, 622.

unless made so by statute, 622.

or under special charters, 625.

liable for defective walks, 625.

have no greater rights than others in water courses, 586.

MUTUAL FAULT,

injuries by, not redressed in lnw, 673.

exception in case one party is reckless, 673.

N.

NAPHTHA,

unlawful sales of, 658.

HUMIC! PAL CORPO UATIONS- Oontintlld.
no& liable f(\r defeela In ways, 622.
unless made so by statute, 699.
or under special charters, 625.
Hable for defective walks, 625.
have no greater rights than otben in w~tter counea, 8 .
HUTUAL FAULT,
lnjurlea by, no& redreeeed in law, 673.
aception In cue ooe puty Ia reckl81&, m.

NATURAL LIBERTY,

meaning of, 6.

NAVAL OFFICERS.

when exempt from private suits, 410.

N.

NAVIGABLE WATERS,

abatement of nuisances on, 46.

nuisances in, 617, 618, 619.

dams across, 617.

boundaries on, 319-322.

eneroachmeuts upon, 321.
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use of for rafting, 321.

trespas-es by ﬁshing in, 829-332.

NEBRASKA, -

action for causing injury by sale of liquors in, 252.

NECESSITY, WORKS OF,

what are, 153-155.

NEGLIGENCE,

in making commercial paper, 488-490.

in not guarding against frauds. 476, 488.

in discounting paper, 491.

oi‘ vendee docs not excuse ven(ior’s fraud. 491.

ﬁres started by, 536, 548, 539-592.

in communicating ﬁre by machinery, 591

in use of ﬁrearms and explosives, 393.

contributory, in case of injury by beasts, 344. 346.

a bar to action for causing death, 264.

deﬁnition of, 630.

degrees oi‘, 630, 631.

question of is one of fact, 632.

of guest at public inn, 637.

oi telegraph companies, liability for, 646, 647.

of workmen, 647, 648.

of professional men, 648.

in performance of statutory duties, 650-658.

NAPHTHA,
unlawful wee o( 858.
NATURAL LIBERTY,
meaning of, 6.
NAVAL OFFICERS,
when exempt from private 1ulta, '10.
NAVIGABLE WATERS,
abatement of nuisances on, 46.
nuiaances in, 617, 618, 819.
dams across, 617.
boundaries on, 819-32a
encroachments upon, 331.
u~ of thr rafting. 321.
trespas-es by fishing In, 829-3Sa
NEBRASKA,
action for causing Injury by ule of liquors In, B.
NECESSITY, WORKS OF,
what are, 153-lM.
NEGLIGENCE,
in making commercial paper, 4.88--480.
in not guarding against fr~tuds. 476, 488.
in discoun\ing paper, 491.
of vendee does not excuse vendor'g fraud, 491.
tlres started by, :i36, 548, 5~9-592.
in communicating fire by machinery, 591
In use of firearms and explosives, 393.
contributory, in case of Injury by beuta, 3-i-1. ate.
a bar to action for causing death, 264.
definition of, 630.
degrees of, 630, 631.
question of is one of fact. 632.
nf guest at public Inn. 637.
of telegraph companies, liability for, 6(8, 647.
of workmen, 647, 648.
of professloaal men, 648.
in performance of atatutory duties, 650-MS.

1 at or-xx. 73 1

INDJ.~X.

NEGLIGENCE — Oontinucd.

general principles governing redress for, 659.

NEGLIGENCE- Continued.
general principles governing rcdre88 for, 659.
duty mu.sL first be shown, 6.19, GOO.
must be duty to person llamnitled, 660.
failure in performance must appPar, 661.
presumptions of negligence, when arise, mil, 662.
in case of railway compunies, 662, 66.5.
general rule, 663.
burden of plea to show, 665.
what sufficient proof of, 666.
whether question of is one of law, 666.
in general, cannot be, 666, 669.
genera] rule stated, 670.
cases when it is, 671.
contributory, a bar to relief, 672, 674.
reason of the rule, 661.
burden of proof when tt Is set up. 678.
co.operating with recklessness, 674.
general rule as to, 674, 674, 675.
exceptions to in eome States, 67<HS79.
what is not, 676.
mus~ be proximate to the injury, 679.
of infants, imbeciles, etc., 680.
whether atlributable to gnnrdlan, etc., 680-683.
arising subsequent to the Injury, 683.
of third parties, when imput&ble to party lnjun.•d, 684.
contracts against, whether lawful, 684-687.
of telegraph compunies, 687.
allowing slRto to filii from roof, 6M.
of bailees. Sec BAILKES.
of Innkeepers. See INNKEEPEHB.
of common carriers. See Co1n10N CAmu~-;us.

duty must ﬁrst be shown, 659, 660.

must be duty to person tlntnniﬂetl, 660.

failure in performance must appear, 661.

presumptions of negligence, when arise, 661, 662.

in case of railway companies, 662, 665.

general rule, 668.

burden of plea to show, 665.

what suﬂicient proof of, 666.

whether question of is one of law, 666.

in general, cannot be, 666, 669.

general rule stated, 670.

cases when it is, 671.

contributory, a bar to relief, 672, 674. -

reason of the rule, 661.

burden of proof when it is set up. 673.

co-operating with recklessness, 674.

general rule as to, 674, 6'74, 675.

exceptions to in some States, 676-679.

what is not, 676.

must be proximate to the injury, 679.
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of infants, imbeciles, etc., 680.

whether attributable to guardian, etc., 680-683.

arising subsequent to the injury, 683.

of third parties, when imputable to party injured, 684.

contracts against, whether lawful, 684-687.

of telegraph companies, 687.

allowing slate to fall from roof, 665.

of ballees. See Barucr-;s.

of innkeepers. See Imsxsntmns.

of common carriers. See Connors Cuuurzns.

NEGLIGENT FIRES,

injuries from, 76-79, 536, 548, 589, 592.

NEGLIGENT INJURIES,

by servant, master liable for, 538, 589.

exception of injury to fcllowservant, 541-544

NEGLIGENT FIRES,
injuries from, 76-79, 536, 548,

by master to servant. master liable for, 5-19-564.

See N EGIJG1-LNC I-:.

aso, 692.

NEGLIGENT INJURIES,

NEGOTIABLE PAPER,

by servant, master liable for, 538, 539.
exception of injury to fellow-servant, 541---li-H.
by master to scrva.nt. master liable for, .'i-19--.'i64.

ﬁaud in procuring or making, 488, 489.

fraudulently ﬁlling up blanks in, 490.

NEW HAMPSHIRE,

Sloe NEOLIGE.NC'~:.

action for injury by sale of liquors in, 253. 251.

NEWS.

·NEGOTIABLE PAPER,
fraud in procuring or making. 488, 489.
fraudulently filllng up blanks in, 4!1U.

no privilege in publishing, 219.

NEWSPAPERS,

liability for libels in, 143. 217-220.

NEW

HAliPSH~RE,

See Linrzi-

ac&ion for injury by sale of liquol"8 in, 2.13. 2:;1.

NEW YORK,

action for injury by sale of liquors in, 25-3.

NEWS,
no privilege in publishing, 219.

NEWSPAPEHS,
liability for libels in, 143, 217-220.
See LIBEL.

NBW YORK,
action for injury by sale of liquol'\o\ in. 2.1:\.

781

732 11v1>1~:x.

NOISES,

782

INDEX.

when nuisances. 599.

NOLLE PROSEQUI,

whether entry of is end of prosecution, 186.

NORTH CAROLINA,

action for injury by sale of liquors in, 256.

NOTARY PUBLIC,

liability of to private suits, 39:5.

NOTICE,

innkeepers cannot restrict liability by, 637.

nor common carriers, 639.

of evil propensity of domestic animal, 343-345.

N UISANCE,

what is, 565.

annoyances without fault are not, 566.

classiﬁcation of, 566.

to the realty, 567.

ﬁlthy percolations, 567. ,

percolating waters, 568.

deposits upon land, 569.

leakage from water pipes, etc. 570.

bursting of reservoirs, 570-573.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

falling waters and snows, 574. _

drawing elf surface water, 575-580.

withdrawing subterranean waters, 580.

in the use of water courses, 581-585.

in diversion of water courses, 583.

in ﬂooding lands by water, 585, 586.

in fouling water of streams, 587-589.

negligent ﬁres, 589-‘393.

in use of ﬁrearms, 593.

removing lateral support, 594.

removing subjacent support, 595.

causing personal discomfort, 596-599.

offensive noises, 599.

jar of machinery, 600.

dust, smoke, etc., 600.

offensive odors, 601.

mental disquietude, 602-605.

dangerous places, 605-607.

which threaten calamity, 607.

diseased beasts, 608.

who responsible for, 608-612.

who may complain oi‘, 612-614.

private injury from public, 614.

in highway, 615, 627.

special injury from, 618.

continuous wrong of, 619.

by municipal corporations, 619, (I22.

defects in sidewalks, 625.

.I

NOISES,
when nutaancee, ~
NOLLE PROSEQUI,
whether entry of ls end of prosecution, 181.
NORTH CAROLINA,
action for injury by sale of ltquora ln. ICS8.
NOTARY PUBLIC,
liability of lo private suits, SW.
NOTICE,
innkeepers cannot restrict liability by, 63'7.
nor common carriers, 639.
of evil propensity of domestic animal, ~NUISANCE,
what is, MIS.
annoyances without fault are not, He.
cla~siftcation of, 566.
to tbc realty, 667.
ftllby percolations, 667.
percolating waters, 568.
deposits upon land, 569.
leakage from water pipes, etc, 570.
bursting of reservoirs, 570-678.
falling waters and snows, 574.
drawing off surface water, 575-680.
withdrawing subterr11nean waters, 580.
in the use of water courses, Ml-381S.
In diversion of water courses, 588.
In flooding lands by water, 585, 586.
In fouling water of streams, 58'7-li89.
negligent fires, 589-.'>93.
In use of ftreanns, 598.
removing lateral support, 594.
removing subjacent support, 5DIS.
causing personal discomfort, 500-599.
offensive noises, 599.
jar of machinery, 600.
dust, smoke, etc., 600.
offensive odors, 601.
mental disquietudl', ('102-605,
dangerous places, 60.'5~07.
which threaten calamity, 607.
diseased beasts, 608.
who responsible for, 608-619.
who may complain of, 612-61'-.
private injury from public, 61-i.
in highway, 615, 627.
special Injury from, 618.
continuous wrong of, 619.
by municipal corporatlona, 619, a2a
defects ln sidewalks, 625.

mums. 733

NUISANCE — Continued.

INDEX.

excavations in streets, 626.’

abating, who has right of, 46.

OCCUPANT,

necessity the justiﬁcation 1'or,47.

peace not to be violated in. 47.

request to remove should be ﬁrst made, 47, 48.

injury not to be inﬂicted in, 48, ~19.

destruction of buildings in, 46, 47, 49.‘

action for damages after abatement, 49

O.

liable for continuing a nuisance, 608-612.

NUISANCE- Otmtin.UMJ.
excavations in streets, 620:
abatiDg, who has right or, 46.
necessity the justification for, 4'7.
peace not to be violated in 47.
request to remove should be first made, 47, 48.
injury not to be inflicted in, 48, 49.
destruction of buildings in, 46, 47, 40. ·
action for damages after abatctmnt, 49

OCCUPATION.

‘ slanders in respect to, 201-203.

what may be a nuisance, 596.

ODORS, OFFENSIVE,

0.

nuisance oi‘, 601, 602.

OFFENSES,

by persons in military service, 299, B00.

OFFICE.

See Cltrukl.

slander in respect of, 201, 202.
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wrongful exclusion from, 298.

OFFICES,

are trusts, 375.

classiﬁcation of, 875, 876.

do facto incumbency, 401.

OFFICIAL C()1i1ML‘NlCATIONS,

privilege in respect to, 215.

OFFICERS.

legislative, executive and judicial, 875.

administrative, 375.

ministerial, 376.

classiﬁcation of duties, B76.

ministerial action by legislative, 877.

by judicial, 378.

legislative, not liable to private suits, 376, 377.

discretionary action of, 376-379.

when liable to private suits, 379.

not when action is discretionary, 376-379.

not when duties are public exclusively, 379.

not when duties are judicial, 380, 381.

See JUDICIAL Orsrci-zns.

liability to private suits of policeman, 381.

of lottery commissioner, 381.

of highway oﬂicers, 382. 399.

OCCUPANT,
liable for continuiDg a nuisance, 808-612.
OCCUPATION,
slanders ln respect to, 201-203.
what may be a nuisance, 396.
ODORS, OFFENSIVE,
nuisance of, 601, 602.
OFFENSES,
by persons in military service, 299, 800.
See CRUIU.
OFFICE,
slander iD respect or, 201, 202.
wrongful exclusion from, 208.
OFFICES,
are trusts, 875.
clnssiflcation of, 875, 878.
d~ j11cto incumbency, 401.
OFFICIAL CUllML'NWATIONS.
privilege in respect to, 215.
OFFICERS,
legislative, executive and judicial, 873.
administrative, 875.
ministerial, 876.
classification of duties. H76.
ministerial action by legislative, 577.
by judicial, 371:!.
legislative, not liable to private suits, :176, a~7.
discrt·t ionary action of, :l7G-ili0.
when liable to privntc suits, 3iD.
not when action is discretionary, 371hl70.
not when dutic..>s are publi<' t•xclusivl'ly, 379,
not when duties arc judicial, 380, ast.
Sec JumciAL 0lo'FICims.
liability to private suits of policeman, 381.
of lottery commissioner, ast.
of highway officers, 882. :101.1.

733

734 mmsx.

OFFICERS — Continued.

734

INDEX.

of quarantine oﬂlcers, 382.

of recorders of deeds, 383-390.

of inspectors of provisions, etc., 890.

of postmasters, 391.

of clerks of courts, etc., 392.

of sheriﬁs, 392-398.

of constables, 381, 898.

of joilors, 394.

of notaries public, 898. '

of taxing oﬂicers, 898.

where means to provide duty are not provided, 399

do facto, 401, 402.

OFFICERS OF CORPORATION,

torts by, in general, 120-122.

fraudulent reports by, 494-496.

are agents of corporstors. 516.

good fnilh required of, 516, 517.

when liable for frauds, 517, 519-523.

frauds by on corporation, 518-523.

OFFICER, MINISTERIAL.

protection to in making arrests. 459.
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protection under process, 4-39-470.

becomes trespasser ab initio by abuse of process, 462, 463.

but not by more non-l'e:isance. 463.

must obey process at his peril, 464-467.

not to serve process iu his own favor, 191.

See Pnocrzss.

Ol<‘f‘lCERS, MUNICIPAL.

corporation not liable for acts of, 621.

OHIO,

action for injury by sale of liquors iu, 256-258.

OMNIBUS,

injuries by collision of one with another, 684.

OPINION,

of counsel. See Couxsnn.

when false assertion of may be fraudulent, 483 -485, 496, 499.

OI"I‘LAWI{Y,

the ancient, 24, 25.

t)\'l-1RHANGll\'G,

buildings, are nuisances, 567.

trees, are nuisances. 567.

right. to, 567. _

OFFICERS- OM&Iintt«L
of quarantine omcers, 889.
of recorders of deeds, 883-390.
of inspectors of provisiona, etc., 890.
of J•ostmasters, 391.
or clerks of courts, etc., 892.
of sheriffs, 892-398.
of constables, 881, 898.
of j 1Lilors, 894.
of notaries public, 898.
of taxing officer~, 398.
where means to provide duty are not provided, 888.
<U facto, 401, 402.
OFFICERS OF CORPORATION,
torts by, in g~neral, 120-122.
fraudulent reports by, 494-4!J6.
are agents of corporators. 516.
good fnith required of, 516, 517.
when liable for frauds, 517, u19-S2S.
frauds by on corporation, 518--523.
OFFICEH, .\IINISTEHIAL.
protection to in making arrests, 459.
protection under process, 419-470.
becomes trespnsst•r ab initio by abuse of process, 462, (63,
but not by ml're non-l'easnnce. 4G3.
must obey process at his peril, 4G4-467.
not to serve process in his own favor, 191.
Sec PnocEss.
OF :'LCERS, MUNICIPAL,
corporation not liable for acts of, 621.
OHIO,
action for injury by sale of liquors in, 256-258.
O~lNIBUS,

injuries by collision of one with another, 684.
OPIJ\ION,
of counsel. Sec CouNSEL.
when false assertion of may be fraudulent, (8.'3-485, 496, 498.

Ol'TLAWHY,
the ancient, 24, 25.
OYERHANGING,
buildings, arc nuisances, 567.
tree~. are nuistmces, 567.
right to, 567..

numx. 736

INDEX.

P.

PAPERS, PRIVATE.

P.

exemption of from seizure, 294.

PARENT,

control over children, 89.

does not extend to property, 39.

obligation to support children, 89.

and to educate. etc., 40.

right to child's services, 39.

obligation to protect children. 40.

may give property away from children, 41.

lawful restraint of child by, 170.

right to control education of child, 288.

negligence of in exposing child to injury, 880-682.

frauds by on children, 514.

frauds of children on, 515.

action by for seduction of daughter, 228-235.

i’Ali'I‘I(}lPATION,

in a \\'1'0n_:, what constitutes, 124-127, 186.

PARTITION FENCES.

_ statutes for, 339, 340.

PARTNERS,
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liability for each other’s wrongs, 150.

good faith required of, 525.

PARTY TO SUIT,

adoption by of tresspasses of oiiicers, 128-130.

when linblc with others when writs are jointly served, 186.

when liable for void or irregular action, 468.

privilege of, 212.

PARTY WALLS, '

agreement upon not revocable, 809.

what are, 372.

right to repair and rebuild, B78.

injuries in respect to, 373.

PASS ON RAILROAD,

contracts in to exempt from liability, 686.

l’A.\'SENGERS,

diseriminations by carriers between, 262-286.

liability of carriers oi‘, 612. 643.

luggage oi‘, what constitutes. 643.

injuries to in approaching Sittiinn, 644.

may be required to purchase ticket in advance, 611, 646.

removal of for misbehavior, 644, 646.

must be protected against assaults, etc., 645.

must conform to rules of carrier, 645. 646.

presumption of negligence, when injured on railways, 662-865.

injury to by putting arm from window, 069.

PABTURAGE,

in streets, right to, 383, 389.

PAPERS, PRIVATE.
exemption or &om ~elzore, IK.
PARENT,
control over children, 89.
does not extend to property, 81.
obligation to support children, 89.
and to educate, etc., -&0.
right to child's services, 89.
obligation to protect chlldr<'n. 40.
may give property awlly from children, 41.
!~awful restraint of child by, 170.
right to control education of child, 288.
negligence of in <'Xposing child to inJury, 880~
frauds by on children, 514.
frauds of children on, 515.
action by for seduction of daughter, 228-281J.
PARTICIPATIO!'i,
in a wron,~r, what constitut.ea, 124-127, 180.
PARTITION FENCES,
. statutes for, 339, 840.
PARTNERS,
liability for each other's wrongs, 130.
good faith required of, 526.
PAHTY TO SUIT,
adoption by of tres!lpasses of oftlcen, 128-130.
when liable with others when writs are jointly .e"ed, 188.
when liable for void or irregular action, 468.
privilege of, 212.
PARTY WALLS,
agreement upon not revocable, sot.
what are, a72.
right to repair and rebuild, 878.
injuries in respect to, 873.
PASS ON RAILHOAD,
contracts in to exempt from liability, ese.
PA:O:~ENGERS,

discriminations by carriers between, 282-188.
liability of carriers of, 612. 643.
luggage of, what constitutt>!l, 64-1.
injuries to in approaching stution, G.U.
may be required to purchase ticket In advance. 6«. Me.
removal of for misbehavior, 6U, 646.
must be protected against assaults, etc., 84.5.
must conform to rules of carrier, 645. 646.
pf<'sumpllon of negligence, wh<'n lnjurt>d on railway~,~.
injury to by putUng arm from window, 669.
PASTURAGE,
in streets, right to, 889, 889.

735

736 INDEX.

786

INDEX.

PATENTS,

injuries in respect to, 351.

PENNSYLVANIA,

action for injury by sale of liquors in, 258.

PERCOLATIONS.

of ﬁlth are nuisances, 567.

of water, 568.

PERSONAL PROPERTY,

classiﬁcation of, 426.

heir-looms, 427.

ﬁxtures, 427-132.

bettcrments,

sidewalks, 433.

growing crops, 433-435.

wild animals, 435.

wrongs to, 436.

trespass to, 486-441.

indirect injuries to, 441.

conversion of, 441-459.

taking under process, 459-470.

wrongs in respect to, committed abroad, 470-173.

PERSONAL RIGHTS,
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what are, 24.

life, right to, 24.

imperfect protection to this, 24, 26.

outlawry and its consequences, -24, 25.

private vengeance for taking, 25.

weregild, 26.

no action for taking at common law, 26, 27

statutory action for taking,_2S, 262.

immunity from assaults, right to, 29.

what violates this, 29.

words not an assault, 29.

reputation, right to security in, 30-33.

civil rights in general, 33.

religious liberty, 33.

regulation of this, 34.

must be equal, 35.

special regulations of, 35, £36.

political rights, 36.

must come from law, 36, 87.

exceptions, 37.

family rights, 38, 43.

of the husband, 38.

of the wife, 38. 39.

of the parent, 39.

of the child, 39-41.

right to form the family, 41.

rights of master and servant, 42.

rights of guardian and ward, 42.

PATENTS,
lnjnrlcs in respect to, 861.
PENNSYLVANIA.
action for injury by aale of Uquora la, - .
PERCOLATIONS,
of filth are nolsancea, 1587.
of water, 568.
PEBSONAL PROPERTY,
cl!U18itlcation of, 420.
heir-looms, 427.
dxturea, 427-48t.
betterments, 483.
aldewalk.s, 4.~.
growing crops, 438-481.
wild animals, 4315.
wrongs to, 486.
trespuu to, 486-441.
Indirect Injuries to, 441.
conversion of, 441-4;19.
taking onder process, 439-470.
wrongllin respect to, committed abroad, -'70--473.
PERSONAL RIGHTS,
what are, 24.
life, right to, N.
lmperlcct protection to Ulls, 24, 26.
outlawry and its consequences, 24, 25.
private vengeance for taking, 25.
weregild, 26.
no action for taking at common law, 2fl, 27.
statutory nction for taking,' 28, 262.
Immunity from assaults, right to, 29.
what violates this, 29.
words not an ns:<Rult, 29.
reputation, right to security in, 80-33.
civil rlghta In general, 33.
religious liberty, 33.
regulation of this, 84.
must be equnl, S!'i.
special regulations of, 35, 36.
· political rights, 86.
most come from law, 86, B'l.
exceptions, 87.
famlly rights, 88, 43.
of the husband, 88.
of the wife, as. 89.
of the parent, 39.
of the child, 39-41.
right to form the family, 41.
rights of master and servant, G.
rights of guardian IUld ward, 42.

INDEX.

INDEX.

737

PERSONAL RIGHTS — Oontinuod.

rights of adopted children, 42.

forfeiture of, 43, 44.

PERSONAL SECURITY,

injury to right of by assault, 160.

by battery, 160-169.

by false imprisonment, 169-180.

by malicious prosecution, 180-192.

PETITION,

violation of right of, 296.

PETITIONS,

are privileged when, 215.

PEW,

rights in, 239.

PELtBONAL RIGHTS- OontinuM.
rights of adopted children,~.
forfeiture of, 43, 44.
PEUSONAL SECCIUTY,
l.ojury to right of by assault, 160.
by battery, 160-169.
by false imprisonment, 169-180.
by malicious prosecuLion, 1~191..
PETITION,
violation of right of, 296.
PETITIONS,
are privileged when, 2115.
P.ft~W.

PILOT,

not the servant of master of vessel, 549.

rights in, 289.

PIRACY,

literary, 851-359.

of trade marks, 360, 864, 365.

PHYSICIANS,

obligations of good faith to patients, 629.
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ziiselosure of communications to, 530.

slanders of, 201.

certiﬁcate of that person is insane, 178.

implied contract of service of, 648.

liability for negligence, 649.

malpractice of, when not contributory negligence, 888.

PIT, UNGUARDED,

when it may show negligence, 660.

PLEADINGS IN SUITS,

privilege in respect to, 214.

PLAY. See Sroms.

POISON,

one deceived into taking is assaulted, 164.

negligent sale of, '75.

POISONED FOOD,

when leaving it exposed is negligence, 660.

POLITICAL LIBERTY.

meaning of, 9.

POLITICAL RIGHTS,

theory of, 23, 36, 37.

are securities to other rights, 24.

must come from law, 36.

what are universal, 37.

violation of right to assemble, etc., 296.

of right oi‘ petition, 296.

of suffrage, 206-298.

of right to oﬂlce, 298.

47

PlLOT,
not the servant of master

ot vessel, 1548.

PlRACY,
literary, 851-359.
of trade marks, 860, 8CU, SM.
PHYSICIANS,
obligations of good faith to patients, 510.
Jlsclosure of communications to, 580.
!!landers of, 201.
certificate of that person Ia Insane, 178.
implied contract of service of, 648.
liability for negligence, 649.
malpractice of, when not contributory negllgeoce. 888.
l'IT, U~GUARDED,
when it may show neg\lgence, 660.
PLEADINGS IN SUITS,
privilcgt• in respect to, 214.
PLAY. ~rr SPORTS.
POISON,
one deceived into taking Ia uaaulted, 1M.
negligent sale of, 75.
POISONED FOOD,
when lcnving lt expoeed Ia negligence, eeo.
POLITICAL LIBEHTY,
meaning of, 9.
POLITICAL RIGHTS,
Lhcory of, 28, 86, 87.
are securities to other rlghta, M.
must come from law, 86.
what arc universal, 87.
violation of right to assemble. etc., . _
of right of petition, 290.
of suffrage, 296-298.
of right to oftlce, 298.

4:7

737

738 mm-:x.

POSITIVE FRAUDS,

738

INDRX.

what are, 473, 474.

See Fmun.

POSSESSION OF LANDS,

POSITIVE FRAUDS,
what are, 473, 474.

is actual or constructive, 322.

not to be taken by force, 322, 323.

forcible defense of, 3%.

is rightful or wrongful, 826.

trespass on by landlord, 326, 327.

by tenants in common. 327, 328.

in case of highway, 317-319.

what suﬂicient to support trespass, 436-438.

to support trover, 443-447.

responsibility for nuisance by reason of, 608-612.

POSSESSION S.

using force in defense of, 167-169.

life must not be taken in, 167.

excessive force in, 169.

POSTAL CARD,

sending privileged communication by, 216.

POSTMASTERS,

liability ot‘ to private suits, 391.
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PRECEDENTS,

‘ use and necessities of, 18, 19, 20.

PRESS, PRIVILEGE OF. See Pmvrnsan or "rnn Pamss.

PRESUMPTION S,

of negligence, when they arise, 661-663.

must accord with common observation, 663.

of negligence when passengers on railways are injured, 664-665.

in case of injury at railway crossings, 664, 671.

where railway signals are neglected, 664.

PREVENTIVE REMEDIES.

dangers of, 22.

reasons for not giving, in general, 45.

presumption against necessity for, 45.

PRINCIPAL,

when liable for libels of agent, 194, 195.

may be wrong-doer by ratifying act of agent, 127-130.

See Masrsn.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,

obligation of good faith between, 526, 527.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY,

frauds on surety, 482, 483.

PRIVATE LETTERS,

rights in respect to publication, 356-359.

PRIVATE PAPERS,

exemption of from seizure, 294.

PRIVILEGE,

arrests in disregard of, 190-192.

POSSESSION OF LANDS,
is actual or constructive, 322.
not to be taken by force, 822, 828.
forcible defense of, 324.
Ia rightful or wrongful, 826.
trespass on by landlord, 326, 827.
by tenants in common. 827, 828.
In case of highway; 817-:l19.
what sufficicnL to support trespass, 436-488.
to support trover, 443-447.
responsibility for nuisance by reason of, 608-613.
POSSESSIONS,
using force in defenRe of, 167-169.
life must not be taken in, 167.
excessive force in, 169.
POSTAL CARD,
sending privileged communicatlon by, 216.
POSTMASTERS,
liability of to private suits, 891.
PRECEDENTS,
usc antl necessities of, 18, 19, 20.
PRESS, PRIVILEGE OF. See PRIVILEGB
Til& PBBII&
PHEtiUMPI'IONS,
of negligence, when they arise, 661-663.
must accord with common observation, 663.
of negligence when passengPrs on railways are injured, 664-e65.
in case of injury at railway crossings, 664, 671.
where railway signals are neglected, 664.
PHEVENTIVE RE~IEDIES,
dangers of, 22.
reasons for not giving, in general, 4JS.
presumption against necessity for,~.
PRINCIPAL,
when liable for libels of agent, 194, 195.
may be wrong-doer by ratifying act of agent., 127-180.
See ll.A.STEB.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,
obligation of goorl faith between, 526, 527.
PRINCIPAL AND BUimTY,
frauds on surety, 4~2. 483.
PHIVATE LETTERS,
rights in respect to publication, ~9.
PRIVATE PAPERS,
exemption of from seizure, 294.
PR£VILEGE,
arreal.s in disregard of, 190-199.

o•

mmzx. 739

PR1 VILEGE OF THE PRESS,

INDI!:X.

constitutional protection of, 217.

in case of candidates for oﬂice, 218.

in respect to judicial proceedings, 218, 210.

what publications entitled to, 219.

does not extend to publication of news, 219.

in publishing speeches, 219.

in discussing public matters, 219. 220.

PRIVILEGE OF SPEEPII,

in making injurious charges, 210-217.

case of the witness, 211.

of party to suit, 212, 218.

01‘ counsel, 212, 213.

of legislator, 213.

of translator for purposes of a suit, 213.

of the executive, 214.

of judicial oﬂicers, 214.

In legal proceedings generally, 214.

conditional cases 01‘, 214.

petitions, rcmonstrances, etc., 215.

ofﬂcial communications. etc., 215.

in the 1'amil_v relations, 216.
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in conﬁdential relations, 216.

in church matters, 215, 216.

in business dealings, etc., 217.

in school matters, 217.

PRIVY, ,

nuisance of, 567, 602.

PROBABLE CAUSE,

instituting criminal proceedings without, 181.

what is, and the proof of, 181-185, 186.

PROCESS, '

requisites of legal, 172-174.

arrests without, when legal, 174-176.

in case 01‘ insane persons, 176-180

institution of malicious suits by, 180-189.

malicious abuse of, 189.

use of for fraudulent purposes, 190, 191.

oﬂicer cannot sr-rvv in his own favor, 191.

service of on privileged persons, 192.

justiﬁcation under, 459-470.

when not necessary to oﬂicer's protection, 459.

must be fair on its fave, 459-461.

meaning of the term, 460.

departure from command of, 481.

abuse of, 462.

extent of protection under, 463.

what is not fair on its face, 464-487.

if void, magistrate liable, 467.

and party, 468.

PH.f VI LEGE OF THE PRERS,
constitutional protection of, 217.
In caae of candidates for office, 218.
ln respect to judicial proceedings, 218, 219.
what publications entitled to, 219.
does not extend to publication of news, 219.
In publishing specchl•s, 219.
In discussing pnhlic matters, 219, 220.
PRIVILEGE OF SPEEC'II,
ln making injurious charges, 210-217.
case of the witnPss, 211.
of party to suit, 212, 218.
of coun~rl, 212, 218.
of legi,.la!or, 213.
of trunslntor for purposes of a sui&, 218.
of the l ' XCC'It I il'e, 214.
of judicial officers, 214.
In legal proceedings genernlly, 214.
conditional cases of, 214.
petitions, remonstrances, etc., 21~.
official communications. etc., 2Hi.
ln the fam il,\· relations, 216.
in confidential rl'lations, 216.
ln church matters, 215, 216.
in business deRiings, etc., 217.
in school matters, 217.
PH IVY,
•
nuisance of, 567, GOa.
PROBABLE CAUSE,
instituting criminal procrcdln~ without, 181.
what is, and the proof of, 181-lS;j, 186.
PROCESS,
requisites of legal, 172-174.
arrests without, when legal, 174-176.
In case of iqs1mo persons, 176-180
institution of m!\liciouR suits by, 180-189.
malicious abuse of, 189.
usc of for frt\Udulent purpose!!, 100, 191.
oftlrer cannot sr•rvt· in hi!! own favor, 191.
scrvlce of on privileged persons, 192.
justification under, 4-'i!l-470.
when not necessary to officf'r's protection, 4ti9.
must be fair on Its f:ll'e, .f.'i!)-461.
meaning of the term, 460.
dcp1nturc from command of, 461.
abuse of, 462.
extent of protection under, 463.
what Is not fllir on its face, 464-467.
If void, magi11trnte liable, 467.
and party, 468.
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PROCESS — Continued.

740

of execution, protection under, 469.

PROFESSION,

slander in respect to, 201, 202.

Bee A'l"l'0RNEYB; Cnnnomnn; Pnvstcmns.

PROFESSIONS, LEARNED,

right of admission to, 289.

See Arronnszvs; Cnaaovstsn; Pnvsicisns.

. PHOCESS- Oontin~.
of execution, protection under, 469.

PROFESSION,
slander in respect to, 201, 202.
See ATTORNEYS; CLERGYHEN;

PIIYBICIAlfL

PROFESSIONS, LEAHNED,

PROMISES,

when may be frauds, 486.

PROMOTERS OF CORPORATIONS,

frauds by, 494.

PROPERTY,

right of owner to control, 286.

force in defense of‘, 49, 50.

when changed byjudgment, 136-139.

slander of, 220, 221.

right of admission to, 289.
See ATTORNEYS; CLBBGYME~;

PBYSICIARB.

PROMISES,
when may be frauds, 486.
PROMOTERS OF CORPORATIONS,
frauds by, 494.
PROPERTY,
right of owner to control, 286.

ot‘ churches. etc., control of, 291.

PROPERTY RIGHTS,

same under all governments, 23, 24, 36.

PROTECTION OF THE LA“:

wrongdoing does not put one out of, 157-159.
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PROVISIONS.

fraud in sale of, 479.

implied warranty in sale of, 479, 480.

' exposing poisoned, 660.

PROXIMATE CAUSE,

what is, 68-7'7.

of death, what is, 270.

when two independent events may be, 78, 79

in case of injuries by alleged negligence, 679.

PUBLIC.

frauds upon the, 493-496.

PUBLIC DUTIES,

failure in performance of, will not support action, 878, 379.

PUBLIC EASEMENTS, ,

common enjoyment of, 367.

force in defense of, 49, 00.
when changed by judgment, 186-139.
slnnder of, 220, 221.
of churcl~es. etc., control of, 291.

PROPERTY RIGHTS,
satne under all governments, 23, 24, 86.

PROTEm'ION OF THE LAW,
wrong-doing doea not put one out of, 157-159.

PROVISIONS,
fraud in sale of, 479.
implied warranty in sale of, 479, 480.
expMing poisoned, 660.

PROXUI.ATE CAUSE,

what is, 68-7'7.
of death, what Ia, 270.
when two independent eventa may be, 78, 79.
in caae of injuriea by alleged negligence, 679.

PUBLIC,

See Htonwavs; Navtosnnn Wtvraa.

PUBLIC NUISANCE,

special injury from, 612, 614, 616, 618.

action for not barred by time, 613.

that is not, which the State assents to, 615.

PUBLIC RIGHTS,

common enjoyment of, 867.

PUBLIC WRONGS,

what are, 6-8.

when private wrongs also, 7.

PUBLICATION,

frauds upon the, 493-496.

PUBLIC DUTIES,
failure in performance of, will not support action, 876, 879.

PUBLIC EASEMENTS,
common enjoyment of, 867.
See HIGHWAYS;

NAVIGABLE WATBR.

PUBLIC NUISANCE,
special injury from, 612, 614, 616, 618.
action for not barred by time, 613.
that is not, which the State assents to, 615.

of defamatory matter, what is, 193, 194.

by agent or servant, 194. 195.

PUBLIC RIGHTS,
common enjoyment of, 867.

PUBLIC WRONGS,
what are, 6-8.
when private wrongs also, 'l.

PUBLICATION,
of defamatory matter, what la, 198, 1M.
by agent or servant, 194, 195.

mnax. 741

INDEX.

PUBLICATION — Oontimud.

741 .

in newspaper, 195.

privileged, what is, 210-220.

by postal card, loses privilege, 216.

of news, not privileged, 219.

of copyrighted works, 351.

of productions not copyrighted. 358-359.

PUBLISHER OF PAPER,

liable for injurious publications therein, 195.

cannot protect himself by contract of indemnity, 195.

privilege of, 210.

See Pnrvruaon or run Pnitss.

PUPIL. See Tmcnrzn.

PURCHASE,

from wrong-doer is conversion, 451.

of land, gives possession of personalty on it, 453.

of land is not conversion of ﬁxtures, 454.

PURCHASER,

when liable for nuisance on lands bought, 611

of goods, is licensed to remove them, 51, Him-1:06.

of lands, ﬁxtures of, 429.

not obliged to disclose facts not known to st-ller, 476.
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must protect himself by his own vigilance, 476, 487.

need not disclose his insolvency, 477.

unless he intends not to pay, 478.

_ or pays in worthless check, etc., 478.

under execution, protection of, 469.

Q.

QUARANTINE OFFICERS,

not liable to private suits, 382.

R.

BAFTING.

PUBLICATION- OtmtintUd..
ln newspaner, 105.
privileged, what Is, 210-220.
by postal card, loses privilege, 218.
of news, not privileged, 219.
of copyrighted works, 851.
of productions not copyrighted, MS-M9.
PUBLISHER OF PAPER,
liable for injurio•ts publications therein, 19!i.
cannot protect himself by contract of indemnity, 19ti.
privilege of, 210.
See PB.IVILBOB OJ' THII PnK88.
PUPIL. Bee TEACHER.
PURCHASE,
from wrong-doer ls conversion, 4rll.
of land, gives possession of personBlty on It, 458.
of land is not conversion of fixtures, 454.
PURCHASER,
when liable for nuisance on lBnds bought, 611
of goods, is licensed to remove thPm, 51, ao;{-:!OIJ.
of lands, fixtures of, 429.
not obliged to disclose facts not known to sdler, 476.
must protect himself by his own vigilance, 476, 487.
need not disclose his insolvenry, 477.
unless he Intends not to pay, 478.
or pnys in worthless check, etc., 478.
·under execution, protection of, (69,

use of streams for, 821.

RAILROAD COBIPANY,

liable for excessive force in expelling porson from cars, 585, 586, 537.

Q.

not liable for injury to servants by fellow servants. 545.

liable Where road-bed is out of repair. 550, 55!. 558, 564.

for using unsafe machinery, 551-553, 555, 557.

18 not guarantor of safety of machinery, 557, 533.

liable for empioyin g incompetent servants, 558.

QUARANTINE OFFICERS,
not liable to private suits, 88J.

for sending out train insuﬂlciently manned, 560.

liable for inviting persons into dangerous places. 606.

R.

liability as common CM'l'l\'.‘lS, 638-642.

RAFTING.
uso of streams for, 821.
RAILROAD COMPANY,
liable for excessive force In expelling person from cars, MG, G88,118'7.
not liable for injury to l'CrVIUll'l h~· fellow servant~. M~.
liable where road.bed is out of repair. 5.'>0, 551. i'i.it:S, 564.
for using unsafe machinery, 5!>1-5.13, ;,;,5, M7.
II not guarantor of safety of machinery, M7. 5'>M.
liable for employing Incompetent se"ants, M8.
for sending out train insufficiently manned, 680.
liable for inviting persons Into dangerous places, 806.
llablltty u common carriers, IJ88.-64j,

742 moss.

RAILROAD COMPANY — Continued.

742

IND.KX.

liability as carriers of persons, 642-646.

neglect of to fence track, 654-656.

neglect by of signals and warning, 657, 658.

moving trains at unlawful speed, 6-'18.

when liable for ﬁres communicated by locomotives. 661, 662.

presumption against when passenger is injured, 663-665. See 669.

liability for injury at crossings, 664, 665, 668. 670, 671, 680.

liability where passenger puts arm out of window, 669.

sending out trains without brakes, 670.

injuries by leaping from cars of. 676.

by walking on track of, 670.

negligent injuries to infants, etc., 680-688.

RAILROADS,

crossing highway at grade when no nuisance, 616.

right to be carried on, 282-286.

RAILWAY CARS,

leaping from, when not negligence, 676.

See Pssssxoans; Sritanr C/ms.

RAILWAY CROSSINGS.

injuries at, 664, 665, 6'71, 680.

RAILWAY TRACK,

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

injuries to persons walking on, 679

RATIFICATION,

of a trespass. does not make one a trespasser, 127.

exception, 127-130.

by the government of torts, 115. .

REAL PROPEl{'l‘Y,

distinguished from personal, 426.

in case of ﬁxtures, 427.

estates in, 302.

dominion of owner over, 302.

licenses to enter upon, 303-322.

possession of, actual and constructive, B22.

not to be taken forcibly. 323.

may be rightful or wrongful, 824.

by tenants in common, 327, 328.

trespasscs upon in hunting, 328. ’

trcspasses upon in ﬁshing, 329-332.

by inanimate objects, 332.

waste upon, 832-336.

RECAPTION,

right of, 50--54.

peace not to be broken in making, 52.

RECKLESSNESS, '

injuries by, not excused by contributive negligence, 674.

REOORDERS OF DEEDS,

liability of to private suits, 383.

for refusing to record conveyance, 384.

for errors in recording, 384-388.

RAILROAD COMPANY -Continu«l.
liability as carriers of persons, 642-646.
neglect of to fence track, 6.14-636.
neglect by of signals and warning, 657, 658.
moving trains at unlawful speed, 6.>8.
when liable fot· flrcs communicated by locomotives. 661, 682.
presumption against when passcngc!r 1s injurt!(.l, 862-aM. See 66t.
liability for injury at. crossings, 664, 665, 668. 670, 671, 680.
liability where pa~>senger puts arm out of window, 669.
sending out trains willlout brakes, 670.
injuries by leaping from cars of. 676.
by walking on track of, 67Q.
negligent injuries to infants, etc., 680-688.
RAILROADS,
crossing highway at grade when no nuisance, 616.
right to be carried on, 282-286.
RAILWAY CARS,
leaping from, when not negligence, 676.
See PA88ENGERS; 8TnEET CABL
RA.ILWAY CROSSINGS,
injuries at, 664, 666, 671, 680.
RAILWAY TRACK,
injuries to persons walking on, 679
RATIFICATION,
of a trespass, does not make one a trespasser, 197.
exception, 127-130.
by the government of torts, HIS.
REAL PROPERTY,
di:~tinguished from personal, 426.
in CliSe of fixtures, 427.
estates in, 302.
dominion of owner over, 802.
licenses to enter upon, 308-322.
possession of, actual and constructive, 822.
not to be taken forcibly, 823.
may be rightful or wrongful, m
by tenants in common, 327, 328.
trespasses upon in hunting, 328.
trespasses upon in fishing, 329-332.
by inanimate objects, 332.
waste upon, 832-336.
RECAPTION,
right of, 50-M.
peace not to be broken in making, IS2.
RECKLESSNESS,
.
injuries by, not excused by contribut:ve negligence, 67'RECORDEHS 0.1<' DBEDS,
liability of to private suits, 383.
for refusing to record conveyance, 384.
for errors in recollling, 384-:i88.

INDEX. 743

REUORDERS OF DEEDS— Continued.

IND.EX.

for false certiﬁcate, 388.

for recording papers not entitled to record, 890

REGULATION,

of civil rights,

nee Crvn. Rreirrs.

of the right to take ﬁsh, 32.1, 330. ’

of employments by the State, 276-278, 286.

must be reasonable, 277.

instances of lawful, 277, 278.

for their business by carriers, 283-286.

by innkeepers, 687.

RELATION,

torts by, 95. 96.

RELEASE,

to one joint wrong-deer rt-leases all, 139.

exceptions, 139, 140.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,

meaning of, 38, 34.

a part of one’s civil rights, 290.

in schools, 289.

RELIGIOUS WORSHIP,
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what is, 152, 153.

REMEDY,

no wrong without a, 19.

the judge must always find one in the law, 12, 13, 19.

right to, how ascertained, 20.

when statutes necessary for, 14, 15, 19.

loss of, through error, etc., 21.

are preventive or compensatory, 21.

danger of the former, 22.

award of damages the usual, 21.

preventive, dangers of, 22.

what means of are given to party injured, 45.

preventive, not geneizilly given, 45.

in abatement of nuisance, 46-49.

in defense of property, etc., 49, 50.

in recovering property, 50-54.

I in case of confusion of goods, 53, 54.

‘ to recover lands, 57.

by distress of goods, 58, 59.

in case of negligent ﬂrcs, '76-79.

civil, in cases of crime, 85-89.

election of, by waiver of tort, 91-96, 112

for torts by government, 128.

given by statute, when it excludes common law. 651. 652

when the statute imposes a new duty, 653.

when the duty imposed is one to the public, 654.

where railroad companies fail to fence their track, 654-656

for other neglects of statutory duty, 657, 658.

RECORDERS OF DEEDS- Continued.
for f11.lse certificate, 388.
for recording papers not entitled to record, 890
REGULATION,
of civil rights,
oee CIVIL RtonTI.
or the rlght to take fish, 32.!, 830• .
of employments by the State, 276-278, 286.
must be reasonable, 277.
instances of lawful, 277, 278.
for their busioesa by carriers, 283-286.
by innkeepers, 687.
RELATION,
torts by, 93, 96.
RELEASE,
to one joint wrong-doer releasea all, 189.
exceptions, 189, 140,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
meaning of, 38, 84.
a part of one's civil rights, 290.
in school!l, 289.
RELIGIOUS WOHSHIP,
what is, 162, 168.
REMEDY,
no wrong without a, 19.
the judge must always ftnd one in the law, 12, 18, 19.
right to, how ascertained, 20.
when statutes necessary for, 1•. 15, 19.
loss of, through error, etc., 21.
are preventive or compensatory, 21.
danger of the former, 22.
award of damages the usual, 21.
preventive, dangers of, 22.
what means of are given to pMty injured, 46.
preventive, not gencr.tlly given, 4.5.
to abatement of nuisance, 46-49.
in defense of property, etc., 49, 50.
to recovering property, 50-54.
' ln case of confusir)u of goods, 53, 5L
to recover lands. 57.
by distress of goods, 58, 59.
in case of neg I igent fires, 76-79.
civil, in cases of crime, 85-89.
election of, by Wlliver of tort, 91-96, 119
for torts by government, 123.
given by stutute, when it excludes common law, 631, 662.
when the statute imposes a new duty, (l.j3.
when the duty imposed is one to the public, 65f.
where railroad companies fail to f(•nce their track, 6M-6C58
for other neglects of statutory duty, G~•7, MS.

r
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lND.KX.

T44 INDEX.

REMONSTRANCES.

are privileged when, 215.

REMOTE CAUSES,

not ground for action, 68-7'7.

illustrations of what are, 70-77.

REPEATIN G SLANDERS,

liability for, 220.

REPRESENTATIONS.

to constitute frauds must have been material, 496.

must relate to facts, 485.

must not be mere promises, 486

must have been acted on, 502, 503.

REPUTATION,

right to security in, 30.

what the right embraces. 30433.

See Lnmn; Samoan.

RESERVOIRS,

injuries from bursting of, 570-578.

RETROSPECTIVE RULES.

danger of, 19.
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RHODE ISLAND.

action for injury by sale of liquors in, 259.

RIGHTS. _

how deﬁned, 4, 28.

must come from law, 5, 19, 20.

natural, indeﬁnite meaning of, 6.

necessity of restraints upon, 9, 10.

growth of, 11.

breach of, always has its remedy, 12, 13, 19. 20.

classiﬁcation of, 23-44."

little affected by political institutions. 23

personal, 23-44.

civil, 33-36, 2754301.

political, 36, 37.

family, 33-43.

RIOTERS,

municipal corporation not liable for acts of. 621.

ROAD, LAW OF. See HIGHWAY.

ROLLING STOCK.

of railroad, whether ﬁxtures, 428.

ROOF,

injuries by snow from, 665

' slate falling from, 655.

RUMOR,

existence of, when may mitigate damages in slander, 220

REMONSTRANCES,
are privileged when, 211S.
REMOTE C.\lY8ES,
not grounll for action, 68-'7'7.
illustrations of what are, 70-'2'7.
REPEATING SLANDEUS,
Jiauili ty for, 220.
REPH.EtiE~TA.TIO ~S.
to constitute frauds must have been material, 496.
must relate to facts, 48:i.
m n;:t not be mere promises, 486
must have been acted on, 1502, ISOS.
REPUTATION,
right to st>curity in, 80.
what the right embraces, 80-38.
See LmEJ.; SLA!<mER.
RESERVOIRS,
injuries from bursting o~ IS70-6'l&
RETROSPECTIVE RULES,
!.Ianger of, 19.
RHODE ISLAND,
action for injury by aale of liquors in, 259.
RIGHTS.
bow defined, 4., 28.
must CI)DlC from law, 3, 19, 20.
natural, indefinite meaning of, 6.
necessity of restraints upon, 9, 10.
growth of, 11.
brearh of, always has ita remedy, 12, 18, 19, 20.
classification of, 28-44.·
little affected by political institutions. 28
personal, 28-44.
civil, B!h'l6, 276-801,
political, 86, 87.
family, 88-43.
RIOTEHS,
municipal corporation not ltable for acta of, 621.
RO.\D, LAW OF. See HIGHWAY.
ROLLING 1:\TOCK.
of railroad, whether ftxturea, 428.
ROOF,
injuries by snow from, 66rl
• slate falling from, 655.
RUMOR,
exlatence of, when may mitigate damages in slander, 920.

INDEX. 7 45

INDEX.

S.

SALES,

s.

frauds in. See Fa/tun.

distinguished from bailments, 634.

SALES, OFFICIAL,

liability of otﬂcer for excessive, 396.

oﬁieer ennnot purchase at, 395.

SATISFACTION,

of a joint wrong, when at judgment is, 136-189.

SCHOOL BOARDS,

wrongful action of, 288, 289.

authority of over books to be read in schools, 289.

liability of members to_ private suits, 412.

SCIENTER,

essential in fraud, 497.

exceptions, 498-501.

in cases of injury by vicious animals, 340-848.

SCRIVENERS.

obligations of good faith to employers, 529.

SEARCH WARRANTS,

when allowed, 295.

requisites of, 295, 296.
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BEA WEED,

common rights in, 866.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,

what. unlawful, 294.

what lawful, 295.

SEDIMENTARY DEPOSITS,

may be nuisances, 569.

SEDUCTION.

of wife, suit by husband for, 223-226.

action for charging, 227.

of daughter or servant-, action for, 228-235.

of wards, action for, 236.

under promise of marriage, 510-514.

SELECTMEN,

when not liable to private suits, 410-412.

SI:lLI~‘ DEFENSE.

theory of right of, 44.

right to use force in, ~19, 50

SELF PROTECTION,

batteries in are excused, 165, 166.

against unlawful arrest, 165.

excessive force in, 169.

conﬁnement of insane persons for, 177.

SEPARATE ESTATE, .

of married women, frauds respecting, 116.

SEPULTURE,

rights of, 230, 240.

t

SALES,
frauds in. See FRAUD.
distinguished from bailmentl, 8M.

SALEM, OFFICIAL,
liability of officer for excessive, 898.
officer cnnuot purchase at, 891S.
SATISF.\.CTION,
of a joint wrong, when a judgment Ia, 186-188.
HCHOOL BOARDS,
wrongful action of, 288, 289.
authority of over books to be read in schools, 289.
liability of members to private suits, 412.
SCIENTER,
essential in fraud, 497.
exceptions, 4!l8-{i01.
in cases of injury by vicious animals. 340-848.
SCHIVENERS,
obligntions of good faith to employers, 628.
SEARCII W AHRANTS,
when allowed, 295.
requisites of, 295, 296.
SEA WEED,
common rights in, 866.
SEARCHES AND 8EIZUUES,
what unlawful, 21J4.
what lawful, 295.
SEDIMENTARY DEPOSITS,
way be nuis11nces, 569.
SEDu~l'ION,

of wife, suit by husband for, 223-226.
nction for charging, 227.
of daughter or servant, acLion for, 228-1811.
of wards, uction for, 236.
under promise of marriage, 510---li14.
SELECT~IE~.

when not liable to private suits, 410-419.
8EU' OEFENSE,
theory of rigllt of, 44.
right to use force in, 49, IW
SELF PHOTEC'TION,
batteries in are excused, 1M, 168.
against unlawful arrest, 165.
excessive force in, 169.
confinement of insane persons for, 1'l'7.
SEPARATE ESTATE,
of llllllried women, frauds respecting, ue.
SEPULTURE,
rights of, 230, 240.

745

746 mnnx.

746

INDEX.

SERVANT,

action for seduction of, 228-235.

for loss of services of, 241.

of corporation, liable for his own wrongs, 150.

cannot maintain trespass in respect to n1aster‘s goods, 437.

responsibility of master for injuries by, 531-564.

injuries by to fellow servant, master not liable for, 541-544.

except where master delegates his superintendence, 560, 563.

master liable to for his own negligence, 546-564.

except where servant also negligent, 563.

who to be deemed a servant, 531-533.

child is, of the parent. 533.

SERVICES.

of wife, right of husband to, 222-226.

of child, right of parent to, 228.

of ward, suit by guardian for loss of, 236.

of servant, suit by master for loss of, 241.

SHEEP.

trespasses by, 337-346.

statute for protection of, 347.

SHERIFF,

indemnity to, 131.
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adoption by party of acts of, 128-130.

to whom liable for wrongs, 132, 393-397.

joint liability with deputy, 135.

liability of to private suits, 381, 392.

where he levies on wrong property, 393.

where he fails to proceed with (1110 diligence, 893

where he suffers an escape, 393.

for not returning process, 394.

for false return, 394.

for not keeping property with due care, 394.

for disregarding exemptions, 395.

for abuse of process, 395.

for mistakes in service, 396, 397.

for disregarding liens, 397.

for action of deputies, 397.

cannot be purchaser at his own sales, 895.

cannot serve his own process, 191.

SIDEWALKS.

property in, 438.

liability for defects in, 625.

what are defects, 626.

SILENCE.

when fraudulent, 477-483.

when not, 476.

SKILLED WORKMEN,

liability of those who profess to be, 647, 650.

BLENDER.

SERVANT,
action for seduction of, 228-231S.
for loss of services of, 241.
of corporation, liable for his own wrongs, 1~.
cannot maintain trespass In respect to master's goods, 437.
responsibility of master for injuries by, 531-564.
injuries by to fdlow servant, master not liable for, Ml-S«.
except where master delegates his superintendence, ti60, GA.
master liaulc to for his own negligence, 546-564.
except where servant also negligent, 663.
who to be deemed a servant., 531-533.
child 18, of the parent. 533.

SERVICES,
of wife, right of husband to, 222--226.
of child, right of parent to, 228.
of ward, suit by gu1mllan for loss of, 236.
of aerviUlt., suit by muter for loss of, 241.

SHEEP,
trespasses by, 337 -846.
statute for protection of, 847.

SHERIFF,
indemnity to, 181.
adoption by party of acts of, 128-180.
to whom llaule for wrongs, 132, 893-897.
joint liability "fith deputy, 135.
Ual.JUity of to private suits, 381, 892.
where he levies on wrong property, 893.
where he fails to proceed with due diligence, 898
where he suffers an escape, 893.
for not returning process, 894.
for f11lsc return, 894.
for not keeping property with due care, UK.
for disregarding exemptions, 896.
for abuse of process, 89:>.
for mistakes in service, 896, 897.
for disregarding liens, 897.
for action of deputies, 897.
cannot. be purchaser at his own salea, 891.
cannot serve his own process, 191.

SIDEWALKS,
property in, 483.
liability for defects ln, 625.
what are defects, 626.

deﬂnition of, 193.

SILENCE,
when fraudulent, 477-488.
when not, 476.

SKILLED WORKMEN,
liability of those who profeaa t.o be. M7, 0150.

SUNDER,
detlnltioo of, 198.

INDEX. 747

IND.KX.

SLANDER — Continued.

747

two or more cannotjolntly commit, 124.

, publication of, what is, 193, 194. -

what words actionable per as, 195.

those imputing criminal offense, 196-200.

those imputing a

contagious or infectious disease, 200. 201.

those damaging as respects oﬂice or profession, 201.

those injurious to one in his business, 2J2, 203.

what not actionable par as, 203, 204.

special damages must be shown, 203, 204.

what words privileged,

See Pmvrnaoa or Sr-amen.

malice an ingredient in, 209.

truth as a defense to, 207.

what evidence suﬂicient to establish, 208, 209.

construction of words, 208.

liability for repeating, 220.

of property, 220.

of title, 221.

SMOKE.

nuisance of, 600.
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SOVEREIGNTY,

is not suable except by consent, 123.

tlainages by the. 688. ,

SPECIFLC PERFORMANCE,

of license to ﬂow lands, 312.

SPEECH. PRIVILEGE OF. See Pntvtnaoz or Season.

SLANDER- OontinU«l.
two or more canuotjolnt1y commit, 1M.
• publication of, what is, 193, 194.
what words actionable J¥7' u, 191S.
thusc imputing criminal offense, 196-200.
those imputing a contugious or infectious disease, 200, 201.
those uumaging 88 respects office or profession, 201.
those injurious to one in his busint·ss, 21.12, 208.
what not. actionuule p6r B6, 21.13, 204.
special dalDages must Ue shown, 203, 204.
what words privileged,
Bco PRIVILEGE O:J' 8PEBOB.
malice an ingredient in, 209.
truth as a dtfense to, 207.
what evidence sufficient to establish, 208, 209.
construction of words, 208.
liability for repeaUng, 220.
of property, 220.
of title, 221.

SMOKE.
nuisance of, 600.

SOVEREIGNTY,
is not suable except. by consent, 1t8.
damages by the, 688. •

SPEECHES.

privilege in publishing, 219.

SPORTS,

unintended injuries receiv

ed in are excused, 163.

unlawful, injuries received in, 151.

SPRING GUNS.

injuries by, 168, 169.

killing or injuring dogs by, 345.

STAGE COACH PROPRIETORS,

SPECIF~C PEUFOR~IANCE,

of license to flow lands, 812.

SPEECH. PRIVILEGE OF. See PJuvu.Be• o:r BPBKOB.
SPEECHES.
pa·ivilege in publishing, 219.

SPORTS,
unintended injuries received in are ucuacd, 168.
unlawful, injuries received in, 161.

SPRING UUNS,

are common carriers, 638.

STATUTES,

giving action for injuries from intoxicating drinks, 242-262.

for negligently. etc., causing death, 263-274.

STATUTORY DUTIES,

when action will lie for breach of, 650-658.

STEP CHILDREN,

position and rights of, 42.

STOCK IN CORPORATIONS,

statutory forfeiture of 652.

- STREET CAR,

entering when in motion, 671.

leaving by front instead of rear, 671.

STREETS. See HIGHWAYS.

injuries by, 168, 100.
killing or injuring dogs by, 841.

STAGE COACH PROPRIETORS,
are common carriers, 638.

STATUTES,
giving action for injuries from intoxicating drinks, 26-269.
· for negligently. etc., causing death, 2G3-274.

STATUTORY DUTIES,
Whl'n &ction will lie for breach Of1 650-658.

STEP CHILDREN,
position and rights of, 42.

STOCK IN CORPOUATIONS,
statutory forfeiture of

~a

• STREET CAR,
entering when in motion. 671.
leaving by front. Instead of rear, 671.
STREETS. See BIGIIWAYI.

748 A mmzx.

STRIKE

748

INDEX.

does not excuse cm-rier from liability, 640.

SUBJ.»\(JEN'I‘ SUPPORT,

removal of, 595.

SUBORDINATION,

of military to civil power. 299-

SUBORNIN G WITNESS.

action for, 212.

SUBTERRANEAN WATERS,

no action for drawing oﬂ', 580.

SUFFRAGE.

privilege oi‘, 36-37.

_ violation of rights of, 296-298.

SUNDAY LAWS.

no redress for injuries received in violating, 151-I59.

SUPERINTENDENCE,

delegation of by master, 560-563.

SUPERINTEN DENTS,

are fellow servants with subordinates, 544, 545. 562.

exceptions, 560463.

SUPERIOR OFFICER,

when command of is no protection to inferior, 174.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112103469740
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

SUPERVISORS.

linbility of to private suits, 892.

SUPPORT,

lateral, removal of, 594.

subjacent, removal of, 595.

SURETIES.

contribution between, 148.

frauds upon, 482, 483.

SURFACE WATER.

right to protect premises against, 5'74.

drawing oil‘, 575-580.

special levies to draw otf, 566.

right. to drain. 574-580. _

SURVEYOR OF HIGHWAYS.

liability of for improperly opening ditch, 652.

SWIN E,

trespasses by, 837-847.

TI

TAN N IGRY,

not per so a nuisance, 49.

TAXATION,

unequal, 292-294.

TAXES.

remedy for collection of, 658.

\.

STRIKE
does not excuse cnrrier from llabili&y, 6(().
SUBJ AVENT SUPPORT,
removal<•f, 1>05.
SUBOIWINATION,
of milit:u y to civil power, 299.
SUBOHNING WITNESS,
action for, 212.
SUBTERHANEAN WATERS,
no action for drawing oft', 380.
SUF.F'RAGE,
privilege of, 86-37.
.
violation of rights of, 296-298.
SVNDAY LAWS,
no re<lrcss for injuries received In violating, 151-159.
BU PE IUNTENDE:NCE,
delegation of by master, 5~.
SUPERINTENDENTS,
arc fellow servants with subordinates, 644, M:S. 562.
cxecptions, 560-568.
SUPERIOR OFFICER,
when command of is no protection te inferior, 17f.
SUPEIWISOUS.
linbility of to private suits, sn.
SUPPORT,
lateral. removal of, 594.
subjacent, removal of, 5911.
SURETIES,
contribution between, 148.
frlluds upon, 482, 483.
SURFACE WATER.
right to protect premises against, M4.
clrawing off, 575-580.
t!pecial levies to draw off, 566.
right to druin. 574-580.
SURVgYOR OF HIGHWAYS,
liability of for improperly opening ditch, 652.
SWINE,
trespasses by, 837-847.

T.
TANNERY,
not '[1m' • a nutsanco, 49.
TAXATION,
unequal, 292-294.
TAXES,
remedy for collection of, 658.

INDEX.

INDEX.

749

TAXING OFFICERS,

liability of to private suits, 898, 402.

TEACHER,

libel of, 205. '

lawful restraint of pupil by, 171, 172.

refusal by to instruct, 283.

wrongful punishments by, 288.

TELEGRAMS.

liabilities for errors iu, 687.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES,

are not common carriers, 646.

are responsible for negligence, 646.

may make rules for their business, 647.

instances of valid rules, 647.

cannot by contract preclude liability for negligence, 687.

TEN A NT,

rights of in ﬁxtures, 429-432.

in growing crops, 433-435.

liable for continuing a nuisance, 608-612.

TENANT IN COMMON.

possession of one is possession of all, 827.
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disseizeu by one, 327.

wrongs by to co-tenant, 327.

injuries to possession of, 328.

conversion ‘by, 455.

TENANT AT WILL,

possession of, 326.

THEATERS,

right to attend, 285.

ticket to, is a license, 306.

THREATS,

- are not assaults, 29.

duress by, 506, 507.

TIDEWATERS,

ﬁsheries in, 831.

TIM BER.

when cutting of is waste, 333.

sale of standing, 306.

’l‘l'l"LE,

fraudulent misrepresentation of, 492.

slander of, 221.

by accession. 55, 56.

TOLLS.

remedy for collection of, 653.

TRADE MARKS,

what are, 359-864.

protection in use of. 360.

piracy of, 360, 364, 865.

fraudulent, 864.

'fAXING OFFICERS,
liability of to private auir.a, 898, a
TEACHER,
libel of, 203.
lawful restraint of pupil by, 171, 173.
refusal by to instruct, 288. ·
wrongful punishments by, 288.
TELEGUAM8,
liabilities for errors in, 687.
TEL.I':GRAPH COMPANIES,
arc not common carriers, 646.
are responsible for negligence, 648.
mlly make rules for their business, 647.
instances of valid rules, 647.
CIUlnot by contract preclude liability for negligence, 68'1.
TENANT,
righta of in .Oxtures, 429-482.
in growing crops, 433-483.
Iiab!e for continuing ~ nuisance, 608-612.
TENANT IN COM!ll>N,
possession of one is possession of all, 82'l.
disseizen by one, 827.
wrongs by to CO-tenant, 827.
injuries to possession of, 828.
conversion ·by,~.
TENANT AT WILL,
possession of, 826.
THEATEHS,
right to attend, 28:S.
ticket to, is a license, 808.
THHEATS,
are not assaults, 29.
duress by, 006, GO'l.
TIDEWATERS,
fisheries in, 331.
TIMBER,
when cuUing of Is waste, 888.
~le of standing, 806.
TITLE,
fraudulent misrepresentation of, 489.
~>Iauder of, 221.
by accession, M, M
TOLLS,
remedy for collection of, 6t58.
TRADE MARKS,
what are, M9--3M.
protection in use of, 880.
piracy of, 860, 8M, sa.
fraudulent, SM.

749

750 nvnnx.

TRAVEL, UNLAWFUL,

750

INDEX.

injuries received in will not support action, 151-159

TREES, GROWING,

sale of, 306.

TRESPASS,

by domestic animals, 337.

by dogs, 341-348. '

by animals not usually domesticated, 340.

by beasts in highway, 339.

by animals, keeper liable for, 340, 345.

by beasfs escaping when being driven, 341.

by vicious animals, 341-348.

by wild beasts kept by an owner, 348-350.

in breaking into dwelling, 314-317.

ab inilio, what is, 316, 317.

in disturbing possession, 322.

does not give possession, 824.

by landlord upon tenant, 326, 327.

in hunting, 328, 329.

in ﬁshing. 329-332.

by inanimate objects. B32.

distinguished from waste,_332.
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assaults in resisting, 165-168.

foreign, remedies for, 470-472.

assumpsit will not lie for, 90-96.

- by relation, 95, 96.

TRESPASS T0 PERSONALTY,

what it consists in, 436.

who may be wronged by, 436.

by intruder on mere possession, 437.

in taking wood cut by trespasser, 438.

may be unintentional, 438.

in person or by another, 439.

by animals, 439. '

implied force in case of, 439.

injury of must be direct, 439, 441. .

in case of beasts. 441.

remedies in case of, 441.

TRESPASSER,

oﬁieer is, who breaks into dwelling. 314-317.

ob 1'nz‘tz'o when one may become, 316, 317.

not entitled to protection against dangers on grounds trespassed

upon, 660

TRIAL, RIGHT OF,

general rule as to, 291.

TROVER. Sec Couvaaston.

TRUSTEES,

frauds by, 523.

cannot deal in subject-matter of trust for their own advantage, 523-525.

_'§__,?|—

TllAVEL, UNLAWFUL,
Injuries received lD will not support action, 11Sl-11S9
TREES, GROWING,
sale of, 306.
TRESPASS,
by domestic animals, 887.
by dogs, 341-348.
by animals not usually domesticated, 840.
by beasts In highway; 839.
by animals, keeper liable for, 840, ~.
by beas:s escaping when being driven, M1.
by vicious animals, 841-348.
by wild bea9ts kept by an owner, 8~0.
In breaking into dwelling, 814-817.
ab initiQ, what is, 816, 817.
In disturbing possession, 822.
does not give possession, 824.
by landlord upon tenant, 826, 827.
In hunting, 828, 329.
In fishing. 329-382.
by inanimate objects, 889.
distinguished from waste•. ssa.
assaults in resisting, 165-168.
foreign, remedies for, 470-479.
a:;sumpsit will not lie for, 90-96.
by relation, 95, 96.
TRESPASS TO PERSONALTY,
whnt it consists in, 436.
who may be wronged by, 436.
by intruder no mere possession, 487.
in taking wood cut by trespasser, 488.
may be unintentional, 438.
ln person or hy another, 439.
by nnimnls, 439.
Implied force in case of, 439.
Injury of must be direct, 439, 441.
In case of beasts. 441.
remedies in case of, 441.
THESPASSER,
officer is, who hreaks into dwelling, 814-81'7.
ab i1~itio when one may become, 316, 817.
not entitled lo pt"otcction against dangen on grounds trcspaased
upon. f>GO
THIAL, RiGHT OF,
general rule as to, 291.
THOVER. Sec CONVBRBION.
TUUSTEES,
frauus by, 52R
cannot deal in subject-matter of trust for their own advantage, 5~

nwnx. 761

TRUSTS,

751

INDEX.

oﬂicial, 375.

TRUTII,

is a defense to a suit for defamation, 207.

must be specially pleaded, 207.

what evidence required to establish, 208.

must be proved as laid, 209.

TUG BOATMEN.

whether common carriers. 638.

TURNPIKE GATE,

maliciously enabling travelers to avoid, 690

U.

U N CHASTITY,

imputation of, whether actionable, 199, 202, 204.

TRUSTS,
oftlclal, 875.
TRtiTH,
Is a defense to a suit for defamaUoo, 00'7.
must be specially pleaded, 207.
what evidence required to establish, 208.
must be proved as laid, 209.
TUG BOATMEN,
whether common carriers. 688.
TURNPIKE GATE,
mwiciously enabling travelers to aYolcJ. 690

of woman before marriage, 238

UNINTENTIONAL TRESPASS,

cases of, 438.

UNRULY ANIMALS,

u.

trespasses by, 345.

USAGES,

how far they constitute the common law, 14.

V.
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VENDOR.

not obliged to disclose defects to purchaser, 476.

except where articles bought for speciﬁc purpose, 479.

as in case of sale of provisions, 479.

or food for cattle, 480.

what amounts to warranty by, 480, 481, 490.

expressions of opinion by, are not frauds, 483, 485.

UNCHASTITY,
imputation ot, whether actionable, 189, D, 2M.
of woman before marriage, 238
UNINTENTIONAL TRESPASS,
cases of, 438.
UNRULY ANIMALS,
trespasses by, W.
USAGES,
bow far they constitute the common law, 16.

exceptions, 484.

false statements respecting boundaries are frauds, 485.

false promises may be frauds, 486, 487.

sale by of property at a distance, 488.

is not excused for frauds by vendee‘s negligence, 401.

VERMONT,

action for injury by sale of liquors in, 259.

VI(‘lOUS ANIMALS,

injuries by, 840-848.

right to kill, B46.

VIGILANCE.

duty of self-protection hy, 476, 491.

fraudulent representations which disarm, 488.

VOLUNTARY SERVICES.

liability for negligence in case of, 650.

v.
VENDOR.
not obliged to disclose defects to purchaser, 476.
except where articles bought for specific purpoee,
u ln case of sale of provisions, 479.
or food for cattle, ~.
what amounts to warranty by, 480, 481, 400.
expressions of opinion by, aro not frauds, 483, 4811.
exceptions, 484.
false statements respecting boundaries are frauds, 48!S.
false promises may be frauds, 486, 487.
sale by of property at a uistunce, 488.
is not excused for frauds by vendee's negligence, -'01.
VEHMONT,
1\Ction for injury by sale Of Jlquora in, 259.
VICIOUS ANIMALS,
Injuries by, 840-848.
right to kill, 846.
VIGILANCE,
duty of self-protection by, 478, 491.
frnuclulent n>prescntations which disarm, 488.
VOLUNTARY SERVICES,
liability for negligence In case of, 6ISO.

•'Jt.

752 INDEX.

752

INDEX.

VOLUNTARY SOCIETIES,

wrongs to, 7,- 8.

VOTERS. See Euwrons.

W.

WAIVER,

VOLUNTARY SOCIETIES,
wrongs to, 71 8.

VOTERS. Bee ELBOTOu.

of tort, 91-96, 112.

WARD,

W.

frauds by guardian upon, 525,

See Guannux. '

WARN ING8,

neglect of railway companies to give, 657.

WARRANT. .

of commitment for contempt, 425.

See PROCESS.

·WAIVER,
of tort, 91-96, 111.
WARD,
frauds by guardian upon, ~26,

Bee GUARDUJI.

WARRANTY,

implied in case of provisions, 479, 480.

in sale of property at a distance, 488.

positive assertions constitute, 499.

false, is a fraud, 90, 500.

WASTE.

deﬁnition of, 332.

how it differs from trespass, 832.
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is voluntary or permissive, 338.

modiﬁcation of law of, 333.

what amounts to, 833-336;

by mortgngeor, 335, 336.

WATER COURSE.

boundaries on, 319.

extending erections into, 821.

use of for rafting, 321.

right to use of, 577-580.

what is, 578.

rights in not gained by appropriation, 581.

rights of bank proprietors, 582.

diversion of, 583.

use of must be reasonable, 583-586.

water in must not be unreasonably detained, 584.

or diminished, 585.

or fouled, 587.

lands must not be ﬂooded by, 585.

diversion of under statutory authority, 653.

damage presumed from injury to, 66-68.

agreement to change, when binding, B09.

WATER» PIPES,

nuisance of leakage of, 570.

WEAK IN TELLECTS,

frauds upon, 515.

_ _-'—-=-W

WARNINGS,
neglect of railway companlca to give, 85'1.
WARRANT.
of commitment for contempt, 4215.
Bee PRocB88.

WARRANTY,
implied in caae of provisions, 479, 480.
in sale of property at a distance, 488.
positive as~ertions constitute, 499.
false, ia a fraud, 90, 600.

W.A.BTE,
detlnition of, 889.
how it differs from treapaaa, 831.
is voluntary or permissive, 838.
modification of law of, 388.
what amounts to, 838-38&
by mortgageor, 833, 886.
WATER COURSE,
boundarica on, 819.
extending erections into, m.
use of for raning, 821.
right to use of, 677-580.
w bat is, 678.
rights in not gained by appropriation, G81.
rights of bank proprietors, 682.
diversiou of, 683.
use of must be reasonable, ~.
water in must not be unreasonably detained, 584.
or diminisllcd, ~.
or fouled, 587.
lands must not be flooded by, 583.
diversion of under statutory authority, 8158.
damage presumed from injury to, ~
agreement to change, when binding, 809.
WATEH PIPES,
nuisance of leakage of, G'lO.
WEAK INTELLEG'TS,
frauds upon, 615.

_ INDEX.

INDEX.
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WEAPONS.

attempts to use when assaults, 160, 161.

WEREGILD,

WEAPONS,
attempts to use when assaults, 160, 161.

former provisions for, 26.

WEST VIRGINIA.

WEREGILD,
former provisions for, 26.

action ft)!‘ injury by sale of liquors in, 260.

WHARFM ASTER,

WEST VIRGINIA,
action for injury by sale of liquors in, 260.

liability of to private suits, 412.

WHISTLES, STEAM,

WHARFMASTER,
liability of to private suits, 412.

frightening horses by, 671.

WIFE,

WHISTLES. STEAM,

right to support, 38.

frightening horses by, 671.

abandonment of husband, 38.

assaults upon by husband, 223

WIFE,
right to support, 88.
abandonment of husband, 38.
assaults upon by husband, 228
remedies for wrongs to, 22'7.
suit by for seduction of daughter, 284.
Bee F.t.XILY RIGHTS; llusB.um.

remedies for wrongs to, 227.

suit by for seduction of daughter, 234.

See FAMILY Riorrrs; Ilusnsm).

WILD ANIMALS,

property in, 435.

owner of must restrain at his peril, 348-350.

fright of horses by, 350, 618.

WILD ANIMALS,
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WILLS,

property in, 43li.
owner of mu.;t restrain at his peril, 848--8lSO.
fright of horses by, 850, 618.

right of parent to give property by, 41.

WISCONSIN,

action for injury by sale of liquors in, 261.

WITNESS.

privile;-,'c of, 211, 212. _

when may be liable for malicious prosecution, 186, 187.

WORDS,

never constitute an assault, 29, 161.

norjustify a battery, 167.

WORKMEN, ‘

WILLS,
right of parent to give property by, 41.

WISCO:NSIN,
action for injury by sale of liquors in, 261.

WITNESS.
privilc.~e of, 211, 212.
when may be liable for malicious prosecution, 186, 187.

responsible for skill they assume to possess, 647.

undertake for their own good faith and integrity, 648.

WORKS OF NECESSITY AND CHARITY,

what are, 153-155.

WORSHIP.

disturbance of, 602.

freedom of, 38, 34, 290.

WRONG-DOER, .

how one may become a, 60.

when may not retake his property, 52.

WORDS,
never constitute an assault, 29, 161.
nor justify a battery, 167.

WORKMEN,
responsible for skill they assume to poBSe88, 847.
undertake for their own good fllith and integrity, 648.

WORKS OF NECESSITY AND CHARITY,
what are, 153-155.

WORSHIP,

joint liability of, 124-159, 187.

contribution between, 147-149.

indemnity between, 144-147.

not liable to each other, 152-159.

separate liability of, 183, 134.

WRONG-DOING.

injuries sustained in, no redress for, 151-159.

disturbance of! 602.
freedom of, 83, 34, 200.
WRONG-DOER.
how one may become a, 60.
when may not retake his property, 52.
joint liability of, 124-15!), 187.
contribution between, 147-149.
indemnity between, 144-147.
not liable to each other, 162-159.
separate liability of, 183, 13!.
WRONG-DOING,
injuries sustained in, no redress for, Ust-159.

'158

7 54 mnnx.

WRONGS,

754

INDEX.

general classiﬁcation of, 2.

breaches of contract distinguished from, 2.

in law, may not be wrongs in morals, 3.

in morals, may not be wrong in law, 4-.

public, what are, 6.

public, may be private also, 7.

to aggregate bodies, 6, 7, 8.

joint what are, 8.

damage presumed in. 62-68.

proximate cause in, 68-77, 679. 683-

when damage must be averred, 69.

joint, when are, 78-80.

accidents are not, 80. 629, 665. 672.

exercise of rights are not, 81, 688.

distinguished from crimes, 81-90, 97.

distinguished from breaches of contracts, 90, 95, 97.

waiver of, 91-95.

by relation, 95, 96. ‘

committed in person, 60.

by agency of another, 61, 531.

may be joint or several, 61, 124.
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merely intended, are not actionable, 61, 693.

elements of, 62.

who liable for in general, 97-99.

lunatics may be liable for, 99.

reasons for this, 100-103.

damages in suits against, 102.

infants are liable for, 97, 103.

when their intent important, 104.

in what eases not liable. 105, 106.

as owners of lands, 106.

' not liable where the real ground of action is a contract,

106-113.

drunkards are liable for, 103, 114.

under duress, 115.

by married women, 115-118.

by corporations, 119-123.

aﬂecting personal security. 160-195.

of slander and libel, 193-221.

to family rights, 222-274.

in respect to civil and political rights, 275-301.

in respect to real property, 802-336.

committed by animals, 337-350.

aﬂecting incorporeal rights, 351-874.

by ministerial and administrative ofﬂcers, 375-402.

by judicial otﬁeers, 403-425.

in respect to personal property, 426-472.

by deception, 473-506

by duress, 506, 507.
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WRONGS,
general classification of, 2.
breaches of contract distinguished from, 2.
in law, may not be wrongs in moral~, 8.
in morals, may not be wrong in law, 4.
public, what are, 6.
public, may be prlv11te also, 7.
to aggregate bodies, 6, 7, 8.
joint what arc, 8.
damage presumed in, 6~.
proximate cause in, 68-77, 679. 683·
when damage must be averred, 69.
joint, when are, 78-80.
accidents are not, 80, 629, 665, 672.
exercise of rights are not, 81, 688.
distinguished from crimes, 81-90, 97.
distinguished from breaches of contracts, 90, 95, 97.
waiver of, 91-95.
by relation, 95, 96.
committed in person, 60.
by agency of another, 61, 531.
may be joint or se~·eral, 61, 124.
merely intended, are not actionable, 61, 693.
elements of, 62.
who liable for in general, 97-99.
lunatics may be liable for, 99.
reasons for this, 100-103.
damages in suits against, 102.
infants are liable for, IJ7, lOS.
when their intent important, 10!.
in what cases not linblc, 105, 106.
as owners of lands, 106.
not liable where the real ground of action is a contract,
106-113.
drunkards are liable for, 103, 114.
under duress, 115.
by married women, 115-118.
by corporations, 119-123.
affecting personal security, 160-195.
of slander and libel, 193-221.
to family rights, 222-274.
in respect to civil and political rights, 275-301.
in respect to real property, 302-336.
committed by animals, 337--350.
affecting incorporeal rights, 351-374.
by ministerial and administrative officers, 375-402.
by judicial officers, 403-425.
in respect to personal property, 426-472.
by deception, 473-506
by duress, 506, 507.
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WRONGS — Continual.

in conﬁdential relations, 508-530.

when master liable for, 531-564.

of nuisance, 565-627.

from neglect of conventional duties, 628-650.

from neglect of statutory duties, 650-658.

of negligence generally, 659-687.
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inﬂuence of motive in making out, 688-694.

WRONGS- Oontintud.
in confidential relations, 508-530.
when mi\Ster liable for, 531-564.
of nuisance, t:iM-627.
from neglect of conventional duties, 628-650.
from .neglect of statutory duties, 65~8.
of negligence generally, 659-687.
influence of motive in making on~ 688--694.
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